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FORECASTING INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION IN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES IN TRANSITION

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Forecasting international migration in European Countries in Transition

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1. Introduction

A recent overview study (Salt and Singleton 1995) has shown that demographers are helpless when they are given a task of forecasting international migration. A degree of our helplessness can be measured by the level of the accuracy of the forecasts: in the worst case among EEA countries reviewed by Salt and Singleton (1995) the annual *ex-post* error[1] of a forecast was 1150% ! An immediate question arising from the above statement is how we can improve our forecasting of international migration. In this paper an attempt will be made to suggest a possible approach to the forecasting of international migration in Central and Eastern Europe.

In my view, we should first re-examine the underlying theories and causes of international migration and see what they can offer for a forecaster of international migration. The second stage would be to classify the causes according to the degree to which reasonable assumptions of the changes of the processes can be made.

2. Existing theories of international migration.

In the past social scientists have created an impressive body of literature concerning theories of migration. However, relatively little attention has been paid to the problems and specificity of the theories of international migration. A vast number of migrants rambling all over Europe and North America in the last decade not only resulted in immense number of studies on patterns of international migration but also attracted researchers' attention towards theoretical issues and determinants of international migration. Two most comprehensive reviews on these topics have been published respectively by Massey et al (1993) and Greenwod (1992).

The neo-classical macro-economic theory (Lewis 1954) assumes that migrants will move from low to high income areas and that the flow of skilled labour is sensitive to the rate of return to human capital invested. The neo-classical micro-economic theory tries to refine this simplistic picture by inclusion of the concept of the opportunities (Sjaastad 1962) that are individualised. Both these theories are based on the assumption that an individual tries to maximise his income. So called new economics of migration (Stark and Bloom 1985) offers entirely different approach. The argument goes that households not individuals are in the core of emigration decisions and that they try to manage the risk to their income by diversification of labour markets of the members of the household. This theory explains why international migration continues even when wage levels in the source and in the destination level off. The dual labour market theory (Piore 1979) argues that migration is driven by the demand and recruitment practises at the destination rather than income differentials at the source and destination. Locals in the destination tend to move from low wage, low productivity and low stability labour market to high wage, high productivity and high stability labour market, leaving behind vacancies to be filled by migrants. The world system theory (Wallerstein 1994) states that international migration is a consequence of the development of capitalist markets and is as inherent to this process as a flow of capital or investment. It is therefore sensitive to the structural changes of the market and its dynamics, and it has little sensitivity to the income differentiation.

[1] Observed minus forecasted value as a percentage of observed value calculated for single years.

Sociologists (Taylor 1986) argue that the existence of networks is of paramount importance for prospective migrants, as they reduce the cost and risk of migration and enhance the chances of settling in. The network effect can be enhanced by institutional arrangements, both formal and clandestine. The cumulative causation theory (Massey 1990) points at the changes in the cultural and social environments in the origin and destination as the main agents of international migration. Geographers frequently perceive migration in the function of distance (spatial interaction models, see Wilson 1967, 1970). Another useful theory considers migration as a process of spatial diffusion. Demographers, following a strong tradition, concentrate on fertility and mortality and neglect mobility. They frequently look at socio-demographic characteristics of migration, in particular at sex and age structure of migrants (Rogers and Castro 1991).

Finally our historical knowledge of migration in the past could be useful for making educated statements on the possibility of future changes. It should be stressed that the reasoning *per analogiam* to past processes may not be very exact for a number of reasons. One is that historical conditions are never the same. Then human knowledge, perception and values change over time. Last but not least economic condition and geopolitical situation changes.

The existing theories offer explanation on a variety of levels, from micro approaches to macro approaches and use a variety of conceptual frameworks including economics, geography, demography, sociology and behavioural sciences. There are number of common features of these theories: (1) none of them is comprehensive; (2) the fact that they apply to *international* (as opposed to *internal*) migration makes little difference to the formulation of these theories (see also Willekens 1993); (3) they totally ignore forced migration, quite typical for international movements.

The process of migration is complicated and mechanisms behind it so sophisticated, that existing theories offer only a partial explanation of selected aspects of the process and a quite narrow analytical framework. Existing theories overlook a number of issues that are crucial for international mobility, such as political stability/instability, ethnic composition of populations, historical links or environment quality.

Apparently there is a gap between theories of migration and the practice of the demographic forecasting (compare also Öberg and Wils 1992). From the point of view of forecasting international migration probably the most useful is the concept of place utility in the source and destination as perceived by a prospective migrant.

The concept itself is not a new one. Maier and Weiss (1991) provided an excellent insight into the roots, uses and problems of this approach. This concept should be generalised to include extreme, life threatening, situations such as wars or major natural disasters. According to it international migrants would assess the utility of their existing place of residence and compare it with other places of which they have enough knowledge. If in their assessment the utility of a new place is much higher than the utility of their existing place they would migrate. The notion of 'much higher utility' must express direct and indirect costs of migration. An assessment of the utility of a place is specific to a migrant or a household and depends on the values adopted. The framework outlined above can explain a wide spectrum of motives of migration, including forced migration (utility of an existing place equal to 0), potential economic gains, social and family links, including necessity to take care of elderly or incapable family member, change in social

status, improved social and physical security, better environment, migration policy (viewed by a migrant as a degree of "institutionalised" difficulty to established himself in the destination) etc.

However, eclecticism and a very general and wide formulation of this theory make it difficult operationalise and to test it. Defining and calibrating a model based on this theory, which would be used for forecasting of international migration would be difficult if not impossible due to the lack of adequate data and due to methodological and technical problems. International migration is a lot more difficult to quantify than internal migration due to lack or inadequate international co-operation desperately needed to conduct research, cultural differences, reluctance from the international migrants to provide reliable information which is a direct consequence of restrictive migration policies and many other related factors. The fact that the model has been successfully tested in the research of internal migration does not give the ground to use it in the research of international migration. This comment brings immediately another observation that migration theories are of little help in forecasting international migration. In fact, migration decisions are so complicated and dependent on large number of factors ranging from access to information, historical issues, perception to economy. demography and politics, that so far no attempt at realistic mathematical and statistical forecasting of international migration has been successful. Öberg and Wils (1992) came, after a detailed analysis, to similar conclusion.

What actually may be feasible is an educated guess based on our knowledge of past migration and factors influencing them. We may think of some simple conceptualisation. One possibility is to revoke the common knowledge old push and pull factors. This is one element of the migration theories which is widely accepted by the research community. The importance and definition of these factors have generated substantial discussion in the past. Clearly, initial perception of these factors only in economic terms is inadequate. They should be generalised to include at least sociologic, political and ethnic factors. The main merit of this approach is the ease of definition of such factors due to abundant body of literature. It is also fairly straightforward to define scenarios that are based on push and pull factors.

3. Factors influencing international migration: how they evolved and how they can evolve in European countries in transition

Not all factors influencing migration will be discussed here. We will concentrate on these factors which may have impact on international migration. They can be ordered according to their stability. It is reasonable to assume that unstable factors will change migration flows more rapidly than stable ones. In this section an attempt is made to discuss these factors and to make comments on possible future developments.

