

# **Lecture 2: One Parameter Models**

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# Announcements


- Reading: Chapter 3, Hoff
- Homework due: October 18, at midnight

+ Submit homework1.Rmd and  
homework1.Pdf only

- Office Hours
- Quizzes

# Bayesian Inference

- In frequentist inference,  $\theta$  is treated as a fixed unknown constant
- In Bayesian inference,  $\theta$  is treated as a random variable
- Need to specify a model for the joint distribution

$$p(y, \theta) = p(y | \theta)p(\theta)$$


# Bayesian Inference in a Nutshell

*New*

- ① The *prior distribution*  $p(\theta)$  describes our belief about the true population characteristics, for each value of  $\theta \in \Theta$ .
- ② *Same deal as before.* Our *sampling model*  $p(y \mid \theta)$  describes our belief about what data we are likely to observe if  $\theta$  is true.
3. Once we actually observe data,  $y$ , we update our beliefs about  $\theta$  by computing the posterior distribution  $p(\theta \mid y)$ . We do this with Bayes' rule!

# Bayes' Rule

$$P(A | B) = \frac{P(B | A) \overset{P(A)}{\cancel{P(A)P(B)}}}{P(B)}$$

- $P(A | B)$  is the conditional probability of A given B
- $P(B | A)$  is the conditional probability of B given A
- $P(A)$  and  $P(B)$  are called the marginal probability of A and B (unconditional)

# Bayes' Rule for Bayesian Statistics

Updated Belief

likelihood / sampling

$$P(\theta | y) = \frac{P(y | \theta)P(\theta)}{P(y)}$$

Prior distribution

- $P(\theta | y)$  is the posterior distribution
- $P(y | \theta)$  is the likelihood
- $P(\theta)$  is the prior distribution
- $P(y) = \int_{\Theta} p(y | \tilde{\theta})p(\tilde{\theta})d\tilde{\theta}$  is the model evidence

Hard to choose.

$$P(\theta | y) \propto P(y | \theta)P(\theta)$$

B/C  $\frac{1}{P(y)}$  is constant in  $\theta$

# Bayes' Rule for Bayesian Statistics

$$P(\theta | y) = \frac{P(y | \theta)P(\theta)}{P(y)}$$
$$\propto P(y | \theta)P(\theta)$$

- Start with a subjective belief (prior)
- Update it with evidence from data (likelihood)
- Summarize what you learn (posterior)

**The posterior is proportional to the likelihood times the prior!**

# Example: Estimating COVID Infection Rates

- We need to estimate the prevalence of a COVID in Isla Vista
- Get a small random sample of 20 individuals to check for infection

$\theta$  true  
population frac.  
that's infected.  
 $Y \sim \text{Bin}(20, \theta)$



$\theta_{MLE} = \frac{Y}{20}$  . What about Bayes?




## Example: Estimating Infection Rates

- $\theta$  represents the population fraction of infected
- $Y$  is a random variable reflecting the number of infected in the sample
- $\Theta = [0, 1]$     $\mathcal{Y} = \{0, 1, \dots, 20\}$
- Sampling model:  $Y \sim \text{Binom}(20, \theta)$

# Example: Estimating Infection Rates

Sampling  
model  
 $P(Y|\theta)$




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## Example: Estimating Infection Rates

- Assume *a priori* that the population rate is low
  - The infection rate in comparable cities ranges from about 0.05 to 0.20
- Assume we observe  $Y = 0$  infected in our sample
- What is our estimate of the true population fraction of infected individuals?

# Example: Estimating Infection Rates




# Table of Relevant Quantities

# Bayesian vs Frequentist

- In frequentist inference, unknown parameters treated as constants
  - Estimators are random (due to sampling variability) *Y*
  - Asks: what would I expect to see if I repeated the experiment?"  
*(counterfactual world)*

# Bayesian vs Frequentist

- In frequentist inference, unknown parameters treated as constants
  - Estimators are random (due to sampling variability)
  - Asks: what would I expect to see if I repeated the experiment?"
- In Bayesian inference, unknown parameters are random variables.
  - Need to specify a prior distribution for  $\theta$  (not easy)
  -  Asks: "what do I *believe* are plausible values for the unknown parameters given the data?"
  - Who cares what might have happened, focus on what *did* happen by conditioning on observed data.  $P(\theta|y)$

