Democracy and Security

ISSN: 1741-9166 (Print) 1555-5860 (Online) Journal homepage: www.tandfonline.com/journals/fdas20

Curbing Enthusiasm? Democratic Third Parties & Commitment to Civil War Governments

Christopher Linebarger, Andrew J. Enterline & Steven R. Liebel

To cite this article: Christopher Linebarger, Andrew J. Enterline & Steven R. Liebel (15 Oct 2019): Curbing Enthusiasm? Democratic Third Parties & Commitment to Civil War Governments, Democracy and Security, DOI: 10.1080/17419166.2019.1675262

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/17419166.2019.1675262

DEMOCRACY AND SECURITY
https://doi.org/10.1080/17419166.2019.1675262

Routledge
Taylor & Francis Group

Curbing Enthusiasm? Democratic Third Parties & Commitment to Civil War Governments

Christopher Linebarger[a], Andrew J. Enterline[b], and Steven R. Liebel[c]

[a]University of Massachusetts Lowell; [b]University of North Texas; [c]Colorado State University – Pueblo

ABSTRACT

Democracies are capable of committing exceptional resources toward interventions on behalf of governments threatened by civil war. Yet, the security benefits obtained from interventions are often indirect, decisive outcomes remain elusive, and fatalities of military personnel salient to the public. These qualities of intervention can lead a democratic publics to pressure political leaders to end to an intervention. To avoid these political costs while still pursuing foreign policy goals, democratic policymakers may respond by altering their intervention strategy by shifting from the deployment of combat personnel to less politically costly modes of support. To explore the possibility of this shift, we rely on the External Support Project–Primary Warring Party Dataset to operationalize commitment during instances of third-party support of civil war governments for the period 1975–2009. The analysis suggests that democracies engaged in intervention build commitment over time. However, we find that democracies are reluctant to commit combat troops to an intervention and, if they do, are unlikely to maintain this commitment. Instead, democratic third parties resort to other forms of support. In general, the analysis demonstrates the key role of third-party domestic politics in interventions into civil wars.

KEYWORDS

Civil Wars; Commitment; Democracy; Third-Party Intervention

On October 7, 2018, the American-led intervention in Afghanistan entered its seventeenth year. At its height, this intervention included major combat forces deployed by the US, UK, NATO, and small detachments of police, advisors, and intelligence officers from non- NATO states. Despite the enormous wherewithal shown by allied forces, their respective commitments steadily declined as the conflict endured. The United States dramatically reduced its troop commitment after the 2010 surge, allied forces gradually withdrew, and external support for the Afghan government shifted primarily from the deployment of combat personnel to assistance of other kinds, including training of local security forces, economic assistance, and the provision of intelligence.[1]

CONTACT Christopher Linebarger Christopher_Linebarger@uml.edu School of Criminology and Justice Studies, University of Massachusetts Lowell, 113 Wilder Street, HSSB #435, Lowell, MA 01854

One argument used to explain this pattern is that it reflects a broader phenomenon. That is, democratic publics grow weary of the costs associated with third-party interventions in civil war. The national security benefits of interventions are often unclear to the public, whereas policy success is elusive, ambiguous, and combat fatalities are visceral and salient. As a result, democratic publics may demand that their elected decision-makers extricate them from an intervention.[2] Whether democracies are weakly committed to civil war interventions or not, the allied commitment to Afghanistan evolved significantly over time. This evolution has seen the intervention turn from one in which allied forces served as primary combatants against the Taliban to one in which the objective was to help the Afghan government sustain and defend itself. As such, the Afghan case prompts two questions: Does third party commitment during interventions into civil wars change as an intervention endures? Are democratic third-party states more susceptible to commitment-altering forces as their interventions endure?

In the following article, we rely on the political economy theory of foreign policy to explore these questions.[3] Briefly, the political economy approach underscores that democratic leaders are dependent upon large winning coalitions to remain in office.[4] Therefore, to remain in power, democratic leaders must ensure strong and robust economies that maximizes the benefits for their population. Economic prosperity affords democracies the capacity to engage in a range of intervention behaviors, including the costly deployment of combat personnel. Yet, the deployment of military personnel heightens public awareness of the costs of conflict. The public endures casualties and watches as public goods are diverted to an alternative purpose. Although democratic publics may be willing to bear these costs if the survival of the state is at stake, the national interest in a third-party intervention into a civil war is often unclear. As a result, democratic publics pressure policymakers to bring interventions to an end. This political pressure leads democratic policymakers to refocus their intervention policies in favor of alternative, non-combat, forms of support.

We focus on a particular subset of third-party interventions-those in support of civil war governments-because pro-government interventions are more likely to be public, thereby activating the link between publics and elected decision-makers that is central to our expectations. An alternative choice would be to focus on third-party support for rebel movements. However, third party support for rebels violates international norms of sovereignty and is more likely to clandestine. As such, covert support of rebels is undertaken without public knowledge, thereby falling outside the scope of our theory.

To investigate the evolution of democratic commitment during civil war interventions, we rely on the Uppsala Conflict Data Project's (UCDP) External Support Project-Primary Warring Party Dataset (ESPPWPD).

ESPPWPD identifies ten modes of support committed by all third-parties that intervene in civil wars for the period 1975–2009.[5] These support modes range from the deployment of troops by third-party interveners, to the provision of training, weapons, and intelligence. Our analysis reveals dynamic interventions by democracies. In or analysis democratic third-parties demonstrate a gradually increasing commitment over the course of an intervention. Yet, further inquiry reveals that democratic intervenors are less likely to commit troops to an intervention in the first place, and tend to reduce such commitments as an intervention endures. Conversely, when troops are absent democratic third parties are more likely to sup- port civil war governments and we observe gradually increasing commitment of non-troop support as an intervention endures.

Our inquiry has broader implications for the study of civil wars.[6] For example, because democratic publics instigate shifts in commitment, our argument suggests an endogenous relationship between battlefield outcomes and domestic politics. This nexus between democratic publics and the civil war process is, to date, little explored.[7] Moreover, although our analysis reveals that democracies are sometimes less than enthusiastic interveners, they are capable of maintaining their commitment in less visible modes of support for considerable periods of time. The remainder of this article is structured as follows. In the following section we elaborate upon the theoretical perspective grounded in the political economy theory of foreign policy. Next, we describe our research design. In turn, we conduct our empirical analysis, exploring the robustness of democratic interventions across different operationalizations of commitment. Last, we discuss the implications of our study for the scholarly and policymaking communities.

Theory

Our theoretical framework draws upon the political economy theory of foreign policy, which posits that the institutional arrangement of domestic political systems shapes foreign policies.[8] The most prominent body of research within the political economy tradition is that of the selectorate theory.[9] Selectorate theory makes the case that in order for a candidate to win office, or an incumbent to retain it, they must appeal to their "selectorate" (S), defined as that proportion of a given state's population that has some responsibility for selecting the national leader. In a fully developed democracy, institutional reforms tend to eliminate most of the special criteria needed for selectorate membership, thereby enfranchising the bulk of the population. A key quality of *S* is that its members are eligible for inclusion in a leader's "Winning Coalition," *W*, which is that proportion of *S* a candidate or incumbent needs to hold office. Thus, the task of any incumbent leader is to persuade a sufficient proportion of the *S* to join *W*, while the task of

challenger's is to persuade just enough of the incumbent's *W* to defect.[10] This logic also applies to autocracies. Members of autocratic *W* 's might include a few key supporters from the leader's ethnic group who crave private goods.[11]

There are a variety of means by which a political leader attracts and retains constituents, chief among which is the distribution of goods from the public purse. Because leaders in large-*W* systems must distribute these goods over such a large proportion of the populace, these goods take on a public character. In large-*W* systems, such as democracies, national security can be characterized as one such public good. A well-developed military and intelligence service defends the entire democratic populace from external invasion, domestic and international terrorism, and other foreign threats.[12] By contrast, politics in an authoritarian regime is about the delivery of private goods to a relatively small-*W*. Such systems thus tend to be characterized by corruption and rent-seeking, whereby close associates of the leader are rewarded with the spoils of office. National security services in small-*W* systems are staffed by the leader's supporters who, in turn, focus their efforts on repressing dissent and maintaining the leader's position.[13]

