## Case

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#### Engagement requires quid-pro-quos – consensus says *positive inducements* are key

Hall 14 (Senior Fellow in International Relations, Australian National University (Ian, The Engagement of India: Strategies and Responses, p. 3-4)

This book explores the various modes of engagement employed in the Indian case, their uses, and their limits. It follows the growing consensus in the literature that defines engagement as any strategy that employs "positive inducements'' to influence the behavior of states.8 It acknowledges that various, different engagement strategies can be utilized. In particular, as Miroslav Nincic argues, we can distinguish between "exchange" strategies and "catalytic" ones. With the first type of strategy, positive inducements are offered to try to "leverage" particular quid pro quos from the target state.9 An investment might be canvassed, a trade deal promised, or a weapons system provided in return for a specific concession. With the second type of strategy, inducements are offered merely to catalyze something bigger, perhaps even involving the wholesale transformation of a target society.10 In this kind of engagement, many different incentives might be laid out for many different constituencies, from educational opportunities for emerging leaders to new terms of trade for the economic elite. The objects of engagement can include changing specific policies of the target state or transforming the wider political, economic, or social order of a target society. Both of these objectives could be pursued with coercive strategies employing either compellence or deterrence—or indeed with a mixture of both engagement and coercion." But much recent research has argued that the evidence for the efficacy of both compellence and deterrence in changing target state policies is inconclusive.12 Both military and economic sanctions have been shown to have mixed results, and many scholars argue that coercion rarely works." By contrast, there is some considerable evidence that engagement strategies can both elicit discrete quid pro quos from states and generate wider political and social change within them that might in the medium to long term lead to changed behavior at home or in international relations.14 Moreover, it is clear that engagement is both more commonly utilized than often recognized by scholars of international relations and that it is generally considered more politically accepted to politicians and publics in both engaging states and in the states they seek to engage.15 Engagement strategies take different forms depending on their objectives. They can emphasize diplomacy, aiming at the improvement of formal, state-to- state contacts, and be led by professional diplomats, special envoys, or politicians. Alternatively, they can emphasize military ties, utilizing military-to- military dialogues, exchanges, and training to build trust, convey strategic intentions, or simply foster greater openness in the target state’s defense establishment.16 They can be primarily economic in approach, using trade, investment, and technology transfer to engender change in the target society and perhaps to generate greater economic interdependence, constraining a target state's foreign policy choices.17 Finally, they can seek to create channels for people-to-people contact through state-driven public diplomacy, business forums and research networks, aid and development assistance, and so on.

Prefer the counter-interp

1. Predictable Limits – there are infinite actions the US can take toward China – mandating a QPQ narrows solvency advocates to a predictable literature base and creates more in-depth and researched debates
2. Say yes is a good debate – it gives the negative more ground and access the best internal link to topic education as we learn more about internal Chinese politics
3. Functional Limits check – things like T gov to gov and unconditional counterplans check against small affs
4. Condition debates are inevitable – having a QPQ aff against an unconditional CP is a much better debate than the inverse which would just become a meaningless theory debate
5. Reasonability – good is good enough – any alternative results in a shifting of the goal posts and race to the bottom to find the most limiting interpretation –potential abuse is not a voter

## CP

The counterplan triggers the internal link faster – emboldens Taiwan to declare independence which causes our escalation scenario

Perm do both

CP doesn’t solve any of the aff

1. Taiwan – this was above – they only cause Taiwan escalation
2. South and East China Seas – even if China doesn’t lash out at Taiwan that aggression would spill over and increase maritime aggression
3. Opacity – only a response from China removes that scenario for miscalc

Perm do the plan and threaten the counterplan – as part of the negotiations tell China that we will do the CP if they don’t agree to the plan which increases US leverage – also solves the perception links to their disad

#### The CP is the status quo – we have already agreed to support and supply local defense programs – missiles and subs

Gady 9/9/16 (Franz-Stefan, Asian Defense Diplomat and Reporter, “US Agrees to Supply Taiwan With Advanced Torpedoes”, The Diplomat, September 9th 2016, http://thediplomat.com/2016/09/us-agrees-to-supply-taiwan-with-advanced-torpedoes/?utm\_content=buffer59df0&utm\_medium=social&utm\_source=twitter.com&utm\_campaign=buffer)

After many years of delay, the United States will finally approve the sale of advanced MK-48 heavyweight torpedoes to Taiwan, an unnamed official of Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense told Defense News.

