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The Political Events
in the
Republic of Indonesia



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The Political Events in the Republic of Indonesia

*A Review of the Developments in the Indonesian Republic
(Java and Sumatra) since the Japanese surrender.*

Together with Statements by the
Netherlands and Netherlands Indies
Governments, and Complete Text of
the Linggadjati Agreement.

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Part I



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Chapter 1

General Character of the Republic

A review of the revolution and the establishment of the Republic of Indonesia in Java and Sumatra must of necessity begin with the question whether the revolution has been the product of purely Japanese machinations or whether there have been more realistic and more deep-lying causes. It is difficult to give a conclusive answer to this question. It is generally conceded that it would be unfair to look on the revolution as exclusively "made in Japan." Long before the war, a nationalist movement had sprung up in the Indies which, although vague in its ultimate aims and limited in the number of its adherents, had taken root among several groups of intellectuals who wished a relationship with The Netherlands different from the one then in existence.

On the other hand it is equally certain that the Japanese made a skilful and intensive use of the prevailing nationalist tendencies and fitted them into their plans to make the situation for the Allies, after their capitulation, as difficult as they could. Equally certain it is that the delay in the arrival in Java of Allied forces after the Japanese surrender enabled the Japanese to develop their scheme for disruption even further. There is little doubt that these well-conceived Japanese plans were part of a far-seeing policy envisaging at some future date a return conquest of the Indonesian isles.

But whether the revolution is the culmination of gradually developed nationalist tendencies or the explosive effect of Japanese strategems, it is incontestable that the viewpoints and methods of the Republican Administration are a Japanese heritage. The Republican leaders tried to imitate a pattern without comprehending its limitations, with the result that they adopted only its bad points and were incapable or unwilling to develop the good sides this pattern might conceivably have had. To make matters worse, many contributing factors set their fateful seal on the record of failure and impotence displayed so far by the Republican leadership.

First of all, Republican insistence on authority over an extensive territory, without sufficient competent personnel to carry out their tasks, resulted, as it was bound to result, in widespread inefficiency and lack

of responsibility. The majority of the newly, and often self-appointed, functionaries, many of whom stood intellectually but little above the masses, relied exclusively on armed force and consequently the burden of authority and its attending life of luxury became too heavy for them to bear.

Corruption became more and more a general practice. Of cooperation between the various services and departments there was none. Society became disorganized—sinister elements saw their chance for murder and plunder, acquired a number of followers and gradually increased their own power under the emblem of patriotism. And so the Republic, founded on a perverted nationalism, could maintain itself only by hiding the truth, to the world and to itself. This is the more tragic because the possibilities toward a more favorable development were certainly not lacking in the beginning.

An enthusiastic beginning

Undeniably, the Indonesian people had become fully carried away by the currents of nationalism generated by a group of sincere intellectuals and left no doubt that they would no longer accept Netherlands sovereignty. At first, the aims of these Republican leaders were well calculated: before everything else, they wanted to take over complete authority and concentrate it in one central organization. They set to work with great enthusiasm and soon achieved the aims for which they had set out. With the majority of officials who had served under the Dutch and the Japanese remaining at their posts, the Republic made a good start and ere long assumed the aspects of a real state, as yet incomplete but definitely on its way toward a well-functioning organization.

In the course of the next few months, however, certain changes became apparent. There was no lowering of enthusiasm but the Republic's initial and unexpected success created an atmosphere of self-satisfaction and security which soon changed into a conviction that the exercise of authority was after all a very pleasant and not too difficult occupation. The obligations that go with authority were taken lightly. The number of mistakes and wrong judgments increased, without creating any incentive for corrective measures. Thoughts of reconstruction gave way to more revolutionary ideas.

Within six months, the development of the Republic toward political unity had come to a standstill, while elements of dissolution and confusion widened their inroads into all sections of government. Toward the latter part of 1946 these disintegrating elements gained more and

more influence, although externally the Republic appeared to pursue the consolidation of the country's unity.

Disillusion and discontent

Symptoms of ineptitude and failure multiplied. Efforts to maintain law and order, to extend the government's authority, to bring efficiency to the various departments, grew more and more feeble and finally came to a halt. Disillusion followed disillusion, yet the outside world was allowed to see nothing except a facade of success and infallibility. Only the Indonesian people themselves, and especially the intellectual groups among them, could not be kept in the dark as to the true conditions. When the Republican Government found it impossible to meet even the normal demands of a well-organized state, discontent spread through all layers of the populace, and especially among the intellectuals, and although it was held in check through fear of reprisals, it could not be silenced completely. A few intellectuals, who formerly had worked in the various departments of the Netherlands Indies Government, sought contact with Dutch friends, disregarding the danger to which they exposed themselves in doing so. Yet, even though these intellectuals longed desperately for some method to cleanse the young Republic of its evil outgrowths, they were well aware that the building of a real opposition party within the Republic was impossible, not only because of threats and fear, but also because of political inexperience on the part of those opposed to the regime.

The recent Netherlands military action and the subsequent occupation of Republican areas have brought to light much of the drama that has been and still is being enacted behind the curtain of propaganda surrounding the Jogjakarta regime. Some of this material will be presented in the following pages.

Chapter 2

Netherlands Policy in Indonesia

A brief resume of the Netherlands policy with regard to the political status of Indonesia, before, during and after the war, will clarify the confusing picture of events in that area. The Dutch policy of reform dates back to the beginning of this century when the concept of moral obligation toward "colonial" peoples was embodied in all legislation concerning the Indies. Among the advanced steps taken in the years before the war were the establishment and subsequent extension of the "Volksraad" (People's Council) for Indonesia, the elimination of the word "colonies" from the Netherlands constitution, and the formation of a commission to study political reforms.

The basic concept of autonomy for the Indies was propounded for the first time by Queen Wilhelmina in her address of December 6, 1942: "I visualize," the Queen said, ". . . a Commonwealth in which The Netherlands, Indonesia, Surinam and Curacao will participate, with complete self-reliance and freedom of conduct for each part regarding its internal affairs, but with the readiness to render mutual assistance." If this message about the future political status of the Indies could have penetrated the Japanese wall and been spread among the Indonesian peoples, events in the Indies might well have taken a different course. But the Republicans were cut off from the outside world and they remained isolated long after the Japanese surrender—even to this day.

The British interregnum

For, although Netherlands sovereignty over Indonesia was recognized by both the United States and Britain, authority over these areas was placed in the hands of the Commander-in-Chief of the British troops sent to disarm the Japanese. The British Commander did not side with either the Dutch or the Indonesians; he confined himself to occupying a few enclaves—Batavia, Bandung, Semarang, Surabaya—and from there tried to maintain contact with the rest of Java which was in the hands of the Republicans. The same situation prevailed in Sumatra where only Medan, Palembang and Padang were occupied by the

British, while the remaining territory was left under Republican authority.

It is only natural that the Republicans construed this British policy as a recognition of their authority. In any case, the British decision not to intervene gave the Republicans a strong weapon with which to consolidate their position and to convince the masses that Great Britain recognized the Republic.

Entirely different was the situation in territories outside Java and Sumatra. In July, 1946, the Allied Command returned to the Netherlands Government the authority over Borneo, Celebes and all the other islands east of Java. Long before, discussions with leaders of the numerous population groups in these islands had proved that there, too, the desire for independence was uppermost in the people's thoughts. It was therefore decided to call a conference of delegations from the various areas to discuss their future political status. As it was impracticable to have the delegates to this conference chosen through organized elections, representatives from all layers of the population were called together at Malino, near Macassar (Celebes), where from July 16 to 25, 1946, the groundwork was laid for the transformation of the former Netherlands East Indies into a Federation, in which the Republic (Java and Sumatra), East Indonesia and Borneo are to be equal partners.*

The "Malino Territories"

As soon as the Conference was concluded, an immediate start was made with the political and economic reconstruction of the various territories in Borneo and East Indonesia which have since then been known as the "Malino Territories." In December, 1946, the first autonomous state, that of East Indonesia, became an actuality following the Conference of Denpasar (island of Bali). Elections were held by democratic methods which for centuries have been in use in the Archipelago. Adult men in the villages voted for a "committee of electors" by various systems, sometimes using colored sticks dropped into election boxes, elsewhere grouping themselves around their candidate. The "committee of electors" in turn voted for the representatives to the Parliament.

The State of East Indonesia since then has developed with rapid strides and is steadily progressing under a government program approved by its own Parliament. The civil administration and the police,

*See map on inside back cover.

public health and lower and secondary education are all carried out by the Government of East Indonesia.

Discussions are now under way between Netherlands and East Indonesian authorities for a written agreement giving a legal form to the existing accord between The Netherlands and the State of East Indonesia.

Progress is also being made in the preparation for the establishment of the future State of Borneo. The province of West Borneo, by the signing of the West Borneo statute on May 12, obtained autonomy and formed its own administration. It has, therefore, the right to take part in the formation of the United States of Indonesia and the establishment of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union before the State of Borneo is created.

In South Borneo, the provinces of Great Dayak and *Borneo Tenggara* (Southeast Borneo) have already been established, while on August 26, the first meeting took place of the federal council of East Borneo. The only area which is retarding the formation of the State of Borneo comprises the section of Banjarmasin and Hulu Sungai, where, partly as the result of terror and intimidation by infiltration from the Republic, no free elections have as yet taken place.

Chapter 3

The Negotiations

The Linggadjati Agreement, which was to have settled the dispute between The Netherlands and the Republic (Java and Sumatra), was initialed on November 15, 1946, and signed on March 25, 1947—almost two years after the Japanese capitulation. The responsibility for the protracted duration of the negotiations leading to the Agreement did not lie entirely with the Republicans. The Dutch people, engrossed in the problem of repairing the tremendous damage caused by the German occupation of their own country, suddenly saw themselves confronted with another problem, far more perplexing than that of their own rehabilitation.

Progressive attitude in The Netherlands

For centuries, the Dutch had identified themselves with the concept of Holland and the Indies as one country, and although they were conscious of an urgent need for reforms in the overseas territories, they were, for a long time, unable to realize the full extent of the changes that had taken place in Indonesia.

Nevertheless, it cannot be stressed sufficiently that once the idea of independence for Indonesia and of a completely altered relationship between the two countries had taken hold of the popular mind, the vast majority ranged itself behind the progressive parties in Parliament who saw in an independent Indonesia and a Dutch-Indonesian Union the one solution beneficial to both the Indonesians and the Dutch. And it must be stated with equal emphasis that the final failure of the negotiations is due to factors that have their origin exclusively in the Republic. It has indeed become a question whether the Republican regime has ever desired any agreement or has ever given serious consideration to any sort of cooperation with The Netherlands.

As for the Netherlands Government, even though it clung to its first ideals for one and a half years, it did not hesitate to change its viewpoints whenever these clashed with the new mental attitude of the Indonesian world. Yet, although such changes were always to the advantage of the Republicans and often conflicted with former ideals, the Republic

construed them as a policy of concessions. And so the Republic came to believe that, if only it were to hold out long enough, the Dutch would give in to any demand whatever. That, to the Dutch, the Linggadjati Agreement was the farthest limit beyond which they could not go, this the Republic refused to see. To its leaders the Agreement was merely a written confirmation of their conquests over the Dutch, a halting point on the road to further victories and to complete elimination of the Dutch. The entire course of events after the signing of the Agreement proves that the Republican leaders never had any other intention than to evade its consequences systematically and persistently.