3.1 Wars

Most unstable factors of international migration are political changes and wars, often fuelled by uneasy ethnic relations. The World War II and post-war changes of political boundaries triggered a wave of migration estimated by Kosinski (1970) at 25.4 million of migrants. This figure is much underestimated as it takes into account neither people sent to prisons and concentration camps nor deported for forced labour both in Germany and USSR. Existing estimates mention

that 18 million people populated German concentrated camps (Encyklopedia Powszechna 1985), of which between 7 and 11 million were killed (The historical encyclopaedia... 1981). Archipelago Gulag was inhabited by another 12 to 20 million prisoners (Solzhenitsyn 1973, The Oxford companion... 1995). Altogether this gives a number of between 55 and 63 million people who migrated, in most cases forcibly, during or after the second World War. In the case of German concentration camps only a tiny minority were Germans and some other nationals, notably Poles and Polish Jews often did not cross the boundaries of the Third Reich. Whether they all should be classify as international migrants is debatable. Prisoners in Soviet concentration camps were in most cases Soviet citizens or citizens of countries under Soviet occupation. The latter can be probably classified as international migrants, the former certainly not. If we assume that around 2-3 million of prisoners in Gulag camps were not Soviet citizens (this is a very reasonable assumption as the Soviets deported between 1 an 2 million Poles, not to mention citizens of Baltic states and other concerned territories) and assume that about 1 million Germans were imprisoned in German concentration camps we will get a crude estimate of around 44 million international migrants during the War and immediately after it. This estimate covers only former USSR and Europe, excluding neutral states, the UK, Ireland and Iceland,. Even if this estimate is very crude it shows roughly the magnitude of migration.

The territory for which the above estimate of population flows was made had been inhabited by some 469 million people (average of 1939 and 1946 populations, United Nations 1949). That means that around 9.5% of population participated in international migration during and immediately after the World War II.

Today there are two key areas where wars can either continue or start: territories of former Yugoslavia and former USSR.

Let first look at the situation in the former USSR. There is little doubt that Russia is potentially the main threat for peace in the region. Last decade brought a rapid change in its status - from an international superpower to a state hardly able to control its army, with economy in disarray, lack of a clear leadership, a rising wave of criminal activities and, as the invasion of Chechnia clearly has shown, weak and demoralised conventional forces. The Soviet empire, controlled by the Russians in the past, has vanished and many countries that in the past suffered Russian rules is very keen indeed to join NATO, perceived as the most secure protection against Russian imperialism. Russia has a lot of problems with what they call "near abroad": Baltic States regained independence after 50 years occupation, Ukraine is not any longer blindly subordinated (Goncharenko 1995) and Moldova gained independence. In Asiatic successor states of USSR Muslim forces are increasingly popular. Caucasian peoples try to gain some form of autonomy, if not independence. On the top of this come Russian - Japanese and Russian - Chinese territorial disputes and Russian - Norwegian dispute over a section of Barents Sea. All these factors create frustration among politicians and in the military and set the scene for some decisive action.

What sort of action could be taken depends on who would govern Russia. During last two years Russian policy has been harder and more assertive than previously (Latter 1994a). Despite of this, analysts agree broadly that neither Yeltsin nor communists would be quick to start any large scale war, however local, small scale conflicts are probably inevitable. Goncharenko (1995) has called typical Russian strategy in the region as "destabilise and intervene". Latter (1994b) has

suggested that Russia has currently no military capabilities to attack Western Europe therefore these activities would be probably limited to "near abroad".

However a change in power in Kremlin may radically alter the scene. Zhirnovski and his party explicitly state that war against the West is their ultimate aim. Buchan (1994) reports that Zhirnovski drew and showed a map of Europe which recalled the division of Europe agreed in Ribbentrop-Molotov pact. There is no need to recall that this pact has paved the way to the World War II. On another occasions Zhirnovski suggested that India and Russia should share state boundaries (Financial Times 1995) and suggested bombardment of Italian towns in retaliation for NATO's air strikes on Serb forces in Gorazde (Financial Times 1994). Better than expected results of Zhirnovski's party in December elections together with sweeping victory of communist and post-communist parties, who claim restoration of former Soviet Union as their objective makes the possibility of war within former USSR quite feasible.

The situation is further complicated by numerous conflicts and disputes within the former USSR. The list is impressively long: the Armenian-Azeri war over Nagorno-Karabakh, Caspian See boundaries not determined, the Russian - Estonian territorial dispute, the Kirgistan - Tadjikistan dispute over Isfara Valley, the Latvian - Russian territorial dispute, the Lithuanian - Russian conflict over Nemen River border, Russian - Ukrainian conflict over Crimea and the Black Sea Fleet and the Ukrainian - Moldovan territorial dispute.

These conflicts and wars themselves have already generated a substantial stream of refugees. Dunlop (1994) quote 2000 thousand refugees and forcibly resettled in Russia. One should add some 350,000 refugees from Chechnya (UNHCR 1995). This is roughly in line with UNECE (1995) data which quotes 2,281 thousand of refugees and internally displaced persons in the former Soviet Union in December 1994. Again these data are very crude and can be used for indication of the magnitude of the phenomena rather than as exact numbers.

More recent example of the war in former Yugoslavia is another sad illustration of the power of war as a push factor. According to the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE 1993) the war in former Yugoslavia created 5 million refugees and displaced persons (data as of October 1993), mainly from Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia. In 1994 this number dropped to 3.5 million (UNECE 1995). Most of them were internally displaced, the term which lacks precision due to unclear state boundaries. Estimated external (in relation to former Yugoslavia) outmigration was in the region of 0.7 million (UNECE 1993), but certainly has increased since 1993. Given total population in former Yugoslavia was 22.7 mln in 1993 (the year of the largest population mobility) some 22% of population was displaced, including 3% of total population who crossed the boundaries of former Yugoslavia.

Recent peace negotiations in Dayton broughts some hopes for this war-torn region, but a cold reaction from Bosnian Serbs jeopardise the long lasting solution to the conflict (The Economist, 1995a). The implementation of the agreement would require a transfer of people between Bosnian Serb Republic and the Federation, emigration from Sarajevo, declared an open city already stared, and exchanges between predominantly Chroat and predominantly Muslim parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina (by book they all will not be international migrations). The scale of the movements is difficult to assess now, but should be clear within next several months.

Other numerous conflicts, such as Macedonia's partly resolved dispute over its name with Greece or the tension between Albania on one hand and Greece, Macedonia and Serbia on the other over the rights of Albanian minorities in these countries should not result in a full fledged war.

In conclusion of this section we can not exclude an outbreak of a war in former USSR and/or Balkan Peninsula. It may cause a migration of sizeable share (up to 10%) of population concerned for a long period of time (5 year long conflicts are not unusual) with partial re-emigration after the war.

