

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ISSN: 1746-7586 (Print) 1746-7594 (Online) Journal homepage: www.tandfonline.com/journals/rdac20

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To cite this article: Christopher Linebarger, Angela D. Nichols & Andrew J. Enterline (2019) Keeping threat at arm's length: counter-revolutionary interventions by third-party states in support of governments, Dynamics of Asymmetric Conflict, 12:3, 223-241, DOI: 10.1080/17467586.2019.1622028

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/17467586.2019.1622028

DYNAMICS OF ASYMMETRIC CONFLICT
2019, VOL. 12, NO. 3, 223–241
https://doi.org/10.1080/17467586.2019.1622028

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Keeping threat at arm's length: counter-revolutionary interventions by third-party states in support of governments

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ABSTRACT

During the 1970s the military juntas in South America engaged in a cross-national campaign of repression, code-named Operation Condor, targeted against leftist militant groups inspired to action by the Cuban Revolution. This case illustrates an understudied motivation for third-party intervention in domestic conflict: counter-revolution. We therefore formulate a theory in which revolutions shock the international system by empowering new revolutionary regimes that, in turn, inspire dissidents abroad to take up arms. Status quo elites in foreign states seek to staunch this diffusion of revolution by engaging in international repressive campaigns, manifested as third party intervention in civil conflict. We test this expectation on a global sample of intervention opportunities for the period 1975–2004, and assess the threat that revolutionary regimes pose to status quo governments in two ways: (1) the geographic proximity of a revolutionary state to pairs of status quo states; and (2) the geographic proximity of internal-armed conflicts featuring rebels that are supported by a revolutionary states. We find evidence that status quo states respond to the proximity of a revolutionary state, but not to the proximity of support for rebels.

ARTICLE HISTORY
Received 10 January 2019
Accepted 17 May 2019

KEYWORDS
Revolution; intervention; repression; civil conflict; counter-revolution

Beginning in 1975, the military juntas of Latin America's Southern Cone began a covert campaign of cross-border, counter-revolutionary activity. This effort, code-named Operation Condor, linked the military intelligence agencies of Argentina, Chile, Uruguay, Paraguay, Bolivia, and Brazil. This group of states was later joined by Ecuador and Peru and was tacitly supported by the United States. These states perceived themselves to be threatened by myriad Cuban and Soviet-inspired revolutionary terror groups, including the Chilean Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria (MIR), Argentine Monteneros, and the Uruguayan Tupamaros and OPR-33 (McSherry, 2005). These groups, and others like them, waged a low-level campaign of armed violence and terrorism (UCDP, 2018). In reaction, the Condor governments devoted significant resources to prevent the further cross-national spread of political violence inspired by revolutionary states, like Cuba. To this achieve this end, the juntas' intelligence agencies

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supported one another by carrying out torture, extrajudicial killings, and assassinations of exiled dissidents living abroad. Operation Condor illustrates the international dimension of a set of interlinked-armed conflicts, one in which states engaged in cross-national support of counterpart governments to contain the revolutionary threat. Foreign policy thus served the needs of domestic repression.

The historical record is replete with examples of similar behaviour, in which a status quo state threatened by rebellion pursues a repressive campaign abroad. For example, during the French Revolution of 1848, the "July Monarchy" of Louis Philippe was toppled in only three days, inspiring revolutionary dissent by liberals and nationalists across Europe and Latin America (Weyland, 2009). This diffusion of revolution prompted reactionary monarchies to summon the so-called "gendarme of Europe," the Tsarist regime of Russia, to defend and restore conservative governments (Weyland, 2016). More recently, during the Arab Spring of 2011, Saudi Arabia intervened in Bahrain in order to suppress public dissent, while Iran intervened on behalf of the Syrian government. In each of these examples, states undertook efforts to forestall the spread of revolutionary fervour and maintain the power of threatened, status quo governments.

Here, we generalize from these anecdotes to address the following question on a global basis: When do revolutionary threats increase the likelihood that status quo states will intervene to assist governments confronting civil violence? The origins of revolutionary threat can be found in the way that rebellion diffuses, and is framed according to the logic of collective action. Although dissidents who have not yet engaged in violent rebellion, or "proto-rebels" as we term them, may be sufficiently aggrieved to consider rebellion, and their leaders have numerous ways to organize them, they are unlikely to take up arms in the face of the decisive and overwhelming power possessed by the government (Lichbach, 1995). As such, proto-rebel leaders may look internationally for information on the expected utility of rebellion and provide it to their followers. In this way, proto-rebels learn from internationally available information on rebellion (Beissinger, 2002; Black, 2013; Braithwaite, 2010; Danneman & Ritter, 2014; Kuran, 1998; Lake & Rothchild, 1998; Maves & Braithwaite, 2013).

In this way, successful rebellions and revolutions provide useful examples that proto-rebel leaders apply to their own context, in the hope that revolutions abroad can be replicated domestically. Of particular note are those revolutionary states that are brought to power by successful rebellion, which demonstrate the utility of armed conflict to proto-rebels (Beissinger, 2002; Kuran, 1998). In turn, threatened status quo states take steps to defeat proto-rebels by offering support to one another during times of civil unrest (Ambrosio, 2009; Danneman & Ritter, 2014; Weyland, 2016).[1]

Our study provides important implications for existing research. First, and most importantly, we bring quantitative and empirical innovation to an area of study that has, to date, been primarily regional in focus or qualitative in nature (e.g., Ambrosio, 2009; Bader, 2015; Tansey, Koehler, & Schmotz, 2017; Weyland, 2016).[2] By employing the Uppsala Conflict Data Program's External Support Data (Högbladh, Pettersson, & Themnér, 2011), we are able to generalize the propositions of this regional literature onto a global sample of cases. Second, our study speaks to the literature on third-party intervention in civil conflicts, a body of research that identifies a number of motivations for third-party intervention into civil conflicts, including the humanitarian and the geopolitical (Regan, 2010). Our study adds domestic repression and counter-revolution

to this set of motivations. Last, this article speaks to research on the means by which states attempt to manage the international consequences of domestic conflict (e.g., Kathman, 2010).

