

# collaborative Protection Profile for Dedicated Security Component

Version 2.0-PRD-2, May 24, 2024

# Acknowledgements

This collaborative Protection Profile (cPP) was developed by the Dedicated Security Components international Technical Community (DSC-iTC) with representatives from Industry, Information Technology Security Evaluation Facilities (ITSEFs), and International Common Criteria schemes. The organizations that directly contributed to the development of this cPP include:

## **Industry**

Apple Inc.

Google, LLC.

Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd.

## **Common Criteria Test Laboratories**

atsec Information Security

Det Norske Veritas and Germanischer Lloyd (DNV GL)

## **International Common Criteria Schemes**

National Information Assurance Partnership (NIAP)

UK IT Security Evaluation and Certificate Scheme (NCSC)

# Chapter 1. Preface

## 1.1. Objectives of Document

This document presents the Common Criteria (CC) collaborative Protection Profile (cPP) to express the Security Functional Requirements (SFRs) and Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) for a Dedicated Security Component (DSC). The Evaluation Activities that specify the actions an evaluator performs to determine if a product satisfies the SFRs and SARs captured within this cPP are described in the Evaluation Activities for Dedicated Security Component cPP Supporting Document [DSC SD].

The DSC international Technical Community (iTTC) designed the DSC cPP as a standalone PP so that vendors may evaluate a DSC once and re-use this evidence across multiple devices that contain identical DSCs. Vendors may also combine this cPP with a platform solution cPP for CC consumers.

## 1.2. Scope of Document

The scope of the cPP within the development and evaluation process is described in the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation [CC]. In particular, a cPP defines the IT security requirements of a generic type of Target of Evaluation (TOE) and specifies the functional and assurance security measures that the ITSEF must apply to the TOE to demonstrate that it meets the cPP's stated requirements [CC1, Section C.1].

## 1.3. Intended Readership

The target audiences of this cPP are developers, CC consumers, system integrators, evaluators, and schemes.

## 1.4. Related Documents

Table 1. Related Documents

ID	Title	Source
[CC1]	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 1: Introduction and General Model CCMB-2022-11-001, CC:2022 Revision 1, November 2022	<a href="https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/index.cfm">https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/index.cfm</a>
[CC2]	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 2: Security Functional Components, CCMB-2022-11-002, CC:2022 Revision 1, November 2022	<a href="https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/index.cfm">https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/index.cfm</a>
[CC3]	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 3: Security Assurance Components, CCMB-2022-11-003, CC:2022 Revision 1, November 2022	<a href="https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/index.cfm">https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/index.cfm</a>

ID	Title	Source
[CC4]	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 4: Framework for the specification of evaluation methods and activities, CCMB-2022-11-004, CC:2022 Revision 1, November 2022	<a href="https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/index.cfm">https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/index.cfm</a>
[CC5]	Common Criteria for Information Technology Security Evaluation, Part 5: Pre-defined packages of security requirements, CCMB-2022-11-005, CC:2022 Revision 1, November 2022	<a href="https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/index.cfm">https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/index.cfm</a>
[CEM]	Common Methodology for Information Technology Security Evaluation, CCMB-2022-11-006, CC:2022 Revision 1, November 2022	<a href="https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/index.cfm">https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/index.cfm</a>
[CC-E&I]	Errata and Interpretation for CC:2022 (Release 1) and CEM:2022 (Release 1), 001, Version 1.1, February 1, 2024	<a href="https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/index.cfm">https://www.commoncriteriaportal.org/cc/index.cfm</a>
[DSC SD]	Supporting Document: Evaluation Activities for collaborative Protection Profile for Dedicated Security Component: Mandatory Technical Document, Version 2.0-PRD-2, May 24, 2024	<a href="https://dsc-itc.github.io">https://dsc-itc.github.io</a>

## 1.5. Revision History

Version	Date	Description
1.0	9/10/20	Initial publication
1.0.1	December 13, 2022	conversion to asciidoc
2.0-PRD-1	October 31, 2023	Public Review Draft 1 for v2.0
2.0-PRD-2	May 24, 2024	Public Review Draft 2 for v2.0
2.0-Proposed Draft		Proposed Final Draft for v2.0
2.0		Final publication for v2.0

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# Chapter 2. PP Introduction

## 2.1. PP Reference Identification

PP Reference: collaborative Protection Profile for Dedicated Security Component

PP Version: 2.0-PRD-2

PP Date: May 24, 2024

## 2.2. TOE Overview

The Target of Evaluation (TOE) is a Dedicated Security Component (DSC). In the context of this cPP, a DSC is the combination of one or more hardware component(s) and its controlling OS or firmware. The firmware should be dedicated to providing the encompassing platform with services for the provisioning, protection, and use of Security Data Objects (SDOs), which are composed of Security Data Elements (SDEs) such as keys, identities, attributes. See [Figure 1](#) for an example of a TOE representation.




Figure 1. Representation of the Target of Evaluation (TOE)

The TOE should be one or more discrete and embedded hardware components that provide well-scoped security functions that are physically inaccessible directly from the rich operating system. The DSC TOE would consist of isolated firmware and circuitry capable of executing well-defined commands against SDEs/SDOs within the TOE and outside the TOE across restricted interfaces. The DSC TOE is not intended to be a discrete, separate stand-alone component, but one which is directly embedded into a larger system.

A DSC may be comprised of a single embedded component within a device, such as a Secure Enclave Processor (SEP), while in other cases it may be a multi-component system comprised of a software layer and several hardware components (which may be discrete or embedded), such as a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE). Other configurations are possible, with the key point being the DSC is embedded within a larger system and is not a discrete component. These dedicated hardware/software components are integrated into a System on Chip (SoC) and as such are isolated components of a larger physical package. [Figure 2](#) below shows a block diagram of a typical

example of a DSC TOE with all of its internal components.




Figure 2. Example of TOE Internal Components

### 2.2.1. Security Data Objects




Figure 3. Composition of an SDO

An SDO is created by combining SDEs with some attributes. Each SDE used to create the SDO reaches the DSC in one of the following ways:

- By parsing SDEs received via secure channels (see O.PARSE\_PROTECTION).
- By generating the SDEs locally on the DSC as part of the Provisioning service.

An SDO may include one or more SDEs from one or both of these sources. In the Provisioning step, the relevant SDEs are then bound together with a set of attributes resulting in an SDO. Explicit binding occurs when the DSC includes one or more SDEs along with their attributes in a formatted structure to form the SDO. An X.509 certificate is just one example of an SDO (where the signature in the certificate provides the binding of the attributes contained). A DSC protects the integrity of an SDO (see O.DATA\_PROTECTION).

Explicit binding may also occur when the DSC wraps an SDO prior to storing it externally. [Figure 3](#) shows an example SDO with binding data used to secure an arbitrary number of SDEs.

Implicit binding may occur by virtue of the location of SDEs within the DSC. An implicit binding may occur for pre-installed SDEs, in which case the DSC restricts the functionality it allows with the SDEs as part of the firmware itself. It may also occur when the contents of certain protected storage locations carry with them implicit attributes simply by existing in these locations.

Vendors may pre-install keys and other material in the DSC during the manufacturing process, or the DSC may automatically generate keys or other material upon first boot. Since the user (an administrator or client application acting on behalf of a human user) provides no input to these

items, the cPP calls these pre-installed SDEs. Pre-installed SDEs have two distinguishing characteristics:

- These keys may persist over a factory reset; and
- They may not be accessible to administrators.

If the SDOs have been erased (e.g. due to a tamper response), then a factory reset may not be possible. Following an initial boot (e.g. first boot by end-user, or following a factory reset), a DSC may generate SDEs unique to an instance of a DSC that are persisted across user sessions. These are considered to be pre-installed SDEs.