The logic of selectorate theory has enormous implications for national security and wartime decision making. Democratically elected leaders must act to preserve the public's supply of goods. To do so, democratic leaders must "spin" potential victory in a conflict as vital to the national security and worthy of sacrificing spending on other public goods.[14] Commonly given reasons might include defense of the homeland, prevention of a rival state from gaining a strategic advantage, defense of an ally, or even the righting of past defeats in which territory, resources, or national honor is at stake.[15] For the democratic leader, then, special care must be taken to maintain public support during conflict. Because loss of public support in an ill-considered war that consumes public goods may result in removal from office, democratic leaders must be highly selective about those situations in which they choose to deploy troops.[16]

Although this logic is generalizable to all national security policies, the introduction of troops into a civil conflict is a special class of foreign policy. Interventions feature leaders engaging arguably in "wars of choice," risking casualties and financial charges to defend governments challenged by rebels in a foreign conflict.[17] Given that a leader's constituents are unlikely to have detailed knowledge about foreign affairs in general, and the civil war targeted for intervention specifically, they may balk at any action that requires a serious diversion of goods from the public purse. Moreover, a leader's civilian supporters, who ultimately provide recruits to the military services, must also bear any casualties.[18] Therefore, leaders must be prepared to risk angering their supporters by committing their state's resources to distant conflicts.[19]

To add to this difficulty, civil conflicts are frequently characterized as "unconventional war," whereby rebel forces seek to hide in rough terrain

or among a war zone's civilian populace, refusing to engage directly with opposing forces. Rebel aims in this style of warfare are to deny the government and its third-party allies the ability to fight a decisive battle.[20] Over time, a third party's patience with the war deteriorates and public pressure on the leader to withdraw troop commitment mounts. President Kennedy once described this dynamic when addressing the West Point class of 1961: "Where there is a visible enemy to fight in open combat, the answer is not so difficult. Many serve, all applaud, and the tide of patriotism runs high. But when there is a long, slow struggle, with no immediately visible foe, your choice will seem hard indeed."[21] Henry Kissinger put it even more succinctly: "The conventional army loses if it does not win. The guerrilla wins if he does not lose".[22]

Democratic third parties are therefore reluctant to commit troops to civil conflicts whose outcomes are uncertain, and they will attenuate their commitment over time in order to avoid being pulled deeper into un-winnable conflicts. The low but steady rate of casualties suffered by third parties fighting against insurgents provides a highly visible mechanism through which a leader's public support erodes over time.[23] Eventually, democratic publics grow skeptical enough of an intervention to vote culpable leaders out of office, to participate in anti-war movements, or otherwise consider defecting to an alternative winning coalition. We therefore expect that democracies will be reluctant to commit troops to interventions into civil wars. Those democracies that do commit combat troops in support of a civil war government will reduce this commitment over time. These expectations are expressed the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: Democracies are less willing to commit troops to interventions in support of civil war governments.

Hypothesis 2: When democracies do commit troops on behalf of a civil war government this commitment attenuates as an intervention endures.

Though the aforementioned reasoning might imply that democratic institutions are poorly equipped to stabilize foreign governments threatened by rebellion, these same institutions also produce significant countervailing tendencies. First, despite the fact that democratic publics can become intervention-weary, said publics also demand competence from their leaders. As such, some democratic leaders will be reluctant to withdraw completely support from civil war governments, as doing so would be an admission of defeat that a political opponent might use during an election. Second, democracies are able to commit a greater amount of wealth to national security than are authoritarians. This enables democracies to intervene on behalf of civil war governments with many modes beyond combat personnel, thereby allowing democratic leaders to support a civil war government without deploying troops or incurring the disapproval of their

constituents. Last, democracies have available to them a number of available policy options to defray the total cost of an intervention. Each of these countervailing tendencies is elaborated below.

First, although democratic constituents are casualty-averse, they are also concerned with their state's international reputation for deterrence and strength.[24] Indeed, because most citizens have little knowledge about interventions, and foreign affairs in general, they must judge the wisdom of an intervention from public news reporting.[25] The war casualties literature further suggests that losses in war agitate domestic politics, generating political activism among democratic constituencies. This increased activism can help sustain a political leader through difficult times, provided that the public comes to view a failed intervention as harmful to the state's reputation.[26] Once such a rally begins, it may in fact be harmful to a leader's political survival if he or she attenuates commitment or even completely withdraws from a conflict.[27] Indeed, political rivals have every incentive to criticize and attack incumbents for a lack of commitment, as doing so is an efficient way to win defectors from the leader's winning coalition. Arena[28] elaborates this line of reasoning, noting that democratic executives are often hampered in their ability to wind down a conflict over fear of criticism from opposition parties in the legislature.

Turning again to the case of the Vietnam War, US President Lyndon Johnson feared that his Democratic Party would be held responsible for defeat in Vietnam in much the same way it had been criticized nearly twenty years earlier after the Chinese Revolution. Republicans had blamed Democrats for "losing China," and had parlayed that blame into an electoral victory in 1952. Although Johnson ironically held out little hope for victory in Vietnam, his diaries show he felt he had little choice but to continue the commitment lest he feel the brunt of Republican criticism.[29]

This argument suggests that democratic political leaders will prefer, in some situations, to remain committed to a third-party intervention even in the face of an uncertain outcome. Fortunately for these leaders, the great wealth of their political systems avails them of a number of policy options beyond the deployment of combat personnel. Because democratic leaders must pursue the public interest, they tend to enact economic policies resulting in healthier and more robust economies than the privately-oriented, rent-distorted economies of authoritarians. Democracies thus enjoy a greater surplus of resources that they can commit to foreign affairs.[30] Democracies are therefore able to commit a wide array of resources beyond troops. Financial assistance, training, arms supply, and the provision of intelligence are each means by which democracies might aid a civil war government. Although each mode of support exerts a financial cost, the public experiences such expenditures indirectly, rendering forms of assistance beyond troops highly attractive policy choices for

democratic leaders. Propping up a civil war government in this fashion can allow a democratic leader to avoid paying the most highly visible costs of conflict-namely, casualties-while also expending the resources needed to demonstrate commitment. Thus, as a democratic civil war intervention evolves, policy makers can commit other types of support whose costs are less directly felt by the public.

Democratic leaders also have a number of options to defray their costs of intervention into a civil war, including international burden that allows for sharing the overall cost of intervention to be reduced for each third party, or at least for the illusion of a reduction to be created. Burden sharing even allows political leaders to claim a mantle of legitimacy, helping them to argue that a global public good is being served by supporting a civil war government.[31]

Another policy option for defraying the costs of an intervention is that of debt-financing.[32] Typically, third-party states must turn to taxation to finance their commitments. However, taxation is risky for leaders. An extensive line of literature going back to Immanuel Kant's 1795 essay "On Perpetual Peace" advances the argument that the levying of war taxes generates opposition from within the citizenry, increasing the likelihood that citizens will vote their leaders out of office.[33] Democratic leaders are thus incentivized to keep taxes relatively low and to seek out alternative policy instruments. As a result, debt-financing is a very attractive way to fund wars, for two reasons. First, democracies are uniquely credit worthy.[34] Lenders are thus likely to extend massive lines of credit to democracies, knowing that default is unlikely. In turn, this enables a democratic third-party state to borrow massively to pay for pro-government military commitments. The second advantage conferred to democracies by debt-financing relates to accountability. Kreps[35] shows that debt-financing enables leaders to shield their voters from the true costs of war by avoiding the necessity to raise taxes. As such, borrowing funds to wage war is equivalent to borrowing public support for a war.[36] The sum total of this logic, then, is that democratic interventions are associated with high levels of non-troop forms of support for civil war governments, and that these forms of support will increase over time. Following this reasoning, we posit the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 3: Democracies are more likely to commit non-troop support to civil war governments.

Hypothesis 4: When democracies do commit non-troop support on behalf of a civil war government, this commitment increases as an intervention endures.

