TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	(U) BACKGROUND 1
	A. (U) Administrative Matters 1
	1. (U) Appointing Authority
	B. (U) Constraints and Limitations
	C. (U) Format of the Report
II.	(U) ATMOSPHERICS 4
	A. (U) Introduction
	B. (U) Local Security Situation
	1. (U) Iraq 4 2. (U) Baghdad 4 3. (U) Route Irish 4
	C. (U) Known Insurgent Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
	1. (U) Methods of Attack52. (U) Insurgent TTPs for IEDs53. (U) Insurgent TTPs for VBIEDs64. (U) Effectiveness of Attacks7
	D. (U) Recent Incidents in the Vicinity of Checkpoint 541 8
	E. (U) Unit Experience in the Baghdad Area of Responsibility
	1. (U) Division 8 2. (U) Brigade, Division 9 3. (U) Battalion 9 4. (U) Battalion 10
	F. (U) Findings
II)	I. (U) TRAFFIC CONTROL POINTS, BLOCKING POSITIONS, AND TRAINING


A. (U) Introduction	12
B. (U) Traffic Control Points and Blocking Positions	12
C. (U) Standing Operating Procedures in use on 4 March 2005	12
1. (U) Doctrinal Discussion of TCPs and Roadblocks	14 15 16
D. (U) Training of BP 541 Soldiers	18
E. (U) Rules of Engagement Training Received by BP 541 Soldiers	19
F. (U) Findings	20
G. (U) Recommendations	21
IV. (U) THE INCIDENT AT BP 541	23
A. (U) Introduction	23
B. (U) Site Description	23
C. (U) Personnel Involved	24
D. (U) The Mission	25
 (U) Receipt of the Mission	26 27
E. (U) The Incident	29
F. (U) Post-Incident Events	31
G. (U) Forensic Evidence	33
1. (U) 5 March 2005 Report	33

:	5. (U) Number of Rounds	4
н.	(U) Findings	35
I. (U) Recommendations	3 7
V. (U)	COORDINATION	4 0
A.	(U) Introduction	0
В.	(U) MNF-I/MNC-I Involvement	0
C.	(U) Captain	41
D.	(U) Findings	12

I. BACKGROUND

A. (U) Administrative Matters

1. (U) Appointing Authority



the car came under fire. The shooting resulted in the wounding of the driver (Mr.), and Ms. Sgrena, and the death of Mr. Nicola Calipari. The Commanding

General, Division directed a commander's inquiry/preliminary investigation be conducted that night.

B. (U) Constraints and Limitations

- (U) Ideally, the scene of the incident would have been preserved as it existed immediately after the shooting was over and the car had stopped. Doing so would have allowed the initial investigators to get precise measurements on the distances and locations of the significant objects involved in the event. An initial on-site investigation was conducted, but a number of circumstances that occurred on the site prevented the incident site from being treated as a sterile site. Both HMMWVs involved in the blocking position were moved to transport Ms. Sgrena to the Combat Support Hospital in the International Zone. Further, the scene was not deemed to be a crime scene, and efforts were made to clear the roadway. As a result, the car was moved from its position, per the unit's Standing Operating Procedure on Consequence Management, before a location using a global positioning system could be obtained. At the direction of the Commander, Brigade, Division the car was placed back in the position that was thought to be its actual stopping point based on eyewitness testimony and digital photographs taken of the car before its initial removal from the scene.
- (U) A further constraint was the inability to reconstruct the event so as to provide accurate data for forensic analysis of bullet trajectory, speed of the vehicle, and stopping distance due to the inherent danger in the vicinity of the incident location. This was made evident during a site visit by the Joint Investigation Team when a hand grenade was thrown (from the Route Vernon overpass) at the Team's vehicles as members were boarding, injuring one Soldier.
- (U) These factors limited the forensic team's ability to conduct an on-site, in-depth analysis, although extensive tests were performed on Camp Victory. As a result, the forensic studies of the car could not be as conclusive as they normally would be.
- (U) Other limitations include the removal and disposal of the shell casings to allow free operation of the turret in the blocking vehicle. Additionally, the cell phones involved in the incident were returned to Mr. before he left the scene. (Annex 4M). More importantly, while sworn statements were provided by all the key U.S. personnel involved in the incident, the Italian personnel provided only unsworn statements as they are not required under Italian law to swear to statements until appearing before a judge.

C. (U) Format of the Report

(U) This report is divided into five sections; (1) Background, (2) Atmospherics, including a historical overview of attacks along Route Irish and prevailing enemy Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs), (3) Discussion of TCP and BP tactical

missions and training received by BP 541 personnel, (4) Events and actions at BP 541 on the evening of 4 March 2005, and (5) Coordination effected pertaining to the hostage recovery. Each section will review the pertinent facts, set forth findings, and, as appropriate, provide recommendations for future action. Additionally, documentary evidence used in preparing this report is included in annexes.

II. ATMOSPHERICS

A. (U) Introduction

(U) This section examines the local security situation as of 4 March 2005, known insurgent Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs), and recent events occurring in the vicinity of Checkpoint 541. The previous experience of the Soldiers manning the BP that night, their parent unit, and their higher headquarters units in the Baghdad Area of Responsibility (AOR), is also examined. The purpose of this section is to present a full picture of the conditions facing the Soldiers manning BP 541 that night.