Discord in Jogjakarta

It must not be lost sight of that the Republic has never functioned as a single unit. There was a symbol—"100 per cent *Merdeka* (Liberty)"—behind which were ranged many different groups, each with its own self-interests. Since most of these groups commanded their own armed troops, the Republican Government dared take no action that any of them might repudiate. This was best demonstrated during the negotiations between the Netherlands and Republican delegations, when every point approved of by the Republicans had to be submitted for approval to "the interior," that is to say, for the approval of various groups and persons. Among these persons and groups are the self-appointed functionaries who are abusing their positions for their personal benefit; persons and groups who are exploiting the enterprises and possessions that were confiscated by the Japanese from their legal owners; groups—as are to be found in every revolutionary period—who simply look on the present chaos as an opportunity for looting, arson and worse.

Under such conditions, and dealing with a Republic incapable of carrying out its responsibility for the maintenance of law and order, it became apparent that no conclusive result would ever be achieved. As for the large masses, these stand entirely outside the conflict. Even though the Republican movement has undoubtedly given these masses more self-assurance, they do not carry sufficient weight with the Republican leadership to consider them as an important factor in the conflict. The overwhelming majority consists of small farmers who wish nothing better than to be left alone and to cultivate their fields. Certainly, nothing is farther from their minds than to mingle in politics at Jogjakarta or to make an effort to rid themselves of a government of which it stands in awe and fear.

Chapter 4

Review of Negotiations from May 27 to July 20, 1947

The salient feature of the negotiations between the Netherlands and Republican delegations since the signing of the Linggadjati Agreement is the curious fact that two Republican Prime Ministers, on two separate occasions, expressed their virtually complete adherence to the proposals of the Netherlands Government, only to be repudiated within a matter of hours by the destructive forces in Jogjakarta.

On June 23, Prime Minister Sjahrir made a broadcast, meeting to a large extent the Netherlands proposals; the next day, in Jogjakarta, he was forced to resign.

His successor, Prime Minister Sjarifoeddin, on July 15 accepted the draft agreements submitted by the Netherlands Indies Government; the next day he went before the microphone and rejected the proposals.

Implementing the Linggadjati Agreement

The series of negotiations started on May 27, 1947, two months after the signing of the Linggadjati Agreement, when the Netherlands Commission-General sent to the Republican delegation a Memorandum summarizing the minimum conditions that would make execution of the Agreement possible. These conditions were:

1. The first application of article 15 of the Agreement concerning the reorganization of the Netherlands Indies Government into a central apparatus of the future federation and the establishment of organs for cooperation with the supreme government in The Netherlands,

2. The arrangement of foreign relations.

3. Military cooperation to bring about complete cessation of hostilities, restoration of law and order, reconstruction of defense for Indonesia and reduction of the military forces.

4. The solution of the most important economic problems.

5. The determination of the relation to, and of the cooperation with, parts of Indonesia not belonging to the Republic of Indonesia, and of the

inclusion of the Dutch-occupied territories of Java and Sumatra in the Republican territory.

The Republicans reply, sent on June 8, was deemed unsatisfactory, as the Commission-General made clear in its Memorandum of June 20. The main reasons were:

a. The Republic's proposals for reform and adaptation of the Netherlands-Indies Government actually did not mean reform but elimination.

b. The Republican proposals regarding foreign relations aimed at immediate diplomatic representation of their own during the period of transition, for which there is no ground in the Linggadjati Agreement.

The Republican reply, sent on June 8, was deemed unsatisfactory, did not go beyond stating that Netherlands assistance should be limited to the supply of equipment and "if necessary" of advisers.

d. Cooperation in the field of economics, as suggested by the Commission-General in their proposals of May 27, would be invalidated completely.

c. As to the other problems mentioned in the Note of May 27, it was clearly shown that the Republic never intended completely and loyally to apply the principals of Linggadjati.

Premier Sjahrir resigns

On June 23, Premier Sjahrir made a radio speech on his own authority in which the Netherlands proposals were met to a large extent. The next day, Sjahrir departed for Jogjakarta but was unsuccessful in getting his proposals approved. He was thereupon forced to resign.

Meanwhile, the Netherlands Government had, on June 20, forwarded an aide memoire to the Republican Premier in which the urgency of accepting the proposals of May 27, was once more stressed. President Soekarno who, after the fall of the Sjahrir Cabinet, had centralized all power in his own person, replied to this aide memoire without, however, opening up any new points of view.

The situation had now reached a rather critical stage and at that moment the United States Government intervened by forwarding, on June 26, an aide memoire to the Republican Government. This aide memoire offered a last chance to the Republican Government to demonstrate to the world and to the parties concerned, how far its readiness for agreement on the principles of Linggadjati and for the execution of those principles really existed.

A further Netherlands contribution was made simultaneously by the Netherlands Government in a new memorandum summarizing the essential points of the Netherlands proposals made on May 27. This time, however, a number of clear and distinct deeds were demanded of the Republican Government, which were as follows:

Dutch demand deeds, not words

a. Total cessation of hostilities, including an end to the construction of fortifications, the lifting of the food blockade and the discontinuation of destruction, as well as the halting of all actions against the territories of Indonesia outside the Republic.

b. Cessation of negotiations respecting foreign relations and the elimination of organizations and functions incompatible with the conditions laid down in the Linggadjati Agreement.

c. Dissolution of organizations and the withdrawal of functionaries maintaining a pretense that Republican authority extended to territories of Indonesia outside the Republican territory.

Amir Sjarifoeddin, the new Republican Premier, replied to this letter on July 5, but he did not attain the extent of agreement of Sjahrir's speech of June 20. Then, upon request, Dr. van Mook granted permission to two Republican Ministers to travel to Jogjakarta to draw up a more acceptable reply. These Ministers returned on July 8, with a reply which, for the first time, was not entirely unsatisfactory. Points of view were approaching each other more closely.

Overnight reversion

On July 15, discussions were reopened. Two draft agreements were submitted on this occasion by the Netherlands Indies Government.

Minister Amir Sjarifoeddin and his colleagues accepted both drafts during these discussions, which were characterized by a cordial and hopeful atmosphere. The deadline for the cessation of hostilities was fixed at 23.59 hours, July 16, but not until after the Republican delegation had been consulted about the feasibility of this demand. The delegation admitted that it was possible to issue orders to that effect on extremely short notice. As a matter of fact, orders had already been issued in some areas. Sjarifoeddin's confidence in the success of the latest discussions was demonstrated by the letter he wrote to Dr. van Mook in which he called on the Netherlands Indies Government for assistance in the execution of the agreements, since it might be impossible for the

Republican troops to withdraw from the demarcation lines through lack of transport.

To everybody's great astonishment, Sjarifoeddin came on the air via radio Jogjakarta on the night of July 16, and emphatically rejected the Netherlands proposals, which he had accepted on July 15. This meant another demonstration of the impotence of the constructively-minded Republicans to stand up against the destructive elements in Jogjakarta.

Official Republican statements of later date prove unequivocally that Jogjakarta neither wanted to accept the Netherlands proposals concerning safety in the interior, nor would agree to the required clear and overt acts.

The Republican Minister Susanto and three of his colleagues submitted again a number of counter-proposals on July 17. However, these were quite out of line with the original Netherlands proposals. The Netherlands Government was thereupon compelled to take other measures.

Chapter 5

Propaganda in the Republic

On October 21, 1946, during the negotiations which led, three weeks later, to the initialing of the Linggadjati Agreement, a Joint Publicity Commission was established by the Netherlands and Republican delegations. Its aim was to create a mutually favorable atmosphere; official publications on both sides were to avoid all political agitation. The Dutch lived up strictly to this agreement and refrained from any propaganda except to stress the grave necessity for cooperation in the reconstruction of the country. It was different on the Republican side.

There was, for example, the announcer of the Republican radio station in Batavia who each day sent out the official communiques of the Republican Department of Information—and often added stories of his own invention to the official newscast; stories that always were harmful to the Dutch and influenced the political situation. Upon complaints from the Netherlands side the Department “reprimanded” the announcer, who nevertheless continued his practices.

The same anarchy was noticeable in the Republican press, where no one paid any attention to the instructions, requests and pleas from the Republican Department of Information to help, or at least not to hinder, the activities of the Joint Publicity Commission. Every rumor, no matter how silly, was exploited, if only it could be used as anti-Dutch propaganda. This went on until March 25, 1947, the day the Linggadjati Agreement was signed. Thereafter, there was a brief interlude of quiet, but it did not last long before radio and press resumed their former tone of aggression. Besides, Dutch publications were hardly ever permitted in Republican territory, while local commanders forbade the inhabitants to listen to non-Republican broadcasts.

The Republican radio speaks

The Linggadjati Agreement was less than three weeks old when, on April 13, 1947, the notorious Soetomo, better known as “Boong” (Comrade) Tomo, appeared before the Republican microphone and made known his new “battle program.” This program consisted of two points:

1. “continued training in guerilla warfare for the people,” and

2. "psychological preparation of the people against a war of nerves from outside."

Not a word about the Agreement. The reaction of the Republican Government expressed itself in peculiar form: "Boong" Tomo was made a lieutenant-general in the new national army.

Here is another excerpt from a Republican broadcast sent out *after* the signing of the Linggadjati Agreement:

Radio Republic Besuki. April 12, 1947—"With the signing of the Linggadjati Agreement the struggle for the Indonesian people is not yet ended; it has merely entered a new phase. The people are summoned to assume a stronger attitude against threatening aggression." And again: "The Banjuwangi district of the Masjoemi (principal Islam party) recently held a meeting summoning the people to revive their battle spirit, to struggle unitedly against Article 14 of the Linggadjati Agreement, and also to continue practicing guerilla warfare."

Most of the broadcasts aim at sowing doubts in the minds of the listeners as to the sincerity of The Netherlands regarding the execution of the Linggadjati Agreement. Others give fantastic stories of cruelties committed by Dutch troops in the occupied areas. Such is the method followed by the Republican radio, official and non-official, to prepare the people in Java and Sumatra for cooperation with the Dutch. Nowhere has there been a single constructive word, everything has been negation.

Day after day, the Republican broadcasts are directed to the people at home, to the Indonesians in the Dutch-held areas, to the territories of Borneo and the state of East Indonesia. Not an opportunity is missed to ridicule the Dutch, to present them as exploiters. Radio plays, sports talks, religious addresses, everything is filled with anti-Dutch propaganda.

Republican newspapers rouse hatred

The Republican press is no different. It gets its news from the official communiques of the Republican Department of Information and from telegrams sent out by the Republican press bureau "Antara." Especially "Antara", in the short time of its existence, has become known for its unreliability. It never checks on the reports it receives, any rumor finds a place in its wire services.

Many of the Republican newspapers published in the Dutch-occupied areas receive their paper through Dutch distribution channels. But this does not prevent them from joining the anti-Dutch propaganda campaign

which is led from the Republican capital. The following are recent items from these papers:

"Do you know, readers, that . . . in Batavia many Dutch soldiers steal merchandise because their pay is insufficient?" (*Berita Indonesia*, May 17, 1947.)

"After the official signing of the Linggadjati Agreement, the Dutch do not say much but they act so much the more. They do not care whether their actions are in conflict with the Agreement. There are many examples to show in what crude, provocative and sly manners the Hollanders obstruct the desire for peace and cooperation." (*Rajat*, May 17, 1947).

"Netherlands political activities are intended to make us lose our patience and to force us into unreasonable actions . . ." (*Socara Oemoem*, May 19, 1947).

"During the negotiations the Hollanders looked only after their own interests. But the Indonesians, too, have their demands. The most important factor is the unity of the Lasjkars (irregular troops). As long as this unity exists, Indonesia will be able to conquer the Netherlands without using force. The Dutch have made some proposals, but they do this only to confuse the Indonesians." (*Kedaulatan Rajat*, May 13, 1947).

"If the Hollanders are willing to listen to our reasonable demands, we'll get down to brass tacks. But if it must go the other way, pitting our strength against each other, for that, too, we are prepared. . . . Again the Dutch are trying to evade the contents and intent of the Linggadjati Agreement. As we see it, we soon will be throwing our strength against each other. The Jogjakarta Cabinet has probably made its decision in that direction. If it must come, let it come, now—this very moment. The two Ministers from The Netherlands have now arrived here and they will soon see that we are planning to let it come to a match of strength."