According to local Taiwanese media reports, the “problem” over the purchase of the MK-48 has “now been resolved” and the MK-48 is included in this year’s military budget request, currently being debated in Taiwan’s Legislative Yuan. The sale of the torpedoes was first requested during the presidency of George W. Bush.

Neither the United States nor Taiwan has officially confirmed the deal. It is also unclear how many torpedoes will be sold and under what timeframe.

Once procured, the MK-48 Mod 6 Advanced Technology (AT) heavyweight torpedoes will be installed aboard the two Hai Lung-class (improved Dutch Zwaardvis-class) submarines, according to the source.

Both Hai Lung class submarines—the Hai Lung (Sea Dragon) 793 and Hai Hu (Sea Tiger) 794—are currently undergoing a $12.35 million life extension upgrade, overseen by the military-run Chung-shan Institute of Science and Technology. (The Republic of China Navy also operates two World War II-era U.S.-made Guppy-class subs)

As I noted previously (See: “Taiwan to Upgrade 2 Submarines”), the subs “will undergo hull, mechanical, and electrical upgrades, as well as non-propulsion electronic system modifications including upgrades to the TIMNEX 4CH(V2) electronic support measures system and a new combat system. The new combat system will in all likelihood be an off-the-shelf variant of Lockheed Martin’s SUBICS (Submarine Integrated Combat System).”

#### The U.S. can’t effectively defend Taiwan and China knows it — deterrence fails.

White 15 — Hugh White, Professor of Strategic Studies at the Australian National University, former Intelligence Analyst with Australia’s Office of National Assessments and Senior Official with Australia’s Department of Defence, 2015 (“The harsh reality that Taiwan faces,” *The Straits Times*, April 15th, Available Online at http://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/the-harsh-reality-that-taiwan-faces, Accessed 06-25-2016)

But the stark reality is that these days, there is not much the US can realistically do to help Taipei stand up to serious pressure from Beijing.

Back in 1996 when they last went toe-to-toe over Taiwan, the US could simply send a couple of aircraft carriers into the area to force China to back off. Today the balance of power is vastly different: China can sink the carriers, and their economies are so intertwined that trade sanctions of the kind the US used against Russia recently are simply unthinkable.

This reality does not yet seem to have been understood in Taiwan. The overwhelming desire on the island is to preserve its democracy and avoid reunification by preserving the status quo. But it understands that China's patience is not inexhaustible — eventually China wants to get Taiwan back.

Taiwan also understands that it cannot stand up to the mainland by itself, but it hopes that by slowly expanding its international status and profile within the status quo — without seeking independence — it can build support among regional countries as well as from the US, which will help it resist Beijing's ambitions for eventual reunification.

Alas, this seems an illusion. There is a real danger that the Taiwanese overestimate the international support they can rely on if Beijing decides to get tough.

No one visiting Taipei can fail to be impressed by what the Taiwanese have achieved in recent decades, not just economically but also politically, socially and culturally. But the harsh reality is that no country is going to sacrifice its relations with China in order to help Taiwan preserve the status quo. China is simply too important economically, and too powerful militarily, for anyone to confront it on Taiwan's behalf, especially when everyone knows how determined China is to achieve reunification eventually.

## Allies

No link and link turn – part of the quo is that China recognize the US’ security role in East Asia which means that the plan would help allies feel more secure as it would result in an increase in US presence in other regions – also the plan gets China out of the South and East China Seas which would be seen as a major victory for our allies and would strengthen our ties with them

#### No Alliance DA — other policies solve and the plan will push allies toward *the U.S.*, not China.

Glaser 15 — Charles L. Glaser, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, Fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former Emmett Dedmon Professor of Public Policy and Acting Dean at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, former Strategic Analyst for the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, holds a Ph.D. and a Master’s in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2015 (“Time for a U.S.-China Grand Bargain,” Belfer Center Policy Brief, July, Available Online at <http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/glaser-us-china-jul15-final.pdf>, Accessed 06-24-2016, p. 3)