Research design

Sample & unit of analysis

We are interested in the commitment of third-party states, acting singly or with others, in support of a civil war government over time. Data on interventions are derived from the ESPPWPD (Version 1–2011), a data collection built on the UCDP's standard for measuring intrastate armed conflict during the period 1975–2009.[37] Our unit of analysis is the "intervention-year."[38] To generate this unit, we aggregate the data sample from 1811 third party conflict-years down to a maximum of 709 intervention-years across 75 UCDP conflicts.[39] The ESPPWPD records ten modes of intervention into civil conflicts, including: (1) Troops; (2) Access to military or intelligence infrastructure/joint operations; (3) Access to territory; (4) Providing weapons; (5) Providing materiel/logistics support; (6) Providing training/expertise; (7) Providing funding/economic support; (8) Providing intelligence material; (9) Providing other forms of support; and (10) Providing support of unknown type. We include all such types in our identification of third-party state interventions.[40]

In Table 1 below, we report the frequency of third-party interveners by intervention-year. A few features are immediately apparent. First, the majority of intervention years (~59%) contain only one third party state. Second, a skew toward the high end of the distribution is visible. That is, a small

Table 1. Frequency of pro-government third party states by intervention-year, 1975–2009.

Number of Third Party States	Freq.	Percentage	Cum. Percentage
1	417	58.82	58.82
2	116	16.36	75.18
3	74	10.44	85.61
4	55	7.76	93.37
5	12	1.69	95.06
6	12	1.69	96.76
7	2	0.28	97.04
8	1	0.14	97.18
9	1	0.14	97.32
10	1	0.14	97.46
13	1	0.14	97.6
16	1	0.14	97.74
18	1	0.14	97.88
20	1	0.14	98.03
21	1	0.14	98.17
25	3	0.42	98.59
27	1	0.14	98.73
33	3	0.42	99.15
39	2	0.28	99.44
41	1	0.14	99.58
42	1	0.14	99.72
43	1	0.14	99.86
45	1	0.14	100

number of intervention-years contain a large number of third-party states that can distort our estimated models.[41] In the statistical analysis that we report below, we therefore report models in which we remove all observations containing four or more third parties. Models including all interventions are reported in the Appendix, with the results remaining largely similar.

Dependent variables

Many studies on democratic commitment in third party interventions concentrate their efforts on the duration and outcome of interventions,[42] the propensity of states to participate or withdraw from multilateral coalitions,[43] or the ability of formal alliances to reinforce coalitions.[44] By contrast, our study focuses on the effect of democratic institutions upon commitment, particularly commitment of different kinds of resources. To assess our hypotheses, we use the ESPPWPD to compute three dependent variables: *Commitment, Troop Commitment*, and *Non-troop Commitment*.

We operationalize *Commitment* by recording the frequency of third-party states that intervene in each of the aforementioned ten modes in each intervention-year. We then divide the number of states intervening in each mode by the total frequency of third-party states present in a given intervention-year. This operation results in ten distinct proportions. We then compute the overall mean of these ten proportions for each intervention-year. The resulting variable, *Commitment*, ranges in value from > 0 to 1 in each intervention-year. Values closer to 1 correspond to interventions in which third-party states intervene across many intervention modes, while values closer to 0 indicate interventions with fewer modes.[45] *Commitment* thus measures the degree to which third party states avail themselves of the menu of possible types, or modes, of intervention into a civil war on behalf of a government. According to our theory, democratic states will be able to commit much greater resources.[46]

While *Commitment* provides an aggregate measure by which to test our theoretical frame- work, our hypotheses differentiate between the deployment of troops and other non-troop resources. As such, we disaggregate *Commitment* into two additional variables. Our second variable is *Troop Commitment*, which captures the proportion of third-party states deploying troops to an intervention. Troops deployments are the most costly and visible form of intervention by a third-party state. Troop deployment places the lives of soldiers at stake, involving them directly in foreign conflicts, and so third-party publics are likely to pay much greater attention to their deployment and react to casualties. Our third and final dependent variable is *Non-troop Commitment*, containing all other intervention modes. The furnishing of weapons, logistics, and other modes of support, though costly in a financial sense, are less visible to third-party publics.

To explore the face validity of our three variables, we undertake a brief study of the civil war in Afghanistan (UCDP Conflict ID#137) for those years in which external support of the government is present. The dynamics of these variables are shown across Figure 1.[47] In the figure, the y1-axis corresponds to the frequency of third parties intervening in the conflict, while the y2-axis corresponds to the values of our three variables. In terms of *Commitment*, three conflict phases are clearly visible. The first phase, representing the period 1978–1991, demonstrates a time in which a lone state, the Soviet Union, supported the civil war government during the Soviet-Afghan War. This phase unfolded as follows. Following the Saur Revolution of 1978, the pro-Soviet People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) came to power in Kabul. Armed conflict immediately ensued, with the PDPA consumed by factional infighting and challenged by armed rebellion. Soviet intervention was nearly immediate and represented by the provisioning of arms, weapons, and training to the new government.[48] This escalation is clearly visible in the trend line for *Commitment*. A further escalation in Soviet commitment began in 1979, after a coup deposed the original leaders of the pro-Soviet PDPA. In response, Soviet military forces landed in Kabul on December 25, executed the PDPA leadership, installed new leaders, and occupied the country. A prolonged counter-insurgency campaign then began, with the Soviets and the reconstituted Afghan government attempting to crush insurgent challengers. Despite the Soviet deployment of over 100,000 troops, their commitment in defense of their client government never included the provision of intelligence, or even access to the Soviet intelligence infrastructure. Indeed, a high level of



Figure 1. Third party commitment in Afghanistan, 1978–2009.

distrust between the Soviets and their clients characterized this phase of the war. Soviet commitment declined after the withdrawal of their troops in 1989, although other forms of support persisted until 1992.[49] The dynamics of this phase of conflict are also visible in the trend lines for *Troop Commitment* and *Non-troop Commitment*. The Soviets displayed maximal commitment in terms of troop deployments, but their reluctance to aid their client with additional forms of support is visible in the fact that *Non-troop Commitment* wavers at less than 0.4.

In the second phase of the Afghanistan case (1993–2001), the most notable external intervener was that of Pakistan, which offered funding and assistance to the Taliban after it seized Kabul in 1996. Saudi Arabia was sporadically involved in this endeavor as well. These third parties had numerous motivations, although their commitment never escalated to troop deployments.[50] These trends are demonstrated by a decline in overall third-party *Commitment* and the absence of *Troop Commitments*. The final phase of the conflict is the post-9/11 invasion and stabilization operations by international forces (2001-present). In the wake of 9/11, the United States and other allied powers contributed troops and other forms of support to support a new government in the wake of the Taliban's collapse. One notable feature is the large number of third parties participating.[51] *Commitment* reflects some fluctuation over this period, but is generally steady. Interestingly, the aggregated *Commitment* measure and *Non-troop Commitment* generally decline over the entire period. Only *Troop Commitment* is maintained at a high level, reflecting the fact that the United States was willing to deploy keep their own troops deployed in the theater.

Independent variables

We operationalize two primary independent variables to test our hypotheses.[52]

(1) *Democratic Intervention*. We expect that democratic political institutions create incentives that affect the way their political leaders commit to third-party interventions. To assess the impact of these institutions, we rely on the Polity dataset to compute the mean Polity2 score across all third-party states waging a pro-government intervention.[53] The Polity2 score ranges from −10 (most autocratic) to +10 (most democratic). We then create a dichotomous variable coded "1" if this score is greater than 5, and zero otherwise.[54]
(2) *Intervention Time*. The passage of time proxies for the costs of an intervention and the diverging effects of insurgency expected in our hypotheses.[55] The variable Intervention Time thus measures the number of years that have passed since the onset of a given intervention.

Because we argue that the effect of *Democratic Intervention* is conditional on *Intervention Time*, we interact these two variables in several of our models.

