

# Macroeconomics

## Lecture 11 – New Keynesian Model II; Time Consistency of Monetary Policy

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# Outline

- 1 Sticky prices
- 2 Firm problem with sticky prices
- 3 Equilibrium
  - New Keynesian Phillips Curve
  - Dynamic IS curve
  - Monetary policy rule
- 4 Model outputs

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## Sticky prices: data, models

- ▷ How sticky/rigid are prices of goods?
    - ▷ Empirical work (Dhyne et al, 2005) → average duration of a price spell is ~3 quarters in US, ~4 quarters in the EU
  - ▷ How is this built in the New Keynesian model?
- Common sticky price mechanisms:
1. **Calvo pricing**: firm able to change price with a constant probability
  2. *Rotemberg pricing*: price change possible, but costly
  3. *Taylor contracts*: firm can change price every  $T$  periods

We do Calvo pricing – most common and analytically convenient

## Calvo pricing

- ▷ Every period, each firm **will be unable to change price with probability  $\theta$** 
  - ▷ probability same for all firms, independent of their prices
- ⇒ probability  $1 - \theta$  to set a new, optimal, price in a given period
- ▷ average duration of a price  $\frac{1}{1-\theta}$  periods
  - ▷  $\theta$  calibrated to match a target duration, e.g. 3 quarters.  
In a model with period = quarter:

$$\frac{1}{1-\theta} = 3 \Leftrightarrow \theta = \frac{3}{5} \quad \frac{2}{3}$$

$$1 = 3 - 3\theta$$

## Price index under sticky prices

Look at price index again:  $P_t = \left( \int_0^1 P_t(i)^{1-\varepsilon} di \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\varepsilon}}$

Firms symmetric  $\Rightarrow P_t(i) = P_t^*$  for all firms that can set price

Large number of firms  $\Rightarrow$  **probability**  $\theta$  becomes **share** of firms

Denote  $S(t)$  the set of indices of unlucky firms (set of size  $\theta$ ) and  $\bar{S}(t)$  the set of lucky firms (set size  $1 - \theta$ ). Then:

$$P_t = \left( \int_{S(t)} P_t(i)^{1-\varepsilon} di + \int_{\bar{S}(t)} P_t(i)^{1-\varepsilon} di \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\varepsilon}}$$

$$\begin{aligned} \left( \int_{S(t)} P_t(i)^{1-\varepsilon} di \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\varepsilon}} &= \left( \int_{S(t)} P_{t-1}(i)^{1-\varepsilon} di + (1 - \theta) P_t^{*1-\varepsilon} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\varepsilon}} \\ &= (\theta P_{t-1}^{1-\varepsilon} + (1 - \theta) P_t^{*1-\varepsilon})^{\frac{1}{1-\varepsilon}} \end{aligned}$$

First integral  $\rightarrow t - 1$  price index (up to a power) because risk of being unlucky (i.e. being in  $S(t)$ ) same for all  $\Rightarrow$  price aggregate on  $S(t)$  same as price aggregate on  $[0, 1]$

## Aggregate price dynamics

Using the new formula  $P_t = \left( \theta P_{t-1}^{1-\varepsilon} + (1-\theta)P_t^{*1-\varepsilon} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\varepsilon}}$  we can get:

$$1 + \pi_t = \frac{P_t}{P_{t-1}} = \left[ \theta + (1-\theta) \left( \frac{P_t^*}{P_{t-1}} \right)^{1-\varepsilon} \right]^{\frac{1}{1-\varepsilon}}$$
$$\rho_t = \ln P_t ; \quad \rho_t - \rho_{ss} = \frac{P_t - P_{ss}}{P_{ss}}$$

with  $P_t^*$  the optimal price set in period  $t$  by firms that **can** change price. Firms symmetric  $\Rightarrow P_t^*$  same for all.

Log-linearized using Taylor series around steady state with  $P_t/P_{t-1} = 1$  and  $P_t^*/P_{t-1} = 1$ :

$$\pi_t = (1-\theta)(\rho_t^* - \rho_{t-1}) \tag{1}$$

- ▷ How is optimal  $P_t^*$  chosen? Dynamic problem, coming up next

Taylor approximation around a steady-state

$$f(x) \simeq f(x_{ss}) + f'(x_{ss}) \cdot (x - x_{ss}) + \cancel{\bar{O}(x - x_{ss})}$$

$$f(x, y) \simeq f(x_{ss}, y_{ss}) + \underbrace{\frac{\partial f}{\partial x}(x_{ss}, y_{ss})}_{x} \cdot (x - x_{ss}) + \underbrace{\frac{\partial f}{\partial y}(x_{ss}, y_{ss})}_{y} \cdot (y - y_{ss}) + \cancel{\bar{O}(x - x_{ss}, y - y_{ss})}$$

