

Reading Research

Administrative Preliminaries

- Names, &c.
- Labor Day next week
- Upcoming assignments
 - For next time (September 11): summarize each reading we'll discuss next session
 - The first reading, by Andrew Enterline, is optional: it's not an example of research
 - This is a “turn something at all plausible in, get full credit” assignment
 - Try to figure out what might be useful or interesting to you
 - Jargon foreshadowing: “independent” and “dependent” variables
 - For September 18: Journal Report
 - Journals posted to Canvas announcements, also added to assignments
 - (You’re not committed; talk to me if change is desired—or if links break!)

Hoover Green: Background

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- Reading in groups

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- Journals and presses

General Political-Science Journals

- [American Political Science Review](#)
- [American Journal of Political Science](#)
- [Journal of Politics](#)
- [British Journal of Political Science](#)
- [Annual Review of Political Science](#)

American-Politics Journals

- [American Politics Research](#)
- [Public Opinion Quarterly](#)
- [State Politics and Policy Quarterly](#)

Comparative-Politics Journals

- [Comparative Political Studies](#)
- [Comparative Politics](#)
- [World Politics](#)
- [Government and Opposition](#)
- [European Journal of Political Research](#)

International-Relations Journals

- [International Organization](#)
- [International Studies Quarterly](#)
- [Journal of Peace Research](#)
- [Journal of Conflict Resolution](#)
- [International Security](#)

Special-Topics Journals

- [Political Behavior](#)
- [Political Psychology](#)
- [Political Communication](#)
- [Environmental Politics](#)
- [Global Environmental Politics](#)
- [Policy Studies Journal](#)
- [Journal of Public Policy](#)

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 - And, *sotto voce*, affiliations and identities

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 - First, theory: what's the question? Then, empirics: what's the answer?
 - Exploratory vs. inferential research
 - When you know the topic, conjecture what the results will be

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 - Examples and narrative detail are typically secondary

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- Mark up the reading with your own notes
- You need not take any of these systems as gospel: the key point is to find what works for you
 - Grad-school advice: record quick summaries of every piece of research you read

Woessner and Kelly-Woessner

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 - Terminology: “panel study,” “regression to the mean,” “operational identity”...
 - How much do we need to know?

Woessner and Kelly-Woessner

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Woessner and Kelly-Woessner

- What do they have to say? What are their central claims, and how do they attempt to show that those claims are correct?
- Are you convinced? What of? What convinces you?

The argument that symbolic ideology and operational ideology are separate constructs is supported by the fact that self-reported ideologies often are at odds with issue positions (Stimson 2004). This also is true in studies specifically of college students, who tend to express greater support for progressive policy positions than their self-reported ideological identifications would predict (Bailey and Williams 2016).

Self-reported ideology, as used on surveys of college students' political attitudes, is therefore similar to party affiliation in that it has strong affective components, is a form of social identity, and is resistant to change. According to Jost, Federico, and Napier (2009), "peer and reference groups also exert a reasonably strong influence on left-right self-placement....[t]he resulting identifications tend to persist as long as one's relational context does not change markedly."

We argue, therefore, that students' ideological identities are resistant to change, whereas their issue positions are more malleable. If this is the case, any "liberalizing" effect of college would appear first in students' issue positions.

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Corollary

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Main claim

V More recently, researchers have returned to the original school of thought, arguing that party affiliation is an enduring psychological attachment, formed early in the socialization process.

- Bartels (2002), for example, found that party identification is a “pervasive dynamic force” consistent with the Michigan-model view that “partisan loyalties are formed early in life, remain perfectly stable throughout adulthood, and serve as the unmoved movers of more specific political attitudes and behavior.” Green and colleagues argued that revisionist interpretations are the result of measurement error and that accounting for such error eliminates the effects of short-term forces on party identification (Green and Palmquist 1990; 1994; Schickler and Green 1997). These findings support the conceptualization of party identification as a form of social identity (Green, Palmquist, and Schickler 2002; Mason 2015).

Argument Supporting Claim

Our analysis was based on student surveys from the Higher Education Research Institute (HERI) at the University of California, Los Angeles, including the 2009 CIRP Freshman Survey (TFS) and the 2013 CIRP College Senior Survey (CSS). The combined TFS-CSS data include 17,667 students at 156 campuses who completed both the freshman and senior surveys at the same institution.


