

# Problem Set 4

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## Answer 1.

Since a continuous preference relation has a continuous representation, say  $u$ . Notice that  $[0, 1]$  is compact, so it attains its maximum. Let the maximum be  $x^*$ .

Suppose that  $a < b \leq x^*$ , we have  $x^* \succsim a$  by assumption on  $u$  and so  $b \succ a$  by strong convexity. The other side is similar.

## Answer 2.

Denote  $\succsim$  be the preference on the space. Let  $S = \{s > 0 | (0, s) \succsim (1, 0)\}$ . We discuss the problem by the behavior of  $S$ .

1.  $S = \emptyset$ :

We have that  $\forall s \in \mathbb{R}^+$ ,  $(0, s) \prec (1, 0)$ . Let  $\succsim_1$  be the preference with respect to the first commodity and  $\succsim_2$  be the preference with respect to the second commodity. We claim that the preference for this case is the lexicographic preference  $\succsim'$  induced by  $\succsim_1$  and  $\succsim_2$ .

Let  $(x_1, y_1), (x_2, y_2)$  be two different bundle. W.L.O.G, we suppose that  $(x_1, y_1) \succ' (x_2, y_2)$ . It suffices to prove that  $(x_1, y_1) \succ (x_2, y_2)$

(1)  $x_1 > x_2$ :

By quasi-linearity on the first commodity,  $(x_1, y_1) \succ (x_2, y_2)$  iff  $(x_1 - x_2, y_1) \succ (0, y_2)$ . Next, by homotheticity,  $(x_1 - x_2, y_1) \succ (0, y_2)$  iff  $(1, \frac{y_1}{x_1 - x_2}) \succ (0, \frac{y_2}{x_1 - x_2})$ . Moreover,  $(1, \frac{y_1}{x_1 - x_2}) \succ (1, 0) \succ (0, \frac{y_2}{x_1 - x_2})$  is known by strict monotonicity and assumption that  $S = \emptyset$ .

(2)  $x_1 = x_2, y_1 > y_2$  ::

By quasi-linearity on the first and the second commodity,  $(x_1, y_1) \succ (x_2, y_2)$  iff  $(0, y_1 - y_2) \succ (0, 0)$ , which is straightforward by strict monotonicity.

2.  $S = (0, \infty)$ :

We have that  $\forall s > 0$ ,  $(0, s) \succ (0, \frac{s}{2}) \succsim (1, 0)$ . Hence  $\forall s > 0$ ,  $(\frac{1}{s}, 0) \prec (0, 1)$ .

Thus,  $\forall t \in \mathbb{R}^+$ ,  $(0, 1) \succ (t, 0)$ . With a similar argument in  $S = \emptyset$ , we know that  $\succsim = \succsim'$ , where  $\succsim'$  is the lexicographic preference induced by  $\succsim_2$  and  $\succsim_1$ .

Notice that by strict monotonicity, if  $S \neq \emptyset, (0, \infty)$ , then  $S = (m, \infty)$  or  $[m, \infty)$  for some  $m > 0$ .

3.  $S = (m, \infty)$ :

We know that  $(0, m) \prec (1, 0)$  and for every  $\epsilon > 0$ ,  $(0, m + \epsilon) \succ (0, m + \frac{\epsilon}{2}) \succsim (1, 0)$ .

Rewrite tuple  $(x, y)$  as triple  $(x, y, x + \frac{y}{m})$ .

Let  $\succsim_3$  be the preference represented by the utility function  $u(x, y) = x + \frac{y}{m}$ . We claim that  $\succsim$  is the lexicographic preference induced by  $\succsim_3$  and  $\succsim_1$ . Notice that the lexicographic preference satisfies strict monotonicity, quasi-linearity and homothecity.

By quasi-linearity on two commodities, it suffices to check the relation between  $(a, b), (0, 0)$ , where  $(a, b) \neq (0, 0)$  and  $(a, 0), (0, b)$ , where  $a, b \neq 0$ . The first case is trivial.

