

DAO-FL: Enabling Decentralized Input and Output Verification in Federated Learning with Decentralized Autonomous Organizations

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Abstract—In the rapidly evolving landscape of Web3 and blockchain technologies, decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) have emerged as innovative structures that operate autonomously through blockchain and smart contracts, eliminating the need for centralized control. The federated learning (FL) process, akin to an information flow under structured transparency, involves local models (LMs) as inputs and the global model (GM) as the output for each global iteration. Due to the centralized validation of LMs and GM updates, traditional FL systems lack transparency and security. To tackle these challenges, we introduce DAO-FL, a smart contract-based framework that harnesses the power of DAOs to enhance the security and transparency of FL systems. DAO-FL introduces the concept of DAO Membership Tokens (DAOMTs) as a governance tool within a DAO. DAOMTs play a crucial role within the DAO, facilitating members' enrollment and expulsion. Our framework incorporates a Validation-DAO for decentralized input verification (DIV) of the FL process, ensuring reliable and transparent validation of LMs. Additionally, DAO-FL utilizes a multi-signature approach facilitated by an Orchestrator-DAO to enable decentralized GM updates. This approach ensures decentralized output verification (DOV) of the FL process. We present a comprehensive system architecture, detailed execution workflow, implementation specifications, and qualitative evaluation for DAO-FL. Evaluation under threat models highlights DAO-FL's out-performance against traditional centralized-FL, effectively countering input and output attacks. DAO-FL excels in scenarios where DIV and DOV are crucial, offering enhanced transparency and trust. In conclusion, DAO-FL provides a compelling solution for FL, reinforcing the integrity of the FL ecosystem through decentralized decision-making and validation mechanisms.

Index Terms—Decentralized autonomous organization, Decentralized input verification, Decentralized output verification, Federated Learning, DAO membership tokens, Non-transferable tokens, Smart contract, Soul-bound tokens, Structured transparency.

I. INTRODUCTION

IN the dynamic landscape of Web3 and blockchain [1] technology, several disrupting technologies have emerged, transforming the way we interact and conduct digital transactions. Decentralized autonomous organizations (DAOs) [2] represent innovative organizational structures that operate autonomously through blockchain technology and smart contracts [3], [4], eliminating the need for centralized control.

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DAOs have the potential to revolutionize traditional hierarchical management paradigms, reducing communication, administration, and collaboration expenses within organizations [5]. Another groundbreaking innovation is Soul-Bound tokens (SBTs) [6], [7], which are non-transferable tokens (NTTs) intrinsically linked to specific addresses, serving as unique digital identities and reputation indicators. SBTs provide enhanced security and authenticity in various applications, including identity verification and exclusive ownership rights. Furthermore, Non-fungible Tokens (NFTs) [8], [9] have emerged as a game-changer in the art and gaming industries. These tokens represent distinct and indivisible digital assets, enabling provable ownership and authenticity for digital art, collectibles, and virtual assets.

Federated learning (FL) [10]–[13] as a distributed artificial intelligence (DAI) technique facilitates the collaborative learning of a highly accurate deep learning model by aggregating local models (LMs) into a global model (GM) through the FL process. The FL process can be viewed as an information flow within the context of structured transparency (ST) [14], where LMs serve as inputs and the GM is the output for each global iteration (GI) [15]. Input and output verification are vital components in ST. Input verification (IV) validates information flow inputs, ensuring alignment with requirements. Output verification (OV) guarantees output integrity, validating policy compliance and preventing tampering. Decentralized input verification (DIV) and Decentralized output verification (DOV) distribute these verification processes across multiple entities, eliminating reliance on a single entity. In FL, IV confirms compliance of submitted LMs with process policies, while OV ensures adherence of the produced GM to process policies.

FL is a resource-intensive process that typically requires several days of training to develop an initial deployable GM and necessitates ongoing updates over extended periods. In traditional centralized FL frameworks, LMs are validated by a central server, which aggregates them to produce the GM. This reliance on a centralized server for both input and output verification creates a critical vulnerability: if the central server is compromised, a single erroneous GM update can severely undermine the accuracy and integrity of the entire FL process. Moreover, this centralized approach limits transparency and accountability, as the validation and aggregation processes are controlled by a single entity, increasing the risk of manipulation and misuse. These shortcomings highlight the urgent need for a more robust and decentralized solution that can

enhance the security and reliability of FL systems. To address these challenges, we propose the DAO-FL framework, which integrates DAOs and a multi-signature [16] contract with FL to facilitate Decentralized Input Verification (DIV) and Decentralized Output Verification (DOV). By leveraging the principles of decentralization, DAO-FL distributes the verification process across multiple participants, thereby enhancing transparency and significantly reducing the risks associated with central authority manipulation. This innovative approach not only strengthens the integrity of the FL process but also fosters a more collaborative and trustworthy environment for all stakeholders involved. The following is a summary of our contributions:

- We introduce DAO Membership Tokens (DAOMTs) which serve as a means for governance in systems utilizing DAOs.
- We design decentralized schemes for member enrollment and member expulsion within a DAO.
- We present a comprehensive system architecture and detailed execution workflow of DAO-FL, a framework powered by DAOs and smart contracts for partially decentralized orchestration of the FL process. The VDAO ensures DIV by validating and rewarding local model uploads (LMUs). Additionally, DAO-FL utilizes a multi-signature contract through the ODAO to ensure DOV by validating the GM updates.
- We present comprehensive implementation and deployment specifications, including the smart contract code¹. Additionally, we provide evaluations of DAO-FL concerning threat models, qualitative assessments, and case studies. Furthermore, we discuss DAO-FL's applicability, limitations, and future direction.

The remaining sections of this article are structured as follows: Section II provides a comprehensive review of related literature on our study. In Section III, we explore the relevant preliminaries necessary for understanding our work. The system architecture and execution workflow of DAO-FL is expounded upon in Section IV. Implementation specifications, deployment details, evaluation on threat models, and qualitative evaluation of DAO-FL can be found in Section V. This section also covers the discussion on applicability, limitations, future directions of DAO-FL, and practical case studies. Finally, we conclude our paper in Section VI. Table I lists the abbreviations, symbols, and their descriptions.

II. RELATED WORK

Bluemke *et al.* in [21] examined the importance of data privacy-enhancing technologies in AI governance. They emphasized advancements in balancing privacy and performance during data exchange and analysis, highlighting the role of ST in facilitating controlled information flow. Their work addresses critical questions regarding who can access data, when, and how, ensuring efficient collaboration while minimizing the risk of data misuse.

Majeed *et al.* in [1] proposed the ST-BFL framework, integrating homomorphic encryption, FL-aggregators, FL-verifiers, and a smart contract to meet the components of ST

TABLE I
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS, SYMBOLS AND DESCRIPTION

Abbreviation	Symbol	Description
DIV	-	Decentralized input verification
DOV	-	Decentralized output verification
DAO	-	Decentralized Autonomous Organization
DAOC	-	DAO contract
DAOFLC	-	DAO-FL contract
DAOMT	-	DAO Membership Token
-	$D_{i,t+1}$	local dataset of $FLTrainer_{i,t+1}$
FLNFTC	-	FL-NFT contract
FLT	FLT	FL Task
FLTP	-	FL-task publisher
FLTokenC	-	FL-Token contract
-	$FLTrainer_{i,t+1}$	i^{th} FL-Trainer for $t + 1^{th}$ GI
GI	t	t^{th} Global Iteration
GM	GM	Global Model
GMCID	$GMCID$	Global Model (IPFS) Content Identifier
IPFS	-	InterPlanetary File System
IV	-	Input verification
JP	JP	Join Proposal
KP	KP	Kick Proposal
LM	LM	Local Model
LMU	$LMU_{i,t+1}$	local model upload of $FLTrainer_{i,t+1}$
LMUVDRF	-	LMU's verification, denial, and reward flag
LMURI	-	local model Uniform Resource Identifier
LMCID	-	local model (IPFS) Content Identifier
MultiSigC	-	Multi-Signature contract
-	n(DAOMT)	DAOMT supply
NFT	-	Non-fungible Token
NTT	-	Non-transferable Token
ODAO	-	Orchestrator-DAO
ODAOc	-	Orchestrator-DAO contract
ODAOm	$ODAOm_i$	i^{th} Orchestrator-DAO member
ODAOmT	-	Orchestrator-DAO Membership Token
ODAOmTC	-	Orchestrator-DAOMT contract
OV	-	Output verification
-	<i>Regulator</i>	regularity body governing FL ecosystem
SBT	-	Soul-Bound Token
ST	-	Structured Transparency
-	<i>tokenURI</i>	IPFS URI for meta data of tokens
URI	-	Uniform Resource Identifier
VDAO	-	Validation-DAO
VDAOC	-	VDAO contract
VDAOm	$VDAOm_i$	i^{th} VDAO member
VDAOmT	-	Validation-DAO Membership Token
VDAOmTC	-	Validation-DAOMT contract

¹<https://github.com/umermajeedkhu/DAOFLcode/tree/main/contracts>

TABLE II
OVERVIEW OF STRUCTURED TRANSPARENCY IN RECENT BLOCKCHAIN-ENABLED FL FRAMEWORKS AND DAO-FL

	Input Privacy	Output Privacy	Input Verification	Output Verification	Flow Governance
ST-BFL [15]	homomorphic encrypted LMs	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> homomorphic encrypted GM decryption key access restriction 	-	decentralized (FL-verifiers) (★ lacks detailed protocol design)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Smart Contracts FLTP FL-verifiers FL-aggregator
FL-Incentivizer [17]	basic FL privacy	basic FL privacy	centralized (FLTPCO)	centralized (FLTPCO)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Smart Contracts FLTPCO FL-Tokens FL-NFT
PureFed [18]	symmetric key encryption (★ needs trusted Validator)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> symmetric key encryption basic FL privacy 	centralized (Validator)	centralized (decision controller)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Smart Contracts Owner Worker & Validator PureFed Server
OpenFL [19]	basic FL privacy	basic FL privacy	decentralized (feedback by other FL-Trainers)	- (each FL-Trainer aggregates global model locally)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Challenge - Smart Contract Global Reputation Scores
DFL [20]	symmetric key encryption (★ needs trusted blockchain nodes)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - basic FL privacy 	decentralized (blockchain nodes) (★ only tamper-based validation of local models)	decentralized (★ multi-signature scheme) (★ each blockchain node aggregate global model locally)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Smart Contracts Smart Infrastructures Edge Servers Blockchain Nodes
DAO-FL (This work)	basic FL privacy	basic FL privacy	decentralized (Validation-DAO) (★ DAO-based voting)	decentralized (Orchestration-DAO & MultiSigC) (★ DAO-based approval)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Smart Contracts FLTP & DAOs FL-Tokens FL-NFT DAOMTs

[14] in FL process. Homomorphic encryption ensures input privacy, while FL-verifiers validate the GM for OV. However, ST-BFL does not support LM validation, as it prioritizes input privacy over IV. Moreover, details on the authentication and authorization of FL-verifiers, which are crucial for OV, are lacking. In contrast, DAO-FL emphasizes decentralized IV and OV in the FL process using DAOs. Majeed *et al.* proposed the FL-Incentivizer in [17], which incentivizes device participation in FL through FL-Tokens and provides ownership rights to a GM via FL-NFT. FL-Incentivizer employs the FLTPCO for LMs' validation and GM updates, ensuring centralized IV and OV. However, DAO-FL extends on the FL-Incentivizer by decentralizing the IV and OV processes using DAOs and a multi-signature contract.