Both the TFS and CSS ask students about their demographic background, political attitudes, and college experiences (HERI 2018a; 2018b). Because the two surveys ask certain identical questions, we could measure shifts in students' political attitudes over time on both specific issues and self-placement using a symbolic five-point ideological scale (i.e., "far left," "liberal," "centrist," "conservative," and "far right"). This ideology variable also allowed us to measure the mean student ideology for students at a particular campus. Finally, the data include institutional variables such as college ranking and Carnegie classification.

Evidence to Examine Claim

Woessner and Kelly-Woessner


Figure 1

- Woessner and Kelly-Woessner (2014)



Woessner and Kelly-Woessner

- Woessner and Kelly-Woessner
Shift in Ideological Self-Placement from First to Fourth Year



Does this support the authors' theory?


Woes

The shifts in student views of gay marriage from 2009 to 2013 are hardly surprising; the public was undergoing a similar turnabout. The Pew Center polling shows a 5% shift in overall support for gay marriage in roughly the same period. However, the public's overall views on abortion changed hardly at all.² Yet, we saw students moving left on abortion far more often than they drifted right. Thus,

- What do attempt to do now do they
 - Are you conservative or liberal? How do they
- attitudes toward abortion are at least one example of how the college experience contributes to a substantive shift in political views over a relatively short period. This movement on abortion is consistent with Astin's (1993) analysis 27 years earlier, which found abortion to be the issue on which students' views changed the most.

Figure 5

Net Ideological Shift in Abortion by 1st Year Ideology



Woessner and Kelly-Woessner

- ~~What do they have to say? What are their central claims and how do they~~
The relationship between liberal arts college classification and students' drift to the left was confounded by peer ideology. When
- peer ideology was removed from our models, liberal arts colleges tended to produce more leftward movement on overall ideological identification ($p < 0.001$). The addition of peer ideology eliminated the effect. This means that the leftward drift of students at liberal arts colleges is explained by the fact that their peers tend to be more liberal than those at other universities.

Alternative explanations: control variables

Table 7

Regression Predicting Shifts in Student Views from the First to Fourth Years

Independent Variable	Ideology	Abortion	Gay Marriage	Affirm Action	Racism Problem	Dissent Vital
(Constant)	0.249*** (0.060)	0.218* (0.094)	1.669*** (0.089)	-0.569*** (0.093)	-0.015 (0.090)	-0.046 (0.090)
Sex	0.073*** (0.011)	0.03 (0.017)	-0.155*** (0.016)	-0.031 (0.017)	0.061*** (0.016)	-0.064*** (0.016)
Is R non-white?	0.094*** (0.012)	0.076*** (0.020)	0.078*** (0.018)	-0.037 (0.019)	0.025 (0.019)	0.033 (0.019)
Arts & Humanities or Social Sciences Major?	0.122*** (0.011)	0.069*** (0.017)	0.025 (0.016)	0.107*** (0.017)	0.113*** (0.016)	0.081*** (0.016)
School Ranking	0.029*** (0.006)	0.02* (0.009)	0.051*** (0.008)	0.113*** (0.009)	0.038*** (0.008)	-0.01 (0.008)
Liberal Arts College?	1.9E-02 1.3E-02	-3.2E-02 2.1E-02	-4.0E-03 1.9E-02	-9.1E-02*** 2.0E-02	4.0E-03 2.0E-02	2.9E-02 2.0E-02
Average Peer Ideology	0.28*** (0.021)	0.095** (0.033)	-8.3E-02** 3.1E-02	1.2E-01*** 3.2E-02	-5.0E-02 3.2E-02	7.2E-02* 3.1E-02
Ideological Self-Placement (1st Year)	-4.2E-01*** 7.0E-03	-1.0E-01*** 1.0E-02	-2.7E-01*** 1.0E-02	2.8E-02** 1.0E-02	-2.7E-02** 1.0E-02	-9.0E-03 1.0E-02
Adjusted R ²	0.228	0.009	0.074	0.02	0.006	0.004
n	14,486	14,234	14,290	13,927	14,322	13,276

Abortion -liberal +conser; Sex: M=1 f=2; Car 1=bac 3=research; Rank 1=low 3=high; Relig 0=no 1=yes; Expen

Ordinal Regressions of Likelihood to Vote on Perceptions of Voter Fraud and Media Bias

