MIGRATION FROM EASTERN EUROPE TO EUROPEAN COMMUNITY: CURRENT TRENDS AND FUTURE DEVELOPMENTS

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WORKING PAPER 94/4

SCHOOL OF GEOGRAPHY • UNIVERSITY OF LEEDS

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Submitted for publication as Chapter 2 entitled 'Extra-Community migration: the East-West perspective' in: P.H.Rees, J.S.C.Stillwell, A.Convey, M.Kupiszewski (eds.) Population migration and European Community. John Wiley and Sons, London.

Abstract: Paper starts with the discussion of the availability and quality of data on international mobility in Europe. Then the analysis of current trends in migration from Eastern Europe and European Community is being made as well as an outlook at possible factors contributing to the future changes in international migration from Eastern to Western Europe.

Leeds 1993

Migration from Eastern Europe to European Community: Current trends and future developments

Since the mid eighties and in particular in the nineties all developed European countries have witnessed increasing migrational pressure on their boundaries. One of the important factors responsible for this increase are the recent political changes in ex-Soviet block countries. The aim of this chapter is firstly to discuss to what extent countries of Eastern Europe and former USSR have contributed to the increasing migration to Western Europe and secondly to examine the future of East-West migration. This cannot be done without first a brief look at the availability and quality of the data.

The term Eastern Europe or East will denote in this chapter all European countries of ex-soviet block including former USSR. The term Western Europe or West will usually denote European Community unless stated otherwise.

1 The data

Gathering data on international migration is a painful experience due to their scarcity and incomparability. There is no single definition of 'international migrant' and the practice of the registration of migrants differ from country to country. As Poulain et al. (1991) have shown, even within European Community reports from receiving and sending countries may differ as much as over 1000% in a single year. For example in 1988 Germany reported that 12210 of its citizens migrated to France, but France acknowledged only 1114 Germans (Poulain et al., 1991). Table 1 shows that the situation is much worse when one try to assess the magnitude of flows between countries of Eastern and Western Europe. The table shows data on migration from Eastern Europe to Germany, as

Table 1: Number of migrants to Germany reported by various statistical agencies

According to respective East European Statistical Office

From	Poland[a]	Hungary[b]	Czecho-Slovakia[c]
1987		6389	717
1988	24630	4864	719
1989	18528		1021
1990	11431		

According to German Statistisches Bundesamt[d]

From	Poland	Hungary	Czecho-Slovakia
1987	158220	8938	9101
1988	313792	12966	11978
1989	455075	15372	17130
1990	370172	18400	21000

Migration reported by German authorities as % migration reported by source country

From	Poland	Hungary	Czecho-Slovakia
1987		139.90	1269.32
1988	1274.02	266.57	1665.92
1989	2456.15		1677.77
1990	3238.32		

Notes:

a to West Germany only
b All emigrants irrespective of destination, both legal and overstayers
c to East and West Germany
d Including Aussiedlers

Source: SOPEMI 1992

reported by national East-European and German statistical offices, with discrepancies in the extreme case of well over 3000% Apart from the lack of international harmonization of definitions, the discrepancy is due to the fact that all East European countries reported in their official statistics only migrants who left legally. Historically post-war migration from Eastern Europe has been subject of strict political control exerted by Communist governments. Until the late eighties or early nineties (depending on the country) it was necessary to apply for a permission to emigrate. The application had a number of consequences, such as almost sure dismissal of managerial and professional staff from their current posts, police supervision and endless administrative hassles, including compulsory removal from some categories of rented housing. As the procedure was very protracted applicants were often left without any income for a long time. When the positive decision was taken by the authorities the applicant received a one-way passport allowing him only to leave the country. On the top of administrative problems, restrictions were made on the amount of money which a migrant was allowed to take away, which made legal transfer of savings and money coming from selling a house or a flat extremely difficult. Finally, border checks were conducted in unfriendly, sometimes abusive manner. These factors severely limited the number of applications and consequently the number of registered emigrants. More details on this issue can be found in SOPEMI (1992) and Okólski (1991). Redei (1992) provides a description of the situation in Hungary, Kupiszewski (1994) for Poland.

Not surprisingly a majority of emigrants preferred to apply for a tourist passport and not to reveal their willingness to emigrate. This allowed them to keep their options open in case they were unsuccessful in settling in in a foreign country. The data on these migrants have been captured only by the ministries of internal affairs. In all East European countries when crossing a state boundary it was necessary to fill in a form with the information allowing for identification of a person and information on his/her destination, itinerary and planned duration of stay abroad and hand it over to the border guard. On return similar form was required and exit and return form were matched and compared. It was therefore

fairly simple to keep track of all citizens staying abroad and in particular those overstaying. Ministries of Internal Affairs kept these data, but they refused to publish them. Only recently it was possible to use some data on boundary crossing from Poland (see Kupiszewski 1994). Similar data have been released in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) (Boubnova 1992).

These data may be misleading with respect to the destination of the migrants, as some destinations were perceived as 'better' in terms of chances of receiving a tourist passport than others and therefore selected more frequently by applicants. It was often the case, that the country of destination shown in the form was just a transitional country on the way to extra-European destinations (Fassman, Münz 1990).

The second half of the eighties and the beginning of the nineties witnessed dramatic legal changes in all ex-Communist countries. In Poland and Hungary Communist governments have gradually increased the degree of freedom. In other countries the bloodless revolution of 1989 brought radical changes. Currently all East Europeans are allowed to keep their passports at home and travel at will. In the case of the CIS, despite the fact that appropriate legislation has been passed, technical obstacles hamper the process of issuing everybody with a passport. As a consequence of democratisation of political systems existing forms of registration of transborder flows have been abandoned but, as in Western Europe, no other systems of monitoring have been introduced.

Despite of the scarcity and low reliability of the data we have some idea on the size and structure of the migration flows. The information comes from two types of sources: firstly from statistical registers of the receiving countries and secondly from the national censuses of sending societies.