Pre-installed SDOs (i.e., SDEs with implicit binding installed by the vendor at manufacturing time) are typically not accessible by non-administrative users of the platform (i.e., client applications) and are reserved for use by the DSC itself to manage its sub-components, keys, and, indirectly, user content. Pre-installed SDOs typically have implicitly bound attributes. Since pre-installed SDOs rarely, if ever, leave the DSC, they may have no formal structure containing attributes. That does not mean these attributes do not exist; only that there exists no structure in which one would find them all in one place.

The DSC may allow the modification of attributes for pre-installed SDOs. One example would be the authorization value necessary to use the SDO. Obviously, the vendor may have a strong desire to keep the users of the DSC from changing the SDE itself, or deleting it. They could allow administrators to hide the SDO, but not delete it for the sake of factory resets.

Another case of implicit binding occurs when a DSC reserves a bank of user-accessible registers with common attributes. The bank contains one or more registers, usually all of the same size. Again, the functionality within the firmware determines the attributes especially when the function applies only to one or more members of the bank of reserved registers. Without the benefit of a structure with explicit attributes, the DSC relies on the firmware to enforce the policies inherent to the attributes associated with a bank of registers; for example, the DSC firmware implicitly binds the common attributes to the bank of registers.

An SDO held in the DSC may be exported (propagated) only if it is either in a wrapped form (i.e. with confidentiality and integrity of the SDO protected by a cryptographic key-based operation), or if it is transmitted over a secure channel (protecting confidentiality, integrity and optionally authenticity of the receiving endpoint).

### **2.2.2. Services**




Figure 4. Services Provided by the TOE

The labels in Figure 4 refer to the following:

- SDE: Security Data Element
- SDO: Security Data Object (composed of SDEs and attributes)
- SDO ID: Unique identifier for an SDO
- SDO1: SDO that is modified or is a reference to original SDO
- SDO2: SDO that is bound to the DSC but stored outside of it

DSCs provide seven core security services to a platform as illustrated in [Table 2](#).

Table 2. Core Security Services

<b>Service</b>	<b>Description</b>
Parse	The DSC shall ingest pre-installed keys, credentials, tokens, attributes, etc. from trusted components or services external to its boundary either across a secured channel or in a manner that the objects are protected for use only by the DSC.
Provision	The DSC shall create SDOs from parsed or generated SDEs and attributes using binding mechanisms to apply integrity protection to the SDEs together with their attributes.
Protect	The DSC shall manage protected storage for all SDOs. DSCs may implement local storage internal to the DSC boundary or utilize external storage outside the DSC boundary. A DSC shall maintain the integrity and confidentiality (if required) of SDOs stored both inside and outside the boundary.
Process	The DSC shall modify and use SDOs or their attributes on behalf of authorized entities. The Process service shall coordinate with the Protect service for storage of the SDOs while not in use and shall collaborate with the Prove service to authenticate the requesting entity and validate their authorization for access to the SDO in the requested mode. The Process service shall submit an SDO to the Purge service when it is no longer needed by the platform.
Prove	The DSC may attest to a remote entity that the DSC is currently in a specific state. During this process, the DSC shall use the appropriate attributes or authentication tokens (such as nonces, digital signatures, etc.) to enable the remote entity to verify the authenticity of the source of the evidence.
Purge	When the platform no longer needs an SDO, the DSC shall execute a mechanism for destroying the SDO by permanently removing it from the DSC to protect against unauthorized recovery.
Propagate	If an SDO is required by or allowed to be used by a remote peer, the DSC shall ensure that the SDO is exported only as a protected object or is transmitted over a trusted channel.

### 2.2.3. Roots of Trust

This collaborative Protection Profile (cPP) assumes a DSC will contain a Root of Trust (RoT) that is comprised of the compute engine, one set of firmware code, and pre-installed SDOs, including a unique identity bound to the hardware. The firmware code may be immutable, or it may be mutable but with controlled, authenticated, and authorized updates allowed to ensure continued integrity of the RoT. This code may provide one or more RoT services, such as a RoT for Measurement, Verification, or Reporting. The unique identity bound to the hardware should be immutable and third parties should be able to authenticate the manufacturer of the Root of Trust through its unique identity (e.g., the unique identity may be a credential signed by the manufacturer).

### 2.2.4. DSC Characteristics

The security functional requirements rely on the following characteristics of the DSC:

- Subjects

- Roles
- Objects
- Security Attributes
- Operations

Subjects: The following list contains the fundamental actors in the expected operational use cases of the DSC. The first three are active actors, while the fourth is usually passive but could be active.

- S.DSC - DSC with security attribute DSC.ID, which is the identity of the DSC
- S.Admin - Admin (an authorized administrator with special privileges) security attribute - See [Section 2.2.5](#) for more discussion on administrator roles.
- S.CApp - Client Application (CApp) (i.e. an authorized user or an application with a verifiable identity) with security attribute CApp.ID - See [Section 2.2.5](#) for more discussion on user roles.
- S.EPS - External Platform Storage (EPS) (e.g. transient SDE/SDO source and destination, in the case of data imported and exported for the sole use inside the DSC). In the case of a passive EPS, the DSC will properly protect the integrity and confidentiality of the objects it stores and retrieves from there. In the case of an active EPS with security attribute EPS.ID, the DSC and EPS may choose to create a secure channel through which they will pass objects back and forth.

Roles: Users of the DSC are assigned to Roles which enumerate the permissions which are granted to the Objects and Operations. See [Section 2.2.5](#) for more discussion on roles.

Objects: The following list contains objects the DSC expects to use during the expected operational use cases.

- OB.P\_SDO - Pre-installed SDOs (e.g. DSC.ID) with security attributes listed in the next paragraph.
- OB.T\_SDO - Transient SDOs or just SDOs (i.e. SDOs in the DSC currently, but are either ephemeral or are normally stored external to DSC when not in use) with security attributes listed in the next paragraphs. See [Section 2.4.1](#), [Section 2.4.3](#), and [Section 2.4.5](#) for more discussion on keys, which are the primary use cases for SDOs.
- OB.AuthData - Authorization Data (including authentication data, e.g. PINs, passwords, tokens)
- OB.Pstate - Platform State (e.g. measurements and assertions)
- OB.FAACntr - Failed Authorization Attempt Counters
- OB.AntiReplay - Anti-replay tokens (e.g. counters, nonces, etc.)
- OB.Context - Session Context (The DSC may maintain one or more sessions with a CApp involving one or more of SDOs, Authorization Data, Platform State, Failed Authorization Counters, and Anti-Replay Tokens. The DSC may represent internally the state of these objects at any given time in a Session Context) - See [Section 2.4.2](#) for more discussion on sessions.

Security Attributes: The following list contains the minimum security attributes for a DSC. Individual DSCs may implement additional security attributes beyond this (whether they are additional standalone attributes or additional attributes that are associated with SDOs); the ST author is expected to identify these.

- DSC.ID - The DSC identifier. It may also serve as the identifier for the DSC RoT.



- CApp.ID - The Client Application identifier.
- EPS.ID - The External Platform Storage (EPS) identifier. This attribute is optional for a passive EPS (i.e. plain memory that only stores information). If the DSC uses an active EPS to manage storage, then support for this attribute is required.
- SDO.\* - The SDO Security Attributes:
  - SDO.ID - SDO Identifier
  - SDO.Type - SDO Type
  - SDO.AuthData - SDO Reference authorization data
  - SDO.Reauth - SDO re-authorization conditions
  - SDO.Conf - SDO Confidential SDE list
  - SDO.Export - SDO export flag
  - SDO.Integrity - SDO integrity protection data
  - SDO.Bind - SDO binding data

Operations: The following list contains the expected operations of a DSC.