For the second case, by homothecity, it suffices to check  $(1, 0)$  and  $(0, t)$ . One is easy to check the lexicographic preference meets  $\succsim$ .

4.  $S = [m, \infty)$  and  $(0, m) \succ (1, 0)$ :

We have  $(0, n) \prec (1, 0)$  if  $n < m$ . Hence we have  $(0, 1) \succ (\frac{1}{m}, 0)$  and  $(0, 1) \prec (t, 0)$  if  $t > \frac{1}{m}$ . Notice that it just interchange the first and the second entry on the case  $S = (m, \infty)$

Therefore, the preference is the lexicographic preference induced by  $\succsim_3$  and  $\succsim_1$ .

5.  $S = [m, \infty)$  and  $(0, m) \sim (1, 0)$ :

We claim that  $\succsim_3$  is the preference  $\succsim$ . To see this, notice that  $\succsim_3$  is homothetic, strictly monotone and quasi-linear on two commodities.

With the same trick in 3., it suffices for us to check  $(0, t)$  and  $(1, 0)$ . Done!

**Answer 3** One needs more benefit to give up same quantity of some commodity when one has less such commodity.

(1  $\implies$  4) Let  $(x_1, x_2) \sim (x_1 - \epsilon, x_2 + \delta_1) \sim (x_1 - 2\epsilon, x_2 + \delta_1 + \delta_2)$ .

We have, by 1,  $(x_1 - \epsilon, x_2 + \frac{\delta_1 + \delta_2}{2}) \succsim (x_1 - 2\epsilon, x_2 + \delta_1 + \delta_2)$ .

By strong monotonicity,  $\frac{\delta_1 + \delta_2}{2} \geq \delta_1 \implies \delta_2 \geq \delta_1$ .

(4  $\implies$  1) Suppose 4, by continuity, it suffices for us to prove that  $x \succsim y \implies \lambda x + (1 - \lambda)y \succsim y$  for all  $\lambda \in \mathbb{Q}$ .

Let  $\lambda = \frac{p}{q}$  and  $(x_1, x_2) \succsim (y_1, y_2)$  be different bundles. We want to show that  $\lambda(x_1, x_2) + (1 - \lambda)(y_1, y_2) \succsim (y_1, y_2)$

(1)  $x_1 \geq y_1, x_2 \geq y_2$ : Straightforward by monotonicity.

(2)  $x_1 > y_1, x_2 < y_2$ : For simplicity, write  $x = (x_1, x_2)$  and  $y$  in similar manner. For  $\theta \in [0, 1]$ , there exists  $\theta x \sim y$ . For each  $n = 1, \dots, q - 1$ , there exists  $\alpha_n$  such that  $(\frac{q - n}{q}\theta x_1 + \frac{n}{q}y_1, \alpha_n) \sim \theta x \sim y$

since  $(\frac{q-n}{q}\theta x_1 + \frac{n}{q}y_1, 0) \precsim y$  and  $(\frac{q-n}{q}\theta x_1 + \frac{n}{q}y_1, y_2) \succsim x$ . Notice that

$$\alpha_1 - \theta x_2 \leq \alpha_2 - \alpha_1 \leq \alpha_3 - \alpha_2 \leq \cdots \leq y_2 - \alpha_{q-1} \Rightarrow \alpha_n \leq \frac{q-n}{q}(\theta x_2) + \frac{n}{q}y_2$$

Therefore,  $\lambda x + (1-\lambda)y \succsim \lambda \theta x + (1-\lambda)y \succsim (\frac{q-n}{q}\theta x_1 + \frac{n}{q}y_1, \alpha_n) \sim y$ .

(3)  $x_1 < y_1, x_2 > y_2$ : Similar to (2).