Putra *et al.* in [18] presents PureFed, a FL framework designed to enhance efficiency, collaboration, and trustworthiness in AI model training. It leverages blockchain technology for secure, traceable interactions through smart contracts, encryption, and dual digital signatures. PureFed also implements dynamic aggregation and incentive mechanisms to optimize model convergence and promote honest collaboration. Wahrstätter *et al.* in [19] introduces OpenFL, a framework that enhances trust, scalability, and data privacy in FL through a collateral-backed reputation system. By leveraging the Ethereum blockchain and smart contracts, OpenFL requires participants to stake collateral to deter malicious behavior

while emphasizing off-chain computation to reduce costs. The study demonstrates OpenFL's effectiveness with datasets like MNIST and CIFAR-10, positioning it as a promising model for future decentralized federated learning advancements.

Kalapaaking *et al.* in [20] propose an auditable and verifiable mechanism for blockchain-based decentralized federated learning (DFL), enabling scalable peer-to-peer exchange and aggregation of local models by blockchain nodes. A multi-signature scheme is used to verify the aggregated model, ensuring consensus and integrity. Edge servers run Ethereum nodes for smart-contract-based monitoring during local training, employing AES encryption to secure models before validation and aggregation by blockchain nodes. However, The article does not provide details on the access management of AES keys among blockchain nodes or the decryption process for aggregating local models. Moreover, DFL only provides tamper-based validation of local models, comparing their hashes to ensure integrity during transmission. Table. II analyzes recent blockchain-enabled FL frameworks alongside the proposed DAO-FL framework through the lens of ST components.

Lunesu *et al.* in [22] demonstrated the practical use of SBTs for COVID-19 vaccine certification through a decentralized Vaccine System DApp, leveraging blockchain. The authors highlight SBTs' potential in establishing a decentralized society and enabling self-sovereign identity (SSI). In

[23], the authors proposed using SBTs to encode individuals' affiliations and academic credentials in a decentralized network. By incorporating off-chain storage, smart contracts, and cryptographic technologies, they enhance privacy and security, offering reliable academic credential verification.

Diallo *et al.* in [24] presented an eGov-DAO system to enhance the efficiency, transparency, and security of e-government transactions. By implementing a DAO and smart contracts, the system automates transactions, reducing errors and uncertainty while ensuring accountability and mitigating corruption risks. Although the study offers a comprehensive design and potential advantages, additional research is essential to assess the practical applicability of the system in real-world government operations. Aitzhan *et al.* in [16] presented a decentralized energy trading system utilizing multi-signature transactions on the blockchain. Multi-signature ensures transaction security, requiring 2 out of 3 signatures to spend a token and preventing mediators from controlling transactions. This enhances security and protects against theft, fostering a trustworthy and competitive energy trading environment without relying on third parties.

Zhang *et al.* in [25] introduced a cross-chain digital asset system aimed at enhancing secure trading and payment by employing a relay chain alongside two parallel chains: the digital asset chain (DAC) and the payment chain (PC). This system addresses interoperability challenges between different blockchains, facilitating efficient communication and transaction security while enabling seamless digital asset exchange.

III. PRELIMINARIES

This section provides an overview of the technologies employed in the design and implementation of the DAO-FL framework.

A. Decentralized Autonomous Organization

A DAO [26] is a digital entity akin to traditional companies, empowering members to propose and vote on governance decisions typically made by boards or executives. Operating autonomously, a DAO follows business logic encoded in its smart contract to achieve its community's collective mission, supported by a token-based incentive structure. Launched in 2016, "The DAO" was the first DAO, raising \$150 million in Ether (ETH) and becoming a significant digital crowdfunding project [5]. Other notable DAOs include DigixDAO, Aragon, and Steemit. The creation of a DAO starts with Externally Owned Accounts (EOAs) [1] sending Ether to the DAO's smart contract address, after which DAO tokens are issued to these EOAs, signifying membership and voting rights. DAOs facilitate various objectives, such as delivering services, raising funds, managing smart assets, coordinating with other autonomous software, and fostering stakeholder collaboration.

B. Structured Transparency

Structured transparency [14] is a framework that balances privacy and transparency in information flows, consisting of five components: input privacy, output privacy, IV, OV, and flow governance. Input privacy ensures that confidential information is processed without exposure to unauthorized

parties, while output privacy allows data contribution without the risk of revealing sensitive input. IV involves verifying the integrity and authenticity of input, whereas OV ensures that the output remains untampered. Flow governance manages and controls the overall information flow. Each component has specific requirements: input privacy requires secure processing mechanisms; output privacy demands protection against the inference of sensitive input data from the output; IV needs methods for input integrity verification; OV requires techniques to confirm output integrity; and flow governance necessitates comprehensive control over the entire information flow.

C. Multi-signature wallet

A multi-signature (multisig) wallet is a digital wallet that enhances security by requiring multiple approvals before a transaction is executed [27]. Transactions in multisig wallets are governed by the quorum quotient (m-of-n ratio), which specifies the minimum number of signatories needed to authorize a transaction, relative to the total number of signatories [16]. For example, a 3-of-5 wallet requires at least three of five signers to approve a transaction. This setup is beneficial for scenarios involving multiple parties that must agree on a transaction or when additional security is needed to prevent unauthorized activities. Multisig wallets are widely used in various domains, such as financial transactions, corporate governance, and cryptocurrency exchange management. They often leverage smart contracts to enforce the requirement of multiple signatures for transaction approval, ensuring robust security and consensus before execution.

IV. PROPOSED FRAMEWORK

This section provides a detailed explanation of the proposed system architecture and execution workflow within the DAO-FL framework. As illustrated in Fig. 1, the system architecture consists of three main components: the administrative block, the decentralized block, and the FL-trainer block.

The administrative block in the DAO-FL framework includes key stakeholders such as the regulator, FL-task-publisher (FLTP), Orchestrator-DAO (ODAO), and Validation-DAO (VDAO). These entities manage and coordinate various functions within the DAO-FL ecosystem. The regulator, denoted as *Regulator* oversees the FL ecosystem, deploys the FLNFTC, and standardizes FL-NFTs metadata. When an FLTP entity uses the DAO-FL framework to train an FL model, it must deploy specific smart contracts: ODAOC, VDAOC, DAOFLC, and MultiSigC, tailored for the FL task (FLT). The ODAO, overseeing the FL process, comprises multiple members ($ODAO_M_i$). Orchestrator-DAO members (ODAOs) approve FLTP's proposals and possess the ability to aggregate LMs. The VDAO verifies LMs submitted by FL-Trainers through its VDAO-members (VDAOs), where each $VDAO_M_i$ validates LMs pertinent to the FLT.

The decentralized block comprises several key components: FL-NFT contract (FLNFTC), ODAO contract (ODAO), Orchestrator-DAOMT contract (ODAOMTC), VDAO contract (VDAOC), Validation-DAOMT contract (VDAOMTC), DAO-FL contract (DAOFLC), Multi-Signature contract (MultiSigC),

FL-Token contract (FLTokenC), and InterPlanetary File System (IPFS). FLNFTC, based on ERC-721 and deployed by the regulator, tokenizes FLT's GM. ODAOC and VDAOC manage memberships for ODAO and VDAO, respectively. ODAOMTC and VDAOMTC mint Orchestrator-DAOMTs (ODAOMTs) and Validation-DAOMTs (VDAOMTs) for their corresponding members. Both contracts are ERC-721 customizations deployed by their respective DAO contracts. A detailed explanation of DAOMTs is available in Section IV-A. DAOFLC orchestrates the FL process for the FLT, supported by MultiSigC for decentralized verification through collective signatures from $ODAOM_i$. FLTokenC, deployed by DAOFLC, manages FL-Tokens for FLT. IPFS [17] provides decentralized storage for metadata, LMs, and GM.

The system architecture also includes two other key components: FL-NFTs and FL-Tokens. Each FL-NFT, denoted as *FLNFT* and identified by a unique id *FLNFTID*, is a dynamic ERC-721 compliant NFT associated with a specific FLT. It includes an IPFS-based Uniform Resource Identifier (URI), *tokenURI*, linking to the metadata of the current GM [17], along with a *GMCID* representing the IPFS Content Identifier (CID) [17] of the latest GM. Additionally, each FL-NFT holds the address of its DAOFLC, defined internally as *OrchestratorAddress*. The *tokenURI*, *GMCID*, and

The subsequent subsections are outlined as follows: Section IV-A introduces the concept of DAOMTs. Section IV-B proposes a member enrollment scheme for adding new DAO members, while Section IV-C presents a scheme for expelling inactive or malicious members. Section IV-D outlines a mechanism for transferring ODAOC or VDAOC ownership. In Section IV-E, we propose a partially decentralized orchestration scheme for the FL process in the DAOFLC using MultiSigC. Section IV-F details the DAO-FL framework’s execution workflow, orchestrating the FL process from initial setup to completing a full GI. Section IV-G explores GM commercialization through the transfer of FL-NFT and smart contracts’ ownership.

DAOs are decentralized organizations governed by members through a voting-based decision process. DAOMTs are tokens specifically designed to represent membership within a DAO. Classified as NTTs and SBTs, they cannot be traded or transferred [6]. As unique NFTs, DAOMTs are created (minted) or destroyed (burned) to manage membership. Typically, members hold only one token per address. DAOMTs can also be grouped into collections to represent different membership levels or types. They play a vital role in DAO governance, granting members voting rights on proposals and

Algorithm 1 : Membership Enrollment via DAOC

Caller: $DAOM_p$ **Output:** *new JP*

```

1: procedure proposeJoin(address candidate)
2:   Ensure  $DAOM_p \in DAO$ 
3:   if  $candidate \notin DAO$  and  $!JoinProposals[candidate].open$  then
4:     Create new  $JP \leftarrow \{proposer: DAOM_p, candidate: candidate, open: true, approvalvotes: 0, denialvotes: 0, voters: \emptyset\}$ 
5:     Add  $JP$  to  $JoinProposals$ 
6:   else
7:     Revert
8:   end if
9: end procedure

Caller:  $DAOM_v$    Output: updated JP, [DOAMT Minted for candidate]
```

```

1: procedure voteJoin(address candidate, bool  $V_v$ )
2:   Ensure  $DAOM_v \in DAO$ 
3:    $JP \leftarrow JoinProposals[candidate]$ 
4:   if  $JP.open$  and  $DAOM_v \notin JP.voters$  then
5:     if  $V_v == true$  then
6:       Add Approval vote for  $DAOM_v$  in  $JP$ 
7:     else
8:       Add Deny vote for  $DAOM_v$  in  $JP$ 
9:     end if
10:    Count  $JP.approvalvotes$  and  $JP.denialvotes$ 
11:     $Q = 60\% * n(DAOMT)$ 
12:    if  $JP.approvalvotes > Q$  then
13:      Mint DOAMT for candidate
14:    end if
15:    if  $JP.approvalvotes > Q$  or  $JP.denialvotes > Q$  then
16:      Set  $JP.open = false$ 
17:    end if
18:  else
19:    Revert
20:  end if
21: end procedure
```

facilitating decentralized decision-making. By representing the membership, DAOMTs help ensure a democratic approach to managing and guiding the DAO's operations.

