# FIT2093 Assignment 1 – Semester 1, 2019

#### **Submission Guidelines**

- **Deadline:** Assignment 1 is due on 31 May 2019 at 11:55pm (Melbourne, Australia time).
- **Required Files:** All the required files for the assignment are included in the ZIP archive file AssFiles.zip available on Moodle.
- Student Groups: Students should submit their report as a group of 3 students from their tutorial class. Each group should choose one student as the submitter who will submit the assignment on behalf of the group. Please form your assignment groups as soon as possible and email your tutor to let them know of your group members and the submitter group member. The names and student ids of all group members should also be clearly stated in the report.
  - **NOTE 1:** If you want to work in a group of 2 students you need to get approval from your tutor.
  - **NOTE 2:** If you are unable to find group members, please contact your tutor, who will assign you to a group.
- Submission File Format: Only PDF file format is accepted. On various text editor software you can use "Save as PDF" option or use free converters to convert your file to PDF. A handwritten submission is not acceptable.

**Note:** Do not submit a compressed version of the PDF file or a compression of multiple files. Such submissions may risk losing partial or complete assignment marks.

- Submission Platform: Electronic submission via Moodle.
- **Required Student Information:** Please include the name and student id of all students in the group within the main PDF file.
- Filename Format: A1\_TutorialDay\_TutorialHour\_GroupNumber.pdf
- Late Submission Policy: Submit a special consideration form (available on moodle) to formally request a late submission.
- Late Submission Penalty: A late submitted assignment without prior permission will receive a late penalty of a 5% deduction per day (including Saturday and Sunday) or part thereof, after the due date and time.
- **Plagiarism:** It is an academic requirement that your submitted work be original. Zero marks will be awarded for the whole submission if there is any evidence of copying, collaboration, pasting from websites, or copying from textbooks.

**Note:** Plagiarism policy applies to all assessments.

### Marks

- This assignment is worth 10% of the total unit marks.
- The assignment is marked out of 100 nominal marks.
- For example if you obtain 60 marks for this assignment, it will contribute  $\frac{60}{100} \times 10 = 6$  marks to your final unit grade.
- Answers to explanation questions will be graded based on the correctness and quality of the answer.
   Answers to computation questions will be graded based on the correctness of the method/code and the computation result.

#### **Notes**

- You can use the sagemath tool to perform any calculation necessary for this assignment. The sagemath web interface is available at: https://sagecell.sagemath.org/.
- For each question, you need to show both the results and your working process such as the source code or the commands you are using to solve the tasks. You will get zero marks for a specific question if only the result is provided. The format should be similar to the sample solutions of the lab contents on Moodle.
- Do not write the answers in scientific notation, you need to provide all of the digits for any requested parameter in **hexadecimal** format (similar to provided values). Note that numbers in this assignment written in hexadecimal format are written with a '0x' prefix (e.g. '0xa0b1c2d3'). This is a standard notation for indicating the hexadecimal format and many software packages expect hexadecimal numbers to be input in this way, e.g. this prefix allows SageMath to interpret the value in hex.
- Since the input values in the tasks are huge, newlines are used to fit the inputs within the page width. These
  newlines must be removed before pasting the values to the tools. You can use a text editor to remove the
  newlines.
- Try small examples (from lecture notes, lab contents, or other resources) to make sure you are using the proper format for the tools and the correct equation before trying the given values.

## 1 Task 1 (40 marks)

Alice is using the following "textbook" RSA-3072 digital signature scheme:  $sig = (msg)^d \mod N$  for message authentication. Given the public modulus N, answer the following questions.

N=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

### (a) (10 marks) Given Alice's private key d and the message msg, compute Alice's signature sig.

d=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

msg=0x6b948843b86adb04a834cba6a76d5753da8ffbdcd01782a49d395f52f4c37a0cc39eeb41646ebc2b2003bacb203328e210604f248e02fa95aa6eec50751abe267f5c0b70f60901a4fd338f61bb200acb3f2cf80d602acf85c5ee2f015667e9520e2d5c1aa84dcc69c9358a376846d2a0e9b52877fe17a76ce4bf6c46c7a46f61102d42869e0a594c4ad71a699a603654e4d6bdf83fc09b9741b70e82013