3.2 Ethnicity, religion and languages

Central and Eastern European states have in many case divers, from the point of view of ethnicity, populations. Table 1 shows up to five largest national groups, religions and languages spoken in each of the transition countries (including New Independent States). The national composition is given for two years (the first year being 1989 for the former Soviet Republics and 1992 or as close as possible for other states; the second year being 1995 (estimates for July).

It is clear that for most of the countries of Central Europe minorities do not constitute a serious problem at the moment because they are very homogeneous as it is in the case of Poland, Czech Republic or Hungary[2]. It should be noted that the flow of Aussiedler from Poland to Germany, which peaked in 1989 at 250,340 reduced in 1994 to only 2440 (Statistisches Bundesamt 1995). A strong migration flow constitute Aussiedler from former USSR to Germany. Over the last three years there were some 200 thousand of them per year and this trend may continue for the next couple of years. Soviet Jews who fled *en masse* to Israel (with the apogee of 185 thousand in 1990) continue do so with much lower intensity of some 60-70 thousand over the period 1992-1994 (Sabatello 1995). There are some evidences of a substantial counterflow from Israel to former USSR (Hawley, Stanger 1991) but data are difficult to get.

Slovak Republic does not fit into this picture very well, as it is apparently unable to settle relations with a sizeable (over 10 %) and allegedly badly treated Hungarian minority. The recent legislation on official languages which virtually excludes the use of Hungarian in public life did no good to the mutual relations. Surprisingly this uneasy relations did not generated any noticeable migration from Slovakia to Hungary (Juhasz, Dövenyi 1994). In fact, Hungarians registered 413 migrants from former CSSR over the period of three and a half years starting in January 1990 (SOPEMI 1995). It is therefore unlikely that the situation changes dramatically in future.

Before the civil war has started in the former Yugoslavia, the share of Muslims (largest ethnic and denominational group) in Bosnia-Herzegovina was as low as 44% (Table 1). Ethnic cleansing has reduced the share of Muslims to 38% in 1995. At the same time the share of Serbs has increased from 33% to 40%. Other former Yugoslav republics, with the exception of Slovenia, have smaller but still huge minorities: in Croatia 12% of population is Serb. A quarter of population of rump Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) constitutes minorities. In particular,

[2] CIA's estimates of the ethnic composition of Hungarian population in 1993 and 1995 differ substantially, probably because of a better access to information in 1995.

Albanians in Kosovo, who make up 14% of total population of rump Yugoslavia, and 81.6% of the population of Kosovo itself (Kupiszewski 1996b), and who show one of the highest rates of the natural increase in Europe (3% pa, Gosar 1991) may create in future some migration pressure. Some further relocation will unavoidably occur as a result of implementing Dayton peace agreement.

Albanians, Bulgarians and Romanians respectively, totalling in their countries between 90% and 85%, form ethnically more homogeneous states (Table 1). Romania is much more stable than other Balkan countries despite not being able to cohabitate peacefully with the Hungarian minority in Transylvania. This conflict has lasted for centuries and has already contributed to the inflow of Romanian Hungarians to Hungary. Over the period 1988-1993 there were some 66 thousand people who migrated from Romania to Hungary, out of them around 90% of Hungarian origin (Juhasz, Dövenyi 1994[3]). As there are more than two and a quarter million Hungarians in Romania there is little doubt that this flow will continue to exist in future. Germans are another Romanian minority with a strong migration propensity. They were about 90-95 thousand strong in 1992 and since then 12426 of them (in 1993 and 1994) moved to Germany as Aussiedler. It is reasonable to assume that some 4-5 thousand of Romanian Germans a year will continue to migrate to Germany over the next decade unless there is a rapid change in the German legislation.

Albania is a fairly homogeneous country: in 1992 90% of its population were ethnic Albanians whilst the second largest nationality contained only 8% Greeks. Rapid migration of Albanian Greeks to Greece (SOPEMI 1995) increased the proportion of Albanians to 95% and reduced the share of Greeks to 3% (Table 1), that is to some 100 thousand. The emigration potential of Albanian Greeks is therefore quite limited and it is likely that this stream of migration will disappear within next several years.

In 1989, in 9 out of the 14 former republics Russians were the second largest nationality, with a share of over 30% in Estonia, Latvia and Kazakhstan and over 20% in Ukraine (Table 1). Where they were not the second largest, then they were the third largest national group as in Moldova, Armenia, Tadzhikistan and Georgia. Altogether, the Russians living in ethnically non-Russian countries number 25 million plus 8 million living in autonomous regions of the Russian Federation. The demise of the Soviet empire resulted in a dramatic change of the role of Russians in the former non-Russian republics. They have lost their privileged position and turned into unwanted foreigners.

Emigration is one possible response to this situation for the Russians. The traditional pattern of migration in the former Soviet Union from west to east and from north to south has changed and reverse trends of migration from east to west and from south to north emerged during the 1980' (Rowland 1993). This process has recently accelerated bringing growing number of migrants from the successor states of former USSR to Russia. Data assembled in Table 1 confirm it. The share of Russians diminished most dramatically in Azerbajian (from 5.6% in 1989 to 2.5% in 1995) and Tadjikistan (from 7.6% to 3.5% respectively). Less pronounced changes occurred also in Kazachstan, Lithuania and Latvia.

[3] Data from SOPEMI (1995) suggest a smaller flow. Juhasz, Dövenyi use data from CSO, whereas SOPEMI from the Ministry of Home Affairs.

Migration of Russians between successor states of Former USSR should be now considered international migration. Among Western analyst there is quite strong tendency to see these migration as "internal" as long as the migrants do not cross the boundaries of former Soviet Union or even former communist block countries. This approach should be treated as a gross naiveté. That is only a matter of time when these migrants go West. And the time may be short, given housing shortages, particularly acute for migrants, and generally unsatisfactory (despite some limited recovery) economic situation in Russia. It may be expected that the a limited number of Russian migrants will come West within the next five - ten years.

3.3 Political changes

Political changes are difficult to predict. The weakness of analysts may be best illustrated by a fact that in the early eighties no one predicted the fall of communism, despite a large number of specialised research and intelligence institutions watching communist and now post-communist region with much attention.

The most important predictable change affecting countries in transition will be admission to the NATO and the European Union. The former is easier from technical point of view but more difficult from political point of view as it challenges Russia's historical dominance in the region. It is also of a little significance from the point of view of international migration as it would involve migration of limited number of military and diplomatic personnel. According to a document on 'how and why' the NATO should expand, initially the relocation of combat troops to new member either will not be an option or will take place on a very small scale (Clark 1995).

Admission of countries in transition to the European Union will have an entirely different character: it will eventually include freedom of movement of people within the European Union Area and possibly even within the European Economic Area. At this stage any prediction on the timing of the admission of countries in transition are difficult. A reasonable forecast for Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and may be Slovenia is that they will be admitted between the year 2000 and 2010. Other countries will follow probably between 2005 and 2020. More precise dates might be available after the Intergovernmental Conference in 1996. Four countries mentioned above will increase the population of European Union by over 60 million (in 1995 they were inhabited by 61.6 million people) that is by around 17%. The newcomers will constitute a huge migration potential and we do not really know how they would use their newly acquired freedom.

