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Diplomacy and Other Forms of Intervention in Civil Wars

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Much of the empirical literature suggests that outside interventions tend to lengthen the expected duration of civil wars; conversely, the policy community often acts as if it holds the opposite expectation for the outcome of intervention. The authors argue that the divergence can be found in how models of intervention are specified in the literature. They propose a model with two novel contributions. First, they incorporate mediations as the key to resolving the strategic problems that the civil war parties face. Second, they account for the decaying effect of interventions over time. Their results suggest that diplomacy is critical for understanding the duration of civil conflicts. They find that mediation has a dramatic effect on the expected duration of a civil war and that when controlling for diplomatic efforts, economic interventions can also reduce the expected duration.

Keywords: diplomacy; interventions; civil war; mediation

Do outside interventions into civil wars contribute to war termination, or do they have the adverse effect of prolonging the conflict? The weight of the broadly empirical evidence suggests that outside military and economic interventions increase the duration and hostility levels and make the termination of civil conflicts less likely (Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000; Regan 2000, 2002; Elbadawi and Sambanis 2000). This poses an empirical conundrum where the policy community anticipates one outcome from its actions, and the evidence suggests quite the opposite. The discrepancy between apparent expectations of the policy makers and the results from the scholarly community can be accounted for by a closer theoretical and empirical specification of models of third-party intervention, particularly the effects of mediation and the sequencing of different combinations of interventions on civil war duration.

The consequences of civil wars are not constrained by the national frontiers in which they unfold. Thus, the containment of conflicts by effective policy is a crucial

736

element in sustaining regional security and economic stability. Moreover, the spillover effects are not limited to the diffusion of fighting but also to the depression of economic growth in neighboring countries (Murdoch and Sandler 2002). This regional dependency points to the increasing need for more comprehensive knowledge about the conditions under which outside actors can effectively contribute to the management of internal conflicts and civil wars.

Perhaps the most worrisome case requiring immediate action by the international community is the civil war in the Darfur region of Sudan. The reactions to the conflict by the international community were mixed. In October 2004, some members of the African Union (Libya, Egypt, Nigeria, and Chad) condemned the idea of United Nations (UN) sanctions on the Sudanese government and rejected any foreign intervention, describing the crisis as an "African question."[1] To date, the ambiguity over how best to intervene has caused political gridlock, where harsh words cannot be followed by resolute action. To some extent, we see this as an information problem, where national policy makers simply do not know what to do.

A growing body of empirical work has explored the role of outside parties in the management of internal conflicts, although the cumulative evidence is not convincing. Part of the problem, we argue, is that empirical models generally consider intervention as a dichotomous action engaged by the policy community, while the policy community conceives interventions as a more complex undertaking involving a range of alternative strategies, coordination, and sequences. That is, our models account for whether an actor intervened or not, targeted the government or the opposition, or employed economic or military instruments. Scholars commonly assume that conflict management attempts by third parties affect war outcomes independently of one another. Also implicit is the assumption that individual interventions are independent of other attempts and avenues to manage a conflict. What we observe in the referent world, however, suggests that the range of options considered by potential interveners is rather broad. In short, the empirical evaluations of interventions do not jibe sufficiently with what we observe taking place around the globe.

In this article, we articulate a theoretical framework that integrates mediation, military, and economic interventions into a model of the expected duration of civil wars and then subject this argument to empirical examination. We see interventions comprising two types: (1) those that attempt to influence the structure of the relationship among combatants and (2) those that attempt to manipulate the information that these actors hold. We anticipate—and prior evidence supports the notion—that when used independently, structural interventions increase the expected duration of a civil conflict, but manipulating the information of the combatants will decrease expected durations. There are two major innovations to our research. First, we use newly generated data on all diplomatic intervention efforts by third parties in civil conflicts. Diplomacy, we argue, is critical to understanding the conflict management aspects of outside interventions. Second, we specify a decay function for interventions that reflects their declining utility over time.

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1. *New York Times*, October 18, 2004.

We are adopting a broad view of interventions, incorporating various approaches that outside parties can use to manage conflicts. As historical events reveal, this can include military, economic, and diplomatic initiatives. When combining tools of coercion, enticement, and diplomacy, we move closer to capturing the "carrot-and-stick" strategies often advocated by the policy community and contemporary folklore.

Our argument proceeds as follows. Initially, we discuss contemporary research that has attempted to systematically explore the role of interventions on civil war duration. Next, we present a theoretical model that accounts for the role of outside interventions and the conditions under which they should be most effective. This model motivates a series of empirical tests against data on interventions in civil conflicts from 1944 to 1999. Finally, we draw inferences from the results of our analysis about future theoretical development. The results suggest that mediation is a critical component in the management of civil conflicts and is instrumental in determining the effect of other forms of intervention.

THE STATE OF KNOWLEDGE ON CIVIL WAR DURATIONS

Previous research has demonstrated that outside interventions are associated with longer war duration. For example, Elbadawi and Sambanis (2000) present evidence to suggest that external interventions predict an increase in the expected duration of a civil war. Balch-Lindsay and Enterline (2000) find similar evidence when expanding the notion of intervention to include aspects of the strategy of the intervention, mainly the targeting of opposition or the government forces. Regan (2000, 2002) also finds that outside interventions tend to increase the duration of internal wars. Most of these results show a consistent pattern in the relationship between interventions and civil war durations. However, there is some evidence in the literature suggesting that military support for rebel movements can shorten expected durations of civil conflicts (Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbom 2004). Overwhelmingly, however, the evidence points to military and economic interventions as factors that tend to increase the duration of civil wars. This is in marked contrast to the policies and public statements that guide many of these interventions.

