**Title: A decade of democratic and structural turbulence: Myanmar’s subjective well-being trajectory, 2014-2024**

**Background**

Global conflict is escalating, with over 100 countries engaged in some form of external conflict in the past 5 years, affecting 1 in 8 individuals (Institute for Economics & Peace, 2024; Raleigh & Kishi, 2024). Conflict disrupts peace and has significant economic, health, and psychological implications that reverberates across socioeconomic identities and transcend borders (Kóczán & Chupilkin, 2022; Raleigh et al., 2023; Charlson et al., 2019).

Conventional psychological research on well-being is typically conducted in Western countries during relatively peaceful times. This temporal and geographical bias suggests that current psychological knowledge may not capture the full spectrum of human experience and may not generalize to increasingly prevalent conflict and wartime settings. As an example, the “happiness pie chart” model suggests that life circumstances play a very limited role in individual well-being, and well-being is primarily a function of genetic predispositions and personal effort (Lyubomirsky et al., 2005; Sheldon & Lyubomirsky, 2021). Based on this popular theoretical model, it would lead to a counter-intuitive hypothesis that large-scale war and conflict may have a minimal impact on people’s well-being. However, our work in the last few years has shown that war and conflict, the most drastic disruption of life circumstances, indeed have hampered humans’ ability to live their best lives.

**What do we know about subjective well-being in war/conflict settings so far***Syrian Civil War.* One of the first PWB studies on this topic centered in the Syrian conflict, which started in 2011 as part of the Arab Spring protests, and quickly escalated to years long of armed conflicts between the then Assad government and opposition forces (Cheung et al., 2020). Between 2008 and 2015, the absolute prevalence of negative affect increased by 41.4%, and the average life satisfaction score dropped by 5.15 (range 1–10). ﻿During the conflict, Syrians were 5-times less likely (OR = 0.20, 95% CI 0.17–0.23) to report having social support compared to before the conflict. Sex and age differences in well-being trend were small. The overall decline in well-being was also observed regardless of whether they were directly exposed to conflict.

*Russian Invasion of Ukraine.* Since the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the War in Ukraine has become the deadliest conflict in Europe World War II. Similar to the Syrian study, we examined the well-being trajectory in Ukraine and Russia from before to after the invasion. Ukrainians experienced the 11th steepest life satisfaction decline worldwide (120 countries) in 2022 yet became the most hopeful about their life. Furthermore, while the life satisfaction of some segments of the population was more vulnerable in the immediate aftermath of the invasion, the decline in life satisfaction was a widespread phenomenon shared across Ukrainian society. Conversely, on the offensive side, Russians saw increase in both life satisfaction and hope following the Invasion.

*War in Afghanistan.* In addition to investigating population well-being trajectories in prolonged war and conflict, we wondered if the end of a war would necessarily translate to improved subjective well-being for an embattled population. For this, we turned to the War in Afghanistan which commenced in 2002 following the 9/11 terrorist attack in New York, in the US and the US’s military actions to combat terrorism. It examined the well-being trends in Afghanistan from 2018-2019, 2021 following the US government withdrawing its remaining military personnel from the country, and 2022 when the country was once again under the Taliban control (Stutzman et al., 2025). We found that the average life satisfaction of Afghans did not drop in 2021 from before the US withdrawal. However, after the withdrawal and reinstatement of the Taliban government, the life satisfaction of Afghans dropped by 1.24 units (0.91 SD). Almost all respondents reported a life satisfaction score below 5 and two-thirds under 2 on the scale of 0 to 10 in 2022. In fact, under the renewed Taliban regime, Afghanistan had the lowest life satisfaction score in recorded history (over 170 countries since 1946). While almost all segments of the Afghan population saw a decline in subjective well-being in the wake of Taliban reclaiming power, the most disadvantaged groups (i.e. women, people with elementary education or less, and the poorest quintile) experienced the sharpest drop in how they evaluated their current life, compared to their best possible life.

A few insights came to mind after revisiting these studies.

1. Drastic changes in life circumstances (from starting of a war to conclusion of a war without prudent planning) could result in enduring changes in subjective well-being of the affected populations, even in the presence of the usual protective factors (e.g., better social support, being female, and high income and education levels).
2. Context matters a lot. The impetus of every war is different. Developing an understanding of the historical, cultural, and political context of the countries/ settings where the conflicts take place is essential for well-being researchers to conduct the study.
   * Example: Geographical differences in subjective well-being due to e.g., exposure to conflict and allegiance to certain political groups
3. Studying individual conflicts offer us the opportunity to tease apart the common well-being impacts of conflicts, while highlighting the some of the forgotten conflicts happening in the world.