- OP.Import (See Parse) - The DSC may receive SDOs, SDEs, Authorization Data, Platform State, Anti-Replay Tokens or Session Contexts from the CApp or the EPS. The Admin may also give the DSC Authorization Data.
- OP.Create (See Provision) - The DSC may create SDOs, SDEs, Authorization Data, Platform State, Anti-Replay Tokens, or Session Contexts with authorization from a CApp or Admin.
- OP.Use (See Process) - The DSC may use or perform a cryptographic operation on Pre-Provisioned SDOs, Transient SDOs, SDEs, Authorization Data, Platform State, Anti-Replay Tokens, or Session Contexts with Create authorization from a CApp or Admin. Cryptographic operations may include encryption, decryption, hashing, signature generation, and signature verification.
- OP.Modify (See Process) - The DSC may modify SDOs, SDEs, Authorization Data, Platform State, Anti-Replay Tokens, or Session Contexts with authorization from a CApp or Admin.
- OP.Attest (See Prove) - The DSC may create an attestation of Platform State using an SDO or Pre-Provisioned SDO and Anti-Replay Tokens as authorized by a CApp or Admin respectively.
- OP.Store (See Protect) - The DSC may store SDOs, SDEs, Authorization Data, Platform State, Anti-Replay Tokens, or Session Contexts in protected storage of the DSC. See section 2.4.5 for more discussion on protected storage.
- OP.Export (See Propagate) - The DSC may export SDOs, SDEs, Authorization Data, Platform State, or Anti-Replay Tokens to a CApp or EPS with the proper authorization from the owner of each object. In the case of EPS, the DSC will bind the objects to the DSC in such a way as to deny other DSCs or entities the ability to import, use, modify, attest, store, export, or destroy them. The DSC may export Session Contexts only to an EPS binding it in the same way as above.
- OP.Destroy (See Purge) - The DSC may purge SDOs, SDEs, Authorization Data, Platform State, Anti-Replay Tokens, or Session Contexts in protected storage with proper authorization from the owner of each object.

### 2.2.4.1. Concept of Users in DSC

The entities using the DSC will be client applications on the platform. They may be acting as proxies for users or may have identities of their own. The DSC will not be able to distinguish the difference; therefore, the cPP will recognize an entity known as the Client Application (CApp), as the user presenting authentication tokens and authorization values (collectively known as authorization data) to the DSC for the purposes of identity verification and authorization to perform operations.

The term users may be used throughout the cPP as a stand-in for Client Application, but there is not a specific requirement for direct user accounts or users within the system as opposed to the Client Applications.

### 2.2.5. Roles

As with many systems, rather than managing access rights individually for each "user" of the DSC, access rights are managed through the use of roles. Within the DSC, there are three possible roles that are defined. These roles are defined as:

- ADM-R - Owner Admin role - the administrator role related to the management of the DSC once it has been integrated into a platform.
- MFGADM-R - Manufacturer Admin role - the administrator role related to the management of firmware and key material that form the basis for the root of trust.
- CApp-R - Client Application role - the client role of the DSC that requests and utilizes the functionality provided by the DSC.

Depending on the configuration of the DSC, there may not be a separation of the Admin roles, such that the capabilities of the ADM-R and MFGADM-R roles are combined into a single role. For the purposes of the cPP, unless specifically called out, all administration roles are assumed to be combined and will use ADM-R.

As the DSC is generally a component within a larger system or platform, the roles of the DSC are specific to the DSC. While there may be matching roles between the DSC and its platform, the roles here are specifically those in the DSC and are independent of any defined on the platform.

The ADM-R role provides sufficient privileges to manage the functionality of the DSC. As a role designed for the administrator, this role may be responsible for the following:

- Manage access control for SDOs (does not mean the contents of any particular SDO can be read by the administrator)
- Manage the configuration of the DSC

The MFGADM-R role, if explicitly defined in a DSC, may include the following responsibilities (which may be part of the ADM-R role otherwise):

- Manage the pre-installed SDOs and configuration of the DSC

The CApp-R role is focused on utilization of the functionality provided by the DSC. The following would be representative of the responsibilities for this role:

- Requesting the creation of the SDOs
- Accessing or modifying created SDOs
- Deleting created SDOs

The ADM-R role does not mean that an administrator may be able to read the contents of any SDO even though it may be able to manage access rights on the SDO.

The management of timely updates (security or functional) for the DSC may be handled in a variety of ways, and as such may be associated with any role (though clearly this should be restricted to a well-defined "user").

In general, the CApp-R role is expected to be the primary role used when the components of the platform call to access the services provided by the DSC. Some examples of entities that may call the DSC and utilize the CApp-R role include:

- A content provider controlling access to its content through an application.
- A human entity using the platform who has an identity that they use to authenticate themselves to the content provider through a CApp.
- An application vendor acting on its own behalf to update software on the platform.
- An original equipment manufacturer (OEM) that designed and manufactured a more complex system with the DSC as a component (assuming that the DSC manufacturer and the manufacturer of the more complex system using the DSC as a component are different entities).

## 2.3. TOE Use Cases

DSCs are used in platforms to support mobile commerce, to manage platform credentials, manage user access to sensitive resources such as enterprise data centers or entertainment content servers, to manage and protect data-in-transit such as through secure channels or VPN tunnels, and to manage and protect keying, authentication, and authorization material for data-at-rest solutions such as self-encrypting drives.

For the mobile commerce use case, users, merchants, and financial institutions expect and require that financial transactions between them and their platforms be trusted and secure. For example,

- All peers to a transaction must be able to authenticate each other.
- The integrity of the transaction must be ensured.

To support such transactions, a DSC performs the following:

- Ingests data elements and attributes and exports the data objects associated with these transactions and the identities of the parties
- Generates data objects to use for these transactions.
- Securely stores data elements bound with their attributes within a protected hardware boundary.
- Authenticates and processes these data elements within a protected execution environment to ensure the authenticity of the parties and the transactions.

- Establishes secure communications channels between the parties to ensure the integrity and confidentiality of the transactions.
- Securely erases data objects when no longer needed.
- Ensures its own integrity and authenticity prior to execution.

DSCs are implemented to satisfy the following use cases:

#### **[USE CASE 1] Protected Key Store**

A platform leveraging DSCs as a hardware-secured Private Key Store facilitates the use of secure and protected storage of secret symmetric keys and private asymmetric keys for access to data and services. These DSCs would provide safe use of the private and secret keys inside the protected hardware boundary.

#### **[USE CASE 2] User / Platform Authentication to Enterprise Managed Resources**

A platform leveraging DSCs for a hardware-secured ID facilitates the use of the platform as a secure and reliable form of authentication for authorized access to highly sensitive local or remote data and services.

#### **[USE CASE 3] Mobile Commerce**

A platform that uses DSCs facilitates secure storage and protected use of credentials for financial transactions between trusted and authorized users, platforms, merchants and financial institutions. These DSCs would provide safe use of the credentials inside the protected hardware boundary. The use of certified hardware-isolated credential stores on smart platforms and only unlocking their use with authenticated authorization provides confidence that the transaction was indeed authorized by the approved 'platform holder'.

## **2.4. Key Reference Model**

The Key Reference Model abstraction draws inspiration from several different DSC products. The products distinguish themselves from one another in the types of keys supported, how they are protected, the types of applications supported, the number of layers of key, and the number of keys at each layer.