The remainder of the articles is structured as follows. First, we review counter-revolutionary strategies that a state might pursue when threatened by the diffusion of revolution. We then develop a theoretical framework grounded in the emergence of revolutionary regimes and counter-revolutionary foreign policy by status quo states. In turn, we execute hypothesis tests anchored to third-party intervention in intrastate conflict given the proximity of revolutionary threats for the period 1975–2004. We close the article by discussing the implications of our study.

Strategies of counter-revolution

Counter-revolution has only recently emerged as a topic within the academic literature (Ambrosio, 2009; Carothers, 2006; Danneman & Ritter, 2014; Weyland, 2016). The emergence of this burgeoning research is, in part, a response to global events, particularly the 1990s wave of democratization, the Colour Revolutions of the early 2000s, and the Arab Spring of 2011 (e.g., Beissinger, 2007; Kuran, 1991; Saideman, 2012). Counter-revolution was an especially notable feature of the Colour Revolutions, wherein mass dissent erupted during the Georgian Rose Revolution of 2003 and then spread in a "cascade-like" fashion to Ukraine in 2004 and Kyrgyzstan in 2007 (Beissinger, 2007). Although the earliest events in this cascade produced notable dissident successes, the spread of revolution was quickly halted as threatened regimes undertook various repressive responses. For example, mass dissent in Uzbekistan was crushed in 2005 when military forces opened fire on protesters, resulting in at least 187 deaths (Ambrosio, 2009; Bader, 2015; Beissinger, 2007; Horvath, 2013; Howell, Ishkanian, Obadare, Seckinelgin, & Glasius, 2008; Petrov & Ryabov, 2006). Russia also stands out as a key counter-revolutionary force, as it offered aid and assistance to states threatened by revolution (Horvath, 2013).

A similar kind of process unfolded during the Arab Spring. Beginning in late 2010 with the fall of the Tunisian regime, proto-rebels and other dissidents quickly mobilized and took to the streets throughout the Middle East and North Africa. Again, despite early rebel success, status quo regimes in the region were able to retain political power. Most dramatically, however, Saudi Arabia and Iran, both threatened by the spread of political violence, undertook interventions into nearby civil conflicts in order to reinforce allied, status quo governments. Saudi Arabia intervened in Yemen, while Iran contributed heavily to the defense of the Syrian regime (Odinius & Kuntz, 2015; Petrov & Ryabov, 2006; Tansey, 2016; Tansey et al., 2017).

Scholars identify several types of strategies that states employ to defend themselves from cascading revolution of which counter-revolutionary foreign policies are but one form (Ambrosio, 2009; Cameron & Orenstein, 2012; Odinius & Kuntz, 2015; Tansey, 2016; Tansey et al., 2017; Vanderhill, 2013). Ambrosio (2009) identifies four general types of strategies that status quo governments employ to counter-revolutionary influences: (1) "insulation"; (2) "subversion"; (3) "coordination"; and (4)"bolstering." We discuss each strategy, in turn.

Insulation reflects those domestic policies that a status quo state uses to keep cascading revolution outside of its own borders. States and their intelligence agencies

specifically seek out proto-rebel entrepreneurs and other actors, targeting them for elimination. During the "dirty wars" of the 1970s, the juntas of the Southern Cone relied on military forces, in conjunction with right-wing death squads and paramilitary forces like the Argentine Anti-communist Alliance ("Triple A"), to hunt dissidents. This notorious campaign of state terror included torture and disappearances, ultimately resulting in over 60, 000 deaths (McSherry, 2005). Beyond killing dissidents, regimes can insulate themselves from the international revolution by way of institutional repression. Scholarship on autocratization identifies numerous methods by which a state can centralize its political power in the face of dissent. Political parties can be outlawed, elections cancelled or manipulated, and the press can be censored (Levitsky & Way, 2010). Autocratic elites can even offer political concessions to dissidents, maintaining the illusion of democratic reform, hoping that such actions foreclose on mobilization (Levitsky & Way, 2010). In a more subtle contemporary example, Russian President Vladimir Putin targeted pro-democracy organizations and foreign election monitors operating on Russian soil, restricting the ability of foreign revolutions to appeal to domestic dissidents (Ambrosio, 2009).

Yet, in each of these examples, insulation strategies, whether violent or institutional, are domestically oriented. In contrast, the bolstering, subversion, and coordination strategies are primarily international in scope. Strategies in these categories seek to defeat spreading international revolutions at their source. Subversion strategies, for example, are confrontational in that the threatened state seeks to coerce or weaken a revolutionary state in the international system. A plethora of policies exist within this category, including economic sanctions against the revolutionary state or initiating covert action against the revolutionary state. Significant examples of subversion are found in American foreign policy, such as the trade embargo levied against Castro's Cuba, as well as the covert efforts to overthrow him. Similarly, during the Colour Revolutions Russia sought to destabilize the revolutionary Georgian and Ukrainian governments by offering support to ethnic separatists (Petrov & Ryabov, 2006). Coordination is in many ways the opposite of subversion, as it aims at fostering cooperation among status quo states. For example, Russia used the Shanghai Cooperation Council (SCO) as a vehicle for members to rhetorically delegitimize cascading revolutions (Ambrosio, 2009; Cameron & Orenstein, 2012).