Another set of high-level revelations about the line of research. It is made possible because

1. our shared desire to do the best science at we can,
2. the injustice that we observe in research and in the world broadly where the suffering of civilians from war and conflict is rampant but forgotten, and
3. the institution that is UofT, particularly PWB Lab, allows us to conduct this line of research safely and freely.

**Myanmar: a fledgling democracy in struggle**

This time, we turn to the other side of the Eurasia continent and looking at a conflict is soon becoming “a forgotten crisis” (Htet et al., 2024; United Nations, 2024).

Since its independence from the British Empire in 1948, Myanmar has been oscillating between autocratic ruling by the military, the Tatmadaw, and brief periods of parliamentary democracy (BBC News, 2023). The Saffron Revolution, a nation-wide movement led by young Buddhist monks and against the military regime, in 2007 ushered in a new constitutional era for the country to slowly establish a civilian parliament where the sanction of the military junta (Steinberg, 2008). In 2011, President Thein Sein carried out a series of political reforms such as loosening media censorship, freeing political prisoners, and strengthening international relations, sanctioning pro-democratic parties for elections. Leveraging opportunities stemming from these reforms, the National League for Democracy (NLP), the largest opposition party founded and led by Aung San Suu Kyi, the most notable democratic leaders in the nation, regained its political party status and claimed a sweeping victory at the parliamentary by-election in 2012 and the national elections 2015 (BBC News, 2012; Karimi, 2015). Despite these progressive reforms and diversified political system, the Myanmar government persisted in suppressing and prosecuting religious and ethnic minorities, most prominently Rohingya Muslim minorities (Human Rights Watch, 2013), which raised concerns of ethnic cleansing (United Nations, 2017).

Following another major defeat of its shadow party in the national elections in November 2020, The Tatmadaw launched a coup d'état on February 1st, 2021 , in which the democratically elected officials, including President Win Myint and State Counsellor Aung San Suu Kyi, were deposed and detained and the results of the last National Elections were declared invalid (Regan, 2021). Nation-wide protests against the military junta by civilians, professionals, opposition party, and ethnic minorities erupted subsequently. In response, the military junta has resorted to indiscriminate attacks and restricted civilian access to essential resources. By late 2021, at least 1,500 people were killed by the military (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2025b). This heightened political tension has given rise to over thousands non-state resistance groups (e.g., military arm of the exiled government, ethnic minority armies, and pro-democratic protesters) which combat the military junta, engulfing the country in extreme violence since (Center for Preventive Action, 2025).

The year 2024 marked the most devastating year for civilians, with at least 1,824 civilians fatalities and over 40% of the deceased being women and children (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2025b). By the end of 2024, three years since the violent turnover of the democratic government, more than 19.9 million people or one-third of the population relying on humanitarian assistance (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2025). Additionally over 3.5 million people had been displaced within the country, while another 71 thousand moving across country borders (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, 2025a). These figures likely under-represented the well-being consequences faced by the Burmese people as the country was prone to natural disasters (e.g., typhoon and floods) (United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 2024). The healthcare systems were also under threat at the junta targeted medical professionals protested against the regime (Paddock, 2022). The situation was also compounded by the increasing regional instability due to internal conflicts and unaffordability of living essentials resulted from the devaluation of Myanmar kyat (Henschke et al., 2024; Reuters, 2024).

Unfortunately, the empirical evidence of the mental health and well-being consequences following the coup d'état is scant. In my co-authored work published in The Lancet Regional Health – Southeast Asia, we estimated from nationwide population-based survey that a third of Burmese adults had post-traumatic stress disorder, anxiety, or depression in five months following the coup (Fan et al., 2024). Another study, using a non-probability adult sample, estimated the rate of probable depression, anxiety, and both were about 60% (Saw et al., 2023). The most recent study was based on a selected sampled of young girls and women from disadvantaged communities in country 2.5-3 years since the coup (September 2023-January 2024). Over 80% of the respondents reported at least one conflict-related stressors (e.g., displacement, disruption of education, separation from parents, injury, death of family members) and such as exposure put them 2.5 times more likely to develop any depression symptoms (Pearson et al., 2025). The lack of long-term studies once again illustrated how Myanmar has slowly faded in the international news and international research communities. Furthermore, the psychological consequences of war and conflict extend beyond development of mental disorders.

