

Macroeconomic Theory - Competitive Equilibrium

Chien-Chiang Wang

November 8, 2021

Outline

- ✓ ▶ So far, we have studied the centralized economy (planner's problem.)
- 之前 学习过 ▶ However, there is no market, there is no price, there is no interaction between agents in the economy
- ✓ ▶ The social planner's economy is like a home production economy
- ✓ ▶ In competitive equilibrium, firms produce, households work and invest capital
2 agents!
- Now! ▶ Households take salary, interest return, and dividend payment, and the income is used to purchase goods from firms
- ✓ ▶ We study the decentralized, market economy in this lecture

Sequential Trading Equilibrium

Environment

- ▶ There are mass one households and mass one firms
- ▶ A household holds capital and make capital accumulation decisions
- ▶ Each household also own one unit of labor force in each period: $n = 1$
- ▶ A household supplies labor and rents capital
- ▶ Firms are capital and labor demanders


Environment

- ▶ Firms produce output following the production function $F(k, n)$
- ▶ Household owns the share of firms
- ▶ In the planner's economy, we consider that households work for their own firms

$$f(k) = F(k, 1)$$

↳ 之前假设我是 100% 全投入

Economic Models



Firms

- ▶ Households are identical. Firms are also identical.
- ▶ It is sufficient to analyze the representative household and the representative firm
- ▶ We assume that the firm's goal is to maximize profit. It is given by,

$$\max_{k_t, n_t} F(k_t, n_t) - \underbrace{r_t k_t}_{\text{Cost of the input}} - \underbrace{w_t n_t}_{\text{Cost of the input}}$$

First order conditions:

$$r_t = F_k(k_t^*, n_t^*)$$

$$w_t = F_n(k_t^*, n_t^*)$$

- ▶ The function $F(k, n)$ is homogeneous of degree one (constant returns to scale).

$$F(ak, an) = aF(k, n) \quad (1)$$

for all k, n

Firms

透過對 a 微分求極值

？不怪這個 a 在幹啥？
這就是為了把 k_t, n_t

- Take derivative w.r.t. a on both side of (1): 兩句串在一起，就先用 a 造出連按兩句的式

$$F_k(ak, an)k + F_n(ak, an)n = F(k_t, n_t)$$

Let $a = 1$:

$$F_k(k, n)k + F_n(k, n)n = F(k_t, n_t)$$

- The firms' profit:

$$\begin{aligned}\pi &= F(k_t^*, n_t^*) - r_t k_t^* - w_t n_t^* \\ &= F_k(k_t^*, n_t^*)k_t^* + F_n(k_t^*, n_t^*)n_t^* \\ &\quad - r_t k_t^* - w_t n_t^* \\ &= 0\end{aligned}$$

門結果，會互消

公司不可能獲利
本來要把公司獲利拿給家戶
(∴ 持有股份)

- Therefore, we will neglect to include dividend payment in the consumer's budget constraint

但股利一定是 0，
就不用特地加一個内生變數

Households

- Households own labor and capital:

$$\begin{aligned} & \max_{c_t, k_{t+1}} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t u(c_t) \\ & \text{subject to} \quad c_t + x_t = w_t + r_t k_t \\ & \quad k_{t+1} = (1 - \delta) k_t + x_t \\ & \quad k_{t+1} \geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

Handwritten note: 假设 $n=1$, 全投入工作 (Assume $n=1$, all labor is invested in work)



$$\begin{aligned} & \max_{c_t, k_{t+1}} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t u(c_t) \\ & \text{subject to} \quad c_t + k_{t+1} - (1 - \delta) k_t = w_t + r_t k_t \\ & \quad k_{t+1} \geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

Transversality Condition

- The finite horizon lagrangian:

BC.

$$L = \sum_{t=0}^T \beta^t \left\{ u(c_t) + \lambda_t \left\{ -[c_t + k_{t+1} - (1-\delta)k_t] \right\} + \mu_t k_{t+1} \right\}$$

$$c_t : u'(c_t) = \lambda_t$$

$$k_{t+1} : \lambda_t = \beta \lambda_{t+1} [r_{t+1} + (1-\delta)] + \mu_t$$

$$k_{T+1} : \lambda_T = \mu_T$$

反馈

- We must have $\mu_t = 0$ for $t < T$; because otherwise $\mu_t > 0$ implies that $k_{t+1} = 0$, and by the firm's problem, $r_{t+1} = f'(f_{t+1})$ will be infinite (not well-defined).

Transversality Condition

- complementary slackness

$$\beta^T \mu_T k_{T+1} = 0$$

$$\Rightarrow \beta^T \lambda_T k_{T+1} = 0$$

$$\Rightarrow \beta^T u'(c_t) k_{T+1} = 0$$

Let $T \rightarrow \infty$

$$\text{TVC : } \lim_{T \rightarrow \infty} \beta^T u'(c_T) k_{T+1} = 0$$

Households

Definition

①

A sequential markets equilibrium is a sequence of prices $\{w_t, r_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$, allocations for the representative household $\{c_t, k_{t+1}^s\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$, and allocations for the representative firm $\{n_t^d, k_t^d\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$, such that

1. Given k_0 and $\{w_t, r_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$, allocations $\{c_t, k_{t+1}^s\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ solve the household maximization problem
2. Given $\{w_t, r_t\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$, allocations $\{n_t^d, k_t^d\}_{t=0}^{\infty}$ solve the firm's maximization problem for $t \geq 0$
3. Markets clear: for all $t \geq 0$

$$\begin{aligned} n_t^d &= 1 && \rightarrow \text{Labor mkt} \\ k_t^d &= k_t^s && \rightarrow \text{Capital mkt} \\ F(k_t^d, n_t^d) &= c_t + \underbrace{k_{t+1}^s - (1 - \delta)k_t^s}_{\pi_t} && \rightarrow \text{Good mkt} \end{aligned}$$

Market Clearings

- Recall that

$$f(k) = F(k, 1)$$

- Constant returns to scale implies that

$$F(k_t, 1) = F_k(k_t, 1)k_t + F_n(k_t, 1) \leftarrow \text{p8}$$

- Recall that $f(k_t) = F(k_t, 1)$, then

FOC

$$r_t = F_k(k_t, 1) = f'(k_t)$$

$$\begin{aligned} w_t = F_n(k_t, 1) &= \frac{F(k_t, 1) - F_k(k_t, 1)k_t}{1} \leftarrow \text{43页} \\ &= \frac{f(k_t) - f'(k_t)k_t}{1} \end{aligned}$$

- Substitute r_t and w_t into the household's budget constraint

$$c_t + k_{t+1} - (1 - \delta)k_t = \frac{w_t + r_t k_t}{\text{把上面求出的 } w_t, r_t \text{ 代入}} = f(k_t) \leftarrow \text{即可得}$$

Households

- By the first order condition of the household's problem

Euler: $\beta^t u'(c_t) = \beta u'(c_{t+1}) [f'(k_{t+1}) + (1 - \delta)]$ ← p10 整理得到

- By market clearing condition and household's budget constraint

$$f(k_t) = k_{t+1} - (1 - \delta)k_t + c_t$$

- By TVC

$$\lim_{T \rightarrow \infty} \beta^T u'(c_T) k_{T+1} = 0$$

- By the nonnegativity constraints

$$c_t \geq 0$$

$$k_{t+1} \geq 0$$

- The equilibrium conditions are exactly the same as in the social planner's problem → 基本福利定理: CE = PO