On 1.1.1986 the European Community admitted Spain and Portugal. Table 2 shows the increase in the migration flows from Spain and Portugal to selected countries of European Community in 1985, that is when the boundaries were closed, and in 1990 when the process of integration was well advanced.

Over these five years the flow from Portugal to selected EC countries trebled whereas the flow from Spain increased by 1/3. The numbers presented here should be treated as indication only, as France, crucial for migration from Iberian Peninsula has not been taken into consideration due to a lack of data. Nevertheless the growth of migration flows was apparent but not staggering, especially in from Spain. One should note that the proportion of per capita GDP in European Community and Portugal and Spain has not changed substantially between 1985 and 1990, what suggests the importance of freedom of movement for migration flows.

We may therefore expect that removal of administrative barriers for migration from countries in transition to the European Union will have some substantial impact on the size of emigration, however it would be difficult to predict the increase in numerical terms. Certainly more detailed comparison of the historical changes in the magnitude of flows could be more fruitful but the availability and the quality of the data are the main obstacle for such exercise.

3.4 Migration policy

Migration policy is another element which notoriously lack of stability. It tends to respond to pressures of time or serves as an easy way to gain votes of the political right. Migration policies expresses nations' attitudes to foreigners as well as current political, social and economic conditions. There is a distinctive difference between policies pursued by 'immigration nations', such as the USA, Canada or Australia and 'emigration nations' that is all European nations.

The message which has been sent by reach countries of Europe for the last several years is clear: migrants are not needed anymore. Visser (1995) argues that a change in migration policy in one country generates parallel changes in other countries. This is partly due to migrants' response to changing conditions in the destination: if the planned destination gets more hostile determined migrant will chose another, less hostile destination. From the point of view of forecasting, this feature of migration policies is important as we can adopt simplifying assumption that policy changes go in the same direction in a group of countries (as in Western or Central Europe) at roughly the same time.

The list of policy changes in the last three years is quite impressive: the most important are measures that address handling refugees and asylum seekers. The changes here went in four directions: tightening legislation (Germany, France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, Austria, The United Kingdom), speeding up processing of the applications (United Kingdom, Switzerland, France), making the period of awaiting for a decision less attractive from economic point of view (France) and signing bilateral agreements on readmission (Germany, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovak Republic, Romania, France, Italy, Spain, Portugal)(SOPEMI 1994, 1995). The general tendency to interpret the Geneva Convention in a strict way has been noted (SOPEMI 1995), as well as adhering to the Dublin Convention. Countries in transition are not sources of asylum seekers anymore and, with exception of Yugoslavia and possibly former USSR will not become in foreseeable future. They are recipients of asylum seekers, what may create some serious problems in future.

Important measures are taken to curb illegal migration. This is being done by increasing border control (France), facilitating expulsion (the Netherlands, Italy) and curbing dishonest employers who offered illegal migrants employment (France, Austria, Belgium, Italy, the United Kingdom, Spain) (SOPEMI 1994, 1995).

Other measures aim at tightening rules on legal entry to a country (Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Spain), penalising air and sea carriers for carrying migrants without appropriate documents, increasing on the spot checks.

The unusual legislation, where a migrant may be expulsed if he is suspected to commit a crime or even if he was seen in the place known for illegal activities ("milieu à l'illégalité répandue") is under discussion in Italy (Bonada 1995). No legal proceedings will be necessary and the defendant will have no right to appeal. In the proposed legislation the assumption of innocence will be replaced with the assumption of guilt, but only with respect to foreigner.

This tightening of laws and practices already brought marked decrease in the number of asylum applications logged in Europe and will reduce further legal migration. What impact will it have on illegal migration is unclear. On one hand restrictive measures and deportations may deter illegal migrants, on the other there is a possibility that those who would have been legal migrants would try to reach their destination illegally.

Formal agreements allowing exchange of workers under the state control signed between Germany and some other West European countries and countries in transition (Kupiszewski 1996a) could be very helpful, allowing for control of the inflow of migrants, reducing at the same time incentives to go illegally.

A crucial measure which could curb all form of migration would have been sealing off boundaries and withdrawing all types of visa concessions. A move in this direction is unacceptable from a political point of view as it would contravene the general integration tendency in Europe.

3.5 Economic conditions

Two issues seems to be important for international migration from economic point of view: the magnitude of economic discrepancies between countries in Europe and the impact of economic transformation and restructurisation.

The scale of economic discrepancies between countries in transition and Western Europe have been discussed elsewhere (Kupiszewski 1996) and is shown in Table 3. Judging by the difference in GDP per capita the most affluent European countries, such as Luxembourg, Denmark or Germany are over 20 times better off than the poorest European country - Albania. This measure does not take into account the differentiation in the price level which is an important factor from the point of view of "feel good" factor of prospective migrants. A synthetic measure allowing for incorporation of this factor in each country is per capita GDP based on purchase parity power rather than on fixed exchange rates. The differences between the reach and the poor are still very significant, but smaller then for GDP calculations based on exchange rates. The most affluent countries of former Soviet block such as former Czechoslovakia and Hungary (Romania has not been taken into consideration here, as its GDP (PPP) seems to be unreliable high) reached about 80% of GDP (PPP) of Greece, the worst off country of European Union. Poorer countries of the former Soviet block, as Poland and Bulgaria reached around 60% of the GDP (PPP) of Greece. However the comparison of Central and East European countries with the United Kingdom, the leader in the Table 3 leaves little room for optimism as these countries reach between 20% and 30% of the GDP (PPP) of the UK.

It may be enlightening to examine another important economic factor - the employment in agriculture. Hungary's(38.5%) and Yugoslavia's (40.9%) shares of population employed in agriculture is closed to 15 times of the share of employed in agriculture in Belgium (2.7%) and United Kingdom (2.1%) and more than 1.5 of the share of Greece. Other Central and East European countries with the share over 20% can be compared with Greece and Portugal, but have some over 10 times more of agricultural population than the United Kingdom. As the agricultural sector in Central and East Europe is underdeveloped and inefficient there is little doubts that it will have to modernise and streamline its labour force. These people will be first candidates to become guest workers in Western Europe, as many of them will be unable to find employment in their own countries. The extent of this migration depends mainly on the dynamics of economic change in Central and Eastern Europe.

This factor will have all important impact on the migration of migrants from entirely different end of migration spectrum: the professionals and research staff. So far it was this group which was very keen to migrate (Rhode 1993). However the introduction of a free economy has reduced the outflow of the skilled redirected them from research institutions and universities to emerging private enterprises (Hryniewicz, Jalowiecki, Mync 1992, Ardittis 1994).

Another interesting finding has been reported by a team of researchers from Population Activities Unit of the ECE UN (Frejka et al. 1995). According to their research the motives of migration and the length of stay abroad differ between Polish migrants on one hand and Ukrainian and Lithuanian migrants on the other. It should be pointed that current Ukrainian and Lithuanian patterns are quite similar to Polish patterns in the late eighties, what immediately brings a hypothesis that international migration patterns evolve with the level of economic development and advancement of transition processes.