B. (U) Local Security Situation

- 1. (U) <u>Iraq</u>. From July 2004 to late March 2005, there were 15,257 attacks against Coalition Forces throughout Iraq. The U.S. considers all of Iraq a combat zone. (Annex 8E).
- 2. (U) <u>Baghdad</u>. Baghdad is a city of six million people and is home to a large number of suspected insurgents and terrorists operating both in the city and its environs.
- 3. (U) <u>Route Irish</u>. Route Irish is an East-West road along south Baghdad. It is approximately 12 kilometers long and runs from the International Zone in downtown Baghdad to BIAP. The highway is a four-lane road with a 50 meter wide median. (Annexes 8E, 144K).
- (U) Route Irish has six major intersections. Each of these has been assigned a corresponding checkpoint number by Coalition Forces to facilitate command and control. Entry Control Point 1 (ECP 1) is located at one end of the highway near BIAP. Checkpoints 539-543 follow the road east going into downtown. (Annex 141K).
- (U) Checkpoint 541 refers to the intersection of Route Irish with Route Vernon (also known as Route Force), which runs North-South. (Annex 142K).

(U) Route Irish is commo	only referred to as	"the deadliest road	in Iraq" by	journalists,
Soldiers, and commanders.				
				Soldiers in
Division and	Division 1	have come to refer t	o Route Iris	h as "IED
Alley." (Annex 8E).				



(U) The majority of IED and VBIED attacks occur in and around three overpasses (Eq. (CP 541, and Eq. (Dec.)) and the turnoff to the International Zone. As mentioned earlier, CP 541 is the location where the incident occurred on 4 March 2005. (Annex 3E).

C. (U) Known Insurgent Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures

1. (U) Methods of Attack

(U) Insurgent attacks throughout the Iraqi Theater of Operation fall into one of several categories, all of which have occurred along Route Irish in the past year. They include: Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs), Unexploded IEDs, Hand Grenades, Indirect Fire (mortars, rockets, and unidentified indirect fire), Rocket-Propelled Grenades (RPGs), Small Arms Fire (SAF), Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIEDs), and Complex Attacks. The most common attacks along Route Irish are IEDs, VBIEDs, and SAF. (Annex 8E).

2. (U) <u>Insurgent TTPs for IEDs</u>

(U) A large number of evolving techniques have been adopted by the insurgents in placing IEDs along Route Irish. Examples of currently used techniques are listed below:





(Annex 11E).

3. (U) Insurgent TTPs for VBIEDs

(U) There are two basic types of car bombs, i.e.,

Both can be either command or remote-detonated.

(Annex 8E).



(U) The techniques for employing VBIEDs continue to evolve. Some of the more commonly used techniques include:



(Annex 8E).

4. (U) Effectiveness of Attacks

(U) The number of IED detonations from 15 June 2003 through 4 March 2005 (the date of the incident), has steadily increased.

the overall average number of casualties during that period is nearly one per IED detonation. (Annex 4E).



(U) The number of VBIED detonations from 15 June 2003 through 4 March 2005 has also seen a relatively steady increase.

there have been spikes for particular VBIED events that have produced large numbers of casualties. (Annex 4E).



D. (U) Recent Incidents in the Vicinity of Checkpoint 541

(U) Overpasses like Checkpoint 541 are particularly susceptible to attacks. Such sites provide excellent early observation in all directions, easy escape routes, and high speed access to Route Irish. The latter factor is particularly evident at Checkpoint 541 where there is a long (380 meter) exit lane coming off of southbound Route Vernon leading to the on-ramp to Route Irish. (Annex 5E).



(U) On the evening of the incident, there were at least two cases of small arms fire in the immediate vicinity, one before and one after the incident. Also, as mentioned earlier, while the Joint Investigation Team was examining the site, a hand grenade was tossed at the personnel from the Route Vernon overpass. This site is under the observation of insurgents in the adjoining housing complex and local neighborhoods anytime a position is established at Checkpoint 541. (Annex 1E).




(U) Furthermore, two days before the incident, two Soldiers from the same unit (
) were killed by an IED at Company, Company, lost a very close friend in that attack. (Annexes 1E, 74C).

E. (U) Unit Experience in the Baghdad Area of Responsibility

1. (U) <u>Division (</u>

(U) The Division returned to Iraq in early February 2005. It conducted a formal Transfer of Authority with the Division and assumed responsibility for MND-Baghdad on 27 February 2005. (Annex 15E).





4. (U) Battalion (
(U) was new to the Baghdad AOR, having arrived on 21 February 2005. Their Right Seat/Left Seat Ride program began on 22 February 2005. personnel were in the last night of their Right Seat/Left Seat Ride program with and in charge of VIP security operations on the evening of 4 March 2005. The Transfer of Authority occurred the next day, 5 March 2005. (Annexes 59C, 63C).
(U) is responsible for security inside the International Zone as well as U.S. Embassy VIP movement security along Route Irish. (Annex 58C).
(U) has Direct Liaison Authorized (DIRLAUTH) to coordinate directly with for security along Route Irish. This is the same level of coordination previously authorized by Division to When executing DIRLAUTH, directly coordinates an action with units internal or external to its command and keeps the commander informed. The TOC passes all coordination efforts through the Brigade TOC to JOC. (Annex 58C).
F. (U) Findings
(U) Route Irish and its checkpoints, particularly the ones at the three overpasses (EQ, CP 541, and EQ, or continually subject to attacks from IEDs, VBIEDs, SAF, and other methods of attack. It is a road filled with dangers that can kill, maim, and injure Soldiers and civilians. (Annexes 3E, 5E, 8E).
(U) The insurgents are continually adjusting their methods of attack along the Route Irish corridor. (Annex 11E).
(U) The long straightaway off southbound Route Vernon leading to the on-ramp to westbound Route Irish provides an excellent opportunity for a suicide VBIED to build up speed and threaten Soldiers in their positions. (Annex 5E).
(U) The Soldiers of had suffered a significant number of deaths in the four months that they had been in Iraq as of 4 March 2005, including two Soldiers that were killed by an IED at two days before the incident. (Annexes 1E, 10E).