The former sources do not give any idea of clandestine migration and their comparability is limited due to various definitions of migrant and migration adopted. Another problem with these data is that they are either not published

or published as 'grey' publications. Often they are highly aggregated, in varying tabulations and for various periods in time, which makes it difficult to use them. In general, however they provide the most reliable information on international emigration from Eastern Europe both in the Communist era and today.

The second source is the information obtained from national censuses of sending countries. Data on international migration were not available until the most recent censuses held in the late eighties and early nineties. It is possible, as Korcelli (1992a) for Poland, Redei (1992) for Hungary and Pavlik (1991) for Czechoslovakia have noted, to get a crude idea on the size of outflow, both legal and clandestine, by comparison of the results of the census against the results of the current registration. One cannot be sure, however, to what extent the differences are due to registration errors, census errors or international migration.

Basically the available data allow only a simple analysis for one country or for a pair of countries and for one or two points in time. It is much more difficult to provide an analytical view of what happens over a longer period of time for large geopolitical blocks or for whole of Europe.

2 Existing situation

The last decade has brought some fundamental changes in migration patterns in Europe. Firstly, the traditional emigration countries of Southern and Eastern Europe became both emigration and immigration countries (Salt 1991). For Eastern Europe this is a new phenomenon. In the past there were small contingents of labour immigrants from 'brother' countries, in particular in East Germany, the former Soviet Union and then Czechoslovakia (Grzeszczak 1989). However, these workers were under strict police surveillance, enjoyed limited rights and in many cases lived in closed precincts.

A second important change in the European migration scene is the increase in the volume of migration and the stock of foreign population. For example, during the decade 1980-1990 the latter has increased in Denmark from 101.6 thousand to 160.6 thousand; in Germany from 4453.3 thousand to 5241.8 thousand and in Italy from 298.7 thousand to 781.1 thousand (SOPEMI 1992). The new wave of travellers and migrants is hard to control and difficult to manage. It consists of short term travellers, illegal migrants, asylum seekers, regular labour migrants and long term migrants who sometimes seek permanent stay permits in the host country and eventually apply for citizenship.

2.1 Number of boundary crossings

Political changes have a noticeable impact on the number of outward boundary crossings which constitute a convenient measure of overall international mobility. In Czechoslovakia in 1970 3.7 million crossings were reported. The number peaked in 1980 at 10.3 million and in late eighties oscillated around the level of 7 million (Okólski 1991)[1]. Hungary presented even greater growth with the increase from 1 million crossing in 1970 to 6.7 in 1989 (Okólski 1991). Much more impressive increase has been observed in Poland, from 0.9 in 1970 to 19.3 in 1989 (Okólski 1991). In first eight months of 1992 the number of crossings jumped to 15.5 million (Donosy, 12.9.1992). In former USSR, where the number of outwards boundary crossings by Soviet citizens raised from 2.0 million in 1985 to 8.4 million in 1990 (own calculations based on data from Boubnova 1992). Yugoslavia, except in 1983 and 1984, shows constant high mobility on the level well over one exit for each two citizens of the country (Okólski 1991), which is comparable to the one reached by Poland in 1989. Obviously current war in former Yugoslavia has resulted in dramatic change of the character of the mobility.

The number of boundary crossings shows to some extend the intensity of

interaction of each of the countries with 'external world', but does not directly determine the size of outflow. It may, however, influence international migration indirectly, as visits abroad increase the amount of information available to potential migrants.

2.2 Illegal migrations

Illegal migrants come predominantly from the former USSR, Romania and Bulgaria, but Poland[2], Albania[3] and other countries of Eastern Europe also contribute their fair share. The ultimate target of the illegal emigrants, especially from the former USSR, Romania and Bulgaria, are the countries of Western Europe, in particular Germany, but some East European countries are also quite desirable destinations. Major receiving East European countries - namely Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland have agreements allowing citizens of former Soviet block to travel without visas. On many occasions this right is being abused in two ways: either the incomers overstay, exactly as many East Europeans overstay in Western Europe or they try to find their way to the West without relevant documents.

Those illegals who stay are active in the black labour market. They specialise in smuggling and petty trade from the pavement. The largest open air market in Warsaw is called the 'Russian Market'. Shamshur (1992) and Shevtsova (1992) offer more detailed characteristic of the phenomenon. They are also numerous press reports on illegal paramedical services, often based on beliefs in supernatural phenomena. Some of foreigners make organized street prostitution the main source of their income. Romanians, especially Romanian Gipsies, specialize in begging, often using little children as a decoy. Although there is lack of clear statistical evidence, these migrants are perceived as criminogenous by receiving societies. There is also a growing number of migrants from Africa and Asia, who on many occasions treat East European countries as a sort of stopover on their way to richer Western Europe.

From the point of view of Western Europe it is important to note that even more prosperous East European countries are severely impoverished and not attractive destinations in comparison with Western Europe. For many illegal migrants these countries are in fact nothing more than stepping stones on the way to the West. Usually migrants try to get from Bohemia, Poland or Hungary to Germany and Austria, often with political asylum in mind. As they usually have little chance of obtaining visas, they try to cross the boundary illegally on a large scale. The boundary crossings often are organized by 'professional' guides, who persuade villagers from Romania to travel legally to Poland or the Czech Republic and then illegally to Germany, where according to them everyone can obtain a well paid job. The migrants often sell their homes just to have some cash to start with and they end up as homeless. Some idea of the magnitude of illegal migration is indicated by the following statistics: within the first 9 months of 1992 Polish border guards along a 78 km stretch of boundary with Germany intercepted 9178 persons (including 8133 Romanians and 395 Bulgarians) trying to cross boundary illegally (Markiewicz, 1992). The problem is aggravated by the fact that East European governments cannot afford the costs of repatriation of illegals and their legal systems, unlike that in Germany, prohibit confiscation of assets of migrants in order to meet these costs. So those caught red-handed are registered, requested to go home and released. However, they do not return home but instead try to get across the border again and again. The Germans tried to curb illegal inflow with a spectacular and decisive action. Gazeta Wyborcza of 9.12.1992 (Rumuni do domu) reports on expulsion of 244 out of 60 000 Romanians threatened with forced repatriation. This was hardly successful. Only recent changes in paragraph 16 of German constitution on asylum law coupled with bilateral agreements being negotiated or signed with the neighbours of Germany on repatriation of asylum seekers to the first safe country (all countries surrounding Germany are deemed to be safe) will make this option much less attractive. This policy was apparently efficient: In RFL/RL Daily Report of 20 July 1993 sharp drop in the number of illegal border crossing from Poland (to 10038 in the firs half of 1993) is reported. However, the discrepancy in the standard of living will remain an important factor attracting illegal migrants for

years to come (see section 3.2).