Last, bolstering occurs when one status quo state offers aid to another, hoping to reinforce it against the revolutionary tide. The bolstering strategy is of particular theoretical interest to us here because it matches up well with the aforementioned case of Operation Condor in Latin America. Foreign aid, intelligence sharing, arms sales, training, and so forth, can be deployed by one status quo state to reinforce another against domestic dissent, thereby raising the cost to proto-rebels for pursuing rebellion. Russia notably supplied financial assistance to threatened regimes, particularly in Belarus (Ambrosio, 2009), while Saudi Arabia and Iran each offered foreign aid to regimes throughout the Middle East. However, in their most extreme form, bolstering strategies entail not just foreign aid but the deployment of military and intelligence forces into other status quo states in the international system in an effort to shore up domestic deterrence of proto-rebels. In the following section, we elaborate the causal linkages that result in bolstering, status quo foreign policies by status quo governments in the face of threats by revolutionary regimes.

Theory

When revolutionaries prevail and establish their own governments a demonstration effect is transmitted into the international system (Beissinger, 2002; Elkins & Simmons, 2005; Forsberg, 2016; Kuran, 1989, 1998; Lake & Rothchild, 1998; Weyland, 2009, 2014). This demonstration of rebel success can inspire proto-rebels in status quo states to engage in revolutionary behaviour. Status quo states so threatened seek to defend themselves by employing a range of responses in domestic and foreign policies, including the aforementioned insulation, coordination, subversion, and bolstering strategies. It is bolstering that is of particularly theoretical interest to us, for as Farber and Gowa (1995) and Gowa (2011) note, commonly experienced threats like revolution abroad bring status quo states together so that they might usefully combine their resources in an effort to neutralize threats before they metastasize and threaten domestic stability. Werner (2000, pp. 347–348) puts it succinctly, stating that "leaders fearful of such effects have a keen interest in seeing the establishment or the maintenance of governments abroad that strengthen, or at least do not undermine, their position at home."

It is the process of status quo maintenance, or bolstering, of counterpart regimes that we focus on here. We focus on three links that are part of this process: (1) the practice by proto-rebels of searching the international system for relevant analogies from which to learn about the likelihood of success when contemplating mobilization; (2) the emergence and survival of revolutionary regimes and states that furnish the analogies observed by proto-rebels; and (3) the reaction of status quo states to this demonstration effect.

The first link is learning by proto-rebels in status quo states. Learning is rooted in the micro-foundations of rebellion, especially the collective action problem (Lichbach, 1995). Proto-rebels, like all social actors, must make decisions under conditions of uncertainty (Elkins & Simmons, 2005). Rebellion is a costly activity, with individual dissidents risking imprisonment or death. Indeed, given that the state possesses disproportionate military advantages during the early stages of a rebellion, the rational strategy for individual proto-rebels is to completely forego mobilization and instead seek to free ride on the efforts of others who are willing to take such risks.

In order to overcome barriers to collective action, then, proto-rebel entrepreneurs must develop mobilization strategies, including searching the international environment for previously successful strategies that they might employ (Lichbach, 1995). As a result, proto-rebels learn about the utility of rebellion by observing analogs of rebellion and their outcomes in the international system. Indeed, Lichbach (1995, pp. 118–120) writes that successful foreign revolutions can signal to proto-rebels that the expected utility of rebellion has changed. Proto-rebel entrepreneurs may then extract this information out of the international environment and supply it to their followers, thereby encouraging mobilization. Thus, rebel success in state A at time t increases subsequent proto-rebel estimates in states B, C and D of winning at time t + 1. Tilly (1978, p. 158), makes a similar argument on the diffusion of protests, arguing that "when a particular form of riot or demonstration spreads rapidly, what diffuses is not the model of behavior itself, but the information-correct or not-that the costs and benefits associated with the action have suddenly changed."[3]

The second linkage is that proto-rebels are primarily drawn to the most vivid of revolutionary analogies: the successful creation of a new revolutionary state (Weyland, 2016). Stunning rebel success can inspire even in the most distant proto-rebel the belief that the calculus of rebellion has shifted in their favour. The Revolution of 1848 again illustrates this quite usefully. The sudden and unexpected fall of the French "July Monarchy" dramatically captured the attention of European proto-rebels, generating in them a euphoric belief that revolution was possible in their own states. These dissidents "threw rationality to the wind" (Weyland, 2016, p. 218), drawing upon the successful toppling of foreign monarchies and making analogies to their own circumstances (Weyland, 2016).

Additional examples in the historical record are plentiful. For instance, the sudden independence of the United States in 1783 directly inspired French dissidents on the other side of the Atlantic Ocean, providing the impetus for a wave of mobilization and counter-revolution in the France of 1789 (Haas, 2005). One French revolutionary, the Marquis de Lafayette, picked up on this exact logic when he threatened to present Europe with the "contagious example of a dethroned king" (Haas, 2005, p. 7). During decolonization in the 1950s and 60 s, Ghana's independence helped to provoke political violence in the Belgian Congo and Angola (Gurr, 1970, p. 97). More recently, following the Cuban Revolution, Marxist proto-rebels mobilized across Latin America.

The third linkage in our theory is that of repression by threatened status quo states. States threatened by proto-rebel learning have resort to a whole menu of policy tools of varying legality and violence. Underlying this feature is the well-known, basic assumption that threatened governments are controlled by self-interested political elites who seek to remain in office (Bueno de Mesquita, Smith, Siverson, & Morrow, 2003). Dissident political parties can be outlawed, elections cancelled, and public movement restricted. Proto-rebels can be arrested, tortured, and killed (Danneman & Ritter, 2014; Davenport, 2007). Yet, these kinds of policy responses are primarily domestic in nature. Although most repression is of this variety, a focus solely on domestic politics obscures the role that foreign policy may play in repression, specifically the use of the aforementioned bolstering strategies (Ambrosio, 2009).