302517efceebc9be49a7bc86ab89653f3281ffcc20824970410461510f4a9b538f8d5468b872cbef 23a348b61576ae1f840138f14e7f8f13643aae1467cd534803555f8b2facb34fae15d53dc8c954bc 8af0561597bfbb5a82c3b08bc83d349962aaaa6e164a138045b96dd9730aa7e1bb440838c42296ff 2bdf53ca69f09c7e74c5e855455ffb052399e82e7e182d8efa08c96bdd166a00381d3fc53bb2a3d4 6b0aa6e2af8a45cd00e8bffe34fb7bafd20dade1efece7331b417136e2ed971c8f16e193948f3c65 95e9f63a948610f1d3e2246e6603d0b039f9bdd50fc50baadef

(b) (10 marks) Given Alice's public key (e, N) where N is given in (a) and e = 0x10001 in **hexadecimal**, and the following two message/signature pairs (msg1, sig1) and (msg2, sig2) Bob received from Alice, show how Bob verifies the digital signatures. Do both messages pass the verification?

msg1=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

sig1=0x2be8a53416b161b0b7e76e28046a7a8b923417536fc6b27f2cb1666daaf6ab0292b696d9946
134f3de1e4a9db1a0d47c5c888b0699bc29bf497dbcc49bd643bf151a06514d45f418aca2198a622
0d56970d7c15bc65caaac568148fa03f1d39d8cbf3b6e919e8ed3ff25655f15e18e0b89109f8f337
dcb80853dd22d73461dd3956e83e97debf6a5878f1219682cac4d2a71a2fc662743221d2faba4fe8
ab2f02055bbc895c38475c95590c9b08beeec49217bbc52a3771012022a9c537477892b1eeadf17e
f5f9471d1d40abd097ca9026fa321df01add8289bf611bd4c029ecab9c0539a22b9360f241950bcb
9b32dc339ca9c94054c0be4e1772629b7344a544c0eb566895d64ee773d220e417f9805bb3645751
5474146a22264c05c1a8f1a23c156c87111d4198dbee9e89fc14e059e0e9030c5d1ce2327ebbe990
99d006c99e5d0cfb9ea2cd94b944c8933277e53f63a0e0664c9a652711ac0438bab41c6107924afa
a77a5953c02e235a18f320822cdbb2621ea0912631d55aefd1a4d

msg2=0x31c276bb243008ad8ee81ee029e80aad7e9ff16ed54dafe20649756f6bae1b57fb095865c4a 902d55892d0d22e3ba2ca62d7bc3a069a18f9c8df8e5b09a640ab1dd35bac240e6fbec27d7089abd cf943d3894cbe1e13a2db39dae0a1409259b76ead144ec7a8c308c4bd1ca1cc8133de63c46d80925 10ffa422bf8827d81e377bf70a07e6e82ed8b863cdc2aa6705731237f79f36aa6c35ca3f03542f0a 7d5c56e3711b96b20c7bbb0da837c6cc3abec24783d2b95de9e6bc052b81d21955912d40a18b03ba 9fcd206c37ccac389524b4ef4835822ea0cb3524ecd1a47ca2baa4bc66fd3dc4ba174aab59088019 f9932102709519f8146d3d5af858077f351c97d277aaacf9a832e0b4271475bf5fd29e380149e2bb d443f0e0363f7e96d2a3f02e384a01caf6b11afde551696f411f26e603225fde420deec3f4f715ab b5e445180d2717870b2285f761f0baa917751512442ddbfd05e529a15b649f6d45aa93fb31626ab9 a498d98612e225140c98551d0851057c332366e60f39234e0c711

 $\label{eq:sig2=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$ 

5227075756ff2f4fb0a15741102c31c1e59662767d78691bf864f3fbda722da50b8e02e88f7b6029eb85da47c44439b90e9cd4d027d171960b9438d9c9c73d211e555

(c) (10 marks) Assume the attacker Marvin intercepted the following two message/signature pairs (msg1, sig1) and (msg2, sig2) signed by Alice using the same private key (d, N) from (a). Explain how Marvin can perform an **efficient forgery** attack that, given (msg1, sig1), (msg2, sig2) and Alice's **public** key (N, e), computes a forgery message/signature pair (msg3, sig3), where sig3 is a valid signature for the **new** message msg3 (here, new means that msg3 is not equal to either msg1 or msg2). NOTE: Marvin's forgery method CANNOT use Alice's secret key d, which is assumed to be unknown to Marvin. Show a **numerical** example that the signatures forged by Marvin can pass the verification.

