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Mediation and Peacekeeping in Civil Wars

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The occurrence of outside mediation and peacekeeping has increased exponentially since the end of the Cold War. But how do third-party states and international organizations decide which civil wars to intervene in? And how do they decide whether to mediate talks between the warring parties or to send peacekeepers? In this study, we propose that third parties are influenced by their interests in a civil war country, they take into account the urgency a civil war poses, and they shy away from particularly challenging civil wars. Empirical tests confirm some of these hypotheses but also yield some contrary results. In contrast to much of the empirical literature, which has mostly treated different conflict management tools separately, this study combines two of the most important aspects of international conflict management – mediation and peacekeeping – into one theoretical framework.

INTRODUCTION

Efforts to manage conflicts have proliferated in the past two decades. There have been 62 civil-war years with peacekeeping missions (24 per cent of all civil-war years during this time) and 112 (43 per cent) with international mediation efforts after the end of the Cold War between 1989 and 1998 according to our data-set, compared with 42 (9 per cent) civil-war years with peacekeeping and 105 (21 per cent) with mediation between 1955 and 1988 during the Cold War.[2] Thus, the proportional occurrence of both mediation and peacekeeping has more than doubled. Several observers[3] link this increase in conflict management to a decrease in the number of civil wars (although there has been a recent upswing).[4] Several studies that examine the effectiveness of peacekeeping seem to support this link.[5] At the same time, many conflict management efforts fail. Still, if international conflict management is effective overall in reducing the number of wars, then the 'international community' – or at least international organizations with such a mandate and third-party states with a specific interest in a conflict – has a motivation to engage in efforts to manage conflicts.

There is more at play. International organizations and third-party states clearly do not apply conflict management at random to the civil wars in the world. Some conflicts see multiple peacekeeping missions and numerous mediation efforts, whereas others are largely forgotten.

In this article, we examine the factors that influence when and how the international community manages civil war by sending mediators or peacekeepers. Rather than studying these two types of third-party conflict management efforts in isolation from one another, we focus our attention on the conditions that influence whether third parties will choose between neither sending mediators nor peacekeepers, only intervening diplomatically with mediation, or deploying peacekeepers to an ongoing civil war (we exclude one-sided military and other interventions).

A sizeable literature has developed that examines the causes of civil war, the conditions under which settlements occur, and the conditions that promote the durability of these settlements. This study adds to the literature in two ways. First, although studies have placed considerable emphasis upon the outcomes of civil wars and civil war conflict management efforts, they have devoted less attention to the question of when conflict management efforts actually take place within civil wars. Understanding when conflict management is applied to civil wars is especially important to studies of its success due to the problem of selection bias. As a result of the unequal distribution of conflict management, determining the conditions under which conflict management efforts occur within civil wars is as important as understanding when such efforts will be successful. Without controlling for selection bias, empirical analysis of the conditions associated with civil war conflict management success may yield faulty inferences. In addition, understanding when conflict management occurs and what form it takes provides a means of comparison with the factors associated with its success.

Second, those studies that do focus upon the conditions under which conflict management takes place, such as Gilligan and Stedman's study of peacekeeping in civil wars,[6] Greig's study of mediation in enduring rivalries,[7] and Greig and Regan's study of mediation in civil wars,[8] tend to examine different types of conflict management largely in isolation from one another. These studies are useful to get a detailed understanding of the circumstances under which a specific type of conflict management is used. Yet, we know that conflict management and resolution efforts influence and reinforce each other. Quite often, for example, the occurrence of mediation is linked to the occurrence of peacekeeping. Similarly, the need for mediation often arises due to the failure of disputants to negotiate a settlement themselves. Thus, different conflict management tools can substitute for one another. Most and Starr developed the concept of foreign policy substitutability.[9] According to this concept, decision makers choose from a range of policy options, all of which may lead to the same desired outcome. Decision makers choose from the range of available options according to their preferences and their estimates of the probability of success for each option.[10] Thus, we hope to gain a better understanding of the circumstances in which two of the most commonly used tools of international conflict management are employed by examining them simultaneously.

There are several characteristics of civil wars that make achieving a durable settlement between contending sides difficult. Civil wars are inherently

asymmetrical, involving a rebel group and a government that is at least initially in command of the power structures.[11] This is not to say that power asymmetries might not be present in interstate conflicts as well, but they often reach levels of higher intensity and complexity in the domestic context. Civil wars also tend to carry substantial commitment problems that make domestic peace more difficult to achieve.[12]

Conflict management efforts have to deal with these problems and have to overcome them if a durable peace is to be reached. This not only leads to uncertainty about the outcomes of the conflict management process, but also increases the costs borne by third parties willing to engage. This raises questions about when and how third parties intervene. Furthermore, how is the employment of one type of mission dependent on the existence of other missions already on the ground?

The answer to these questions is also of methodological interest. Studies of any type of intervention are consistently faced with possible self-selection effects. This necessitates a more thorough understanding of the factors that precipitate conflict management in the first place. Some studies have sought to determine the factors that influence the employment of different types of conflict management efforts.[13] Here, however, we try to examine the factors shaping the chances of simultaneous or sequential employment of different types of conflict management missions – mediation and peacekeeping – versus doing nothing. This research question is important in a twofold way: first, multidimensional conflict management efforts have become increasingly common in the last decade or so, and second, different aspects of conflict management tend to interact with each other in a mutually reinforcing way[14] or hindering each other.[15]

A MULTIDIMENSIONAL VIEW OF CONFLICT MANAGEMENT

We define conflict management broadly to include both efforts that focus upon settling the issues under dispute in a civil war and efforts to limit the conflict between civil war disputants. Our fundamental question is when do third parties attempt to mediate ongoing civil conflicts, when do they choose to send peacekeepers (with or without simultaneous mediation), and when do they not try to manage the conflict with these two tools? In other words, when do third parties choose to intervene to manage a conflict, and when do they substitute one conflict management tool for another?

Of course, third parties have other options to intervene in civil wars. They can intervene militarily to support one side in a war, rather than trying to limit the fighting with a peacekeeping mission,[16] they can support armed groups in a civil war in more clandestine ways,[17] issue sanctions,[18] or public appeals, offer arbitration, or send fact-finding missions. And the warring parties themselves have other options as well: they can negotiate a settlement without outside help (although Walter shows that negotiated settlements without an outside guarantee are more likely to break down).[19] We focus our study on mediation and peacekeeping as these are two of the most commonly applied types of conflict, and perhaps the two types that have been

most deeply studied (though usually one type in separation from the other). We exclude other options for several reasons: first, one-sided interventions – military or other – follow a different logic. Instead of limiting or ending a conflict, their goal is to help one of the two sides to win the war or to prevent it from losing. Second, the goal of sanctions is often more to punish one side rather than to engage with both sides of a conflict in order to manage it. Sanctions thus also follow a different logic, and it would be difficult to include them in our model. Third, options such as public appeals and fact-finding missions are usually much less costly than mediation or peacekeeping but also probably have a much lower impact. Although we do not include these factors in our model, we believe that future research, step by step, should build more comprehensive models of all different options of conflict management.