2.3 Asylum seekers

The growth in the number of asylum seekers was probably the most characteristic feature of the change of international migration patterns in the last decade. In Denmark asylum seekers increased from 0.2 thousand in 1980 to 4.6 thousand in 1991, in Germany from 107.8 thousand to 256.1 thousand and in Italy from 3.1 thousand in 1983 to 27.0 thousand in 1991 (SOPEMI 1992). In the whole of Europe the number of applicants jumped from 67 thousand in 1983 to over a half of a million in 1991 (Hovy 1992). Simultaneously the share of asylum seekers in Europe who originate from Eastern Europe has been growing. Until 1986 the percentage of applicants who were European stood below 27%. From 1987 it has fluctuated well over 30 %, in 1988 going as high as 39.6%. In nine countries of European Community: Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and UK, these proportions were even higher (Hovy 1992). As among European applicants only a marginal proportion is from outside ex-Soviet block countries this means that the overall increase is due to the increase in the number of applicants from the East.

For political reasons before 1989 all claims by citizens of Communist Eastern Europe were almost routinely accepted in the West. The major sending country was Poland with the number of applicants growing regularly till 1988 and moderately reduced in 1989. A similar trend can be observed for Hungarian asylum seekers. There is no doubt that the political changes which occurred after 1989 in these two countries and in Czechoslovakia, and now inherited by Czech Republic, as Slovaks have troubles coming to terms with their huge Hungarian minority, will make it difficult for anyone from these countries to claim the right to political asylum in future.

Since 1989 the most important sending country has been Romania (47 thousand applications lodged in Europe in 1989). Also Bulgaria's share has increased, albeit on much lower level. Despite the fact that in both these countries democratically elected governments are in place it may be in some cases justified for other countries to grant asylum to members of some national groups (as Hungarians and Gipsies from Romania or Turks from Bulgaria) or to political dissidents. The willingness to apply for asylum may be enhanced by appalling economic situation, which constitutes a major push factor. Also the states of former Soviet Union are the major source of asylum seekers and refugees. Temporarily they are confined to the territory of Commonwealth of Independent States (Öberg, Boubnova 1993), but no doubts they eventually will go West. The questions are: when and how many?

Between 1983 and 1990 for the East European asylum seekers the main destination was Germany (around 175 thousand applications) with second largest, Austria (65 thousand), receiving one third of applications lodged in Germany. Large numbers (over 20000) of applicants selected also Hungary, Italy, Yugoslavia and Sweden (Hovy 1992). It is symptomatic that ex-communist countries attracted almost exclusively applicants from their geopolitical region of Europe. Virtually all applications lodged in Hungary came from Eastern Europe (but most recently there are reports on growing number of Chinese asylum seekers applying there, Redei 1992) and 95% of those logged in Yugoslavia. Among West European countries Austria (84.9%), Italy (70.2%) and Germany (35.2%) had the highest proportions of European applicants among asylum seekers.

According to UNHRC Zagreb (quoted after The Economist, 19.9.1992) war in former Yugoslavia caused 1979 thousand refugees from Bosnia & Herzegovina and Croatia to look for a shelter within Yugoslavia and some 501 thousand refugees have sought safe haven in other European countries. Germany took 220 thousand of them, Switzerland 70 thousand, Austria 57 thousand, and Hungary 50 thousand. Apart from Germany countries of European Community have shown little interest in admitting of them. Greece has made effort to take 7 people, Ireland was more

generous taking 10. In most recent reports (July 1993) total number of 3.5 million of refugees is mentioned and 4 million is forecasted within couple of months. Many Yugoslavs do not meet the definition of asylum seeker as set by the 1951 Geneva Convention, but they are war refugees and displaced persons. This makes their situation particularly difficult from legal point of view. Rapid outflow from former Yugoslavia is a phenomena of the last two years, yet it has already generated the largest in Europe wave of refugees since the World War Two.

It is clear that with the progress in creation of democratic systems to replace monoparty Communist rule and with strengthening of healthy market economies Eastern Europe will cease to produce asylum seekers. The problem is that currently only three countries Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland have made some economic progress, but they still have very long way to go. Virtually all other East European countries are in a desperate situation and in years to come will remain the sources of applicants for asylum.

2.4 *Labour and long term migration*

Long term labour migrants form another significant category of population moving to Western and to some countries of Eastern Europe.

Since the mid 1980's Europe has witnessed general increase in the volume of migration. It was mainly due to family reunion as the stocks of foreign labour have been relatively stable (Salt 1991). It is likely that part of official labour migration have been replaced with clandestine inflow, but it is very difficult to substantiate such speculation.

These general trends are similar to the trends observed in the inflow from the East, with the main difference being that since late eighties a very rapid increase in migration from former Communist block have been observed. Okólski (1991) provides some evidence of increasing official outflow from Poland,

Romania and Hungary, although the latter country does not have any importance as source of migrants. There were also some sporadic short lasting waves, as emigration of some 352 thousand Turks and Pomaks from Bulgaria to Turkey during 1990, of whom 138 thousand reemigrated back to Bulgaria (SOPEMI 1991). Vasileva (1992) quotes 369839 emigrants of whom 159937 returned before 10.9.1990. The differences are probably due to different periods of time for which statistics have been assembled. Vishnevsky and Zayonchkovskaya (1992) quote Goscomstat data on net international migration in former Soviet Union for the period from 1961 to 1990. Until 1970 net migration was positive but later showed constant negative values. Record losses of 203.7 thousand were noted in 1989, but these were more than doubled (412.7 thousand) in 1990. Needless to say that vast majority of these migrants aim at Israel (187 thousand in 1990, Holt 1991) and then Western Europe and North America. However, those East European countries which are more successful in the process of economic transition, such as Hungary, Poland and Czech Republic, also received their share.