msg1=0xa9edfdd28f7b79039fc041e8244d3d06bbac0e2cd108e1c5fd5691ae03545cf27a465bee1216e6f97f5d2443767a32a6dcb46f012aa0ac19cf5e6b81097e2846cea4eab599620fc876ef6071d92b67cec573d91366301a60f90efab964ccfbda9b5fc197ba86bdfb9e7a5380f7e28c90e7149a3d8ca5d443e22df5e284cbb5700c2f89df1c6a7d21dca87a856523bf1a37e44e85e76a03be641ff9366b6a8552bee1763bca3cdba155899137fb8fae54fa4558a9cfcb5dfabcd1473068b93ca

sig1=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

msg2=0x4eaacda480337afeea561e82087deb98a9b16e84a7fdb9f6c586e37e04f74c42a891d2dbb397154a0e76b7df72c0975702965a1ca2a70bad04a7285b0a5618ef9bca9070f76c1930225f56f58d17b15b8954a35e08223f505c9c2e93cf8bf7f28c50647d385863dc36bd9e52556c896e89e9073015a7c38a59f2914124701451844450a2e4c792b70e99bc730f82005154f7e6c79b4ef394aaa155c524c18da44ea8615ca0cce07aa822c0ec6704902bef72db21f3302cfccf3ab79458c1f197

 $\begin{array}{l} \text{sig2=0x77dd1b15bcf1cf5dc65d64408a18771a7cfb2af1833de20d7802ddd85d2c09429f52bf9e1c2}\\ 700a39f22f2d98933e22fc57876f30a1d86696a6970fae76d89e5556046fe1f91a07015714fc3d30\\ 2e326bbe364f5784ffb0a6c68f33a693a758e442e1e2410731d2f6e77776e0435f5d806c8b149aef\\ 99fcc8f49620b487a6703178839d3658b4c5008e2db841383a9aceb0862aec852f6af50926f9045a\\ fff5e40ab52929993e3b79bca23777f06ea2914a284b90254798d131dfd0e8b97d0c94bfa589ed9a\\ 75a4d4ea045fecf7325eb6e91ca6536113d6acbe6e83a1dfac9833edafb8d2d25439a8eb0ad6cec2\\ 89d8628cc0733ca231409065c3215e3ad5e2f5ad61756e6d4bd5b14fffb78e9d1f470057061f0b9a\\ b988f3be141435a8a71f70f7084a20f6ce13ac2aceba4546afc6fd28b305dbde81c7b54be192c69f\\ 118ce5d131b5f217e2ec804c1e11578cbff51270a4fd166322dd69aa48a18466f608c2621baf8280\\ 02d55c8361cbb1f7b3279c986bdf1c3da2c12fe565e7c15d7250\\ \end{array}$ 

(d) (10 marks) Explain how Alice can modify the digital signature scheme to prevent the forgery attack in (c) without changing the keys from (a). Show the new signature of the same message msg from (a) signed by her private key (d, N) using the modified signature scheme.

## 2 Task 2 (40 marks)

Use gpg and openss1 to perform the following tasks.

- (a) (10 marks) Alice wants to use the "Hybrid" encryption method combining RSA and AES-128 in 8-bit CFB mode (CFB-8) to send an encrypted file to Bob (email address: bob@fit2093.edu). Given Bob's public key file bob.pub (this file is available on Moodle), Alice's AES-128 session key K=0x6cfba139ea2c55e5ecff60429ce20ade, CFB-8 IV value IV=0x6b66a2ce1972853f84d1874736369036, and the plaintext file msg\_qa.bin (this file is available on Moodle), compute the two components of the hybrid encryption ciphertext in two files: (1) the RSA ciphertext component in file c\_rsa.bin and (2) the AES ciphertext component in file c\_aes.bin, both files written in hexadecimal format. Show your code / working process.
- (b) (10 marks) Bob received the two ciphertext component files <code>c\_rsa\_qb.bin</code> and <code>c\_aes\_qb.bin</code> encrypted by the hybrid encryption scheme in (a) from Alice. (NOTE: these files are available on Moodle and are different than the ones you have computed in part (a) of this task.) Given Bob's private key file <code>bob.prv</code> (this file is available on Moodle) and <code>IV=0x5fe4bbaf52dfd660407a9a8e123901ea</code>, show Bob's decryption process and the decrypted plaintext.