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Age in Years	0.02 (0.003)**	0.02 (0.003)**	0.02 (0.00)**
Education	0.49 (0.06)**	0.50 (0.06)**	0.50 (0.06)**
Sex (Female=1)	0.11 (0.11)	0.17 (0.12)	0.18 (0.12)
Race (Black=1)	-0.03 (0.22)	0.07 (0.22)	0.03 (0.21)
Ethnicity (Hispanic=1)	-0.90 (0.14)**	-0.83 (0.14)**	-0.81 (0.14)**
Campaign Interest	0.62 (0.05)**	0.62 (0.05)**	0.59 (0.05)**
Party ID	-0.03 (0.03)	0.01 (0.04)	-0.42 (0.11)**
Voter Fraud		-0.27 (0.07)**	-0.57 (0.16)**
Media Bias		-0.03 (0.06)	-0.42 (0.14)*
Fraud x Party ID			0.08 (0.04)**
Bias x Party ID			0.09 (0.03)**
	2,332	2,302	2,302

Notes: * $p<0.05$; ** $p<0.01$ (one-tail tests). Coefficients and standard error for constants are not shown.

Dependent variable

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Education	Measured as a 4-point scale ranging from less than high school(1) to college graduate (4). M=2.8; SE=0.02.	Age in Years 0.02 (0.003)**	0.02 (0.003)**	0.02 (0.00)**
Campaign Interest	Scale from "no interest at all" (1) to "a great deal" M=3.78; SE= 0.028.	Education 0.49 (0.06)**	0.50 (0.06)**	0.50 (0.06)**
Partisan ID	Scale from strong R (1) to strong D (7). M=4.13; SE= 0.045.	Sex (Female=1) 0.11 (0.11)	0.17 (0.12)	0.18 (0.12)
Voter Fraud	Scale from perceiving voter fraud net Clinton a lot of votes (1) to voter fraud net Trump a lot of votes (5).	Race (Black=1) -0.03 (0.22)	0.07 (0.22)	0.03 (0.21)
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	Media Bias	-0.03 (0.06)	-0.42 (0.14)*
	Fraud x Party ID		0.08 (0.04)**
	Bias x Party ID		0.09 (0.03)**
		2,332	2,302

Notes: * $p<0.05$; ** $p<0.01$ (one-tail tests). Coefficients and standard error for constants are not shown.

Dependent variable

Ordinal Regressions of Likelihood to Vote on
Perceptions of Voter Fraud and Media Bias

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Age in Years	0.02 (0.003)**	0.02 (0.003)**	0.02 (0.00)**
Education	0.49 (0.06)**	0.50 (0.06)**	0.50 (0.06)**
Sex (Female=1)	0.11 (0.11)	0.17 (0.12)	0.18 (0.12)
Race (Black=1)	-0.03 (0.22)	0.07 (0.22)	0.03 (0.21)
Ethnicity (Hispanic=1)	-0.90 (0.14)**	-0.83 (0.14)**	-0.81 (0.14)**
Campaign Interest	0.62 (0.05)**	0.62 (0.05)**	0.59 (0.05)**
Party ID	-0.03 (0.03)	0.01 (0.04)	-0.42 (0.11)**
Voter Fraud		-0.27 (0.07)**	-0.57 (0.16)**
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Ordinal Regressions of Likelihood to Vote on Perceptions of Voter Fraud and Media Bias

Independent variables
Statistical confidence
Coefficient signs

	(1)	(2)	(3)
Age in Years	0.02 (0.003)**	0.02 (0.003)**	0.02 (0.00)**
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Sex (Female=1)	0.11 (0.11)	0.17 (0.12)	0.18 (0.12)
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Ordinal Regressions of Likelihood to Vote on Perceptions of Voter Fraud and Media Bias

		(1)	(2)	(3)
Education	Measured as a 4-point scale ranging from less than high school(1) to college graduate (4). M=2.8; SE=0.02.	Age in Years 0.02 (0.003)**	0.02 (0.003)**	0.02 (0.00)**
Campaign Interest	Scale from "no interest at all" (1) to "a great deal" M=3.78; SE= 0.028.	Education 0.49 (0.06)**	0.50 (0.06)**	0.50 (0.06)**
Partisan ID	Scale from strong R(1) to strong D(7). M=4.13; SE= 0.045.	Sex (Female=1) 0.11 (0.11)	0.17 (0.12)	0.18 (0.12)
Voter Fraud	Scale from perceiving voter fraud net Clinton a lot of votes (1) to voter fraud net Trump a lot of votes (5).	Race (Black=1) -0.03 (0.22)	0.07 (0.22)	0.03 (0.21)
Media Bias	Scale from perceiving news very biased for Clinton (1) to very biased for Trump (5).	Ethnicity (Hispanic=1) -0.90 (0.14)**	-0.83 (0.14)**	-0.81 (0.14)**
		Campaign Interest 0.62 (0.05)**	0.62 (0.05)**	0.59 (0.05)**
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Table 2. Parameters for Analysis of LegCo Enactments