(U) Soldiers were experienced in patrolling, providing route security, and conducting TCPs. (Annex 10E).
(U) Due to it being their first full day on shift, Soldiers lacked experience in
ssuing operational orders and in battle tracking security forces during execution of
blocking missions. (Annexes 59C, 63C).

III. TRAFFIC CONTROL POINTS, BLOCKING POSITIONS, AND TRAINING

A. (U) Introduction

(U) This section examines TCPs, BPs, and training matters. It first discusses the difference between a TCP and a BP. Standing Operating Procedures (SOPs) for the various units involved regarding TCPs and BPs are assessed, and the Rhino Bus TTP is outlined. This is followed by a review of the training on TCPs, BPs, weapons, and Rules of Engagement (ROE) that the Soldiers manning BP 541 had received before 4 March 2005. The ROE that were in effect that night are explained. The section concludes with findings and recommendations.

B. (U) Traffic Control Points and Blocking Positions



C. (U) Standing Operating Procedures in use on 4 March 2005

(U) SOPs are designed to serve as guidelines for specific operations and are not prescriptive in nature. They provide a baseline for acceptable operations from which commanders can derive principles and techniques and adapt them to their current mission. (Annexes 44C, 65C, 72C, 96C, 98C).

- (U) <u>Doctrinal Discussion of TCPs and Roadblocks (Army Field Manual 3-21.9, Chapter 7)</u>
- (U) Construction and manning of checkpoints and roadblocks are high frequency tasks for an infantry company and subordinate elements when they must establish area security during stabilization operations. (Annex 5F).
- (U) A checkpoint is a predetermined point used as a means of controlling movement, such as a place where military police check vehicular and pedestrian traffic, to enforce circulation measures and other law, order, and regulations. (Annex 5F).
- (U) A roadblock is used to limit the movement of vehicles along a route or to close access to certain areas or roads. Checkpoints and roadblocks can be either deliberate or hasty. The primary difference is the extent of planning and preparation conducted by the establishing force. (Annex 5F).
 - (U) Checkpoints and roadblocks may be established to:
 - (U) Check and/or inspect and register all personnel and vehicles in and out of the controlled area.
 - (U) Deter illegal movement.
 - (U) Create an instant roadblock.
 - (U) Control movement into the area of operations or on a specific route.
 - (U) Prevent smuggling and contraband.

(Annex 5F).

- (U) The layout, construction, and manning of checkpoints and roadblocks should reflect the considerations of Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Troops Available Time, Civilians (METT-TC), especially the time available for emplacing them. (Annex 5F). The following factors should be considered in establishing a checkpoint or roadblock:
 - (U) Position the checkpoint or roadblock where it is visible and where traffic cannot turn back, get off the road, or bypass without being observed.
 - (U) Place obstacles in the road to slow or canalize traffic into the search area.


• (U) Position a combat vehicle off the road, but within sight, to deter resistance to Soldiers manning the checkpoint. It must be able to engage vehicles attempting to break through or bypass a checkpoint.

(Annex 5F).

(U) Many items are used to reinforce a roadblock or a checkpoint. These include: barrels filled with sand, water, or heavy concrete blocks (emplaced to slow and canalize vehicles), concertina wire (emplaced to control movement around the checkpoint), and signs stating the speed limit into and out of the checkpoint (in both English and the local language.) (Annex 5F).

2. (U) TCP SOP







5. (U) Rhino Bus Run TTP Background Information

(U) Since October 2004, there had been significant insurgent contact on Route Irish. Most of the contacts were RPGs, SAF, IEDs, and VBIEDs. These attacks prompted a reassessment of the Coalition's responses for operations along Route Irish.



D. (U) Training of BP 541 Soldiers

(U) The Soldiers manning BP 541 on 4 March 2005 received SOP training on TCPs at and the National Training Center (NTC). (Annexes 72C, 96C, 97C, 98C). was part of mobilization training, and was conducted by the The training at Battalion leadership and the Mobilization Assistance Team, while the training at NTC occurred as part of the Mission Rehearsal Exercise. (Annex 96C). (U) Based upon the fact that two Soldiers were killed by an IED two nights , his experience, training, and risk assessment, the before at

Company Commander chose to augment the	TTP on 4 March 2005 by placing
two HMMWVs at BP 541 for additional force	e protection. Force protection was
paramount in his mind because of the threat	of IEDs and VBIEDs. (Annex 74C). As a
result, Second Lieutenant tasked the	overwatch vehicle gunner to operate the
green laser pointer rather than have Staff Ser	geant the Truck Commander do so.
(Annexes 77C, 87C).	