In the West the traditional destinations for the migrants from Eastern Europe have remained unchanged for decades. The primary targets are Germany and Austria and then Italy, France and Nordic countries. The USA and Canada remains important as a traditional destination especially for Poles and Ukrainians who have a long history of resettlement and well established communities in these countries.

The most important destination among countries mentioned above is Germany. SOPEMI (1992) reports that German net migration gains from Eastern Europe have doubled every year between 1986 and 1989, rising from 63.1 to 460.6 thousand and then stabilizing below half a million a year. The inflow to Germany in 1989 consisted of 387 thousand migrants (Statistishes Bundesamt 1991), who claimed to be ethnic Germans (Aussiedler)[4], 250 thousand legally migrating foreigners and 121 thousand asylum seekers. On the top of these flows there were 344 thousand migrants from East Germany (Ubersiedler)[5], who till the unification

of Germany in 1990 count as international migrants (Kemper 1993 after Sommer and Fleischer 1991).

Aussiedlers form the largest group of immigrants to Germany. Between 1968 and 1991 there were 1986 thousand of them, originating predominantly from Poland (50.7%), former USSR (26.6%) and Romania (18.4%) (Table 2). The number of Aussiedlers from Poland peaked in 1989, when they were over a quarter of million of them. Since then there has been a sharp decrease in the inflow from Poland (40 thousand in 1991), but this was partially offset by rapid increase in the number of Aussiedlers from former USSR and Romania (Statistishes Bundesamt 1991 and 1992).

It is clear that the main reason for this massive inflow of migrants is German constitutional law (Article 116 of the German Constitution) granting German citizenship to anyone who is able to prove German origin. In Poland, former Soviet Union and Romania there exist substantial groups either of German origin or able to prove German origin. These people are quite keen to resettle to Germany, some due to their feeling that they belong to German nation, some clearly because their countries of origin are in a disadvantageous economic situation. The result is that many of them do not speak any German (Kemper 1993) and have no link whatsoever with German culture. The German Ministry of Labour has taken on the expensive task to convert them into real Germans. Given the cultural and mental differences between Eastern Europe and Germany, no doubt this is a job for generations.

The policy of instant granting citizenship to Aussiedlers is in sharp contrast to the policy of no naturalization of second or even third generation of non-German migrants, who were born and brought up in Germany and who linguistically and often to large extend culturally are German.

Over the last decade there also were some changes in the stock of East European population in other EC countries. Table 3 demonstrates that apart from

Germany sizable East European populations exist in UK, France and Italy and outside the European Community also in Sweden and Austria. In Spain and Germany, for which more detailed data are available, increase in stocks of East Europeans, especially Poles and Romanians, have played vital role. In Germany the East European population has grown much faster than the stock of all foreign population. Some countries may have actually reduced the East European population residing there, as for example France did.

In Eastern Europe the primary target for East European migrants is Hungary. Redei (1992) reports that between 1.1.1989 and 30.6.1992 72170 work permits were issued in Hungary to Romanian citizens, who are the largest group, many of them of Hungarian origin. According to Vukovich (1992) Romanian citizens constitute between 70 and 80% of all applicants. Poles add another 10% to the pool, but their number is decreasing and are being replaced by a growing number of Chinese workers (Pataki 1992).

In Poland in Warsaw macroregion in the first half of 1992 only 3042 work permits have been issued, 69.7% of them to the citizens of former USSR (Mazur 1992). A real problem, in particular in Poland, lies in illegal employment which is difficult to curb and attractive both to employers (mainly small firms in the construction sector) and employees (in Poland almost exclusively from former USSR, in Hungary majority from Romania). Malacic (1992) believes that they replace migrants from the host countries who migrate further to Western Europe. Regular migrants who move to Eastern Europe are much more stabilized than those who move illegally. Nevertheless it is very likely that a good share of them will try to migrate further West, based on the experience they had gained already and better access to information.

Some of long term migrants may apply for the citizenship. Based on very fragmentary data for France (INSEE, Annuaire Statistique 1982 and 1991-92) and Germany (Statistisches Bundesamt, 1991, 1992), we may believe that the number of successful applicants has been growing between 1980 and 1989. In East

Table 2: Migration of Aussiedlers into West Germany

Country of origin	1985	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990	1991	from 1968 to 1991
Poland	22075	27188	48419	140226	250340	113253	40129	1006864
Former USSR	8222	10052	19815	47572	98134	147455	147320	528846
Bulgaria	7	5	12	9	46	27	12	313
Former Yugoslavia	191	182	156	223	11496	530	450	13183
Romania	14924	13130	13990	12902	23387	107189	32187	365237
Former Czecho-Slovakia	757	882	835	949	2027	1324	927	54712
Hungary	485	584	579	763	1618	1038	925	13057
Other countries	69	64	44	29	34	11	27	3496
Total	46730	52087	83850	202673	387082	370827	221977	1985708

Source: Statistisches Bundesamt 1991, 1992

Table 3: East European population in EC countries - 1980 and 1990

East European population in EC countries - 1980

	Belgium	Denmark	France	Germany	Greece	Italy	Luxembourg	Netherlands	Portugal	Spain	UK
Bulgaria				4100[e]							
Czecho-Slovakia	600[s]			26900[e]							
Hungary				21100[e]						61[n]	
Poland	7600[s]	970[k]	64800[h]	87600[e]				3184[i]		115[d]	
Romania				12300[e]						53[n]	
Former Yugoslavia	5900[i]		62500[h]	631800[d]	460[p]	5000[t]		14100[a]		88[n]	
Former USSR				6500[e]						59[n]	
Total (Eastern Europe & former USSR)											53000[b]