Note: Bob's gpg passphrase is fit2093.

**Hint:** The symmetric session key K is encrypted as a **binary** file instead of a text file. Use a hex editor to get K in hexadecimal format.

- (c) (10 marks) Due to network errors, instead of the files in part (b) of this task, Bob actually received the file c\_aes\_qc.bin, which contains an error in the **2nd** block (this file is available on Moodle). Compute how many blocks are corrupted by using a **mathematical formula**. Verify your result by decrypting c\_aes\_qc.bin. Show your verification process.
- (d) (10 marks) The attacker Marvin intercepted two ciphertext files <code>c\_aes1\_qd.bin</code> and <code>c\_aes2\_qd.bin</code> sent by Alice. Marvin found out that due to a vulnerability in Alice's encryption software, Alice encrypted both files by using the same AES-128 key <code>K</code> and <code>same IV</code>, and he also managed to get the plaintext file <code>msg1\_qd.bin</code> corresponding to ciphertext file <code>c\_aes1\_qd.bin</code> by hacking Alice's computer, though he didn't find the second plaintext file <code>msg2\_qd.bin</code> corresponding to the ciphertext file <code>c\_aes2\_qd.bin</code>. Explain how Marvin can use his available information to find some information on the second plaintext file <code>msg2\_qd.bin</code> corresponding to ciphertext <code>c\_aes2\_qd.bin</code>, even though Marvin does not know Alice's encryption key <code>K</code>. Show the content of the plaintext blocks of <code>msg2\_qd.bin</code> that Marvin can compute.

# 3 Task 3 (20 marks)

After Alice did the mid-semester test, she has a new idea about how to mitigate the vulnerability of the PIN encrypted by the "schoolbook" RSA-3072 encryption  $(c = (PIN)^e \mod N)$ . Assume PIN is a positive integer smaller than  $2^{16}$ . Instead of directly encrypting the PIN, she writes the PIN in binary format first, then she appends **2048** 1 bits at the **rightmost** side of the binary representation of PIN. For example, integer abcd in **hexadecimal** becomes an **integer** x:

$$x = 10101011111001101 \underbrace{1 \dots 1}_{2048 \text{ 1 bits}}$$

in **binary** format. She then computes  $c' = x^e \mod N$  as the ciphertext.

(a) (10 marks) Explain an **efficient** attack against the above mitigation technique. Given the public modulus N, Alice's public key e = 0x10001 in **hexadecimal**, and the ciphertext c' encrypted by using the above mitigation technique, show how the attacker Marvin can recover the PIN **efficiently** without Alice's private key.