Reassuring U.S. Allies

Possibly the most frequently raised objection to the United States ending its commitment to Taiwan is that it would undermine the credibility of U.S. defense commitments to its East Asia allies. This concern is overstated. U.S. entry into a grand bargain with China would undoubtedly send political shockwaves throughout the Asia Pacific, but the United States could take a variety of actions to demonstrate the strength of its continuing commitments. For example, it could increase the capability of the forces it commits to the region and further deepen joint U.S.- Japan military planning and high-level discussions on the requirements for extended deterrence. In fact, the United States has already begun taking some of these measures.

U.S. alliances are likely to endure because its allies do not have options that are more appealing. Meanwhile, their need for security is likely to continue to grow as China rises. Any doubts about U.S. reliability are likely to convince them to work harder to strengthen their alliances with the United States, not to abandon it or to bandwagon with China.

#### Link turn – increased military presence draws allies closer to the United States

Glaser 15 — Charles L. Glaser, Professor of Political Science and International Affairs and Director of the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University, Fellow in the Kissinger Institute at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, former Emmett Dedmon Professor of Public Policy and Acting Dean at the Harris School of Public Policy at the University of Chicago, former Strategic Analyst for the Joint Staff in the Pentagon, holds a Ph.D. and a Master’s in Public Policy from the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, 2015 (“Time for a U.S.-China Grand Bargain,” Belfer Center Policy Brief, July, Available Online at <http://belfercenter.hks.harvard.edu/files/glaser-us-china-jul15-final.pdf>, Accessed 06-24-2016, p. 3)

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Extend Glazer – Taiwan key to US china relations – most important aspect

#### US-China relations key to solve prolif

**Asia Society Center 9**

(Asia Society Center on U.S.-China Relations and Pew Center on Global Climate Change, January 2009 “A Roadmap for U.S.-China Cooperation on Energy and Climate Change” pg. 6-7 HY)

China and the United States are closely linked through a vast web of economic, political, and security interests and social networks that have deepened and broadened through government-to-government collaboration and through the process of globalization. The result is an interdependent, bilateral relationship in a world in which the fates of all nations are tied ever closer together, as evidenced by the rapid internationalization of the 2008 financial crisis. China and the United States face similar strategic challenges in seeking to strengthen energy security, combat climate change, and ensure economic growth and prosperity. However, neither can fully meet these challenges—nor can the world—without the full engagement of the other. Nearly four decades ago, a historic rapprochement between the United States and China set in motion the most far-reaching transformation of the international economic, political, and security order since the aftermath of World War II. In opening the door to a new strategic relationship in 1972, China and the United States overcame more than 20 years of mutual isolation, ideological rivalry, and intense hostility, inflamed by a hot war in Korea, a nearconflict over Taiwan, and a proxy war in Vietnam. The initial objective of this rapprochement was the containment and strategic isolation of the Soviet Union, and one effect was, indeed, to hasten the peaceful demise of the Soviet Union and its Eastern European empire, thereby ending the Cold War and creating the conditions for a more integrated world economy. The subsequent normalization of U.S.-China relations in 1979 created the international conditions for China’s successful opening to the outside world and its market-based economic reforms, leading not only to the extraordinary reemergence of China on the global stage, but to the acceleration of globalization. Despite periodic bilateral tensions and differences, the U.S.-China relationship has contributed significantly to global economic growth and strategic stability, as well as to solving many pressing political and security problems. As China has grown immensely more powerful over the last thirty years, the United States and China have not engaged in a destabilizing strategic competition for regional and global dominance. Rather, leaders in both nations have recognized their increasing strategic interdependence and have effectively collaborated to solve or manage regional and global threats and challenges. For example, since 9/11, the two countries have cooperated quietly and extensively on a wide range of counter-terrorism measures. They have also engaged in sustained and effective collaboration on proliferation, including the Six Party Talks, to eliminate North Korea’s nuclear weapons program; establishing collaborative bilateral and international measures, stimulated by the 2003 SARS epidemic and the later emerging danger of avian flu, to prevent and contain pandemics; and consulting at a high level on a daily basis in response to the fall 2008 global financial crisis. In addition, they have effectively handled the volatile Taiwan issue, leading to more hopeful prospects for long-term peace and stability in cross-Strait relations.