Control variables

We operationalize the following control variables, each of which impacts commitment in some way:

(1) *Capability*. The ability of third-parties to commit is influenced by more than just their domestic institutions, but also their ability and capability to do so. We therefore control for the level of resources available to interveners in the first place. As such, for each intervention, we sum the third parties' portion of the system-wide Composition Indictor of National Capability (CINC) measure.[56] CINC is derived from the Correlates of War National Material Capability data (NMC) and is widely used in studies of conflict. We then subtract the sum of the pro-rebel third party CINC scores out of this value. Subtracting pro-rebel capability is important because stronger rebel forces may actually act as a deterrent, thus reducing the likelihood that a pro-government intervener will commit at higher levels. The range of this variable is ~0.41 to 0.34;
(2) *Ethnic Similarity*. Intervening states are likely to commit to a higher degree if they share a common identity with the civil war state. We use the Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) data[57] to calculate the proportion of third-party states that share a dominant ethnic group with the civil war state. This variable ranges from 0 to 1, with higher values meaning that most of the intervening states are ethnically similar to the civil war state;
(3) *Third Party Alliances*. We anticipate greater commitment when intervening third- party states have formal security agreements with each other. We therefore calculate the proportion of third-party states that are allied with one another. Alliances are identified using the Correlates of War's Formal Alliances (v4.1) data.[58] We then divide the number of third-party states that have alliances with each other by the total number of third parties present. This variable ranges from 0, in which none of the third-party interveners have formal alliances with one another, to 0.5 in which half of the third-party intervenors have at least one alliance with a corresponding third-party state;
(4) *Alliances with Civil War State*. We anticipate that if third party states have vital strategic interests in a civil war they are likely to engage in greater commitment. We calculate the frequency of third-party states that have at least one interstate alliance of any type with the civil war

state in a given year.[59] The frequency of this variable ranges from 0 to 7;

(5) *Diamonds*. We anticipate that the presence of extractable resources will affect third party commitment to civil war governments. We rely on the DIAMONDATA to identify whether diamond deposits are located in the civil war state.[60] We operationalize the variable *Diamonds*, which is coded "1" when diamonds are present in the civil war state and zero otherwise;

(6) *Rebel Support*. Third-party commitment in favor of a civil war government will also depend upon the presence of external support for rebel movements. These "balanced" interventions are more costly and require greater commitment.[61] We operationalize the variable Rebel Support by using the ESPP- WPD to identify the frequency of third-party states supporting rebel groups during an intervention-year. In turn, we compute the natural log of this value, which ranges from 0 to 2.8;

(7) *Intra-Third-Party Hostility*. Pro-government third parties might intervene in support of their favored side of a civil war, but remain at cross purposes to one another. We therefore identify the frequency of Militarized Interstate Disputes (MIDs) per year among the third parties,[62] and divide this value by the frequency of third parties intervening on the governing side in a given year. This variable ranges from 0 to 5; and,

(8) *Cold War*. Kalyvas and Balcells[63] argue that the Cold War period was notable for asymmetrical warfare. During that period, communist states like the Soviet Union played an important role in supporting rebel forces abroad and spreading the doctrine of revolutionary insurgency to an international audience. Many democratic third- parties thus had important reasons to commit a greater level of resources to civil wars abroad. To control for this logic, we specify the variable Cold War, coded "1" during all intervention-years prior to 1990 and "0" in all other cases.

Descriptive statistics for each of our variables are reported in the Appendix.

Model specification

Because our data are cross-sectional time-series in structure, we specify Feasible Generalized Least Squares (FGLS) regression models with corrections for panel heteroscedasticity and a panel-specific AR(1) process. We inspect the data sample for outliers, leverage, problematic residuals, as well as multi-collinearity. These diagnostics indicate no troubling issues.

Table 2. Democratic interventions & commitment to civil war governments, 1975–2009 (FGLS).

	Commitment		Troop Commitment		Non-troop Commitment	
Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Democratic Intervention	0.064***	0.045***	−0.049***	−0.090***	0.087***	0.057***
	(0.007)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Intervention Time	0.002***	−0.001	0.001	−0.003*	0.003***	0.001**
	(−0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.000)
Democratic Intervention × Intervention Time		0.002+		0.002*		0.002***
		(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)
Ethnic Similarity	−0.081***	−0.095***	−0.011	−0.018	−0.079***	−0.080***
	(0.014)	(0.025)	(0.016)	(0.012)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Third Party Alliances	−0.113***	−0.079***	0.027	0.037*	−0.137***	−0.143***
	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.024)	(0.024)
Alliances with Civil War State	0.077***	0.062**	−0.009	−0.019	0.077***	0.068***
	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.024)	(0.023)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Diamonds	−0.005	−0.002	0.007	0.019	−0.026*	−0.027**
	(0.012)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.011)	(0.009)
Rebel Support	−0.006+	−0.009+	0.044***	0.048***	0.030	−0.013***
	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.020)	(0.003)
Capability	−0.024	−0.009	−0.290***	−0.271***	0.009***	0.037+
	(0.019)	(0.030)	(0.025)	(0.033)	(0.001)	(0.020)
Hostility	0.004**	0.002	−0.003	−0.003	0.009***	0.010***
	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.000)
Cold War	0.053***	0.035***	0.005	0.005	0.052***	0.050***
	(0.005)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.006)
Constant	0.199***	0.232***	0.055***	0.093***	0.202***	0.227***
	(0.007)	(0.013)	(0.012)	(0.013)	(0.007)	(0.007)
N	581	581	581	581	581	581
χ^2	300.6	124.0	265.9	204.6	586.5	3074
Panels	69	69	69	69	69	69

Coefficients with standard errors in parentheses;
Two-tailed (* * *$p < 0.001$, * * $p < 0.01$, *$p < 0.05$, +$p < 0.1$).

Analysis

The results of our FGLS models are reported in Table 2. We specify six models differentiated by the information included in the operationalization of commitment. Models 1 and 2 are associated with *Commitment*, Models 3 and 4 are associated with *Troop Commitment*, and Models 5 and 6 are associated with *Non-troop Commitment*. Models 1, 3, and 5 are designed to test Hypotheses 1 and 3 concerning initial levels of commitment. Models 2, 4, and 6 interact *Democratic Intervention* and *Intervention Time* in order to test Hypotheses 2 and 4 concerning the impact of time. The majority of all the pro-government third party interventions in our sample (59%) contain only three or fewer third party states. Therefore, each model we report excludes outliers containing four or more third party states.[64]

First, we consider the non-interactive tests of Hypotheses 1 and 3 concerning initial levels of commitment (Models 1, 3, and 5). The constant term is small, indicating that on average the value of *Commitment* is quite low. Model

1 therefore indicates that democratic third-party states are given to intervening in as few modes as possible. However, more nuanced conclusions are visible once we disaggregate *Commitment*. In Model 3, *Democratic Intervention* exerts a negative impact on *Troop Commitment*. Predominately democratic interventions thus feature states that are initially reluctant to deploy troops, lending support to Hypothesis 1. Elected leaders are aware that civil conflicts are notoriously difficult wars in which to intervene and may forego troop deployments. By contrast, the strongly positive result on *Non-troop Commitment* (Model 5) indicates that democratic interventions generally feature significant initial outlays in other modes of support. Democratic leaders, loath to commit troops to costly and dangerous foreign wars, will often rely instead upon the supply of logistical support, training, and weapons provided to civil war governments. These alone are significant findings for the literature. They indicate that largely democratic interveners are more likely to use aid beyond military force to intervene in foreign conflicts.

Significant support is also found for Hypotheses 2 and 4, concerning the effects of time. *Intervention Time* is not significant in Model 3; however, upon its interaction with *Democratic Intervention* in Model 4, a strong negative result on *Troop Commitment* is identified, confirming the earlier finding. Given that civil wars represent conflicts over secondary interests, rather than conflicts over the national survival, elected leaders are reluctant to maintain whatever initial troop deployments they may have made. Moreover, Model 6 indicates initially large values for *Non-troop Commitment*, which rise over the course of *Intervention Time*. Democratic regimes have the large and prosperous economies necessary to fund *Non-troop Commitment* for very long periods of time, lending further support to our hypotheses.

The effect of *Intervention Time* upon various forms of commitment can be seen in the case of the Vietnam War. Therein, the financial costs of American intervention drew resources away from President Lyndon Johnson's favored domestic policy programs, and nightly news reports of casualties undermined the President's political standing. By 1968, Johnson was forced to withdraw from his own reelection campaign. The newly inaugurated president, Richard Nixon, then instituted a program of "Vietnamization," focused on withdrawing troops from combat and instead offering support for the South Vietnamese government in other areas.[65] A similar pattern is evident in Afghanistan.