#### Answer 4

Notice that  $(0, \dots, 0, x_i, 0, \dots, 0) \sim (\alpha_i x_i, 0, \dots, 0)$  by reducing the problem to  $K = 2$  with commodity 1 and commodity  $k$ . We have

$$(0, x_2, 0, \dots, 0) \sim (\alpha_2 x_2, 0, \dots, 0) \Rightarrow (x_1, x_2, \dots, x_K) \sim (x_1 + \alpha_2 x_2, 0, x_3, \dots, x_K)$$

for some  $\alpha_i > 0$  by quasi-linearity on all commodities. Similarly,

$$\begin{aligned} (x_1, x_2, \dots, x_K) &\sim (x_1 + \alpha_2 x_2, 0, x_3, \dots, x_K) \\ &\sim (x_1 + \alpha_2 x_2 + \alpha_3 x_3, 0, 0, x_4, \dots, x_K) \sim \cdots \\ &\sim (x_1 + \alpha_2 x_2 + \alpha_3 x_3 + \cdots + \alpha_K x_K, 0, \dots, 0) \end{aligned}$$

By strong monotonicity, the preference can be represented by  $\sum_{k=1}^K \alpha_k x_k$ , where  $\alpha_1 = 1$ .

#### Answer 5

Let  $T = \{t_2 + \cdots + t_K | (0, t_2, \dots, t_K) \succ (s, 0, \dots, 0), \forall s > 0\}$ . Suppose that  $T \neq \emptyset$ , let  $m = \inf T$ . Depending on whether  $m \in T$ , we discuss it in two parts.

1.  $m \in T$ :

Let  $m = \sum_{k=2}^K m_k$  and  $(0, m_2, \dots, m_K) \succ (s, 0, \dots, 0) \forall s > 0$ . Notice that  $(1, 0, 0, \dots, 0) \prec (0, m_2, \dots, m_K) \prec (1, m_2, \dots, m_K)$ . So there exists some  $\lambda \in (0, 1)$  such that  $(1, \lambda m_2, \dots, \lambda m_K) \sim (0, m_2, \dots, m_K)$  by continuity.

Since  $\sum_{k=2}^K \lambda m_k = \lambda m < m = \inf T$ , there exists some  $s^* > 0$  such that  $(s^*, 0, \dots, 0) \succsim (0, \lambda m_2, \dots, \lambda m_K)$ .

Hence  $(s^* + 1, 0, \dots, 0) \succ (0, \lambda m_2, \dots, \lambda m_K)$  by strict monotonicity in commodity 1 and

$$(s^* + 2, 0, \dots, 0) \succ (1, \lambda m_2, \dots, \lambda m_K) \sim (0, m_2, \dots, m_K)$$

by quasi-linearity in commodity 1. It leads to a contradiction.

2.  $m \notin T$ :

For all  $n \in \mathbb{N}$ , we have  $y_n = (0, t_{n2}, \dots, t_{nK})$  with  $\sum_{k=2}^K t_{nk} < m + \frac{1}{n}$  and  $y_n \succ (s, 0, \dots, 0)$  for all

$s > 0$ .

Notice that  $y_n \in [0, m+1]^K$  for all  $n$ . Hence, there exists a converge subsequence. W.L.O.G, let  $y_n$  converges to  $L$ . Let  $L = (L_1, L_2, \dots, L_K)$ . Easy to see that  $L_1 = 0$  and  $L_2 + L_3 + \dots + L_K = m$ . We have some  $(s^*, 0, \dots, 0) \succsim L$  and so  $(s^* + 1, 0, \dots, 0) \succ L$ . By continuity, there exists an neighborhood  $B$  of  $L$  such that  $y \in B \Rightarrow y \prec (s^* + 1, 0, \dots, 0)$ , which contradicts to  $y_n \rightarrow L$ .

Combining the two argument, we know that  $T = \emptyset$ , and there exists some  $v((0, x_2, \dots, x_K))$  for  $x_2, \dots, x_K$  such that

$$(0, x_2, \dots, x_K) \sim (v((0, x_2, \dots, x_K)), 0, \dots, 0)$$

by continuity. Moreover, let  $v((x_1, x_2, \dots, x_K)) = x_1 + v((0, x_2, \dots, x_K))$ , then the statement is proven by quasilinearity in commodity 1.