B. Membership Enrollment in ODAO and VDAO

The process of joining ODAO or VDAO follows a similar approach. This section outlines the steps for joining a DAO through a DAO contract (DAOC), which is inherited by both ODAOC and VDAOC. After DAO creation, pre-existing members denoted as $DAOM_i \in DAO$, are required. The sequential steps for joining a DAO are summarized below:

- Step 1: When a new *candidate* seeks to join the DAO, a current member ($DAOM_p$) initiates a “proposeJoin” transaction to the DAOC, providing the *candidate*’s address to propose their inclusion in the DAO.
- Step 2: The DAOC validates that $DAOM_p$ holds a DAOMT.
- Step 3: If the candidate is not a current DAO member and no “Join Proposal” (JP) exists for the candidate’s address, a new JP is created. Proposed by $DAOM_p$, the JP is marked “open” for processing, with *approvalvotes* and *denialvotes* set to 0. The voter set is empty, indicating no votes have been cast yet.
- Step 4: The JP is stored in the *JoinProposals* mapping, indexed by the *candidate*’s address.

Steps 1-4 are combined in the procedure *proposeJoin* (Algo. 1). DAO members vote to accept or reject the JP as follows:

- Step 5: When a $DAOM_v$ votes on a JP , they initiate a “voteJoin” transaction in DAOC, submitting the




Fig. 2. Membership Enrollment in DAO - Sequence diagram.

candidate’s address and a boolean variable (V_v) representing their decision. A “true” value indicates approval, while “false” signifies disapproval.

- Step 6: To prevent spam, the DAOC verifies that $DAOM_v$ holds a DAOMT.
- Step 7: If an open JP exists for the *candidate* and $DAOM_v$ hasn’t voted yet, their vote is added to $JP.voters$. The total number of approval and denial votes are tallied as:

$$JP_{approvalvotes} = \sum_{V_v \in JP.voters} \mathbf{1}_{V_v == true}, \quad (1)$$

and

$$JP_{denialvotes} = \sum_{V_v \in JP.voters} \mathbf{1}_{V_v == false} \quad (2)$$

respectively. The quorum is $Q = 60\% \times n(DAOMT)$, where $n(DAOMT)$ is the DAOMTC’s total supply. If $JP_{approvalvotes}$ exceeds Q , DAOC mints a DAOMT for the candidate via DAOMTC and closes the JP by setting

Algorithm 2 : Member Expulsion via DAOC

Caller: $DAOM_p$ **Output:** new KP

```

1: procedure proposeKick(address candidate)
2:   Ensure  $DAOM_p \in DAO$ 
3:   if candidate  $\in DAO$  and ! $KickProposals[candidate].open$  then
4:     Create new  $KP \leftarrow \{proposer: DAOM_p, candidate: candidate,$ 
       open: true, approvalvotes: 0, denialvotes: 0, voters:  $\emptyset\}$ 
5:     Add  $KP$  to  $KickProposals$ 
6:   else
7:     Revert
8:   end if
9: end procedure

Caller:  $DAOM_v$  Output: updated  $KP$ , [DOAMT Burned for candidate]
1: procedure voteKick(address candidate, bool  $V_v$ )
2:   Ensure  $DAOM_v \in DAO$ 
3:   Ensure candidate  $\in DAO$ 
4:    $KP \leftarrow KickProposals[candidate]$ 
5:   if  $KP.open$  and  $DAOM_v \notin KP.voters$  then
6:     if  $V_v == true$  then
7:       Add Approval vote for  $DAOM_v$  in  $KP$ 
8:     else
9:       Add Deny vote for  $DAOM_v$  in  $KP$ 
10:    end if
11:    Count  $KP.approvalvotes$  and  $KP.denialvotes$ 
12:     $Q = 60\% * n(DAOMT)$ 
13:    if  $KP.approvalvotes > Q$  then
14:      Burn DOAMT owned by candidate
15:    end if
16:    if  $KP.approvalvotes > Q$  or  $KP.denialvotes > Q$  then
17:      Set  $KP.open = false$ 
18:    end if
19:  else
20:    Revert
21:  end if
22: end procedure

```

the “open” flag to false. If $JP_{denialvotes}$ exceeds Q , the JP is rejected, and the “open” flag is set to false.

Steps 5-7 are consolidated in the procedure *voteJoin* (Algo. 1). Fig. 2 visually illustrates the process of joining a DAO.

C. Member Expulsion in ODAO and VDAO

The presence of inactive or malicious members in a DAO necessitates their removal. Inactive members fail to participate in the FL process, while malicious members endorse inaccurate updates. Both ODAO and VDAO use the same kick-out mechanism for expelling such members. The mechanism follows these sequential steps:

- Step 1: When a DAO member ($DAOM_p$) identifies another member (*candidate*) for expulsion, $DAOM_p$ begins the kick-out process by submitting a “proposeKick” transaction to the DAOC, including the *candidate*’s address as an argument.
- Step 2: DAOC confirms that $DAOM_p$ possesses a $DAOMT$, preventing spam transactions.
- Step 3: If the *candidate* is a DAO member and no existing “Kick Proposal” (KP) is underway for them, a new KP is initiated. The *candidate* becomes the target, and $DAOM_p$ serves as the proposer. The KP is marked “open,” indicating it is pending a decision. Both *approvalvotes* and *denialvotes* are set to zero, and the $KP.voters$ list is empty.
- Step 4: The KP is added to the *KickProposals* mapping, indexed by the *candidate*’s address.

Steps 1-4 are consolidated into the procedure *proposeKick* (Algo. 2). The voting process, carried out by DAO members for the KP , includes the following steps:




Fig. 3. Member Expulsion from DAO -Sequence diagram.

- Step 5: In the DAO’s kick proposal voting process, a member ($DAOM_v$) can vote via a “voteKick” transaction to DAOC. This transaction includes the *candidate*’s address and a boolean (V_v) indicating approval (true) or disapproval (false).
- Step 6: DAOC verifies that both $DAOM_v$ and the *candidate* possess a $DAOMT$.
- Step 7: If the KP is “open” for the *candidate* and $DAOM_v$ has not yet voted, their vote is recorded in $KP.voters$. The total approval and denial votes are counted as:

$$KP_{approvalvotes} = \sum_{V_v \in KP.voters} 1_{V_v == true}, \quad (3)$$

and

$$KP_{denialvotes} = \sum_{V_v \in KP.voters} 1_{V_v == false} \quad (4)$$

Algorithm 3 : Transferring DAOC

Caller: FLTP **Modifier:** onlyOwner() **Output:** [Ownership *transferred*]

```

2: procedure transferOwnership(address newOwner)
3:   oldOwner ← owner()
4:   if oldOwner ≠ newOwner then
5:     Transfer DOAC to newOwner
6:   if newOwner ∉ DAO then
7:     Mint a DAOMT for newOwner
8:     Burn the DAOMT of oldOwner
9:   end if
10: end if
11: end procedure

```

respectively. The quorum is $Q = 60\% \times n(DAOMT)$, where $n(DAOMT)$ is the DAOMTC's total supply. If the $KP_{approvalvotes}$ exceed the threshold Q , DAOC proceeds to burn the DAOMT held by the *candidate*, thereby closing the KP by setting the “open” flag to false. Conversely, if $KP_{denialvotes}$ exceed Q , the KP is rejected, and the “open” flag is likewise set to false.

Steps 5-7 for a KP are summarized in the procedure *voteKick* (Algo. 2). The sequential process for expelling a member from a DAO is illustrated in Fig. 3.

D. Transferring ODAOC and VDAOC

The FLTP owns the GM, verified by the FL-NFT in FLNFTC. The FLTP also owns ODAOC and VDAOC. Upon transferring the FL-NFT ownership, ODAOC and VDAOC must also be transferred. The steps for transferring DAOC ownership, outlined in the procedure *transferOwnership* (Algo. 3), are as follows:

- Step 1: The current owner (FLTP) initiates a “transfer ownership” transaction to DAOC, specifying the new owner's (*newOwner*) address.
- Step 2: DAOC confirms that *newOwner* is distinct from the current owner and completes the ownership transfer. If *newOwner* is not a DAO member, a DAOMT is minted for them, and the *oldOwner*'s DAOMT is burned to maintain scarcity.

E. Partially Decentralized Orchestration of FL process in DAOFLC through Multi-Signature Contract

In a multi-signature wallet setup, the Multi-Signature Contract (MultiSigC) gathers signatures or votes from specified individuals. Once the quorum is met, MultiSigC executes the transaction within the designated contract. In DAO-FL, MultiSigC collects votes from ODAOMs for decentralized approval of proposals, enabling transaction execution in the DAOFLC to orchestrate the FL process. Although MultiSigC manages decentralized approval, the FLTP retains sole responsibility for executing approved proposals, resulting in partial decentralization. This sequential process, illustrated in Fig. 4 is as follows:

- Step 1: The FLTP initiates a transaction “propose” (or “proposecreateFLNFT” or “proposeUpdateGM”) with specific arguments submitted to MultiSigC. This transaction can address proposals such as “createFLNFT,” “Initiate_LMUs,” “Cease_LMUs,” “setLMUVDRF,” or “UpdateGM.” After verifying the transaction's origin,

Algorithm 4 : MultiSigC

Caller: FLTP **Modifier:** onlyOwner() **Output:** [new *Proposal* (*proposal*)]

```

1: procedure propose(selector, [tokenURI], [GMCID], [t + 1])
2:   Require: Caller == MultiSigC.owner()
3:   if Validate(propose) then
4:     proposal ← Create new Proposal with proposalID
5:     Set proposal.state = “Open”, proposal.selector
6:   else
7:     Revert
8:   end if
9: end procedure
Output: [proposal executed]
1: procedure execute(uint proposalID)
2:   Require: Caller == MultiSigC.owner()
3:   if Proposal[proposalID].state == “Executable” then
4:     selector = Proposal[proposalID].selector
5:     argumentData = Proposal[proposalID].argumentData
6:     if Call DAOFLC.selector with argumentData then
7:       Set proposal.state = “Executed”; Update state of MultiSigC
8:     end if
9:   else
10:    Revert
11:   end if
12: end procedure
Output: [proposal closed]
1: procedure closeProposal(uint proposalID)
2:   Require: Caller == MultiSigC.owner(); state ← Proposal[proposalID].state
3:   if state == Open or state == “Executable” then
4:     Set Proposal[proposalID].state = “Closed”
5:   else
6:     Revert
7:   end if
8: end procedure

Caller: ODAOMv    Output: updated proposal, [proposal executable]
1: procedure approve(uint proposalID)
2:   Ensure ODAOMv ∈ ODAO; proposal ← Proposal[proposalID]
3:   if proposal.state == “Open” and ODAOMv ∉ proposal.approvals then
4:     Add ODAOMv to proposal.approvals
5:     numApprovals = proposal.approvals.length()
6:     if numApprovals > (Q = 60% * n(ODAOMT)) then
7:       Set proposal.state = “Executable”
8:     end if
9:   else
10:    Revert
11:   end if
12: end procedure

```

MultiSigC validates it against the arguments, proposal type, and current state. Once validated, a new *proposal* is created with a unique *proposalID* and is set to “Open” state. The *selector* of *proposal* is configured using the corresponding function signatures [28] in DAOFLC. The FLTP then seeks ODAOMs' approval off-chain. This step is outlined in the procedure *propose* (Algo. 4).