$$x - x_{ss} = x_{ss} \cdot \frac{x - x_{ss}}{x_{ss}} = \underline{x_{ss} (\ln x - \ln x_{ss})}$$

$$f(x, y) \simeq f(x_{ss}, y_{ss}) + \underbrace{\frac{\partial f}{\partial x}(x_{ss}, y_{ss})}_{x} \cdot x_{ss} (\ln x - \ln x_{ss}) + \underbrace{\frac{\partial f}{\partial y}(x_{ss}, y_{ss})}_{y} \cdot y_{ss} (\ln y - \ln y_{ss})$$

$$\left(\frac{P_t}{P_{t-1}}\right)^{1-\varepsilon} = \theta + (1-\theta) \left(\frac{P_t^*}{P_{t-1}}\right)^{1-\varepsilon} P_t^{*\varepsilon-1} P_{t-1}^{\varepsilon-1}$$

~~$P_{ss}^{1-\varepsilon} P_{ss}^{\varepsilon-1}$~~

$$(1-\varepsilon) P_{ss}^{1-\varepsilon-1} P_{ss}^{\varepsilon-1} \cdot P_{ss}^1 (p_t - p_{ss}) + (\varepsilon-1) P_{ss}^{1-\varepsilon} P_{ss}^{\varepsilon-1-1} P_{ss} (p_{t-1} - p_{ss})$$

$$= \theta + (1-\theta) \left(\frac{P_t^*}{P_{ss}}\right)^{1-\varepsilon} + (1-\theta) ((1-\varepsilon) P_{ss}^{1-\varepsilon-1} P_{ss}^{\varepsilon-1} (p_t - p_{ss}))$$

$$+ (\varepsilon-1) P_{ss}^{1-\varepsilon} P_{ss}^{\varepsilon-1-1} P_{ss} (p_{t-1} - p_{ss})$$

$$(1-\varepsilon)(p_t - p_{ss}) + (\varepsilon-1)(p_{t-1} - p_{ss}) = (1-\theta)((1-\varepsilon)(p_t^* - p_{ss}) + (\varepsilon-1)(p_{t-1} - p_{ss}))$$

divide everything by  $1-\varepsilon$

$$p_t - p_{ss} - (p_{t-1} - p_{ss}) = (1-\theta)(p_t^* - p_{ss} - (p_{t-1} - p_{ss}))$$

$$= (1-\theta)(p_t^* - p_{t-1})$$

$$= \pi_t$$

$$= p_t - p_{t-1}$$

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## Accounting for firm history

Production in  $t = k$  of a firm that last optimized prices in  $t = s$  with  $s \leq k$  is labelled  $Y_{k|s}(i)$

Using equilibrium conditions  $C_t(i) = Y_t(i)$ ,  $C_t = Y_t$  and the demand formula  $C_t(i) = \left(\frac{P_t(i)}{P_t}\right)^{-\varepsilon} C_t$ , we can write:

$$Y_{k|s}(i) = \left(\frac{P_s^*}{P_k}\right)^{-\varepsilon} Y_k$$

Profit maximization: stochastic discount factor needs be applied between  $t$  (not necessarily  $t = 0$ ) and  $t + k$ :

$$M_{t,t+k} = E_t \left[ \frac{\beta^k C_{t+k}^{-\sigma} P_t}{C_t^{-\sigma} P_{t+k}} \right] = E_t \frac{1}{1+i_t} \frac{1}{1+i_{t+1}} \cdots \frac{1}{1+i_{t+k-1}}$$

$$u(C_t, N_t) = \frac{C_t^{1-\delta}}{1-\delta} - \frac{N_t^{1+\eta}}{1+\eta}$$

## Firms: Optimal price setting

$P_t^*$  maximizes present discounted value of firm, i.e. future (nominal) profits:

$$\max_{P_t^*} E_t \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} M_{t,t+k} \Pi_{t+k}^n$$

where every expected future period is either:

1. a period where price cannot be set  $\Rightarrow$

$$\Pi_{t+k|t+s}^n = P_{t+s}^* Y_{t+k|t+s} - TC_{t+k}^n(Y_{t+k|t+s}) \text{ with some } s \geq 0$$

2. or a period where price can be set:

$$\Pi_{t+k|t+k}^n = P_{t+k}^* Y_{t+k|t+k} - TC_{t+k}^N(Y_{t+k|t+k})$$

which is same profit as in the flexible price model

## Firms: Optimal price setting – role of $\theta$

Profit  $\Pi_{t+k}^n$  depends on  $P_t^*$  **only if firm never could change price between  $t$  and  $t+k$**   $\Rightarrow k$  times unlucky, probability  $\theta^k$

