#### ) Long-term harm to U.S. alliances outweighs the short-term benefits of the case.

Thim 12 — Michal Thim, Research Fellow at the Association for International Affairs (Prague), Member of CIMSEC—The Center for International Maritime Security, Asia-Pacific Desk Contributing Analyst for Wikistrat, Postgraduate Student in Taiwan Studies at the School of Contemporary Chinese Studies at the University of Nottingham, previously a Graduate Student in Asia-Pacific Studies and Taiwan Studies at National Chengchi University, holds an M.A. in Political Science from Charles University in Prague, 2012 (“Of Peace and Appeasement: Comments on Charles Glaser’s Article, ‘Will China’s Rise Lead To War?’,” *Taiwan In Perspective*—a blog, August 21st, Available Online at https://taiwan-in-perspective.com/2012/08/21/of-peace-and-appeasement-comments-on-charles-glasers-article-will-chinas-rise-lead-to-war/, Accessed 07-10-2016)

As for U.S. objectives, abandoning Taiwan may serve a purpose in the short-term perspective. China’s government may appear to be temporarily satisfied and Washington may succeed in tackling concerns of other regional players. However, short-term benefits could easily turn into long-term losses. It is difficult to assume that Japan, Korea, or the Philippines would not reflect on such fundamental change in the regional security environment and there is a little reason to believe that strengthening alliance with U.S. is the most likely result. Loss of confidence in sincerity of U.S. pledges and rebalancing towards Beijing seems to be the rather likely option.

Moreover, even if Taiwan subsequently concedes to Chinese government pressure, undesirable war with China is avoided, and yet other states proceed to tighten relations with U.S., Taiwan under Chinese control would irreversibly change regional geopolitics further into Washington’s disadvantage.

#### The plan crushes the credibility of U.S. alliance commitments — diplomatic reassurances won’t be enough to prevent a destabilizing arms race.

Easley 16 — Leif-Eric Easley, Assistant Professor in the Division of International Studies at Ewha University, Research Fellow at the Asan Institute for Policy Studies in Seoul, former Northeast Asian History Fellow at the Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center at Stanford University, holds a Ph.D. from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2016 (“Grand Bargain or Bad Idea? U.S. Relations with China and Taiwan,” *International Security*, Volume 40, Number 4, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via Project Muse)

Abandonment of Taiwan would be a greater shock for U.S. credibility than the 2008 financial crisis, Arab Spring, Syrian civil war, or Ukrainian conflict because it would contradict decades of U.S. policy, be a sin of commission rather than omission, and have greater direct relevance to Asia’s geopolitics. A grand bargain with China would not only degrade U.S. soft power and alliances; it could drive Asian countries to unilaterally enhance their own defenses, fueling an arms race and further diminishing security in the region. Glaser suggests that such dynamics could be avoided if U.S. leaders visit Japan and South Korea with security treaties in hand and clarify why those countries are different from Taiwan. Alliances among democracies are based not only on treaties and national interests, however, but also on shared values and popular support. Perceptions of reliability affect how people vote and can redirect democratic processes behind alliance cooperation.

#### The plan decimates U.S. credibility with all Asian allies.

Tucker and Glaser 11 — Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Professor of History at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University, Senior Scholar at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, holds a Ph.D. in History from Columbia University, and Bonnie Glaser, Senior Fellow with the Freeman Chair in China Studies and Senior Associate with the CSIS Pacific Forum at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the Institute of International Strategic Studies, holds an M.A. in International Economics and Chinese Studies from the School of Advanced International Studies at Johns Hopkins University, 2011 (“Should the United States Abandon Taiwan?,” *The Washington Quarterly*, Volume 34, Issue 4, Fall, Available Online at <https://csis-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/twq11autumntuckerglaser.pdf>, Accessed 07-10-2016, p. 32-33)

U.S. Friends and Allies

Washington’s long-term support for Taiwan also has significance for U.S. allies and friends. Asian countries which look to the United States to balance China’s rising power may not want Washington to squander resources and energy on Taiwan, but were it to conversely ignore Taiwan’s security, they would see their own safety threatened. U.S. credibility, therefore, is at stake. U.S. inconstancy could convince American allies and friends to rely less on Washington, undertake an arms race, and/or bandwagon with China. After the Clinton administration dispatched two aircraft carrier battle groups to the area around Taiwan in the 1995— 1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, the region’s confidence in the United States soared and a wave of counterbalancing against China occurred. Japan, Singapore, the Philippines, and other nations all bolstered their security ties with the United States.