(This article appeared in the Dutch-language daily *Nieuwsblad*, official organ of the Republican Department of Information, May 9, 1947).

Interesting orders from Republican Commanders

Although, properly speaking, the orders of the day issued by the Republican troop commanders are not a part of the propaganda campaign carried out against the Dutch, they are so revealing that a few examples are included here:

This one is dated June 29, 1947, two months after the signing of the Linggadjati Agreement: "All Dutch enemies must be beheaded as soon as possible. This must be done as speedily as possible. I have already given instructions. Sector commanders may not withdraw. If it cannot be otherwise, they must fall as heroes in their own sector . . . Fight against the enemy on life and death. Do not only expel the enemy, murder him with all the strength of army and people. . . . The Almighty will protect you, commanders and soldiers."

On July 7, 1947, the former dentist, now General, Moestopo, issued the following order: "From today you must all be on your guard . . . You can begin in an illegal manner. Be not confused. The more enemies are murdered, the sooner the enemy will vanish from our country. All means are permitted. I consent to whatever method of killing . . ."

It is well to remember that these orders were issued when it was not at all certain that the situation would result in armed conflict between Dutch and Indonesians. As soon as this armed conflict had become an actuality, General Moestopo issued the following order:

"Allah be praised! The commanders in East Java must praise the Lord, because the time has come when we shall be able, once and for all, to kill the Hollanders, in whatever manner, to slaughter them and burn them, just as I have already ordered . . ."

Chapter 6

The Republic and the Truce

On October 14, 1946, the Dutch and the Republicans came to an agreement on the terms of the truce. A "cease fire" order was to be issued by both sides. The Netherlands Commander-in-Chief did so the very same day. The Republicans delayed their order again and again, and when it was finally issued, it had lost its practical value.

The causes for this failure are many. In the first place, constructively-minded Republicans were unable to assert their authority over the military, while the total lack of discipline among the various armed organizations made it possible for regional and local commanders to carry out or disobey military orders to suit their personal mood or inclination. In the second place, Republican propaganda, instead of impressing on the people the necessity of observing the truce, continued to raise its voice in distrust and hatred (see previous chapter). If the Republican radio did not call the country to actual battle, it constantly reminded civilians and the military that the country must remain watchful against any attempt of the Dutch to overrun the Republican territories by surprise and deprive the people of their freedom.

The list of violations of the truce is endless. Firing on Netherlands patrols was an almost daily occurrence. Reports of large-scale terrorization came in from practically every section in Java and Sumatra. If it had been hoped that the signing of the Linggadjati Agreement on March 25, 1947, would put a halt to these depredations, it soon became apparent that its effect on Republican commanders and leaders of the innumerable organizations was, to say the least, negligible.

Endless list of violations

In the official reports received from March 26 until the end of April, enumerating some thirty-odd violations, one finds incidents such as:

Murder and kidnapping of the inhabitants of the *dessahs* Tjilakoe, Madjalaja and Selagombong (near Batavia); *kampung* (native section) Waroeng entirely plundered and the inhabitants kidnapped;

Inhabitants of demarcation area near Medan (Sumatra) ordered by military troops to evacuate and burn their own houses;

Wave of terrorism in Bodjong and Tjibodas (near Bandung);

Loerahs (Indonesian police chiefs) of six *kampongs* near Buitenzorg kidnapped and murdered;

Population of Tjianjur (large town in western Java) forced to evacuate the town. Said the leader of the troops, "Although Linggadjati has been signed, the *berontak* (revolt) will continue";

Twenty farmers (including ten women) taken from their rice fields near Semarang;

Inhabitants of Gunung Sari, Lepit and Silo (near Surabaya) kidnapped;

Wave of murder, arson, kidnapping and plundering near the demarcation line at Sukabumi (west Java). Most of these were the work of the *Pemuda Rajat Proletar* (Proletarian People's Youth).

These are only a very few of the incidents taken at random from the official reports for the month of April alone. Not included are the many cases of attacks on Dutch military patrols guarding the Netherlands side of the demarcation lines, the firing on airplanes over Dutch-held territory and the firing with artillery on Netherlands positions.

The reaction of the Republican leaders to the truce can best be described in the word of "Boong" (Comrade) Soetomo, who on October 18, 1946—four days after the signing of the truce—made a broadcast over Radio Jogjakarta, the official station of the Republican Department of Information. Said "Boong" Tomo:

"My beloved people, who have lived for hundreds of years under oppression, remain with your divisions, do your duty, chase the Dutch out of our country. . . . Brothers, as long as a foreign army stands on Indonesian soil, we shall use every opportunity to fire on them, to bombard them and to burn all imperialist buildings in our country. . . . Brothers, burn the factories, destroy them systematically, as only the Indonesian people can do, and do it with dynamite. . . ."

In this manner did the Republic react to the Truce, so solemnly signed on October 14, 1946.

Chapter 7

Republican Activities against Borneo and East Indonesia

The basic idea of the Linggadjati Agreement is founded on voluntary cooperation and recognition of the right of self-determination for the component parts of the future United States of Indonesia. These component parts are the Republic (Java and Sumatra), Borneo and East Indonesia. As soon as the Linggadjati Agreement was signed, it was, therefore, the task of these three states to prepare and establish a new legal order in harmony with the ideological structure of the United States of Indonesia. By placing its signature under the Agreement, the Republic declared its willingness to do so.

Recognition of the component parts of the federation implied the Republic's duty to change Article 1 of its constitution which declares that the Indonesian state is a single entity in the form of a republic. This, however, the Republic did not do. Moreover, it waited to the very last moment before abrogating Republican functions such as those of Governor of Borneo, Governor of Celebes and the Lesser Sunda Islands.

The Republic ignores "Malino" territories

In its domestic policy, the Republic equally refrained from promoting the projected formation of a state on federative basis. This was proved by the attitude of the K.N.I.P. (*Komite Nasional Indonesia Poesat*—the appointed Parliament of the Republic) during the discussions of the Linggadjati Agreement at Malang in early March of this year. Nor did the K.N.I.P. take steps to order the resignation of its members representing Borneo, Celebes and the other islands, although their task was ended with the signing of the Agreement.

Even now there are still 41 members in the K.N.I.P. representing territories over which the Republic has neither *de facto* nor *de jure* authority.

That the Republic never intended to consider itself bound by the

*See map on inside back cover.

Linggadjati Agreement as far as the so-called Malino Territories (Borneo, East Indonesia) were concerned, is shown by statements from high Republican authorities made after the signing of the Linggadjati Agreement.

Mohammed Hatta, Vice-President of the Republic, said on April 18, 1947, "Our constitution expresses implicitly the unity of all territories, and not that of Java and Sumatra alone."

Addressing the Indonesian students, President Soekarno stated on April 24, 1947, "It has always been our intention to establish a free state comprising all of the former Netherlands Indies. Now that the Linggadjati Agreement has been signed, we must look on it as a springboard to continue the struggle. Our revolution is a matter that does not concern the Javanese and the Sumatran alone, but the entire Indonesian people."

On April 20, the Republican Department of Information declared in a broadcast, "The Republic does not know the so-called Malino Territories. We regret that the State of East Indonesia has been formed by the Dutch with the collaboration of some of our compatriots. We know that this conflicts with the agreement of Linggadjati."

On May 17, 1947, President Soekarno again stated, "From Pulau Weh to the southern part of Papua, from the Oleh group to the small islands south of Timor, all the land belongs to the territory of the single state of Indonesia. In our fight, we have just acquired Java and Sumatra, which must be our investment capital to achieve our common ideals. We are aspiring to increase this capital and therefore we must continue to work to satisfy the inner desire of the people of Indonesia of 70 million souls."

Infiltration methods

However, the Republic did not confine itself to words alone to assert its authority over the two other member states of the future United States of Indonesia. Infiltration of Republican propagandists and armed troops into Borneo, East Indonesia and the Lesser Sunda Islands continued at undiminished pace. In the night of April 24, 1947, some fifty *praos* (native boats) were intercepted by the Netherlands Navy at Glimanoek, on the island of Bali, where the terrorists tried to land over a four-mile front. A week earlier, on April 13, another *prao* with 40 armed terrorists was intercepted. During the questioning of these men, they testified that they had all been freed from the

Republican prison at Sragen to which they had been sentenced for terms running from 20 years to life imprisonment, for murder, arson and other such crimes.

On April 16, 1947, a *prao* from Java landed at Kaledoepa (South Celebes), carrying machineguns and 35 cases of hand grenades. Seven *praos* were intercepted about the same time carrying men and weapons to Banjarmasin (Borneo), and four other *praos* were halted near Cheribon enroute to Western Borneo.

On June 2, 1947, the following details of the infiltration activities of the F.P. (Field Preparation), an official section of the Republican Army, were made known following the questioning of a captured F.P.-officer. The F.P. was specifically formed as a first step to drive the Dutch from Borneo and Celebes. Instructions and directives for propaganda to be carried out by the F.P., read: "Loyalty to the Republic despite the signing of the Linggadjati Agreement; continuation of the fight until 100 per cent *merdeka* (liberty) is won. As soon as F.P. has prepared the ground, infiltration of armed Republican troops will follow, supported by F.P. cells previously formed in the various areas. These cells will assume leadership to cause disturbances, arson, sabotage, etc."

This incessant interference by the Republic in the domestic affairs of East Indonesia made it difficult for the East-Indonesian Government to continue the political and economic reconstruction of the country, while in Borneo it created conditions which for a long time delayed its political organization and preparation for membership in the projected Federation. Distrust in the Netherlands intentions was never allowed to wane, and if this did not help, there were always the threats of what would happen to Indonesians who collaborated with the Dutch, once the Republic had gained authority over Borneo and East Indonesia.

That these threats were no idle gestures was demonstrated more than once by the infiltrants from Java who kept the inhabitants in many areas in a constant state of unrest. The foremost leaders in East Indonesia and Borneo who worked hard for the realization of the ideals they had so earnestly advocated at the Malino and Denpasar Conferences, saw their work obstructed again and again by these Republican tactics. When the Linggadjati Agreement was finally signed, there was a momentary hope among these leaders that the resulting quiet and order would permit them to accelerate the development of their state. But it soon became apparent that nothing had changed and that, if anything, the situation had grown worse instead of better.

"Malino" territories fear Republican domination

No sooner had the Linggadjati Agreement been signed than the Republic made preparations to enter into diplomatic relations with foreign countries and to open foreign trade relations and, briefly, conducted itself as a completely sovereign state. In doing so, the Republic usurped the authority which East Indonesia had transmitted to the Netherlands Indies Government as precursor of the Federal Government. It was, therefore, definitely to the interest of East Indonesia to put a halt to this action by the Republic, since the Republic, moreover, pretended in all respects to speak on behalf of the whole of Indonesia, including East Indonesia and Borneo.

The subversive propaganda and the Republican infiltrations which threatened to prostrate an independent existence for the Malino Territories, together with the Republican attempts to establish diplomatic relations abroad, ignored the nationalist aspirations of the Malino Territories. This naturally caused the authorities in these territories to demand that the Republic make its standpoint clear.

East Indonesia and Borneo wanted to know, once and for all, what the situation was, and they refused to be victimized for having chosen the correct and democratic road toward independence, instead of the road of terrorism and intimidation. To these authorities in East Indonesia and Borneo, the Denpasar statute and the West-Borneo statute were no empty documents but the realization of deep-felt aspirations.

When, therefore, the Netherlands Commission-General on May 27, 1947, issued its first sharp memorandum to the Republic (see Chapter 4), it did so with complete understanding of the problems of East Indonesia and Borneo. Since then, constant contact with both of these areas was maintained, and when the final decision was made for military action against the Republic, it was with the absolute approval of East Indonesia and Borneo.