#### Nuclear conflict caused by North Korea can be avoided through collaboration of the United States and China.

Sam Nunn, member of the U.S. Senate (D-Ga.) from 1972 to 1997, is co-chairman and chief executive of the Nuclear Threat Initiative, 5/26/16, “ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS, NATIONS MUST COOPERATE TO AVOID CATASTROPHE”, The Washington Post, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/on-nuclear-weapons-nations-must-cooperate-to-avoid-catastrophe/2016/05/26/f5af4c4c-21e0-11e6-9e7f-57890b612299\_story.html

Around the world, leaders must take practical steps to reduce nuclear risks now: First, the agreement to curb Iran’s nuclear program has significant regional and global implications for stopping the spread of nuclear weapons. All parties must live up to their commitments, assuring full implementation. Second, North Korea’s nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles threaten regional stability in Northeast Asia. We must work closely with our allies in South Korea and Japan to stop these programs and eliminate nuclear weapons from the Korean Peninsula. China must play a vital role in this joint venture if we are to avoid this nuclear nightmare without military conflict. Third, we should build on the progress to secure nuclear materials that Obama and other leaders have made at the four Nuclear Security Summits. Leaders must sustain the momentum of the summits and develop a global nuclear security system that covers all weapons-usable nuclear materials, including those held for military purposes. We must also make an all-out global effort to secure dangerous radiological materials and prevent a terrorist “dirty bomb.” Fourth, the United States and Russia cannot afford to treat dialogue as a bargaining chip when our two countries hold more than 90 percent of the world’s nuclear weapons and weapons-usable nuclear materials. Most urgently, Washington and Moscow must rebuild a bridge of cooperation to ensure that neither the Islamic State nor any other violent extremist group acquires nuclear, radiological or other weapons of mass destruction. A joint working group should be formed to develop priorities and an action plan to prevent catastrophic terrorism — a threat to both of our nations and the world. Fifth, nuclear weapon states should avoid reckless rhetoric that can lead to disastrous mistakes. Split-second decisions made by those directly responsible for nuclear weapons and warning systems can be affected by the surrounding atmosphere. A poisoned political climate can lead to miscalculation, turning a false warning caused by a software glitch or a cyber attack into a nuclear exchange. Sixth, in Washington, the question of “How much nuclear is enough?” must be asked and weighed against other urgent defense needs, with a focus on the need for stability among nuclear weapon states. Perry has called for a review of whether we should phase out our land-based missile force and for canceling plans to build a new air-launched nuclear cruise missile. Considering the growing terrorist threat, both the United States and Russia should reexamine the current practice of storing hundreds of short-range nuclear weapons in Europe. We must also bring the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty — a powerful nonproliferation tool — into force globally, including by securing U.S. Senate approval. Finally, it defies human nature to build trust when weapons remain postured for mutual assured destruction. Washington and Moscow together must carefully dismount the “nuclear tiger” by reducing first-strike capabilities and fears, increasing warning and decision time for leaders and improving the survivability of their nuclear forces. We must escape the trap of continuing this high-risk and costly policy, with the likelihood of other nations following in our footsteps.

## Elections

#### Sam Wang projects a 91% chance Clinton will win— we are inserting this screen shot of his prediction into the debate—it’s from yesterday



#### Wang’s model is best—more simulations and more precise

Wang 16 --- Sam Wang, neuroscience professor, 2016 (“About PEC and the Meta-Analysis (FAQ),” Princeton Election Consortium, Accessed Online at <http://election.princeton.edu/faq/>, Accessed on 9-3-16, ES)

The right-hand sidebar features a meta-analysis directed at the question of who would win the Electoral College in an election held today. Meta-analysis provides more objectivity and precision than looking at one or a few polls, and in the case of election prediction gives a highly accurate current snapshot. In 2004, the median decided-voter calculation captured the exact final outcome. In 2008, the final-week decided-voter calculation was within 1 electoral vote.