Once the choice is made to consider dialog over violence in settling the issues under dispute in a civil war, both negotiation and mediation become options for conflict management. Mediation is similar to negotiation in its reliance upon diplomacy over violence as a means of conflict resolution, but it differs in its inclusion of a third party to the negotiations. The mediator can help to stimulate a settlement between the disputants through such means as solving informational problems, offering carrots and sticks, and offering enforcement guarantees. Although mediation relies upon the consent of the disputants, the inclusion of a third party into the negotiations often functions to constrain the options of disputants.

Not only can third parties seek to manage conflicts by intervening diplomatically, they can also intervene militarily through peacekeeping. Peacekeeping, particularly UN missions in the 1960s and 1970s, is similar to mediation in its tendency to rely upon the consent of the belligerents for the intervention. Yet, peacekeeping also differs in several important ways. First, and most obviously, peacekeeping involves the deployment of military forces into a conflict. Second, peacekeeping carries with it much broader constraints upon disputants than mediation. This constraining effect has grown as peacekeeping missions have evolved in the post-Cold War era to include more peace enforcement missions in which disputant consent is not necessarily a prerequisite for intervention. Finally, unlike mediation, the primary goal of most peacekeeping missions is not to produce a settlement between the parties. Instead, although peacekeeping may ultimately create an environment conducive to the settlement of a conflict, the limitation of conflict between disputants is often its primary goal.[20]

In the next section, we provide a theoretical framework with three main factors that affect third parties' decision on whether to send mediators or peacekeepers into a civil war: first, if third parties – especially major powers and the countries neighboring a civil war country – have particular interests in that country, they are more likely to manage the conflict, directly or via an international organization. Second, the more urgent they perceive a conflict to be, and the more human suffering it causes, the more likely they will attempt to manage it. Third, conflicts that are seen as complex and challenging will see less conflict management.

In choosing a form of conflict management, third parties must weigh its costs against its likely effectiveness. Peacekeeping is an inherently costly endeavor, representing one of the most expensive means of managing a conflict.[21] These costs tend to undermine the willingness of third parties to provide peacekeepers in all but the most dire of circumstances. Some researchers highlight the trade-offs involved in choosing between the application of purely diplomatic conflict management efforts by third parties and the use of military intervention in civil wars.[22]

The empirical literature has shown that peacekeeping does not necessarily translate into conflict resolution. Sambanis argues that the degree to which peacekeeping leads to conflict resolution depends largely upon the degree to which peacekeeping fulfills the mandate of its mission and the way that both disputants and third parties react to the peacekeeping mission.[23] Diehl takes a more pessimistic view, finding that peacekeeping is rarely followed by settlements of the issues under dispute.[24]

In the following section, we develop a set of expectations regarding when each form of conflict management – neither mediation nor peacekeeping, mediation only, or peacekeeping with or without mediation – is most likely to take place within civil wars.

Third-Party Interests and Conflict Management

The decision of third parties to intervene in a conflict, through mediation or peacekeeping, is not one made lightly. Both forms of conflict management entail costs for the third party. Mediation carries reputational, political, and opportunity costs for the third party serving as mediator.[25] Failed mediation efforts by a third party can undermine their ability to manage future conflicts, and the diplomatic effort expended to deal with one conflict is energy that cannot be applied to others. Peacekeeping is an even more expensive means of managing conflicts.[26] Peacekeeping not only brings similar reputational costs to mediation, but also substantial material and audience costs for the providers of peacekeeping, and the risk of peacekeepers getting injured or killed.[27] Given these costs, it makes sense to see conflict management efforts as strategic tools that are used when they are of interest to the third party.[28]

Greig and Regan see civil war mediation in this strategic context, arguing that the utility that a third party has for mediating a civil conflict is a function of the degree to which the warring state and the potential mediator are bound by common interests.[29] Shared economic ties,[30] alliance linkages,[31] and historical ties[32] all provide interests that can motivate a third party to mediate a civil conflict. The interests of the conflict parties – the government and one or several rebel groups – play a role as well. In particular, either side to a conflict may be hesitant to accept conflict management from an outside party that is closely aligned with the opposing side. Although it is difficult to account for their context-specific interests in a global study such as this one, we take into account a country's ability to resist outside conflict management efforts by including its military power in our model.

The application of peacekeeping follows similar strategic calculations. In general, states with significant political, social, and economic interests in a civil war country have the strongest incentives to intervene militarily to support one side of the conflict and preserve those interests.[33] These same interests increase the likelihood that a state will deploy peacekeepers to a civil war directly, without relying on an international organization.[34]

States are not the only actors that seek to manage ongoing civil conflicts, much of the mediation and peacekeeping efforts directed at these conflicts are conducted by international organizations. Because international organizations are creations of states, it makes sense to expect that international organizations will, in general, reflect the interests of their member states when they intervene into conflicts.[35] Neack, for example, argues that states become involved in and, ostensibly, support UN peacekeeping missions to protect national interests.[36] As a result, states are likely to be particularly inclined to support peacekeeping missions by international organizations of which they are members of when these missions are directed at what are seen as strategically vital target countries.

Of particular importance in the provision of conflict management to civil wars are the interests of major powers, which often act within international institutions to mobilize efforts to provide mediation and peacekeeping. Durch suggests that UN peacekeeping requires the support of major powers; without it – especially because of the veto powers held by the major powers in the UN Security Council – a peacekeeping mission may not occur at all.[37] Oudratt goes further, arguing that UN peacekeeping missions lean toward the interests of major powers.[38] On the contrary, because most civil conflicts are tangential to the interests of most major powers, key providers of conflict management, they typically avoid intervention in them.[39]

Jacobsen, and Gilligan and Stedman, however, find that state interests do not appear to influence significantly the onset of UN peacekeeping missions.[40] Yet, this does not necessarily mean that major power interests do not shape the application of conflict management efforts. Major powers can channel their conflict management efforts through many different means, offering mediation and engaging in mediation themselves, in coalition with other willing states, and through international organizations that they participate in. The close relations and shared histories of France and Britain to their former colonies, for example, have encouraged both to provide mediation and peacekeeping to civil wars in these former colonies. Given this logic, we expect that civil conflicts in which major powers have the most direct interests at stake will be the most likely to attract conflict management efforts. As the strategic importance of these issues increases for major powers, we anticipate that these conflict management efforts will be more likely to involve the more costly and risky deployment of peacekeepers.