 $N=0 \times a05 \text{bb} 3783769 \text{b8} 32 \text{a2} \text{d0} 22646 \text{c4} 8344948282 \text{cd} \text{cd} 42 \text{bff} 414 \text{ec} 90 \text{f2} 3 \text{b7} \text{e3} \text{b1} \text{b8} 17137664 \text{f4} 40163\\ 19586395741996245 \text{f9} \text{c2} \text{c6} \text{6} \text{dee} 453352 \text{dc} 329 \text{fe} 54228 \text{beaa} 559 \text{a6} 10114 \text{dbe} 902 \text{c3} 2572 \text{e9} 54660 \text{ad}\\ \text{bd0} \text{6} \text{f8} \text{da8} \text{c7} \text{70} \text{c3} \text{3} \text{bb} \text{5} \text{ad1} 5 \text{f5} 506073 \text{ea} 0 \text{c5} 0 \text{ff} 4 \text{e9} 906 \text{e1} 6 \text{ee} \text{70} \text{d1} 311 \text{e0} \text{ad8} 1896 \text{f4} 807282361 \text{f5} \text{b2}\\ 116488 \text{de} 06966 \text{b5} 71 \text{cdb} 15 \text{da} 536226378 \text{bc} 1 \text{fb} \text{a8} \text{a3} 476 \text{c5} 809 \text{b5} \text{a2} 74 \text{a0} 117 \text{b5} \text{de} 3 \text{e5} 52278 \text{d3} 9 \text{fd} \text{fa} 6\\ 2 \text{de} 29 \text{f3} 38 \text{b0} 453 \text{ac} 3 \text{a} \text{f6} 1 \text{a3} 0 \text{dc} \text{b2} 2975949 \text{a3} \text{d0} \text{ec} 2 \text{d2} \text{b7} \text{f0} \text{d2} \text{c4} \text{d2} \text{e3} \text{ef} 6 \text{dde} \text{fa} 8 \text{ca} \text{ad2} 1 \text{bc} 16972 \text{dce}\\ \text{cfcd} 5 \text{f9} 332373 \text{a7} 59632 \text{f7} \text{f0} 2 \text{c5} 2 \text{dd} 424 \text{b8} 3985 \text{ea} \text{a6} 73 \text{ce} 67023366 \text{e8} 5899729 \text{fc} 1 \text{d1} \text{fe} \text{de} 02 \text{fa} 9 \text{c5}\\ 3 \text{aa} 01328 \text{c9} 108 \text{a3} \text{c5} 145 \text{f4} 7 \text{ef} 988688 \text{f3} 3076 \text{d4} 9821314210 \text{d1} \text{f4} \text{db} 88 \text{fa} 836 \text{d4} 1 \text{f3} \text{dc} 3960499 \text{eb} 46 \text{b}\\ 28261 \text{aa} \text{a1} 515 \text{e0} \text{fb} 6 \text{d7} 481 \text{ae} 051 \text{b6} 07683 \text{cb} \text{fd} \text{c1} 8 \text{d6} \text{b6} 92 \text{f9} 3 \text{d6} \text{fa} \text{cf} 4002 \text{d6} \text{fa} 835 \text{aa} \text{c4} \text{d6} 1911 \text{b6} 6\\ 859 \text{a8} 1043763 \text{e1} \text{d0} \text{ef} 6 \text{e4} 7 \text{f1} \text{a7} \text{a4} \text{c8} \text{d5} 7993 \text{b0} \text{fb} 67 \text{b5} 758 \text{ed} 3 \text{ac} \text{a9} 540 \text{d3} 9 \text{e1} 50935 \text{cd} \text{d0} \text{c3} 20 \text{d1} 66 \text{d}\\ \text{a6} 5612 \text{ae} 78322 \text{f9} 6853885 \text{e6} \text{a4} 4 \text{ad} \text{d3} 306 \text{a8} 99 \text{fa} \text{b2} \text{f8} 7 \text{cf2} \text{a1} \text{d}$ 

c\_prime=0x90fdea0c662ed2cef739c491c2f391d8cf636b80144c412580c02e3262e4fa10c6e101f4
c53d09619c7cb6fc9d8edfe2a676c1c128bd8e32528aff243101b9daf655bcd5460a9bf020ff4bef
0f61b94304b142b6b18830b8b4d5574e8b54903de67df71f39234fdf9f66723ab1bf426d1c0a95fa
bae8485e9edf7f4c868ca2816398b1f46ffda2a84b5d52ff36bad829ddc2e123f86cb266256824f0
47fb6f6a1c7593eaf4ae5c47c6f5e633370d832345fde53324d02687a9b21e60fcefb5e2e2eb1ace
969fe72afca67847acad093dec8976336ace5f135257f740f625851a3258854775a3f4f123eae1a6
253b2740de37d112bca596f36e4c0d4cfc50b05643b8ec0b52619ae7d0ae990e041ba01bc149ac4a
510c81e3aef3f4f2843a50f15c637e274e714c6a768e0c7d96e28a5365b64aee0315623794724573
648516ebc9b0f5135a180ac3141a98f2ef0f005f6980781036c9b1c7975774708d1929d1935ae782
de80722124220a9dd3fadc457d8bdb8be762b0158187ee619142637d

(b) (10 marks) An implementation of the RSA-3072 encryption software that Alice uses has the following vulnerability: the software neglects to clear the value of  $\phi(N)$  from the memory after the key generation process. An attacker Marvin who manages to gain access to Alice's computer exploits this vulnerability by performing a memory dump of the machine after Alice completed her key generation, to get the value of Alice's  $\phi(N)$ . Explain how Marvin can **efficiently** factorise N by using this additional information. Show how to factorise the modulus N from (a) by using the following  $\phi(N)$ .

phi=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