There are two aspects of the impact of economic transformation and restructurisation on international migration. The first is the likely change in the employment in agriculture. At the beginning of the restructurisation process there were over 35% employed in agriculture in, Hungary and Former Yugoslavia and over 20 % in Bulgaria, former Czecho-Slovakia, Poland and Romania. Amongst EU member states only Greece has over 20% of its labour force in agriculture with many countries (Belgium, Luxembourg, Netherlands, UK) staying well below 5% threshold (Table 3). There is little doubt that economic reforms in the countries in transition will reduce the share of employed in agriculture as it happened in West European countries in the past (Economic Commission for Europe, 1992). Some labour released in this process will be absorbed by services which now are very undeveloped in rural areas. The rest will have either to take a dole or to migrate to urban areas which will be reluctant to absorb this new, relatively unskilled, labour. We may therefore expect that some of these people will migrate to the West.

The second economic process which may trigger some international migration is streamlining and privatisation of gigantic state owned mining and heavy industry enterprises. Their economic existence in many cases depends on various form of state subsidies, both official and hidden as non-execution of overdue taxes, which will have to reduced over time. The process will bring inevitable a reduction of labour force resulting in unemployment in old industrial areas. Some of these areas, notably upper Silesia in Poland, have already a tradition of international migration. High unemployment itself may cause international migration. Combination of two factors mentioned above may trigger quite substantial emigration.

The assessment of the future changes of the economic disparities discussed above is in fact the assessment of the economic growth of nations of Europe. It may be pointed that liberalisation of economies both in the West and East will certainly have reducing effect on migration flows as cheap East European labour will not have to move to the West in order to find capital and the capital, which is abundant in the West and badly needed in the East, will have incentives to relocate eastwards. This process is threatened by political reluctance in the West to allow more freedom in trade as it would jeopardise some of sectors of industry, in particular heavily subsidised agriculture. Resurgence of popularity and electoral victories of more or less repainted communists in the East, with their tradition of centralised government and omnipotent state, is another threat. Some authors (Molle, de Konong and Zandvliet 1993) argue that carefully planned economic aid can reduce international migration. This aid should be directed towards restructuring and demonopolising economies and reducing unemployment in agricultural and industrial regions.

3.6 Demographic discrepancies

Coleman (1992, 1993) and Dzienio and Drzewieniecka (1992) have pointed out that Western Europe will have to face shrinking of its labour force and ageing of its populations. At the same time Eastern Europe will have to face the increase in labour force and the process of ageing will not be that rapid, at least in some countries. There is, however, little evidence that demographic discrepancies themselves can generate migration. Coleman (1992) argues correctly that if there is a labour deficiency in the West, governments' priorities will be to bring unemployed back to work, offering them re-training and various incentives rather than to bring foreign workers. Another opportunity to increase the labour in West European countries is to increase female labour force participation.

3.7 Networks

The importance of the networks of existing compatriots in a destination is widely recognised. Such a network provide information, reduces the sense of insecurity. Visser (1995) who fitted a regression model to obtain missing elements of flow matrices noted that a positive relationship was found between the volume of migration and population sizes of sending and receiving countries, and sizes of foreigners of sending and receiving countries, in receiving and sending countries respectively. This shows the importance of support in decisions to migrate. To some surprise economic discrepancies did not play a significant role in Visser's model.

Networks of East Europeans in Western Europe and West Europeans in Eastern Europe have long history. German colonisation in Poland, Czech and Slovak Republics' territories goes back as far as to early medieval times. It was not only a physical colonisation but also a cultural one. First towns in Eastern Europe were created based on German Law. In particular, the law on which the town of Magdeburg was created gained immense popularity. German craftsmen helped to create the wealth and beauty of Prague. The XVIth century witnessed hectic economic activities in the basin of Baltic Sea. Hanseatic cities flourished and levered up the whole region. In the XIXth and early XXth centuries a substantial number of migrants from the Slavonic part of

Europe migrated westwards as far as to the United States and Canada. The second World War with the largest resettlement in history reduced somewhat the ethnic diversity of the region but this has been partially offset by large scale migrations in the last decade.

It is difficult to estimate the size of foreign populations. Census data are far from exact as foreigners may often wish not to disclose the nationality with which they identify themselves. This results in underenumeration errors. Not all who naturalised themselves in the host country lost their roots. We have therefore to use some proxy variable to assess the size of foreign populations. The number of registered foreigners is a convenient proxy variable as this information is universally collected by national statistical offices. Table 4 shows reported East and Central European populations in West European countries. Not surprisingly the country with the largest number of registered foreigners (1.8 million) originating from Eastern and Central Europe is Germany. On the top of this one should add well over 2.5 million of Aussiedler, who, whatever their declared nationality, keep close links with countries of their origin. France, Italy Switzerland and all have over 100000 registered foreigners from countries in transition. It should be expected that these three countries will face the most persistent inflows in future. The most important sending countries, again judging by the data on the origin of migrants, will be former Yugoslavia, Poland, Romania and USSR. This pattern is very similar to the pattern of sources of Aussiedler.

What may be expected in future is that existing networks will have a "sucking" effect on migrants. On the other hand they will also generate a substantial stream of return migration but it is likely that the net migration will be positive for Western states.

4. Should we care about migration between and inflow to countries in transition?

So far the discussion concentrated on the flows from countries in transition to 'external world', in particular to Western Europe. The silent assumption was made that what really counts for population change is the outflow of migrants from countries in transition to reach countries in Europe and elsewhere. This is, however an oversimplification. Two other types of flows have been neglected: migration between countries in transition and migration from 'outside world'. The latter may be further divided into flows from the Less Developed Countries and the Western World.

Population redistribution between countries in transition is quite remarkable. For example in 1994 Hungary's net gains with exchange with former USSR was 13291, with former Yugoslavia 13773, with Romania 52357. Migration processes within former USSR are extremely important: exchanges between Russia and Ukraine are over 200 thousand; Latvia lost net 14949 people to Russian Federation (Council of Europe 1995). These are registered reallocations. They are increased by unregistered, clandestine migration.

A century ago Ravenstein said that each stream of migration generates a counterstream. It is important to realise how big this counterstream is and what is its composition. We may now distinguish two components: a flow of professional and managerial staff from the West to the East. It will include senior managers, accountants engineers and marketing specialists which are indispensable to run Western investments. Language teachers and various consultants will top up

the list. There is also return migration which we know very little about. This category of migrants is important because it is likely that they will constitute a large counterstream. According to German data migration from Germany to Poland exceeded migration from Poland to Germany by 23049 (Council of Europe 1995). This happens probably for the first time since World War II and has an immense significance. It is very likely that this large stream of Germans heading for Poland (over 105 thousand) consist mainly of Aussiedler who migrated some time ago, acquired German citizenship, which they treat as a sort of insurance policy, and now go back home. Small scale regional studies of migration pattern in Opole region in Poland could be useful in explaining the phenomena.