To give further context to our findings, we report in Table 3 the substantive effects of the control variables from Models 3 and 5, as they range from their minimum to maximum values. Results are rank ordered by their effect sizes in Model 3. Beginning with Model 3, the most prominent and important variable is *Rebel Support*; indeed, the impact of this variable dwarfs all others in our model. This is unsurprising – rebel movements that receive external support are highly likely to receive assistance from governments.[66] This variable, more than any other, then, predicts *Troop Commitment*, and underscores that civil wars are

Table 3. Substantive impact on commitment (Table 2, Models 3 and 5).

	% Change	
Variable	Model 3	Model 5
Rebel Support	546.66	−10.01
Intervention Time	18.38	38.10
Diamonds	15.33	−15.80
Cold War	10.35	18.88
Alliances with Civil War State	−18.11	26.46
Ethnic Similarity	−13.59	−8.95
Third Party Alliances	−29.57	6.46
Hostility	−34.97	15.69
Democratic Intervention	−66.20	35.06
Capability	−99.00	−22.56

arenas for intense third-party competition. By contrast, *Rebel Support* is not statistically or substantively significant in Model 5. We can conclude therefore that although states are willing to deploy troops to oppose externally supported rebels, they do not find such rebels a reason to shift from the deployment of combat personnel to other forms of aid.

Interestingly, the variable *Capability* also exerts opposing effects in Models 3 and 5. This result adds evidence to the claim that states with available resources expend their them upon intervention modes other than troops. Likewise, *Alliances with Civil War State* exerts diverging effects. In Model 3, the variable is insignificant, but in Model 5, it indicates that third-parties regard their allied states as important national security assets to be defended with *Non-troop Commitment*. The fact that democracies appear less willing to devote troops to formal allies is something that should be investigated in future research.

The effect of *Cold War* is consistently positive across all models, suggesting that third- party states tend to commit at higher levels during that period. The patronage that rebel forces received from Cold War superpowers significantly elevated their threat, prompting pro- government third-parties to elevate their own commitment. Although the variable *Hostility* is positively associated with commitment in many models, its effect is substantively minor. We interpret this to mean that even if third-party states are hostile toward each another, they will remain committed to mutual interventions in support of civil war governments in order that their rivals do not gain an upper hand.

Across all specifications, *Ethnic Similarity* is negatively-signed, which is counter to the intuitive logic that similarity begets cooperation. This means that as the proportion of intervening states sharing the same ethnically dominate groups with the civil war state increases, commitment is lower. It is likely, however, that ethnically similar states are unable to credibly disavow one another when cultural issues are at stake. In other words, when a civil war occurs, leaders in culturally similar third parties are compelled to intervene because their voters demand it (Saideman 2001), but their commitment tends to be perfunctory.

Finally, it is worth noting those variables that fail to exert a statistically significant impact on *Troop Commitment* (Model 3). *Alliances with Civil War State, Hostility*, and *Third-Party Alliances* each fail to achieve statistical significance in Model 3. It is likely that this result obtains because of the importance that third-party leaders place on troop deployments. Troops are such inordinately important commitments that leaders will deploy them to third party interventions regardless of treaty relationships or hostilities with fellow intervenors.

To provide a more formal test of Hypotheses 2 and 4, in Figure 2 (a) and (b) we calculate predicted values for *Troop Commitment* and *Non-troop Commitment*. The x-axis reports the range of the dependent variables, the y-axis reports the range of *Intervention Time*, and the y2-axis reports the distribution of *Intervention Time*. A linear fit for *Democratic Intervention's* effect is then plotted. In Figure 2 (a), the model demonstrates the low initial values for democratic *Troop Commitment* relative to non-democratic interventions. Although non- democratic interventions show steadily declining values for *Troop Commitment*, the decline for democratic interventions is much more pronounced. Figure 2 (b), however, shows just the opposite. In cases where *Democratic Intervention* is present, the model exhibits a slow, but steady increase in the value of *Non-troop Commitment*. Although the passage of a single year has only a limited impact, these effects build as an intervention endures. By contrast, non-democratic interventions commit a lower level of *Non-troop Commitment*, and their commitment is largely unchanged over the range of *Intervention Time*.

In summarizing these findings, we can conclude that, in general, democracies engaged in third-party civil war interventions try to build commitment over time, hoping that opponents will eventually tire (Models 1 and 2). However, upon disaggregating the dependent variable into *Troop Commitment* and *Non-troop Commitment*, we find a theoretical meaningful divergence. Models 3 and 4 show that democracies are reluctant to commit troops to battle and to keep them deployed in harm's way. This result may also explain why, so many years after the original invasion of Afghanistan, the conflict is virtually ignored in contemporary American political discourse. The American *Troop Commitment* to Afghanistan has declined such that its exposure to casualties is relatively minimal.[67] Yet, the Afghan government remains dependent on *Non-troop Commitment* (Models 5 and 6). Commentators have expressed the view that withdrawal of these other forms of commitment might imperil the Afghan government's survival.[68] It is likely, therefore, that the United States will continue Non-troop Commitment in some form to stave off a precipitous collapse of the Afghan government.

Conclusion

Based on our analysis, we conclude that democratic intervenors waging pro-government civil war interventions wars are reluctant to deploy troops to the



(a)



(b)

Figure 2. Fitted values of *democratic intervention* & *intervention time*, 95% confidence intervals (Table 2, Models 4 & 6).

field; yet, in turn, elected leaders try to stave off foreign policy disaster by using non-troop forms of support. These findings can be taken a number of ways. On one hand, it suggests that democratic leaders have the resources at their disposal to commit to an intervention and an election-seeking incentive to achieve victory. On the hand, however, our findings suggest democracies may be "pouring good money after bad," expending a great deal of time and resources on matters that might be of secondary importance.

Our findings provide the basis for a number of important avenues for future research. To date, the study of third-party intervention in civil wars tends to focus on motivations and outcomes (Shelton, Stojek and Sullivan 2013). Yet, interventions also vary according to commitment. That said, we recognize that our operationalization of commitment is indirect. Future work should conceive a direct measure of commitment by coding the fluctuation in various forms of intervention over time. A time-varying operationalization would enable researchers to study the relationship between third-party domestic politics and battlefield developments in a much more nuanced way.

Another obvious next step is to model both sides of a given civil war. Commitment features prominently in rebel-biased interventions; however, a key difference is that rebel biased interventions are often clandestine. Aiding rebels violates the international system's sovereignty norms, often requiring that states maintain some kind of plausible deniability. Modeling the manner in which democratic citizens achieve accountability over their elected decision-makers in the context of such clandestine action is therefore of the highest importance. Additionally, it is likely that there is a kind of feed-back cycle present between domestic politics and battlefield behavior. The Vietnam War is again instructive in this regard. In that case, commitment did not only fluctuate according to the vagaries of domestic politics, but also because of rationally chosen rebel strategies. Communist rebels undertook specific campaigns in order to undermine American domestic resolve. Studying this phenomenon is not only interesting in its own right, full of policy implications, but is also a direct application of the commitment mechanisms examined herein.

Finally, future policy and academic debate should turn on whether or not political leaders face the necessary incentives for a rational intervention policy. Policy needs to be constructed in such a way that the dilemma faced by leaders in Vietnam and Afghanistan are avoided. Political leaders considering interventions must therefore consider more easily accomplishable goals. Ambiguous goals are likely to give rise to the dilemmas and lingering commitments identified here. Closely exploring these dynamics helps us to understand the often-vexing dilemmas that leaders in which leaders often find themselves. As the war in Afghanistan approaches its twentieth year, such explorations cannot be timelier.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