- Step 2: ODAOMs evaluate the proposal off-chain, considering its attributes, nature, and the states of MultiSigC and DAOFLC. If valid, an ODAOM_v submits an “approve” transaction with the *proposalID* to MultiSigC. MultiSigC verifies that the transaction is legitimate, appropriate, and timely. It also ensures the *proposal* is open and that ODAOM_v hasn't previously voted. Upon successful validation, a approval vote is recorded. The cumulative approvals are defined as:

$$numApprovals = \sum_{ODAOM_v \in \text{proposal.approvals}} 1. \quad (5)$$

If the cumulative approvals exceed the quorum Q (60% of ODAOMTC supply), the *proposal*'s state is updated to the “Executable”. This step is outlined in procedure *approve* (Algo. 4).




Fig. 4. Partially Decentralized Orchestration of FL process in DAOFLC through MultiSigC - Sequence diagram.

- Step 3: Once a *proposal* has the required approvals, FLTP initiates its execution by submitting an “execute” transaction with the *proposalID* to MultiSigC. MultiSigC verifies the *proposal*’s executability based on its state and the current MultiSigC state. If valid, the proposal is executed within DAOFLC, and its state is updated. This process is detailed in the procedure *execute* (Algo. 4). FLTP then submits the next “propose” transaction to maintain DAO-FL operations.

Algorithm 5 : FLNFTC Owner & Deployer: Regulator

Input: “Federated Learning NFT”, “FLNFT”, *base_URI*
Output: FLNFTC *deployed*

```

1: procedure FLNFTC_Constructor(_name, _symbol, base_URI)
2:   FLNFTC ← {owner: Regulator.address, name: _name,
   symbol: _symbol, base_URI: base_URI}
3: end procedure
Output: FLNFT minted   Executor: DAOFLC
1: procedure craftFLNFT(GMCID, tokenURI)
2:   FLNFTID ← Mint FLNFT transferred to FLTP
3:   FLNFT ← {tokenURI: tokenURI, GMCID: GMCID,
   OrchestratorAddress: DAOFLC.address}
4: end procedure
Output: [FLNFT updated]   Executor: DAOFLC
1: procedure assignGMCID(GMCID, FLNFTID)
2:   if FLNFTC.Verify_GMCID(FLNFTID, GMCID) then
3:     Assign GMCIDs[FLNFTID] ← GMCID
4:     Ensure Distinct GMCIDs
5:     Emit GMCIDset(FLNFTID, GMCID)
6:     Return true
7:   end if
8: end procedure
Output: [FLNFT updated]   Executor: DAOFLC
1: procedure assignTokenURI(tokenURI, FLNFTID)
2:   if FLNFTC.Verify_TokenURI(tokenURI, FLNFTID) then
3:     Assign tokenURIs[FLNFTID] ← tokenURI
4:     Ensure Distinct tokenURIs
5:     Emit TokenURIset(FLNFTID, tokenURI)
6:     Return true
7:   end if
8: end procedure

```

Algorithm 6 : FLTP

Output: Proposal “createFLNFT” *created*

```

1: procedure Generate_FLNFT(t)
2:   Create  $GM_t$ 
3:   GMCID ← Store  $GM_t$  on IPFS
4:   Create FLNFT_Metadatat for  $GM_t$ 
5:   tokenURI ← Store FLNFT_Metadatat on IPFS
6:   Call MultiSigC.proposecreateFLNFT(GMCID, tokenURI)
7: end procedure
Output: Proposal “Initiate_LMUs” created
1: procedure Initiate_LMUploads(t + 1)
2:   Call MultiSigC.propose(selector, t + 1)   ▷ for “Initiate_LMUs”
3: end procedure
Output: Proposal “Cease_LMUs” created
1: procedure Halt_LMUploads(t + 1)
2:   Call MultiSigC.propose(selector, t + 1)   ▷ for “Cease_LMUs”
3: end procedure
Output: Proposal “setLMUVDRF” created
1: procedure Configure_LMUVDRF(t + 1)
2:   Call MultiSigC.propose(selector, t + 1)   ▷ for “setLMUVDRF”
3: end procedure
Output: Proposal “UpdateGM” created
1: procedure Aggregate_LMUs(t + 1)
2:   Create  $GM_{t+1}$  using [9]
3:   GMCID ← Store  $GM_{t+1}$  on IPFS
4:   Create FLNFT_Metadatat+1 for  $GM_{t+1}$ 
5:   tokenURI ← Store FLNFT_Metadatat+1 on IPFS
6:   Call MultiSigC.proposeUpdateGM(t + 1, GMCID, tokenURI)
7: end procedure

```

If a *proposal* lacks sufficient approvals due to inaccuracies in *tokenURI* or *GMCID*, FLTP can submit revised proposals. To discard inaccurate ones, FLTP submits a “closeProposal” transaction with the *proposalID*, closing it for future accurate submissions. This process is detailed in the procedure *closeProposal* (Algo. 4).

F. Execution Workflow of DAO-FL framework

In this subsection, we explore the execution workflow of the DAO-FL framework for a complete GI t , as depicted in Fig. 5. The following is an outline of the sequential flow:

- Step 1: The Regulator deploys the FLNFTC for the FL ecosystem, providing three arguments: “Federated




Fig. 5. DAO-FL: Simplified execution workflow.

Learning NFT" as the name, "FLNFT" as the symbol, and a base_URI for the *tokenURI* of FL-NFTs. Ownership of FLNFTC is subsequently transferred to the *Regulator*. This process is summarized in the procedure *FLNFTC_Constructor* (Algo. 5).

- Step 2: FLTP deploys ODAO, specifying two candidate

ODAOs ($ODAO_i$) and a base_URI for *tokenURI* of ODAOs. The procedure *ODAO_Constructor* (Algo. 7) transfers ownership of ODAO to FLTP. ODAO then deploys ODAOMTC with specified parameters (name, symbol, base_URI) as outlined in procedure *ODAOMTC_Constructor* (Algo. 8), transfer-

Algorithm 7 : ODAOC Owner & Deployer: *FLTP*

Output: ODAOC *deployed*, $(FLTP, member1, member2) \in ODAO$

```

1: procedure ODAOC_Constructor( member1, member2, base_URI)
2:   Set ODAOC.owner = FLTP.address
3:   Deploy ODAOMTC ("Orchestrator-DAOMT", "ODAOMT", base_URI)
4:   Call ODAOMTC.mint(recipient) for recipient in
   [FLTP, member1, member2]
5: end procedure

```

Algorithm 8 : ODAOMTC Owner & Deployer: *ODAO*

Output: ODAOMTC *deployed*

```

1: procedure ODAOMTC_Constructor( _name, _symbol, base_URI)
2:   ODAOMTC  $\leftarrow$  {owner: ODAO.address, name: _name,
   symbol: _symbol, base_URI: base_URI}
3: end procedure
4: Caller: ODAO    Modifier: onlyOwner()    Output: [ODAOMT minted]
1: procedure mint(address recipient)
2:   if candidate  $\notin$  ODAO then
3:     Mint ODAOMT for recipient
4:   end if
5: end procedure

```

Algorithm 9 : VDAO Owner & Deployer: *FLTP*

Output: VDAO *deployed*, $(FLTP, member1, member2) \in VDAO$

```

1: procedure VDAO_Constructor( member1, member2, base_URI)
2:   Set VDAO.owner = FLTP.address
3:   Deploy VDAOMTC ("Validation-DAOMT", "VDAOMT", base_URI)
4:   Call VDAOMTC.mint(recipient) for recipient in
   [FLTP, member1, member2]
5: end procedure

```

ring ODAOMTC's ownership to ODAO. ODAO mints ODAOMTs for FLTP and the two members using the procedure *mint* (Algo. 8). ODAOMs can then manage membership enrollment and expulsion within ODAO, as defined in Section IV-B and Section IV-C, respectively.

- Step 3: FLTP deploys VDAO following the procedure *VDAO_Constructor* (Algo. 9), adding two initial VDAO members ($VDAOM_i$) and setting a base URI for the *tokenURI* of VDAOMs. Ownership of VDAO is transferred to FLTP. Through the procedures *VDAOMTC_Constructor* and *mint* (Algo. 10), VDAO deploys VDAOMTC using specified parameters (name, symbol, base_URI) and transfers ownership to VDAO. VDAOMs are minted for FLTP and the two members. Once VDAO is deployed, VDAOMs manage membership enrollment and expulsion operations within VDAO.
- Step 4: FLTP deploys DAOFLC, passing the addresses of FLNFTC, ODAO, and VDAO as arguments, and transfers ownership of DAOFLC. DAOFLC then deploys FLTokenC with a designated name and symbol for FL-Tokens, transferring FLTokenC's ownership to DAOFLC. This process is detailed in the procedures *DAOFLC_Constructor* (Algo. 11) and *FLTokenC_Constructor* (Algo. 15).
- Step 5: FLTP deploys the MultiSigC and transfers its ownership, as outlined in procedure *MultiSigC_Constructor* (Algo. 12).
- Step 6: FLTP submits the "setMultiSigCAddr" transaction to DAOFLC with MultiSigC's address. The procedure *setMultiSigCAddr* (Algo. 11) outlines this step. Afterward, MultiSigC can execute transactions within DAOFLC.

Algorithm 10 : VDAOMTC Owner & Deployer: *VDAO*

Output: VDAOMTC *deployed*

```

1: procedure VDAOMTC_Constructor( _name, _symbol, base_URI)
2:   VDAOMTC  $\leftarrow$  {owner: ODAO.address, name: _name,
   symbol: _symbol, base_URI: base_URI}
3: end procedure
4: Caller: VDAO    Modifier: onlyOwner()    Output: [VDAOMT minted]
1: procedure mint(address recipient)
2:   if candidate  $\notin$  VDAO then
3:     Mint VDAOMT for recipient
4:   end if
5: end procedure

```

- Step 7: Following procedure *Generate_FLNFT* (Algo. 6), FLTP constructs the "preliminary GM parameters" for the FLT, stores them on IPFS, and generates a CID called *GMCID*, representing GM_t for $t = 0$. FLTP also uploads additional files (instructions for FLT, LMUs, reward criteria, etc.) to IPFS, forming a JSON-encoded metadata known as *FLNFT_Metadata_t*. This metadata is uploaded to IPFS, resulting in a URI called *tokenURI*. FLTP then initiates procedure *proposecreateFLNFT* (*propose*) in Algo. 4, starting the multi-signature process (Section IV-E) for the "createFLNFT" *proposal*. Upon its execution, DAOFLC mints the FL-NFT on FLNFTC for FLTP, as shown in procedures *createFLNFT* (Algo. 11) and *craftFLNFT* (Algo. 5), setting the FL-NFT's properties, including the *OrchestratorAddress*.
- Step 8: The FLTP triggers procedure *Initiate_LMUploads* (Algo. 6) to commence the LMUs on the DAOFLC. It then initiates procedure *propose* (Algo. 4) with parameters such as *selector* and $GI + 1$, where *selector* is derived from the "Initiate_LMUs" function signature [28] in the DAOFLC. This starts the multi-signature process for the "Initiate_LMUs" *proposal* (Section IV-E). During its execution, procedure *Initiate_LMUs* (Algo. 11) verifies that status of the *DAOFLC.LMUactiveF* flag is false. If true, it indicates LMUs are accepted; if false, it updates it to true and emits the *LMUsInitiated(t + 1)* event, signaling the initiation of LMUs for $GI + 1$. FL-Trainers monitor this event to submit their LMUs.
- Step 9: *FLTrainers_{t+1}* concurrently initiate procedure *SEND_LMU* (Algo. 13) to commence their LMUs on DAOFLC. Each *FLTrainer_{i,t+1}* retrieves the latest GM CID from *DAOFLC.GMCID* and downloads the corresponding GM (GM_t) from IPFS. Utilizing their local private dataset $D_{i,t+1}$, *FLTrainer_{i,t+1}* computes their local model $LMU_{i,t+1}$ as [10], [17]:

$$w_{t+1}^i \leftarrow w_t - \eta g_i, \quad \forall i. \quad (6)$$

Where g_i is the local gradient of *FLTrainer_{i,t+1}* on $D_{i,t+1}$, w_t is the global parameter, η is learning rate, and w_{t+1}^i is the local parameter. Subsequently, $LMU_{i,t+1}$ is stored on IPFS, generating the associated CID *LMCID*. Additionally, JSON-encoded meta-data for $LMU_{i,t+1}$ is created and stored on IPFS, resulting in the URI *LMURI*. *FLTrainer_{i,t+1}* submits its LMU to DAOFLC using procedure *uploadLM* (Algo. 11), with