5. Scenario setting of international migration

5.1 Existing experience in setting scenarios of international migration

The experience in setting scenarios for possible changes of international migration is very limited. National statistical offices of the countries of the European Economic Area in most cases adopted a practice of assuming that there would be a specific annual net migration or in few cases gross migration over a long period of time (Salt and Singleton 1995). In some cases the forecasted numbers are based on historical data, in other cases there are based on an expert advice. The most sophisticated set of scenarios have been developed by Swiss Federal Office of Statistics (Salt and Singleton 1995). These practices were hardly successful, giving in many cases unacceptably high *ex -post* errors.

Another approach was adopted by Drbohlav (1993), who used a Delphi technique to forecast the East-West migration. The finding of his study conducted in 1992 and 1993 was that after a short term increase of flows from the East to the West there will be a reduction and levelling of. Three years later we may say that the first part of the prognosis (the increase of East-West migration) was wrong, whereas the second was right.

Visser (1995) estimated migration matrices for 1992 and then extrapolated existing time series to derive matrices of future international migration. He adopted three scenarios related to a possible economic growth within EEA.

5.2 Four scenarios

Constructing scenarios is very risky business for a demographer. Constructing scenarios of the change of international migration is even riskier. The main problem is that the scenarios usually have a weak theoretical background. They express what the researcher thinks is likely or, often, what the researcher is interested to assess effects of.

The following four scenarios are proposed:

- No change
- Harmonious development with enlargement of the European Union
- An economic decline of countries in transition

- A war within former USSR

They will be discussed in more detail later on. The first scenario is a "benchmark" scenario to which other may be compared. The second one is the one which in my view is the most likely one. The third and fourth are 'catastrophic' ones, respectively from economic and security points of view. Neither of them is likely, neither of them can be excluded.

The time horizon of these scenarios is 15 years that is period 1995-2010. It seems to be the maximum period for which we may make any statements. After that time the technological change, such as teleworking, may have some impact on international migration and this is impossible to assess now.

5.2.1 No change scenario

This scenario has been conceived as a benchmark scenario to which results of all other scenarios can be compared. The central assumption of this scenario is that existing trends in international migration over 1992-1994 only (to avoid the peak of 1989-1991) should be extrapolated for the next 5 years and remain (1995-2000) stable afterward. The selection of the period based on which data would be collected determines the trajectory of the changes of the volume of the flows. The period is very short (3 years only), but that may be helpful from the point of view of data collection. Over this period international migration reduced in comparison to the period 1989-1991, but these three years are very special from political point of view. Massive migration at that time can be seen as a rapid reaction to the removing of political obstacles and will not repeat.

5.2.2. Harmonious development with enlargement of the European Union scenario

This scenario assumes that the process of European integration and unification will go smoothly but will not be very fast. It is assumed that the first country in transition to join European Union will be Czech Republic and that this happens in 2002. In 2005 Poland and Hungary will become EU members and in 2010 Baltic States and Slovenia will be admitted. The admission of other countries of the region is not expected within this framework as it is unlikely to happen within assumed time period, that is 15 years.

Existing trends over 1992-1994 only (to avoid the peak of 1989-1991) remain stable for the next 5 years (1995-2000). After 2000 migration between countries which will be admitted to the European Union and the European Union would increase at 10 percent per year as a result of closer co-operation and removing barriers step by step. After the unification over 3 years there will be a sharp increase in migration between these countries. The growth factor will be calculated based on the size of existing foreign populations in destination countries and normalised to values between 0.33 and 3.0, based on the data for Spain and Portugal shown in Table 2. Later on the exchange will stabilise.

5.2.3 Economic decline of countries in transition scenario

The assumption underlying this scenario is an economic decline in countries in transition. Poverty and economic misery would push people to seek better life abroad and at the same time deter inflow form less developed countries. Inflow from developed countries would suffer as well due to weakening economic links. This scenario would result in a 5% per year increase of existing outflows from the countries in transition to the developed countries and a 5% decrease of inflow from LDCs and developed countries to countries in transition over 5 years. Stabilisation of flows after the year 2000 is assumed.

It should be noted that existing economic trends do not fully justify this scenario. Most countries in transition show an increase in their GDP. Worrying is a long time decline of economies in former USSR: the GDP of the Russian Federation dropped by 4% pa in the first half of 1995, industrial production dropped by 0.9% and consumer prices index was 215.5% (September 1994 - September 1995) (The Economist, 1995b). Other successor states are doing even worse. Despite these rather poor economic results the pace of decline has been substantially reduced and if there are no unexpected catastrophic events there are some chances for recovery in future.

The real question is how sustainable the economic growth or reduction of economic decline is. Given the economic fragility of countries in transition and general difficult economic situation in the world it is worth to examine the consequences of the negative economic developments.

5.2.4 War within former USSR scenario

This is "worse case" scenario for Europe. It assumes that the situation in the former USSR gets out of control resulting in a war on the former Soviet territory. This will result in a massive relocation of population fleeing from territories affected by military operation and ethnic cleansing. The rate of migration adopted in this scenario is substantially lower than the one observed during the World War II what is justified by the observed tendency for refugees in former USSR not to leave its territory.

In this scenario existing trends over 1992-1994 only (to avoid the peak of 1989-1991) should be extrapolated for the next 5 years (1995-2000). It is assumed that conflict start in the year 2001 and will last for 5 years (2001-2005). Over this 5 years 10% of the population of the former Soviet Union will try to find shelter in European countries. Over the next 5 years migration levels will return to 1992-1994 level. Other flows will remain unchanged.

6. Conclusions

One of choices a researcher has to make during a scenario setting exercise is either to offer general scenarios which are easier to justify and define or to prepare more sophisticated and detailed scenarios requiring meticulous studies. In this paper former approach was adopted, resulting in a set of four broadly formulated and highly generalised scenarios. All scenarios are with the reference to the matrices of flows between countries in transition, other European countries and most important destinations on other continents, such as USA, Canada or Australia. It is assumed that the age and sex structures of migrants will remain unchanged. Hopefully this approach will provide sufficient detail for the population projections. Should this not be the case

more sophisticated scenario setting on a "from country to country" basis is feasible, but would be a resource hungry exercise.

All users of these (and other) scenarios should be aware of the methodological weakness of any (and in particular this one) scenarios: there is no way we can prove that any of these scenarios will happen. We can hardly say that one is more likely than others. This is particularly true when the scenarios of international migration is considered due to notorious discontinuity of the process.