More broadly, much of the literature points to a relationship between ethnolinguistic fractionalization (ELF), income, and economic growth (Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbom 2004); indigenous land claims (Fearon 2001); geography (Fearon and Laitin 2003); and the type of war (Regan 2002; De Rouen and Sobek 2004) as predictors of the duration of a civil war. Not all studies agree on the substantive or statistical significance of each factor, but a general consensus points to a series of structural conditions and outside actions that influence the course of internal conflicts. Our primary focus is on the role of external actors and how different attempts to influence the outcomes are more or less effective at shortening the duration of a civil war.

We see the discrepancy between the actions of the policy community and the results of scholarly research to be a function of how we model the process rather than

the inability of the policy makers to tailor the "right" conflict management policies. There are two main points.

First, empirical studies have almost exclusively been concerned with military and economic interventions, with little systematic study on the role of mediation in civil war. Evidence from interstate conflict management shows that mediation is a frequent, if not always successful, form of conflict management (Dixon 1996; Bercovitch and Regan 1999; Bercovitch and Diehl 1997). There is also evidence pointing to the role of third-party mediation in the duration of interstate disputes, and results suggest that under some conditions, mediation can reduce the expected duration of a dispute (Regan and Stam 2000). Others also suggest that the theoretical linkages between mediation attempts in a conflict and its management should be strong (Kydd 2003; Greig 2001), but to date, there have been no efforts to test this in an interstate environment. In the data we present, there are more than 400 diplomatic efforts by third parties to manage 153 internal conflicts. This simple count of mediations demonstrates that third parties have an apparent expectation that mediation can play an effective role in settling internal conflicts. Thus, the limited emphasis on economic and military intervention presents a narrow formulation of the policy tools that third parties can choose from. We argue that this works against demonstrating a relationship between outside interventions and the effective management of internal conflicts.

Our second concern is that large-N studies have failed to account for the declining effect of third-party interventions on war duration. Structural support for one side is not equally potent over the course of a long-running conflict. Even though it is not possible to tell when a gun is no longer useful, bullets have been expended, or money spent, we can reasonably assume that over time the initial effect of the intervention degrades.

We address both of these issues in the following sections. First, we articulate an argument that posits that both structural conditions and negotiations influence the duration of civil wars. Third parties can play off both of these elements by designing strategies that allow them to manipulate structure and information. Second, we present a research design, data, and tests that allow us to draw inferences about the role of intervention as a tool of conflict management in civil wars.

MEDIATIONS AND THE MANAGEMENT OF INFORMATION

We frame civil war duration in terms of a bargaining process where private information that civil war parties hold is a critical component in the settlement of conflicts (Lake 2003; Reiter 2003). This framework works from the basic premise that in the bargaining environment, third-party intermediaries can help civil war parties to disclose private information on their capabilities, expectations, and payoffs from a negotiated settlement. The role of an outside actor is central to peaceful settlement given two main problems confronting the civil war parties: (1) the difficulty in signaling one's own strength, resolve, and preferences to the opponent and (2) the civil

parties' inability to identify a mutually acceptable solution to their disagreements and make a credible commitment to this position without being vulnerable in the postconflict period (Fearon 1998; Walter 2002). The outbreak of civil war itself shows the difficulties that the government and the opposition groups have in solving their differences at the negotiation table. When both sides of the conflict believe that they can successfully pursue their aims by fighting and they do not trust the other side, they adopt resolute positions at the bargaining table that lead to the breakdown of negotiations. Absent the transfer of information that reduces uncertainty over the distribution of power, relative resolve, and the preferences of the opponent, adversaries are unable to identify a mutually agreeable solution, and civil wars have an increased tendency to become protracted conflicts. To be effective, third parties need to take actions in the course of the conflict that transform the conflict by influencing the information and structure and facilitating communication between the adversaries.

In this respect, an outside involvement that manipulates only the structural balance of capabilities tends to prolong rather than decrease the duration and level of violence in a conflict (Regan 2000, 2002). A potential explanation for the deleterious consequences of military or economic interventions is that these third-party strategies increase the ability of one or both sides to resort to violence with some prospect of prevailing but do not help the adversaries to overcome their distrust and misperceptions of one another. Material incentives encourage the receiver of the support to continue fighting but do not present a conducive environment where the adversaries can communicate effectively and identify their differences. Especially if military or economic support is given to an actor that prefers fighting to settlement with the hope of prevailing on the battlefield, interventions will facilitate the solidification of its preferences and expectations around this position. If, however, civil war parties can be moved to a stable cooperative position, peaceful solutions are more likely to prevail.