Broadly speaking, bolstering is pursued when status quo regimes seek to augment one another's capabilities against domestic opponents. Failure to do so-i.e., foreign rebels win-reinforces existing demonstrations of rebel success in the international system. Status quo states have a significant incentive, therefore, in ensuring that revolution is defeated abroad before it can metastasize at home. One significant counter-argument is that domestic repression is a more cost-effective response by a status quo government. Indeed, rather that bolster the capabilities of fellow status quo states, threatened governments can always divert resources into their own domestic repressive apparatus. If this counter-argument is true, "insulation" strategies reflect superior choices for status quo states. However, bolstering can achieve outcomes that insulation cannot. First, bolstering can neutralize any reinforcement of the demonstration effect emitted by rebel victory (Ambrosio, 2009). Second, foreign rebel successes potentially produces a hostile new regime with strong incentives to provide material aid, training, and sanctuary available to subsequently mobilizing proto-rebels (Beissinger, 2002, 2007; Salehyan, Gleditsch, & Cunningham, 2011). These resources can, in turn, raise the cost to status quo governments of implementing purely domestic strategies. Status quo states must therefore enact foreign policies that preempt costly domestic repression.

Last, bolstering allows status quo states to, in effect, bide their time in the hope that a revolutionary state will "burn itself out" given the absence of additional rebel successes. Effectively, status quo states use bolstering strategies to contain revolution. The reaction of the conservative regimes to the European revolutions of 1848, the Russian reaction to the Colour Revolutions of the mid-2000s, and the Middle Eastern reactions to the Arab Spring of the early 2010s suggest that such containment is a natural reflex by status quo states (Ambrosio, 2009; Saideman, 2012; Weyland, 2012). Indeed, revolutionary states are frequently unstable and weak, and bolstering nearby status quo states facilitates the implosion of nascent revolutionary states. Furthermore, encouraging such failure can result in a negative demonstration effect for proto-rebels. If part of the attraction to rebellion is the idea of creating superior forms of government, the failure of this alternative may reduce the attraction for proto-rebels and stop any momentum building to overcome collective action barriers. As such, proto-rebels might learn that rebellion is costly and unlikely to achieve its promised outcome.

Although bolstering strategies clearly have advantages relative to others, status quo states face budget constraints in any choice they make. They cannot, for example, afford to bolster every other status quo state in the international system. As a result, status quo states must gauge the necessity of bolstering specific partners given revolutionary threat and deploy resources accordingly. As the shared revolutionary threat increases for any given pair of status quo states, they are more likely to bolster one another's incumbent governments.[4] Given our reasoning, we surmise that revolutionary threat corresponds, first and foremost, to the geographic proximity of a revolutionary state to a given pair of status quo states. Proximity of revolutionary states is closely correlated with the strength of demonstration effects, and the ease by which revolutionary regimes might supply and arm proto-rebels (Beissinger, 2002; Kuran, 1989, 1998; Lake & Rothchild, 1998). Given these proximity-based linkages between proto-rebels, revolutionary regimes, and status quo states, we formulate the following hypothesis:

Hypothesis 1: The greater the threat of revolutionary states, manifested by their proximity, the greater likelihood of foreign policy bolstering among pairs of status quo states.

Research design

We use the Correlates of War (COW) state system (v2011) to create a global sample of pairs of state-years, or "dyad-years," for the period 1975–2004 (Bennett & Stam, 2000).[5] We rely on Colgan (2012) to exclude from the sample those dyad-years in which one or both states contain a revolutionary state.[6] The result is a sample of dyad-years reflecting pairs of states that are candidates for interventions by one or both status quo states comprising the dyad. In turn, we then identify whether one or both states in such a dyad is host to an intrastate-armed conflict, as defined by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP).[7] We then exclude from the sample all dyad-years that are free of intrastate conflict. This exclusion establishes a risk set comprising dyad-years experiencing domestic dissent in one or both states in a dyad-year.[8] This results in a final sample of 109, 824 status quo dyad-years; that is, a sample of status quo states to engage in the intervention.

Dependent variable

Our variable of interest is the onset of an intervention by one or both states in a status quo dyad-year. To operationalize intervention, we rely on the UCDP's External Support-Primary Warring Party Dataset (ESD) (Version 1–2011).[9] From this data, we code a dichotomous variable, *Intervention*, which is coded a value of "1" in the dyad-year when either member of a dyad initiates intervention into the counterpart state in a dyad-year, and a value of "0" when intervention is absent. *Interventions* commence in 239 dyad-years of the test sample.[10]

Independent variables

Threat of revolutionary states

Our theory associates the threat of revolutionary states with their geographic proximity to status quo states. We operationalize two variables to assess the influence of revolutionary regimes on interventions by status quo states in two separate models:

(1) *Distance to Revolutionary State (ln)*. We identify the minimum inter-capital distance between the two states comprising a dyad and the nearest revolutionary state during year t. We then compute the natural log of this value and lag the result by one dyad- year. *Distance to Revolutionary State (ln)* varies from 8.19 to 9.41 logged kilometers; and
(2) *Distance to Rebel Support (ln)*. We rely on the ESD data to identify the set of cases in which revolutionary states provide any form of external support to rebel groups in a given year. Second, we identify the minimum inter-capital distance between a status quo dyad and the state in which rebels are receiving aid from a revolutionary state in a given year. We then compute the natural log of this value and lag the result by one dyad-year. *Distance to Rebel Support (ln)* varies from 4.72 to 9.41 logged kilometers.[11]