East European population in EC countries - 1990

	Belgium	Denmark	France	Germany	Greece	Italy	Luxembourg	Netherlands	Portugal	Spain	UK
Bulgaria				11400[d]							
Czecho-Slovakia				30400[f]							
Hungary				35100[d]						188[m]	
Poland		3861[j]	46300[g]	241300[d]		16996[a]				613[m]	
Romania				53100[d]						779[m]	
Former Yugoslavia	5800[a]		51700[g]	652500[d]	1892[o]	10400[l]	1500[c]	13500[a]		416[m]	
Former USSR				8100[f]						402[m]	
Total (Eastern Europe & former USSR)											57000[a]

Sources and notes:

a SOPEMI 1992

b SOPEMI 1992, data for 1984

c SOPEMI 1992, data for 1985

d SOPEMI 1992, data as on 30 September

e SOPEMI 1992, data as on 30 September 1983

f SOPEMI 1992, data for 1987

g SOPEMI 1992, according to the Census held on 6 March 1990

h SOPEMI 1992, according to the Census held on 4 March 1982

i SOPEMI 1992, data for 1981

j Stpiczynski 1992

k Stpiczynski 1992, data for 1989

l Baldwin-Edwards (1991), data for 1988

m Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, 1991

n Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, 1991, data for 1981

o National Statistical Service of Greece 1988, data for 1987

p National Statistical Service Greece 1990, data for 1989

q Okolski 1991, data for 1981

r Okolski 1991

European countries the number of applications for naturalization is insignificant due to various conditions such as requirement of a minimum length of stay in the host country or knowledge of the language and culture what in most cases cannot be met by the majority of the most recent migrants.

3 Future of East-West migration

There are various factors influencing international migration which are to limited extend predictable. One can mention here the political situation and closely linked with it ethnic and religious relations, economic development, demographic imbalances and finally migration policy development (see Chapter 17). Based on analysis of these factors it is possible to make some forecasts of the probable changes in international migration. Assessment of the feasibility of more formal numerical forecasting is made at the end of this section.

3.1 Ethnicity, nationalisms and wars

Nationalism of all sorts turned out to be a major factor causing unrest, disturbances, riots and even wars in postcommunist Europe. Nationalism has an enormous impact on migration, constituting a very powerful push factor. The degree of national homogeneity forejudges to some extent, the probability of frictions between nations inhabiting a country. However, historical resentments are equally important. Table 4 shows the three largest national groups in each of republics of former Soviet Union and states of Eastern Europe. It is clear that countries of Central-Eastern Europe do not constitute serious threat at the moment, either because they are very homogeneous (as in the case of Poland or Hungary) or they are able to settle existing conflicts peacefully as the Czechs and Slovaks have done. Despite a sizeable and allegedly badly treated Hungarian minority in Slovakia, it is unlikely that there will be massive migrations from this area, although a limited outflow of Slovak Hungarians to Hungary and probably

to the West may occur.

A much more explosive situation exists in the Balkan peninsula and in Romania. From the ethnic point of view this region is a real melting pot. Before the war started the share of the largest nationality (Muslims) in Bosnia-Herzegovina was as low as 44%. Other former Yugoslav republics had lesser but still huge minorities. Albania, Bulgaria and Romania, with the shares of Albanians, Bulgarians and Romanians respectively between 90% and 85% are more homogeneous.

The register of existing or potential national conflicts in these two regions is a very long one. In former Yugoslavia, apart from war torn Bosnia and Herzegovina and to lesser extent Croatia and Serbia, there are at least three areas of potential friction. Macedonia is in dispute over its name with Greece and has unsettled conflicts with Greece and Bulgaria; Voivodina, where only half of the population is Serb and 18.9% Hungarian[6] and finally Kosovo, where war between suppressed Albanians (over 77% of Kosovo's population during the last Census in 1981[7], but extremely quickly growing) and Serbs seems to be imminent. Albania, the poorest country in Europe, may easily be dragged into this conflict, hence would make the Yugoslavian war international.

If these potential conflicts turn into reality they will trigger large, perhaps going into hundreds of thousand, waves of refugees. The geographical location of Kosovo and Macedonia combined with existing conflict in Bosnia will probably protect Western Europe for a while. But nothing will protect Greece, Albania and Bulgaria, all ill prepared to give shelter to large number of migrants.

By Balkan standards Albania is fairly homogeneous country - with 90% of Albanians and only 8% Greeks, the second largest nationality. But this minority is another potential source of unrest, as it is backed by the government of Greece which claims part of Northern Epirus and by the Greek Orthodox Church.

Table 4: Shares of the three largest nationalities as a percentage of total population

Country/Area	Total Population (1000s)	Nationality groups as a percentage of the total population: First % nationality	Second % nationality	Third % nationality
USSR	285,743	50.5 Russians	15.5 Ukrainians	5.8 Uzbeks
Russia	147,022	81.5 Russians	3.8 Tatars	3.0 Ukrainians
Ukraine	51,452	72.7 Ukrainians	22.1 Russians	0.9 Jews
Belorussia	10,152	77.9 Belorussians	13.2 Russians	4.1 Poles
Moldova	4,335	64.5 Moldavians	13.8 Ukrainians	13.0 Russians
Lithuania	3,675	79.6 Lithuanian	9.4 Russians	7.0 Poles
Latvia	2,667	52.0 Latvians	34.0 Russians	4.5 Belorussians
Estonia	1,566	61.5 Estonians	30.3 Russians	3.1 Ukrainians
Georgia	5,401	70.1 Georgians	8.1 Armenians	6.3 Russians
Azerbaijan	7,021	82.7 Azerbaijanis	5.6 Russians	5.6 Armenians
Kazakhstan	16.464	39.7 Kazaks	37.8 Russians	5.8 Germans
Uzbekistan	19,810	71.4 Uzbeks	8.3 Russians	4.7 Tadzhiks
Kirghizstan	4,258	52.4 Kirgizs	21.5 Russians	12.9 Uzbeks
Tadzhikistan	5,093	62.3 Tadzhiks	23.5 Uzbeks	7.6 Russians
Turkmenistan	3,523	72.0 Turkmens	9.5 Russians	9.0 Uzbeks