E. (U) Rules Of Engagement (ROE) Training Received by BP 541 Soldiers

- and the National Training Center (NTC), as well as in Kuwait and Iraq. (Annexes 111C, 128C, 134C). The training at and NTC centered on basic ROE concepts of the escalation of force, hostile intent, hostile act, and positive identification. Specifically, Soldiers were briefed on the right of self defense, which allows them to defend themselves and Coalition Forces with all necessary force to negate the potential threat. Soldiers also received training in graduated force, which is designed to allow them to employ escalating measures of non-lethal force to properly discern hostile intent and prevent accidental civilian injury. Soldiers were briefed on positive identification (PID), which requires Soldiers to have a reasonable certainty that the object of attack is a proper military target. Soldiers were also briefed on the protections afforded detainees and civilians, their duty to care for the wounded and sick, military necessity, proportionality, discrimination, and collateral damage¹. (Annexes 111C, 1G, 3G).
- (U) While at NTC, judge advocates from the Center for Law and Military Operations (CLAMO) conducted impromptu interviews with the Soldiers, including Soldiers from where they were questioned about basic ROE principles. ROE is a key aspect of training at NTC and Soldiers are challenged with difficult, real world scenarios that emphasize ROE issues, such as, the use of force and properly identifying hostile intent. (Annexes 111C, 1G).
- (U) The Soldiers of the BP 541 team had received formal refresher ROE training approximately one month before the incident. (Annexes 129C, 132C, 133C, 137C). This training included vignettes on TCP operations, fixed site security, and patrols, and emphasized the use of graduated force and how and when to use non-lethal measures of force. Specifically, the vignettes highlighted how to discern hostile act and hostile intent from innocuous civilian activity. (Annexes 111C, 1G).

- (U) The entire battalion, including every member of the BP 541 team, received an indepth review of a recent AR 15-6 investigation involving a shooting incident that further reinforced proper execution of ROE. (Annex 133C). The investigation involved the wounding of a civilian at a TCP, in which the vehicle was driving at a high rate of speed and the Soldiers at the TCP engaged the vehicle. The brief discussed the use of signs, chemical lights, spotlights, and graduated force as it applies to fixed position operations. Failure to follow the SOP was discussed and how proper use of the SOP can help a Soldier to discern hostile intent. Escalation of force to discern hostile intent was emphasized. (Annexes 111C, 1G, 2G, 3G).
- (U) Furthermore, the Soldiers were briefed on ROE before going out on patrol each day. They were so briefed on 4 March 2005. (Annexes 83C, 129C, 130C, 132C, 134C, 135C).



F. (U) Findings

(U) The leaders and Soldiers understood their mission to block vehicle access to Route Irish on the evening of 4 March 2005. They were knowledgeable of the Rules of Engagement to be employed in that mission. (Annexes 74C, 77C, 83C).

(U) The Soldiers at BP 541 had been trained, and routinely refreshed on, the Rules of Engagement since their arrival in theater. (Annexes 77C, 81C, 111C).
(U) There is no written SOP or TTP in and establishing a solution of the sand establishing a solution of the supervision of the mission one week, and executed the mission the following week under the supervision of the outgoing unit (Right Seat/Left Side Ride). The only training received by Soldiers on was that employed along Route Irish during after-curfew Rhino Bus Runs, and occurred during the Left Seat Right Seat Ride process with (Annexes 72C, 96C, 97C, 98C, 9G). It is clear that these BPs were not established as TCPs.
(U) There is no clear guidance in these units on what equipment is required for establishing a (e.g., different road signs). (Annexes 1F, 2F, 3F).
(U) Requiring the gunner in a blocking position to operate the hand-held spotlight as well as his crew-served weapon is an accepted practice in . (Annexes 72C, 74C).
G. (U) Recommendations
(U) Recommend that all Major Subordinate Commands (MSCs) review the inherent differences between the blocking mission and any other mission involving TCPs. Given the nature of the environment in Iraq, recommend that blocking positions be addressed separately in unit SOPs.
•
(U) Recommend a comprehensive review of TCP and blocking position procedures, The Soldiers and leaders must look at the position holistically, i.e., from the perspective of Iraqi drivers and what they might see. Units must enforce a quality control program to maintain established standards.
(U) As of this writing, MNC-I has already embarked on a comprehensive analysis of Entry Control Points (ECPs), TCPs, and BPs.
•

- (U) Recommend that permanent Coalition participation be included in the Force Protection Working Group to solicit lessons learned from other nations' experiences in operating ECPs, TCPs, and BPs in an insurgency environment.
- (U) Recommend the development and publication of a written SOP for Rhino Bus Runs.

IV. THE INCIDENT AT BP 541

A. (U) Introduction

(U) This section examines the shooting incident at BP 541 on the night of 4 March 2005. The section begins with a description of the site and then a brief look at the individuals involved. The mission assigned to the Soldiers is detailed. The incident itself is then described. The events immediately following the shooting are addressed next. Following this is a look at the forensic evidence. The section concludes with findings and recommendations.


B. (U) Site Description


- (U) BP 541 was located on the on-ramp from southbound Route Vernon onto westbound Route Irish approximately six miles west of the International Zone in Baghdad. Specifically, BP 541 () was located at the intersection of Route Vernon and Route Irish, which is the second intersection on Route Irish east of Baghdad International Airport (BIAP). The road leading to the on-ramp begins where the westernmost lane of Route Vernon separates from the highway. The on-ramp itself begins near a side street that borders the edge of a housing area on the west side of the road. This point is approximately 640 meters south of the nearby underpass on Route Vernon, and approximately 380 meters from where the road to the on-ramp splits from Route Vernon. (Annexes 141K, 144K).
- (U) At the interchange of the on-ramp and Route Vernon, the highway becomes an overpass extending over Route Irish. Three separate concrete Jersey barriers are located in the on-ramp to Route Irish. The barriers are arranged with the first two barriers on the right hand side of the on-ramp and the third one on the left hand side of the on-ramp, but not in a serpentine configuration, as one approaches from the north. The first barrier is approximately 75 meters from the concrete abutment of the Route Vernon overpass near the beginning of the on-ramp. The second barrier is approximately 37 meters beyond the first barrier (112 meters from the concrete abutment). The third barrier is approximately 31 meters beyond the second barrier (143 meters from the abutment). This third, or southernmost, barrier is approximately 80 meters from where the on-ramp merges with westbound Route Irish. The total length of the on-ramp is approximately 223 meters. (Annexes 142K, 144K).
- (U) From the vantage point of the southernmost barrier, Route Irish is directly south of the position with a 50-meter median separating the eastbound and westbound lanes. To the north and northwest of the position, there is a large open area that is littered with garbage and debris. The field extends from the bottom of the on-ramp to the side street and west. Immediately beyond the side street, approximately 150 meters from the southernmost barrier, is a large housing community with windows and porches that overlook the on-ramp. There is a clear line of sight from the houses to the on-ramp. The