1. Noah Coburn, *Losing Afghanistan: An Obituary for the Intervention* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2016).
2. Ivan Arreguin-Toft, "How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict," *International Security* 26, no. 1 (2001): 93–128; Andrew Mack, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict," *World Politics* 27, no. 2 (1975): 175–200.
3. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Alistair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. Morrow, *The Logic of Political Survival* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2003).
4. Bueno de Mesquita et al, *The Logic of Political Survival*; Valentino, Benjamin A., Paul K. Huth, and Sarah E. Croco, "Bear any burden? How Democracies Minimize the Costs of War," *The Journal of Politics* 72, no. 2 (2010): 528–544.
5. Stina Hogbladh, Therese Pettersson, and Lotta Themner, "External Support in Armed Conflict 1975–2009" (Paper Presented at the International Studies Association Annual Convention, Montreal, Canada, 2001).
6. The literature on third-party interventions into civil wars is vast and reviewing it is beyond the scope of this article. The interested reader is referred to T. David Mason, and Sara McLaughlin Mitchell, *What Do We Know About Civil Wars?* (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2016); Patrick Regan, "Interventions into Civil Wars: A Retrospective Survey with Prospective Ideas," *Civil Wars* 12, no. 4 (2010): 456–476; and Allison M. Shelton, Szymon M. Stojek, and Patricia L. Sullivan, "What Do We Know About Civil War Outcomes?" *International Studies Review* 15, no. 4 (2013): 515– 538.
7. See the following for an important exception: Jun Koga, "Where Do Third Parties Intervene? Third Parties' Domestic Institutions and Military Interventions in Civil Conflicts," *International Studies Quarterly* 55, no.4 (2011): 1143–1166.
8. Bueno de Mesquita et al, "The Logic of Political Survival"; Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, James D. Morrow, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alastair Smith, "Testing Novel Implications from the Selectorate Theory of War," *World Politics* 56, no. 3 (2004): 363–388; Benjamin E. Goldsmith, "Defense Effort and Institutional Theories of Democratic Peace and Victory: Why Try Harder?" *Security Studies* 16, no. 2 (2007): 189–222; Morton Halperin, Joe Siegle, and Michael Weinstein, *The Democracy Advantage: How Democracies Promote Prosperity and Peace* (New York: Routledge, 2009); David Lake, "Power Pacifists: Democratic States and War," *American Political Science Review* 86, no.1 (1992): 24–37; Kevin Narizny, *The Political Economy of Grand Strategy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press); Kenneth A. Schultz, *Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Kenneth A. Schultz, and Barry R. Weingast, "The Democratic Advantage: Institutional Foundations of Financial Power in International Cooperation," *International Organization* 57, no. 1 (2003): 3–42.
9. Bueno de Mesquita et al, "The Logic of Political Survival".
10. James D. Morrow, Bruce Bueno de Mesquita, Randolph M. Siverson, and Alastair Smith, "Restesting Selectorate Theory: Separating the Effects of W from Other Elements of Democracy," *American Political Science Review* 102, no.3 (2008): 393–400.
11. Jessica L. Weeks, "Autocratic Audience Costs: Regime Type and Signaling Resolve," *International Organization* 62, no. 1 (2008): 35–64.

12. Dan Reiter, and Allan C. Stam, *Democracies at War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002).
13. Bueno de Mesquita et al, *The Logic of Political Survival*; Weeks, Jessica L., "Autocratic Audience Costs".
14. Sarah E. Croco and Jessica L. Weeks, "War Outcomes and Leader Tenure," *World Politics* 68, no. 4 (2016): 577–607; Western, Jon, *Selling Intervention and War: The Presidency, the Media, and the American Public* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press); Valentino, Benjamin, Paul K. Huth, and Sarah E. Croco, "Bear Any Burden?".
15. Adam J. Berinsky, "Assuming the Costs of War: Events, Elites, and American Public Support for Military Conflict," *The Journal of Politics* 69, no. 4 (2007): 975–997; Adam J. Berinsky, *In Time of War: Understanding American Public Opinion from World War II to Iraq* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2009); Elizabeth A. Stanley, *Paths to Peace: Domestic Coalition Shifts, War Termination, and the Korean War* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009); Matthew Wells, "Casualties, Regime Type, and the Outcomes of Wars of Occupation," *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 33, no. 5 (2016): 469– 490.
16. Bueno de Mesquita et al, "The Logic of Political Survival"; Croco, Sarah E. "The Decider's Dilemma: Leader Culpability, War Outcomes, and Domestic Punishment," *American Political Science Review* 105, no. 3 (2011): 457–477; Benjamin E. Goldsmith, "Defense Effort and Institutional Theories of Democratic Peace and Victory"; Jack Snyder, *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1991).
17. Richard Haas, *War of Necessity, War of Choice: A Memoir of Two Iraq Wars* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2010).
18. George W. Downs, and David M. Rocke, "Conflict, Agency, and Gambling for Resurrection: The Principal-Agent Problem Goes to War," *American Journal of Political Science* 38, no. 2 (1994): 362–380; Benjamin A. Valentino, Paul K. Huth, and Sarah E. Croco, "Bear Any Burden?".
19. Sarah E. Croco, "The Decider's Dilemma"; Sarah E. Croco, and Jessica L. Weeks, "War Outcomes and Leader Tenure"; Giacomo Chiozza and Hein Erich Goemans, *Leaders and International Conflict* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Benjamin E. Goldsmith, "Defense Effort and Institutional Theories of Democratic Peace and Victory"; Hein Erich Goemans, *War and Punishment: The Causes of War Termination and the First World War* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); Elizabeth A. Stanley, *Paths to Peace*; Weeks, Jessica L., "Autocratic Audience Costs."
20. Ivan Arruguin-Toft, "How the Weak Win Wars; Mack, Andrew, "Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars."
21. William C. Westmoreland, *A Soldier Reports* (Cambridge: Da Capo Press, 1989), 38.
22. Henry A. Kissinger, "The Viet Nam Negotiations," *Foreign Affairs* 47 (1969): 211–234.
23. Scott Sigmund Gartner, Gary M. Segura, and Michael Wilkening, "All Politics are Local: Local Losses and Individual Attitudes Toward the Vietnam War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 41, no. 5 (1997): 669–694; Scott Sigmund Gartner and Gary M. Segura, "War Casualties, and Public Opinion," *Journal of Conflict Resolution 42*, no. 3 (1998): 278–300; Christopher Gelpi, Peter D. Feaver, and Jason Reifler, "Success Matters: Casualty Sensitivity and the War in Iraq," *International Security* 30, no. 3 (2006): 7–46; Christopher Gelpi, Peter D. Feaver, and Jason Reifler, *Paying the Human Costs of War: American Public Opinion and Casualties in Military Conflicts* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009); Michael R. Koch, and Stephen P. Nicholson, "Death and Turnout: The Human Costs of War and Voter Participation in Democracies," *American Journal of Political Science* 60, no. 5 (2015): 932–946; Patricia L. Sullivan, "Sustaining the Fight: A Cross-Sectional Time-Series Analysis of Public Support for

Ongoing Military Interventions," *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 25, no. 2 (2008): 112–135.