## Answer 6

a.

$$\begin{aligned} (a_J, c_{-J}) \succ (b_J, c_{-J}) &\iff \sum_{i \in J} v_i(a_i) + \sum_{k \notin J} v_k(c_k) \geq \sum_{i \in J} v_i(b_i) + \sum_{k \notin J} v_k(c_k) \\ &\iff \sum_{i \in J} v_i(a_i) \geq \sum_{i \in J} v_i(b_i) \\ &\iff \sum_{i \in J} v_i(a_i) + \sum_{k \notin J} v_k(d_k) \geq \sum_{i \in J} v_i(b_i) + \sum_{k \notin J} v_k(d_k) \\ &\iff (a_J, d_{-J}) \succ (b_J, d_{-J}) \end{aligned}$$

b. We have  $v_1(a) + v_2(b) \geq v_1(c) + v_2(d)$  and  $v_1(c) + v_2(e) \geq v_1(f) + v_2(b)$ .

Adding these two, we have

$$v_1(a) + v_2(b) + v_1(c) + v_2(e) \geq v_1(c) + v_2(d) + v_1(f) + v_2(b)$$

Hence,  $v_1(a) + v_2(e) \geq v_1(f) + v_2(d)$  and thus,  $(a, e) \succsim (f, d)$ .

c. Consider the preference relation represented by  $u(x, y) = x + xy^2 + y$ . It satisfies condition S clearly since it only has two variables. However, it is not separated. This can be seen by  $(5, 2) \succsim (0, 27), (0, 7) \succsim (1, 2)$  but  $(5, 7) \prec (1, 27)$ , contradicting Hexagon-condition.

## Answer 7

a. It is not differentiable since the improvement direction is not open, but it should be if it is differentiable.

b. The indifference curves are straight lines.

To see this, pick any bundle  $x$  and pick  $y$  which  $y - x$  is perpendicular to  $v(x)$ . Notice that  $y \succsim x$  since  $y \notin D_{\succsim}(x)$ . If  $\delta \dot{v}(x) > 0$ , then  $((y - x) + \delta) \dot{v}(x) = \delta \dot{v}(x) > 0 \Rightarrow y + \delta \succ x \succ y \Rightarrow v(y) = v(x)$ . Hence, by symmetry  $y \succsim x$ , which proves that the indifference curve is a straight line and moreover, perpendicular to  $v(x)$  for  $x$  on the curve.

c.  $\subseteq$ : If not, say there exists some  $d \in D(x)$  such that  $x - d \succ x$ . Notice that, by convexity,  $x - \lambda d \succ x$  for  $\lambda \in (0, 1)$ . Since  $-d \dot{v}(x) < 0$ , there exists  $\delta$  with  $\delta_k > (-d)_k$  on every entry  $k$  but  $\delta \dot{v}(x) < 0$ . We have  $x + \lambda \delta \succ x - \lambda d \succ x$ , so  $\delta$  is an improvement direction, which contradicts to differentiability.

For the rest of the problem, consider the preference represented by  $u(x, y) = xy$ , the direction that perpendicular to  $v$  is in  $E$  but not in  $-D$ .

d. It is not continuous since  $(\frac{1}{n}, \frac{3}{2}) \sim (\frac{1}{2} + \frac{1}{n}, \frac{1}{2})$  but  $(0, \frac{3}{2}) \succ (\frac{1}{2}, \frac{1}{2})$ .

However, it is differentiable. It suffices to check the case that  $x_1 + x_2 = 1$  and not hard to see that  $\delta_1 + \delta_2 > 0$  iff  $x + \delta \succ x$ . Hence  $v(x_1, x_2) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{2}}(1, 1)$ , done!