# 1ar semis

## CP

#### China won’t take the threat of the counterplan seriously — they think the U.S. will eventually back down.

Mearsheimer 14 — John J. Mearsheimer, R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science and Co-Director of the Program on International Security Policy at the University of Chicago, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from Cornell University, 2014 (“Say Goodbye to Taiwan,” *The National Interest*, March/April, Available Online at <http://nationalinterest.org/article/say-goodbye-taiwan-9931?page=show>, Accessed 06-28-2016)

While the United States has good reasons to want Taiwan as part of the balancing coalition it will build against China, there are also reasons to think this relationship is not sustainable over the long term. For starters, at some point in the next decade or so it will become impossible for the United States to help Taiwan defend itself against a Chinese attack. Remember that we are talking about a China with much more military capability than it has today.

In addition, geography works in China’s favor in a major way, simply because Taiwan is so close to the Chinese mainland and so far away from the United States. When it comes to a competition between China and the United States over projecting military power into Taiwan, China wins hands down. Furthermore, in a fight over Taiwan, American policy makers would surely be reluctant to launch major attacks against Chinese forces on the mainland, for fear they might precipitate nuclear escalation. This reticence would also work to China’s advantage.

## Alliances da

### 1ar – o/v

**Taiwan conflict is more probable—nationalist tensions and political climate set the stage for war. It happens faster—it would take years for Japan to develop nuclear weapons and start a conflict but Taiwan war happens by the end of Tsai’s term.**

#### Japan won’t proliferate

Lewis, director of the East Asia Nonproliferation Program at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, ‘14

(Jeffrey, “If Japan Wanted to Build a Nuclear Bomb It’d Be Awesome at It,” Foreign Policy, June 26)

That’s because the Japanese would not jury-rig a tiny arsenal out of civil plutonium. **They could do it, sure, but why?** Why completely alter the structure of Japanese security policy for a handful of makeshift bombs that might not work? If Japan goes nuclear, it will do so only as part of a fundamental change in how the Japanese look at their security environment. In that case, Japan would build nuclear weapons like they do everything else, down to the beer machine at Narita — with meticulous care. Japan would construct dedicated plutonium production reactors and facilities to separate weapons-grade plutonium, probably conduct nuclear tests, and deploy modern delivery systems, such as missiles. This is, I would argue, the most important point to understanding U.S.-Japan relations, and extended deterrence. We often talk about nuclear weapons in Japan **like a thermostat** — **if U.S. credibility declines in Tokyo, Japan will build a nuclear arsenal to compensate**. It’s almost as if we cut 10 bombs, the Japanese will want 10 of their own to make up the difference. That’s not right at all. For Japan, becoming a nuclear weapons power would require a dramatic break in a foreign and security policy that has historically centered on the U.S. alliance. **So would unarmed neutrality.** It is Japan’s lack of such strategic options that account for the most interesting Japanese behaviors in foreign and security policy. As one Japanese observer pointed out to me, neither alternative — nuclear-armed independence nor unarmed neutrality — **has a mainstream constituency in Japan**. That means the only practical approach for Japanese policymakers is an alliance with the United States. Tokyo has little choice but to accept whatever level of security Washington can provide at the moment. Another colleague compared it to riding on the back of a motorcycle — you can see the bumps and twists in the road, but you can’t do anything about it. That’s scary. The result, of course, is a lot of whining from Japan about the credibility of the U.S. guarantee. What else can they do? And it accounts for the tendency of the country’s politicos to fixate on symbols of Washington’s commitment, **just as Max Weber observed that Protestants tended to obsess about material success as a sign of predestination**.