Mediation facilitates the transfer of information quite efficiently. An outside mediator serves as the conduit for information, ideas, and possible concessions that civil war parties would not possibly convey without a third-party intermediary. Outside interventions can provide a more objective view of conditions and possible outcomes of the conflict, which help adversaries to update their beliefs about the likely outcomes. Absent an outside intervention, the information held by the warring parties is at best asymmetrical, and neither side has a unilateral incentive to honestly convey its military capabilities, expectations of victory or defeat, or the value of a settlement that it would accept for the fear of exploitation by its adversary. Third parties can therefore influence the value of a settlement by transmitting information on the preferences of adversaries and offering inducements that make a negotiated outcome more attractive than other solutions. In this respect, diplomatic initiatives can help parties find a cooperative solution that both sides can agree to and allows the parties to make the credible commitments required of negotiated ends to civil wars (Walter 2002). The key to successful interventions, therefore, is to reduce the asymmetry of information about capabilities and incentives and, in doing so, help civil war parties find a peaceful solution that can benefit both sides.

Mediation is thought by some scholars to be the most common and effective tool of conflict management. And while the relative success of mediation is not high, there is evidence that certain types of mediation attempts are more successful than others (e.g., Princen 1992; Dixon 1996; Bercovitch and Regan 1999; Regan and Stam 2000). The key element of mediation is that it involves an explicit attempt to transform a conflict from one of hostility to one of cooperation. Mediation, moreover, involves the voluntary agreement by all three parties, which in turn agree to the format, the location, and the range of issues. In effect, mediation ties the motivation to intervene explicitly to efforts at conflict management.

At the core of the ideas about mediation is the notion that mediators transfer information between the combatants, information about relative capabilities, prospects for victory or defeat, possible concessions, reservation points, and other bits of vital information that antagonists cannot credibly convey. This information is critical to understanding the effect of interventions on the duration of internal conflicts. But unlike the dictates of conventional wisdom, mediators might not need to be unbiased (Kydd 2003; Svensson 2005). The most important element in facilitating the movement toward a compromise outcome is to provide information. We know that parties to a civil war have a difficult time making credible commitments and that this liability makes problematic—maybe even impossible—the implementation of peace agreements (Walter 2002; Svensson 2005). This difficulty arises because they have no sanctuary if concessions or an agreement increase their vulnerability. They are therefore reluctant to betray information absent an outside mediator who can help the adversaries communicate sincerely to learn about each other and solve their differences with nonviolent means.

To date, there have been few or no systematic studies of outside diplomatic efforts to settle intrastate conflicts. Attention at the theoretical and empirical levels has focused primarily on mediation in interstate conflicts (Kydd 2003; Regan and Stam 2000; Bercovitch 1997). Mediation has been shown to be effective at helping the adversaries to reach a settlement (Bercovitch and Regan 2003; Dixon 1996; Bercovitch and Diehl 1997) and shortening the duration of a conflict (Regan and Stam 2000). In most works, the core element of third-party conflict management involves information transmitted that allows parties to broach agreements that might otherwise be difficult (Filson and Werner 2002). The importance of negotiation and mediation may reside in mediators' ability to create turning points (Druckman 2004), offer or provide guarantees (Walter 2002), or offer incentives.

Mediation, however, does not appear to have a great track record if judged in terms of successful agreements. In fact, most of the evidence points to success rates in the neighborhood of 30 percent (Dixon 1996; Bercovitch and Diehl 1997; Bercovitch and Regan 2003). Regan and Stam (2000), however, demonstrate that mediation can have an impact on the expected duration of a militarized interstate dispute (MID) and, in fact, under certain conditions, lead to shorter conflicts (see also Greig 2001).

We see no compelling reason to expect outside diplomatic interventions to have any different impact on internal conflicts. That is, individual mediation attempts might fail to achieve an agreement more often than they succeed, but the cumulative

effect can be to shorten the duration of a civil war. We hypothesize, therefore, the following:

> *Hypothesis 1:* The existence of third-party diplomatic efforts (generally conceived of as mediation) to achieve a settlement will shorten the duration of a civil war.

Although diplomatic efforts by external parties can be effective on conflict duration, a successful intervention outcome might also be contingent on the timing of the effort. Regan and Stam (2000, 250), for example, find that "at some points in time (earlier on) mediation seems to do little to increase the hazard, or probability that the dispute will end. As time passes, the hazard rate increases, and at some point past roughly 100-200 months the hazard associated with mediation seems to increase exponentially." Following from Regan and Stam's approach, we also test for whether the success of third parties in facilitating the termination of the conflict through mediation is a matter of timing. At certain points in the conflict, third parties can more effectively communicate information about the utility of continued fighting and the terms of potential settlements to the warring parties. More important, this approach treats conflict as a dynamic process where adversaries' perceptions about the potential benefits and losses from peaceful settlement and fighting evolve over time. Accounting for the curvilinear relationship between intervention timing and conflict duration relaxes the assumption that the effect of outside interventions is static over time. This discussion suggests the second hypothesis:

> *Hypothesis 2:* There is a curvilinear relationship—represented by an inverted U shape— between the timing of a diplomatic intervention and the duration of a civil war.

MILITARY AND ECONOMIC INTERVENTIONS

Military and economic interventions pose a slightly different question. Previous research demonstrates that these types of structural interventions often prolong a conflict and are not very effective at bringing about the termination of a civil war. This result holds despite what appears to be an implicit or explicit assumption about the role of structural interventions as a tool of conflict management. We argue that diplomacy and military or economic initiatives work on different parts of the warring parties' decision calculus about whether to continue fighting. Most realpolitik arguments and studies in the bargaining literature argue that relative capabilities will have an effect on the bargaining positions of the actors. The strong can make greater demands, and the weak must make greater concessions: in a bargaining situation, relative capabilities play an important role in forging agreements. Structural changes to the balance of capabilities stand just as much chance of emboldening or stiffening resolve as they do providing incentives to settle and therefore extend the willingness of both sides to fight on toward victory.