Forsaking Taiwan would likely have the opposite effect. A U.S. decision to abandon Taiwan—leading to unification of an unwilling Taiwan with China—would be particularly alarming to Japan. Tension between China and Japan remains high, and the resolution of chronic economic, security, and history problems in the foreseeable future appears unlikely. Dependent on sea lanes of supply and communication which pass close to Taiwan, Tokyo would consider itself to be more vulnerable, and it would be. Japan would also be outflanked should China decide to use Taiwan as a military platform. Contested claims to oil fields and islands in the East and South China Seas would be more difficult to defend. If Japan began to doubt U.S. reliability, that could deal a fatal blow to [end page 32] the U.S.—Japan alliance. Moreover, adding to Japan’s dismay, South Korea, increasingly reliant on its burgeoning economic ties with China, might calculate that if the United States can sever ties to Taiwan, Seoul could be safer renouncing its security alliance with Washington and aligning with Beijing.

The current urge to seek protection against a potentially powerful and abusive China has made the United States more welcome across Southeast Asia. Aware that they cannot effectively hedge against China without U.S. collaboration, Southeast Asian nations have quietly repaired rifts and reinvigorated cooperation with Washington. They welcomed Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s declaration in Thailand in 2009 that ‘‘the United States is back’’ in Asia. Although they don’t share Tokyo’s view of Taiwan’s geostrategic importance, they do worry about freedom of navigation and resource claims in the South China Sea. They would likely interpret a shift in U.S. policy away from Taiwan as a signal of U.S. surrender to Chinese interests, and eventually follow suit.

#### Tons of alt causes to relations

Bates 13. (Scott Bates is the former senior policy adviser for the U.S. House of Representatives Homeland Security Committee. He is president of the Center for National Policy, an independent think tank in Washington, D.C. U.S.- CHINA RELATIONS NEED OVERHAUL. June 3, 2013. http://www.sfchronicle.com/opinion/openforum/article/U-S-China-relations-need-overhaul-4573363.php)

Preparing for his first meeting with President Obama, China’s new ruler Xi Jinping stated that he is looking for a “new power relationship” with the United States that will acknowledge China’s rising influence in global affairs. Rather than accommodate the grand ambitions of the Chinese leadership, or seek to build a “personal relationship” based on polite conversation, the most important thing President Obama can do to preserve the peace and prosperity of the Pacific region is to inform President Xi that China’s conduct in international affairs is out of bounds and that business as usual is over. Since the fall of Mao Zedong and the beginning of the rise of China, U.S. presidents, business leaders, academics and foreign policy elites have all repeated a similar refrain; “engage China, accommodate its rise and bring them into the international system.” But over the past two decades, a pattern has emerged: China has been increasing its power and influence by any means. In their mad dash to grab resources, Chinese leaders are using methods outside the norms of the international system — and at the expense of the United States and our allies — to take what they want. Here are three examples that clearly demonstrate that unless Chinese policy changes dramatically, the next U.S. president will need to regard China as a clear and present danger to the prosperity and long-term national security of the United States: Waves of cyber-attacks that originate from China. In just the past few months, the enormous scale of Chinese cyber- attacks against American businesses and our defense establishment have become very public. The bipartisan Commission on the Theft of American Intellectual Property, led by Republican presidential candidate Jon Huntsman and former Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair, concluded that cyber-attacks originating primarily from China are costing the United States at least $300 billion in lost profits and productivity per year. The private sector security firm Mandiant discovered that a unit of the People’s Liberation Army stole technology blueprints, manufacturing processes, clinical trial results, pricing documents, negotiation strategies and other proprietary information from more than 100 companies that had hired Mandiant. China’s increasingly aggressive assertions of territorial claims. In just the past year, Chinese troops have crossed 12 miles inside the line of control on the border with India and its naval forces have made incursions into the territorial waters of Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and the Philippines. Most troubling are daily air and sea incidents involving Chinese forces off islands long administered by Japan. One of the only neighbors with which China has failed to place pressure is North Korea. Chinese assistance continues to be the only reason the nuclear armed regime in Pyongyang still clings to power. The 20-year military buildup by Beijing. Some experts contend that China’s double-digit military spending increases every year since 1989 should not be of concern to the United States because U.S. defense spending is still several times greater than that of Beijing. However, what cannot be overlooked is that increases in China’s military budget accounted for more than 90 percent of the aggregate increase in military spending among China and its East Asian neighbors last year. A growing percentage of the Chinese military’s budget is being spent on aircraft carriers and destroyers — hardware designed to project military power. While U.S. military assets are spread to meet global commitments,China can concentrate its force in East Asia and indeed there are now real questions as to whether the U.S. Navy would be able to carry out its century-long mission of supporting allies and maintaining freedom of navigation in East Asia. It is becoming increasingly difficult not to view China as a clear and present danger to the prosperity and long-term national security of the United States. Nothing could be more important for the future of peace and stability in the Pacific and the world than to have a positive and mutually beneficially relationship between the United States and China. All the more reason for Presidents Obama and Xi to take on the hard issues first and build a new foundation for U.S.-China relations based on trust, respect and the mutual interest of avoiding conflict.