In addition to major powers, neighboring states to a civil conflict also often have important interests at stake that are influenced by the fighting.[41] Civil wars often create negative externalities affecting a country's neighbors. This can include refugee flows, a reduction in cross-border trade, regional instability, armed groups establishing rear bases in adjacent countries, or illicit trading in arms. Thus, states

neighboring to a civil war may seek to manage nearby conflicts as a means of protecting their interests and minimizing the costs that they experience from the war. This, in fact, is often the case: for instance, Nigeria led a peacekeeping mission of the Organization of African Unity in Chad in 1981–82. Greig and Regan find that neighboring states are significantly more likely to offer civil war mediation than states further removed from a conflict.[42] Working against this logic, governments facing a civil war may be keen to keep neighbors out. They are more likely to be able to do so the more military power we have, a fact for which we account below in our theoretical and empirical models. Still, holding military power equal, our argument suggests that as the number of states bordering a civil war state increases, the number of parties with a sufficient interest in regional stability to motivate them to manage the conflict will also increase, leading to a higher likelihood of both mediation and peacekeeping.

Hypothesis 1a: Civil wars are more likely to attract international conflict management (mediation and peacekeeping) when they occur in countries that fall within the interest spheres of major powers (former colonies or allies of major powers, oil exporters).

Hypothesis 1b: Civil wars are likely to attract international conflict management from neighboring states that have an interest to intervene. Thus, the more neighboring states surround a country experiencing civil war, and the more these neighboring states are affected by the war, the more likely we are to see conflict management efforts.

Urgency for Intervention

Although the political and strategic interests of third parties play an important role in determining where and how the international community will respond to civil conflicts, we also see this response shaped by the urgency a conflict demonstrates for conflict management, through two interlinked mechanisms. First, witnessing the human suffering caused by civil wars may lead to an expectation that its government, the United Nations, or another international organization should 'do something about it'. Media publish reports and images about the conflict and op-eds urge action; citizens call their representatives or form pressure groups.[43] Second, despite a controversial discussion, there has been an increasing recognition that international human rights standards may sometimes trump national sovereignty.[44] Although interests still play an important role, states and, maybe more so, international organizations such as the UN seem to be more likely to try to manage conflicts that are perceived as urgent, causing great human suffering.

We focus on two aspects of the level of urgency that a conflict shows. First, civil wars that cause a humanitarian emergency show a great level of urgency and should be associated with a higher probability that third parties will try to manage the conflict. Peacekeeping can alleviate the causes of a humanitarian emergency in a more direct and quicker way than mediation and should thus have an even greater probability. We use genocide, politicide, and refugee flows as indicators of a

humanitarian emergency. In this respect, the development of a humanitarian emergency presents one of the clearest indicators of an urgent need for conflict management in a civil war. For example, in recent years, the conflicts in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and in Darfur have seen plenty of conflict management efforts. Not only do civil war-produced humanitarian emergencies provide a clear sense of the need for intervention, they also suggest a broader threat to the international community that can play an important role in mobilizing efforts to manage a conflict. Civil war refugees that spill across the borders of neighboring states impose considerable costs upon these states, sometimes threatening their own stability. Kenya, for example, is concerned about the situation in refugee camps for Somali refugees, and there have been several grenade attacks in the mostly Somali Eastleigh district of Nairobi. Several studies have linked peacekeeping missions to humanitarian emergencies.[45] These peacekeeping missions are often not primarily driven by national interest, but rather by a belief that conditions have deteriorated so significantly that diplomatic efforts to manage the conflict are unlikely to be fruitful. We expect that when actors in the international community intervene in civil wars marked by genocide and large-scale civilian displacements, the likelihood that they use peacekeeping over solely diplomatic intervention will increase.

Second, just as the development of a humanitarian emergency during a civil conflict can highlight the need for conflict management by members of the international community, the intensity and duration of conflict can play a similar role. Long-lasting, intense conflict tends to develop a momentum of its own.[46] Over time, warring parties increasingly see the conflict costs that they have previously experienced as sunk costs, encouraging them effectively to double down on their prior wager by devoting even more resources to win the conflict and earn a reward on those sunk costs.[47] At the same time, the longer a conflict continues and the more intense it becomes, the more the level of animosity between the two sides grows and the more likely they become to see one another as 'evil'.[48] In turn, the deepening of hostility between the two sides and their development of enemy images of one another often functions to shut down their communication lines and harden their bargaining positions.[49] In this respect, it becomes increasingly difficult over time for two sides embroiled in long-running, intense civil wars to manage their conflict bilaterally through negotiation. Instead, third-party assistance is often necessary to overcome these barriers to conflict management.

Greig finds in his study of interstate conflicts that mediation becomes more likely to take place as both conflict intensity and duration increase.[50] Mediators can encourage the two sides to talk to one another, serve as a go-between between the two sides, recognize and communicate areas of common interest, and provide incentives that can make potential settlements more palatable to the two sides. The protracted and intense civil war in Mozambique, for example, was ended partially, thanks to mediation from the Catholic Community of Sant'Egidio. Peacekeepers can help to build trust and security among the contending sides by monitoring their disarmament and demobilization and providing an enforcement mechanism after an agreement, thereby removing some of the impediments to a settlement.[51] Following

this logic, we expect that long-running, intense conflicts and those producing a humanitarian emergency will be more likely to attract third-party conflict management efforts.

Mediation is a low-intensity effort that, while less costly, also tends to be less effective in managing violence. The longer a conflict spirals out of control, the less likely non-military options like mediation are to be effective, requiring the deployment of peacekeepers to have any hope of effectively managing the conflict.[52] High death tolls between belligerents can serve to make it more difficult for the parties to reconcile with one another.[53] As a result, although mediation can play an important role in assisting belligerents to move from war to peace, mediation alone will often be insufficient to manage the conflict and establish peace. Instead, among these most challenging conflicts, peacekeepers are often necessary effectively to change conditions on the ground and the dynamics between the warring sides to facilitate the achievement of peace. Gilligan and Stedman, and Mullenbach find that the likelihood of UN peacekeeping increases as the duration and number of deaths of a conflict increase.[54] Peacekeeping missions in Angola and Mozambique, for example, each began 13 years after the respective civil wars had started. Because of the high levels of mistrust between the contending sides in the toughest conflicts and their fears that the other side will renege on any negotiated settlement, the presence of peacekeepers may be a prerequisite for the two sides reaching any sort of lasting agreement.