Slovenia	1,963	91.0 Slovenians	3.0 Croats	2.0 Serbs
Croatia	4,784	78.0 Croats	12.0 Serbs	0.9 Muslims
Serbia & Montenegro	10,642	63.0 Serbs	14.0 Albanians	6.0 Montenegrians
Bosnia-Herzegovina	4,364	44.0 Muslims	33.0 Serbs	17.0 Croats
Macedonia	2,174	67.0 Macedonians	20.0 Albanians	4.0 Turks
Albania	3,285	90.0 Albanians	8.0 Greeks	
Bulgaria	8,869	85.3 Bulgarians	8.5 Turkish	2.6 Gypsies
Hungary	10,333	89.9 Hungarian	4.0 Gypsies	2.6 Germans
Romania	23,170	89.1 Romanians	8.9 Hungarians	0.4 Germans
Czecho-Slovakia	15,725	62.9 Czechs	31.8 Slovaks	3.8 Hungarians
Poland	38,386	97.6 Poles	1.3 Germans	0.6 Ukrainians

Sources New World Demographics 1992, CIA, 1993

Romania, much more stable than other countries of Balkan Peninsula, has her own troubles as a result of the Hungarian minority in Transylvania. This conflict has deep historical roots and is being aggravated by Romanian nationalists. It has already contributed to the inflow of Romanian Hungarians to Hungary (Szoke 1992) and no doubt will continue to do so in future.

Gypsies, who are particularly numerous in Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria and Slovakia constitute separate problem. Their presence does not cause any direct large scale problem, but they are disliked by local communities and flee en masse to the West (Barany 1992). Given the traditional mobility of Gypsies and fairly strong incentives to go, this flow will continue even if West European countries increase measures to discourage it.

An extremely explosive situation exists in the former Soviet Union with around a half of a dozen of local conflicts heating up the political atmosphere. These conflicts itself have already generated substantial stream of refugees. Öberg and Boubnova (1993) quote 600 thousand refugees in the CIS. If the conflicts are globalized we may have to deal with unmanageable tidal wave instead of with a stream of people. In 1991 Poland worked out plans for reception of some 6 million refugees from former Soviet Union, but none can make credible forecasts.

In 9 out of 14 former republics Russians are the second largest nationality, with the share as high as 22.1% in populous Ukraine and well over 30% in Estonia, Latvia and Kazakhstan (Table 4). If they are not the second largest national group, they are the third largest as in Moldova, Armenia, Tadzhikistan and Georgia. Altogether the Russians living in non-Russian republics number 25 million plus some 8 million living in autonomous regions of former Russian republic. The collapse of the Soviet empire has dramatically changed the situation of Russians in the non-Russian republics, now successor states of Soviet Union. From being a better educated and politically privileged nationality with access to the best jobs and cultural and educational amenities, they have been

turned into unwanted foreigners against whom on some occasions an armed hand was raised, as in Moldova.

In the Baltic states efforts are being made by the governments to limit the political rights of the Russians, but not so as to cause any decisive response from the Russian state (Brubaker 1992). In the former Central Asiatic republics the national differences are aggravated by religious differences and will remain so with the growth of influence of militant Moslems. Growing conflict in Tadzhikistan is an excellent example. Also the collapse of some branches of industry, such as the coal industry in the Ukraine, which is dominated by Russian labour, may put large Russian communities under threat.

For the Russians one possible response to this situation is to emigrate. Due to the division of labour along national lines massive emigration of the Russian population would be an economic catastrophe to many successor states. But step by step replacement of Russian specialists is feasible. A slow stream of outflow of Russians from non-Russian republics started more than a decade ago (Vishnevsky and Zayonchkovskaya 1992), but the outflow from the successor states may accelerate in future.

The natural destination for these migrants will be Russia. But Russia already has serious problems with the dislocation of troops withdrawn from Eastern Europe and the prospect for any economic assistance to those returning will be bleak. They may also be perceived as strangers or even foreigners in Russia. It is likely that they will try to find their way to the West - initially to Poland and Hungary and then to Western Europe.

Another wave of ethnic migration, namely emigration of those who identified themselves with one of states outside former Soviet empire, has been in place for relatively long time, but only recently has it gained momentum. According to the 1989 Census of Population in the former Soviet Union there were 2038 thousand Germans, 1126 thousand Poles, 374 thousand Bulgarians, 358 thousand

Greeks, 171 thousand Hungarians and 47 thousand Finns (after Chesnais 1993). Numbers given by the Census are usually lower than those given by national organizations or interested third countries. For example Korcelli (1992b) refers to Polish estimates of somewhere between 2 and 3 million of Poles in former USSR, Gasior (1990) speaks of 2 to 4 million.

Only Greece and Germany have received a substantial number of this category of migrants. Greece took almost 20 thousand Pontnian Greeks during eighteen months starting on 1.1.1990 (SOPEMI 1992). As it was discussed earlier many Soviet Germans migrated to Germany. Öberg and Boubnova (1993) say that 52% of Soviet Germans do not use German as their native language. It is unlikely that they are perceived as Germans in Germany. The German government, already in political trouble because of immigration, would like to reduce the inflow as much as possible. Various projects to create German enclaves in CIS have been put forward, but they all are costly and some, as creation of German zone in Kaliningrad area, politically unacceptable. An attempt to recreate German settlement in Ulyanovsk on Volga river cost Russia 48.6 million roubles (between 1990 and 1992) and 9000 hectares of land, while Germany contributed in kind constructing a school, bakery and factory for cheese production. As a result 1535 Germans from Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan, Ukraine and Siberia moved there rather than to Germany (Markiewicz 1993). Only 1.05% of those who selected Germany in 1991. A similar scheme has been launch by Ukrainian government (The Economist 29.8.1992). The combined efforts of Ukrainian, Russian and German governments to create better condition for resettlement within the CIS have not been particularly successful. They are however extremely important as they pave the way to limit migration in future.