Set against this historical and theoretical backdrop, we will investigate the short and long-term consequences of conflict on population well-being in the Myanmar Civil War, using data involving **over 2.7 million global citizens and three international databases of peace and conflict.**

Given the growing severity, evolving geopolitical concerns, and escalating international scope of these conflicts, the proposed research will draw on data before and during the conflicts and 12,800 Burmese participants to

1. document the trends of subjective well-being (SWB) in Myanmar in the past decade,
2. segments of the Burmese population most impacted by the coup de tat and subsequent civil war, and
3. estimate the changes in SWB attributable to the conflicts using multi-level models

**Methods**

Nationally representative data will be drawn from the Gallup World Poll (GWP), which annually surveys an average of 1,000 adults from each of 150 countries and territories since 2005. We will examine the well-being (i.e., life satisfaction, hope, affect) trajectories between 2014 and 2024 in Myanmar and its administrative regions with geo-located conflict event and death data provided by *Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED)*, an internationally recognized datasets on organized violence (Raleigh et al., 2010; Uppsala Conflict Data Program, 2024). Multilevel linear and logistic regression was used to examine the change in well-being in Myanmar and individual administrative regions. Each well-being measure was predicted from a linear time trend with random intercepts and random slopes for each administrative region. We will further conduct analyses stratified by age, gender, socioeconomic status, fundamental needs (e.g., food and shelter), and political attitudes from GWP to identify characteristics contributing to well-being disparity within the Burmese population. To contextualize the well-being trend of Myanmar in the past decade, we will conduct another set of multilevel analyses to compare Myanmar with countries undergoing major conflicts and war in the past decade (2014–2024), as identified by the high number of conflict events in the country from *UCPD* and *ACLED* and ranking in *Global Peace Index* and *State Fragility Index*.

**Variables (years of available data)**

**Main Outcomes – Evaluative well-being**

*Life Satisfaction.* Subjective evaluation of life currently, on a continuous scale from *the worst possible life* (0) to *the best possible life (10).*

*Hope.* Subjective evaluation of life five years from now, on a continuous scale from *the worst possible life* (0) to *the best possible life (10).*

**Secondary Outcomes – Affective well-being**

*Smile or laugh.* Whether respondents smiled or laughed a lot yesterday.

*Enjoyment.* Whether respondents experienced enjoyment during a lot of the day yesterday.

*Worry.* Whether respondents experienced worry during a lot of the day yesterday.

*Sadness.* Whether respondents experienced sadness during a lot of the day yesterday.

*Anger.* Whether respondents experienced anger during a lot of the day yesterday.

*Stress.* Whether respondents experienced stress during a lot of the day yesterday.

**Sociodemographic variables**

*Age [WP1220] (2012-2024);*

*Marital Status [WP1223] (2012–2024):*

*Education Level [WP3117] (2012–2024):*

*Income Quintile [INCOME\_5] (2012–2024):*

*Household income in international dollars [INCOME\_2] (2012–2024):*

*Religion [WP1233/WP1233 Recoded] (2012–2024)*

* *Rationale: As a Buddhism-majority country, Myanmar has a track record of persecuting and endangering the Muslim minorities.*

### *Urbanicity [WP14](2012-2024):* Do you live in a rural area or on a farm, a small town or village, a large city, or suburb of a large city?

**Living necessities and standards**

*Shelter [WP43]* (2012–2024): Have there been times in the past 12 months when you did not have enough money to provide adequate shelter or housing for you and your family?

*Food [WP40]* (2012–2024): Have there been times in the past 12 months when you did not have enough money to buy food that you or your family needed?

Living standards (2014-2024): Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with your standard of living, all the things you can buy and do?

**Benevolence of People**

*Donating money [WP108] (2012-2024):* Have you done any of the following in the past month? How about donated money to a charity?

*Volunteering [WP109] (2012-2024):* Have you done any of the following in the past month? How about volunteered your time to an organization?

*Helping strangers [WP110] (2012-2024):* Have you done any of the following in the past month? How about helped a stranger or someone you didn't know who needed help?

**Confidence in national institutions**

*Confidence in judicial system [WP138] (2012-2024):* In this country, do you have confidence in each of the following, or not? How about judicial system and courts?