Controls

Regardless of the influence of revolutionary states on decisions to intervene, interventions likely are conditioned by additional factors, chief among which are political interests and proximity to one another (e.g., Kathman, 2011). To avoid over-crediting the effect of revolutionary regimes on the likelihood of intervention, we operationalize controls that may retard and induce intervention. First, we operationalize three variables designed to control for the fact that revolutionary states pose varying levels of geopolitical threat to status quo dyads:

(1) *Status Quo State S*. The likelihood of intervention is conditional on the degree to which two status quo states value their interstate relationships with each another. Therefore, we operationalize *Status Quo State S* by way of the Signorino and Ritter (1999) "S- score" method, which computes the similarity of two states' alliance portfolios, on a scale of ? 1 to +1 at time t. To do so, we draw data on alliances in each dyad-year from the Alliances and Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) data (Leeds, 2003);

(2) *Revolutionary State S*. In Model 1, in which we estimate the effect of *Distance to Revolutionary State (ln)* on intervention, we assess the effect that status quo states find a given revolutionary regime actually threatening. To assess this effect, we again rely on the "S-score" method to calculate the mean alliance portfolio similarity that the states comprising a status quo dyad have with the nearest revolutionary state in year t; and
(3) *Rebel Host State S*. In Model 2, in which we estimate the effect of *Distance to Rebel Support (ln)* on intervention, we compute the mean "S-score" between the dyad and the nearest state hosting rebels supported by a revolutionary state.

Next, we operationalize controls that characterize the relationship between the two status quo states comprising a dyad, as well as the characteristics of the civil conflict ongoing in either state, that are commonly specified in extant research (e.g., Findley & Teo, 2006; Lemke & Regan, 2004):

(1) *Relative Capability*. Intervention is conditional on the capacity of a status quo government to intervene, either due to excess resources or the capacity to ignore the target state's preference against intervention. To capture this effect, we rely on the Correlates of War National Material Capabilities (NMC) data, and the Composite Indicator of National Capabilities (CINC) contained therein, to identify the share of systemic capability for each state in a dyad (Singer, 1993; Singer, Bremer, & Stuckey, 1972). We then identify the maximum CINC value within that dyad, per year;
(2) *Distance (ln)*. The cost of intervening is a negative function of distance, with more distant target states more costly to reach and support. Therefore, we expect that status quo states that are separated by great distances are less likely to intervene in one another's politics. To capture this effect, we include a measure of the distance between states in each dyad, expressed in terms of logged kilometers, lagged by one year;
(3) *Joint Democracy*. Democratic states are less likely to intervene in one another's affairs. We employ the Polity IV "polity2" regime score, which classifies regimes on a scale of -10 (most autocratic) to +10 (most democratic). The condition of is present if each state in a dyad reflects a polity2 score of >6. In turn, we code the variable Joint Democracy a value "1" if both states in a given status quo dyad are democratic and "0" otherwise (Marshall, Jaggers, & Gurr, 2014);
(4) *Ethnic Ties*. Intervention is likely conditional on ethnic ties between states because domestic elites in a state contemplating intervention face a political cost for failing to support a kin-controlled central government facing the domestic challenge (Saideman, 2001). As such, we include a dummy variable coded "1" if the two states in a given status quo dyad share at least one ethnic group in their respective governing structures. The data are drawn from the Transborder Ethnic Kin (TEK) data, provided by the Ethnic Power Relations project (Vogt et al., 2015);
(5) *Refugee Flows*. Intervention is likely a function of refugees transiting between two status quo states (Salehyan & Gleditsch, 2006). We compute the natural log of the total number of refugees that transited from a sending state to a recipient state according to the records of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR, 2019). We then match sender and receiving stats to our dyad-year sample and then lag the variable by one year;

(6) *Conflict Incompatibility*. Revolutionary conflicts of the kind implicated in our theory are centre-seeking conflicts in which dissidents seek to overthrow the existing government. Non-centre-seeking conflicts, by contrast, are separatist conflicts that do not figure centrally in our theory. We expect that the likelihood of intervention is heightened by centre-seeking conflicts because they are linked to proto-rebel activity. *Incompatibility* is also derived from the UCDP's Armed Conflict Data (Gleditsch, Wallensteen, Eriksson, Sollenberg, & Strand, 2002; Pettersson & Eck, 2018), and is coded "1" during centre-seeking conflicts, and "0" otherwise; and

(7) *Conflict Intensity*. As a civil conflict's hostilities escalate, any intervention is likely to incur greater casualties and expenditures, thereby lowering the likelihood that intervention will occur. We use the Armed Conflict Data to obtain information on the yearly intensity of given civil conflicts (Gleditsch et al., 2002; Pettersson & Eck, 2018). *Conflict Intensity* is coded "1" if, in a given year, a conflict incurs 25 or more battle deaths in a given year, and "2" if it incurs more than 1000 battle deaths in a given year, and "0" otherwise; and

(8) *Systemic Rebel Support*. Bolstering foreign policy behaviour by status quo states was central to the Cold War (Westad, 2005). We expect that as a greater share of revolutionary states support rebel movements, the more likely that status quo states are to intervene in one another's politics. We compute the proportion of the revolutionary states that support rebel movements out of all the states in the system engaged in the same behaviour.

Given the binary nature of our dependent variable, we estimate logit models throughout the analysis that follows. Because the data has a TSCS structure, we report robust standard errors clustered on dyads, with two-tailed significance levels. We specify cubic polynomials for each of our models to account for temporal dependence (Carter & Signorino, 2010), but in the interests of brevity do not report these coefficients below. Diagnostic tests reveal no troubling issues with our estimations.[12] Descriptive statistics for our variables are reported in Table 1.