Profit maximization can then be rewritten:

$$\max_{P_t^*} E_t \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \theta^k M_{t,t+k} [P_t^* Y_{t+k|t} - TC_{t+k}^n(Y_{t+k|t})]$$

$$\text{s.t. } Y_{t+k|t} = \left( \frac{P_t^*}{P_{t+k}} \right)^{-\varepsilon} C_{t+k}$$

## Firms: Optimal price setting – FOC

First Order Condition w.r.t.  $P_t^*$ :

$$E_t \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \theta^k \left( M_{t,t+k} Y_{t+k|t} (P_t^* - \frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon-1} MC_{t+k|t}^n) \right) = 0$$

Moving all terms with the marginal cost on right hand side:

$$E_t \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \theta^k M_{t,t+k} Y_{t+k|t} P_t^* = \frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon-1} E_t \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \theta^k \cancel{Q_{t,t+k}} Y_{t+k|t} MC_{t+k|t}^n$$

Using formula for  $M_{t,t+k}$  and solving for  $P_t^*$ :

$$P_t^* = \frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon-1} \frac{E_t \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \theta^k \beta^k C_{t+k}^{1-\sigma} P_{t+k}^{\varepsilon-1} MC_{t+k|t}^n}{E_t \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \theta^k \beta^k C_{t+k}^{1-\sigma} P_{t+k}^{\varepsilon-1}}$$

Optimal price is markup  $\times$  weighted sum of future marginal costs

## Firms: Optimal price setting – FOC linearized

$$P_t^* = \frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon - 1} \frac{E_t \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \theta^k \beta^k C_{t+k}^{1-\sigma} P_{t+k}^{\varepsilon-1} MC_{t+k|t}^n}{E_t \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \theta^k \beta^k C_{t+k}^{1-\sigma} P_{t+k}^{\varepsilon-1}} \quad MC_{t+k|t} = \frac{MC_{t+k|t}^n}{P_{t+k}}$$

Log-linearizing with Taylor expansion around steady state with  
 $P_t = P_{t-1} = P$ :

$$p_t^* - p_{t-1} = (1 - \beta\theta) \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} (\beta\theta)^k E_t [\hat{mc}_{t+k|t} + (p_{t+k} - p_{t-1})] \quad (2)$$

where  $\hat{mc}_{t+k|t} = mc_{t+k|t} - mc_{ss}$ ,  $mc_t = \ln \left( \frac{MC_{t+k|t}}{P_t} \right)$  – we use the percentage deviation of real marginal cost from its steady-state level (it's closely related to output gap – to be shown)

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## Aggregate production – approximation

$Y_t(i)$  and  $N_t(i)$  vary across firms because of sticky prices  $\Rightarrow$  aggregate production function not same as firms' function.

Aggregate labor definition:  $N_t = \int_0^1 N_t(i) di$ ; using the firms' production function:

$$Y_t(i) = A_t \cdot N_t(i)^{1-\alpha}$$

$$N_t = \int_0^1 \left( \frac{Y_t(i)}{A_t} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} di = \left( \frac{Y_t}{A_t} \right)^{\frac{1}{1-\alpha}} \int_0^1 \left( \frac{P_t(i)}{P_t} \right)^{-\frac{\varepsilon}{1-\alpha}} di$$

In logs:

$$(1 - \alpha)n_t = y_t - a_t + \ln \left[ \int_0^1 \left( \frac{P_t(i)}{P_t} \right)^{-\frac{\varepsilon}{1-\alpha}} di \right]$$

where last term measures price dispersion. We do Taylor approximation around s.s. with  $P_{ss}(i) = P_{ss}$ , so null dispersion  $\Rightarrow$  **approximate** aggregate production function:  $y_t = a_t + (1 - \alpha)n_t$

## Inflation and marginal cost

Use  $p_t^* - p_{t-1} = (1 - \beta\theta) \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} (\beta\theta)^k E_t[\hat{m}c_{t+k|t} + (p_{t+k} - p_{t-1})]$

and relation between  $MC(Y_{t+k|t})$  and  $MC(Y_{t+k})$  (using MC

formula and demand):  $mc_{t+k|t} = mc_{t+k} + \frac{\varepsilon\alpha}{1-\alpha}(p_t^* - p_{t+k})$