24. Bueno de Mesquita, The Logic of Political Survival; Croco, "The Decider's Dilemma"; Downs and Rocke, "Conflict, Agency, and Gambling for Resurrection"; Christopher Gelpi and Joseph M. Greico, "Competency Costs in Foreign Affairs: Presidential Performance in International Conflicts and Domestic Legislative Success, 1953–2001," *American Journal of Political Science* 59, no. 2 (2015): 440–456; Goemans, *War and Punishment*; Chiozza and Goemans, *Leaders and International Conflict*; Weeks, "Autocratic Audience Costs."
25. Croco, "The Decider's Dilemma."
26. Michael T. Koch and Patricia Sullivan, "Should I Stay or Should I Go Now? Partisanship, Approval, and the Duration of Major Power Democratic Military Interventions," *The Journal of Politics* 72, no. 3 (2010): 616–629; Michael T. Koch, "Casualties and Incumbents: Do the Casualties from Interstate conflicts Affect Incumbent Party Vote Share?" *British Journal of Political Science* 41 no. 4 (2011): 795–817; Koch and Nicholson, "Death and Turnout"; Sullivan, "Sustaining the Fight."
27. Goemans, *War and Punishment*; Stanley, *Paths to Peace*.
28. Philip Arena, "Crisis Bargaining, Domestic Opposition, and Tragic Wars," *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 27, no. 1 (2015): 108–131.
29. Ibid, 122.
30. Goldsmith, "Defense Effort and Institutional Theory of Democratic Peace and Victory"; Halperin et al, "The Democracy Advantage"; Paul K. Huth and Todd L. Allee, *The Democratic Peace and Territorial Conflict in the Twentieth Century* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Schultz and Weingast, "The Democracy Advantage."
31. Andrew Bennet, Joseph Lepgold, and Danny Unger, "Burden-sharing in the Persian Gulf War," *International Organization* 48, no. 1 (1991): 39–75; Robert Johns and Graeme A.M. Davies, "Coalitions of the Willing? International Backing and British Public Support for Military Action," *Journal of Peace Research* 51, no. 6 (2014): 767–781; Weitsman, *Waging War: Alliances, Coalitions, and Institutions of Interstate Violence* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2013); Valentino et al, "Bear Any Burden?".
32. Gustavo A. Flores-Macias and Sara E. Kreps, "Political Parties at War: A Study of American War Finance, 1789– 2010," *American Political Science Review* 107, no. 4 (2013): 833–848; Schultz and Weingast, "The Democracy Advantage," Sarah E. Kreps, *Taxing Wars: The American Way of War Finance and the Decline of Democracy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).
33. Bueno de Mesquita et al, "Testing Novel Implications from the Selectorate Theory of War"; Flores-Macias and Kreps, "Political Parties at War"; Immanual Kant, *On Perpetual Peace* (Arlington: Broadview Press); Kreps, "Taxing Wars"; T. Clifton Morgan and Sally Howard Campell, "Domestic Structure, Decisional Constraints, and War: So Why Kant Democracies Fight?" *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 35, no. 2 (1991): 187–211; Reiter and Stam, *Democracies at War*.
34. Schultz and Weingast, "The Democratic Advantage."
35. Kreps, *Taxing Wars*.
36. Flores-Macias and Kreps, "Political Parties at War.
37. UCDP's definition of an intrastate armed conflict are those armed conflict episodes that occur between a central government and an organized non-state actor resulting in 25 or more battle-deaths in a year. We downloaded these data, hereafter the ESPPWPD, from http://www.pcr.uu.se/research/ucdp/datasets/. See also, Nils Peter Gleditsch, Petter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg, and H°avard

Strand, "Armed Conflict 1946– 2001: A new dataset," *Journal of Peace Research* 29, no. 5 (2002): 615– 637; Erik Melander, Therese Pettersson and Lotta Themner, "Organized Violence, 1989– 2015," *Journal of Peace Research* 53, no. 5 (2016): 727–742.

38. An alternative research design is one in which individual third party interveners are examined separately in a pooled sample, and changes in commitment are computed over time. However, treating multilateral interventions as many separate and independent observations is problematic from a design standpoint. Our theory concerns overall commitment exerted across an entire intervention and the "democraticness" of interventions over time. Our theory does not make predictions about individual third parties, except insofar as an intervention might be comprised of only a single such intervener. As such, aggregated intervention-years are the most appropriate unit of analysis.
39. The actual number of observations reported in our analysis is reduced by an AR(1) correction and the removal of outliers.
40. We hasten to add that given that the ESPPWPD only records years in which third party support is ongoing, UCDP conflict-years are absent from the sample if third party intervention is absent. This decision is justified on theoretical grounds, given that we are only interested in the qualities of the states intervening on the government side and not in unobserved conflict-years with no such interventions.
41. Examples of conflicts in the distribution's tail include the multinational coalition deployed to Afghanistan (UCDP Conflict ID#137) and Iraq (UCDP Conflict ID#62) during the post-9/11 insurgencies in those states, support by the Eastern Bloc (UCDP Conflict ID#71) to Ethiopia during that state's insurgencies in the late- 1970s, Eastern Bloc aid to Mozambique during that the RENAMO insurgency of the 1980s (UCDP Conflict ID#136), and multinational support for the US in its conflict with al-Qaeda (UCDP Conflict ID#224). Within these examples, Cold War era conflicts tended to feature the Soviet Union and its allies trying to stabilize socialist regimes threatened by anti-communist insurgency. Post-Cold War operations feature US-led multilateral operations in the Middle East.
42. Jason Lyall, "Do Democracies Make Inferior Counterinsurgents? Reassessing Democracy's Impact on War Outcomes and Duration," *International Organization* 64, no. 1: 167–192.
43. Atsushi Tago, "Too Many Problems at Home to Help You: Domestic Disincentives for Military Coalition Participation," *International Area Studies Review* 17, no. 3 (2014): 262–278; Ulrich Pilster, "Are Democracies the Better Allies? The Impact of Regime Type on Military Coalition Operations," *International Interactions* 37, no. 1 (2011): 55–85; Alex Weisiger, "Exiting the Coalition: When Do States Abandon Coalition Partners during War?" *International Studies Quarterly* 60, no. 4 (2016): 753–65.
44. Sarah E. Kreps, *Coalitions of Convenience: United States Military Interventions After the Cold War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); Weitsman, *Waging War*; Patricia Weitsman, *Dangerous Alliances: Proponents of Peace, Weapons of War* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004).
45. The mathematical expression for Commitment, as well further details on its construction, are located in the Appendix.
46. Our operationalization of *Commitment* to an intervention has advantages over alternatives. For example, alternative measures might focus on the level of committed resources within each intervention mode. Total troop numbers, levels of financial support, value of provided weapons, and so forth, might each provide acceptable alternatives. Unfortunately, at present, data of this granularity is highly limited. As such, Commitment is the best available measure given current data. Moreover, it matches our theory in that each intervention mode represents an allocation of a portion a third-party state's available power. Any third-party state, acting singly or in

a group, willing and able to contribute across multiple intervention modes is, in fact, displaying greater commitment.

47. Note that the years 1992 and 2002 are absent, because the ESPPWPD records no third-party support for the Afghan government during these years.
48. Coburn, *Losing Afghanistan*; Stephen Coll, *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001* (New York: Penguin Press, 2004).
49. Ibid.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid.
52. Additional details on the construction and distribution of these variables are reported in the Appendix.
53. Monty G. Marshall, Ted Robert Gurr, and Keith Jaggers, *Polity IV Project: Dataset Users' Manual* (Baltimore: Center for Systemic Peace, 2019).
54. This measure captures the domestic pressures that democratic leaders face. Autocrats, by contrast, though dependent on domestic constituents, are somewhat shielded from public pressure so long as the leader can supply a small group of key supporters with private goods. Our expectations thus explicitly make the case that democratic regime types correlate with greater domestic pressure on leaders and, thus, greater commitment to third-party interventions. One alternative way of measuring this domestic pressure might include the timing of elections. However, we note that most modern autocracies carry out elections. See also, Steven Levistsky and Lucan A. Way, *Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
55. The costs of conflict could be measured more directly by way of battle deaths. The UCDP Battle-Related Deaths dataset provides time varying estimates of deaths in civil wars, see Petterson, Therese Stina Hogbladh, and Magnus Oberg, "Organized Violence, 1989– 2018 and Peace Agreements," *Journal of Peace Research* 56, no. 4 (2019): 589–603; however, these estimates are not disaggregated by third-parties. Moreover, casualties are an imperfect measure, as third-party publics may be more or less sensitive to the impact of casualties, depending on the conflict. More importantly, recent findings show that time has its own independent effect separate from casualties. Democratic constituents often perceive time itself as an important asset that is expended by conflict (see also, Sanaei, Ali, "Time is of the Essence: The Causal Effect of Duration on Support for War, *Journal of Peace Research*, Forthcoming). Time's effect is relatively constant and is not contingent on the conflict in the same manner as casualties.
56. J. David Singer, Stuart Bremer, and John Stuckey, "Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820– 1965," in *Peace, War, and Numbers*, ed. Bruce Russett (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1972), 19–48; J. David Singer, "Reconstructing the Correlates of War Dataset on Material Capabilities of States, 1816– 1985," *International Interaction* 14, no. 2 (1993): 115–132.
57. Manuel Vogt, Nils-Christian Bormann, Seraina Ruegger, Lars-Erik Cederman, Philipp Hunziker, and Luc Girardin, "Integrating Data on Ethnicity, Geography, and Conflict: The Ethnic Power Relations Data Set Family," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 59 no. 7 (2015): 1327–1342.
58. Douglas M. Gibler, *International Military Alliances*, 1648– 2008 (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2009).
59. Ibid.