The following paragraphs describe the relationships between elements of the DSC.

### **2.4.1. Key Usage**

One way to categorize keys is by the cryptographic functions they are allowed to participate in. When one creates a key, one often restricts its use to encryption and decryption, or to signature generation and verification. There are exceptions to this rule, especially in proof of possession protocols. However, certification regimes often require strict separation of usage in regards to encryption/decryption and signature generation/verification: one may use a key for one or the other, but never both. As such, a DSC may have to enforce this separation of usage for keys; this may mean that an attribute must accompany a key to help the DSC in its enforcement.

## 2.4.2. Sessions

For a DSC, a connection is established between a CApp and the services provided by the DSC when keys or services are requested. Each time the CApp establishes a connection to the DSC the CApp is authenticated to ensure the CApp has authorization to the requested keys. Since a CApp (acting as an agent of the user) may utilize their DSC keys multiple times, the establishment of individual connections for each use can be a resource constraint for the DSC as authorization methods using public keys tend to be resource intensive (i.e. uses a fair amount of internal memory and takes a long time).

As an alternative to requiring authorization for each access to a key, the DSC could allow the user or owner of the key to open a session. With a session, the CApp would provide the authentication data for the first connection, then the DSC would maintain the session and authorization using a series of less resource-intensive challenges and responses. In some instances the DSC may still require additional authorization (such as an elevation of privileges) to access keys (or different, related keys). Such a protocol of challenges and responses may generate and use ephemeral authorization tokens, which would be one form of critical security parameter (CSP). The DSC may have to switch session contexts in and out of the DSC to external temporary storage, which necessitates the protection of these CSPs. Such a session context is one type of SDO.

A session is a local connection only, between the CApp on the platform containing the DSC and the DSC itself. If the activities involving the DSC involve a connection with a remote system (i.e. something not on the platform), such a remote connection is the responsibility of the CApp. While the DSC may assist in establishing the remote connection, the DSC itself is only aware of the session between the CApp and the DSC itself.

Where a DSC may support a direct connection to a remote entity, this connection is established over a channel, with its own separate requirements (a channel may also support sessions, but that is dependent on the protocol used).

## 2.4.3. Key Hierarchies

Another way to categorize keys is the relationship they have with each other. A DSC may have a key hierarchy, or key chain, whereby data at rest is protected by one or more keys, which are protected in turn by one or more additional keys, and potentially so on. This model calls out three categories of keys generally found on typical DSCs. DSCs may contain Root Keys, Intermediate (or Branch) Keys, and Leaf Keys.

Most DSCs have a concept of Root Keys. These keys are typically provisioned by the DSC manufacturer and have some permanence in the DSC. Root Keys may be derived from seeds (which is discussed later), injected at manufacturing time, or provisioned by a user. Root keys installed by the manufacturers are considered administrator key material. Typically, normal client applications, including OEMs, should not alter or erase this material unless specifically authorized to do so. Root keys installed by the administrator should be similarly restricted. Client application-installed root keys, on the other hand, are not considered as permanent since the client application or the administrator can remove them at any time without authorization.

Root Keys may either be encryption/decryption keys, signature verification keys, or signature generation keys. Encryption/decryption keys, or simply Root Encryption Key (REK), usually anchor

a hierarchy of keys stored external to the DSC necessitating both the encryption key to protect the key outside the DSC, and the decryption key to expose its contents within the protected and secure confines of the DSC. The signature verification keys from public key schemes should always contain the public portion and never the private portion. Use of signature generation keys as Root Keys is rare.

Most DSCs have a concept of Intermediate Keys. These are sometimes known as Branch Keys, Key Encryption Keys, and Key Wrapping Keys. In the SFRs of this cPP, these will be referred to as Key Encryption Keys (KEKs), even if the target of encryption is not a key. Intermediate Keys must always be encryption/decryption keys. Intermediate Keys cannot be signing keys.

Note that although chained certificates (see certificates below) are one form of a sequence of keys, each of which signs another key, the creation and verification of such a chain of certificates is out of scope for the core requirements of the cPP; however, it may be added as a package if one or both of these features (creating the chain and verifying the chain) is indeed present in the DSC. Nonetheless, the primitives of signing and verification are present due to other cryptographic operations in scope for this cPP.

Intermediate Keys should always be protected (i.e. wrapped) by either a Root Key or another Intermediate Key.

Leaf Objects consist of Authorization Data and Leaf Keys. Leaf Keys can be either encryption, decryption, signature generation, or signature verification keys. Leaf Objects collectively refers to data that should be wrapped by either a Root Key or a KEK and is not subsequently used as a KEK itself. Leaf Keys used for encryption/decryption do not wrap other keys (at least in the context of the DSC; what happens outside the DSC with Leaf Keys is out of its control). In many contexts, a Leaf Key used for encryption/decryption is known as a Data Encryption Key (DEK). In the context of the DSC, this cPP will not assume how the user of the DSC will use the Leaf Keys it creates, and will refrain from using the term DEK.

Certificates contain either signed public keys or some sort of Authorization Data. Signature keys come in several varieties: signature generation keys, which contain a private key for signing (and maybe also the public key for verification) and signature verification keys, which contain only the public verification key and do not contain the private key (and thus cannot perform a signing function). There are also symmetric signature keys. In this case these consist of only a single key for both signing and verifying.

Authorization Data may have an arbitrary length of bits or bytes and may contain arbitrary or non-arbitrary values of bits or bytes.

Seeds have a special place in this Key Reference Model. Manufacturers, owners, and users of the DSC can use permanent seeds to create Root Keys. Manufacturers have good reasons to use seeds to derive Root Keys and other items in the Key Reference Model. These include:

- Seeds take less space to store than certain asymmetric keys for given desired cryptographic strengths.
- Having seeds that are unique per DSC increases the probability that the same key derivation function on different DSCs will yield unique keys.

Figure 5 contains an example of a hierarchy of keys where each lower-level key is wrapped by a higher-level key that is connected to it. The Root Encryption Key is an example of a Root Key. The numbered Key Encryption Keys are examples of Intermediate Keys. The Data Encryption Keys and Stored Keys are examples of Leaf Objects. Figure 5 serves as an illustration of key hierarchies; other configurations are possible.




Figure 5. Example Key Hierarchy

Roles may play an important part in key hierarchies. One of the simplest models enforces a different hierarchy for each role at the Root Key level. Another way to put this is each hierarchy at the Root Key level supports a different role. However, for more complexity, once Intermediate Keys are allowed, then each Intermediate Key could serve as the root of a hierarchy of keys for a different role. Here is where the key functions and the roles come together. Roles may further divide into which role has the right to use a key, which role has the right to move the key from one parent to another, which role has the right to destroy a key, etc.

#### **2.4.4. Protected Storage Locations**

This cPP covers several different types of storage locations for keys and critical security parameters (CSPs) such as authentication tokens. Some DSCs may have a generous amount of protected storage internal to themselves, which allows it to accommodate all keys and CSPs in operational use, whether the DSC is performing operations to administer itself or operations on behalf of users. Other DSCs may have a minimal amount of protected storage locations with just enough to accommodate root keys along with a limited number of operational keys and CSPs for user authorized sessions.

For those cases in which the DSC relies on storage external to itself to accommodate all the keys and CSPs on which applications expect it to operate, it will either have to support secure channels to another DSC with a more generous allocation of protected storage locations, or use a series of wrapping keys to protect private keys and CSPs while outside of the DSC. Whether the DSC is powered on or powered off, the DSC is expected to provide support for protected storage locations for its Root Keys. If the DSC uses external storage without secure channels, then it should be ready to wrap both Intermediate Keys as well as the Leaf Objects. This implies that there will be some sort of structure on each of these items stored external to the DSC. The next section discusses that structure.