Type of measure:

Proposed by government	3.9*** (.76)	4.2*** (.76)
Member amendment to proposal	-2.6*** (1.05)	-2.7*** (1.0)
Member amendment to motion	-.22 (.25)	-.22 (.25)
Other	-.52 (.51)	-.63 (.53)

Proposer:

(Distance to DAB) ²	-.00045*** (.000009)	
Opposition		-.57*** (.20)
Constant	.03 (.26)	-.32 (.25)

Note. Dependent variable: measure enacted. Parameters, with robust standard errors in parentheses. $N = 629$. LegCo = Legislative Council; DAB = Democratic Alliance for the Betterment of Hong Kong.

* $p < .1$. ** $p < .05$. *** $p < .01$, all two-tailed.

TABLE 1
RADIO TOWER SIGNAL AND SOLDIER DECORATIONS

	<i>Decorated</i>		<i>High Decoration</i>		<i>N Decorations</i>	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Signal strength	0.0010*** (0.0003)		0.0003 (0.0002)		0.0013** (0.0005)	
Log transformed		0.0984*** (0.0272)		0.0352 (0.0215)		0.138*** (0.0509)
Enlistment age relative to 18	-0.0146*** (0.0009)	-0.0145*** (0.0009)	-0.0101*** (0.0008)	-0.0101*** (0.0008)	-0.0319*** (0.0022)	-0.0318*** (0.0022)
Wounded dummy	0.407*** (0.0167)	0.407*** (0.0167)	0.288*** (0.0178)	0.288*** (0.0178)	1.080*** (0.0626)	1.080*** (0.0626)
Nazi membership	-0.00465 (0.0131)	-0.00471 (0.0131)	-0.00387 (0.0113)	-0.00394 (0.0113)	-0.0256 (0.0298)	-0.0258 (0.0297)
Enlistment-year FE	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Kreise-level controls ^a	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Individual controls ^b	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
N soldiers	9072	9072	9072	9072	9072	9072

*** $p \leq .01$, ** $p \leq .05$, * $p \leq .1$; kreise-clustered standard errors in parentheses

^a Kreise-level controls include the fifth-order polynomial of population, the share of Jewish and Catholic population in 1933, the share of unemployed and partially employed in 1933, the share of white- and blue-collar workers in 1925, the logged distance to the closest city, the percentage of Nazi vote in 1933, the logged average property tax in 1930, and the number of welfare recipients, social renters, and war participants per thousand people.

^b Individual controls include whether the soldier was Catholic or married, the soldier's economic class, a dummy for living in a large city, and his relative height and weight.




Fig. 3 Roommate-respondent attribute correspondence and preferences. This model presents OLS regression coefficients with standard errors clustered by respondent.