Analysis

The results of logit estimations on our global samples are reported in Table 2, with Model 1 estimating the effect of *Distance to Revolutionary State (ln)* and Model 2 estimating the effect of *Distance to Rebel Support (ln)*.[13] In Model 1, the variable *Distance to Revolutionary State (ln)* is statistically significant and negatively signed, suggesting that when revolutionary states are geographically more proximate, status quo states are more likely to intervene in one another's civil conflicts in support of the government. This finding adds significant support to our theory. By contrast, *Distance to Rebel Support (ln)* fails to achieve statistical significance in Model 2, and as such does not offer support for our expectation. In part, this non-finding may be due to the fact that overt support of rebels by revolutionary regimes is quite rare historically.

One possible confounding explanation for our results is that they may be a function of the strong effects exerted by the subsample containing to our anecdotal example, that of Operation Condor in the Western Hemisphere. To assure robustness, we

Table 1. Descriptive statistics.

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Intervention	0.01	0.05	0	1
Distance to Revolutionary State (ln)	8.9	0.23	8.19	9.41
Distance to Rebel Support (ln)	8.31	0.82	4.72	9.41
Status Quo State *S*	0.62	0.23	−0.254	1
Revolutionary State *S*	0.76	0.15	0.046	1
Rebel Host State *S*	0.62	0.17	−0.07	1
Relative Capability	0.012	0.02	0.01	0.18
Distance (ln)	8.23	0.73	1.63	9.42
Joint Democracy	0.47	0.49	0	1
Refugee Flows	0.01	0.122	0	14.97
Ethnic Ties	0.01	0.12	0	1
Conflict Incompatibility	0.14	0.34	0	1
Conflict Intensity	0.54	0.68	0	2
Systemic Rebel Support	0.36	0.08	0.15	0.55

therefore repeat our analysis on a sample that excludes status quo dyads in the Western Hemisphere. Models 3 and 4 report these results, and it is clear that our coefficients remain stable and are not merely driven by this one anecdotal case.

Next, we consider the performance of our control variables. The variable *Status Quo State S* is negative and significant across all specifications. This result is initially counter-intuitive. A common expectation is that as alliance similarity among dyads increases, so too will the likelihood of an intervention. However, if two closely aligned states perceive a common threat, they are unlikely to resort to intervention in the first place. Rather, two closely aligned states already have in place security relationships that render intervention unnecessary. In other words, closely aligned states are more likely to choose strategies from the "coordination" category and aid one another by means other than the intervention. Our anecdotes substantiate this point. Members of the Gulf Cooperation Council or the Shanghai Cooperation Organization were notable for the manner in which they cooperated with one another, rather than engaging in the bolstering-type behaviours associated with intervention. The burgeoning literature on counter-revolutionary organizations has yet to give much consideration to the different strategies might be substitutes for one another. Instead, these strategies have been studied in isolation (e.g., Ambrosio, 2008; Cameron & Orenstein, 2012; Kamrava, 2012; Odinius & Kuntz, 2015; Tansey, 2016; Tansey et al., 2017). Exploring the tradeoffs among the strategies available to regional organizations thus represents a fruitful avenue for future research.

Revolutionary State S in Model 1, as well it's variant in Model 2, *Rebel Host State S*, are statistically insignificant, suggesting that affinity with the revolutionary regime or host state exerts no influence on the decision to intervene. The variable *Relative Capability* is positively signed and statistically significant in all of our models, suggesting that as the disparity in the material capability of two status quo states increases, so too does the probability of an intervention. As surmised above, an explanation for this finding is that a relatively more powerful status quo state can exert its will more easily upon its weaker counterpart. *Distance (ln)* also performs as expected, such that the farther apart that status quo states become, the less likely they are to intervene in one another's politics. Additionally, the performance of *Refugees Flows* suggests a positive association between the transnational movement of humans and the likelihood of intervention in a pair of status quo states; that is to say, as internal conflicts

Table 2. Interventions by Status Quo States, 1975–2004 (Logit Models).

	Global		Ex. Western Hem.	
Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Distance to Revolutionary State (ln)	−1.1623**		−1.1217**	
	(0.3638)		(0.3748)	
Distance to Rebel Support (ln)		−0.0536		−0.0923
		(0.1122)		(0.1217)
Status Quo State *S*	−1.5904***	−2.1669***	−1.6206***	−2.3017***
	(0.3900)	(0.4669)	(0.4303)	(0.5338)
Revolutionary State *S*	−0.6143		−1.0031	
	(0.6392)		(0.6788)	
Rebel Host State *S*		−0.3749		−0.5972
		(0.4960)		(1.5679)
Relative Capability	18.8087***	20.5096***	17.7265***	19.4926***
	(2.6700)	(2.3365)	(3.0575)	(2.7783)
Distance (ln)	-0.8552***	-0.8730***	-0.8337***	-0.8537***
	(0.0929)	(0.0857)	(0.0952)	(0.0899)
Joint Democracy	0.0550	−0.0121	0.0063	−0.0609
	(0.2611)	(0.2905)	(0.2676)	(0.3048)
Refugees Flows	0.1440***	0.0921**	0.1603***	0.1111***
	(0.0255)	(0.0331)	(0.0258)	(0.0330)
Ethnic Ties	0.9051*	1.0621*	0.9694**	1.1548**
	(0.3590)	(0.4376)	(0.3643)	(0.4403)
Conflict Incompatibility	0.7115*	0.8390*	0.7198*	0.8839*
	(0.3292)	(0.4036)	(0.3360)	(0.4132)
Conflict Intensity	-1.4225***	-1.5060***	-1.3714***	-1.4619***
	(0.2395)	(0.3193)	(0.2440)	(0.3244)
Systemic Rebel Support	0.6326	0.7956	0.0890	−0.5972
	(0.7921)	(1.4847)	(0.8005)	(1.5679)
Constant	12.4891***	2.8233*	12.4708***	3.7849**
	(3.3234)	(1.2802)	(3.3950)	(1.2816)
N	109,824	86,311	107,290	84,092
$\chi 2$	787.9	696.3	794.1	667.0
Log-likelihood	−1397	−1027	−1325	−959.5

Co-efficients with standard errors in parentheses. Two-tailed (* * *p <0.001, * * p <0.01, *p <0.05, +p <0.1). Polynomial coefficients suppressed for brevity.

generate refugees, status quo recipients are likely to be disrupted, prompting interventionist foreign policies. *Ethnic Ties* also performs similarly, indicating that the greater the ethnic similarity of two status quo states, the greater the likelihood of intervention.