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#### Perception of a diminished U.S. commitment to South Korean security causes Israel to escalate against Iran –Israel will interpret that as a unique signal

Tyler Cowen 13, professor of economics at George Mason University and at the Center for the Study of Public Choice, Director of the Mercatus Center, 4/5/13, “Why the U.S. helps defend South Korea and what can go wrong,” <http://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2013/04/why-the-u-s-helps-defend-south-korea-and-what-can-go-wrong.html>

Why the U.S. helps defend South Korea and what can go wrong It is not because we need to subsidize their defense per se, to cite one argument which some non-interventionist critics have attacked. It is so, when North Korea behaves in a ridiculous manner, the South can respond (not respond) with great restraint. What we are subsidizing is a) a feeling of security, and b) not building nuclear weapons in response. We do something broadly similar for Japan. The potential problem is when the same U.S. acts which produce a feeling of security in South Koreans produce a feeling of insecurity in North Korean leaders. And the broader game we are playing, with numerous allies, means we might end up pushing some individual confrontations beyond an optimal point (e.g., how would Israel respond with Iran if we wavered on South Korea?) Might we have to overinvest in the South Korean feeling of security — from a strictly Korean peninsula point of view — to keep Japan, Israel, Taiwan, the Saudis, and others “in line”? It would be good if the North Korean leadership would read this blog post, as they would then realize that what to their eyes appears to be American “overstepping” is done for the sake of other audiences. It is problematic for the American government to itself communicate this point. Imagine announcing “we don’t stand by South Korea as much as it appears, we are just doing this because Israel faces a signal extraction problem and we can somewhat sway their inference toward relaxing about their own security situation.” It would be bad if the Saudi leadership would read this blog post (or understand this to begin with). The American government would then have to produce a feeling of security for South Korea all the more.

#### Israel’s willing to unilaterally attack – the Iran deal means their threat perception’s on the brink

Wayne White 8-24, Scholar at the Middle East Institute, former Deputy Director of the State Department's Middle East/South Asia Intelligence Office, served in Niger, Israel, Egypt, the Sinai and Iraq as an intelligence briefer to senior officials of many Middle East countries and as the State Department's representative to NATO Middle East Working Groups in Brussels, 8/24/15, “The Danger of Rogue Israeli Military Action against Iran,” <http://www.lobelog.com/the-danger-of-rogue-israeli-military-action-against-iran/>

These latest revelations from Barak’s biographers, if accurate, tend to confirm my worst fears. Israeli leaders have been quite serious regarding their repeated military threats against Iran (albeit restrained to date by several intervening factors). The recent Iran nuclear agreement doubtless represents a new and even more serious challenge in the eyes of senior Israeli political leaders that could produce renewed interest in going it alone militarily. Whether something would intervene again to stay the hand of Israel’s hardline leadership is unknown.