The flows of those who have a place outside former USSR to go to will probably continue as long as there will be any people left who will be in a position to claim a foreign nationality.

The existence of large diaspora of nationals abroad can also stimulate migration.

It is enough to say that approximately twelve million Poles and their descendants live outside Poland (Stpiczynski 1992), mainly in Germany, Austria, France, Italy and United Kingdom and outside Europe in North America. Czech and Slovak communities exist in Germany, France, Austria and Switzerland (van de Kaa 1993). Although there are between 2 and 3.5 million[8] Hungarians outside Hungary, emigration does not have much appeal to Hungarians in Hungary. On the contrary it is likely that there will be sizable migration to Hungary. Among the nations of former Soviet Union large groups of Ukrainians and Armenians are located all over the world and this may be an important stimulus to migration.

It seems that the emigration of ethnic minorities will continue in the future for at least two reasons. First, there still exists a huge German population, especially in former Soviet Union but also in other countries, which is willing to emigrate. The second reason is the swelling of ethnic emigration by friendship and kinship links. The experience with emigration of Germans from Poland shows clearly that paradoxically, the more Germans emigrated from Poland, the larger the emigration stream became, although in the long term the process is probably selflimited.

3.2 Economic discrepancies - a main pushing factor

It is widely agreed that migration is very sensitive to economic incentives. The disparities in the level of living between Eastern and Western Europe are quite substantial (see Table 5). The per capita GDP of better off East European countries could be compared to Portugal, but if we look at the extreme values - Luxembourg has 46 times the per capita income of Albania. The majority of Western countries have per capita GDP between three and fifteen times higher than in Eastern Europe. Life expectancy at birth is 4.9 years longer in the West and the maternal mortality rate is more than four times lower. Okólski (1991) shows that similar discrepancies exist in housing conditions and work time required to purchase consumer goods.

Table 5 General economic characteristics of East-European and EC countries

	GDP per capita 1990[a]	Real GDP per capita 1989[c]	Life expectancy at birth 1990[c]	Human Development Index 1990[c]	Maternal mortality rate (per 100000 live births) 1990[c]	Unemployment 1990[c] in %
Albania	543[b]		72.2	0.791	100	
Bulgaria	2250		72.6	0.865	40	7.8
FormerCzecho-Slovakia	3140		71.8	0.897	14	5.6
Hungary	2780	6245	70.9	0.893	21	6.1
Poland	1690	4770	71.8	0.874	15	10.4
Romania	1640		70.8	0.733	210	
Former Yugoslavia	3060	5095	72.6	0.857	11	
Former USSR	3518		70.6	0.873	45	

Belgium	15540	13313	75.2	0.950	4	7.9
Denmark	22080	13751	75.8	0.953	4	9.6
France	19490	17164	76.4	0.969	13	9.0
Germany	22320	14507	75.2	0.955	8	5.1
Greece	5990		76.1	0.901	7	7.7
Ireland	9550	7481	74.6	0.921	3	14.0
Italy	16830	13608	76.0	0.922	6	9.9
Luxembourg	24980[c]	16537	74.9	0.929	2	1.3
Netherlands	17320	13351	77.2	0.968	14	7.5
Spain	11020	8723	77.0	0.916	7	15.9
United Kingdom	16100	14610	75.9	0.962	11	6.9
Portugal	4900	6259	74.0	0.850	14	4.6
Eastern Europe & USSR	2469[c]		71.0		48	
European Community	15495[c]	12860	75.9		11	8.5

Sources:

a World Bank, 1992
b Geographical Digest 1990-91, 1992; data for 1987/8
c UNDP, 1992

The level of outmigration will be influenced by the rate of development of East European economies in the near future. It is beyond the scope of this paper to provide economic predictions. The Economist's surveys of Eastern Europe and Russia (The Economist of 13.3.1993 and 5.12.1992 respectively) give very positive account of changes and fairly optimistic look into the future for Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia and a bit less encouraging picture of other countries' performance and prospects. Already there is some evidence of the influence of the economy on migration behaviour: Hryniewicz, Jalowiecki and Mync (1992) have shown that, since the introduction of market economy in Poland, the international brain drain of research institutions and universities has been replaced by an internal brain drain, in which research and teaching staff have taken jobs in the commercial sector.

The level of unemployment in the East will have an impact on decision to emigrate. These decisions may be fairly insensitive to the level of unemployment in receiving countries, as many unemployed East Europeans will seek jobs in segments of the market completely unattractive to native population. Table 5 shows unemployment levels in the East and West. They are on similar level. However it must be stressed that in Eastern Europe, where for the last 50 years unemployment virtually did not exist, this phenomenon is very shocking. For the well-being of families it is much more dangerous than in the West, as in the East many employed live on the brink of poverty and do not have any resources which could allow for survival of bad times. One should also bear in mind that unemployment is, as migration, age selective: last-to-come-first-to-go rule applies almost everywhere. Since 1990 unemployment has increased in all the countries of Eastern Europe, including former Soviet Union and probably will continue to rise for two or three years, which must push substantial numbers of people out of their countries.