Military or economic assistance to a party involved in a civil war can influence the structural conditions that make them more or less likely to prevail. Many would

argue that the effect of external interventions is a function of the target of the assistance (e.g., Balch-Lindsay and Enterline 2000; Regan 2002; Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbom 2004). For example, in general, the rebels have less military capability than the government, and external support for the rebels will increase their expectations for victory, increase the level of demands they make for a settlement, decrease the amount of concessions they are willing to make, and therefore extend the duration of a conflict. External support for the government would have the opposite effect.

Two things about these arguments deserve mention. First, solely military or economic interventions lack the explicit link to the notion of conflict management. While the external patron may be attempting to make conditions better for a settlement, the recipient simply sees the aid as increasing the ability and motivation to fight on to victory. Second, it is possible that military and economic efforts by external parties are actually attempts to compel victory or stalemate and are not really efforts at conflict management. This would be consistent with some of the cold war rhetoric about proxy wars. Under these conditions, we would expect that military and economic interventions would have an independent affect of prolonging an internal conflict. Material inducements would increase the resiliency of the adversaries in fighting and decrease their utility from negotiated settlements. Once supported materially, warring parties look for solutions to their disputes in fighting rather than the negotiating table. That is, military or economic interventions influence the structural relationship between combatants in a way that increases the incentives to fight over negotiate. We hypothesize, therefore, the following:

> *Hypothesis 3:* Military and economic interventions undertaken independently of diplomatic efforts will prolong the expected duration of a conflict.

We think that to correctly model the role of interventions as a tool of conflict management in civil wars, we have to make an explicit link to the desired outcome. That is, just manipulating structural conditions might fall far short of the actions required to move the parties toward a compromise. We maintain that military and economic factors can still play an important role in the management of civil wars, but their implementation must be more nuanced, more targeted than prior research has been able to specify.

Without explicitly positing a strategy where actors combine structural incentives and information within a coordinated intervention attempt, we do see these two forms of intervention within one conflict to provide a stronger influence than the individual parts. Put differently, if mediations are included as part of the approach to intervening, the relative influence of each form of intervention should be affected. In fact, in a strictly coordinated strategy, we would anticipate that, for instance, military interventions are made more effective by the influence of mediation. Not only is information provided about possible concessions and the like, but the military balance can help entice or coerce those concessions that are necessary.

We hypothesize, therefore, the following:

Hypothesis 4: When controlling for the existence of diplomacy, military and economic interventions will decrease the expected duration of a civil war.

RESEARCH DESIGN

The hypotheses were tested against data on civil conflicts in the post–World War II period (1945-1999). We operationalize civil conflict as organized armed violence within a country that results in at least 200 fatalities. The data were originally described in Regan (2000, 2002). The conflict month is the unit of analysis. Data on interventions are recorded systematically at the level of the month and are disaggregated into military, economic, and diplomatic efforts by third parties. There are more than 13,000 conflict months, incorporating 153 individual conflicts, and approximately 1,400 interventions in 102 of the conflicts. Importantly, we introduce new data on diplomatic interventions, which will be fully described below.

We use an event history approach to model the expected duration of civil conflicts. Among the competing parametric models of survival analysis, we have chosen to test the model with a Weibull parameterization.[2] The Weibull model allows us to test for duration dependency in the termination of civil conflict, which is an advantage over other event history analysis methods. This duration analysis technique estimates the relationship between the time elapsed up to t and the risk of conflict termination at time t. The duration dependency parameter is denoted with p. Positive duration dependency ($p > 1$) suggests that the conflict is more likely to terminate with the passing of time, whereas negative duration dependency ($0 < p < 1$) suggests the institutionalization of the conflict: as the adversaries continue fighting, their chances of settling the conflict also decrease over time. The Weibull distribution makes the assumption that there is a monotonic increase or decrease in the baseline hazard with respect to time (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004). The functional form of our model can be represented by

$$h(t|S, C) = pt^{p-1} + \exp(\beta_I I + \gamma_C C).$$

In the functional form, h reflects the rate at which a civil conflict terminates at time t, given that it has survived until t. p is the shape parameter, I is the vector denoting interventions and C is the vector denoting control variables, as will be explained below (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004). γ and β represent the vectors of the coefficients on the variables of interest.

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2. We checked the robustness of our results to the estimation technique. We relaxed the assumption about the underlying shape of the distribution against a Cox model and found no significant differences in the interpretation of the results. That is, all of the coefficients demonstrated the same substantive effects, although magnitudes and significance levels did vary somewhat. We use a Weibull model because it allows a time metric, making the transformation easier and facilitating an intuitive interpretation of the results.