Table 1 Nationalities, religions and languages in countries in transition region ranked by percentage shares of total populations

Area	Total pop. (000s) in 1989/1992 and 1995	First nationality in 1989/1992 (%) First nationality in 1995 (%) First religion `1995(%) First Language 1995 (%)	Second nationality in 1989/1992 (%) Second nationality in 1995 (%) Second religion `1995(%) Second Language 1995 (%)	Third nationality in 1989/1992 (%) Third nationality in 1995 (%) Third religion `1995(%) Third Language 1995 (%)	Fourth nationality in 1989/1992 (%) Fourth nationality in 1995 (%) Fourth religion `1995(%) Fourth Language 1995 (%)	Fifth nationality in 1989/1992 (%) Fifth nationality in 1995 (%)
USSR (1989)	285,743	50.8 Russians	15.5 Ukrainians	5.8 Uzbeks	3.5 Belorussians	2.8 Kazakhs
Russia (1989)	147,022	81.5 Russians	3.8 Tatars	3.0 Ukrainians	1.2 Chuvashs	1.2 Dagestanians
(1995)	149,909	81.5 Russians	3.8 Tatars	3.0 Ukrainians	1.2 Chuvashs	0.9 Baschkirs
Ukraine (1989)	51,452	72.7 Ukrainians	22.1 Russians	0.9 Jews	0.9 Belorussians	0.6 Moldavians
(1995)	51,868					
Belorussia (1989)	10,152	77.9 Belorussians	13.2 Russians	4.1 Poles	2.9 Ukrainians	1.1 Jews
(1995)	10,437					
Moldova (1989)	4,335	64.5 Moldavians	13.8 Ukrainians	13.0 Russians	1.5 Jews	0.5 Belorussians
(1995)	4,490	64.5 Moldavians	13.8 Ukrainians	13.0 Russians	3.5 Gaugaz	1.5 Jews
Religions (1995)		98.5 Orthodox	1.5 Jews			
Lithuania (1989)	3,675	79.6 Lithuanians	9.4 Russians	7.0 Poles	1.5 Belorussians	1.2 Ukrainians
(1995)	3,876	80.1 Lithuanians	8.6 Russians	7.7 Poles		
Latvia (1989)	2,667	52.0 Latvians	34.0 Russians	4.5 Belorussians	3.5 Ukrainians	2.3 Poles
(1995)	2,763	51.8 Latvians	33.8 Russians	4.5 Belorussians	3.4 Ukrainians	2.3 Poles
Estonia (1989)	1,566	61.5 Estonians	30.3 Russians	3.1 Ukrainians	1.8 Belorussians	0.3 Jews
(1995)	1,625	61.5 Estonians	30.3 Russians	3.17 Ukrainians	1.8 Belorussians	1.6 Finns
Georgia (1989)	5,401	70.1 Georgians	8.1 Armenians	6.3 Russians	5.7 Azerbaydzhanians	3.0 Ossetians
(1995)	5,726					
Religions (1995)		65 Georgian Orthodox	11 Muslim	10 Russian Orthodox	8 Armenian Orthodox	
Language (1995)		71 Georgian	9 Russian	7 Armenian	6 Azeri	
Azerbaydzhan (1989)	7,021	82.7 Azerbaydzhanians	5.6 Russians	5.6 Armenians	3.3 Dagestanians	0.6 Kabardinians
(1995)	7,790	90 Azerbaydzhanians	2.5 Russians	2.3 Armenians	3.2 Dagestanians	
Religions (1995)		93.4 Muslim	2.5 Russian Orthodox	2.3 Armenian Orthodox		
Language (1995)		89 Azeri	3 Russian	2 Armenian		
Armenia (1989)	3,305	93.3 Armenians	2.6 Azerbaydzhanians	1.6 Russians	0.3 Ukrainians	0.0 Georgians
(1995)	3,557					
Religions (1995)		94 Armenian Orthodox				

Kazakhstan (1989)	16,464	39.7 Kazaks	37.8 Russians	5.8 Germans	5.4 Ukrainians	2.0 Uzbeks
(1995)	17,377	41.9 Kazaks	37 Russians	5.2 Ukrainians	4.7 Germans	2.1 Uzbeks
Religions (1995)		47 Muslim	44 Russian Orthodox	2 Protestant		
Language (1995)		40 Kazach	66 Russian			
Uzbekistan (1989)	19,810	71.4 Uzbeks	8.3 Russians	4.7 Tadzhiks	4.1 Kazakhs	2.4 Tatars
(1995)	23,089					
Religions (1995)		88 Muslim	9 Eastern Orthodox			
Language (1995)		74.3 Uzbek	14.2 Russian	4.4 Tadzhik		
Kirghizstan (1989)	4,258	52.4 Kirgizs	21.5 Russians	12.9 Uzbeks	2.5 Ukrainians	2.4 Germans
(1995)	4,770					
Religions (1995)		70 Muslim				
Tadzhikistan (1989)	5,093	62.3 Tadzhiks	23.5 Uzbeks	7.6 Russians	1.4 Tatars	1.3 Kirgizs
(1995)	6,155	64.9 Tadzhiks	25 Uzbeks	3.5 Russians		
Religions (1995)		80 Sunni Muslim	5 Shi'a Muslim			
Turkmenistan (1989)	3,523	72.0 Turkmens	9.5 Russians	9.0 Uzbeks	2.5 Kazakhs	1.1 Tatars
(1995)	4,075	72.0 Turkmens	9.8 Russians	9.0 Uzbeks	2 Kazakhs	
Religions (1995)		73.3 Muslim	11 East Orthodox			
Language (1995)		72 Turkmen	12 Russian	9 Uzbek		
Slovenia (1992)	1,963	91.0 Slovenians	3.0 Croats	2.0 Serbs	1.0 Muslims	
(1995)	2,052					
Religions (1995)		96 Roman Catholics	1 Muslim			
Language (1995)		91 Slovenian	7 Serbo-Chroatian			
Croatia (1992)	4,784	78.0 Croats	12.0 Serbs	0.9 Muslims	0.5 Hungarians	
(1995)	4,667	78.0 Croats	12.0 Serbs	0.9 Muslims	0.5 Hungarians	0.5 Slovenians
Religions (1995)		76.5 Roman Catholics	11.1 Orthodox	1.6 Slavic Muslim	0.4 Protestant	
Language (1995)		96 Serbo-Chroatian				
Serbia & Montenegro (1992)	10,642	63.0 Serbs	14.0 Albanians	6.0 Montenegrins	4.0 Hungarians	
(1995)	11,102					
Religions (1995)		65 Orthodox	19 Muslim	4 Roman Catholics	1 Protestant	
Language (1995)		95 Serbo-Chroatian	5 Albanian			
Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992)	4,364	44.0 Muslim	33.0 Serbs	17.0 Croats		
(1995)	3,201	38 Muslim	40 Serbs	22 Croats		
Religions (1995)		40 Muslim	31 Orthodox	15 Roman Catholics	4 Protestants	
Language (1995)		99 Serbo-Chroatian				
Macedonia (1992)	2,174	67.0 Macedonians	20.0 Albanians	4.0 Turks	2.0 Serbs	
(1995)	2160	65 Macedonians	22 Albanians	4 Turks	3 Gypsies	2 Serbs
Religions (1995)		67 Eastern Orthodox	30 Muslims			
Language (1995)		70 Macedonian	21 Albanian	3 Turkish	3 Serbo-Chroatian	