A conformant TOE may include "write-once" storage such as single-use eFuses. Since data is written to any such storage as part of the initial provisioning of the TOE, the data is considered immutable once the TOE has entered its evaluated configuration. The integrity of this data is maintained through the physical properties of its storage medium.

#### **2.4.5. SDEs and SDOs**

This section is used to map keys and authentication tokens to SDEs and SDOs. This cPP does not impose a strict structure on the items in the key hierarchy. An X.509 certificate is one example of a strict structure of a key with attributes. Collecting attributes of an SDE and composing an SDO structure with an SDE and attribute fields imposes temporal and storage penalties in all cases. In certain resource-constrained cases the attributes could be implicit.

In the previous section on protected storage locations, a DSC may have to use storage external to itself. In these cases, an SDO of a wrapped key may contain a number of important attributes, such as a pointer to its parent, authorization values, and other indications of the functions allowed (encrypt vs. sign). Alternatively, some or all attributes may be implied, which means that only the keys or CSPs themselves exist outside the DSC. In either case, the sensitive values, such as private keys, secret keys, and CSPs, should be encrypted when outside the DSC. The parents of these objects are either Intermediate Keys, or encrypting Root Keys.



Some DSCs may want to distinguish between SDEs created within itself from SDEs ingested from an external source. Additionally, some DSCs may output SDEs without additional context or attributes from the DSC. A DSC, in some contexts, will not distinguish an ingested SDE from raw keys.

# Chapter 3. CC Conformance Claims

As defined by the references [CC1], [CC2], [CC3], [CC4], [CC5] and [CC-E&I], this cPP:

- conforms to the requirements of Common Criteria CC:2022, Release 1
- is Part 2 extended, Part 3 conformant
- does not claim conformance to any other PP or package.

The methodology applied for the cPP evaluation is defined in [CEM] and refined by the Evaluation Activities in [DSC SD]. This cPP satisfies the following Assurance Families: APE\_CCL.1, APE\_ECD.1, APE\_INT.1, APE\_OBJ.2, APE\_REQ.2 and APE\_SPD.1.

In order to be conformant to this cPP, a TOE must demonstrate Exact Conformance. Exact Conformance is defined as the ST containing all of the requirements in [Section 5](#) of this cPP (these are the mandatory SFRs), and potentially requirements from [Appendix A](#) (these are optional SFRs) or [Appendix B](#) (these are selection-based SFRs, some of which will be mandatory according to the selections made in other SFRs) of this cPP. While iteration is allowed, no additional requirements (from CC Parts 2 or 3, or definitions of extended components not already included in this cPP) are allowed to be included in the ST. Further, no requirements in [Section 5](#) of this cPP are allowed to be omitted.

The PPs and PP-Modules that are allowed to be specified in a PP-Configuration with this cPP are specified on the [DSC-iTC website](#) Allowed Components page.

# Chapter 4. Security Problem Definition

## 4.1. Assets

**R.AUTHDATA:** Authorization Data that the TOE manages in support of the authorization services that it offers, including both user-provided authentication tokens and authorization values and those created by the TOE. Authorization Data may be special cases of SDEs, or they may be attributes in an SDO. The TSF may use Authorization Data to manage the use and disposition of a single SDE, or a broad class of SDEs. The TOE protects the integrity of Authorization Data, and in some cases, may protect their confidentiality.

**R.CONFKEY:** Confidential (or secret) keys used in symmetric cryptographic functions and private keys used in asymmetric cryptographic functions are managed and used by the TOE in support of the cryptographic services that it offers. This includes user keys that are owned and used by a specific user (which are a special case of an SDE), and support keys used in the implementation and operation of the TOE. The confidentiality and integrity of these keys must be protected.

**R.PUBKEY:** Public keys are managed and used by the TOE in support of the cryptographic services that it offers (including user keys and support keys). This includes user keys that are owned and used by a specific user (which are a special case of an SDE), and support keys used in the implementation and operation of the TOE. The integrity of these keys must be protected.

**R.SDE:** An SDE is an item of user data that is held in (and may be stored on) the TOE and that may be used only by an authorized subject (i.e. a user or process acting on behalf of that user). Typically the TOE will not know what an SDE represents in terms of the application or service that it is used for: it will characterize an SDE only in terms of the authorization requirements that are necessary to access it (i.e. the presentation and possibly processing of authorization data presented to the TOE), and the operations that can be performed on or with it after authorization has been achieved. An SDE may require protection of its confidentiality, its integrity, or both.

**R.SDO:** An SDO comprises one or more SDEs that are collectively bound to one or more attributes (e.g. an identifier for the identity that a key or authorization data is associated with). These attributes may necessarily be used by the TSF to enforce authorization policies concerning the allowed use and disposition of the subject SDEs. The bindings can either be explicit (e.g. in a well-formatted standards-based data structure) or implicit (e.g. by virtue of their location within the TOE which implies privileges of use and disposition by certain users), or a combination of both.

## 4.2. Threats

**T.BRUTE\_FORCE\_AUTH:** An unauthorized user may attempt to gain unauthorized access to the TOE by repeatedly and rapidly supplying a large number of permutations of authorization data, such as passwords, biometrics, etc. that protect the SDEs, in the hopes that valid authorization data can be obtained through brute force.

**T.HW\_ATTACK:** An individual with physical access to the TOE may apply hardware attacks such as probing, physical manipulation, fault injection, environmental stress, or reactivating blocked test-features or other pre-delivery services to manipulate the behavior of the TOE to disclose SDEs.

**T.SDE\_TRANSIT\_COMPROMISE:** An attacker with the ability to observe data transmission into and out of the TOE may access or determine plaintext values of keys, authorization data, and other SDEs as the TSF transmits them into or out of the TOE.

**T.UNAUTH\_UPDATE:** An unauthorized user may force the platform to update the TOE with firmware that compromises its security features. Poorly chosen update protocols, cryptographic algorithms, and keys sizes may allow adversaries to install software or firmware that bypasses security features or rolls back to firmware versions with compromised security features and provides them with unauthorized access to SDEs.

**T.UNAUTHORIZED\_ACCESS:** An unauthorized user may gain unauthorized access to one or more SDEs within the TOE. If an adversary gains access to SDEs stored in the TSF, they may attempt to view, use, or destroy this data as well as impersonate a user or that user's platform.

**T.WEAK\_CRYPTO:** An unauthorized user or attacker that observes network traffic transmitted to and from the TOE may cryptographically exploit poorly chosen cryptographic algorithms, random bit generators, ciphers or key sizes. Weak cryptography chosen by users or by TSF protection mechanisms puts the user's data (including SDEs), identity, and platform at risk of exploitation by adversaries.

**T.WEAK\_ELEMENT\_BINDING:** An unauthorized user may successfully break the association between SDEs, for example to replace one element with another element.

**T.WEAK\_OWNERSHIP\_BINDING:** A user may successfully access or manipulate SDEs that they do not own.

### 4.3. Assumptions

This section describes the assumptions made in identification of the threats and security requirements for dedicated security components. The dedicated security component is not expected to provide assurance in any of these areas, and as a result, requirements are not included to mitigate the threats associated.

**A.AUTH\_USERS:** Authorized users follow all provided guidance regarding the safeguarding of SDEs held outside the TOE.

**A.CREDENTIAL\_REVOCATION:** If a platform is lost, stolen, or compromised then there is a method of revocation of any credentials held (or equivalent method of mitigating the impact of potential access to the credentials). Credential revocation ensures that the loss of physical custody does not have significant negative impact on the security of the platform. This implies that an attacker has only limited access to the device to apply attacks. It further implies that the device owner is not seen as an attacker.