### 1ar – at: japan da – link

**No alliances DA—**

1. **Offsets—the US would increase military coordination and presence to satisfy Japan**
2. **No alternatives—allies need the US and can’t go anywhere else for protection**

**That’s Glaser.**

**As would the US**

Glaser 15 — Charles L. Glaser, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, Fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former Emmett Dedmon Professor of Public Policy and Acting Dean at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, former Strategic Analyst for the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, holds a Ph.D. and a Master’s in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2015 (“A U.S.-China Grand Bargain? The Hard Choice between Military Competition and Accommodation,” *International Security*, Volume 39, Number 4, Spring, Available Online to Subscribing Institutions via MIT Press Journals)

In addition, the United States could take other actions that would starkly distinguish its policies toward Japan from its policies toward Taiwan, which should help to offset doubts that accommodation on Taiwan might create. Most obviously, the United States could increase the size and improve the quality of the forces it commits to Japan's protection. Other policies could include further deepening U.S.-Japan joint military planning and continuing high-level discussions of the requirements for extending deterrence to Japan. Growth in Chinese conventional and nuclear forces has increased the importance of these interactions; ending the U.S. commitment to Taiwan would make them still more valuable.98

**Many other issues in the relationship**

Xu 14 (Beina, Editor/Writer Council on Foreign Relations 7/1/14, Citing Jennifer Lind, associate professor of government at Dartmouth College & Sheila Smith, CFR Senior Fellow, “The U.S.-Japan Security Alliance”, http://www.cfr.org/japan/us-japan-security-alliance/p31437)

"It's been very corrosive for the alliance," Smith says of the Okinawa issue. "It has focused our attention on this one particular base, when the real challenge for the alliance has been to come up with a broader framework for the sustainability of U.S. forces in Japan." The Future of the Alliance The coordination between U.S. and Japanese military forces after the devastating March 2011 earthquake and consequent tsunami that struck Tohoku demonstrated the resilience of the alliance. The SDF conducted rescue operations in tandem with thousands of U.S. forces under Operation Tomodachi, the largest bilateral mission in the history of the alliance. U.S. forces aided the SDF in clearing Sendai's airport, assisted in search-and-rescue teams, and prepared Japan's defense readiness. This high level of support echoed Japan's own cooperation during the Gulf and Iraq wars. In November 2001, the government of Junichiro Koizumi dispatched the Maritime Self-Defense Force to the Indian Ocean to support U.S. military operations in Afghanistan, marking Japan's first overseas military action during a combat operation. A year later, Japan drafted a bill that would allow the SDF to be dispatched to postwar Iraq, and in 2003 it sent forces to aid in postwar reconstruction efforts. At a 2 + 2 meeting in early October 2013, the United States agreed to deploy reconnaissance drones to Japan, which also pledged up to $3.1 billion to relocate five thousand U.S. Marines from Okinawa to Guam. Ministers also agreed to rewrite the guidelines for U.S.-Japanese Defense Cooperation for the first time since 1997 in revisions that would expand cooperation on counterterrorism and bolster the allies' ability to respond to an attack on Japan. In July 2014, Japan took a step toward a more active role in regional security when Abe announced that his cabinet had approved a reinterpretation of the antiwar Constitution that would allow Japanese forces to aid friendly nations under attack. The decision marks a significant shift from a position that had strictly limited Japan to act solely in its own defense. "Japan, for half a century, has expanded its military capability in ways that raise questions about the interpretation of Article Nine in its constitution," says Smith. "And the question has become, 'How much can Japan do in the alliance?'" Some experts have defined the modern-day alliance to be more inclusive, advocating initiatives such as trade and energy cooperation as the road to a future framework. "This is bigger than just the military. These are instruments we use to improve our own national prosperity and security, and that's fundamentally what this alliance should be about," Smith says. The multilateral Trans-Pacific Partnership has been a highly promising economic development that observers hope will tighten the alliance. After the Fukushima nuclear disaster forced Japan to reconsider its energy policies, Washington agreed to a long-term liquefied natural gas export deal with Japan that could see the United States become a supplier for the island country. "This is the most relevant the alliance has been in a long time," says Lind. "With the ebb and flow of what's going on in the region, these are two countries that are highly incentivized to make this work."