Albania (1992)	3,285	90.0 Albanians	8.0 Greeks			
(1995)	3,414	95 Albanians	3 Greeks			
Religions (1995)		70 Muslim	20 Albanian Orthodox	10 Roman Catholic		
Bulgaria (1992)	8,869	85.3 Bulgarians	8.5 Turks	2.6 Gypsies	2.5 Macedonians	0.3 Armenians
(1995)	8,775					
Religions (1995)		85 Bulgarian Orthodox	13 Muslim	0.8 Jews	0.5 Roman Catholic	
Hungary (1992)	10,333	96.6 Hungarians	1.6 Germans	1.1 Slovaks	0.2 Romanians	
(1995)	10,319	89.9 Hungarians	4 Gypsies	2.6 Germans	2 Serbs	0.8 Slovaks
Religions (1995)		67.5 Roman Catholic	20 Calvinist	5 Lutheran		
Language (1995)		98.2 Hungarian				
Romania (1992)	23,170	89.1 Romanians	8.9 Hungarians	0.4 Germans		
(1995)	23,198					
Religions (1995)		70 Romanian Orthodox	6 Roman Catholic	6 Protestant		
Czecho-Slovakia (1992)	15,725	62.9 Czechs	31.8 Slovaks	3.8 Hungarians	0.5 Poles	0.3 Germans
Czech Republic(1995)	10,433	94.4 Czechs	3 Slovaks	0.6 Poles	0.5 Germans	0.3 Gypsies
Religions (1995)		39.2 Roman Catholic	4.6 Protestant	3 Orthodox		
Slovak Republic(1995)	5,432	85,2 Slovaks	10.7 Hungarians	1.5 Gypsies	1 Czechs	0.3 Ukrainians
Religions (1995)		60.3 Roman Catholic	8.4 Protestant	4.1 Orthodox		
Poland (1992)	38,386	97.6 Poles	1.3 Germans	0.6 Ukrainians	0.5 Belorussians	
(1995)	38,792					
Religions (1995)		95 Roman Catholics				

Sources:
Data for 1989: New World Demographics L.C. (1992),
Data for 1992 (or as close as possible): The CIA World Factbook (1993)
Data for 1995 The CIA World Factbook 1995.

Table 2 Flows of migrants from Spain and Portugal in 1985 and 1990 to selected states of European Community

		B	DK	D	I	NL	Total	Per capita GDP in Spain and Portugal as a % of the per capita GDP in EC12
Portugal	1985	373	78	2126	398	533	3508	52.2
	1990	1539	124	7806	265	806	10540	54.5
Spain	1985	1057	641	5749	974	1612	10033	71.8
	1990	1438	837	8067	1155	1851	13348	75.4

Source: Council of Europe 1986 and 1991, Eurostat 1989, 1993.
Note: Only these member states of EC were listed for which comparable data were available.

Table 3 General economic characteristics of East-European and European Union countries

	GDP per capita 1993[i]	Real GDP (PPP) per capita 1991[j]	Life expectancy at birth 1993[j]	Human Development Index 1990[c]	Maternal mortality rate (per 100000 live births) 1990[c]	% of population employed in agriculture (year)	Unemployment rate in 1995
Albania	800[b]		72.2[c]	0.791	100		
Bulgaria	1440	4980	71	0.865	40	26.6(85)	16.3[l]
Former Czecho-Slovakia		6280		0.897	14	21.6(80)	
Czech Republic	2710		71				2.9[k]
Slovak Republic	1950		71				13.9[k]
Hungary	3350	6080	69	0.893	21	38.5(95)	11.2[k]
Poland	2260	4500	71	0.874	15	27.9(88)	15.1[k]
Romania	1140	6900	70	0.733	210	28.5(90)	10.5[k]
Former Yugoslavia	3060[a]	5095[c]	73	0.857	11	40.9(81)	
Former USSR	2340[ha]		70.6[c]	0.873	45		1.7[hk]
Belgium	21650	17510	77	0.950	4	2.7(90)	10.2[m]
Denmark	23700[f]	17880	75	0.953	4	5.4(90)	9.7[m]
France	22490	18430	77	0.969	13	5.7(91)	11.5[m]
Germany	23560	19770	76	0.955	8		10.0[m]
Greece	7390	7680	78	0.901	7	23.2(90)	9.2[e]

Ireland	13000	11430	75	0.921	3	14.9(90)	14.6[m]
Italy	19840	17040	78	0.922	6	8.4(91)	11.9[p]
Luxembourg	24980[c]	16537[c]	74.9[c]	0.929	2	3.5(91)	1.5[e]
Netherlands	20950	16820	78	0.968	14	4.5(91)	6.9[m]
Spain	13590	12670	78	0.916	7	10.7(91)	22.7[n]
United Kingdom	18060	21780	76	0.962	11	2.1(90)	8.3[m]
Portugal	9130	9450	75	0.850	14	17.9(90)	7.0[o]
Eastern Europe & USSR	2469[c]		71.0[c]		48		
European Community	15495[c]	12860	75.9[c]		11		10.1[e]

Sources and notes:

a World Bank 1992, data for 1990
b Geographical Digest 1992-93, 1992; data for 1989
c UNDP 1992, data for 1990
e OECD 1993, data for 1992
f World Bank 1993
g UNDP 1992
h Russian Federation only
i World Bank, 1995
j World Resources, 1994
k OECD 1995a, data for April 1995
l OECD 1995a, data for 1993
m OECD 1995b, data for June 1995
n OECD 1995b, data for Q3 of 1994
o OECD 1995b, data for Q2 of 1995
p OECD 1995b, data for April 1995

Table 4. Central and East European populations in selected West European countries as close as possible to 1993

	Belgium	Denmark	Finland	France	Germany	Italy	Norway	Nether-lands	Sweden	Spain	Switzer-land	UK
Albania						30800[a]						
Bulgaria				800[b]	56700[a]							
Czecho-Slovakia	500[d]			2000[b]	52000[a]						5400[a]	
Hungary	700[d]		300[a]	2900[b]	62200[a]				3400[a]	188[c]	4200[a]	
Poland	4800[d]	5100[a]	700[a]	46300[e]	260500[a]	21100[a]	2800[a]		16100[a]	613[c]	5100[a]	
Romania				5700[b]	162600[a]	19400[a]			5000[a]	779[c]		
Croatia					153100[a]							
Bosnia-Herzegovina					139100[a]		6300[a]					
Former Yugoslavia[f]	7400[a]	11600[a]	2400[a]	51700[e]	929600[a]	72400[a]	7300[a]	24700[a]	32400[a]	416[c]	245000a	
Former USSR	900[d]		13300[a]	4300[b]	63600[a]					402[c]		
Total (Eastern Europe & former USSR)												78000[a]

Sources and notes:

a SOPEMI 1995, data for 1993
b SOPEMI 1994, data for 1990
c Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, 1992, data for 1990
d SOPEMI 1994, data for 1991
e SOPEMI 1992, according to the Census held on 6 March 1990
f Without Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina when data for these countries are given separately

Note:

The sources from which data for this table has been assembled varies enormously as the statistics of international migration varies from country to country. It was impossible to acquire data for uniform period of time. Therefore the direct comparison of the data provided across various countries should be made with caution.

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