The variables *Conflict Incompatibility* and *Conflict Intensity* are each statistically significant in all four models, but exert opposite effects on the probability of an intervention. Specifically, the positive coefficient on *Conflict Incompatibility* suggests that when an internal conflict in a status quo state is centre-seeking, intervention is more likely. This finding shows that interventions are not driven by ethnic interventions, but are rather induced by centre-seeking rebels aiming to overthrow the state. This finding thus adds significant evidence to our underlying assumption that revolutionary threats induce bolstering-type foreign policies.

That said, the negative effect on *Conflict Intensity* suggests that status quo states are also cost conscious when considering intervention. Moreover, it may be that as violence escalates in a counterpart state, a state contemplating intervention sees the effort as a lost cause because the collective action barriers to mobilization have already been overcome by proto-rebels. As a result, policymakers may reason that resources that might be devoted to intervention might be better devoted to domestic deterrence at home. Finally, the statistically insignificant coefficient for the variable Systemic Rebel Support indicates that no there is no systemic effect of rebel support on intervention.

We now turn to the substantive effects of our models, reported in Table 3. Given both pairs of regression models show similar results, we take the global samples (Models 1 and 2) as the "ground truth" in our analysis, with special focus paid to Model 1. To calculate the substantive effects, we hold most variables constant at their means or modes, and then allow them to vary individually from −1 standard deviation to +1 standard deviation. The one exception is that of *Conflict Intensity*, which is made to vary from "1" to "2," allowing us to discern the effect of high-intensity conflicts. *Distance (ln)* is held constant at its minimum value, allowing us to model status quo states that directly border one another. The reported impact of *Distance to Revolutionary State (ln)* is −31%, suggesting the hypothesized effect is not trivial. That said, many of the control variables specified in our models exert greater influence on the likelihood of intervention by status quo state; indeed, the impact of the *Distance to Revolutionary State (ln)* is smallest in magnitude. For example, *Refugee Flows* and *Ethnic Ties* each exert tremendous influence on the likelihood of intervention, echoing earlier research (e.g., Findley & Teo, 2006; Saideman, 2001). We conclude, then, that physical linkages between status quo states, such as refugees, exert a much greater effect.

In Figure 1, we calculate the predicted probabilities from Model 1. To do so, we set all continuous control variables at their means and then allow the variable *Distance to Revolutionary State (ln)* to vary across its entire range of values. We then plot the likelihood

Table 3. Probability of Intervention (Table 2, Model 1).

	%Δ
Refugees Flows	540
Ethnic Ties	401
Conflict Incompatibility	103
Relative Capability	64
Distance to Revolutionary State (ln)	−31
Status Quo State *S*	−42
Conflict Intensity	−76



Figure 1. Effect of *Distance to Revolutionary State (ln)* (Table 2, Model 1, 95% Confidence Intervals).

of intervention. The likelihood of *Intervention* declines from 0.003, when revolutionary states are most proximate, to .0015 when they are most distant. This represents a 50% decrease and provides convincing evidence in favour of our main hypothesis.

Figure 1 provides additional implications. For example, it is visible in the distribution of *Distance to Revolutionary State (ln)* that most revolutionary states are distant from a given status quo dyad. This is because revolutions are relatively rare events, particularly within the temporal domain under study. This emphasizes one of our main points: revolutions, and the regimes that emerge from them, are strikingly dramatic events that can captivate proto-rebels and inspire them to action on a global basis.

Conclusion

Domestic revolutions are international phenomena. Revolutions create demonstration effects, broadcasting the fruits of mobilization against central governments. Proto-rebels in status quo states scan the international system for these demonstration effects, looking for cues, methods, and analogs that they might employ. During many of the revolutionary waves discussed here, domestic dissent is credited by historians with an international stimulus. During the Arab Spring, Colour Revolutions, Communist Revolutions, and even as far back as the Revolutions of 1848, individuals considering rebellion were inspired to action by the seeming success of dissent abroad. In response, status quo states engage in counter-revolutionary foreign policies, with Operation Condor in Latin America of the 1970s being an emblematic example. Consistent with this dynamic, we anticipated that the greater the threat posed by revolutionary regimes, the more likely that states would engage in counter-revolutionary interventions abroad. Our empirical analysis demonstrates support for this expectation when threat is operationalized by the geographic proximity of revolutionary states.