...to get a **macro** relationship between marginal cost and prices:

$$p_t^* - p_{t-1} = E_t \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \theta^k \beta^k \left( (1 - \theta\beta) \frac{1}{1 - \alpha + \alpha\varepsilon} \hat{m}c_{t+k} + \pi_{t+k} \right)$$
$$\xrightarrow{x_t = \partial E_t x_{t+1} + z_t}$$

which can be written recursively: (try for  $x_t = E_t \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \delta^k z_{t+k}$ )

$$\rightarrow p_t^* - p_{t-1} = \beta\theta E_t [p_{t+1}^* - p_t] + (1 - \beta\theta)\theta \hat{m}c_t + \pi_t$$

combine with  $\pi_t = (1 - \theta)(p_t^* - p_{t-1})$ , to get:

$$\pi_t = \beta E_t [\pi_{t+1}] + \lambda \hat{m}c_t \quad (3)$$

with  $\lambda \equiv \frac{(1-\theta)(1-\beta\theta)}{\theta} \frac{1-\alpha}{1-\alpha+\alpha\varepsilon}$ . **Almost the AS relationship!**

$$x_t = \mathbb{E}_t \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \delta^k z_{t+k} = z_t + \mathbb{E}_t \sum_{k=1}^{\infty} \delta^k z_{t+k}$$

↓

$$= \delta \mathbb{E}_t x_{t+1} - \boxed{\text{to be shown}}$$

$$x_{t+1} = \mathbb{E}_{t+1} \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \delta^k z_{t+1+k}$$

$$\mathbb{E}_t x_{t+1} = \mathbb{E}_t \mathbb{E}_{t+1} \sum_{k=0}^{\infty} \delta^k z_{t+1+k} = \mathbb{E}_t \sum_{k=1}^{\infty} \delta^{k-1} z_{t+k}$$

$$\delta \mathbb{E}_t x_{t+1} = \mathbb{E}_t \sum_{k=1}^{\infty} \delta^k z_{t+k}$$

$$x_t = z_t + \delta \mathbb{E}_t x_{t+1}$$

## Marginal cost gap → output gap

Use  $mc_t^n = w_t^n + \left(\frac{1}{\alpha-1}\right)a_t + \left(\frac{\alpha}{1-\alpha}\right)y_t$ , consumption-labor optimality  $w_t^n - p_t = \sigma y_t + \eta n_t$  and approximate log GDP  $y_t = a_t + (1 - \alpha)n_t$  to get:

$$mc_t = \left(\sigma + \frac{\eta + \alpha}{1 - \alpha}\right) y_t - \frac{1 + \eta}{1 - \alpha} a_t - \ln(1 - \alpha)$$

In s.s.,  $mc_{ss} = \ln(MC_{ss}) = \ln\left(\frac{MC_{ss}^n}{P_{ss}}\right) = -\ln\left(\frac{\varepsilon}{\varepsilon-1}\right) \equiv -\mu$ . Using formula of GDP in flexible-price equilibrium:

$$mc^f = mc_{ss} = -\mu = \left(\sigma + \frac{\eta + \alpha}{1 - \alpha}\right) y_t^f - \frac{1 + \eta}{1 - \alpha} a_t - \ln(1 - \alpha)$$

Taking difference of  $mc_t$  and  $mc_{ss}$ , we obtain marginal cost gap as function of **output gap**  $\tilde{y}_t \equiv y_t - y_t^f$ :

$$\hat{mc}_t = \left(\sigma + \frac{\eta + \alpha}{1 - \alpha}\right) (\underbrace{y_t - y_t^f}_{\tilde{y}_t}) \quad (4)$$

We're back to initial idea of output gap: difference of real (sticky price) GDP and ideal (flexible price) one

## The New Keynesian Phillips Curve (AS)

We finally obtain the **New Keynesian Phillips Curve**:

$$\pi_t = \beta E_t \pi_{t+1} + \lambda \hat{m}c_t \quad \& \quad \hat{m}c_t = \left( \sigma + \frac{\eta + \alpha}{1 - \alpha} \right) (y_t - y_t^f)$$
$$\downarrow \qquad \qquad \qquad \swarrow$$
$$\pi_t = \beta E_t \pi_{t+1} + \kappa \tilde{y}_t$$



$$\text{where } \kappa \equiv \frac{(1-\theta)(1-\beta\theta)}{\theta} \frac{1-\alpha}{1-\alpha+\alpha\varepsilon} \left( \sigma + \frac{\eta+\alpha}{1-\alpha} \right)$$

$\kappa$  depends negatively on both  $\theta$  and  $\beta$ , which get smaller if period length gets larger  $\Rightarrow$  the GDP-inflation relationship steeper with longer horizon, like the medium-run AS vs. long-run AS in old models