Hypothesis 2: Civil wars are more likely to attract international conflict management (mediation and peacekeeping) the more intense and violent they are, showing a need for an urgent resolution (genocide/politicide, refugee flows, duration, number of battle deaths).

Challenges for Conflict Management

Third parties, as described above, are cognizant of the costs of conflict management, particularly when it involves the deployment of military forces.[55] As a result, following a different logic than the one outlined above, third parties may tend to avoid providing peacekeeping forces – even to conflicts that need it most – when conditions associated with the conflict are sufficiently risky that they threaten to impose unacceptable costs upon the parties providing conflict management. This sense of risk and costs that undermines the willingness to provide peacekeeping may be particularly pronounced in what are, sadly, the conflicts that most need military intervention – long-running conflicts marked by a high level of intensity.[56] This works against the argument outlined above, which states that long, intense conflicts instill a sense of urgency. It is an empirical question whether, on balance, long and intense conflicts attract more or less mediation and peacekeeping. Yet, one way to resolve this puzzle may be to distinguish between the two types of conflict management that we examine: Third parties that recognize the need to provide some level of conflict management to the most dangerous conflicts may choose mediation over peacekeeping to avoid paying the costs of military intervention while still

attempting to do something to manage the conflict. Consistent with this argument, evidence in the mediation literature suggests that mediation is more likely to be used the longer a conflict continues and the more intense it becomes.[57]

Thus, we concentrate on other characteristics of civil wars that influence the costliness of providing peacekeeping to them. One impediment to peacekeeping is the unwillingness of the host state to accept peacekeeping. Just as major powers tend to resist mediation as a way of avoiding outside interference in their internal affairs, strong states are likely to resist the deployment of peacekeeping forces within their borders.[58] Gilligan and Stedman find that peacekeeping is less likely to take place as the size of the government army in a civil war country increases.[59] Government army size influences the occurrence of peacekeeping in civil wars in several ways. First, a regime with a large army may believe that it is more capable of imposing a settlement upon the rebels than a government with a smaller army, making its government less willing to accept military intervention. Second, the presence of a large government army in a civil war state may cause potential interveners to believe that government forces can address the conflict without outside interference, preventing the dispatch of peacekeeping forces to the conflict. Finally, the presence of a large government army may increase the risks, making potential interveners unwilling to deploy peacekeeping forces, especially when the government is not perceived as being truly interested in solving the conflict issues. As such, we anticipate that to the degree to which third parties attempt to manage civil wars involving large government armies, they will prefer to rely upon diplomatic efforts rather than dispatching peacekeepers.

Next, the complexity a conflict presents for conflict management is likely to shape the willingness of third parties to intervene in them, either through mediation or peacekeeping. For example, the sheer number of parties involved in a conflict can lead to challenges for conflict management. For a third party seeking to mediate a conflict, increasing the number of factions involved in conflict can increase the chances that spoilers will emerge, derailing talks that might otherwise be successful. A higher number of factions involved in a mediation effort increase the risks of miscommunication, the chances of incompatible positions among the parties, and the complexity of the talks in general. As such, third parties concerned with their international reputations and seeking to avoid diplomatic failure should prefer to mediate conflicts involving fewer factions.

The challenges that multiparty conflicts present for diplomatic efforts are likely to be even more acute for military interventions in a conflict. Outside actors considering sending peacekeepers to a civil war involving many parties may fear the possibility of being caught between a large number of conflict lines, undercutting their ability to stabilize a conflict. At the same time, increasing the number of factions raises the chances that some warring parties will see themselves as disadvantaged by the presence of peacekeepers, causing them to oppose the peacekeeping force. This raises the odds that peacekeepers will find themselves facing unacceptable costs as they become the targets of attacks from dissident groups and become increasingly unable to prevent a return to violence. Even if

peacekeepers are able to avoid attacks against them by disaffected groups, conflicts with a large number of factions may prove so difficult to resolve that third-parties fear peacekeeping will result in a quagmire in which the belligerents neither yield to a conflict settlement nor create an environment conducive to the ultimate withdrawal of peacekeepers. As such, we expect that third parties will be less likely to offer diplomacy or peacekeeping to conflicts involving multiple factions, with the likelihood of peacekeeping most strongly affected.

The issues over which a civil war is fought can also increase its complexity, reducing the willingness of third parties to attempt to manage it. Ethno-religious conflicts tend to be among the most difficult conflicts for third parties to manage, with the root issues over which the conflict is fought often long-running, intractable, and highly salient for the parties. Many observers and researchers believe that ethno-religious conflicts are more difficult to resolve by mediation and that they pose greater risks to peacekeepers[60] and that they may therefore be less likely to attract peacekeeping missions,[61] despite the fact that these conflicts will often be the ones with the most need for third-party conflict management. For prospective mediators, ethno-religious conflicts are among the toughest to deal with and the most likely to result in failure. As a result, it makes sense for third parties to avoid such conflicts, preferring to direct their diplomatic energies toward conflicts where the chances for success are much greater. Still, if we were to look at ethno-religious conflicts exclusively, we would expect those that affect third-party interests and cause greater human suffering to attract more conflict management than those that do not.

Although the challenges presented by a civil war's complexity can shape the willingness of third parties to attempt any form of conflict management, the territorial characteristics of a civil war can shape the form conflict management takes when it is applied. The territorial characteristics of a civil war influence both the difficulty and costs involved in conducting an effective peacekeeping mission. Key to successful peacekeeping is the ability of peacekeepers to separate the warring parties physically.[62] Geography, however, may make it difficult for a peacekeeping force not only to separate the combatants, but also to ensure its own safety.[63] Mountainous territory, for example, can make peacekeeping more difficult by providing a sanctuary for groups involved in the civil war that oppose the presence of the peacekeeping force.[64] From these sanctuaries, rebel groups can launch attacks upon peacekeepers, raising the costs of the mission. At the same time, access to a sanctuary allows rebel groups a greater capacity to continue challenges to governments, extending the duration peacekeepers must remain in country as a stabilization force. As a result, because difficult terrain can make the job of controlling territory and stabilization more difficult and costly for a peacekeeping force, third parties faced with unfavorable geography are likely to choose diplomacy over peacekeeping when they seek to manage civil wars, even if factors would otherwise encourage the use of military intervention.

Hypothesis 3: Civil wars are less likely to attract international conflict management (mediation and peacekeeping) the more challenging they are

seen for potential management. This includes wars with many factions, multiple civil wars in one country, wars in countries with a high number of neighboring states, in countries with difficult mountainous terrain, and in countries with large government armies and ethnic civil wars.