**A.ROT\_INTEGRITY:** The vendor provides a RoT that is comprised of the TOE firmware, hardware, and pre-installed SDOs, free of intentionally malicious capabilities. The platform trusts the RoT since it cannot verify the integrity and authenticity of the RoT. Trust in the RoT may be intrinsic in the case of an immutable RoT, while a mutable RoT will verify the authenticity and integrity of the updates before applying them.

**A.TRUSTED\_PEER:** The remote peer communicating over a secure channel is trustworthy, and will not abuse the secure channel in order to introduce malware or fraudulent SDEs into the TOE.

## **4.4. Organizational Security Policies**

There are no organizational security policies defined in this cPP.

# Chapter 5. Security Objectives

## 5.1. Security Objectives for the TOE

**O.AUTH\_FAILURES:** The TOE resists repeated attempts to guess authorization data by responding to consecutive failed attempts in a way that prevents an attacker from exploring a significant amount of the space of possible authorization data values.

**O.AUTHORIZATION:** The TOE authorizes only authenticated subjects to access SDOs stored by authenticated users of the TOE, pre-installed SDOs stored in the RoT by the manufacturer of the TOE, and management functions that are used to manipulate the TSF and its stored data.

**O.DATA\_PROTECTION:** The TOE provides authenticity, confidentiality, and integrity services for SDOs.

**O.FW\_INTEGRITY:** The TOE ensures its own integrity has remained intact and attests its integrity to outside parties on request.

**O.PARSE\_PROTECTION:** All SDEs are received by the TOE over a secure channel for parsing, protecting confidentiality and integrity of the SDEs while in transit. The TOE authenticates the source of all SDEs received, and authenticates itself to the remote peer.

**O.PURGE\_PROTECTION:** The TOE provides secure destruction of SDEs when they are deleted, so that the previous value of the SDE can no longer be accessed (and cannot be restored).

**O.SECURE\_UPDATE:** The TOE software/firmware either does not allow update, or else implements a mechanism that ensures only authorized updates are applied. If the TOE allows updating its firmware, it is required to implement a mechanism that ensures only authorized firmware can be loaded into the TOE. A secure update mechanism ensures the firmware is authorized through verification of its integrity and authenticity while also preventing rollback to a previous and potentially vulnerable firmware instance.

**O.STRONG\_BINDING:** The TOE provides a mechanism for binding data to its attributes (including the identity of its owner) and prevents unauthorized changes to data attributes.

**O.STRONG\_CRYPTO:** The TOE implements strong cryptographic mechanisms and algorithms according to recognized standards, including support for random bit generation based on recognized standards and a source of sufficient entropy. The TOE uses key sizes that are recognized as providing sufficient resistance to current attack capabilities.

## 5.2. Security Objectives for the Operational Environment

The Operational Environment of the TOE implements technical and procedural measures to assist the TOE in correctly providing its security functionality. This section defines security objectives for the Operational Environment and consists of a set of statements describing the goals that the Operational Environment should achieve.

**OE.AUTH\_USERS:** Authenticated users follow all provided guidance regarding the safeguarding of SDEs, especially authentication tokens such as passwords, pass-phrases, and biometrics.

**OE.PHYSICAL:** The platform holder will ensure that an attacker has no prolonged, unsupervised physical access to the platform. If a platform is lost or stolen then the platform holder will promptly initiate revocation of any credentials held (or equivalent method of mitigating the impact of potential access to the credentials). The platform may initiate the revocation based on local conditions or in response to remote signals such as from a service provider on the request of the platform holder.

**OE.TRUSTED\_PEER:** Connections using secure channels are made only to trusted peers, in whom confidence has been established that they will not abuse the secure channel in order to introduce malware or fraudulent SDEs into the TOE.

### 5.3. Security Objectives Rationale

Table 3 shows the mapping of Security Objectives for the TOE and for its Operational Environment to Threats and Assumptions, along with rationale for these mappings.

Table 3. Security Problem Definition Mapping to Security Objectives

Objective	Threat or Assumption	Rationale
O.AUTH_FAILURES	T.BRUTE_FORCE_AUTH	This objective ensures that the TSF has a method to thwart brute-force authorization attempts.
O.AUTHORIZATION	T.UNAUTHORIZED_ACCESS	This objective defines and enforces policies that govern access to SDOs.
	T.HW_ATTACK	This objective ensures that the access control policy is not thwarted by physical attacks on the TOE.
O.DATA_PROTECTION	T.SDE_TRANSIT_COMPROMISE	This objective ensures that the confidentiality of SDEs is enforced.
	T.UNAUTHORIZED_ACCESS	This objective ensures that SDOs have adequate protections.
	T.WEAK_ELEMENT_BINDING	This objective assures the authenticity and integrity of SDEs.
	T.WEAK_OWNERSHIP_BINDING	This objective protects SDEs from unauthorized access.
O.FW_INTEGRITY	T.WEAK_ELEMENT_BINDING	This objective ensures that the TOE’s firmware cannot be corrupted in a way that allows the unauthorized substitution of SDEs.
	T.WEAK_OWNERSHIP_BINDING	This objective ensures that the TOE’s firmware cannot be corrupted in a way that causes ownership bindings not to be enforced.

<b>Objective</b>	<b>Threat or Assumption</b>	<b>Rationale</b>
O.PARSE_PROTECTION	T.SDE_TRANSIT_COMPROMISE	This objective ensures that SDEs are not transmitted into the TOE over an insecure channel.
O.PURGE_PROTECTION	T.HW_ATTACK	This objective ensures that a hardware attack does not expose SDE remnants that could compromise the TOE or any of its stored data.
	T.SDE_TRANSIT_COMPROMISE	This objective ensures that residual data associated with SDEs do not remain when the SDEs themselves are deleted.
O.SECURE_UPDATE	T.UNAUTH_UPDATE	This objective prevents the application of untrusted firmware updates to the TOE.
O.STRONG_BINDING	T.WEAK_OWNERSHIP_BINDING	This objective establishes ownership of SDEs to determine the users that may interact with them.
O.STRONG_CRYPT	T.WEAK_CRYPT	This objective ensures that the TOE implements cryptographic algorithms that are not subject to compromise.
OE.AUTH_USERS	A.AUTH_USERS	This objective holds that sufficiently trained and trusted users will follow instructions as assumed.
OE.PHYSICAL	A.CREDENTIAL_REVOCATION	This objective ensures that an adversary will not have sufficient access to the TOE to exploit the login mechanism if the assumption holds that credential revocation is enforced upon a lost or stolen TOE.
	T.HW_ATTACK	This objective ensures that the adversary has only a limited window of opportunity to engage in a hardware attack on the physical TOE.
OE.TRUSTED_PEER	A.TRUSTED_PEER	This objective holds that if the TOE's Operational Environment is configured such that the TSF can only communicate with trusted peer, then this assumption will be satisfied.
	A.ROT_INTEGRITY	This objective holds that the vendor's RoT can be relied upon if the only entities that the TSF communicates with are trusted.

The objectives can map to multiple assumptions or threats to fully define the objectives of the TOE and the operational environment.



# Chapter 6. Security Functional Requirements

The individual security functional requirements are specified in the sections below. Based on selections made in these SFRs it will also be necessary to include some of the selection-based SFRs in Appendix B. Additional optional SFRs may also be adopted from those listed in Appendix A for those functions that are provided by the TOE instead of its Operational Environment.