Route Vernon overpass stands several stories higher than the on-ramp and runs parallel to the on-ramp until the on-ramp curves to the southwest, approximately 50 meters from the beginning of the on-ramp. The overpass is supported by large cylinder concrete supports. The ground under the overpass is also littered with garbage and debris. (Annexes 16K, 143K).

(U) The road itself is concrete. There is a slight elevation gain between the beginning of the on-ramp and its merger with Route Irish. The curve is banked slightly. The on-ramp, but for the Jersey barriers, is wide enough to accommodate two vehicles abreast of each other, i.e., it is two-lanes wide. (Annexes 16K, 19K).

C. (U) Personnel Involved








(U) Second Lieutenant, using the factors of METT-TC, positioned the vehicles to provide standoff from the overpass (a common hand grenade throwing location), a clear line of sight to on-coming traffic, overwatch field of view (to watch for threats from nearby buildings), and to allow adequate room for on-coming vehicles to stop and turn around. (Annexes 77C, 83C).
(U) Staff Sergeant so vehicle was positioned to block traffic from using the on- ramp to enter Route Irish. The other vehicle was positioned to provide overwatch of the area as well as to block traffic entering the on-ramp the wrong way from Route Irish. (Annexes 77C, 83C).
(U) After consulting with Staff Sergeant setablished the Alert Line at the concrete abutment of the Route Vernon overpass. The Warning Line was established as the second light pole on the overpass up the on-ramp from the Alert Line. (Annexes 77C, 83C, 16K).
(U) Second Lieutenant and Staff Sergeant informed the gunners of the Alert Line and Warning Line locations, and reviewed when to shine the spotlight, and when to fire warning shots. (Annexes 77C, 83C).
3. (U) The duties of the Soldiers
(U) Specialist was the driver of the blocking vehicle and was to remain in the driver's seat, facing west down Route Irish. (Annexes 85C, 130C).
(U) Specialist was the gunner in the blocking vehicle. He was to remain in the turret, facing north up the on-ramp toward on-coming traffic. From there, he was to operate a three million candlepower hand-held spotlight that he was to shine on approaching vehicles as soon as possible, even before the Alert Line (he was able to see at least 20 meters beyond the Alert Line). (Annexes 77C, 79C, 83C, 134C).
(U) Staff Sergeant , the Truck Commander of the blocking vehicle and acting Platoon Sergeant, was to be dismounted so he could execute local security around his vehicle. (Annexes 83C, 131C).
(U) Specialist was the driver of the overwatch vehicle and was to remain in the driver's seat, facing west down Route Irish. (Annexes 89C, 128C).
(U) Sergeant was to be in the turret of the overwatch vehicle where he would operate a green laser pointer. He was to shine the laser pointer on a vehicle as soon as he saw it, but no later than at the Alert Line, focusing it on the driver's side of the windshield. He was also to keep watch on the area between Route Irish and the on-ramp. (Annexes 87C, 129C).

provide local security for his vehicle. (Annexes 81C, 132C).
(U) Second Lieutenant was to be dismounted so he could supervise the operation of the BP. (Annexes 77C, 133C).
4. (U) Communications Regarding the Mission Duration
(U) Captain , Second Lieutenant , and Staff Sergeant were all concerned about the length of time that the Soldiers had been manning their blocking positions. (Annexes 74C, 77C, 83C). Captain was concerned that leaving his Soldiers in a static position for more than 15 minutes left them open to attack. He was also concerned that he was not adequately performing his patrolling mission because his Soldiers were tied down to the blocking positions. (Annex 74C).
(U) Captain checked with the TOC at least two times seeking to collapse the blocking positions and return his Soldiers to their patrolling mission. The TOC, after checking with TOC, informed him that the convoy had not passed and to stay in position. (Annexes 74C, 2L).
(U) At 2010 hours, the Battle Captain requested permission from the TOC to remove blocking positions until 15 minutes before VIP movement. (Annex 2L).
(U) At 2014 hours, the Captain informed the Captain that Company, Could reduce their blocking positions until 2018 hours. (Annex 2L).
(U) At 2015 hours, the Battle Captain reported to the Captain that Company, blocking positions would remain in place. (Annex 2L).
(U) At 2020 hours, the Battle Captain notified to keep blocking positions in place. (Annex 2L).
(U) At 2030 hours, Captain asked again about collapsing the blocking positions. He was told that the word from was not to move off the blocking positions, that the convoy would be coming down Route Irish in approximately 20 minutes, and that the convoy would consist of all. (Annexes 97C, 3L).