Chapter 8

The Republic and the Food Supply

Rice is the staple food of the Indonesian people. Without rice there is famine. When the Netherlands authorities assumed control over the enclaves—Batavia, Semarang and Surabaya in Java; Medan, Padang and Palembang in Sumatra—they had to provide rice for the population, of which the overwhelming majority is, of course, Indonesian. To feed these people, Dutch authorities had to obtain rice either from abroad, or from Republican territory.

More serious than anywhere else was the situation in Batavia, the most populous enclave city. Although accurate statistics were out of the question, it is certain that in Batavia alone some 70 to 100 persons died each day from hunger. What happened in the *kampongs* (native sections) was usually hidden from the outside world, but there is no doubt that many deaths occurred there without being brought to official attention.

The rice situation

There was no rice to be had from abroad. The allotted quantities were barely sufficient for a small part of the populace. And thus the authorities were entirely dependent on the rice from Republican territory. To get this rice into Batavia, the cooperation of the Republican Government was essential. The food problem concerned exclusively a very large group of Indonesians and one might have expected that the Republican authorities would lay aside all prejudices and make every possible effort to bring food to their starving compatriots. But it did not happen that way. Endless efforts were made, first by the Allied Command and later by the Dutch, to come to some kind of arrangement with the Republic. But instead of understanding and goodwill, these efforts met with a totally false notion concerning the seriousness of the situation and a provocative lack of responsibility on the part of the Republican authorities.

In principle, the Republic on several occasions promised that it would send rice shipments. But what was actually sent was insignificant in relation to the need. This was partly due to the fact that irregular

troops and bands obstructed transportation to Batavia and confiscated the trucks which the Dutch had made available for the exclusive use of rice transport. But if the Republican authorities had taken their task more seriously and if they had been able to establish an organization with even a modicum of efficiency, much could have been done to alleviate the suffering of the Indonesians within the enclaves.

Before the war, the rice situation in Java and the other islands required the transportation within Java itself of some 1,000,000 tons of rice each year. This transportation has completely broken down, with the result that some areas have an abundance of rice while others suffer shortage. Close to Batavia, several areas enjoy such abundance, and with only a little goodwill the Republic could have sent some of it to Batavia—to feed their own compatriots.

Many agreements made, none kept

In February, 1946, the Allied Food Control Board supplied the Republican Distribution Organization with rice, for distribution among the population. This rice was supplied from reserves built up the previous year, and was given to the Republic on the condition that equal quantities would be restituted at a later time. Without this condition, the Food Control Board would not have dared use up its reserves. And so, in March and April of 1946, 6,562 tons of rice were delivered to the Republic, which promised speedy restitution.

Meanwhile, the Allied Military Administration and the Republican authorities had made an agreement that the Republic would ship each day between 11 and 20 tons of rice to Batavia, in exchange for which the Republic was to receive manufactures and other goods. The Republic promised to send at least 20,000 tons of rice, for which it would receive 39,000 yards of textile. The textiles were duly delivered, but of the promised 20,000 tons of rice, the Allied Military Administration received exactly 537 tons.

The Republic pleaded that it did not possess sufficient quantities, yet, at the same time, Mr. Soetan Sjahrir made an agreement with India for the delivery of 500,000 tons of rice.

New negotiations followed and again it was arranged that, beginning November 1, 1946, the Republic would ship to Batavia *each month*: 80,000 tons of rice, 3,000 tons of unshelled rice, 2,000 tons of corn, 500 tons of peanuts, 500 tons of tapioca.

Nothing was ever received.

On November 6, 1946, the matter was taken up by the Joint Civil Affairs Committee. A new program was compiled and the Republic

was asked to make rice available for the Dutch-occupied areas, for Sumatra and for the other islands. The Republic promised to make known its decision forthwith. The answer is still being awaited.

Then came the Linggadjati Agreement, offering a splendid opportunity to come to some definite arrangement with regard to the food distribution. The Republic admitted that, in accordance with discussions for the establishment of a Joint Food Supply Fund, it had assumed the obligation to relinquish its surpluses to shortage areas. But before everything else, the Republic wished to live up to its rice contract with India.

Finally, on May 31, 1947, the Dutch and the Republicans came to an agreement for the delivery of 70,000 tons of rice from the current harvest, in exchange for textiles. The rice never came.

Not only, after one-and-a-half years of negotiations, has the Republic done nothing to alleviate the hunger of the Indonesian people, over whom it so often claims authority, but the Republic has not even returned the 6,562 tons of rice it borrowed.

Chapter 9

Two Months after the Military Action

The preceding chapters, based as they were on authentic Republican documents and utterances, demonstrated the necessity for intervention in a situation which could only lead, and did lead with accelerated pace, toward disorganization and deterioration; a situation engendered and kindled by an irresponsible regime that was not equal to its task and, therefore, doomed to sterility and negativism. It was for this reason that in the night from July 20 to 21, 1947, Netherlands armed units made their way into the interior of Java and Sumatra, in order to put an end to the intolerable chaos and to create conditions for the building of a State that would bring renewed hope and fulfillment to the Indonesian people.

This action lasted only ten days during which considerable areas of the Republic were occupied. Upon the request of the United Nations Security Council, hostilities were halted on August 4. Since then, it has been possible to investigate conditions in the newly occupied territories, conditions whose stark reality far surpassed the impressions gained through Republican documents and utterances and described in the foregoing pages. That section of the Republic that now lies open for critical study, presents a very somber perspective. Fortunately, there are a few areas that show a favorable contrast, as, for example, eastern Java, which was governed and administered in a reasonably satisfactory manner; a result, mainly, of the fact that the Republican officials in that area paid little or no attention to the decrees, orders and proclamation emanating from Jogjakarta.

Scenes of confusion

In many other areas, on the other hand, the situation is pitiful. Reports received from these sections speak of "startling lack of sense of duty," "lack of responsibility," "self-interest," "lack of organization," "serious neglect of administrative duty," etc. All such qualifications are documented with facts which anyone can verify.

"The abuses and indifference," one of these reports states, "were promoted by the very low pay of officials, so that most of them—as

they explained—had to seek extra earnings. Despite the very large number of officials—in some services five times as many as in prewar years—the number of really efficient officials was pitifully small. Trained officials from the prewar period had all been dismissed and replaced by politically reliable but ignorant persons. . . .”

In Palembang (Sumatra) there were no less than 6,728 persons registered as officials, although most of these never did any work. To the question why there were so many officials, the answer was “We took the organization over from the Japanese, and we left it as it was.”

A typical example is the post office in Palembang. The personnel consisted of some 80 persons, among whom were a number of girls “to make tea.” Except for the 10 men who actually did the work, the staff used the post office as a trading center. In its safes were found 14 bags of nutmeg, automobile tires, textiles and other commercial goods.

In the financial field, conditions were not much better. The highest Republican functionaries were permitted to issue warrants on the treasury for non-specified purposes. The amount of these warrants found in the safe of the financial department in Palembang was 39 million Japanese guilders. It is probable that these funds were used to finance the *Pemuda* (Youth) and *Lasjkir* (irregular army) groups. Some of these high officials, on several occasions and with intervals of only a few days, drew amounts of one or more millions.

While the people suffer

The examples in Palembang are the more curious because all this happened in an area that is generally recognized as having better conditions than most other sections of the Republic.

They are only a minute part of the documented material gathered from various Republican areas. Wherever the Dutch troops arrived, they found neglect and deterioration. In wide areas there were hunger and want; in others, there was relative abundance. Nowhere was the food distribution system found to be working properly.

The suffering of the Indonesian people has grown worse through the application of the scorched earth policy, directed mainly toward non-military objects: by the agitation from Jogjakarta which incessantly incites toward new destruction; by the stimulation of passions and criminal instincts; by attacks on Chinese and Indo-Europeans still living within Republican territory.

A good deal of time will go by before law, peace and order have returned to the tragic islands. But already much has been done during the few months since the action. And, as Lieutenant Governor-General H. J. van Mook expressed it in his radio address of August 3, 1947: "Everywhere (in the Dutch-occupied areas), work and communications are reviving. Soon everyone will have the opportunity to take his lawful place and do his share toward the rebuilding of a really free and strong Indonesian nation where non-Indonesians of good will shall be able to share in the work.

"This is the real importance of the restoration of law and order, the indispensable foundation of real liberty. We shall make use of it with energy and application for the reconstruction of the country."

Part II

Text of the Linggadjati Agreement

Signed on March 25, 1947, between the Netherlands Commission-General and the Delegation of the Republic of Indonesia.

Preamble—The Netherlands Government, represented by the Commission-General for The Netherlands Indies, and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia, represented by the Indonesian delegation, moved by a sincere desire to insure good relations between the peoples of The Netherlands and Indonesia in new forms of voluntary co-operation which offer the best guarantee for sound and strong development of both countries in the future and which make it possible to give a new foundation to the relationship between the two peoples; agree as follows and will submit this agreement at the shortest possible notice for the approval of the respective parliaments:

Article I. The Netherlands Government recognizes the Government of the Republic of Indonesia as exercising de facto authority over Java, Madura and Sumatra. The areas occupied by Allied or Netherlands forces shall be included gradually, through mutual cooperation, in Republican territory. To this end, the necessary measures shall at once be taken in order that this inclusion shall be completed at the latest on the date mentioned in Article XII.

Article II. The Netherlands Government and the Government of the Republic shall cooperate in the rapid formation of a sovereign democratic state on a federal basis, to be called the United States of Indonesia.

Article III. The United States of Indonesia shall comprise the entire territory of The Netherlands Indies with the provision, however, that in case the population of any territory, after due consultation with the other territories, should decide by democratic process that they are not, or not yet, willing to join the United States of Indonesia, they can establish a special relationship for such a territory to the United States of Indonesia and to the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

Article IV. The component parts of the United States of Indonesia shall be the Republic of Indonesia, Borneo, and the Great East without prejudice to the right of the population of any territory to decide by democratic process that its position in the United States of Indonesia shall be arranged otherwise.

Without derogation of the provisions of Article III and of the first paragraph of this Article, the United States of Indonesia may make special arrangements concerning the territory of its capital.

Article V. The constitution of the United States of Indonesia shall be determined by a constituent assembly composed of the democratically nominated representatives of the Republic and of the other future partners of the United States of Indonesia to which the following paragraph of this article shall apply.

Both parties shall consult each other on the method of participation in this constituent assembly by the Republic of Indonesia, by the territories not under the authority of the Republic and by the groups of the population not, or insufficiently, represented with due observance of the responsibility of the Netherlands Government and the Government of the Republic, respectively.

Article VI. To promote the joint interests of The Netherlands and Indonesia, the Netherlands Government and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia shall cooperate in the establishment of a Netherlands Indonesian Union by which the Kingdom of the Netherlands, comprising The Netherlands, The Netherlands Indies, Surinam and Curacao, shall be converted into said Union consisting on the one hand of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, comprising The Netherlands, Surinam and Curacao, and on the other hand the United States of Indonesia.

The foregoing paragraph does not exclude the possibility of a further arrangement of the relations between The Netherlands, Surinam and Curacao.

Article VII.

A. The Netherlands Indonesian Union shall have its own organs to promote the joint interests of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the United States of Indonesia.

B. These organs shall be formed by the Governments of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the United States of Indonesia and, if necessary, by the parliaments of those countries.

C. The joint interests shall be considered to be cooperation on foreign relations, defense and, as far as necessary, finance as well as subjects of an economic or cultural nature.

Article VIII. The King (Queen) of The Netherlands shall be at

the head of the Netherlands Indonesian Union. Decrees and resolutions concerning the joint interests shall be issued by the organs of the Union in the King's (Queen's) name.