60. Elisabeth Gilmore, Mils Petter Gleditsch, Paivi Lujala, and Jan Ketil Rod, "Conflict Diamonds: A New Dataset," *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 22, no. 3 (2005): 257–92.
61. Dylan Balch-Lindsay and Andrew J. Enterline, "Killing Time: The World Politics of Civil War Duration, 1820– 1992," *International Studies Quarterly* 44, no. 4 (2000): 615–642.
62. Faten Ghosn, Glenn Palmer, and Stuart A. Bremer, "The MID3 Data Set, 1993– 2001: Procedures, Coding Rules, and Description," *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 21 no. 2 (2004): 133–54.
63. Stathis N. Kalyvas and Laia Balcells, "International System and Technologies of Rebellion: How the End of the Cold War Shaped Internal Conflict," *American Political Science Review* 104, no. 3 (2010): 415–429.
64. Models including these observations are reported in the Appendix.
65. Richard Halloran, "A Grand Delusion: America's Descent into Vietnam," *Parameters* 32, no. 2 (2002): 127; Mark Atwood Lawrence, *The Vietnam War: A Concise International History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); Brian VanDeMark, *Into the Quagmire: Lyndon Johnson and the Escalation of the Vietnam War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).
66. Dylan Balch-Lindays, Andrew J. Enterline, and Kyle A. Joyce, "Third-Party Intervention and the Civil War Process," *Journal of Peace Research* 45, no. 3 (2008): 345–363.
67. Pam Constable, "Afghan Government Puts Brave Face on US Withdrawal, But Experts are Alarmed," *The Washington Post*, December 18, 2018. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/afghan-government-puts-brave-face-on-us-withdrawal-but-experts-alarmed/2018/12/21/6f17dc94-0504-11e9-9122-82e98f91ee6f_story.html.
68. Ibid.

Appendix

Descriptive Statistics

Table A1 below contains the descriptive statistics for those variables appearing in our models.

Construction of the Commitment variable

Here, we describe the procedure by which we construct the *Commitment* variable. As described in the main text, this variable represents the degree to which a third party or parties commits resources across a variety of intervention modes. First, we obtain the frequency of each intervention mode in each intervention-year. Table A2 reports the distribution of the ten intervention modes as they appear in our sample.

Second, we divide the frequency of each intervention mode by the frequency of third parties present in a given intervention-year. This procedure yields ten ratios. The distributions of these ratios are reported in Table A3 below.

Third, we average our ten ratios together. The result of this averaging produces the *Commitment* variable. Equation 1 expresses the computation of *Commitment*. Figure A1 shows the distribution of *Commitment*, the main dependent variable (appearing in Models 1 and 2).

Table A1. Descriptive statistics, third party state interventions into civil conflicts, 1975–2009.

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Resources	0.27	0.12	0.10	0.50
Troop Commitment	.09	0.26	0	1
Non-troop Commitment	0.29	0.13	0	0.56
Democratic Intervention	0.55	0.50	0.00	1
Intervention Time	10.98	8.67	1.00	35
Ethnic Similarity	0.04	0.13	0.00	0.65
Third Party Alliance	0.06	0.13	0.00	0.50
Alliances with Civil War State	0.35	0.68	0.00	7.00
Diamonds	0.14	0.34	0.00	1
Capability	0.03	0.08	−0.41	0.23
Rebel Support	0.54	0.09	0.00	2.8
Intra-Third Party Hostility	0.27	0.69	0.00	5

Table A2. Descriptive Statistics, Third Party State Interventions into Civil Conflicts, 1975–2009.

Variable	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Commitment	0.27	0.12	0.10	0.50
Troop Commitment	.09	0.26	0	1
Non-troop Commitment	0.29	0.13	0	0.56
Democratic Intervention	0.55	0.50	0.00	1
Intervention Time	10.98	8.67	1.00	35
Ethnic Similarity	0.04	0.13	0.00	0.65
Third Party Alliance	0.06	0.13	0.00	0.50
Alliances with Civil War State	0.35	0.68	0.00	7.00
Diamonds	0.14	0.34	0.00	1
Capability	0.03	0.08	-0.41	0.23
Rebel Support	0.54	0.09	0.00	2.8
Intra-Third Party Hostility	0.27	0.69	0.00	5

Table A3. Frequency of intervention modes, 1975–2009.

Variable	Obs.	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.
Troops	709	0.85	4.17	0	43
Access to territory	709	0.10	0.48	0	6
Access to infrastructure	709	0.11	0.68	0	12
Weapons	709	1.03	0.86	0	7
Material support	709	0.98	1.19	0	16
Training	709	1.38	2.60	0	30
Funding	709	0.63	0.68	0	4
Intelligence support	709	0.10	0.47	0	6
Other	709	0.05	0.43	0	6
Unknown	709	0.08	1.31	0	29



Figure A1. Distribution of commitment, 1975–2009.

$$\left(\left(\frac{troops_t}{parties_t}\right)+\left(\frac{infrastructure_t}{parties_t}\right)+\left(\frac{territory_t}{parties_t}\right)+\left(\frac{material_t}{parties_t}\right)+\left(\frac{training_t}{parties_t}\right)+\left(\frac{funding_t}{parties_t}\right)\left(\frac{intelligence_t}{parties_t}\right)\left(\frac{other_t}{parties_t}\right)\left(\frac{unknown_t}{parties_t}\right)\right)\Big/10 \quad (1)$$

Next, we separate *Troop Commitment* from *Commitment* for Models 3 and 4. The distribution of Troop Commitment is shown in Figure A2 below.

Next, we separate *Non-troop Commitment* from *Commitment* for Models 5 and 6. The distribution of *Non-troop Commitment* is shown in Figure A3 below.

Construction of Independent Variables

In this section, we describe the construction of our independent variables. First, we show in Figure A4 below the distribution of Democratic Intervention, a 1/0 dummy variable that is coded "1" if the majority of the third parties in a given intervention-year are democratic (i.e., coded above "5" on the Polity scale). 50% of the intervention-years in our sample are classified as democratic.

In Figure A5 below, we show the distribution of Intervention Time. This variable is constructed by counting the years that have passed since the onset of an intervention.

Robustness Tests

We removed outliers from the models shown in the main body of the paper. In the Table A4 below, we report models that include all observations.



Figure A2. Distribution of troop commitment, 1975–2009.



Figure A3. Distribution of non-troop commitment, 1975–2009.



Figure A4. Distribution of democratic intervention, 1975–2009.



Figure A5. Distribution of intervention time, 1975–2009.

Table A4. Democratic third-party interventions & commitment, 1975–2009 (FGLS), with outliers included.

	Commitment		Troop Commitment		Non-troop Commitment	
Variable	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Democratic Intervention	0.056***	0.049***	-0.046***	-0.109***	0.073***	0.056***
	(0.006)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.007)	(0.009)
Intervention Time	0.002***	0.000	-0.003***	-0.004***	0.003***	0.001*
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Democratic Intervention × Intervention Time		0.001+		0.005***		0.002***
		(0.001)		(0.001)		(0.001)
Ethnic Similarity	-0.057***	-0.068***	-0.013	-0.010	-0.087***	-0.090***
	(0.012)	(0.017)	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Third Party Alliances	-0.098***	-0.072***	0.012	0.015	-0.092***	-0.094***
	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.018)	(0.023)	(0.021)	(0.021)
Alliances with Civil War State	0.065***	0.044*	-0.010	-0.016	0.068***	0.061**
	(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.027)	(0.029)	(0.020)	(0.020)
Diamonds	-0.008	-0.013	-0.046**	-0.018	-0.000	-0.016
	(0.010)	(0.014)	(0.018)	(0.022)	(0.013)	(0.010)
Rebel Support	-0.005*	-0.006	0.006	0.010+	-0.008**	-0.009***
	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Capability	-0.016	-0.027	-0.066*	-0.085**	0.008	0.004
	(0.021)	(0.024)	(0.028)	(0.031)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Hostility	0.007***	0.001	-0.001	-0.001	0.007***	0.006***
	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.000)	(0.001)
Cold War	0.041***	0.030***	-0.008*	-0.002	0.035***	0.033***
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.006)	(0.007)
Constant	0.189***	0.215***	0.141***	0.169***	0.196***	0.217***
	(0.006)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.009)
N	682	682	682	682	682	682
χ^2	371.91	161.73	116.1	116.14	168.69	587.85
Panels	75	75	75	75	75	75