Algorithm 11 : DAOFLC Owner & Deployer: *FLTP*

Output: DAOFLC, FLTokenC *deployed*

```

1: procedure DAOFLC_Constructor(FLNFTC.address, ODAO.address, VDAO.address)
2:   Set DAOFLC.owner = FLTP.address
3:   Deploy FLTokenC ("Federated Learning Token", "FLToken")
4: end procedure

Caller: FLTP Modifier: onlyOwner()
Output: DAOFLC.MultiSigCAddr set
1: procedure setMultiSigCAddr(MultiSigC.address)
2:   Set DAOFLC.MultiSigCAddr = MultiSigC.address
3: end procedure
Caller: MultiSigC Modifier: onlyMultiSigC() Output: FLNFT minted
1: procedure createFLNFT(tokenURI, GMCID)
2:   FLNFTID = call FLNFTC.craftFLNFT (tokenURI, GMCID)
3:   DAOFLC ← {FLNFTID: FLNFTID, GMCID: GMCID}
4: end procedure
Caller: MultiSigC Modifier: onlyMultiSigC() Output: LMUs initiated
1: procedure Initiate_LMUs(t + 1)
2:   if DAOFLC.LMUactiveF == false then
3:     Set DAOFLC.LMUactiveF = true
4:     Emit DAOFLC.LMUsInitiated(t + 1)
5:   end if
6: end procedure
Caller: MultiSigC Modifier: onlyMultiSigC() Output: LMUs ceased
1: procedure Cease_LMUs(t + 1)
2:   if LMUactiveF == true then
3:     Set LMUactiveF = false; Set LMUC[t + 1] = true
4:     Emit LMUsCeased(t + 1)
5:   end if
6: end procedure
Caller: MultiSigC Modifier: onlyMultiSigC()
Output: DAOFLC.LMUVDRF[t + 1] set
1: procedure setLMUVDRF(t + 1)
2:   Set LMUVDRF[t + 1] = true
3: end procedure
Caller: MultiSigC Modifier: onlyMultiSigC() Output: FLNFT updated
1: procedure UpdateGM(t + 1, GMCID, tokenURI)
2:   GMCIDsuccessF = Call FLNFTC.assignGMCID(GMCID, FLNFTID)
3:   TokenURIsuccessF = Call FLNFTC.assignTokenURI(tokenURI, FLNFTID)
4:   if GMCIDsuccessF and TokenURIsuccessF then
5:     Emit GMUpdated(t + 1, GMCID, tokenURI)
6:     DAOFLC ← {tokenURI: tokenURI, GMCID: GMCID}
7:     Set GIC[t + 1] = true
8:   end if
9: end procedure
Caller: FLTraineri,t+1 Output: LMU uploaded and recorded
1: procedure uploadLM(LMCID, LMURI, t + 1)
2:   if DAOFLC.Authenticate_LMU(LMCID, LMURI, t + 1, FLTraineri,t+1.address) then
3:     Call DAOFLC.Record_LMU(LMCID, LMURI, t + 1, FLTraineri,t+1.address)
4:   end if
5: end procedure
Output: LMU recorded for FLTraineri,t+1
1: procedure Record_LMU(LMCID, LMURI, t + 1, FLTraineri,t+1)
2:   LM = Create new LMUs[t + 1][FLTraineri,t+1.address]
3:   LM ← {status: "Submitted", LMCID: LMCID, LMURI: LMURI, approvalvotes: 0, denialvotes: 0, voters: ∅}
4: end procedure
Caller: VDAOMi Modifier: onlyVDAOM()
Output: LM updated, [LM rewarded]
1: procedure voteLMU(FLTraineri,t+1.address, t + 1, Vi)
2:   Require: VDAOMi ∉ LMUs[t + 1][FLTraineri,t+1.address].voters
3:   LM ← LMUs[t + 1][FLTraineri,t+1.address]
4:   if Vi == true then
5:     Add Approval vote for VDAOMi in LM
6:   else
7:     Add Deny vote for VDAOMi in LM
8:   end if
9:   Count LM.approvalvotes and LM.denialvotes
10:  if LM.approvalvotes > (Q = 60% * n(VDAOMT)) then
11:    Call FLTokenC.issueFLToken(FLTraineri,t+1)
12:    Set LM.status = "Rewarded"
13:  else if LM.denialvotes > Q then
14:    Set LM.status = "Denied"
15:  end if
16: end procedure

```

Algorithm 12 : MultiSigC Owner & Deployer: *FLTP*

Output: MultiSigC *deployed*

```

1: procedure MultiSigC_Constructor(DAOFLC.address, ODAO.address)
2:   Set MultiSigC.owner = FLTP.address
3: end procedure

```

LMCID and *LMURI*. DAOFLC may impose a limit on the number of LMUs permitted for GI *t* + 1.

- Step 10: The procedure *uploadLM* (Algo. 11) is initiated by *FLTrainer_{i,t+1}*. The DAOFLC.Authenticate_LMU function validates *LMU_{i,t+1}* and may reject it if the LMUs limit is exceeded. If valid, *LMU_{i,t+1}* is added to the LMUs for GI *t* + 1 and associated with *FLTrainer_{i,t+1}* through procedure *FLTPC.Record_LMU* (Algo. 11). The LM properties, including approval and denial votes, are initialized to 0, the voter list is empty, and the LM's status is marked as "Submitted."
- Step 11: The FLTP initiates the procedure *Halt_LMuploads* (Algo. 6) to stop LMUs on the DAOFLC. This triggers the procedure *propose* (Algo. 4) with arguments like *selector* and *t* + 1, where *selector* is linked with the DAOFLC's "Cease_LMUs" function. This starts the multi-signature process (Section IV-E) for the "Cease_LMUs" proposal. The proposal's execution activates the *Cease_LMUs* procedure (Algo. 11). If *LMUactiveF* is true, it is set to false. The *LMUceased(t + 1)* event is emitted, the *LMUC* flag is marked as true, and LMUs for GI *t* + 1 are halted.
- Step 12: After LMUs are ceased for *t* + 1, VDAOMs in VDAO concurrently initiate the procedure *Review_LMuploads* (Algo. 14). In this procedure, each *VDAOM_i* downloads the LM uploaders' addresses using the function DAOFLC.Fetch_LMUx(*t* + 1). For each *FLTrainer_{i,t+1}* in the fetched list, the VDAOM downloads the corresponding LMU (*LMU_{i,t+1}*) using the function DAOFLC.Fetch_LMU(*t* + 1, *FLTrainer_{i,t+1}*). The *VDAOM_i* checks *LMU_{i,t+1}* and casts an approval or denial vote by invoking procedure *DAOFLC.voteLMU* (Algo. 11) with a boolean vote argument *V_i*. True signifies approval, while false indicates disapproval for *LMU_{i,t+1}*. The total approval and denial votes are counted as

$$LM_{approvalvotes} = \sum_{V_i \in LM.voters} \mathbf{1}_{V_i == \text{true}}, \quad (7)$$

and

$$LM_{denialvotes} = \sum_{V_i \in LM.voters} \mathbf{1}_{V_i == \text{false}} \quad (8)$$

respectively. The quorum *Q* is determined. If the *LM_{approvalvotes}* exceed the *Q*, the procedure *FLTokenC.issueFLToken* (Algo. 15) is utilized to issue an FL-Token for *FLTrainer_{i,t+1}*, LM's status is set to "Rewarded". However, if the *LM_{denialvotes}* exceed the *Q*, the LM's status is set to "Denied".

- Step 13: The FLTP initiates the procedure *Configure_LMUVDRF* (Algo. 6) using the *selector* of the "setLMUVDRF" function in the DAOFLC and *t* + 1. This triggers the multi-signature process (Section

Algorithm 13 : FL-Trainer $FLTrainer_{i,t+1}$

Output: LMU *generated* and *uploaded* by $FLTrainer_{i,t+1}$

```

1: procedure SEND_LMU
2:   Get  $DAOFLC.GMCID$ 
3:   Download  $GM_t \leftarrow$  IPFS using  $DAOFLC.GMCID$ 
4:   Generate  $LMU_{i,t+1}$  using [6];  $LMCID = \text{Store } LMU_{i,t+1}$  on IPFS
5:   Create  $LMURI$  for  $LMU_{i,t+1}$ ;  $LMURI = \text{Store } LMURI$  on IPFS
6:   Call  $DAOFLC.uploadLM(LMCID, LMURI, t+1)$ 
7: end procedure

```

Algorithm 14 : VDAO member $VDAOM_i$

Output: LMUs *voted* by $VDAOM_i$

```

1: procedure Review_LMUploads
2:   foreach  $FLTrainer_{i,t+1}$  in  $DAOFLC.Fetch\_LMUx(t+1)$ 
3:      $LMU_{i,t+1} = \text{Call } DAOFLC.Fetch\_LMU(t+1,$ 
4:        $FLTrainer_{i,t+1}.address)$ 
5:     Call  $DAOFLC.voteLMU(FLTrainer_{i,t+1}.address,$ 
6:        $t+1, V_i)$ 
7:   end foreach
8: end procedure

```

Algorithm 15 : FLTokenC **Owner & Deployer:** $DAOFLC$

Output: FLTokenC *deployed*

```

1: procedure FLTokenC_Constructor(name, symbol)
2:    $FLTokenC \leftarrow \{owner: DAOFLC.address, name: \_name,$ 
3:      $symbol: \_symbol\}$ 
4: end procedure
5: Output: FLToken minted for  $FLTrainer_{i,t+1}$ 
6: procedure issueFLToken( $FLTrainer_{i,t+1}.address$ )
7:   Mint  $1 * 10^{18}$  FLToken for  $FLTrainer_{i,t+1}$ 
8: end procedure

```

IV-E) for the “setLMUVDRF” *proposal*, by invoking the procedure *propose* (Algo. 4). During proposal execution, the procedure *setLMUVDRF* (Algo. 11) is called to set the $LMUVDRF(t+1)$ flag, indicating the completion of the LMUs’ verification, denial, or reward process for $GI\ t+1$.