Article IX. In order to promote the interests of the United States of Indonesia in The Netherlands and of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in Indonesia, a High Commissioner shall be appointed by the respective Governments.

Article X. Statutes of the Netherlands Indonesian Union shall, furthermore, contain provisions regarding:

A. Safeguarding of the rights of both parties towards one another and guarantees for the fulfillment of their mutual obligations;

B. Mutual exercise and civic rights by Netherlands and Indonesian citizens;

C. Regulations containing provisions in case no agreement can be reached by the organs of the Union;

D. Regulation of the manner and conditions of the assistance to be given by the services of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the United States of Indonesia as long as the services of the latter are not, or are insufficiently, organized; and

E. Safeguarding in both parts of the Union of the fundamental human rights and liberties referred to in the Charter of the United Nations Organization.

Article XI.

A. The Statutes of the Netherlands Indonesian Union shall be drafted by a conference of representatives of the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the future United States of Indonesia.

B. The statutes shall come into effect after approval by the respective parliaments.

Article XII. The Netherlands Government and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia shall endeavor to establish the United States of Indonesia and the Netherlands Indonesian Union before January 1, 1949.

Article XIII. The Netherlands Government shall forthwith take the necessary steps in order to obtain the admission of the United States of Indonesia as a member of the United Nations Organization

immediately after the formation of the Netherlands Indonesian Union.

Article XIV. The Government of the Republic of Indonesia recognizes the claims of all non-Indonesians to the restoration of their rights and the restitution of their goods as far as they are exercised or to be found in the territory over which it exercises *de facto* authority. A joint commission will be set up to effect this restoration and restitution.

Article XV. In order to reform the Government of The Indies in such a way that its composition and procedure shall conform as closely as possible to the recognition of the Republic of Indonesia and to its projected constitutional structure, the Netherlands Government, pending the realization of the United States of Indonesia and of the Netherlands Indonesian Union, shall forthwith initiate the necessary legal measures to adjust the constitutional and international position of the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the new situation.

Article XVI. Directly after the conclusion of this agreement, both parties shall proceed to reduce their armed forces. They will consult together concerning the extent and rate of this reduction and their cooperation in military matters.

Article XVII.

A. For the cooperation between the Netherlands Government and the Government of the Republic contemplated in this agreement, an organization shall be called into existence of delegations to be appointed by each of the two Governments with a joint secretariat.

B. The Netherlands Government and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia shall settle by arbitration any dispute which might arise from this agreement and which cannot be solved by joint consultation in conference between those delegations. In that case a chairman of another nationality with a deciding vote shall be appointed by agreement between the delegations or, if such agreement cannot be reached, by the President of the International Court of Justice.

Article XVIII. This agreement shall be drawn up in the Netherlands and Indonesian languages. Both texts shall have equal authority.

Radio Address by H. M. Queen Wilhelmina on December 6, 1942

Today it is a year ago that the Japanese, without previous declaration of war, launched their treacherous attack on our Allies. At that time we did not hesitate for a moment to throw ourselves into the struggle and to hasten to the aid of our Allies, whose cause is ours.

Japan had been preparing for this war and for the conquest of the Netherlands Indies for years and in so doing sought to follow the conduct of its Axis partners in attacking one country after another. This plan we were able to prevent, thanks to our immediate declaration of war. After a year of war we can bear witness that the tide is turning and that the attacker, who had such great advantages, is being forced on the defensive.

It is true that the Netherlands Indies, after defending themselves so heroically, are, for the most part, occupied by the enemy, but this phase of the struggle is only a prelude. The Japanese are getting ever nearer the limit of their possibilities as our ever-growing might advances towards them from all sides. They have not been able to break China's courage and endurance and Japan now faces the ebbing of her power in this self-willed war, which will end with her complete downfall.

At this moment my thoughts are more than ever with my country and my compatriots in the Netherlands and the Netherlands Indies. After an age-old historical solidarity in which had long since passed the era of colonial relationship, we stood on the eve of a collaboration on a basis of equality when suddenly we were both confronted by the present ordeal. The treacherous aggression on the Netherlands in 1940 was the first interruption in the process of development; the heroic battle of the Netherlands Indies, followed by the occupation of the major part of this territory in 1942 was the second.

At the time when the Indies were still free and only Holland was occupied, the vigor of our unity became apparent and on both sides a feeling of stronger kinship developed more rapidly than it could have in peacetime. Now, however, this mutual understanding has been deepened still further because the same struggle is shared in all its agony and the same distress is suffered in all its bitterness. In the Netherlands as well as in the Netherlands Indies the enemy, with his propaganda for the so-called new order, has left nothing untried to lure the spirit of the people and to disguise his tyranny and suppression with the lies of his promises for the future. But these lies and this deceit have been of no avail because nearly all have seen through them and have understood

that our enemies have as their aim nothing but slavery and exploitation and that as long as they have not been driven out and defeated there can be no question of freedom.

In previous addresses I announced that it is my intention, after the liberation, to create the occasion for a joint consultation about the structure of the Kingdom and its parts in order to adapt it to the changed circumstances. The conference of the entire Kingdom which will be convoked for this purpose, has been further outlined in a Government declaration of January 27th, 1942. The preparation of this conference, in which prominent representatives of the three overseas parts of the Kingdom will be united with those of the Netherlands at a round table, had already begun in the Netherlands Indies, Surinam and Curacao, the parts of the Kingdom which then still enjoyed their freedom. Especially in the Netherlands Indies, detailed material had been collected for this purpose and it was transmitted to me in December 1941 by the Governor-General. The battle of the Netherlands Indies disrupted these promising preparations.

We can only resume these preparations when everyone will be able to speak his mind freely.

Although it is beyond doubt that a political reconstruction of the Kingdom as a whole and of the Netherlands and the overseas territories as its parts is a natural evolution, it would be neither right nor possible to define its precise form at this moment. I realize that much which is great and good is growing in the Netherlands despite the pressure of the occupation; I know that this is the case in the Indies where our unity is fortified by common suffering. These developing ideas can only be shaped in free consultation in which both parts of the Kingdom will want to take cognizance of each other's opinions. Moreover, the population of the Netherlands and of the Netherlands Indies has confirmed through its suffering and its resistance, its right to participate in the decision regarding the form of our responsibility as a nation towards the world and of the various groups of the population towards themselves and one another.

By working out these matters now, that right would be neglected, and the insight which my people have obtained through better experience, would be disregarded.

I am convinced, and history as well as reports from the occupied territories confirm me in this, that after the war it will be possible to reconstruct the Kingdom on the solid foundation of complete partnership, which will mean the consummation of all that has been developed in the

past. I know that no political unity nor national cohesion can continue to exist which are not supported by the voluntary acceptance and the faith of the great majority of the citizenry. I know that the Netherlands more than ever feel their responsibility for the vigorous growth of the Overseas Territories and that the Indonesians recognize, in the ever increasing collaboration, the best guarantee for the recovery of their peace and happiness. The war years have proved that both peoples possess the will and the ability for harmonious and voluntary cooperation.

A political unity which rests on this foundation moves far towards a realization of the purpose for which the United Nations are fighting, as it has been embodied, for instance, in the Atlantic Charter, and with which we could instantly agree, because it contains our own conception of freedom and justice for which we have sacrificed blood and possessions in the course of our history. I visualize, without anticipating the recommendations of the future conference, that they will be directed towards a commonwealth in which the Netherlands, Indonesia, Surinam and Curacao will participate, with complete self-reliance and freedom of conduct for each part regarding its internal affairs, but with the readiness to render mutual assistance.

It is my opinion that such a combination of independence and collaboration can give the Kingdom and its parts the strength to carry fully their responsibility, both internally and externally. This would leave no room for discrimination according to race or nationality; only the ability of the individual citizens and the needs of the various groups of the population will determine the policy of the government.

In the Indies, as in the Netherlands, there now rules an oppressor who, imitating his detestable associates and repudiating principles which he himself has recognized in the past, interns peaceful citizens and deprives women and children of their livelihood. He has uprooted and dislocated that beautiful and tranquil country; his new order brings nothing but misery and want. Nevertheless, we can aver that he has not succeeded in subjugating us, and as the evergrowing force of the United Nations advances upon him from every direction, we know that he will not succeed in the future.

The Netherlands Indies and the Netherlands with their fighting men on land, at sea and in the air, with their alert and brave merchantmen and by their dogged and never failing resistance in the hard struggle, will see their self-sacrifice and intrepidity crowned after the common victory with the recovery of peace and happiness for their country and their people in a new world. In that regained freedom they will be able to build a new and better future.

**Statement broadcast to the Netherlands nation
on July 20, 1947, by Premier Louis J. M. Beel.**

Compatriots, the events in Indonesia are taking so serious a course that I believe that I cannot leave you in a state of uncertainty a moment longer than is strictly necessary. We have lived in this uncertainty long enough, both you and I, and with me all those, within the Cabinet as well as outside, who during the last months have made every effort day and night to arrive at a peaceful solution of the difficulties that have arisen.

I will spare you a summary of the efforts that have been made toward this end, but there are a few facts which I will bring back to memory.

On May 27 the Commission-General reluctantly suspended the round-table negotiations with the Republic concerning the execution of certain details of the Linggadjati Agreement. The Commission did so because it had become convinced that further discussions would not lead to any acceptable result, because the opposing party gave evidence that it was leaning on principles which are in direct contradiction to the Linggadjati Agreement, which had been initialled and signed by this very same opposing party. Moreover, the opposing party evidently felt that the situation would prolong the negotiations indefinitely.

In its memorandum of May 27 the Commission-General made a last effort to bring the Republic to another viewpoint. It believed that no better way to accomplish this could be found than to put all its cards on the table. The Commission-General laid before the Republic a detailed program for the execution of the Linggadjati Agreement in its entirety. It did so in the hope that this would convince the Republic of the honest will of the Netherlands Government to execute the Linggadjati Agreement not only according to the letter, but also according to the spirit, and that this conviction would induce the Republic equally to accept the principles of the Agreement as its course of action, so that this Agreement again could serve as a mutual starting point for further elucidation.

Since then, the documents and statements issued by the Republic, together with the actions of her authorities, have made it clear how much the Republic clings to fundamentals that are in conflict with the specific stipulations of the Agreement into which she has entered on her own volition. This refers in part to the fact that the Republic continues

to disavow the responsibility, implied in Netherlands sovereignty, for the maintenance of safety and justice for the whole of Indonesia during the transition period, and that she demands the recognition of a sovereignty for herself which is her right neither in the transition period nor thereafter, but which is only intended for the United States of Indonesia in its entirety within the framework of the royal union that has been agreed upon. For more than a month and a half, first the Commission-General and thereupon the Netherlands Government, have endeavored to bring the Republican Government back to the fundamentals of what has been voluntarily accepted through the signing of the Linggadjati Agreement. In vain!

Compatriots, there is more. On October 14 of last year, a military truce was concluded between The Netherlands and the Republic by which all acts of force on either side would be eliminated. The Netherlands immediately met the obligation resulting from this truce. On that very same day, October 14, 1946, the Netherlands armed forces were notified by telegraph of the truce, with additional instructions that from that moment on they had to abstain from all hostilities. On her side, however, the Republic did not issue a similar statement until months later and afterward even disavowed it in parts. The Republic has never ceased to commit acts that were in direct conflict with this truce, and the Republic does not deny this. From the signing of the truce until this day violations of demarcation lines have occurred from Republican territory, skirmishes have been started by regular Republican army units; firing on Netherlands patrols, arson in kampongs, intimidation, mistreatment, kidnapping and murder, actions of guerillas and artillery, building of military positions, cutting of telephone and railway connections, destruction of roads and bridges, etc., have been daily occurrences.