# Example: estimating shooting skill in basketball

- On November 18, 2017, an NBA basketball player, Robert Covington, had made 49 out of 100 three point shot attempts.
- At that time, his three point field goal percentage, 0.49, was the best in the league and would have ranked in the top ten all time
- How can we estimate his true shooting skill?
  - Think of "true shooting skill" as the fraction he would make if he took infinitely many shots

$$\hat{\theta}_{MLE} = \frac{49}{100} = .49$$



# Example: estimating shooting skill in basketball

- Assume every shot is independent (reasonable) and identically distributed (less reasonable?)
- Let  $Y \sim \text{Bin}(\overset{=100}{n}, \theta)$  where  $\theta$  corresponds to his true skill
- Frequentist inference tells us that the maximum likelihood estimate is simply  $\frac{y}{n} = 49/100 = 0.49$
- What would our estimates be if we use Bayesian inference?
  - What properties do we want for our prior distribution?

$$P(\theta|y) \propto P(y|\theta)P(\theta)$$

$$\theta \in [0, 1], \quad P(\theta) > 0 \text{ for all } \theta \in [0, 1]$$

# Cromwell's Rule

The use of priors placing a probability of 0 or 1 on events should be avoided except where those events are excluded by logical impossibility.

If a prior places probabilities of 0 or 1 on an event, then no amount of data can update that prior.

I beseech you, in the bowels of Christ, think it possible that you may be mistaken.

--- Oliver Cromwell

# Cromwell's Rule

Leave a little probability for the moon being made of green cheese; it can be as small as 1 in a million, but have it there since otherwise an army of astronauts returning with samples of the said cheese will leave you unmoved.

--- Dennis Lindley (1991)

If  $p(\theta = a) = 0$  for a value of  $a$ , then the posterior distribution is always zero, regardless of what the data says

$$p(\theta = a|y) \propto p(y|\theta = a)p(\theta = a) = 0$$

# Example: estimating shooting skill in basketball

- Assume every shot is independent (reasonable) and identically distributed (less reasonable?)
- Let  $Y \sim \text{Bin}(n, \theta)$  where  $\theta$  corresponds to his true skill
- Frequentist inference tells us that the maximum likelihood estimate is simply  $\frac{y}{n} = 49/100 = 0.49$
- What would our estimates be if we use Bayesian inference?
  - If our prior reflects "complete ignorance" about basketball?
  - What if we want to incorporate prior domain knowledge?

Uniform?  $p(\theta) \propto \mathbb{1}[\theta \in [0, 1]]$



$$P(\theta|y) \propto L(\theta)P(\theta)$$

$$\text{Unif: } P(\theta) \propto \mathbb{1}[\theta \in [0,1]]$$

$$L(\theta) \propto \theta^y (1-\theta)^{n-y}$$

$$P(\theta|y) \propto \theta^y (1-\theta)^{n-y} \mathbb{1}[\theta \in [0,1]]$$

$$\int_0^1 k \theta^y (1-\theta)^{n-y} d\theta = 1 \quad \text{Beta Distribution}$$

$$P(\theta|y) = \text{Beta}(\quad, \quad)$$


# The Binomial Model

- The uniform prior:  $p(\theta) = \text{Unif}(0, 1) = \mathbf{1}\{\theta \in [0, 1]\}$ 
  - A "non-informative" prior
- Posterior:  $p(\theta \mid y) \propto \underbrace{\theta^y (1 - \theta)^{n-y}}_{\text{likelihood}} \times \underbrace{\mathbf{1}\{\theta \in [0, 1]\}}_{\text{prior}}$
- The above posterior density is a density over  $\theta$ .

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- The above posterior density is a density over  $\theta$ .
- $p(\theta \mid y) \sim \text{Beta}(\underline{y + 1}, \underline{n - y + 1}) = \frac{\Gamma(n)}{\Gamma(n-y)\Gamma(y)} \underbrace{\theta^y (1 - \theta)^{n-y}}_{\substack{// \\ k}}$

# Example: estimating shooting skill in basketball



Posterior is proportional to the likelihood



# Summarizing Posterior Results

- An entire distribution describes our beliefs about the value for  $\theta$ . How can we summarize these beliefs?

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- *Point estimates*: posterior mean or mode:
  - $E[\theta \mid y] = \int_{\Theta} \theta p(\theta \mid y) d\theta$  (the posterior mean)
  - $\arg \max_{\theta} p(\theta \mid y)$  (*maximum a posteriori* estimate)

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- Posterior variance:  $\text{Var}[\theta | y] = \int_{\Theta} (\theta - E[\theta | y])^2 p(\theta | y) d\theta$



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- $\arg \max p(\theta | y)$  (*maximum a posteriori* estimate)

- Posterior variance:  $\text{Var}[\theta | y] = \int_{\Theta} (\theta - E[\theta | y])^2 p(\theta | y) d\theta$
- Posterior credible intervals: for any region  $R(y)$  of the parameter space compute the probability that  $\theta$  is in that region:  $p(\theta \in R(y))$

*Random* *constant*