*Confidence in national government [WP139] (2014-2024)*: In this country, do you have confidence in each of the following, or not? How about national government?

*Confidence in honesty of elections [WP144] (2014-2024):* In this country, do you have confidence in each of the following, or not? How about honesty of elections?

*Approval of national leadership [WP150] (2014-2024):* Do you approve or disapprove of the job performance of the leadership of this country?

*Perception of corruption in country [WP146] (2014-2024):* Is corruption widespread throughout the government in this country, or not?

**Corruptions**

*Perception of corruption in country [WP146] (2014-2024):* Is corruption widespread throughout the government in this country, or not?

**Civil Society**

*Intention to move to another country [WP1325]:* Ideally, if you had the opportunity, would you like to move PERMANENTLY to another country, or would you prefer to continue living in this country?

* Like to move to another country\* Like to continue living in this country\* (DK)\* (Refused)\*

*Satisfaction with freedom to choose [WP134]:* In this country, are you satisfied or dissatisfied with your freedom to choose what you do with your life?

**Political variables**

*Approval of head of state [WP13125] (2014-2020):* Do you approve or disapprove of the way the leader/head/President of this country is handling his/her job as leader/head/President?

*Confidence in local policy force in city of area [WP112] (2014-2024):* In the city or area where you live, do you have confidence in the local police force, or not?

*Confidence in the military [WP137] (2015-2020):* In this country, do you have confidence in each of the following, or not? How about the military?

**Corruptions**

*Perception of corruption in businesses [WP145] (2012-2024)*: Is corruption widespread within business located in this country or not?

*Perception of corruption in country [WP146] (2014-2024):* Is corruption widespread throughout the government in this country, or not?

**Country-level Factors**

*Total number of conflicts by region.* It includes conflicts from state-based violence, non-state violence, and one-sided violence. Data are provided by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program.

*Total number of deaths from conflicts by region.* It includes death resulted from state-based violence, non-state violence, and one-sided violence. Data provided by the Uppsala Conflict Data Program.

Armed Conflict Location & Event Data

* 2010 Jan to present

**Timeline**

# Figures and Descriptives

## Conflict and Fatality Data

Here I examined conflict and fatality resulted from conflict data from geo-tagged two datasets, Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) and Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP). Both datasets will allow mapping of conflict and fatality data at the first administrative level (i.e., states and regions) in Myanmar. The trend of conflict and fatality from both datasets (Figs. 1–4) were largely the same (e.g., large uptick in starting at 2021). Furthermore, figures 5 and 6 revealed the regional differences in frequency of conflict and number of fatalities from ACLED and UCDP, which is a good rationale to consider the effect of conflict exposure in geographical regions on subject well-being.

Between 2021 and 2024, ACLED recorded 44,230 conflicts and 76,024 conflict-related deaths, while UCDP logged 5,554 conflicts and 10,471 conflict-related deaths. This is mainly due to the more stringent methodologies employed by UCDP—longitudinal tracking of conflicts that resulted in at last 25 deaths in a year. However, the UCDP data picked up much bigger number of fatalities resulted from the religious and ethnic conflicts in the Rahkine state (Al Jazeera, 2019). Additionally, even though both data resources are commonly used in the literature, UCDP is certainly the more reputable option. Because of these reasons, the current study will use UCPD as the primary dataset for conflict and fatality data. ACLED can be used as a supplementary dataset for sensitivity analyses.

**Fig. 1. Number of conflicts in Myanmar by year (2014-2024), ACLED**

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**Fig. 2. Number of conflicts in Myanmar by year (2014-2024), UCDP**

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**Fig. 3. Number of fatalities from conflicts in Myanmar by year (2014-2024), ACLED**

**A graph of a number of explosions

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**Fig. 4. Number of fatalities from conflicts in Myanmar by year (2014-2024), UCDP**

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**Fig. 5. Distribution of conflicts in Myanmar by region and year (2014-2024), ACLED and UCDP**

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**Fig. 6. Distribution of fatalities in Myanmar by region and year (2014-2024), ACLED and UCDP**

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**Gallup World Poll (GWP)**

**Sample size consideration**

GWP data from 2014 to 2024 will be used in the current study. Data are grouped in the time periods before (2014-2020) and after (2021-2024) the coup de tat’ occurred. The baseline period had a total sample size of 7,760 with an average of 1,109 participants per year. The period after the coup de tat’ had 4,000 participants, split evenly across 4 years.