The Linggadjati Agreement was to inaugurate a period of honest cooperation. Nevertheless, the number of violations since the signing of the Linggadajati Agreement has passed the one-thousand mark.

During our visit to Indonesia, my colleague the Minister of Overseas Territories and myself have investigated the situation; we were deeply impressed by the almost superhuman patience that was demanded of our Netherlands soldiers.

Certainly, on our side there were also violations of the truce. The Republic has made public a few score of these cases. All these incidents have been investigated and on each case a report was issued and forwarded to the Republic. Never did the Republic send us any report concerning violations cited by us.

We have repeatedly demanded of the Republic that she put a stop to this unbearable situation. In the documents exchanged after May 27 about which I have just spoken, we demanded again and again that orders be given for the cessation of hostilities. The Republic ignored this demand as long as possible and finally rejected it because it was supposed to imply a one-sided term. In reality, The Netherlands has lived up to the truce from the first day and moreover proposed to withdraw and decrease armed forces on both sides, provided they be replaced by a bona fide police organization.

Compatriots, I need not tell you that it has not been easy for the Government during the last months to retain its patience in the face of all these events. It cannot be accused that it has not maintained this patience until the very last. The Government did so because it was and still is convinced that very many, inside as well as outside the Republican territory, desire to reconstruct the whole of Indonesia, and Java and Sumatra in particular, on a basis of continuous cooperation with The Netherlands. The Government did so because, both in the rejection of the principles of Linggadjati and in the continuing violations of the truce, it recognized above all the efforts of certain groups which, to our regret, finally appeared to have enough power to eliminate the proponents of an honest, constructive policy, or made it impossible to accept proposals which these proponents deemed reasonable.

The Government did so because elsewhere, in the Malino areas (East Indonesia), it has had more and more opportunity to demonstrate what can be accomplished with proper cooperation; to demonstrate how through mutual trust constructive work can be achieved.

Toward the end it seemed as though such a policy might still be possible with the Republic. On July 15 agreement was reached with her representatives, the Minister President, the Vice-Minister President, and two other Ministers on the measures for carrying out the Linggadjati Agreement, which seemed to justify the hope that a beginning could be made with practical cooperation. Unfortunately, Jogjakarta also rejected this agreement of her own leaders; even as Sjahrir previously had been forced to resign, now Sjarifoeddin has been forced to dispute the proposals which he himself accepted.

Compatriots, there comes a turning point where forbearance ceases to be a virtue!

Now that it has been established that the present Republican Government cannot check the economic devastation and plundering, the monetary confusion and the lawlessness of certain groups and areas, and therefore cannot be considered capable of guaranteeing safety and

justice in her territory; and on the other hand refuses to create, together with us, the necessary conditions; now that it has been established that, unless a speedy change is effected, numerous economic objects, utilities, communications and other valuable possessions, belonging for the greater part to non-Indonesians and foreigners, and also large stocks of foodstuffs and raw materials of which the world is in the greatest need, will be destroyed; now that the dangers for the inhabitants of certain areas are increasing by the absence of a fair food supply, and now that it has been established that this Republican Government refuses to adhere to the justified demand of the Netherlands Government to end all these open violations of signed agreements; now the Netherlands Government must place itself on the standpoint that the truce concluded on October 14, 1946, and the agreement signed on March 25, 1947, at Linggadjati, have been violated by the Republican Government and its organs in such a manner that the Netherlands Government can no longer believe in the goodwill of the Republic and, therefore, must recover its freedom of action in accordance with the stipulations of the Linggadjati Agreement.

The Netherlands Government has acted in this spirit.

The Netherlands Government has authorized the Governor-General, in view of the confusion and ever-increasing hostilities, destructions etc., to order the military forces at his disposal to take policing action in order to realize that for which the Republic herself appears powerless.

Compatriots, the Government does not conceal that this step has caused it great pain and that the Government is conscious that for many among you, besides anxiety for those who are doing their duty overseas, there is disappointment which is no less than that of the Government.

We have carefully refrained from exercising any pressure on the Republic as long as the reaching of an accord remained the aim. To the contrary, the Netherlands Government has met the Republic in this respect as far as possible. The Netherlands Government has shown complete understanding of the healthy nationalist aspirations which have manifested themselves in Indonesia. That the Netherlands Government has no inclination whatever to contest this healthy nationalism, to this East Indonesia and West Borneo can bear testimony.

In complete liberty, we have induced the Republic to enter into an agreement on principles the justice of which we continue to recognize and whose application we continue to demand. However, it is absolutely unacceptable that, once this agreement was signed voluntarily, it is being violated from day to day. The Government will continue to adhere to the principles of Linggadjati. Whoever might believe that there is now

reason to disavow these principles, will find the Government in opposition. The application of these principles with regard to the other partner states of Indonesia and with regard to all such parts which express the wish, will be continued without hindrance. These principles will also retain their full meaning with regard to the Republic.

As soon as a leadership of the Republic is willing and capable to practice cooperation in accordance with Linggadjati, a place with equal rights as those of the other partner states within the circle of the United States of Indonesia, will be open.

4.

Memorandum of July 20, 1947, from the Lieutenant Governor-General, Dr. H. J. van Mook, to the Government of the Republic of Indonesia.

On behalf of the Netherlands Government, I am compelled, to my own regret and that of the Government, to communicate to you the following:

The rejection of the latest proposals which I submitted to your Minister-President on the 15th of this month, has convinced the Netherlands Government that the Government of the Republic is either not prepared or unable to carry out the Truce concluded on October 14, 1946, and the Agreement concluded on March 25, 1947, in a manner meeting the reasonable demands in that respect.

The facts have proven that the Republican armed forces have never really lived up to the Truce. Continuously, hostilities on Indonesian side have occurred on the demarcation lines, hostilities that were directed both against our armed forces and against the populace within the territory under our protection. In some cases, these attacks assumed such an organized character and they were so evidently ordered or approved by the military leaders of the Republic that we were compelled to take forcible measures against these actions and to endeavor to create a safer and more tolerable situation by certain extensions of the occupied territory.

But even these limited measures and the subsequent negotiations did not lead to a cessation of hostilities on Republican side.

Neither has there ever been a cessation of the acts of violence from Republican territory against the parts of Indonesia outside the Republic. Not even the recent dismissal of the Republican governors of these territories who had been maintained in contravention to the Linggadjati Agreement, brought with it a cessation of activities of the organizations within the Republic whose aim it is to keep alive, through violent means, the unrest and agitation in certain areas of East Indonesia and Borneo.

The isolation of certain cities, such as Medan, from the surrounding Republican territory, as a result of which important population groups and especially the Chinese were threatened with famine, has not been lifted, in spite of the promise and statement from Republican side that orders would be given within a week and indeed have been given.

In addition, particularly during the last months, the destructions inside and outside the demarcations lines have not been halted; to the contrary, during the last weeks they have assumed an increasingly grave character.

Finally, the Republican Government has also refused to take definite measures that actually could have led to a cessation of hostilities without infringing on the authority of the Republic. The Republican Government has receded to a proposal which actually is nothing but a repetition of the former stipulations of the Truce which never have been carried out by the Republican commanders, not even in territories such as Modjokerto for which measures for demilitarization had been agreed upon.

As regards the Linggadjati Agreement, on May 27 the Commission-General communicated to the Republican Government a number of final proposals. Of these proposals, a certain part was accepted—on paper, at least—after difficult and prolonged consultation.

Among these was the proposal of the Netherlands Government for a speedy and broad execution of Article 15 through the establishment of the federal council, which essentially would form the government during the transition period, albeit with the preservation of the *de jure* authority of the Representative of the Crown.

Furthermore, and without explicit preservation, a proposal was accepted concerning foreign relations, a proposal which in effect is no more than a very broad execution of what was explicitly agreed in this respect. Nevertheless, both after the signing of the Agreement and after the above-mentioned acceptance of these proposals, the Republican Government has continued to enter into foreign relations that are in direct conflict with the Agreement, and to maintain functionaries who have no place in the system that was agreed upon.

The acceptance of the economic proposals can be viewed only if linked with the proposal concerning the special police, as without a really effective joint apparatus for the restoration and maintenance of order and safety, the execution of these economic proposals must be considered impossible. This last proposal, however, was rejected by the Republican Government as far as its main feature, namely the cooperation between Netherlands and Indonesian units, was concerned.

Under these circumstances, the Netherlands Government must state that, after so long and fruitless an effort to obtain a really peaceful cooperation from Republican side, the Netherlands Government can no longer consider itself bound, in its dealings with the Republic, either to the Truce or to the Linggadjati Agreement. The Netherlands

Government cannot continue to bear responsibility for a situation which is untenable in itself and which must lead to an increasing weakening of the economic and spiritual foundations, on which alone the sovereign United States of Indonesia and the Netherlands-Indonesian Union can be built speedily and solidly.

The Netherlands Government, therefore, recovers its freedom of action and will take such measures that will make an end to this untenable situation and which will create conditions of order and safety which will render possible the execution of the above-named program, as it is expressed in the Linggadjati Agreement.

**Press statement issued in Batavia on July 20, 1947,
by Lieutenant Governor-General Dr. H. J. van Mook.**

After many months of patient negotiations and controlled defense against almost continuous aggression, the Netherlands Government has reluctantly and with great regret arrived at the conclusion that the present Government of Indonesia is either unwilling or incapable of carrying out the Truce of October 14, 1946, as well as the Agreement of Linggadjati signed March 25.

Some final proposals handed by the Commission-General to the Indonesian Delegation on May 27 were accepted on paper after long drawn-out and difficult negotiations. The first proposal concerning the so-called Interim Government during the period of transition was in reality an accelerated and generous execution from the Dutch side of Article 15 of the Agreement. The second proposal was destined to bring the foreign relations for the transition period within well-defined borders.

This Agreement was violated even after it had been accepted, as the Republican Minister of Foreign Affairs continued his negotiations with the Middle East, while illegally appointed Republican representatives were maintained in their functions. Three other proposals comprising economic rehabilitation, reestablishment of legal security for non-Indonesians, and public safety must be considered as an entity, because without this security rehabilitation would be impossible.

The repudiation by the Republic of real collaboration in this respect makes the acceptance of the two other proposals valueless, as it would withhold from the Interim Government, which carries the final responsibility, the effective means to control security. The truce has in reality never been observed by the Republican military forces. Attacks on the demarcation lines, violence against persons under Netherlands protection, armed action against territory outside the Republic and inflammatory propaganda continued almost without intermission.

The food blockade of Medan (Sumatra), which brought a part of the population on the verge of starvation, was not discontinued although the Republican Government declared that orders to that effect were given more than ten days ago. Hostages are still taken and kept imprisoned in the interior.

During the last months violence on the demarcation line as well as in parts of East Indonesia and Borneo have increased rather than diminished. This was accompanied by senseless destruction of roads

and bridges and valuable economic objects. Our latest proposal to withdraw the Republican military forces ten kilometers from the demarcation lines and to replace them by Republican police was nevertheless rejected.

If all these facts are taken into consideration, together with the condition that almost for two years hundreds of thousands of Indonesian, Chinese, Arabs and Dutch have been driven from their homes and employment and concentrated in limited areas, present circumstances must be deemed intolerable.

After all these experiences, including the enforced resignation of Prime Minister Sjahrir, there seems to be no prospect of a real solution by further negotiations.

Therefore, the Netherlands Government has informed the Government of the Republic that she, in view of almost constant violations by the Republic, does not consider herself bound any further by the Truce or the Agreement and retakes her freedom of action.

In view of her ultimate responsibility and her unchanged desire to carry out the political program embodied in Linggadjati, she will take proper measures to reestablish order and safety in sufficiently large territories to carry out that program.

The Netherlands Government is convinced that she will receive the aid and approval of countless Indonesians who are aware that the conduct or the lack of authority of the present Republican Government can only lead toward disaster and never procure the firm foundations for continued collaboration between The Netherlands and the free United States of Indonesia.