3.3 Demographic discrepancies

Recent UN projection of world population (UN, 1991) forecasts that between 1990 and 2010 we will have to face some 2% reduction in the labour force in Western Europe[9]. Strictly speaking the forecast refers to the population in the age between 15 and 60 for women and 65 years for men. It does not take into account extended - sometimes up to 23 - 24 years of age - period of education neither varying labour force participation ratios. Sophisticated analysis of the phenomena may be found in Coleman (1992). South and North Europe will grow by respectively 1.3% and 3.6% of the existing labour force. In Eastern Europe and former USSR forecast growth will be even faster: 9.1% and 16.5%. Poland will account for 54% of growth of labour force in Eastern Europe. Germany - migration Mecca for many East Europeans - will undergo the most profound structural changes losing 18.2% of its labour force (Dzienio, Drzewieniecka 1992). Purely demographic changes will be enhanced by structural transformations - East European economies have a high proportion of their labour force employed in agriculture. Employment in this sector will probably shrink, as it happened in developed European countries, and part of released labour will have serious troubles finding employment. Therefore on supply side there will be a pressure to go. However on demand side, in the West, it is doubtful if there will be many jobs to take up. It is likely, as Coleman (1992) argues, that governments will try to offset labour force losses by liquidation of unemployment, retraining and increase in female labour force participation before they allow foreigners to come. Political pressure from the right and extreme right as well as experiences gained in the sixties and seventies, with guest workers who refused to go home when they were not needed any more, will enhance these policies.

3.4 Could we forecast the numbers of migrants?

Forecasting of internal migration is a tricky business. Forecasting of international migration is an even more difficult task, but theoretically feasible

in very stable and therefore non-existing conditions.

The problem with forecasting East-West migration is the lack of stability. Politically the region resembles a barrel of gunpowder. Economic stability is limited. Probably only demographic processes (understood narrowly as fertility and mortality) are stable, although a war can destabilize them easily. Attempts to apply specific theories of migration are of limited help. Öberg and Wels (1993 p.1) state: "There is of course no scientific method to predict either flows or event what will influence them...", however they recognize that theory is useful in explanation of existing flows.

Let us take just two examples. Who in 1986 or 1987 had predicted that roads on Hungarian-Austrian border would be jammed with East German "Trabbies" heading for West Germany? Who at the same time had predicted that half a million of Yugoslav Moslems, Serbs and Croats would be knocking to the doors of Western Europe, not as guest workers but as expellees? Certainly not very many and definitely not those who are in power to take political decisions.

Despite these limitations, press reports, research publications and speeches of politicians are full of statements forecasting on the numbers of migrants. The only problem is that they are completely unfounded. The differences in the predictions are not less than ten fold. Segbers (1991) quotes various estimates of emigration from former USSR between 2 and 25 million.

What we can really say about the future of East-West migrations? We may envisage some structural changes - reduction in the number of asylum seekers from Central-East Europe offset by the rapid increase from former Yugoslavia and not so rapid but still high flow from Romania. There is also a possibility of an increasing inflow of Albanians, of citizens of the Baltic states and above all from the other successor states of Soviet Union. The change in asylum policy may reduce the flows of unfounded asylum seekers. Labour migration may remain high with a fairly stable geographical structure. The migrational behaviour of

inhabitants of former USSR remains an enigma. Up to now outflow from this area was, in real terms high, albeit low in comparison to the migration potential. The economic recovery of Central-East Europe gives a good prospect for reduction of these flows, but high unemployment will probably hamper this trend. Another important factor in future will be chain migration. It is likely that the late eighties and early nineties have seen the peak of migration. It is, however, sure that overall level of migration from the East to West will remain high for a long time and the Western Europe will have to learn how to live with this phenomenon.

4 Conclusions

Eastern Europe has around 410 million inhabitants. The majority of them live in relative poverty, as compared with those living in Western world. Political instability, unemployment and poor economic conditions may force many of them to migrate. Currently they do it at a pace of slightly less than one million a year (Öberg and Wils 1993 for the period 1990-1991). The inflow of that size is difficult for the West to accept mainly for political and economic reasons. It also causes demographic and, what more important, human capital losses in the East. It is in the vital interest for whole of Europe to curb these migrations and the only way to do that is to remove push factors in the East. As the Yugoslav war has proved international community is powerless in the case of ethnic conflicts, but it can help develop economies of the region - mainly by removing barriers in free trade. It is naive to believe that the alternative policy - more barbed wires and watch towers - will help in long term.

5 Acknowledgements

I am most grateful to Professor Philip Rees who has improved my rough English. It must have been a hard job. However all errors remain my responsibility.

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Endnotes

1. Data in this paragraph are quoted after Okólski (1991; table 1). Statistishes Bundesamt and Eurostat (1991, table 11.5) quotes on some occasions different values than Okólski, but the quality of data in Statistishes Bundesamt publications are unclear, as they failed to refer to the sources.

2. Poles "specialize" in overstaying abroad. For example W.Spirydowicz, an official from Consular Department of Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that there around 150 thousand Poles residing illegally in Greece (In interview by E.Pawelek 'Pieszo, bez paszportu i pieniedzy, Zycie Warszawy, 16.6.1992).

3. Albanians mainly migrate to Italy and Greece. The latter country is often chosen by Albanian Greeks. RFE/RF Daily Report nr 121 of 29.6.1993 quotes after AFP a Greek official claiming that there are 150 thousand illegal Albanian immigrants in Greece. Three days later the same source (RFE/RF Daily Report nr 124 of 2.7.1993) reported that illegal Albanians are being expelled from Greece at a pace up to 3000 a day.

4. A detailed characteristics of Aussiedlers is given in Fleischer and Pröbsting 1989.

5. German law recognized at that time Aussiedlers - citizens of other countries who are ethnic Germans and Ubersiedlers - German who lived in German Democratic Republic.

6. Thus almost all Hungarian population have fled from Voivodina to Hungary, Mniejszosci traktowac nowoczesnie, Interview with Geza Entz, Secretary of State for Hungarians Abroad, Rzeczpospolita, 12.8.1992.

7. Most recent census in former Yugoslavia did not cover Kosovo due to tense

political situation. It is also likely that Serb authorities preferred not to have data from this area.

8. Mniejszosci traktowac nowoczesnie, Interview with Geza Entz, Secretary of State for Hungarians Abroad, Rzeczpospolita, 12.8.1992.

9. In this section terms Western, Eastern, Northern and Southern Europe follow division adopted in UN projections.