**Okinawa outweighs**

Lind 15—Jennifer Lind, an associate professor of government at Dartmouth College, Doctor of Philosophy (PhD), Political Science and Government from MIT, Master of Pacific International Affairs from University of California San Diego, 2015. (“Could Okinawa Derail U.S.-Japan Relations?” *National Interest,* April 2nd, Available Online at [*http*://nationalinterest.org/feature/could-okinawa-derail-us-japan-relations-12526?page=3](http://nationalinterest.org/feature/could-okinawa-derail-us-japan-relations-12526?page=3), Accessed 06-26-2016, p. 2-3)

Peculiar, for two reasons. First, although the eventual return of Okinawa to Japan was legislated in 1971, it was actually an important accomplishment of the Kennedy administration. Reischauer believed that a crisis over Okinawa could happen at any time, and would damage or even destroy the alliance. So as ambassador he devoted tremendous energy to negotiating the reversion of Okinawa with both the U.S. military and the Japanese. This effort floundered for a while after the president’s assassination, and was not realized until the Nixon years. But Reischauer’s contribution was an important Kennedy-era legacy, and thus a strange omission from a panel on that topic. But that’s the problem with non-events; though always eager to assign blame for a crisis that did happen, we forget to confer praise for one that didn’t.

Okinawa also belonged on that stage because it still remains a vexing challenge in the U.S.-Japan alliance.

In the past few years, as Japan’s dispute with China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands grows more heated, with aircraft and ships from each side circling around the disputed islands, Shinzo Abe’s government has emphasized the dangers that Chinese military modernization and territorial claims pose to Japan. In this environment, the U.S.-Japan alliance and Okinawa’s bases acquire even more significance than in the past. But also in the past few years, Okinawa’s anti-base movement has accelerated, and in general alliance managers face a more complex political environment.

In fact, just a few days after the symposium, Okinawa’s governor, Takeshi Onaga, brought the issue back into the headlines. Japan’s Defense Ministry had begun preliminary exploration and drilling on a facility that would replace the U.S. Marine base at Futenma. Tokyo and Washington view the move as essential to create a sustainable U.S. presence, because it moves the Marines out of a potentially dangerous urban location.

But Okinawans didn’t want the facility moved to a different part of Okinawa—they wanted it off the island completely, and elected Governor Onaga on that platform. On March 22 he issued a deadline of one week to stop the drilling, or lose the permit. Tokyo ignored him, describing his demand as “very regrettable,” and suspending the governor’s work stoppage order.

Onaga responded by vowing, “I will knuckle down and respond to this in keeping with the will of the Okinawans.”

What happens next? “Once again,” wrote DC scribe Chris Nelson, “the base relocation issue threatens to blow up in our face.” The Okinawans are, in Carol Fulp’s words, becoming visible. They’re shouting louder and louder—and want to be onstage too. Averting an alliance crisis over Okinawa was Reischauer and Kennedy’s challenge. Averting another one is ours.

### AT: Israeli Strikes

**No Iran strikes coming – recent Israeli elections have moderated Israel**

**Cohn, 1/23/2013** (Carolyn, “Israel election cuts Iran risk,” *Reuters’ Global Investing* blog, http://blogs.reuters.com/globalinvesting/2013/01/23/israel-election-cuts-iran-risk/)

Israeli markets cheered election results today, with stocks rising 1 percent and the shekel edging up towards recent nine-month highs. Right-wing prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu claimed victory, but his **Likud** party **and ultra-nationalist allies** Yisrael Beitenu **lost ground to a new centrist party**. Final results are expected tomorrow.¶ **Voters** seem to have **concentrated on domestic issues**, including the state of the economy, **but** foreign investors tend to look at the **geopolitical risks**, and these appear to **have lessened.¶ Punters have been removing their bets on an air strike on Iran, particularly since the re-election of** Barack **Obama** as U.S. President in November. **The chance of a strike** on Iran by the U.S. or Israel by the end of the year **has fallen to 23.1 percent** today, according to online exchange Intrade.com, **compared with** around 35 percent shortly after the U.S. election, and **a high of 60 percent in October**.¶ Political risk analyst Alastair Newton at Nomura also thinks chances of a strike have diminished. He writes in a note today:¶ Although Israel’s stated policy on Iran is unlikely to shift significantly whatever the make-up of the next government, **securing the necessary support** in the security cabinet **for a strike now looks like a much harder task** than would have been the case had Mr Netanyahu won a clear majority.