INTERVENTION VARIABLES

Interventions take place as discrete events, but their effects are more long term or, in some sense, linger, although their influence degrades over time. That is, we can think of military support for either the government or the rebels as taking place at a specific point in time, but the impact of that support will undoubtedly play out over a more extended period. For example, the impact of military aid in the form of weapons is not confined to the specific month during which they were transferred. In fact, as long as they are not captured, degraded, or destroyed, they will continue to contribute to the capabilities of the recipient. A question—and one that must be addressed by the policy community—is how quickly an intervention will degrade when placed into a hostile environment. We consider this to be an empirical question and one that cannot be answered ex ante. The decay function that we build into the effects of interventions posits that there is a rather steep decline in the value of an intervention, but the rate of decline tapers off over time. That is, we impose a condition where there is a large initial effect of an intervention, but one that becomes muted over time.[3] Even when thinking about economic or diplomatic interventions, the "boost" associated with the initial intervention decays, in part, as the political value wears out.

DIPLOMATIC INTERVENTIONS

Conceptually, we view diplomatic initiatives as attempts by outside parties to transform a conflict by means of communicating information about the conflict that can help generate movement toward potentially overlapping bargaining positions. Third parties can convey information about costs, prospects for victory, benefits from settlement, or the subjective estimates of each held by the adversary. In addition, the outside party (or parties) can tie information to explicit carrots or sticks. We code data on four specific forms of diplomatic interventions: (1) mediation, (2) international forums, (3), the recall of ambassadors, and (4) explicit offers to mediate by third parties that were not accepted by both sides. In practice, the vast majority of diplomatic interventions involved mediation by third parties. Data were derived from public sources such as the *New York Times*, Keesings's Contemporary Archives, Facts on File, and case-specific historical treatments.

For a definition of mediation, internal forum, or offers, we rely on the work of Bercovitch (1997), where mediation is a noncoercive, nonviolent, and, ultimately, nonbinding form of intervention. Mediators enter into a conflict to affect, change, modify, or influence the outcome. The mediator can represent a state or a nonstate actor. Offers to mediate represent an explicit offer from a third party and are

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3. We tested for the sensitivity of our results to the decay specification by using the inverse relationship—one with a large lingering initial effect that drops precipitously thereafter. The results suggest that our original specification is much stronger and accurate and that the "boost" from an intervention is rather short-lived.

recorded on the date of the offer. The recall of an ambassador (or the ranking representative in the country) occurs when the intervening government calls home—either permanently or for consultations—the ranking diplomat *and* the recall is explicitly tied to the behavior of the state in its internal conflict. In total, there were 403 diplomatic interventions; 332 were mediations, 5 were recalls of diplomatic representation, 23 involved multilateral forums, and 43 reflect offers to mediate that were not accepted by all parties. Each of these observations reflects external efforts to influence the course of the conflict through diplomatic channels.

Using information on all four categories of diplomacy, we create a dichotomous variable that indicates whether any diplomatic initiative has been undertaken by third parties. Then, the effect of diplomatic interventions is deflated over time to account for the fact that the impact of diplomacy on the warring parties' decision calculi fades with time.[4] The deflating technique relaxes the strong assumption that an intervention that, for example, took place in the third month of the conflict would have the same effect in the fiftieth month. In this approach, the memory factor is a critical component of the effectiveness of third-party strategies, which "diminish[es] across time for the simple reason that memory fades" (Box-Steffensmeier, Reiter, and Zorn 2003).

OPERATIONALIZATION OF VARIABLES

We operationalize the primary explanatory variables related to outside interventions as follows:

1. *Military and economic interventions* are recorded in terms of whether the third party provided resources that were targeted at the authority structures and were convention breaking (see Rosenau 1968; Regan 2000). We also disaggregate economic interventions to material inducements (grant, loan, credit, relief from past obligations, and nonmilitary equipment) and sanctions. Military and economic interventions, economic inducements, and sanctions are all binary variables denoting whether the specific type of intervention has taken place in the month of observation. The interventions are recorded at monthly intervals and are deflated over time in accordance with diplomatic interventions. Data were derived from Regan (2000, 2002).
2. *Diplomatic interventions* are operationalized in terms of third-party involvement in efforts to transform the conflict, as described above. We record dichotomously whether there was a third-party diplomatic effort. That is, diplomacy is a dichotomous variable that reflects the diplomatic efforts of outside parties and is deflated over time, as explained above. Sixty-seven of the 153 civil wars had diplomatic interventions, with the number per conflict ranging between one and twenty-nine.

We include several control variables that have been theoretically linked to the onset or duration of civil wars:

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4. The functional form of the decay is $.99^X$, where X is the number of months since the last intervention. The effect of one intervention stops at the month of any subsequent intervention into that conflict. That is, we reset the counter at each subsequent intervention.

1. *Gross domestic product* (GDP) is recorded in millions of U.S. dollars.
2. *Intensity* is operationalized in terms of the average number of fatalities per month over the course of the conflict.
3. *Size of opposition forces* is derived from the sources identified above. The range is from the hundreds to the tens of thousands.
4. Conflicts were categorized in terms of the *identity of the primary opposition* group. The typology incorporates religious, ethnic, and ideological groups. We use a dichotomous indicator reflecting ideological versus ethnoreligious conflict (Regan 2000).
5. Two variables that account for the existence of extractable resources in the civil conflict state have also been included in the model. *Gemstones* and *opiates* are dichotomous indicators denoting the presence of gemstones or opiates in the conflict state. Data for diamond, gemstone, and opiate production are derived from the Diamond Registry, the National Gemstone Association, and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency, respectively (see Regan and Norton 2005).