- Step 14: The FLTP initiates the *Aggregate_LMUs* procedure (Algo. 6). The approved and rewarded LMUs from previous steps are denoted as \hat{LMU}_{t+1} . The FLTP computes GM_{t+1} using federated averaging (FedAvg) as [10], [17]:

$$\mathbf{w}_{t+1} \leftarrow \sum_{i \in \hat{LMU}_{t+1}} \frac{n_i}{n} \mathbf{w}_{t+1}^i \quad (9)$$

where \mathbf{w}_{t+1}^i is local parameter, \mathbf{w}_{t+1} is global parameter, $n_i = |\mathcal{D}_i|$, and $n = |\bigcup \mathcal{D}_i|$. GM_{t+1} is stored on IPFS, generating a CID referred to as $GMCID$. The updated meta-data, encoded in JSON format as $FLNFT_Metadata_{t+1}$, is also stored on IPFS, yielding a URI called *tokenURI*. The FLTP initiates the procedure *proposeUpdateGM* (*propose*) (Algo. 4) with arguments $t+1$, $GMCID$, and *tokenURI*. This starts the multi-signature process outlined in Section IV-E for the “UpdateGM” *proposal*. During this process, ODAOMs aggregate LMU_{t+1} according to predefined guidelines and approve the proposal if it is valid, certifying its authenticity. When “UpdateGM” *proposal* is executed, the procedure *UpdateGM* (Algo. 11) is called, setting the $GMCID$ and *tokenURI* of the FL-NFT by invoking procedures $FLNFTC.assignGMCID$ and $FLNFTC.assignTokenURI$ (Algo. 5) [17]. These procedures also verify and ensure the uniqueness of $GMCID$ and *tokenURI* for all FL-NFTs. The

Algorithm 16 : FL-NFT’s transfer

Caller: $FLTP$ **Output:** [Contracts Ownership *transferred*]

```

1: procedure FLNFT_TRANSFER(new_owner)
2:   Require:  $new\_owner \neq FLTP.address$ 
3:   Call  $FLNFTC.transferFrom(FLTP.address,$ 
4:      $new\_owner, FLNFTID)$ 
5:    $contracts = [ODAO, VDAO, MultiSigC, DAOFLC]$ 
6:   for all contract in contracts do
7:     Call  $contract.transferOwnership(new\_owner)$ 
8:   end for
9: end procedure

```

DAOFLC emits the event $DAOFLC.GMupdated$, and the $GIC[t+1]$ flag indicates the completion of $GI\ t+1$.

Step 1 of the above execution workflow is carried out once by the Regulator to establish the FL marketplace ecosystem. For each FLT, Steps 2-7 are repeated to prepare the FL decentralized orchestrating space using the DAO-FL framework. Additionally, Steps 8-14 are reiterated for each $GI\ t+1$ within an FLT.

G. Commercializing GM and Transferring ownership

The GM is tokenized to streamline FL processes and facilitate commercialization on platforms such as OpenSea. Trading involves transferring the FL-NFT of GM to the buyer. In DAO-FL, the FLTP, which holds the FL-NFT, also controls contracts including DAOFLC, MultiSigC, ODAOC, and VDAO. To transfer GM’s ownership to a new owner, the FLTP initiates the procedure *FLNFT_Transfer* (Algo. 16). This process encompasses transferring the FL-NFT as well as the ownership of DAOFLC, MultiSigC, ODAOC, and VDAO to the new proprietor.

V. IMPLEMENTATION, DEPLOYMENT, AND EVALUATION

This section presents the implementation, deployment, and evaluation of the DAO-FL framework.

A. Implementation and Deployment

The smart contracts are developed using Solidity [29], with Surya [30] used to visualize their inheritance hierarchy. To support membership in ODAO and VDAO, we initially considered the NTT token standard (EIP-4671 [31]), but due to its early-stage limitations, we have developed a custom smart contract “DAOMTC” to implement DAOMTs. The inheritance graph in Appendix D shows that DAOMTC inherits from OpenZeppelin’s “Ownable” and “ERC165” contracts and implements the IERC721Metadata interface. Since DAOMTs are NTTs, certain functions of the IERC721 interface are not applicable but are retained for compatibility with NFT platforms like OpenSea. To streamline membership management in both ODAO and VDAO, we have developed a smart contract named DAOC. By providing generalized procedures for adding or removing members, DAOC is designed to serve the needs of both DAOs. The DAOC contract extends a customized version of the “Ownable” contract [32], which itself inherits from the “Context” contract [32]. The class diagram for DAOMTC and DAOC is provided in Appendix B.

ODAO and VDAO are distinct DAOs implemented in ODAOC and VDAO, using ODAOMTs and VDAOMTs




Fig. 6. Gas Used, Gas Price, and transaction fee (in ETH) for the deployment of smart contracts.

TABLE III
PARAMETERS

Parameter	Value on Sepolia
<i>Regulator.etherscan</i>	https://sepolia.etherscan.io/address/0x8fa37ecf3d89361e60e7e6adf55485ae62cd72b2
<i>FLTP.etherscan</i>	https://sepolia.etherscan.io/address/0xa0969AeA747c336b49256CFC4Cc2F6E265F6B722
<i>FLNFTC.etherscan</i>	https://sepolia.etherscan.io/address/0x37d18bd11e20774e9BE7c22647156564975CAe6b
<i>ODAO.etherscan</i>	https://sepolia.etherscan.io/address/0xf002f304Cb1C34b40d59347472f2f68Fc882e61f
<i>ODAOBTC.etherscan</i>	https://sepolia.etherscan.io/address/0xDf3E610ce7DCb727150E1351c44e58154E28108
<i>VDAO.etherscan</i>	https://sepolia.etherscan.io/address/0x1d9Cebd90Aa66068cD9FD3d75479DdBDeDA65ebeB
<i>VDAOMTC.etherscan</i>	https://sepolia.etherscan.io/address/0x5303b5a16655C69D7914cf6fcdF5A5429C41279F
<i>DAOFLC.etherscan</i>	https://sepolia.etherscan.io/address/0x21314B8830c7FE06d0B0DAe0c7935794D77FD429
<i>FLTokenC.etherscan</i>	https://sepolia.etherscan.io/address/0x13C3A1a153F7C50a018177aeaC5D70D98A3B2c2C
<i>MultiSigC.etherscan</i>	https://sepolia.etherscan.io/address/0x7001b7f257EEDF4b970577c63095909916BD0cc0
<i>FLTrainer_{1,1}.etherscan</i>	https://sepolia.etherscan.io/address/0xff0e2447422da30927fd079d75dd985cf0cd21e1

as membership tokens, respectively. These tokens are implemented in ODAOMTC and VDAOMTC. As shown in Appendix D, ODAO and VDAO inherit from DAOC, while ODAOMTC and VDAOMTC inherit from DAOBTC. UML diagrams for ODAO, ODAOMTC, VDAO, and VDAOMTC are detailed in Appendix C.

FLNFTC inherits from the ERC721Enumerable standard [33] and the “Ownable” contract [32]. Appendix D depicts the inheritance graph of FLNFTC. FLTokenC derives from “Ownable” contract and the OpenZeppelin ERC-20 implementation [34], [35]. DAOFLC and MultiSigC also inherit from the “Ownable” contract. Appendix E illustrates the inheritance graph for DAOFLC, MultiSigC, and FLTokenC. UML diagrams for DAOFLC, FLTokenC, FLNFTC, and MultiSigC are in Appendix C.

The smart contracts were compiled using Hardhat [36] and deployed on the Sepolia testnet [37]. For transparency, contract verification was conducted using the ETHERSCAN_API_KEY [38]. Gas usage, gas price, and transaction fees are illustrated in Fig. 6. The gas consumed by ODAOMTC, VDAOMTC, and FLTokenC is already accounted for within the consumption of ODAO, VDAO, and DAOFLC, respectively. Additionally, due to network congestion, FLNFTC incurred a higher gas price of 0.15 Gwei, resulting in a transaction fee of 0.00032 ETH, which is not depicted in Fig. 6.

Table III provides Etherscan links for key entities (Regulator, FLTP, *FLTrainer_{1,1}*) and smart contracts deployed on the Sepolia network. Users can explore event logs, transaction logs, and verified contract codes via Etherscan [17]. Our paper focuses on establishing a decentralized ecosystem for IV and OV of the FL process through multi-signature wallets and DAOs. We used the MNIST, Fashion-MNIST, and UNB ISCX VPN-NonVPN network traffic [39] datasets for training local and global models. Due to space constraints, we have omitted details on model configuration, accuracy, and data allocation. Some repetitive quorum-related transactions are also omitted in subsequent figures for brevity.

Since the procedures for member enrollment and expulsion are identical for ODAO and VDAO, we present the implementation results for ODAO. Fig. 7 shows the transaction list for a “Join Proposal” (*JP*), which includes the “proposeJoin” transaction initiated by *ODAO_p* and the “voteJoin” transactions from other ODAOs. Fig. 8 illustrates the minting of ODAOMT upon reaching quorum, alongside the “JPapproved” event indicating JP approval and the “Transfer” event indicating ODAOMT transfer to the *candidate*, emitted by ODAOMTC. Similarly, Fig. 9 presents the transaction list for a “Kick Proposal” (*KP*), including the “proposeKick” transaction and “voteKick” transactions. Fig. 10 demonstrates the burning of ODAOMT upon quorum, with events indicating KP approval and the burning of ODAOMT owned by the

Transaction Hash	Method	Block	Age	From	To
0x08d720a710...	Vote Join	3815822	467 days ago	0x7e727f7E...4bd5e7676	0xf002f304...Fc882e61f
0x18f0159d577...	Vote Join	3815821	467 days ago	0xe319A0Fd...D736909e5	0xf002f304...Fc882e61f
0x93c3814116f...	Propose Join	3815817	467 days ago	0xf0A229BD...B40F56194	0xf002f304...Fc882e61f

Fig. 7. Transaction sequence (*DAOC.proposeJoin* and *DAOC.voteJoin*) for a “Join Proposal” on ODAO (https://sepolia.etherscan.io/address/0xf002f304Cb1C34b40d59347472f2f68Fc882e61f), [Block 3815817-3815822].

ERC-721 Tokens Transferred: ERC-721 Token ID [6] From 0x000000...00000000 To 0xdff9D7...601f3A85

Name Transfer (topic_1 address from, topic_2 address to, topic_3 uint256 tokenId)

Topics

- 0 0xdddf252ad1be2c89b69c2b068fc378daa952ba7f163c4a11628f55a4df523b3ef
- 1 Dec → 0x00
- 2 Dec → 0xdff9D702549E0984b9E788356Fd5f58F601f3A85
- 3 Dec → 6

Name JPAproved (topic_1 address _candidate)

Topics

- 0 0x7b67a5c4766dec0bbdee786e4e5adf80b87425d9c0d8e6a5de4efdd82cc236dd
- 1 Dec → 0xdff9D702549E0984b9E788356Fd5f58F601f3A85

Fig. 8. Minting of ODAOMT after reaching the quorum of approval votes for “Join Proposal” and corresponding events emitted on ODAO (https://sepolia.etherscan.io/tx/0x08d720a7101486f789952ce09e72cb0bf56ce8863994d3eac957a29d0a1ea6a).