Our study has several implications for the broader literature on the diffusion of civil conflict and intervention. First, extant research suggests that states engage in pro-government interventions in order to staunch hostile ideologies and the international spread of civil conflict. The prior work in this area is primarily qualitative or regionally based, with analyses exploring counter-revolution in 1848 Europe (Weyland, 2016), Latin America of the 1970s (McSherry, 2005), or the Middle East of the 2010s (Saideman, 2012). Our study serves as an empirical validation of this general relationship. Second, to date, the humanitarian and geopolitical motives of intervention have received extensive study (e.g., Regan, 2010). We successfully identify an additional motive for intervention-repression abroad. Relatedly, we are also able to speak to research on the international dimensions of domestic political violence (e.g., Black, 2013; Buhaug & Gleditsch, 2008; Danneman & Ritter, 2014; Forsberg, 2014). Such work generally concludes that civil conflict has a significant regional impact, with states intervening in neighbouring civil wars in order to prevent the cross border spillover of the artefacts of conflict, such as refugee flows (Kathman, 2011). Our research elaborates upon this body of work because we demonstrate that intervention is more than just the function of this spillover. Intervention has important intangible dimensions arising out of revolution as well.

These innovations notwithstanding, our approach here has limitations. First, we do not juxtapose alternative foreign policies used by status quo states to combat revolution; rather, we focus solely on intervention in support of beleaguered governments, which typifies the bolstering category of foreign policies. Yet, status quo states can coordinate with each other through international institutions. Moreover, such policies are not necessarily alternatives to intervention but are, rather, complements to it. Future work should not only identify these alternatives but also study their complementarity and substitutability. Secondly, in our analyses, we found little utility in disaggregating intervention into types. For example, no discernable impact was found when we separated out the effect of troop interventions from intelligence sharing, and future research should do so. Last, our analysis can only be generalized to cases in which status quo states are already experiencing armed internal conflict. Expanding beyond this context to include alternative forms of conflict, such as mass protest, should be a priority.

Integral to the story of the modern state system are revolution and reaction. Revolutions inspired emulation by would-be rebels and caused reactionaries to search for methods designed to limit their impact. In some cases, efforts to mitigate revolution have led status quo states to intervene in the internal conflicts of foreign states. Counter-revolutionary strategies, then, underscore that in the arena of repression, foreign policy is very much an extension of domestic policy.

Notes

1. We use the terms “civil conflict” and “intrastate conflict” interchangeably to refer to substate violence.
2. For example, Weyland (2016) mounts an excellent study of counter-revolution during the Revolutions of 1848, while Ambrosio (2009) discusses Russian reactions to the Colour Revolutions of the mid-2000s.

3. An alternative assessment is that proto-rebels and their opponents overestimate the usefulness of foreign.
4. Shared interest between status quo states may be grounded in other types of interests between status quo states beyond the threat of revolutionary regimes, such as culture, trade, ethnic ties and so forth. We examine alternative forms of shared interest more fully in our empirical analysis, below.
5. The temporal domain is limited by 1975 by the availability of our data on third-party state interventions into ongoing intrastate conflicts and by 2004 by the availability of data on post-revolutionary states.
6. Revolutionary states are identified according to the criteria offered by Colgan (2012). These states are host to a government "that transforms the existing social, political, and economic relationships of the state by overthrowing or rejecting the principal existing institutions of society" (Colgan, 2012, p. 446). Beyond radical societal change, revolutionary governments also imply leader change-they are ones in which a leader comes to power through armed force or popular demonstration. They are coded as starting during the year that a revolutionary leader comes into power and terminating either when said leader exits from power. Revolutionary governments are distinguishable from those arising out of rebellions, coups, foreign imposition, and other broad categories of regime change. We also exclude from the analysis of all cases that Colgan (2012) codes as "ambiguous," so that we can have greater confidence in our results. This definition is used widely in studies of the effect of revolution on foreign policy (e.g., Colgan & Lucas, 2017). There are 48 states that have episodes of revolutionary regimes during our temporal domain, but only 11 that are unambiguous. Thus, unambiguous revolutionary states provide a "hard" test for our theory. Revolutionary states have a minimum duration of one complete year, mean duration of 14.63 years, and a maximum duration of 29 years. These state-years are coded as revolutionary: Cuba (1975–2004), Nicaragua (1979–1989), Benin (1975–1990), Republic of Congo (1975–1976), Libya (1975–2004), Ethiopia (1975–2004), Sudan (1989–2004), Iran (1979–1988), China (1975), Myanmar (1975–1987), Cambodia (1975–1978). We refer the reader to Colgan (2012) for more detail about these revolutionary states.
7. UCDP's definition is a conflict episodes that occurs between a central government and an organized non-state actor, resulting in 25 or more battle-deaths in a year (Gleditsch et al., 2002; Melander, Pettersson, & Themnér, 2016).
8. One alternative research design would concentrate on analysis of intervention by status quo states beyond.
9. These data, hereafter referred to as the ESD, are from http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/. The ESD records interventions in several different modes, including: (1) Troops; (2) Access to military or intelligence infrastructure/joint operations; (3) Access to territory; (4) Providing weapons; (5) Providing materiel/logistics support; (6) Providing training/expertise; (7) Providing funding/economic support; (8) Providing intelligence material; (9) Providing other forms of support; and (10) Providing support of unknown type.
10. One advantage of the ESD data is that it includes a range, or "menu," of intervention modes that a third-party state might undertake. When comparing the ESD data to our opening anecdote regarding Operation Condor, we find that the data codes the various Latin American juntas providing covert aid and intelligence support to one another. Moreover, American activities, which included covert logistical support to Operation Condor via the Central Intelligence Agency (McSherry, 2005), is also included in the data. Thus, the ESD is well suited to analysing status quo interventions.
11. *Distance to Revolutionary State (ln)* and *Distance to Rebel Support (ln)* are correlated at $p < .001$, prohibiting their specification together in a single model.
12. In particular, the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for each variable across all specifications is less than 10, the rule of thumb for detecting collinearity. Further tests for outliers and leverage reveal no significant issues.
13. The sample size reduction in Model 2 is due to the fact that there are frequently no intrastate conflicts ongoing in which a revolutionary state is supplying aid to rebels.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

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