OUTCOME VARIABLE

We operationalize the outcome in terms of the end of the conflict. The month in which the conflict terminates is coded 1; all other months are coded 0. Of the 153 conflicts in the post–World War II period, 30 were ongoing as of the end of 1999 and are right censored in the analysis. The right censoring in our data set also supports our choice of a hazard model, given that ordinary least squares estimation techniques do not account for this aspect of the data and produce biased estimates. The outcome, therefore, is the change of state between an ongoing conflict and the end of the conflict.

RESULTS

The discussion of our results proceeds as follows. First, we present the simplest model that includes military and economic interventions along with variables that control for the characteristics of the civil war and of the civil war state. This model is quite similar to Regan's (2002) analysis, where the results suggest that structural interventions prolong the conflict rather than facilitate a negotiated settlement. The results are presented in an accelerated failure time metric, reflecting the likelihood that a conflict ends in the next period, given that an intervention occurs in the current period. Positively signed coefficients indicate that the intervention acts to increase the duration of the conflict, whereas negative coefficients imply shorter durations. Our analysis suggests that neither economic nor military forms of interventions have a statistically significant impact on expected duration. These null findings run counter to many findings in the literature and also to our expectations based on the previous research (see model 1). These differences, we believe, are a result of our accounting for the lingering effects of interventions across time. Previous research has assumed that interventions have a discrete impact without any residual influence through the course of the conflict (an exception is Collier, Hoeffler, and Soderbom 2004). We see this as a limiting assumption, and we posit that our results,

TABLE 1
Duration Model of Interventions in Civil Conflict

Variables	Model 1 (Estimate, SE)	Model 2 (Estimate, SE)	Model 3 (Estimate, SE)	Model 4 (Estimate, SE)
Constant	4.125***	4.554***	4.342***	4.393***
	(1.352)	(1.216)	(1.259)	(1.279)
Diplomatic intervention	—	−1.344***	−1.454***	−1.449***
		(0.445)	(0.432)	(0.436)
Timing of diplomacy	—	0.007	0.006	0.007
		(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.011)
Log (timing of diplomacy)	—	−0.566**	−0.530**	−0.576*
		(0.275)	(0.264)	(0.316)
Military intervention	−0.454	—	−0.210	−0.172
	(0.362)		(0.378)	(0.379)
Economic intervention	0.505	—	0.946*	—
	(0.394)		(0.485)	
Positive economic inducement	—	—	—	0.834
				(0.509)
Sanction	—	—	—	0.157
				(0.638)
Ethnoreligious conflict	0.691**	0.865***	1.000***	0.977***
	(0.311)	(0.330)	(0.333)	(0.338)
Gross domestic product	0.00002	−0.0001	−0.00004	−0.00005
	(0.0005)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)	(0.0004)
Size of the opposition	1.09E-06	2.64E-06*	3.06E-06*	3.01E-06*
	(1.32E-06)	(1.57E-06)	(1.58E-06)	(1.59E-06)
Intensity	−0.0001***	−0.0001***	−0.0001***	−0.0001***
	(0.00002)	(0.00002)	(0.00002)	(0.00002)
Gemstones	0.262	0.246	0.178	0.184
	(0.287)	(0.343)	(0.340)	(0.339)
Opiates	1.198**	1.106**	1.134**	1.122**
	(0.490)	(0.512)	(0.492)	(0.497)
$\ln p$	−0.353***	−0.452***	−0.425***	−0.431***
	(0.075)	(0.077)	(0.080)	(0.080)
p	0.702	0.636	0.654	0.650
$1/p$	1.424	1.572	1.530	1.539
N	13,243	13,243	13,243	13,243
Log-likelihood	−272.192	−260.056	−257.987	−258.505

NOTE: Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors, and the estimates are from an accelerated failure time model.
*$p < .10$. **$p < .05$. ***$p < .01$.

which point to a more vague relationship, come closer to an outcome that squares with policy.

In a second model, we have excluded structural interventions and included the effect of diplomacy and the timing of diplomacy on the length of the conflict. The results show that diplomatic interventions dramatically reduce the expected duration of a conflict. For example, the expected duration for civil conflicts that have

Figure 1:   Expected Duration of Civil Wars, Timing of Diplomacy

experienced diplomatic interventions is reduced by about 76 percent over conflicts without diplomatic interventions. This interpretation is, however, made more complicated by the decay function we used to model the effects of interventions over time, although we will address this issue when we interpret the full results (see model 2).[5]

The results also lend support to the centrality of the timing of diplomacy to conflict duration. The simple interaction of diplomacy with timing is positive but is not significantly related to the expected duration. The log of the timing of diplomacy is negative and significantly associated with duration. The general picture suggested by these observations is that diplomacy is more effective in settling intrastate conflicts when it takes place in the middle stages of the conflict. This conclusion runs counter to Regan and Stam's (2000) findings, in which the authors suggest that mediations in interstate disputes are more effective if they are employed in early or late stages. We interpret our results to suggest that at the beginning, both sides would enter into the conflict with the hope of a victory. As both overestimates its chances of a decisive outcome, the incompatibility between the adversaries might not be amenable to diplomacy. In time, warring parties adjust their success estimates to the new situation. Given that the fighting continues, parties try to avoid future costs of conflict, and diplomacy can be more effective in the later stages of the incompatibility. The curvilinear effect of timing on expected duration can be observed in Figure 1.