Calculations are based on recent available state polls, which are used to estimate the probability of a Democratic/Republican win, state by state. These are then used to calculate the probability distribution of electoral votes corresponding to all 2.3 quadrillion possible combinations. For a popular article about this calculation, read this article and the follow-up.

Is this Meta-Analysis a prediction of what will happen on Election Day?

The basic analysis does not; it is a snapshot of conditions today. Between now and Election Day, think of the Meta-Analysis as a precise snapshot of where the race stands at any given time. In late October the Meta-Analysis should come quite close to the actual outcome.

Starting in 2012, this site also provides a prediction (see essay 1 essay 2) based on the current year’s polls and the amount of variation observed in similar past races. This is a true prediction for November. It has the specific advantage of not relying on poorly-justified assumptions such as econometric conditions. It relies only on polls, which are the only direct measure of opinion. The approach taken in both popular and political science models introduces more noise than signal, as discussed in this essay.

What’s different about this analysis in 2012 compared with 2008?

The main difference is the addition of a prediction for Election Day as described above.

What was different about this analysis in 2008 compared with 2004?

In 2008, three major changes were made.

First, the Meta-Analysis relies entirely on the well-established principle that the median of multiple state polls is an excellent predictor of actual voter behavior. On Election Eve 2004, a calculation based on this principle made a correct prediction of the electoral vote outcome. Additional assumptions were unnecessary and unwarranted. In 2008 the calculation is kept simple – and therefore reliable.

Second, the calculation is automated to allow tracking of trends over time. This allows the Meta-Analysis to be used to identify changes in voter sentiment as seen through the lens of actual electoral mechanisms.

Third, instead of focusing on battleground states, we are tracking all 50 states and the District of Columbia.

In the Meta-Analysis, how can you possibly go through 2.3 quadrillion possibilities? Wouldn’t that take forever?

The Meta-Analysis doesn’t actually calculate the probability of every combination of states one at a time. At a rate of going through a million combinations per second, that process would take over 71 years. Yet repeated simulation is exactly what other sites do – though they only do thousands of simulations, not quadrillions. Such a laborious approach means that they can only approximate the expectation based on a set of win probabilities.

Instead, the Meta-Analysis uses an overlooked method to calculate the probability of getting an exact number of electoral votes, covering all ways of reaching that number given the individual state win probabilities. This is a much easier problem – it can be solved in less than a second. Here is a simple example.

Imagine that there are just two states. State 1 has EV1 electoral votes and your candidate has a probability P1 of winning that state; in state 2, EV2 electoral votes and a probability P2. Assume that EV1 and EV2 are not equal. Then the possible outcomes have the following probabilities:

EV1+EV2 electoral votes (i.e. winning both): P1 \* P2. EV1 electoral votes: P1 \* (1-P2). EV2 electoral votes: (1-P1) \* P2. No electoral votes: (1-P1) \* (1 – P2).

In general, the probability distribution for all possible outcomes is given by the coefficients of the polynomial

((1 – P1) + P1 \* x^EV1) \* ((1 – P2) + P2 \* x^EV2) \* … \* ((1 – P51) + P51 \* x^EV51)

where 1…51 represent the 50 states and the District of Columbia. This polynomial can be calculated in a fraction of a second.

No vote switching – they have to isolate specific voters that would have switched their votes as a result of the plan – nobody is voting for Clinton and then changes their mind because of the aff and votes for the Donald – especially true in this election

#### No Link and Turn — China doesn’t move the election needle, but voters overwhelmingly support the plan.

Thrall and Gomez 16 — A. Trevor Thrall, Senior Fellow in the Defense and Foreign Policy Department at the Cato Institute, Associate Professor in the School of Policy, Government, and International Affairs at George Mason University, holds a Ph.D. in Political Science from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Eric Gomez, Research Associate for Defense and Foreign Policy Studies at the Cato Institute, holds an M.A. in International Affairs from the Bush School of Government and Public Service at Texas A&M University, 2016(“The American Public Is Not Very Hawkish on China,” *Cato at Liberty*—the Cato Institute’s blog, June 9th, Available Online at <http://www.cato.org/blog/american-public-not-very-hawkish-china>, Accessed 06-30-2016)

Though China’s saber rattling in East Asia and the South China Sea hasn’t made a big splash in the 2016 presidential campaign so far, the question of how the United States should respond to China’s rising military and economic power is one of the most important foreign policy challenges the next president will face.