The Obama administration must convey its dismay to the Israelis in no uncertain terms. But if the Israelis receive some alarming intelligence about Iranian intentions they considered credible, Israel might still take unilateral military action to disrupt Iran’s nuclear sector. Israel might do this even though, post-2012, such an attack faces greater military challenges as well as greater political complications because of an Iran nuclear agreement widely accepted by the international community. Perhaps the greatest danger in this regard would be the election of an Iran hawk to the U.S. presidency in 2016, someone that Israel would view as more sympathetic to Israeli military action.

#### Israeli strikes cause global great power war

Rafael Reuveny 10, PhD, Professor in the School of Public and Environmental Affairs at Indiana University, "Unilateral Strike on Iran could trigger world Depression", Op-ed distributed through McClatchy Newspaper Co, <http://www.indiana.edu/~spea/news/speaking_out/reuveny_on_unilateral_strike_Iran.shtml>

A unilateral Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities would likely have dire consequences, including a regional war, global economic collapse and a major power clash. For an Israeli campaign to succeed, it must be quick and decisive. This requires an attack that would be so overwhelming that Iran would not dare to respond in full force. Such an outcome is extremely unlikely since the locations of some of Iran’s nuclear facilities are not fully known and known facilities are buried deep underground. All of these widely spread facilities are shielded by elaborate air defense systems constructed not only by the Iranians, but also the Chinese and, likely, the Russians as well. By now, Iran has also built redundant command and control systems and nuclear facilities, developed early-warning systems, acquired ballistic and cruise missiles and upgraded and enlarged its armed forces. Because Iran is well-prepared, a single, conventional Israeli strike — or even numerous strikes — could not destroy all of its capabilities, giving Iran time to respond. A regional war Unlike Iraq, whose nuclear program Israel destroyed in 1981**,** Iran has a second-strike capability comprised of a coalition of Iranian, Syrian, Lebanese, Hezbollah, Hamas, and, perhaps, Turkish forces. Internal pressure might compel Jordan, Egypt, and the Palestinian Authority to join the assault, turning a bad situation into a regional war. During the 1973 Arab-Israeli War, at the apex of its power, Israel was saved from defeat by President Nixon’s shipment of weapons and planes. Today, Israel’s numerical inferiority is greater, and it faces more determined and better-equipped opponents. Despite Israel’s touted defense systems, Iranian coalition missiles, armed forces, and terrorist attacks would likely wreak havoc on its enemy, leading to a prolonged tit-for-tat. In the absence of massive U.S. assistance, Israel’s military resources may quickly dwindle, forcing it to use its alleged nuclear weapons, as it had reportedly almost done in 1973. An Israeli nuclear attack would likely destroy most of Iran’s capabilities, but a crippled Iran and its coalition could still attack neighboring oil facilities, unleash global terrorism, plant mines in the Persian Gulf and impair maritime trade in the Mediterranean, Red Sea and Indian Ocean. Middle Eastern oil shipments would likely slow to a trickle as production declines due to the war and insurance companies decide to drop their risky Middle Eastern clients. Iran and Venezuela would likely stop selling oil to the United States and Europe. The world economy would head into a tailspin; international acrimony would rise; and Iraqi and Afghani citizens might fully turn on the United States, immediately requiring the deployment of more American troops. Russia, China, Venezuela, and maybe Brazil and Turkey — all of which essentially support Iran — could be tempted to form an alliance and openly challenge the U.S. hegemony. Replaying Nixon’s nightmare Russia and China might rearm their injured Iranian protege overnight, just as Nixon rearmed Israel, and threaten to intervene, just as the U.S.S.R. threatened to join Egypt and Syria in 1973. President Obama’s response would likely put U.S. forces on nuclear alert, replaying Nixon’s nightmarish scenario. Iran may well feel duty-bound to respond to a unilateral attack by its Israeli archenemy, but it knows that it could not take on the United States head-to-head. In contrast, if the United States leads the attack, Iran’s response would likely be muted. If Iran chooses to absorb an American-led strike, its allies would likely protest and send weapons, but would probably not risk using force.¶ While no one has a crystal ball, leaders should be risk-averse when choosing war as a foreign policy tool. If attacking Iran is deemed necessary, Israel must wait for an American green light. A unilateral Israeli strike could ultimately spark World War III.