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5. We provide a Web appendix that tests different specifications of the model. A discussion of these alternative specifications and the results can be found at http://jcr.sagepub.com/ and http://bingweb.binghamton.edu/~pregan/replication_data.html.

Figure 2:   Expected Duration of Civil Wars, Economic Interventions, and Diplomacy

Next, we present the results of a more complete model (model 3) in which we include military and economic interventions, as well as diplomacy, along with the control variables. The effect of diplomatic interventions holds to the pattern in the more basic model: our findings on meditation and its timing are quite robust, despite the inclusion of structural interventions. What the results show is that when controlling for instances of diplomatic interventions, the effect of economic interventions is to prolong the expected duration of a conflict, whereas military interventions bear no relationship to the outcome (Figure 2). This is consistent with previous research but presents a more nuanced picture of how interventions play out when there are multiple types in one conflict. When we interpret the joint impact of diplomatic initiatives and economic ones, we find that the detrimental effects of economic aid are dramatically reduced by the simultaneous influence of diplomatic efforts to manage the conflict (see Figure 3 and Table 2).[6] In addition, the p-value from this model suggests the institutionalization of the incompatibility between the adversaries in intrastate wars: the longer the conflict lasts, the lower the chance that the parties can settle the conflict, and the risk of termination decreases over time. This makes effective outside interventions all the more important.

6. This interactive effect is evident when calculating predicted probabilities (Table 2). That is, in calculating predicted probabilities, we constrain the model to account for both economic and diplomatic interventions. We do not use an interactive empirical model when carrying out the analysis because the data are less clear as to whether any combinations reflect coordinated policies, presumably by the same country. We could have made the assumption that two different types of interventions that were coincident in time were necessarily coordinated, even though not by the same country, but further descriptive analysis should first explore the extent to which this assumption would hold.

The results in model 3 have led us to disaggregate economic interventions, and we introduced them as economic inducements and economic sanctions in model 4. A growing body of literature studies whether and under what circumstances economic sanctions are successful in influencing the behavior of the target country, and this provides a clear environment where the differences between positive inducements and sanctions should play out (e.g., Bolks and Al-Sowayel 2000; Morgan and Schwebach 1997; Pape 1997). However, empirical analyses mostly focus on sticks rather than carrots and ignore the role of economic inducements such as loans, grants, and aid. In our final model, we include both positive and negative economic inducements and place them within a conflict context.

The results of this model are in line with the findings in the previous models as they pertain to military and diplomatic interventions. Furthermore, there seems to be no compelling value to disaggregating economic interventions. The null finding related to sanctions is in line with most of the literature on the economic sanctions. Empirical analyses in the sanctions literature usually point to the ineffectiveness of economic pressure on the behavior of the target country or the limited conditions under which punishment can be successful (e.g., Morgan and Schwebach 1997). The results suggest that the choice of strategy is vital in terms of the duration of the conflict and that framing an intervention in terms of conflict management makes an important contribution to the outcome.

Of conflict characteristics, the identity of the opposition group is a strong predictor of the expected duration of a conflict. That is, religious and ethnic conflicts have a longer expected duration than ideological conflicts, suggesting that the success of the third-party strategies, even if the right type of conflict management strategy is employed, is significantly constrained by the factors that led to the onset of the war. More intense conflicts are more likely to end in the near term than less intense ones, suggesting that parties' willingness to bear high costs of fighting signals their high resolve, and war fulfills its political aim of transmitting information about the true type of the opponent. Among the characteristics of the civil war state, extractable resources such as opiates fuel incentives to continue fighting; this finding suggests that if the resources available to rebel leadership to pay selective benefits are considerable and readily accessible, then the rebels might forego negotiations, though not necessarily in pursuit of a decisive outcome but rather in pursuit of the conflict, such as the case in Colombia. On the other hand, diamonds and precious stones bear no relationship to the expected duration of a conflict. Our interpretation is that opiates are generally illegal, production is portable, and it is a resource controlled by rebels, not governments. Precious stones tend to be in fixed locations and controlled by governments and are therefore less of a tool to fuel a rebellion.

At the core, we interpret the results of the decaying effects of interventions as demonstrating that economic and diplomatic interventions have their greatest effect at the time they are implemented, and this influence declines at a decelerating rate. More directly, diplomatic interventions increase the likelihood that a civil war ends in the next month, but as the period of time from the point of the diplomatic effort increases, the effect of the diplomatic effort decreases. Although structural

Figure 3:   Expected Duration of Civil Wars, with Economic Interventions Controlling for the Effect of Diplomacy

interventions will initially increase the expected duration of a conflict, their debilitating effect on the duration of a conflict decreases over time. But importantly, when one conflict has both economic and diplomatic interventions, the combined effect appears to reduce the negative impact of economic efforts while not diminishing the constructive impact of diplomacy (see Figure 3).[7] To our minds, this points to the potential usefulness of more complex or coordinated strategies of intervention over a more singularly focused attempt to manipulate structural conditions.