Transaction Hash	Method	Block	Age	From	To
0x7de873fc9bd...	Vote Kick	3815828	467 days ago	0xdff9D702...F601f3A85	0xf002f304...Fc882e61f
0xb4de764d43...	Vote Kick	3815827	467 days ago	0x7e727f7E...4bd5e7676	0xf002f304...Fc882e61f
0x0d2aa97fc65...	Vote Kick	3815824	467 days ago	0xa0969AeA...265F6B722	0xf002f304...Fc882e61f
0xc6cd5ba3fba...	Propose Kick	3815823	467 days ago	0xf0A229BD...B40F56194	0xf002f304...Fc882e61f

Fig. 9. Transaction sequence (*DAOC.proposeKick* and *DAOC.voteKick*) for a “Kick Proposal” on ODAO (https://sepolia.etherscan.io/address/0xf002f304Cb1C34b40d59347472f2f68Fc882e61f), [Block 3815823-3815828].

ERC-721 Tokens Transferred: ERC-721 Token ID [4] From 0xe319A0...736909e5 To 0x000000...00000000

Name Transfer (topic_1 address from, topic_2 address to, topic_3 uint256 tokenId)

Topics

- 0 0xdddf252ad1be2c89b69c2b068fc378daa952ba7f163c4a11628f55a4df523b3ef
- 1 Dec → 0xe319A0FdF2bA59925bFC673fc827528D736909e5
- 2 Dec → 0x00
- 3 Dec → 4

Name KPApproved (index_topic_1 address _candidate)

Topics

- 0 0x17a12e660f27f9b33e369e5235bcb4aebc5189c10c2dbd4308d252fb42c1f3d9
- 1 Dec → 0xe319A0FdF2bA59925bFC673fc827528D736909e5

Fig. 10. Burning of ODAOMT after reaching the quorum of approval votes for “Kick Proposal” and corresponding events emitted on ODAO (https://sepolia.etherscan.io/tx/0x7de873fc9bdfb1fca45ad560430eff5ee4778e821fd1e8d981c12a6f1c099da3).

Transaction Hash	Method	Block	Age	From	To
0x8fd223394c0b4e597...	Execute	3829547	1 min ago	0xa0969A...65F6B722	0x7001b7...16BD0cc0
0xe8e49c06d64ee2c9...	Approve	3829546	1 min ago	0xdff9D7...601f3A85	0x7001b7...16BD0cc0
0xe7ae6e70d8fe92330...	Proposecreat...	3829542	2 mins ago	0xa0969A...65F6B722	0x7001b7...16BD0cc0

Name ProposalExecuted (topic_1 uint256 id, string name)

Topics 1 Dec → 1

Data name: createFLNFT

Fig. 11. Transaction sequence for the creation and execution of the “createFLNFT” proposal on MultiSigC, along with emitted events (https://sepolia.etherscan.io/address/0x7001b7f257EEDF4b970577c63095909916BD0cc0), Block [3829542-3829547].

ERC-721 Tokens Transferred: ERC-721 Token ID [1] From 0x000000...00000000 To 0xa0969A...65F6B722

Name GMCIDset (topic_1 uint256 FLNFTID, string _GMCID)

Topics 1 Dec → 1

Data _GMCID: QmT6BBUnEsd84HFqGFNZQWtQdWkjl449pJjBtPHezLN4kj

Name TokenURISet (topic_1 uint256 FLNFTID, string _tokenURI)

Topics 1 Dec → 1

Data _tokenURI: OmaCtmSJZrYXt9B0tZfk62zo5wzsqWw4ZpeF9cJ5USQFWE

Fig. 12. Minting of FL-NFT and emitted events during the execution of the “createFLNFT” proposal (https://sepolia.etherscan.io/tx/0x93e76ce42d9b76f6b4ede511e262e7ac9d77e5079f2cd0171e8e2e554d231a7a).

candidate.

Continuing in this subsection, we present the implementation of the DAO-FL framework, following the

steps in Section IV-F. Fig. 11 illustrates the creation of a “createFLNFT” proposal by FLTP using the procedure *FLTP.Generate_FLNFT* through the “proposecreat-

Transaction Hash	Method	Block	Age	From	To
0xda741296a5bfb207...	Execute	3829908	28 secs ago	0xa0969A...65F6B722	0x7001b7...16BD0cc0
0xff3ed56c0ab04ad1c...	Approve	3829907	40 secs ago	0xdff9D7...601f3A85	0x7001b7...16BD0cc0
0x7ee54fa868ef74d06...	Propose	3829902	1 min ago	0xa0969A...65F6B722	0x7001b7...16BD0cc0

Name ProposalCreated (topic_1 uint256 id, string name, topic_2 uint256 pGI)
Topics 1 Dec → 2 2 Dec → 1
Data name: Initiate_LMUs

Name ProposalExecuted (topic_1 uint256 id, string name)
Topics 1 Dec → 2
Data name: Initiate_LMUs

Name LMUsInitiated (uint256 GI)
Data GI: 1

Fig. 13. Execution of the “Initiate_LMUs” proposal by FLTP, and emitted events by MultiSigC and DAOFLC (<https://sepolia.etherscan.io/address/0x7001b7f257EEDF4b970577c63095909916BD0cc0>), Block [3829902-3829908].

Transaction Hash	Method	Block	Age	From	To
0x941cdc1962f19f304...	Upload LM	3837082	1 min ago	0x22E738...A29F1767	0x21314B...D77FD429
0x91d69513b0170e25...	Upload LM	3837081	1 min ago	0x6cD34C...4282d949	0x21314B...D77FD429
0x5ea0712a2210643e...	Upload LM	3837066	4 mins ago	0xff0e24...f0Cd21E1	0x21314B...D77FD429

Fig. 14. Uploading of LM on DAOFLC by $FLTrainers_{t+1}$ (<https://sepolia.etherscan.io/address/0x21314B8830c7FE06d0B0DAe0c7935794D77FD429>), Block [3837066-3837082].

Txn Hash	Method	Block	Age	From	To
0x39ea2c5e7b2232f53...	Vote LMU	3838281	8 mins ago	0x5E66A5...51446B5A	0x21314B...D77FD429
0x40f04a0f7765c37aa...	Vote LMU	3838279	8 mins ago	0xcf2Dfd...6655d46E	0x21314B...D77FD429
0x8be4343d9973c33f5...	Vote LMU	3838201	25 mins ago	0xa0969A...65F6B722	0x21314B...D77FD429

Name Transfer (topic_1 address from, topic_2 address to, uint256 value)
Topics 1 Dec → 0x00
2 Dec → 0xff0e2447422Da30927F0079D75D0985Cf0Cd21E1
Data value: 100000000000000000

Fig. 15. Decentralized input verification of LMUs by VDAOMs for the FL process, minting of FL-Token and other events emitted (<https://sepolia.etherscan.io/address/0x21314B8830c7FE06d0B0DAe0c7935794D77FD429>), Block [3838201-3838281].

Transaction Hash	Method	Block	Age	From	To
0x126348a9171451adf...	Execute	3843775	5 mins ago	0xa0969A...65F6B722	0x7001b7...16BD0cc0
0x9abbe2ac72118079...	Approve	3843771	6 mins ago	0x0eFFc2...e4397e4A	0x7001b7...16BD0cc0
0xe59a620ff3884d842...	Propose Upda...	3843770	7 mins ago	0xa0969A...65F6B722	0x7001b7...16BD0cc0

Name ProposalExecuted (topic_1 uint256 id, string name)
Topics 1 Dec → 5
Data name: UpdateGM

Name GMUpdated (uint256 gi, string _GMCID, string _tokenURI)
Data gi: 1
_GMCID: QmYgKr6p9MLbAVaQB8dxFPnzahEVX3NvHczZ1fEE
_tokenURI: QmXWZLdK1KCK1fognbjRwgmxdFneCbFsTSK9z5FFpbPdp1

Name GMCIDset (topic_1 uint256 FLNFTID, string _GMCID)
Topics 1 Dec → 1
Data _GMCID: QmYgKr6p9MLbAVaQB8dxFPnzahEVX3NvHczZ1fEE

Name TokenURIsset (topic_1 uint256 FLNFTID, string _tokenURI)
Topics 1 Dec → 1
Data _tokenURI: QmXWZLdK1KCK1fognbjRwgmxdFneCbFsTSK9z5FFpbPdp1

Fig. 16. Creation and execution of proposal “UpdateGM” after DOV by ODAOMs (<https://sepolia.etherscan.io/address/0x7001b7f257EEDF4b970577c63095909916BD0cc0>) and events emitted, Block [3843770-3843775].

ateFLNFT” transaction on MultiSigC. It includes one of the “approve” transactions by ODAOMs and the execution of the “createFLNFT” proposal by FLTP upon reaching quorum, with the corresponding events emitted by MultiSigC shown. Fig. 12 demonstrates the minting of FL-NFT after executing the “createFLNFT” proposal, displaying the emitted events from FLNFTC, including GMCIDset and TokenURIsset. Fig. 13 shows the creation and execution of the “Initiate_LMUs” proposal by FLTP after ODAOMs’ approval. This figure also includes emitted events such as ProposalCreated and ProposalExecuted by MultiSigC, along with LMUsInitiated by DAOFLC. Following the LMUsInitiated event, $FLTrainers_{t+1}$ upload LMs via the “uploadLM” transaction on DAOFLC, as depicted in Fig. 14.

The creation and execution of the “Cease_LMUs” proposal will be omitted. After its execution, VDAOMs perform IV for the FL process by initiating “voteLMU” transactions, as

shown in Fig. 15. The Successful validation of an LMU, results in minting FL-Tokens, as indicated by the “Transfer” event emitted by FLTokenC for a $FLTrainer_{i,t+1}$. We will omit the illustration of the execution of “setLMUADRF” proposal. However, after its execution, FLTP submits the “UpdateGM” proposal to MultiSigC. This proposal undergoes approval by ODAOMs as part of DOV and is ultimately executed as shown in Fig 16. The emitted events include ProposalExecuted by MultiSigC, GMUpdated by DAOFLC, and GMCIDset and TokenURIsset by FLNFTC, indicating the FL-NFT has been updated.

B. Evaluation on Threat Models

Vulnerabilities in information flows can occur at both input and output stages. Input vulnerabilities arise when submitted inputs deviate from prescribed policies. In the FL process, this can manifest as inaccurate or malicious LMs being accepted by

TABLE IV
AVERAGE TRANSACTION COST FOR CENTRALIZED VS DECENTRALIZED
IV AND OV ON PUBLIC AND PRIVATE BLOCKCHAIN

		Input Verification	Output Verification
FL-Incentivizer (Centralized)	Public blockchain	0.000140322 ETH	0.00017406 ETH
	Private blockchain	0	0
DAO-FL (Decentralized)	Public blockchain	0	0
	Private blockchain	0.001080806 ETH	0.00159984 ETH

the compromised FL server for inclusion in the GM, jeopardizing its accuracy. Output vulnerabilities involve non-compliance of the produced outputs with information flow policies or post-production tampering. In the FL process, this includes aggregation attacks, where LMs are incorrectly aggregated into the GM. It also involves post-production tampering, where a malicious entity replaces the legitimate GM with a fraudulent version, further jeopardizing the integrity of the process.