The Evaluation Activities defined in [DSC SD] describe actions that the evaluator shall take in order to determine compliance of a particular TOE with the SFRs. The content of these Evaluation Activities will therefore provide more insight into deliverables required from TOE Developers.

## 6.1. Conventions

The conventions used in descriptions of the SFRs are as follows:

- Unaltered SFRs are stated in the form used in [CC2] or their extended component definition (ECD);
- Refinement made in the PP: the added/removed text is indicated with **bold text**/~~striketroughs~~. When text is substituted (i.e. some text is added in place of some other text, which is then deleted), only the added text is included;

Note that a refinement is also used to indicate cases where the PP replaces an assignment defined for an SFR in [CC2] and replaces it with a selection;

- Selections:
  - Wholly or partially completed in the PP: the selection values (i.e. the selection values adopted in the PP or the remaining selection values available for the ST) are indicated with underlined text;  
e.g. "[selection: *disclosure, modification, loss of use*]" in [CC2] or an ECD might become "disclosure" (completion) or "selection: disclosure, modification" (partial completion) in the PP;
- Assignment wholly or partially completed in the PP: indicated with *italicized text*;
- Assignment completed within a selection in the PP: the completed assignment text is indicated with *italicized and underlined text*  
e.g. "[selection: change default, query, modify, delete, [assignment: other operations]]" in [CC2] or an ECD might become "change default, [select tag]" (completion of both selection and assignment) or "[selection: change default, select tag, [select value]]" (partial completion of selection, and completion of assignment) in the PP;
- Iteration: indicated by adding a string starting with "/" (e.g. "FCS\_COP.1/Hash").

SFR text that is bold, italicized, and underlined indicates that the original SFR defined an assignment operation but the PP author completed that assignment by redefining it as a selection

operation, which is also considered to be a refinement of the original SFR.

If the selection or assignment is to be completed by the ST author, it is preceded by 'selection:' or 'assignment:'. If the selection or assignment has been completed by the PP author and the ST author does not have the ability to modify it, the proper formatting convention is applied but the preceding word is not included. The exception to this is if the SFR definition includes multiple options in a selection or assignment and the PP has excluded certain options but at least two remain. In this case, the selection or assignment operations that are not permitted by this PP are removed without applying additional formatting and the 'selection:' or 'assignment:' text is preserved to show that the ST author still has the ability to choose from the reduced set of options.

Some SFRs include selections that determine or constrain other assignments or selections. In these cases, a table follows the requirement in which each row of the table defines a permitted set of choices. Individual entries in these tables may also require further selections or assignments. Within the tables, the selections and assignments just follow the normal conventions as the specific modifications applied to the SFR are included in the SFR itself, and the table will only follow the normal conventions under that specified within the SFR.

e.g. for the example [Table 4](#), the ST for a TOE that supports RSA keys must include the entries for 'Cryptographic Key Generation Algorithm', 'Cryptographic Algorithm Parameters', and 'List of Standards'. For 'Cryptographic Algorithm Parameters', the ST author must further select which of the required parameter information are supported. Likewise, if the TOE supports ECC the ST must include the entries from row for ECC along with the appropriate selections. The row identifiers (where applicable) are merely intended as quick reference handles; there is no expectation that the TSF actually refer to keys using this identifier (or that they are used within the ST except where useful).

*Table 4. Sample Cryptographic Table*

<b>Identifier</b>	<b>Cryptographic Key Generation Algorithm</b>	<b>Cryptographic Algorithm Parameters</b>	<b>List of Standards</b>
AKG1	RSA	[selection: 2048 bit, 3072 bit]	FIPS PUB 186-4 (Section B.3)
AKG2	ECC	[selection: 256 (P-256), 384 (P-384), 512 (P-521)]	FIPS PUB 186-4 (Section B.4 & D.1.2)
AKG3	BPC	[selection: 256 (brainpoolP256r1), 384 (brainpoolP384r1), 512 (brainpoolP512r1)]	RFC5639 (Section 3) [Brainpool Curves]

Extended SFRs (i.e. those SFRs that are not defined in [CC2]) are identified by having a label '\_EXT' at the end of the SFR name.

## 6.2. Cryptographic Support

## 6.2.1. FCS\_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation

### FCS\_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation

#### FCS\_CKM.1.1

The TSF shall generate cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm **corresponding to [selection:**

- **Asymmetric keys generated in accordance with FCS\_CKM.1/AKG identifier AK1,**
- **Symmetric keys generated in accordance with FCS\_CKM.1/SKG,**
- **Derived keys generated in accordance with FCS\_CKM.5**

~~] and specified cryptographic key sizes [assignment: cryptographic key sizes] that meet the following: [assignment: list of standards].~~

#### **Application Note 1**

*Cryptographic keys can include KEKs that protect keys as well as the keys used to protect SDEs and SDOs. DSCs should use key strengths commensurate with protecting the chosen symmetric encryption key strengths.*

*If Asymmetric keys generated in accordance with FCS\_CKM.1/AKG is selected, the selection-based SFR FCS\_CKM.1/AKG must be claimed by the TOE.*

*If Symmetric keys generated in accordance with FCS\_CKM.1/SKG is selected, the selection-based SFR FCS\_CKM.1/SKG must be claimed by the TOE.*

*If Derived keys generated in accordance with FCS\_CKM.5 is selected, the selection-based SFR FCS\_CKM.5 must be claimed by the TOE.*

## 6.2.2. FCS\_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Distribution

### FCS\_CKM.2 Cryptographic Key Distribution

#### FCS\_CKM.2.1

The TSF shall distribute cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key distribution method [**selection:** *key encapsulation, key wrapping, physically protected channels as specified in FTP\_ITP\_EXT.1, encrypted data buffers as specified in FTP\_ITE\_EXT.1, cryptographically protected data channels as specified in FTP\_ITC\_EXT.1*] that meets the following: [none].

#### **Application Note 2**

*This SFR assumes there is no pre-shared key between the parties. If key encapsulation is chosen, then FCS\_COP.1/KeyEncap SHALL be included which specifies the relevant list of standards. If key wrapping is chosen, then FCS\_COP.1/KeyWrap or FCS\_COP.1/AEAD SHALL be included which specifies the relevant list of standards.*

## 6.2.3. FCS\_CKM.6 Timing and event of cryptographic key destruction

### FCS\_CKM.6 Timing and event of cryptographic key destruction

## FCS\_CKM.6.1

The TSF shall destroy [**assignment:** *list of cryptographic keys (including keying material)*] when [**selection:** *no longer needed, [assignment: other circumstances for key or keying material destruction]*].

### Application Note 3

The TOE will have mechanisms to destroy keys, including intermediate keys and key material, by using an approved method as specified in FCS\_CKM.6.2. Examples of keys include intermediate keys, leaf keys, encryption keys, and signing keys. Key material includes seeds, authentication secrets, passwords, PINs, and other secret values used to derive keys. The ST Author shall list all such keys and keying material that are subject to destruction in the first assignment.

This SFR does not apply to the public component of asymmetric key pairs or to keys that are permitted to remain stored, such as device identification keys.