Since some of the analyses will be conducted at the largest administrative level in Myanmar, it would be prudent to examine the sample size by region. Among the 15 administrative regions, Chin State and Kayah State has too small of a sample size to conduct any moderation analyses.

## Table 1. GWP sample size in regions of Myanmar in the study period.

|  |  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| **Regions of Myanmar** | **Total weighted Sample size** | **Weighted sample size**  **before the coup**  **(2014-2020)** | **Weighted sample size**  **after the coup**  **(2021-2024)** |
| **Yangon Region** | 1958 | 1302 | 657 |
| **Mandalay Region** | 1498 | 1022 | 476 |
| **Ayeyarwady Region** | 1414 | 953 | 461 |
| **Sagaing Region** | 1319 | 880 | 439 |
| **Shan State** | 1308 | 892 | 416 |
| **Bago Region** | 1156 | 781 | 375 |
| **Magway Region** | 1009 | 656 | 353 |
| **Rakhine State** | 503 | 329 | 175 |
| **Mon State** | 506 | 338 | 169 |
| **Kachin State** | 183 | 74 | 109 |
| **Kayin State** | 266 | 158 | 108 |
| **Naypyidaw Union Territory** | 289 | 188 | 100 |
| **Tanintharyi Region** | 268 | 171 | 98 |
| **Chin State** | 49 | 10 | 39 |
| **Kayah State** | 32 | 7 | 25 |

**Subjective Well-being and Structural Factors**

**Evaluative well-being**

The trend of life satisfaction and hope at the national level appear quite stable over time, in particular before and after the coup de tat.

## Fig 1. Trend of life satisfaction and hope in Myanmar, 2014-2024.


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## Affect Well-being

More Myanmar adults smiled and experienced enjoyment than experiencing negative affect such as worry, sadness, stress, and anger even after the coup de tat. There seemed to be delay in the surge of negative affect ­— more people experienced worry, stress, and anger in late 2022, a year after the coup d'état in February 2021.

## Fig 2. Trend of Affective Well-being in Myanmar, 2014-2024.

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**Living necessities and standards**

The reported living necessities (Figure X) and perceived living standards (Figure X) painted an interesting picture of the situation in Myanmar. Even before the coup, a majority of of the adult population did not have enough food (mean=56.8%, SE=0.56%) and shelter (mean=54.6%, SE=0.57%) for themselves or their family. Both proportions dropped to its lowest in later 2022 for the decade (meanfood=53.1%; meanshelter=46.2%), only to rise again in the subsequent years. Despite the prolonged difficult living circumstances, not all people who had their living necessities unfulfilled expressed dissatisfactions about their living standards. In fact, before 2021, less than 30% of the population expressed that sentiment. This proportion rose to 34.3% (SE=0.87%) in the post-coup period (2021-2024), with the most noticeable surge from 2020 (mean=25.9%) to 2021 (mean=37.2%).

Figure X.

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Figure X.

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**Confidence in national institutions**

Here to turn to trust in civil and democratic society, which includes confidence in national institutions (Fig. ) and perception of corruption in country (Fig.). An overwhelming majority of Burmese adults had high confidence in judicial systems (mean=73.2%), national government (90.2%), elections (86%), and head of state (92.2%) before the coup. In 2021, all four parameters plummeted by at least 30%. By 2023, only half of the adult population expressed confidence in these institutions. The diminishing confidence in national institutions corroborated with the growing perception of government-wide corruption following the coup (range=63.9–75.5%).

**A graph of a graph showing the number of people in the military

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**A graph showing the decline of corruption

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**Satisfaction with Freedom**

Despite the ongoing struggles with livelihood, Burmese people remained quite satisfied with their freedom. At least 86.9% people were content with the freedom they got to choose to do with their life. Even following the coup, two-thirds (range=63.1–69.5%) were satisfied with their freedom.

**A graph showing the growth of the country

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**Benevolence**

Despite the economic hardship that almost all Burmese people, they remained very eager in donating money at least once every month before (mean=84.0%) and after (mean=78.4%) the coup, when the country suffered even more financially. Similarly, over half of the Burmese people reported having help people at least once in the past month.

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**PL Notes:**

Myanmar remained one of the least developed countries in terms of economics, human asset, and economic and environmental vulnerability (UN Trade and Developmen, 2025).

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