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- **Dynamic IS curve**
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## Dynamic IS curve

From the Euler equation and goods market equilibrium

$$y_t = E_t y_{t+1} - \frac{1}{\sigma} (i_t - \underbrace{E_t \pi_{t+1}}_{r_t} - \rho)$$

$$\rho = -\ln \beta$$

while in the flexible price model:

$$y_t^f = E_t y_{t+1}^f - \frac{1}{\sigma} (r_t^f - \rho)$$

Take a difference  $\Rightarrow$  **dynamic IS equation** in terms of the output gap  $\tilde{y}_t$

$$\tilde{y}_t = E_t \tilde{y}_{t+1} - \frac{1}{\sigma} (i_t - E_t \pi_{t+1} - r_t^f)$$

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## Closing the model: monetary policy rule

- ▷ Output gap  $\tilde{y}_t$  and inflation  $\pi_t$  are linked through The New Keynesian Phillips Curve and the dynamic IS equation
- ▷ However, the **nominal interest rate is not yet determined by anything**
  - Taylor Rule necessary to solve the model

$$i_t = \rho + \phi_\pi \pi_t + \phi_y \tilde{y}_t + v_t,$$

with reaction coefficients  $\phi_\pi, \phi_y > 0$  and an exogenous component  $v_t$  - an "arbitrary" part of monetary policy is random and persistent

$$v_t = \rho_v v_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t^v, \text{ where } \rho_v \in [0, 1)$$

⇒  $\varepsilon_t^v$  is a new shock – **monetary policy shock**

## Complete model

$$\tilde{y}_t = E_t \tilde{y}_{t+1} - \frac{1}{\sigma} (i_t - E_t \pi_{t+1} - r_t^f) \quad (\text{Dynamic IS})$$

$$r_t^f = \rho + \gamma (E_t a_{t+1} - a_t) \quad (\text{Flex. price real interest})$$

$$\pi_t = \beta E_t \pi_{t+1} + \kappa \tilde{y}_t \quad (\text{New Keynesian Phillips Curve})$$

$$i_t = \rho + \phi_\pi \pi_t + \phi_y \tilde{y}_t + v_t \quad (\text{Taylor Rule})$$

$$v_t = \rho_v v_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t^v \quad (\text{Exogenous part of interest})$$

$$a_t = \rho_a a_{t-1} + \varepsilon_t^a \quad (\text{Exogenous productivity})$$

With  $\rho = -\ln \beta$ ,  $\gamma = \sigma \frac{1+\eta}{\sigma(1-\alpha)+\eta+\alpha}$ ,

$$\kappa = \frac{(1-\theta)(1-\beta\theta)}{\theta} \frac{1-\alpha}{1-\alpha+\alpha\varepsilon} \left( \sigma + \frac{\eta+\alpha}{1-\alpha} \right)$$

## Complete model – dynamics

- ▷ two dynamic endogenous variables only:  $\tilde{y}_t$ ,  $\pi_t$
- ▷ both are **jump variables** (not pre-determined)  
⇒ what does Blanchard-Kahn condition require?
- ▷ two dynamic equilibrium equations: NKPC and Dynamic IS

Linear state-space form:

$$\begin{bmatrix} E_t \tilde{y}_{t+1} \\ E_t \pi_{t+1} \end{bmatrix} = A \begin{bmatrix} \tilde{y}_t \\ \pi_t \end{bmatrix} + B(r_t^f - \rho - v_t)$$

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



## Calibration

$$\text{Period utility } u(C_t, N_t) = \frac{C_t^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma} - \frac{N_t^{1+\eta}}{1+\eta}; \\ \text{production } Y_t(i) = A_t N(i)_t^{1-\alpha}$$

- ▷  $\beta = 0.99 \rightarrow$  s.s. real interest
- ▷ Intertemporal elasticity of substitution  $\sigma = 1$
- ▷ Frisch elasticity of labor supply  $\eta = 1$
- ▷ Production function curvature  $1 - \alpha = 2/3$
- ▷ Elasticity of substitution  $\varepsilon = 6$
- ▷ Probability of sticky price  $\theta = 2/3 \rightarrow$  average price duration
- ▷ Taylor rule  $\phi_\pi = 1.5, \phi_y = 0.5/4 \rightarrow$  active; Blanchard-Kahn holds

# Productivity shock: impulse responses





A positive shock of  $A_t$ :



Source. Galí (2008), Figure 3.1.

# Monetary policy shock: impulse responses

**Contractionary** monetary policy shock on  $i_t$  ( $\varepsilon_t^v > 0$ )



Source. Galí (2008), Figure 3.1.

Consistent with IS-TR and AD-AS