(Annexes 104C, 105C). He was taking what he considered to be the most logical route to

BIAP, but was not checking his speedometer. (Annex 105C). Neither he, nor Mr. Calipari, knew the on-ramp to Route Irish was blocked. (Annex 104C). Indeed, Mr. believed the road to the airport was open. (Annex 105C). (U) At approximately 2045 hours the Soldiers at BP 541 were in the positions that they had been occupying since 1930 hours. They had successfully turned around 15-30 vehicles, with none getting more than a few meters beyond the Alert Line. (Annexes 77C, 79C, 81C, 83C, 87C, 132C). Specialist was in his turret, his M240B (on which he had last qualified just five days before (Annex 6G)) pointed down and to his left at a grassy area with Specialist in the driver's seat in the blocking vehicle. Specialist was in the driver's seat of the overwatch vehicle with Sergeant in the turret. Sergeant was sitting in the rear passenger's seat of the overwatch vehicle, cleaning his protective glasses. Staff Sergeant , the acting Platoon Sergeant, was seeking to determine how much longer they were to remain in position. As such, he was standing with Second Lieutenant near the overwatch vehicle, their backs to the on-ramp. (Annexes 79C, 83C, 128C, 129C, 130C, 131C, 132C, 133C, 134C). None of the Soldiers knew that the Italians were coming. (Annexes 116C, 117C, 118C, 119C, 120C, 121C, 122C). (U) As the car approached the on-ramp to Route Irish, Mr. was on the cell phone updating Mr. on their position and reporting that everything was going fine. (Annexes 104C, 105C). Though not in the habit of checking his speedometer, Mr. estimated his speed at 70-80 kph as he exited off of Route Vernon, heading toward the on-ramp to Route Irish. (Annex 105C). The courtesy light in the car was on and had been since picking up Ms. Sgrena in the Mansour District of Baghdad. (Annex 104C). Additionally, Mr. had his side window halfway open to listen for possible threats. (Annex 105C). Ms. Sgrena and Mr. Calipari were in the rear of the car talking to each other. (Annexes 103C, 105C). The atmosphere in the car was a mix of excitement over the recovery of Ms. Sgrena, and tension from the tasks yet to be completed. (Annex 140C). (U) At approximately 2050 hours, Specialist saw a car approaching the onramp, approximately 140 meters from his position. (Annexes 79C, 134C, 144K). Specialist , holding the spotlight in his left hand, shined his spotlight onto the car before it arrived at the Alert Line. (Annexes 79C, 85C). At this time, Sergeant acquired the vehicle's headlights and saw the spotlight shining on it. He then focused his green laser pointer onto the windshield of the car as it reached the Alert Line. (Annexes 87C, 129C). Both Specialist and Sergeant perceived the car to be traveling in excess of 50 mph (and faster than any other vehicles that evening). (Annexes 79C, 87C, 129C, 134C). (U) The car crossed the Alert Line still heading towards the Soldiers' position without slowing down. Specialist continued to shine the spotlight, and shouted at the vehicle to stop, a fruitless effort, but an instantaneous reaction based on his training.

(Annexes 85C, 130C). Without slowing down, the car continued toward the Warning Line with the spotlight and laser still on it. (Annexes 79C, 87C, 129C).

(U) The car continued to approach at a high rate of speed, coming closer to the Soldiers than any other vehicle that evening. (Annexes 79C, 87C, 129C). When the car got to the Warning Line, Specialist while still holding the spotlight in his left hand, used his right hand to quickly fire a two to four round burst into a grassy area to the on-coming vehicle's right (the pre-set aiming point) as a warning shot. (Annexes 79C, 87C, 125C, 129C, 134C).


(U) The vehicle maintained its speed as it went beyond the Warning Line. (Annexes 77C, 79C, 81C, 83C, 129C, 131C, 132C, 133C). Staff Sergeant trained in vehicle speed estimation, estimated the car was traveling at 50 mph and believed that it would not be able to stay on the road around the curve at that speed. (Annex 83C). Specialist dropped the spotlight and immediately traversed his weapon from his left to his right, without having to move the turret, to orient on the

trained in vehicle speed estimation, estimated the car was traveling at 50 mph and believed that it would not be able to stay on the road around the curve at that speed. (Annex 83C). Specialist dropped the spotlight and immediately traversed his weapon from his left to his right, without having to move the turret, to orient on the front of the car. With both hands on the weapon, he fired another burst, walking the rounds from the ground on the passenger's side of the vehicle and towards the car's engine block in an attempt to disable it. (Annexes 77C, 79C, 81C, 83C, 87C, 129C, 131C, 132C, 133C). The rounds hit the right and front sides of the vehicle, deflated the left front tire, and blew out the side windows. (Annexes 104C, 105C, 132C, 1I).

(U) Mr. reacted by saying into the phone, "they are attacking us," not knowing who was shooting at him. (Annexes 103C, 104C, 105C). He stepped on the brakes, curled up on the left side of the car, and dropped the phone. (Annexes 104C, 105C). Specialist stopped firing as he saw the car slow down and roll to a stop. Approximately four seconds had elapsed between the firing of the first round and the last round, and no more than seven seconds from the time the car crossed the Alert Line until it came to a stop. (Annexes 77C, 79C, 81C, 83C, 87C, 129C, 131C, 132C, 133C, 134C). The car came to a stop near the middle of the on-ramp, such that the first Jersey barrier was aligned with the vehicle between the front and back doors. (Annexes 79C, 83C, 105C).