**Radio address by Lieutenant Governor-General,
Dr. H. J. van Mook, on July 25, 1947.**

Although it is only five days ago that the Netherlands Government was forced to make the grave and difficult decision to abandon, for the time being, the road of negotiation, I feel it is necessary to give an account of the situation and the events.

It was to be expected that the action taken would be represented by many as an act of Netherlands aggression. We knew this when the decision was made. It is always difficult to see reality through a veil of popular slogans. It is particularly difficult in the case of the Republic whose external appearance hides a very contradictory reality.

The desire for independence of the Indonesian peoples has the sympathy of the world, as it has the active sympathy of the Dutch people. The Republic emerged from the Japanese occupation as the embodiment and the champion of this desire. And although it treated the thousands of Netherlands, who had sacrificed almost everything for this country, in a grievous manner, the Netherlands Government tried from the beginning to come to the assistance of the constructive forces in the Republic, in order to ensure the recovery of this country from the ruin Japan had brought.

We could understand that during the first year after the capitulation of Japan we had to be patient and to conquer the fear for a return of colonial rule. In February 1946 the Netherlands Government explicitly acknowledged the right of the Indonesian peoples to self determination. In December 1946 we accepted the Linggadjati Agreement, providing for the creation, in two years, of a sovereign United States of Indonesia, to be closely allied to The Netherlands as an equal state. There could be no further valid reason for suspicion. Holland is accustomed to honor its pledges.

But the Republic remained a closed world, only admitting Netherlands and foreigners on conducted tours in certain parts of Central and East Java. Their propaganda continued to paint The Netherlands and the Netherlands as crafty enemies of Indonesian liberty. The Republic continued to act as if it covered the whole of Indonesia. It continued its hostilities and its threats against all who wanted real cooperation.

It violated the Agreement from day to day, although many Repub-

licans realized the absolute necessity of cooperation in order to rehabilitate the country.

The more it tried to act as a fully organized, internationally accepted state, the more its internal authority deteriorated. We tried patiently to convince the reigning group at Jagjakarta that our assistance was there for the asking. Instead, they associated with Japanese and Germans, with deserters, with adventurers and profiteers of every race. And by keeping up the siege of our perimeters they forced us to maintain a military force to safeguard the numerous people who sought our protection.

And finally the republican idealism disappeared. There remained the irresponsible violence of armed groups; the incapability of newly made administrators; the profit making gentry who thrived on a disrupted economy and a monetary system without foundation. The spectre of suspicion and hostility could not be laid; the muddled accounts could not be shown; the discipline of real governmental authority could not be restored without outside help.

More and more Indonesians turned against the Republic. First, those outside its territory, in Borneo and East Indonesia, who refused to be at the mercy of Jogjakarta. Then, many inside the Republic, intelligent people and simple people alike, who saw that the republican policy would lead nowhere.

We did not decide to take the present action because a minor part of our proposals was refused. We had to take that decision because every real cooperation was refused and because the sane and constructive statesmen within the Republic were no longer able to make the armed groups cease fire. Linggadjati can only be implemented if there is a sufficient measure of peace and order; instead the acts of violence and destruction kept increasing. And the remaining foundation for the prosperity and the liberty of this country were becoming exceedingly thin.

The events of the last five days have proved a few things very clearly. This action is *not* a war against a people. Our troops meet with hardly any resistance. They are welcomed by a population with a feeling of relief that the days of terror and depredations may be over. After having marched for hundreds of miles and having passed through countless defense works, our casualties do not yet run into three figures. And the losses of the dissolving republican armies are not very much higher.

But there is another—and worse—aspect. In many places the repub-

lican troops, before they depart in a hurry, try to execute what the Republican government in Jogjakarta calls a scorched earth policy. The facts are, however, that the burning and looting is not directed to military objectives; that it is a mere wanton destruction of property and of the economic machinery of the country. It is mainly directed against the property of non-Indonesians; and the peaceable Chinese inhabitants of the towns and villages are the worst sufferers, if our troops do not come in time. By these irresponsible actions the clearest proof is provided of the necessity of the joint constabulary, which we proposed and which the Republic refused.

We shall do our utmost to prevent these acts. But they show that this is neither a people's war, nor a military conflict. It is a police action in the territories where the authority of the Republic is crumbling.

We appeal to all citizens in those territories to assist in restoring law and order, so that the constructive work of Linggadjati can start forthwith. Where the people feel safe; where production and transport and trade can be resumed; where education can be restored, the political structure can be erected and the foundation of a really free United States of Indonesia can begin. This country has the means of becoming an orderly, prosperous and strong nation; it will have to become one if its liberty is to be consolidated and maintained. We trust that the leading Indonesians, who know how much hard work will be needed to achieve this ideal, will now feel free to cooperate with those Netherlanders who are eager to assist them in this work.

We are ready to install the proposed interim government for the transition period as soon as political organizations on Java and Sumatra can participate in it, together with Borneo and East Indonesia.

Together we can rebuild Indonesia and eradicate the remains of a Japanese system of force and corruption which is the vicious inheritance of three and a half years of oppression. Everybody of good will, whatever his political inclination, can take his part in this work, if he accepts the Linggadjati program and the responsibility for the well being and the future of Indonesia.

**Radio address by Lieutenant Governor-General,
Dr. H. J. van Mook, on August 3, 1947.**

The Security Council passed a resolution, of which notice was given the Netherlands Government, reading as follows:

"The Security Council, noting with concern hostilities in progress between the armed forces of The Netherlands and the Republic of Indonesia, calls upon the parties (A) to cease hostilities and (B) to settle their disputes by arbitration or by other peaceful means and to keep the Security Council informed about the progress of the settlement."

At the same time, the Government of the United States offered its good services to the Netherlands Government for settlement of the conflict, an offer which has been readily accepted by the Netherlands Government.

Although the Netherlands Government remains convinced there was no ground for intervention of the Security Council in this case because Article 39 of the United Nations Charter does not apply and that the resolution constitutes an interference in the internal affairs of the Kingdom which has no legal foundation, it nevertheless decided to comply with the request contained in it.

The Netherlands Government desires to prove again it does not want to neglect any possibility of limiting an action made necessary by an untenable and lawless situation.

Moreover, it wants to give another opportunity to the Republic to relinquish its attitude of aggression and provocation and to come to a real execution of the Linggadjati Agreement.

It wishes finally to enable the United States Government in the fullest possible way to effectuate its good services.

Therefore, the order has been given to terminate action at midnight, August 4 to 5. As soon as reports make it possible, those parts of Java and Sumatra where the Netherlands Government has taken over direct responsibility for law and order will be clearly indicated.

In connection with conditions found in those regions and with certain actions and threats on the Republican side, the Government must stress that it shall fulfill its responsibility and its obligations regarding the safety of persons and property and the restoration and maintenance of law and order to the fullest extent and with all means at its disposal. Only by doing so the rehabilitation of the country and implementation

of the Linggadjati Agreement become possible. As it rejects every idea of political retaliation, it must be able to assure all those who are under its direct protection that such protection will be given against any form of political revenge whatsoever.

If and when the peace in those regions is disturbed, prompt action will be taken against such disturbances, in cooperation with the civil administration, police and law-abiding citizens.

The Government shall have to observe whether the Republic will also comply with the request of the Security Council. It can only declare at this juncture that a cessation of hostilities should include, in its opinion, a cessation of demolitions, of acts of violence against members and groups of the population in Republican territory, and of hostile propaganda which lately even incited to mass murder.

Be it repeated, we do not want to leave any means untried which can further a peaceful, honorable and reasonable solution of the conflict; in doing so we are free from any feelings of revenge or hostility. Our forces have shown, wherever they came, a balanced and unruffled attitude, a clear sense of order and justice, and a deep compassion for all who were threatened, despoiled or miserable. I am sure the present orders will be executed with promptitude and common sense and with an assurance born from the righteousness of our cause. I feel certain too, that in those regions where they conserve the public peace, all citizens can safely return to their work in order to lay the foundations with our assistance of a free United States of Indonesia.

It will depend on the decision of Jogjakarta and on the execution of that decision within Republican territory whether hostilities will also cease on the other side and whether a new possibility for cooperation will be created. I need not say that everybody hopes so and has always hoped so. But I need not say either that such cooperation is only possible on the foundation of real security of democratic freedom and of good faith in the execution of the agreement.

I would like to conclude on a personal note with a word particularly to all those who live in the territories where our action brought and shall bring peace and security.

For you, a period of fear, of uncertainty, of hostility is over or will be over shortly when dispersed armed bands shall have been disarmed and brought back into the community. For you the time has come for positive work, even if some of your deluded countrymen wrought so much harm in a final attack of destructiveness. For you, after an oppressing nightmare, the free and abundant life can begin.

Far from being full of sound and fury as it is presented to the world,

territories where our troops came have at last found quiet. Far from being a danger to the world of peace, our action has opened these territories to the world from which they were shut off by Jogjakarta. Far from bringing new oppression, we have lifted a load which was oppressing the country. This is not the least important reason why we are eager to accept the American offer. Everywhere there is a revival of traffic and employment. It will not be long before everyone shall have an opportunity to take his lawful place and contribute to the rebuilding of a really free and strong Indonesian nation where non-Indonesians of good will will be able to share in the work.

This is the real importance of a restoration of law and order, the indispensable foundation of real liberty. We shall make use of it with energy and application for the reconstruction of the country, whatever may happen. And whatever may happen, we shall allow nothing to take away from us the security and liberty we have gained.

**Radio address by Lieutenant Governor-General,
Dr. H. J. van Mook, on August 20, 1947.**

It is obviously difficult, in a world where the forces of order and disorder, of totalitarianism and democracy, are still contending and where every country has its own national and international difficulties, to understand what is happening in Indonesia. A screen of phrases, slogans and accusations is hiding the realities for those who have no time or no inclination for a closer inspection of the facts and although it is patently absurd to suppose that The Netherlands would be so foolish, so stupid, so criminal as to undertake a reestablishment of colonial rule, we are accused of just that foolishness, that stupidity, that crime.

In order to understand what is really happening in Indonesia, we have to go back to the Japanese war and to recognize a few fundamental facts.

It has been the unhappy fate of this country that it was subjected to Japanese rule for a longer period and isolated in a more absolute way than any other occupied country in South East Asia. It was almost completely by-passed by the Allied forces. It had no contact with the Allied world and was not directly liberated by the Allied Armies like Burma or The Philippines. It was not allowed to maintain its own administration like Siam or Indo-China and therefore suffered the full impact of Japanese terrorism and Japanese propaganda.

It could know almost nothing of what was happening in the free world and its leading citizens, Indonesian, Dutch and Chinese, were interned, tortured and killed on a larger scale than anywhere else in this region.

The Japanese never intended to establish anything like self-government or independence in these islands as long as they hoped for victory. They eliminated the righteous and put the subservient, the selfish and the cruel in their places. They corrupted the youth and wrecked the system of education. They undermined the administration and ruined the well-balanced economy of the country.

They were hated and imitated at the same time. Many of those who resisted them learned to follow their example of terrorism and corruption.

When their defeat became certain, the Japanese suddenly reversed their policy. If they could not keep The Indies, they would leave them in such a state of disorganization that a decent reconstruction would

become almost impossible. They misused a very genuine and respectable Indonesian nationalism for their own purposes. They had to act in a hurry.

On August 9, 1945, Mr. Soekarno and Mr. Hatta were ordered to appear before the Japanese CINC of the Southern Area at Saigon, Field Marshall Terauchi, to get their instructions. On August 14 they returned to Batavia. On August 15 Japan capitulated. On August 17 the Republic of Indonesia was proclaimed after a very confusing game of political chess in which the Japanese Military Government remained practically neutral but several influential Japanese acted as sponsors.