The factors we identify above as likely to influence third parties in their decision to offer mediation or peacekeeping to a civil war – interests, urgency, and challenges – sometimes work in opposite directions. For instance, international organizations or third-party states may want to stop the fighting because of the human suffering it causes, but fear the challenges a conflict would pose to international peacekeepers, as seems to be the case in Syria as of January 2013. By including all these factors in one model, as described in the following section, we can account for this interplay, by examining, for instance, whether there is more conflict management if more interests are at stake, holding the level of urgency and challenges constant.

RESEARCH DESIGN

In seeking to understand the conditions associated with the choices made in the application of conflict management efforts to civil wars and the form that they take, we focus our analysis on the population of civil wars identified by Doyle and Sambanis during the 1964–98 time period.[65] With their data as our baseline and using the civil war country-year as the unit of analysis, we construct a data-set of 700 usable observations. We also estimate the model using a more robust set of control variables for other forms of third-party civil war involvement. Due to data limitations, this analysis covers the 1975–98 time period and includes 458 observations.

In order to examine the influences upon whether third-party conflict management takes place in civil conflicts and the form that it takes, we create a three-point categorical dependent variable. This variable is coded as '1' in civil war-years in which mediation takes place but peacekeeping does not occur. This variable is coded as '2' in civil war-years in which peacekeeping takes place, regardless of whether mediation occurs or not. In years in which neither mediation nor peacekeeping occurs, our dependent variable is coded as '0'. To identify the occurrence of mediation, we use Bercovitch and DeRouen's Civil Wars Mediation data-set[66] supplemented with original mediation data drawn from Keesings Record of World Events and the New York Times Archive. To code the occurrence of peacekeeping, we rely on Mullenbach's third-party intervention (TPI) intrastate dispute data.[67] In our coding, conflict management – both mediation and peacekeeping – can be provided by a broad array of actors including individuals, states, ad hoc collections of states, and international organizations. Because our dependent variable is a categorical variable without a clear rank ordering between the categories and due to concerns about violations of the independence of irrelevant alternatives assumption

of multinomial logit, we estimate a multinomial probit model for our analysis with 'no mediation/peacekeeping' as the base category.

We conceptualize third-party interest in a civil war across four dimensions. First, because states are most likely to be influenced by, and interested in, civil wars among their neighbors, we use data from Doyle and Sambanis to measure the number of geographic neighbors of each civil war state.[68] Second, given the degree to which fuel-exporting states produce a commodity vital to the international community, we argue that third-party conflict management is more likely to occur in these states. We use Fearon and Laitin's data in which countries are dichotomously coded as fuel exporters when their revenues from fuel exports exceed more than one-third of their total export revenues as our measure for this variable.[69]

Because major powers tend to be particularly important providers of conflict management, we include a dichotomous variable measure whether or not a civil war country is a former colony of one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. We use Hensel's ICOW Colonial History data-set to determine former colonies.[70] We also include a dichotomous variable measuring whether or not a civil war state has a defense pact with a major power, using the COW Alliance data-set to identify the presence of such alliance linkages.[71] The alliance data are generated using EUGene.[72]

We include several variables describing the conditions associated with each civil war and their effects upon civilians. Because long-running and intense conflicts can signal the need for TPI, we include variables describing the elapsed conflict time to date for each civil war-year as well as a measure of annual civil war battle deaths. To measure annual battle deaths, we use Lacina and Gleditsch's data-set to code this variable.[73] Their data-set provides a relatively broad measure, defining battle deaths as the total number of both military personnel and civilians killed in battle. To account for the skewness inherent to the data, we calculate the natural logarithm. Because we anticipate that the combined effect of long-running conflict and high conflict intensity will increase the likelihood of conflict management and influence the choice between mediation and peacekeeping, we include an interaction term between the time and battle-death variables in the model.

To examine how humanitarian needs influence the willingness of third parties to act, we include variables describing the occurrence of genocide and the level of annual refugees created by each civil war. To create our dichotomous variable for genocide, we use data from the State Failure database.[74] For the annual measure of the civilian refugees caused by civil war, we use data from Marshall's Forcibly Displaced Populations data-set.[75] As with the battle-death variable, we add 1 to the number of refugees and calculate the natural logarithm to deal with the skewness present in the data.

We also focus our attention upon the context in which conflict occurs as an influence on the conflict management activity. As we anticipate that the difficulty a civil war presents for military intervention will dampen the willingness of third parties to choose peacekeeping over mediation, we include several variables in the model that reflect the challenge a civil war presents. We control for the type of

conflict, using Doyle and Sambanis' data-set to create a dichotomous variable coding identity-based wars as '1' and all others '0'.[76] As additional indicators of a conflict's complexity, we include Doyle and Sambanis' variable counting the number of factions involved in the civil war as well as a variable describing the total number of ongoing civil wars within the state during the year. Because challenging terrain may make third parties less willing to run the risk of peacekeeping, we use Fearon and Laitin's measure of the difference between the highest and lowest geographical point as a proxy for difficult terrain.[77] The presence of a large government army may also pose a threat to a potential peacekeeping force. Therefore, Doyle and Sambanis's measure of (logged) government army size is included in our model.[78] Finally, to account for the different patterns of conflict management activity during and after the Cold War, we include a dummy control variable coded as '1' before 1990 and '0' thereafter.

A clear indicator of the interests in and concerns for a civil war that third parties have is their historical experience in managing the conflict. Previous efforts to manage a conflict are likely to impose a sense of sunk costs upon third parties, encouraging them to provide conflict management to the conflict in the future, create a momentum of its own. Regan and Stam, and Greig note a cumulative effective of mediation in interstate conflicts in which past mediation and negotiation efforts tend to encourage future mediation efforts.[79] Mullenbach observes a similar cumulative effect among peacekeeping efforts in civil conflicts.[80] As a result, we include two dichotomous variables describing the occurrence, respectively, of mediation and peacekeeping during the previous year. These variables are coded in the same way that our dependent variable is coded. In addition, because bilateral negotiations between the antagonists may signal an increased receptivity toward conflict management or an ability of civil war participants to work things out themselves, we include a dichotomous variable describing whether negotiations occurred between the parties in the previous year. As with our coding of mediation in the dependent variable, we code the negotiation variable by referencing Bercovitch and DeRouen's Civil Wars Mediation data-set[81] supplemented with original data coded from Keesings Record of World Events and the New York Times Archive.