F. (U) Post-Incident Events

(U) Once the car came to a stop, Mr. got out of the car with his hands raised, cell phone in one hand, and told the Soldiers that he was from the Italian Embassy. (Annexes 77C, 79C, 81C, 83C, 85C, 104C, 130C, 131C, 132C, 133C, 134C). Second Lieutenant Staff Sergeant Sergea



(U) Mr. became a little dizzy, so Sergeant First Class got some water for him. Mr. kept making phone calls. He contacted Mr. who put Captain on the phone. Mr. then had Captain talk to Captain kept on insisting that he wanted to go to the airport. After one of the phone calls, though, he said he needed to go to the hospital where Ms. Sgrena had been taken. (Annex 91C).
(U) The incident was reported through command channels, and the Commanding General, ordered an immediate commander's inquiry/preliminary investigation into the incident. Before the investigator had arrived on the scene, the HMMWVs involved in the incident had departed to the CSH and the car had been moved in an effort to clean up the site so that the on-ramp could be re-opened. The Commander, arrived about two hours after the incident and ordered the car be put back in its stopped position to support the commander's inquiry as much as possible. (Annex 65C).
G. (U) Forensic Evidence
1. (U) <u>5 March 2005 Report</u>
(U) Photographs of the incident scene were taken in the hours after the incident by Combat Camera personnel, as advised by CID personnel. (Annexes 32K – 69K). The exact locations of the three incident vehicles could not be determined since the two HMMWVs had been moved upon transporting Ms. Sgrena to the Combat Support Hospital, and the car had been moved during cleanup efforts at the site. (Annex 5I).
2. (U) 11 March 2005 Report
(U) The forensic investigation of the incident scene conducted on the morning of 11 March 2005 provided the following distances between relevant points based on GPS measurements ³ :

⁽U) ³ The position of the Toyota was determined from photographs taken before it was moved during cleanup efforts. The blocking vehicle location comes from GPS readings provided by the Preliminary Investigating Officer based on witness statements regarding its position at the time of the incident.



(Annexes 5I, 143K).

3. (U) 14 March 2005 Report

- (U) A forensic examination of the car was performed after its removal from the scene. This analysis disclosed 11 entrance bullet holes. They are consistent with 7.62 mm bullets. Three bullets perforated the front section of the car at the bumper, right head light, and right fender. Two bullets perforated the windshield. Six bullets perforated the right side, right door, right front and rear passenger windows. No bullet holes or ricochet damage was noted on the car's undercarriage. (Annex 11).
- (U) The trajectory analysis demonstrated that all 11 bullets came from one point of origin. The actual distance from the car to the machine gun could not be conclusively determined because of several variables: the grade of the curve and curvature of the roadway; depressions or elevations of the terrain; the lateral movement of the car; human reaction time, modulation of speed and braking by the driver; a flat tire; and lateral and vertical movement of the machine gun. The security situation at the incident site prevented examiners from visiting the scene. (Annex 1I).


4. (U) <u>BP 541 Traffic Samples</u>

(U) On Friday, 25 March 2005, a certified radar operator conducted two traffic samples at BP 541. From 1809 hours to 1824 hours, 27 vehicles were clocked. The average speed at the Alert Line was 44 mph. The average speed at the beginning of the on-ramp's curve was 24 mph. From 1956 hours to 2015 hours, 30 vehicles were clocked. The average speed at the Alert Line was 46 mph. The average speed at the beginning of the curve was 26 mph. Unlike the night of the incident, which was also a Friday, the road was dry during these samples. (Annex 1M).


5. (U) Number of Rounds

(U) The ammunition box in the blocking vehicle originally contained 200 rounds. There were 142 rounds remaining in the M240B ammunition box. No casings were collected. Eleven rounds hit the vehicle. The weapon had been fired on seven previous occasions using the same ammunition box. As such, there were no more than 40 additional rounds that could have been fired. (Annexes 85C, 99C).

H. (U) Findings



- (U) At the time of the incident, there were only two HMMWVs, and seven U.S. military personnel, at BP 541. Both the blocking vehicle and the overwatch vehicle were positioned on the on-ramp, facing Route Irish. There were no other vehicles, or Soldiers in the immediate vicinity of BP 541, and the BP could not be seen by any other BPs on Route Irish. (Annexes 77C, 79C, 81C, 83C, 85C, 87C, 89C, 117C, 118C, 119C, 120C, 121C, 122C, 123C, 124C).
- (U) The Soldiers had a heightened sense of awareness because of the two VBIED, one for a black car, another for a white car. (Annexes 74C, 77C, 13E, 14E). Given the number of vehicles that had been stopped and turned around, and this awareness of VBIEDs, it is highly unlikely that Specialist was not paying attention. Further, Specialist had recently rotated into the position, replacing Specialist to ensure that there was a fresh set of eyes in the turret. (Annexes 79C, 85C). Rotating qualified personnel in and out of the turret to maintain alertness was a wise decision by the BP 541 leadership.
- (U) Ineffective battle tracking procedures (communications, log posting, and information sharing) at the TOC caused Company, to be left in their blocking positions longer than expected. The night of 4 March 2005 was the last night of the Left Seat Ride for Anna., and 4-5 March 2005 was the first full duty day for the unit. (Annexes 59C, 63C, 97C).
- (U) The spotlight and green laser pointer had proven effective in stopping and turning around vehicles before the car with the Italians arrived at the on-ramp. Many of the vehicles, though, screeched their tires when stopping. While effective for accomplishing the mission, the spotlight and laser pointer may not be the best system from a civilian point of view. (Annexes 77C, 79C, 81C, 83C, 87C, 132C)
- (U) Specialist did not drop the spotlight until after he fired the warning shots, then immediately transitioned to two hands on his weapon as he fired the disabling shots. (Annexes 79C, 83C, 85C, 87C).