Table 7

Regression Predicting Shifts in Student Views from the First to Fourth Years

Independent Variable	Ideology	Abortion	Gay Marriage	Affirm Action	Racism Problem	Dissent Vital
(Constant)	0.249*** (0.060)	0.218* (0.094)	1.669*** (0.089)	-0.569*** (0.093)	-0.015 (0.090)	-0.046 (0.090)
Sex	0.073*** (0.011)	0.03 (0.017)	-0.155*** (0.016)	-0.031 (0.017)	0.061*** (0.016)	-0.064*** (0.016)
Is R non-white?	0.094*** (0.012)	0.076*** (0.020)	0.078*** (0.018)	-0.037 (0.019)	0.025 (0.019)	0.033 (0.019)
Arts & Humanities or Social Sciences Major?	0.122*** (0.011)	0.069*** (0.017)	0.025 (0.016)	0.107*** (0.017)	0.113*** (0.016)	0.081*** (0.016)
School Ranking	0.029*** (0.006)	0.02* (0.009)	0.051*** (0.008)	0.113*** (0.009)	0.038*** (0.008)	-0.01 (0.008)
Liberal Arts College?	1.9E-02 1.3E-02	-3.2E-02 2.1E-02	-4.0E-03 1.9E-02	-9.1E-02*** 2.0E-02	4.0E-03 2.0E-02	2.9E-02 2.0E-02
Average Peer Ideology	0.28*** (0.021)	0.095** (0.033)	-8.3E-02** 3.1E-02	1.2E-01*** 3.2E-02	-5.0E-02 3.2E-02	7.2E-02* 3.1E-02
Ideological Self-Placement (1st Year)	-4.2E-01*** 7.0E-03	-1.0E-01*** 1.0E-02	-2.7E-01*** 1.0E-02	2.8E-02** 1.0E-02	-2.7E-02** 1.0E-02	-9.0E-03 1.0E-02
Adjusted R ²	0.228	0.009	0.074	0.02	0.006	0.004
n	14,486	14,234	14,290	13,927	14,322	13,276

Abortion -liberal +conser; Sex: M=1 f=2; Car 1=bac 3=research; Rank 1=low 3=high; Relig 0=no 1=yes; Expen

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Sex	0.073***	0.03	-0.155***	-0.031	0.061***	-0.064*** (0.016)
Is R non-white						0.033 (0.019)
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Ideological Self-Placement (1st Year)	-4.2E-01*** 7.0E-03	-1.0E-01*** 1.0E-02	-2.7E-01*** 1.0E-02	2.8E-02** 1.0E-02	-2.7E-02** 1.0E-02	-9.0E-03 1.0E-02
Adjusted R ²	0.228	0.009	0.074	0.02	0.006	0.004
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Peers have an independent effect in several of the models. With the exception of gay marriage, the effect is positive; this means that students move more to the left—*independent* of their ideological self-placement—when their peers are more to the left. Students also learn to value dissent more when exposed to liberal versus conservative peers.

Abortion -liberal +conser; Sex: M=1 f=2; Car 1=bac 3=research; Rank 1=low 3=high; Relig 0=no 1=yes; Expen

What's going on with gay marriage?

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Goldsmith et al.

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Goldsmith et al.

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Goldsmith et al.


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Goldsmith et al.

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 - Are views of the *leader* interchangeable with views about the *country*? Is this public diplomacy or personal PR?


Job performance
Approve % - Disapprove %

$r = 0.809$



Opinion of a country
Favorable % - Unfavorable %

$r = 0.807$



Confidence in a country's leader
to do the right thing regarding world affairs
Confident % - Not Confident %

Goldsmith et al.

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 - Would you expect the effect to be the same regardless of the leader involved?

TABLE 1. High-Level Visits: The Number of Valid Cases by Visitors

Leaders	Home country	Number of visits
Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva	Brazil	4
Stephen Harper	Canada	2
Hu Jintao	China	5
Xi Jinping	China	9
Angela Merkel	Germany	15
Manmohan Singh	India	2
Yasuo Fukuda	Japan	1
Yukio Hatoyama	Japan	2
Shinzo Abe	Japan	4
Vladimir Putin	Russia	11
Dmitry Medvedev	Russia	10
David Cameron	U.K.	7
George W. Bush	U.S.	5
Barack Obama	U.S.	6
Donald Trump	U.S.	3


Note: See Section C of the Supplementary Materials for details.

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- What evidence did they use?
 - Is this a good way to study what they're aiming to? Could you think of alternative ways to get evidence about the question?
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FIGURE 7. Results by the Number of Years since Visiting Leader Assumed Office




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
FIGURE 1. OLS Regression Results



Note: Vertical bars are 95% confidence intervals.

Estimates statistically significant at the 0.05 level are in black.


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Goldsmith et al.

- What do they find regarding their central claim? Were they correct?
- What else do they find of note, if anything?
 - “Of note” can mean unexpected, interesting, informative about other questions...

Mastroianni & Ludwin-Peery

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 - But even in this informal presentation, they follow the classic framework starting with theory and following it with evidence
 - As psychology researchers, they also more narrowly follow the conventions of psychology: demarcating each collection of evidence as a separate “study” is very psychology

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 - Beware confirmation bias! Don't only pick apart things you disagree with
- If something seems important but you're not sure you understand or are sure you don't, ask a professor: it's what we're here for