Both candidates have staked out aggressive positions on China. Trump has promised to impose steep tariffs on Chinese imports, suggested that South Korea and Japan should acquire nuclear weapons, and has called for a strong military presence in Asia to discourage “Chinese adventurism.” Clinton, for her part, was a lead architect of the “pivot to Asia” as Secretary of State, redirecting U.S. military and diplomatic efforts from the Middle East to Asia to confront China’s rise.

A close look at public opinion, however, reveals that although complex, the American public’s attitudes towards China are more sanguine than those of its fearful leaders.

To be sure, most Americans have always harbored concerns about the Communist nation and its intentions, and during difficult times Americans worry about the challenge China poses to their economic fortunes. But despite China’s aggressive campaign to modernize its military, and despite two decades of one-sided debate about the China threat, most Americans correctly continue to identify the United States as the stronger military power, and fewer than half view China’s military power as a serious threat (even fewer rate it a “critical threat.”)

Moreover, the prolonged fear mongering has failed to move the needle when it comes to how Americans feel about China. Gallup polls show a slight increase in China’s favorability rating among Americans between 1990 and 2016. And in 2014 the Chicago Council on Global Affairs found that just 48% of the public views China as primarily a rival and 49% see it primarily as a partner.

Most importantly, though, Americans overwhelming support a cooperative approach to dealing with China rather than a confrontational one. Sixty-seven percent responded to the 2014 CCGA poll that the best way to handle the rise of Chinese power is to “undertake friendly cooperation and engagement,” compared to 29% who said the United States should “actively work to limit the growth of China’s power.” And when it comes to the prospect of military conflict with China the public is truly not interested. Just 26% believe the United States should send troops to help if China invades Taiwan.

These figures provide fair warning to the next president to think twice about how to deal with China. An aggressive military posture like the one in place today (and promoted by both candidates) not only runs contrary to public preferences, it also increases the prospects for direct conflict between the United States and China.

TPP distancing should have already triggerd the link which is about trying to Obama

#### Climate deal thumps the link

**Dasgupta, 9/3/2016** (Saibal, “Climate Change Deal May Help China Get US Support on Trade at G-20,” *Voice of America News*, http://www.voanews.com/a/g20-china-trade/3492531.html)

U.S. President Barack **Obama and the Chinese president** have both **committed** the world's two biggest economies **to the Paris** climate **agreement** on Saturday. “Despite our differences on other issues, we hope our willingness to work together on this issue will inspire further ambition and further action around the world,” Obama said soon after he arrived in Hangzhou to attend the meeting. “It was under Chinese leadership that much of this progress was made,” he added. Some analysts believe that the **joint ratification was part of a deal** reached by envoys working in the background. **Washington** may have **agreed to back China's proposal against trade protectionism in return for the climate** change **deal**. Whatever the reasons, China's acceptance of the Paris agreement will be seen as a result of Obama's persuasive powers, and enhance his legacy, they said. **The agreement is** being seen as **a major milestone which will have a positive effect on** discussions over trade and **other issues** at the two-day G-20 meeting. **The joint move should be seen as a case of "concrete cooperation on an issue where China and the U.S. used to be captains of opposing teams and now are working together** for the benefit of the international community," said Paul Haenle, director of the Beijing-based Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy.

Those 20% that they cited includes independents which are already decided

#### Pence has all the power – trump is a puppet with no strings

Oh 7/20 – Writes for Mother Jones, managing editor of mother jones (INAE OH, “Donald Trump Reportedly Plans to Delegate All Domestic and Foreign Power to his VP”http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2016/07/donald-trump-mike-pence-running-mate-domestic-foreign-policy) RMT

A new report from the New York Times Magazine goes behind the scenes of the VP selection process and claims that Trump's first choice was his former rival, Ohio Gov. John Kasich. Perhaps more interestingly, the report sheds light on the unprecedented level of power Trump plans to delegate to his vice president if elected. According to the Times, Trump's son, Donald Trump Jr., was responsible for vetting the potential candidates. Here's a scene from one conservation he had with a Kasich adviser.