To control for other forms of interventions in civil wars, whose primary objective is not to manage the conflict, we include variables describing the existence of external military support to the warring sides, the application of sanctions to the conflict, and the occurrence of one-sided military intervention. To identify external military support, we code two dichotomous external support variables, one for rebel groups and one for the government, using data from the UCDP External Support – Primary Warring Party Dataset, v.1.0-2011.[82] We code a dichotomous variable identifying direct military interventions using Regan's intervention data.[83] Finally, we use data from the Threat and Imposition of Sanctions data-set, v. 3.5[84] to code a dichotomous variable describing whether economic sanctions had been applied against the civil war state.

TABLE 1
MULTINOMIAL PROBIT RESULTS

	(1)		(2)	
	Mediation	Peacekeeping	Mediation	Peacekeeping
TPI				
Former major power colony	−0.110	−0.658**	−0.576 +	−0.646
	(0.260)	(0.249)	(0.307)	(0.399)
Fuel exporter	−0.146	−0.143	−0.684	−0.499
	(0.339)	(0.470)	(0.554)	(0.341)
Major power ally	−0.125	−0.0834	0.144	−0.298
	(0.315)	(0.266)	(0.425)	(0.591)
Urgency				
Genocide	0.128	−0.456 +	−0.214	0.904**
	(0.255)	(0.272)	(0.233)	(0.331)
Refugees	−0.0122	−0.00513	0.00399	0.0591
	(0.0233)	(0.0215)	(0.0229)	(0.0369)
Elapsed time	−0.0857**	−0.0543	−0.116*	0.0204
	(0.0304)	(0.0469)	(0.0457)	(0.101)
Battle deaths	0.0444	0.0528	−0.177*	−0.0851
	(0.0650)	(0.0727)	(0.0696)	(0.160)
Elapsed time × battle deaths	0.00980*	0.00336	0.0173**	−0.00106
	(0.00403)	(0.00719)	(0.00541)	(0.0144)
Challenges				
Factions	0.124 +	0.0411	0.195 +	0.127
	(0.0695)	(0.0605)	(0.101)	(0.102)
Civil wars	−0.143	0.669	0.0405	1.525*
	(0.238)	(0.430)	(0.293)	(0.593)
Bordering states	−0.0926 +	−0.282**	−0.160*	−0.607**
	(0.0525)	(0.0715)	(0.0754)	(0.153)
Mountainous terrain	−0.131	−0.00820	−0.304 +	−0.255 +
	(0.124)	(0.0961)	(0.163)	(0.133)
Ethnic conflict	0.573 +	0.370	1.531**	1.884**
	(0.297)	(0.238)	(0.438)	(0.598)
Government army size	0.0536	−0.559**	−0.100	−0.887**
	(0.112)	(0.135)	(0.182)	(0.267)
Controls				
Negotiation ($t-1$)	0.491 +	0.352	0.921**	0.708*
	(0.267)	(0.224)	(0.298)	(0.333)
Mediation ($t-1$)	2.424**	1.493**	1.919**	1.279**
	(0.281)	(0.289)	(0.375)	(0.425)
Peacekeeping ($t-1$)	0.540	3.163**	0.326	2.650**
	(0.533)	(0.328)	(0.574)	(0.473)
Cold War	−0.880**	−1.063**	−0.787*	−1.337**
	(0.266)	(0.299)	(0.370)	(0.476)
External support-rebels			0.525 +	0.828*
			(0.318)	(0.366)
External support-government			0.802*	0.999*
			(0.369)	(0.399)
Sanctions imposed			−0.539*	−1.621**
			(0.238)	(0.443)
Third-party troop intervention (last year)			−0.277	0.790 +
			(0.327)	(0.438)
Constant	−2.150 +	4.977**	0.0239	7.256*
	(1.287)	(1.641)	(1.883)	(2.998)
N	700		458	
Wald χ^2	2,731.55		481,933.08	

Notes: **$p < 0.01$, *$p < 0.05$, + $p < 0.10$. Robust standard errors reported. Base category = no mediation or peacekeeping.

RESULTS

The results of our analysis suggest that some third-party interests, the urgency a conflict presents for conflict management, and the challenges faced by conflict management efforts influence both the likelihood of conflict management and the form that it takes. That said, our findings depart from our theoretical expectations in several important ways. The results are summarized in Table 1. Because interpretation of multinomial probit models can be difficult and the statistical significance of individual coefficients does not completely describe the effects of particular variables, we use the model to calculate predicted probabilities of all three outcomes in Table 2 and plot key variables. Predicted probabilities were generated using Stata's margins command. We generated predicted probabilities by setting the model's continuous variables to their means, the cold war variable to zero, remaining dichotomous variables to their modes, and then varying the value of the variable of interest in the model. We see generally similar results between the basic model that excludes controls for other TPIs (model 1) and the full model (model 2) that includes them. As a result, we report results from model 2 but highlight differences found in model 1.

Our results provide mixed evidence to support the expectation that the urgency a conflict demonstrates for third-party conflict management drives the international community's response to the conflict. In model 2, as the number of refugees produced by a conflict increases, the international community grows more likely to manage the conflict and more likely to do so through peacekeeping. A civil war that produces 100,000 refugees is more than twice as likely to attract peacekeeping than one producing none. Smaller increases in the number of refugees produced by a conflict, however, only have a limited impact on the occurrence of peacekeeping. Similarly, an increase in the amount of refugees produced by a conflict only slightly reduces the chances that the civil war will see mediation. In model 1, when other TPI controls are excluded, we see no evidence that the refugees produced by a conflict shape conflict management behavior. We believe that, by incorporating into the model a broader set of policy options available to third parties seeking to deal with a refugee crisis, the results from model 2 provide better insight into the effect of refugees on conflict management. These results suggest that while a refugee crisis can increase the likelihood of conflict management, it only does so in a limited fashion.

Unlike refugee crises, genocide reduces the likelihood of both mediation and peacekeeping. At first glance, the distinction in the level of response to refugee crises and genocide seems surprising. If the international community reacts to humanitarian emergencies, it makes sense to expect that both large refugee flows and genocide should foster third-party conflict management. Instead, this finding points to the role that the broader threat that a civil conflict creates has on the propensity for the international community to manage it. As refugees spill across borders, they foster instability in the states that must absorb them. Genocide, by contrast, causes immense suffering within a civil war state, but does not necessarily impose the same significant costs upon neighboring states that might encourage conflict management unless it causes a refugee crisis. This logic is also consistent with the tendency of third parties