We report these results of our calculation of marginal effects in Table 2.[8] As a baseline model for these calculations, we use a set of conditions that very closely approximate the civil war in Angola. There are a couple of reasons for this choice. First, we believe the results make more sense when framed in terms of an actual event; second, this is a protracted conflict where third parties intervened with military assistance, but the conflict did not experience any diplomatic or economic interventions throughout its duration. In this case, conflict management efforts functionally failed to terminate the conflict early in its life cycle. From this perspective, it provides a particularly well-illustrated example. Our model predicts a conflict lasting 182 months; the actual conflict in Angola lasted 188 months, with military interventions coming early but failing to shorten the conflict.

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7. Figure 3 illustrates the effect of economic intervention on the duration of a conflict in which third parties have also undertaken a diplomatic initiative regardless of the time at which they have done so.

8. We have used the coefficient estimates from model 3 to calculate the marginal effects reported in Table 2.

TABLE 2
Predicted Durations: The Civil War in Angola, 1975-1991

	Value	*Duration (in Months)*	*Percent Δ in Duration*[a]
Base model	—	182	—
Diplomatic intervention	Yes	43	–76
Timing of diplomacy (log): early diplomatic intervention	Third month	26	–85
Timing of diplomacy (log): late diplomatic intervention	Sixtieth month	65	–64
Economic intervention	Yes	469	+157
Economic and diplomatic[b] intervention	Yes	110	–39

NOTE: In our data set, the civil war in Angola has died, and it has lasted for 188 months. The baseline duration places size of the opposition and conflict intensity at their mode based on the actual data for this case (16,000 rebel soldiers and 1,595 battle-related deaths). In the Angola case, there were no diplomatic or economic interventions, but outside parties have intervened militarily. Also, it was a conflict along ideological lines. Angola is not a country rich in opiates.
a. Changes calculated from the point of intervention.
b. These values do not account for the timing of the interventions.

The hazard rate formula used to transform our coefficients into estimates of marginal changes can be expressed as follows:

$$h(t) = \lambda p(\lambda t)^{p-1}; \ t > 0, \ p > 0, \ \lambda > 0,$$

where $h(t)$ is the estimated hazard rate at time t, p is the shape parameter, and λ is the positive scale parameter (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004).

One way to evaluate our results is to ask what would have happened if an intervention strategy had been designed differently from that which did transpire. Interestingly, an economic intervention by itself would virtually wash out any possibility of avoiding a protracted conflict since it would increase the expected war duration by 157 percent over the baseline. Diplomacy would reduce the expected duration to only forty-three months, which is a decrease over expectations from the model of about 76 percent. The evidence strongly supports our argument that a diplomatic intervention takes on an explicit conflict management objective and provides information useful for the combatants to make informed choices. Diplomacy effectively helps the combatants revise their subjective probability of prevailing and their perceptions about the adversary's resolve, therefore facilitating the termination of civil wars.

We find the most interesting results when we examine the effects of the timing of diplomacy. One of the key inferences from Table 2 is that if diplomatic initiatives by third parties are undertaken at the sixtieth month, the evidence would suggest that the war would terminate within the next five months. However, the same intervention in the third month would lead to termination of the conflict in the twenty-sixth month. That is, from the point of the intervention, the evidence suggests that the

effect is more immediate in the middle part of the conflict. The nonlinear relationship with regard to time, moreover, suggests that an important part of the intervention strategy is its implementation within a particular phase of a conflict (see Table 2). The independent effect of an economic intervention is to increase war duration, whereas its combined effect with diplomacy would lead to the conflict ending seventy-two months earlier than the baseline would suggest. In short, there is a dramatic difference in the effect of economic interventions, depending on how they are used in conjunction with diplomacy. It seems to matter considerably not only that diplomacy is part of the intervention package but also the time at which diplomatic initiatives are undertaken by third parties. The inference we draw from this is that interventions that have an explicit focus on conflict management are more likely to be effective at stopping the violence than those that focus on manipulating the structural conditions, such as relative capabilities. In effect, the strategy for managing internal conflicts is as important as the tools at the disposal of potential interveners.

CONCLUSION

A number of studies of outside interventions into civil wars have demonstrated that interventions are not effective methods of reducing the amount of violence or the duration of the conflict. These empirical results appear to run counter to expectations in the policy community. We have argued that interventions and the strategic environment in which they are implemented are more complex than have generally been captured by focusing exclusively on military and economic interventions. We posited, first, that diplomacy as a form of intervention was critical to conflict management and, second, that the timing of the diplomatic attempt is just as important as diplomacy itself.

Using a duration model and two novel advancements to research on interventions (diplomatic interventions, a decay function), we have demonstrated that (1) diplomatic interventions are effective conflict management strategies that dramatically change the course of the events in a civil war, (2) intervention strategies that combine different approaches can be made more effective than individual components alone, and (3) the right timing of intervention efforts is also vital for war termination and settlement. The inferences we draw from our analysis suggest that conflict management is a complex business that requires the manipulations of the information held by the parties about the type of their opponent, expectations about losses and gains, and benefits from a negotiated settlement. The policy community would be well served by thinking in terms of conflict management strategies when designing interventions. Specifically, the theoretical implications of our model point toward thinking closely about the strategic problems that the adversaries face, which affect the duration of civil wars (Kydd 2003). Models of intervention, therefore, should pay close attention to the conditions under which interventions are implemented, as well as how successful third-party involvement communicates the objective distribution of power and the resolve of the adversary and also takes into account the contentious issues that lead to the onset of the conflict.

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