Fig. 17 displays the test accuracy trends of DAO-FL and centralized-FL against input, output, and input & output attacks. The experiments utilize the MNIST and Fashion-MNIST datasets for image classification, along with the UNB ISCX VPN-NonVPN dataset [39] for network traffic classification [40], with parameters set to $E = 10$ local epochs and $N = 10$ FL-Trainers per GI. Fig. 17(a, c, d, f, g, i) highlight DAO-FL’s robustness against input attacks, rejecting malicious LMs through DIV via VDAO, thus maintaining GM accuracy. DAO-FL closely matches the accuracy of attack-free-FL, especially near convergence. The slight accuracy drop in DAO-FL during input attacks compared to attack-free-FL is due to the latter’s diverse accurate LMs, while DAO-FL’s global parameters are biased towards approved LMs. In contrast, centralized-FL, relying on a single manipulable server, loses accuracy under input attacks. 17(b, c, e, f, h, i) show that DAO-FL maintains accuracy during output attacks due to ODAO’s vigilance through DOV, which rejects malicious “UpdateGM” proposals. The ODAO enforces the FLTP for alternative accurate “UpdateGM” proposals. Centralized-FL suffers from accuracy deterioration due to tampering and aggregation attacks. These results illustrate DAO-FL’s effectiveness against both input and output attacks.

Both input and output attacks in centralized FL result in decreased accuracy. After an attack, GM’s original accuracy may not be recoverable. These attacks compromise accuracy, introduce bias, or disrupt the FL process, leading to learning failures like vanishing or exploding gradients. Such failures are evident for centralized-FL in Fig. 17(c,f) at epoch=10 and Fig. 17(i) at epoch=250 onwards. Preventing these attacks is crucial for the FL process’s success.

C. Qualitative Evaluation and Discussion

DAO-FL ensures secure and democratic FL process management through decentralized governance involving regulators, FLTP, ODAO, and VDAO. DAO-FL promotes a decentralized approach to manage DAO membership for enrollment

and expulsion through the use of smart contracts: ODAO for ODAO and VDAO for VDAO. It leverages the minting and burning of membership tokens, ensuring transparency and security. These operations rely on decentralized voting mechanisms, where stakeholders approve “Join Proposals” and “Kick Proposals” to control membership decisions. This ensures fairness and inclusivity in the membership process, although it may introduce delays due to the need for consensus.

DAO-FL is compatible with any FL algorithm, with LM and GM validation managed through DIV and DOV based on the algorithm’s security protocol. DAO-FL enhances the trustworthiness of the FL process by allowing participants to verify LMUs quality and integrity via VDAOMs. As ODAOMTC and VDAOMTC supplies increase, decentralization in OV and IV of FL processes strengthens, respectively. In FL setups demanding high security and decentralization, the trade-off of longer times and higher transaction fees to reach quorum becomes acceptable as decentralization increases.

In DAO-FL, the ODAO approves proposals in a decentralized manner, while the execution remains the responsibility of the FLTP, leading to a partially decentralized orchestration of the FL process. To achieve full decentralization, substituting FLTP with an Executer-DAO and implementing a compatible multi-signature contract can enable the decentralized execution of approved proposals, resulting in a fully decentralized orchestration paradigm.

FL inherently protects raw data access, with the GM generally secure against sophisticated data leaks. However, LMs are still susceptible to inference attacks. In DAO-FL, VDAOMT authentication restricts LM access to authorized VDAO members via smart contract interfaces. Although the DAO-FL framework operates on a public blockchain, which poses risks from malicious actors, incorporating privacy-preserving techniques like differential privacy at the LM level can enhance data security and reduce the likelihood of data leaks.

The innovative principles and technologies in DAO-FL create a versatile framework that extends beyond its original application. DAOs can serve as universal proof of membership in various DAOs, while the proposed decentralized enrollment and expulsion schemes are relevant across multiple DAO implementations. The adaptability of smart contracts like MultiSigC and DAOFLC is significant; with careful adjustments to requirements and proposal nomenclature, they can facilitate partially decentralized orchestration for a wide range of information flows. Furthermore, the quorum-based DIV and DOV mechanisms can be tailored to meet the needs of different information flows that require decentralized decision-making, ensuring their broad applicability across various contexts.

D. Applicability, Limitations, and Future directions

DAO-FL, with its decentralized governance and validation mechanisms, is particularly suited for industries that prioritize the integrity of the GM and the FL process. Sectors like healthcare and finance, where privacy, transparency, and security are critical, stand to benefit greatly from DAO-FL’s




Fig. 17. Threat Evaluation of Input, Output, and Input & Output Attacks on DAO-FL, and centralized-FL (N=10, E=10).

decentralized approach, which ensures compliance with regulations and safeguards AI systems. In industries such as supply chain management and logistics, DAO-FL facilitates seamless collaboration among stakeholders while maintaining GM integrity. While DAO-FL prioritizes AI model security over rapid learning and low costs, its advantages in data integrity make it ideal for sectors where trust is paramount. In high-risk industries like critical infrastructure or defense, DAO-FL's decentralized validation mechanisms reduce cyber attack risks and improve system resilience, making it a valuable tool for protecting intellectual property and ensuring reliable machine learning models.

However, DAO-FL has limitations that hinder its widespread adoption, particularly in real-time and time-sensitive applications. Industries like high-frequency trading or autonomous vehicles, which demand low-latency decision-making, may find DAO-FL less applicable due to its complexity and higher transaction costs. Non-deterministic response times, reliance on blockchain network constraints, complex validation processes, and data transfer overheads pose significant challenges for rapid decision-making. Additionally, the decentralized nature of DAO-FL introduces variability in response times, limiting

its suitability for real-time FL applications. Addressing these issues requires further research and optimization.

The cost analysis of DAO-FL is complex, influenced by factors such as gas fees, network congestion, and transaction volume. Table IV compares average transaction costs for FL-Incentivizer (centralized) and DAO-FL (decentralized) for IV and OV on both public (Sepolia) and private blockchains. On public blockchains, the transaction costs for decentralized IV and OV are higher than centralized IV and OV. Although private blockchains usually have no transaction costs, there is cost for establishing and running the network infrastructure. Furthermore, transforming a GM into an FL-NFT for commercial use may not be feasible on a private blockchain. High transaction costs of DAO-driven solutions on public blockchains, especially due to on-chain voting mechanisms, remain a challenge.

To overcome these limitations, several strategies can be explored. Off-chain voting mechanisms, such as those used by platforms like Snapshot and Aragon, can reduce on-chain transaction costs for DIV and DOV. Additionally, gas optimization techniques and layer-2 scaling solutions, like state channels or Plasma, can help reduce transaction fees

and alleviate blockchain congestion. Streamlining validation processes, minimizing data transfer overhead, and refining consensus mechanisms will improve DAO-FL's efficiency and responsiveness, especially in real-time applications. By addressing these challenges, DAO-FL can reach its full potential across diverse industries.

E. Case Studies

These case studies illustrate how DAO-FL effectively prevents and responds to input and output attacks in FL across various real-world scenarios.

1) *Inventory and Logistics Operations in Supply Chain Management*: In the evolving field of supply chain management (SCM), DAO-FL serves as a transformative solution that integrates DIV and DOV mechanisms to strengthen FL processes. In this scenario, stakeholders in a global supply chain collaborate in an FL setup to optimize inventory management and streamline logistics. DAO-FL allows these stakeholders to securely share LMs for collaborative training, ensuring the authenticity and integrity of inputs through decentralized validation. Malicious actors trying to inject incorrect LMs or manipulate the GM face significant barriers, as DAO-FL's robust verification protocols swiftly detect and counteract potential attacks. This safeguards the accuracy of SCM predictions, preserves the integrity of decision-making processes, and enhances operational efficiency and resilience within the supply chain ecosystem.

2) *Fraud Detection in Financial Institutions*: In financial institutions, FL systems play a crucial role in detecting fraud while maintaining customer confidentiality. To enhance fraud detection within privacy regulations, banks can collaborate under regulatory oversight, such as state banks, utilizing DAO-FL for joint fraud detection. At the end of a specified period, participating banks train their LMs on the latest transaction data and securely share these models per DAO-FL guidelines. The GM is generated from the aggregated LMs. However, malicious actors might submit incorrect LMs or execute output attacks on the GM. By employing decentralized mechanisms like DIV and DOV to verify the reliability of LMs and GM updates, DAO-FL reinforces fraud prevention. This proactive strategy effectively detects and responds to fraudulent activities, safeguarding customer interests and ensuring the integrity of financial transactions.

VI. CONCLUSION

This article presents the DAO-FL framework, a groundbreaking approach to decentralized autonomous organizations to enhance FL processes. By incorporating decentralized input and output verification mechanisms, DAO-FL ensures the integrity and security of the FL ecosystem. Using DAO Membership Tokens (DAOMTs) and smart contracts like MultiSigC and DAOFLC demonstrates the framework's adaptability and versatility. With decentralized governance structures involving various stakeholders, DAO-FL provides a transparent and democratic framework for managing FL processes. Qualitative evaluations under different threat models showcase DAO-FL's

superiority over traditional centralized FL approaches, particularly in scenarios requiring decentralized verification. Discussions on applicability across industries, transaction costs, and future directions highlight the framework's potential impact and scalability. Ultimately, DAO-FL strengthens FL integrity through decentralized decision-making and validation mechanisms, setting a new standard for decentralized orchestration in information flows. The DAO-FL framework's emphasis on security and decentralization, through multi-signature contracts and DAOs, encourages future research into enhanced security protocols in FL and decentralized systems, fostering resilient frameworks to mitigate centralization risks and build trust in collaborative data-sharing environments.

APPENDIX A

DEMONSTRATIVE METADATA FOR FL-NFT, ODAOMT, AND VDAOMT

- Explore the FL-NFT's metadata at <https://ipfs.io/ipfs/QmaCtmSJZrYXt9BQtZfk62zo5wzsqWW4ZpeF9cJ5USQFWE>.
- Explore the metadata of ODAOMT at <https://ipfs.io/ipfs/QmNPqQqC1dwADZ2FLwtUi2nGi5CdkYxzZNEaroc3ZUS7R>.
- Explore the metadata of VDAOMT at <https://ipfs.io/ipfs/QmRrHTZcCJvFDWVq9DUuNTgxnCNyWUAANy8TyMRMeQhPp3>.

APPENDIX B

UML DIAGRAM FOR DAOMTC AND DAOC

See the UML diagram at <https://github.com/umermajeedkhu/DAOFLcode/blob/main/UML/appendixB.pdf>.

APPENDIX C

UML DIAGRAM FOR ODAOMTC, ODAOC, VDAOMTC, VDAOC, FLTOKENC, DAOFLC, FLNFTC, AND MULTISIGC

See the UML diagram at <https://github.com/umermajeedkhu/DAOFLcode/blob/main/UML/appendixC.pdf>.

APPENDIX D

INHERITANCE GRAPH OF THE DAOC, DAOMTC, ODAOC, VDAOC, ODAOMTC, VDAOMTC, AND FLNFTC

See the inheritance graph at <https://github.com/umermajeedkhu/DAOFLcode/blob/main/graphs/appendixD.pdf>.

APPENDIX E

INHERITANCE GRAPH OF THE DAOFLC, MULTISIGC, AND FLTOKENC

See the inheritance graph at <https://github.com/umermajeedkhu/DAOFLcode/blob/main/graphs/appendixE.pdf>.

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