TABLE 2
KEY PREDICTED PROBABILITIES

		No mediation/peacekeeping			Mediation			Peacekeeping		
	Value	Probability	95 per cent CI		Probability	95 per cent CI		Probability	95 per cent CI	
Interests										
Former colony	0	0.401	0.175	0.626	0.327	0.096	0.558	0.272	0.019	0.526
	1	0.586	0.365	0.806	0.237	0.058	0.417	0.177	0.011	0.343
Borders	0	0.112	−0.072	0.297	0.100	−0.098	0.297	0.788	0.455	1.121
	2	0.322	0.078	0.566	0.188	−0.016	0.392	0.490	0.171	0.809
	4	0.571	0.348	0.794	0.237	0.056	0.417	0.192	0.017	0.367
	6	0.740	0.556	0.924	0.218	0.050	0.385	0.042	−0.029	0.113
	8	0.828	0.669	0.987	0.167	0.010	0.324	0.005	−0.011	0.020
Urgency										
Genocide	0	0.586	0.365	0.806	0.237	0.058	0.417	0.177	0.011	0.343
	1	0.711	0.518	0.905	0.231	0.062	0.399	0.058	−0.036	0.152
Refugees	0	0.640	0.412	0.868	0.256	0.033	0.478	0.104	−0.030	0.238
	1,000	0.590	0.370	0.810	0.239	0.057	0.420	0.171	0.009	0.334
	10,000	0.570	0.345	0.796	0.231	0.058	0.405	0.199	0.016	0.381
	100,000	0.548	0.312	0.785	0.223	0.054	0.392	0.228	0.017	0.439
	1,000,000	0.525	0.274	0.777	0.214	0.046	0.383	0.260	0.014	0.507
Challenges										
Ethnic conflict	0	0.930	0.847	1.014	0.051	−0.024	0.126	0.018	−0.024	0.061
	1	0.586	0.365	0.806	0.237	0.058	0.417	0.177	0.011	0.343
Mountainous	Min.	0.350	0.083	0.618	0.395	0.057	0.733	0.254	−0.066	0.574
	− 1 SD	0.482	0.244	0.719	0.306	0.087	0.524	0.213	−0.004	0.429
	Mean	0.586	0.365	0.806	0.237	0.058	0.417	0.177	0.011	0.343
	+ 1 SD	0.684	0.470	0.898	0.176	−0.002	0.353	0.141	0.000	0.282
	Max.	0.718	0.505	0.930	0.155	−0.024	0.334	0.128	−0.009	0.264
Government army	Min.	0.165	−0.113	0.444	0.078	−0.030	0.186	0.757	0.427	1.087
	− 1 SD	0.363	0.068	0.659	0.160	0.025	0.295	0.477	0.173	0.780
	Mean	0.593	0.375	0.812	0.239	0.058	0.421	0.168	0.007	0.329
	+ 1 SD	0.714	0.488	0.940	0.255	0.025	0.486	0.030	−0.030	0.091
	Max.	0.776	0.461	1.092	0.223	−0.093	0.539	0.001	−0.003	0.005

Factions	2	0.676	0.464	0.889	0.171	0.027	0.316	0.152	−0.021	0.325
	4	0.582	0.361	0.803	0.240	0.058	0.423	0.178	0.011	0.344
	6	0.480	0.240	0.720	0.320	0.040	0.600	0.200	−0.012	0.411
	8	0.379	0.115	0.643	0.406	−0.016	0.827	0.215	−0.095	0.526
Civil wars	1	0.614	0.394	0.834	0.250	0.061	0.439	0.136	−0.004	0.277
	2	0.345	0.026	0.665	0.130	−0.022	0.282	0.525	0.130	0.919
	3	0.086	−0.171	0.344	0.028	−0.059	0.114	0.886	0.557	1.215
TPI										
External rebel support	0	0.761	0.590	0.931	0.165	0.013	0.317	0.075	−0.017	0.166
	1	0.586	0.365	0.806	0.237	0.058	0.417	0.177	0.011	0.343
External government support	0	0.813	0.633	0.994	0.123	−0.020	0.265	0.064	−0.018	0.146
	1	0.586	0.365	0.806	0.237	0.058	0.417	0.177	0.011	0.343
Sanctions	0	0.586	0.365	0.806	0.237	0.058	0.417	0.177	0.011	0.343
	1	0.803	0.641	0.964	0.177	0.018	0.336	0.020	−0.020	0.060
Ground intervention	0	0.586	0.365	0.806	0.237	0.058	0.417	0.177	0.011	0.343
	1	0.480	0.197	0.763	0.123	−0.072	0.317	0.398	0.077	0.718

to prefer peacekeeping over mediation at the highest levels of civilian displacement, suggesting that refugee crises foster a desire by third parties to directly address the threat through peacekeeping rather than indirectly by using mediation in the hopes of producing a settlement among the belligerents.

Although genocide fails to encourage third-party conflict management efforts, this does not mean that the international community necessarily shrinks from dealing with difficult conflicts that show an urgency for intervention. Ethnic conflicts, among the most dangerous and deadly civil wars, are more than four times as likely to attract mediation alone and nearly 10 times as likely to see peacekeeping than non-ethnic conflicts. Similarly, increasing the number of factions involved in a state's civil wars or increasing the number of ongoing civil wars within a state both significantly reduce the likelihood that no conflict management will take place and significantly increase the chances of mediation and peacekeeping occurring.

We see no evidence that the intensity of a conflict substantively increases the chances for any form of conflict management, suggesting that third parties avoid managing the deadliest conflicts. Despite this tendency, third parties do not avoid managing intractable conflicts. As the duration of a conflict increases, the chances for mediation increase but the chance of peacekeeping declines. This effect is summarized in Figure 1. For a conflict with 4,000 battle deaths, the chance of

FIGURE 1
IMPACT OF CONFLICT DURATION AND BATTLE DEATHS ON CONFLICT MANAGEMENT. NOTE: 95 PER CENT CONFIDENCE INTERVALS PLOTTED USING DASHED LINES



mediation is more than double for a conflict in its 12th month than that of a similar conflict in its 3rd month. For that same conflict, the likelihood of peacekeeping drops by nearly 60 per cent in moving from the 3-month to the 12-month mark of the conflict. This suggests that as a civil conflict lasts longer and proves itself more intractable, third parties do not avoid seeking to manage it. When they do so, however, they tend to use less costly mediation efforts rather than more costly and risky peacekeeping.

When confronted by a civil war in a state with heavily mountainous terrain, third parties are less likely to either mediate or provide peacekeepers to the conflict. Peacekeepers facing mountainous terrain are likely to find both their own movement and monitoring the actions of the two sides substantially more difficult. Rugged terrain can, for example, provide rebels with the ability to launch quick strikes before retreating into the mountains. Mountainous terrain can also make mediation more difficult, providing opportunities for spoilers to continue to mount attacks in the hopes of derailing a settlement between the warring sides. As a result, challenging terrain can undermine the willingness of third parties to offer either mediation or peacekeeping.