I. (U) Recommendations



- (U) Recommend that the Force Protection Working Group, in conjunction with MNC-I Information Operations, propagate a Public Awareness/Public Service Campaign to inform all drivers of their responsibilities for behavior when approaching and while at Coalition Checkpoints. This information could be posted on panels or boards at airports and other major transportation centers, as well as in pamphlets to be distributed from various locations, to include rental car agencies and border control points. This public awareness campaign should enhance safe operations by promoting mutual trust, cooperation, and confidence for Coalition Forces and Iraqi citizens as well as formally outlining expected driver behavior throughout the AOR.
- (U) Recommend the Force Protection Working Group consider the following points as they develop the MNC-I SOP for TCP operations:



(U) Signs written in Arabic and English should, where possible, also incorporate international symbols to accommodate foreign nationals as they begin operating in Iraq.



(U) Recommend a review of frequently established TCP locations to consider the use of existing permanent highway overpass signs that warn drivers that checkpoints may be upcoming (e.g., "Possible Checkpoint Ahead – Next Exit").

(U) Further recommend a transition to a more driver friendly alert signal by substituting devices such as rotating warning lights and sirens to replace spotlights as early warning tools.

(U) Recommend periodic reviews of Right Seat/Left Seat Ride Relief in Place procedures based on:





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(U) Recommend development of a casualty post-incident procedure reference guide to assist junior leaders in accurately preserving incident scenes as much as time and the tactical situation allow.



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- (U) Recommend that no disciplinary action be taken against any Soldier involved in the incident.
- (U) Recommend that this report be circulated to all MNC-I Major Subordinate Commanders for use as an After Action Review tool.

V. COORDINATION

A. (U) Introduction

(U) This section addresses the status of coordination with MNF-I, MNC-I, and their subordinate units regarding the recovery and transport of Ms. Sgrena on 4 March 2005. Further, it examines the role that Captain played in this incident.

B. (U) MNF-I/MNC-I Involvement

- (U) When moving through another unit's battlespace in a combat zone, coordination with forces in the area is required for situational awareness, and, more importantly, for deconfliction of unit movements, positioning, and operations. For example, has successfully coordinated and executed previous movements and operations of units and forces not assigned to their AOR. The unit had coordinated, sometimes on relatively short notice, with numerous Joint Special Operations Units, Special Missions Units, and Special Tactics Units before 4 March 2005, with no incidents. (Annex 65C).
- (U) To determine who or what organizations were aware of the Sgrena recovery and transport operation, sworn statements were taken from key military officials within MNF-I, MNC-I, and their subordinate units that, by their function, would have had access to information about such an operation. A statement was also provided by the U.S. Embassy Baghdad. The results are listed below:
 - (U) No one at the U.S. Embassy, including the about the Sgrena operation until after the shooting incident had occurred. (Annex 114C).
 - (U) No one within the MNF-I leadership knew about the Sgrena operation until after the shooting incident had occurred. (Annexes 1C to 27C).
 - (U) No one, with one exception to be addressed below, within the MNC-I leadership knew about the Sgrena operation until after the shooting incident had occurred. (Annexes 28C to 43C).
 - (U) No one within the leadership knew about the Sgrena operation until after the shooting incident had occurred. (Annexes 44C to 56C).
 - (U) No one within knew about the Sgrena operation until after the shooting incident had occurred. (Annex 5M).
 - (U) No one within the leadership knew about the Sgrena operation until after the shooting incident had occurred. (Annexes 58C to 63C).

until after the shooting incident had occurred. (Annexes 65C to 71C).
• (U) No one within the leadership knew about the Sgrena operation until after the shooting incident had occurred. (Annexes 72C, 96C to 99C).
• (U) No one at the BIAP Command Post knew about the Sgrena operation until after the shooting incident had occurred. (Annex 110C).
• (U) No one at the Hostage Working Group knew about the Sgrena operation until after the shooting incident had occurred. (Annex 126C).
• (U) No one with Company, knew about the Sgrena operation until after the shooting incident had occurred. (Annexes 76C, 78C, 80C, 82C, 84C, 86C, 88C, 90C, 92C).
(U) Thus, it can be positively stated that the U.S. military was totally unaware of the recovery and transport of Ms. Sgrena on 4 March 2005 until after the shooting incident had occurred.
C. (U) Captain
(U) Captain (USA) is the Aide-de-Camp to Major General (ITAR), DCG, MNC-I. (Annex 107C). As early as 28 February 2005, Captain was aware that a number of Italian VIPs would be coming into BIAP. The date for their arrival kept getting pushed back. He was aware that the VIPs would be involved in working the Sgrena hostage situation. Captain (Annexes 107C, 109C).
(U) At approximately 1330 hours on 4 March 2005, Captain Lieutenant Colonel (ITAR), and one PSD departed for BIAP, arriving at about 1350 hours. Major General and another PSD arrived shortly thereafter. (Annex 107C). The plane finally arrived at 1626. (Annex 1H). Eleven passengers deplaned and were immediately taken to the Al Faw Palace at Camp Victory. There, security badges were obtained for five of the VIPs. (Annexes 106C, 107C).
(U) Captain accompanied three Italian VIPs, Major General on Route PSDs in three cars to a location about one kilometer beyond on Route Irish. Two Italians left, heading into Baghdad. The rest of the group waited at the site for a short while, returned to Camp Victory, then went back to the spot past did not want Captain to go back out to but Captain as his aide, insisted since his presence would be necessary to interface with the U.S. security forces in the area. (Annexes 100C, 106C, 107C).