The idea of a republic appealed strongly to the nationalistic imagination. Its organization, however, was weak and chaotic. One might even say that initially the central authority rested on the golden voice of Mr. Soekarno, the same voice that until only two months before had called upon the Indonesians to destroy the Allied forces and had lured thousands of them into the battalions of Japanese labor slaves, to be worked, starved and tortured to death in far off jungles.

Then came the tragic history of the execution of the Japanese surrender of the same 15th of August, 1945. The Allied Command in The Netherlands Indies was transferred from General MacArthur to Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, to a command which was necessarily unprepared for the task. Not until the 29th of September the first few British and Indian, with some Dutch and Indonesian troops landed at Batavia.

During the next month a few other narrow bridgeheads were occupied on Java and Sumatra. The Japanese forces practically interned themselves and passed over the bulk of their armaments to the more violent and irresponsible groups of the Japanese-trained Indonesian auxiliaries and youth organizations.

Over a hundred thousand internees were barely saved by the occupying forces; murders and kidnappings were the order of the day; destruction in several places was much heavier than during the whole war.

The first Soekarno Government contained a number of notorious collaborators. In November, however, Mr. Sjahrir came to the front and formed a new administration by expelling the collaborationist and criminal elements. The possibility of a new relationship between the Indonesians and the Dutch seemed to have come into existence.

It has been the consistent policy of the Netherlands Government to try to reinforce the constructive elements in the Republic in order to build up a real governmental organization.

Outside the Republic, in East Indonesia and Borneo, where the elimination of the Japanese had been achieved much quicker, law and order were gradually restored and regular Indonesian governments came into being. It was our hope that together with the Republic they would be able to form in the near future a sovereign federated United States of Indonesia, allied with The Netherlands in a real union which would be able to provide the personal and material assistance indispensable for the reconstruction of the country. This was laid down in the Linggadjati Agreement.

This hope has not been fulfilled. At first it looked as if slowly but surely the constructive and idealistic forces in the Republic would succeed in getting rid of the bad influence of Japan. They did not succeed. The arms remained principally in the hands of irresponsible groups led by major and minor war lords who were not interested in the restoration of orderly government. They owed their power and a comparatively easy living to the fact that they were armed and could requisition whatever they wanted or needed. There was not only a more or less official Republican Army; apart from that at least three political parties and several individuals had their private armed bands flanked by groups of regular highwaymen.

To their resistance was added in the course of 1946, another and possibly still more disastrous influence. Java and Sumatra contain one of the most highly organized machineries for the production of essential tropical foodstuffs and raw materials. The owners and managers of this machinery had been driven out by the war. The machinery itself had deteriorated but remained. Valuable stocks of its products were lying idle in the interior; they could be made available by cooperation between the Indonesians and the Dutch. This was essential for the restoration of prosperity, but this would mean at the same time the direct loss of a potential plunder worth many hundreds of millions to those who were in power and to an increasing group of individuals and organizations outside Indonesia who were greedy to participate in selling out or receiving other people's property. The needs of the world offered a ready excuse for a smuggling operation on an unprecedented scale offering huge profits to the traders and a nice rake-off to the Republican authorities at the shipping ports.

Corruption already inherited from the Japanese increased tenfold. To the opposition of those who had reason to fear the restoration of law and order was added the opposition of those who would lose by a restoration of property. This is the reason why despite the best in-

tentions, neither the truce nor the Linggadjati Agreement can ever really be implemented on the Republican side as long as the power remains in the hands of the war lords, the gang leaders and the profiteers with their armed guards, even though it means the absolute ruin of the country.

We have tried in every way to strengthen the hands of those who saw the perils for their people, but they are powerless against organized terrorism. This is the fundamental reason why the Republican Government refused a cooperation in practice which they had agreed to on paper. It would have meant the inspection of accounts which would not bear inspection and of which we have found many examples during the last few weeks.

Under duress they had to keep up a hostile propaganda casting suspicion on our intentions and inciting the Indonesians against us in order to cover the real resistance of those who had a vested interest in disorder under a cloak of patriotism. But in the long run this propaganda proved insufficient wherever real contact was established. To prevent a natural cooperation it had to be supplemented by terror. This is the reason why ultimately a policing action was inevitable.

Of course, those who felt themselves threatened, cried that it was a colonial war. The outcry was taken up in the world by those who were deceived by appearances and Republican propaganda, by those who had or meant to have a share in the liquidation of Dutch and other foreign interests in Indonesia, and by those who foster political unrest as a means to their own ends.

But on the other hand the results of the action have clearly demonstrated that we are not waging a colonial war at all but that we are fighting with the Indonesians against the evils of the Japanese inheritance, in order to create the conditions necessary for the formation of a real democratic and decent government of Indonesia.

The breakdown of the negotiations concerning the implementation of the Linggadjati Agreement was not caused, as the Republican spokesmen wish to suggest, by a unilateral interpretation or a high-handed and uncompromising attitude on our part. What we found in the areas where our troops restored law and order made it abundantly clear that it was impossible to implement the Linggadjati Agreement without exposing conditions of graft, fraud and incompetence prevailing particularly among the armed bands and the profiteers which simply could not bear exposure, without reflecting on the Republican Government because it tolerated or had no power to abolish them.

Meanwhile, the decent people and the suffering masses were becoming more and more restive. Requests reached us in growing numbers to step in and clean up the situation. There was a constant and increasing stream of refugees seeking protection within the narrow perimeters held by our troops. And yet our proposals for the formation of a dependable police force and the withdrawal or disbandment of all military and semi-military organizations were rejected. The truce concluded on October 14th, 1946, was practically ignored by the local Republican commanders. Six days after the Linggadjati Agreement was accepted by the Netherlands Parliament, the Republican CINC, General Soedirman, incited his troops to attacks which forced us to enlarge some perimeters in order to give an adequate protection to the inhabitants.

That we did the utmost to keep the Truce is clear enough. There was, as recent events have shown, certainly no military reason to remain cooped up month after month in narrow and overcrowded areas blockaded and harried by irresponsible gangs, who felt safe on the other side of the perimeters. We would not have begun our action, had there been a general hostility or had the Republican Government been really gaining authority over the armed gangs and the profiteers.

The outcome of the action proved that neither was the case. The action itself has exploded the fiction of a national war. There was not a sign of popular resistance. We had not a hundred killed or missing, but the armed gangs of the Republic killed many more of their own people to terrorize them into hostility. Even with these thoroughly Japanese methods of destruction and violence they did not succeed. They only destroyed and killed in a last effort to maintain their own privileged position. Hundreds of harmless and defenseless citizens, Chinese and Indonesian and Eurasian men, women and children, and thousands of homes, thousands of people were made destitute, driven away or herded together without food, shelter or protection.

The government organization we found was in most instances deplorable. There certainly still were districts where the local administration was tolerably good and in a few exceptional cases even excellent, but those districts constituted a minority and the area of reasonably good government was dwindling in many cases. The honest civil servants had been dismissed and replaced by incompetent yes-men.

Generals of the type of General Moestopo, the dentist who presided over the horrible murders by a so-called people's tribunal in Surabaya in October, 1945, were in supreme authority.

A feeling of relief spread wherever such authority came to an end.

When we stopped our action in conformity with the resolution of the Security Council, the violence on the other side increased. Our gesture was interpreted and broadcast as a military defeat. The dispersed bands took heart. In Jogjakarta the wildest rumors about Republican victories were spread and believed. Orders were given formally to cease fire but at the same time orders were issued to continue hostilities and terrorism in the territories occupied by our troops.

The Republican propaganda, too, continues along Japanese lines. Every time something comes to light which does not look too good for the Republic, Jogjakarta at once accuses the Dutch of having either done or provoked it. When we captured some flamethrowers, the Republican propaganda yelled that we were using those instruments which our army does not possess. When the first Japanese were killed or captured among the Indonesian bands, Jogjakarta put out that we used Japanese as shock troops. When they murdered a number of Chinese and burnt their houses, the excuse was that these people, who have been notoriously shy of mixing in the conflict, had been fighting on our side. When they recently fired the city and the oil installations of Pangkalan Brandan, more than ten miles beyond the line where we had halted, depriving four thousand Chinese of their homes and goods, a fictitious Dutch attack was described to explain this deed of wanton destruction and cruelty.

Mr. Sjahrir, unable to free himself from the Republican machine, continues this tradition at Lake Success by imputing to the Dutch troops the much advertised scorched earth policy of the Republic, of which our men found the dreary results wherever the Republican forces had passed and fled.

I shall not analyze these tactics any further. There remains little truth in the statements even of the foremost Republican representatives. On July 5, 1947, Prime Minister Mr. Sjarifoeddin ordered his people to collect the remaining six or seven hundred Japanese still hiding in Republican territory, in order to send them back to Japan. This sounded well because until then the Republican Government had consistently denied that there was even one Japanese left within the Republic. But it was an empty gesture. Several Japanese were killed or captured during the action and in Cheribon an authentic document was found dated July 4, 1947, and containing the names of 42 Japanese in the service of the Republic, with their Indonesian aliases.

Mr. Sjahrir stated at Lake Success that our present forces exceeded by 30,000 the number fixed at the date of the Truce. He was,

however, kept fully informed about our military establishment until he resigned as Prime Minister and knew that at that time the number was about 6,000 below the limit. He may be told that at this moment there is indeed a slight excess of 231 men. He never was able to inform us about the real numbers of armed Republicans.

We have stopped our action in order to reaffirm our willingness to try every method of minimizing the use of force. We thereby gave the present Republican Government one more opportunity to revise its aggressive attitude and its violent methods. Up till now it has shown no sign of such a change. On the contrary, it has tried everywhere to reorganize its terrorism and to extend its destruction. The fact that we halted our troops caused widespread consternation among the inhabitants of the territories on Java and Sumatra which they occupied. They implore us not to withdraw and never to deliver them again to the mercy of the Republic.

Jogjakarta decries these requests as Dutch machinations but at the same time orders are issued to kidnap, kill or mutilate these peaceful citizens, their wives and their children. The list of victims makes dreadful reading and is lengthening, but the areas that have been made safe are widening. They shall remain safe. The authority of the present Republican Government can no longer be recognized there. It has lost its right to obedience, as it has lost the confidence of the inhabitants.


We shall carry the responsibility for law and order until the Indonesians themselves, in cooperation with the inhabitants of other races, take over the responsibility. The Government, a real and decent government, is rapidly being organized there and shall have every assistance we can provide.

The Japanese-inspired nightmare is passing and shall not return. At the same time the opportunity for Jogjakarta to change its attitude and its methods is still open but it cannot continue to be open indefinitely. Neither the Indonesians nor the world nor we can tolerate the continuation of a regime which holds its own by murder, arson and torture. It is possible to hide these things for a time or to excuse them temporarily as the excesses caused by an excited nationalism, but there can be no liberty under a terror and terror would not be needed to rally the Indonesians in the defense of liberty if it were really threatened.

The accusations levelled at us on false or mistaken premises cannot make us feel guilty or ashamed. Together with the Indonesians we are curing the body politic of a Japanese infection. Together with

them we can at last begin to rebuild the country and to shape the really free nation it deserves to be. The destruction ordered by the Republican Government may seriously impede the progress of the work but the liquidation of the Japanese inheritance is a gain which far outweighs the loss and at the same time this loss had revealed that in the last resort there is a better motive than power or profit in the love for this country.

We shall not allow Japan the ultimate victory for which its agents have worked and plotted. Indonesian nationalism does not imply the forcible expulsion of the inhabitants of other races nor isolation from the western world. Because the hostility of Jogjakarta has not taken root and where there is no enmity, the forces of law and order, of honesty and decency, shall prevail over those other instincts of violence and greed and distrust which are trying to wreck the postwar world.



MAP OF INDONESIA