Similarly, the size of the government army of a civil war state also dissuades outside actors from engaging in peacekeeping, pushing them toward the use of mediation. As the size of the government army of a civil war state grows, both the probability of mediation and no mediation/peacekeeping increase, whereas the probability of peacekeeping sharply decreases. This pattern is summarized in Figure 2. For an average civil war, increasing the size of a government's army from 30,599 to 464,210 troops, equivalent to moving from one standard deviation below to one standard deviation above the mean troop level in our data, nearly doubles the probability that third parties will not apply mediation or peacekeeping. This increases the chances of mediation by 59 per cent, while reducing the probability of peacekeeping by 94 per cent. At a government army size of 30,599 troops, third parties are nearly three times more likely to send peacekeepers to the conflict than only mediate. When the government force size grows to 464,210 troops, mediation is 8.5 times more likely to be used than peacekeeping. In this respect, when faced with dealing with a civil war involving a powerful government, third parties become more likely to avoid managing the conflict at all and, when they do attempt to manage it, strongly prefer the use of less costly mediation over riskier peacekeeping.

Interestingly, although we anticipated that third-party interests would play an important role in the application of conflict management efforts to states experiencing civil war, we saw little evidence to support this expectation. Alliances with major powers had no impact upon conflict management efforts directed to a state in civil war. Not only did a civil war-state's former colonial relationship not encourage mediation or peacekeeping, it actually increased the likelihood of no conflict management being applied to the conflict. Similarly, fuel-exporting states were also less likely to see conflict management. This suggests that to the degree to which third parties seek to deal with the effects that civil wars have upon their interests, they appear to do so using tools other than mediation and peacekeeping.

FIGURE 2
IMPACT OF GOVERNMENT ARMY SIZE ON CONFLICT MANAGEMENT. NOTE: 95 PER CENT CONFIDENCE INTERVALS PLOTTED USING DASHED LINES



This might suggest, for example, that third parties with important interests at stake might be more tempted to weigh in decisively into a conflict, perhaps seeking to tip the scales of the conflict toward a particular side through the military aid, sanctions, or direct military intervention.

We anticipated that as the number of countries bordering a civil war state increased, the pool of actors with a sufficient interest to provide conflict management would also grow, raising the likelihood of mediation and peacekeeping. Instead, we found that as the number of neighboring states increased, the likelihood of conflict management diminished. This effect is summarized in Figure 3. A civil war state with two neighbors, for example, has a 0.32 probability of attracting no conflict management during a conflict-year. By contrast, the probability of no mediation/peacekeeping increases to 0.83 for a civil war state with eight neighbors. A similar increase in the number of neighbors reduces the probability of peacekeeping by 99 per cent. The effect of neighborhood size on the occurrence of mediation is more complicated, with the chances of mediation initially increasing with neighborhood size, then declining.

These results suggest that although civil war states with many neighbors have a broader pool of actors with a direct stake in their stability, this larger group of potential interveners can also raise the risk of shirking. Here, each actor, because

FIGURE 3
IMPACT OF NUMBER OF NEIGHBORING STATES ON CONFLICT MANAGEMENT. NOTE: 95 PER CENT CONFIDENCE INTERVALS PLOTTED USING DASHED LINES



regional peace and stability are public goods, has incentives to free-ride off of the conflict management actions of others with similar interests. The problem of free-riding is particularly strong for peacekeeping due to its greater costliness. As a result, even though proximity can heighten interest in an ongoing civil war for regional states, this tendency to engage in costly conflict management efforts is undermined by incentives to buck-pass. Put together with our finding that refugee crises increase the likelihood of peacekeeping, this suggests that it is the negative regional externalities produced by a civil war that drive conflict management, rather than just the size of the region.

If important third-party interests such as alliance ties and fuel exports do not stimulate more conflict management for civil wars, other forms of third-party interventions that signal important interests in a civil war state do increase the likelihood it will see conflict management. Outside military support to either the rebels or the government involved in a conflict increases the likelihood of both mediation and peacekeeping. External rebel support increases the chances of mediation by 44 per cent and more than doubles the likelihood that a conflict will see peacekeeping. Similarly, external support to the government nearly doubles the chance of mediation and almost triples the risk of peacekeeping. Direct military interventions in a civil war also heighten the chances for peacekeeping, more than doubling its likelihood, but decrease the occurrence of mediation by itself. Put together, these results point to the tendency of third parties to grow more likely to apply conflict management efforts at civil that pose the greatest threat

to the international community. A civil war that threatens to become internationalized by involving outside powers can provide such a motivation for conflict management.

We conducted additional robustness tests in which we separated the sample into conflict management provided by the UN and other inter-governmental organizations on the one hand, and states and ad hoc coalitions of states on the other. The results largely confirm our analysis of the full sample above, although there were some differences between the two sub-samples.

DISCUSSION

In this study, we have taken a broader view at international conflict management than many previous empirical studies, by including two of the most important conflict management tools – mediation and peacekeeping – in one theoretical framework and empirical model. Thus, we account for the fact that different foreign policy tools can be substituted for or can complement alternative tools.

We group hypotheses on the factors that influence third parties to intervene in a civil war, and then to choose mediation over peacekeeping or vice versa, into three groups: First, we expect third parties to be influenced by their own historical, economic, or strategic interests. Second, we expect third parties to react to the urgency that a civil war poses in terms of humanitarian emergency, intensity, and duration. Third, we expect third parties to shy away from particularly challenging civil wars.

The empirical results from a multinomial probit model confirm parts of our theoretical framework, but other findings contradict our expectations. State interests such as colonial histories, alliance ties, and fuel exports do not significantly impact the application of conflict management. Non-conflict management interventions that also signal state interests and point to the danger of a civil war developing into a wider conflict, however, not only encourage more conflict management, but also make more costly peacekeeping more likely. Although third parties do not seem to be substantially influenced in their decisions on conflict management by the occurrence of genocide, they react to long-running civil wars by sending mediators and to conflicts that produce refugees by increasing their propensity to send peacekeepers. Third parties shy away from sending peacekeepers, but not mediators into civil wars fought against a powerful government army. Other indicators of challenging wars – the number of simultaneous civil wars in a country and the number of factions – seem to increase their willingness to intervene.

International conflict management has increased considerably since the end of the Cold War. It is important to better understand both when such efforts are likely to be successful and when different forms of conflict management will be applied to civil wars. This study contributes to such an understanding, which will help to reduce selection biases in assessments of conflict management success and to see mediation and peacekeeping as two aspects.

NOTES

1. The views in this study are those of the authors and do not reflect the position of the UN or UNSCO.
2. The data sources are explained in detail in the research design section below.
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14. Fortna (note 5).
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