Did he have any interest in being the most powerful vice president in history?

When Kasich’s adviser asked how this would be the case, Donald Jr. explained that his father’s vice president would be in charge of domestic and foreign policy.

Then what, the adviser asked, would Trump be in charge of?

"Making America great again" was the casual reply.

If true, this means that Trump doesn't plan on doing much governing at all. It may also reveal that he actually agrees with Hillary Clinton's claim that he is temperamentally unfit to become president of the United States. As for Kasich, he declined the offer and isn't even showing up to the Republican convention that's taking place in his home state.

#### Trump will moderate – numerous checks.

Paletta 6-8-16. [Damian, reporter, "Trump Will Consult Congress, Agencies On Iran Deal and Muslim Ban, Adviser Says" Wall Street Journal -- blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2016/06/08/trump-will-consult-congress-agencies-on-iran-deal-and-muslim-ban-adviser-says/]

Presumptive Republican White House nominee Donald Trump would consult with Congress and federal agencies on a number of his signature foreign policy initiatives, including reworking a nuclear deal with Iran and a proposed ban on the entry of Muslims into the U.S., a top adviser said Wednesday. Walid Phares, one of Mr. Trump’s senior foreign policy advisers, said the candidate would seek domestic and international “consensus” on a range of foreign policy initiatives. During an hour-long interview with Wall Street Journal reporters and editors, Mr. Phares offered nuance to a number of Mr. Trump’s foreign policy ideas, suggesting some aren’t set in stone and could be modified as the campaign progresses. For example, Mr. Trump has called a recent nuclear deal with Iran “terrible” and “horrible” but Mr. Phares said Mr. Trump wouldn’t immediately attempt to negate it once in office. “He is going to be revising, reviewing, and maybe trying to modify the Iran deal,” Mr. Phares said. One option, he said, would be to resubmit the deal – or something like it – to Congress for a vote, a process whose outcome would depend on the makeup of Congress next year. Many bankers are watching the U.S. election closely and waiting for a clearer understanding of future U.S. policy towards Iran before doing business with the country. Mr. Phares’s suggestion Mr. Trump would revise the agreement instead of completely voiding it could influence the way some financial institutions deal with companies in Iran seeking access to global markets. Similarly, Mr. Phares said Mr. Trump would consult with immigration, national security, law enforcement, and other officials before proceeding with his proposed temporary ban on the entry of Muslims into the U.S. “His position which was strong – in terms of the ban – was based on the fact that the Obama administration — the Obama-Clinton administration — for the last seven to eight years was not able to equip us with systems by which we were able to identify the jihadists,” he said. Mr. Trump has faced criticism for his foreign policy platform, which breaks from GOP orthodoxy. Mr. Phares said Mr. Trump’s worldview doesn’t fit neatly into traditional labels of “isolationalist” or “interventionalist.” Rather, he described Mr. Trump as a “functionalist” who would work with allies when necessary but not overextend the U.S. in matters in which there isn’t an American interest. He also said that many of Mr. Trump’s proposals so far have only been offered as single ideas, which he compared to pieces of a puzzle. Once more proposals are set forward, something Mr. Phares predicted would happen soon, a broader approach to foreign policy would become clear, he said. “The expectation is the more she’s going to attack, the more he’s going to respond, and if he’s going to respond, he most likely he will address these issues,” Mr. Phares said, referring to Hillary Clinton, the presumptive Democratic presidential nominee. One key challenge for any Trump administration would be building bridges with Arab countries, many of which have been alarmed by some of Mr. Trump’s proposals so far. Mr. Phares said he is interviewed by Arab media outlets at least once a day, and works to explain Mr. Trump’s approach to the region. He predicted that numerous countries would be relieved to have a fresh start with the White House next year following several years of frosty relations with the Obama administration. Mr. Phares dismissed the caricature of Mr. Trump that Mrs. Clinton has worked hard to describe, suggesting, for instance, that he would rush into a nuclear conflict if his feelings get hurt or if another country insults him. “I don’t see an unusual Trump presidency as Madame Clinton is explaining where he’s going to go crazy and start pressing buttons right away,” Mr. Phares said, tapping on the table. “That’s not going to happen. We have a rational institution here.”