## FCS\_CKM.6.2

The TSF shall destroy cryptographic keys and keying material specified by FCS\_CKM.6.1 in accordance with a specified cryptographic key destruction method [**selection:**

1. For volatile memory, the destruction shall be executed by a [**selection:**
  - a. single overwrite consisting of [**selection:**
    - i. a pseudo-random pattern using the TSF's RBG,
    - ii. zeroes,
    - iii. ones,
    - iv. a new value of a key,
    - v. [assignment: some value that does not contain any CSP].
  - b. removal of power to the memory,
  - c. removal of all references to the key directly followed by a request for garbage collection];
2. For non-volatile memory [**selection:**
  - a. that employs a wear-leveling algorithm, the destruction shall be executed by a [**selection:**
    - i. single overwrite consisting of [**selection:** zeroes, ones, pseudo-random pattern, a new value of a key of the same size, [assignment: some value that does not contain any CSP].
    - ii. block erase];
  - b. that does not employ a wear-leveling algorithm, the destruction shall be executed by a [**selection:**
    - i. [selection: single, [assignment: ST author defined multi-pass]] overwrite consisting of [**selection:** zeros, ones, pseudo-random pattern, a new value of a key of the same size, [assignment: some value that does not contain any CSP]] followed by a read-verify. If the read-verification of the overwritten data fails, the process shall be repeated again up to [assignment: number of times to attempt overwrite] times, whereupon an error is returned.

ii. block erase]

]] that meets the following: [no standard].

#### **Application Note 4**

*In the case of volatile memory, the selection "removal of all references to the key directly followed by a request for garbage collection" is used in a situation where the TSF cannot address the specific physical memory locations holding the data to be erased and therefore relies on addressing logical addresses (which frees the relevant physical addresses holding the old data) and then requesting the platform to ensure that the data in the physical addresses is no longer available for reading (i.e. the "garbage collection" referred to in the SFR text).*

*The selection for destruction of data in non-volatile memory includes block erase as an option, and this option applies only to flash memory. A block erase does not require a read verify, since the mappings of logical addresses to the erased memory locations are erased as well as the data itself.*

*Some selections allow assignment of "some value that does not contain any CSP." This means that the TOE uses some specified data not drawn from an RBG meeting FCS\_RBG\_EXT requirements, and not being any of the particular values listed as other selection options. The point of the phrase "does not contain any sensitive data" is to ensure that the overwritten data is carefully selected, and not taken from a general pool that might contain data that itself requires confidentiality protection.*

### **6.2.4. FCS\_CKM\_EXT.7 Cryptographic Key Agreement**

FCS\_CKM\_EXT.7 Cryptographic Key Agreement

#### **FCS\_CKM\_EXT.7.1**

The TSF shall derive shared cryptographic keys with input from multiple parties in accordance with specified cryptographic key derivation algorithms [**selection:** *cryptographic algorithm*] and specified key sizes [**selection:** *key sizes*] that meets the following: [**selection:** *list of standards*].

Table 5. Cryptographic Key Agreement

<b>Identifier</b>	<b>Cryptographic Algorithm</b>	<b>Key Sizes</b>	<b>List of Standards</b>
KAS2	RSA	[selection: 2048, 3072, 4096, 6144, 8192] bits	NIST SP 800-56B Rev. 2 (Section 8.3)
DH	Diffie-Hellman	[selection: 2048, 3072, 4096, 6144, 8192] bits	NIST SP 800-56A Rev. 3, [selection: RFC 3526 (Section [selection: 3, 4, 5, 6, 7]), RFC 7919 (Appendixes [selection: A.1, A.2, A.3, A.4, A.5])]
ECDH-NIST	ECDH with NIST curves	[selection: 256 (P-256), 384 (P-384), 512 (P-521)] bits	NIST SP 800-56A Rev. 3, NIST SP 800-186 (Appendix G.1)

Identifier	Cryptographic Algorithm	Key Sizes	List of Standards
ECDH-BPC	ECDH with Brainpool curves	[selection: 256 (brainpoolP256r1), 384 (brainpoolP384r1), 512 (brainpoolP512r1)] bits	NIST SP 800-56A Rev. 3, NIST SP 800-186 (Appendix H.1)
ECDH-Ed	ECDH with Edwards Curves	[selection: 255, 448] bits	RFC 7748
ECIES	ECIES	[selection: 256, 384, 512] bits	[selection: ANSI X9.63, IEEE 1363a, ISO/IEC 18033-2 Part 2, SECG SEC1 sec 5.1]
KAS-KDF-X	[selection: KDF-CTR, KDF-FB, KDF-DPI] with concatenated keys as input using [selection: AES-128-CMAC; AES-192-CMAC; AES-256-CMAC, HMAC-SHA-1; HMAC-SHA-256; HMAC-SHA-512] as the PRF.	[selection: 128, 192, 256] bits	NIST SP 800-108 Rev. 1 (Section 4) [KDF]  [selection: ISO/IEC 9797-1:2011 (CMAC), NIST SP 800-38B (CMAC), ISO/IEC 18033-3:2010 (AES), FIPS PUB 197 (AES), ISO/IEC 9797-2:2021 (HMAC), FIPS PUB 198-1 (HMAC), ISO/IEC 10118-3:2018 (SHA), FIPS PUB 180-4 (SHA)]
KAS-KDF-KEK	Encrypting one key with another using algorithm specified in FCS_COP.1/SKC	[selection: 128, 192, 256] bits	N/A
KAS-KDF-XOR	exclusive OR (XOR)	[selection: 128, 192, 256] bits	N/A

### Application Note 5

*This SFR captures methods for multi-party key agreement in which multiple parties contribute material used to derive the shared key used by each party to encrypt and decrypt incoming and outgoing messages. TOEs can use the derived keys as symmetric keys, keyed-hash keys, or cryptographic keys for key derivation functions.*

*FCS\_CKM.5 defines KDF-CTR, KDF-FB, and KDF-DPI.*

*For the KDF functions, when concatenating keys for AES-CMAC, the contributions from each party should be an equal number of bits, resulting in the selected key size (e.g., if each share is 128 bits, then the result after concatenation is a 256-bit key, which is appropriate only for AES-256-CMAC). For HMAC functions, the shares can be any size as long as the concatenated result is equal to or greater than the nominal cryptographic strength of the chosen hash function (e.g. if each share is 128 bits, then the result after concatenation is 256 bits, which can be used in any of SHA-1, SHA-256, or SHA-512).*

*For the KDF functions and XOR, each party may have to use an asymmetric method from FCS\_CKM\_EXT.7 to transmit their shares to each other. Key shares may also come from a token, in*

which case, TOEs may use key access methods in FCS\_CKM.3 to authorize access and use of those keys in this SFR.

There are no standards that specify how to derive a key from two keys using KEK or XOR. For KEK, encrypting one key with another, one must use one of the algorithms listed in FCS\_COP.1/SKC and indicate which of the inputs is the plaintext and which is the key. If XOR is selected, the ST Author should describe this method in the documentation.

For cPP/ST authors, please consider the assumptions that opposite parties in the operational environment contribute keying material that meets the same requirements.

### 6.2.5. FCS\_COP.1/Hash Cryptographic Operation (Hashing)

FCS\_COP.1/Hash Cryptographic Operation (Hashing)

#### FCS\_COP.1.1/Hash

The TSF shall perform [cryptographic hashing] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [**selection:** SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA-512/224, SHA-512/256, SHA3-224, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512] that meets the following: [**selection:** ISO/IEC 10118-3:2018, FIPS PUB 180-4, FIPS PUB 202].

#### Application Note 6

The hash selection should be consistent with the overall strength of the algorithm used for signature generation. For example, the TOE should choose SHA-256 for 2048-bit RSA or ECC with P-256; SHA-384 for 3072-bit RSA, 4096-bit RSA, or ECC with P-384; and SHA-512 for ECC with P-521. The ST author selects the standard based on the algorithms selected. SHA-1 may be used as a general hash function and for the following applications: generating and verifying hash-based message authentication codes (HMACs), key derivation functions (KDFs), and random bit/number generation. SHA-1 may also be used for verifying old digital signatures and time stamps, if this is explicitly allowed by the application domain. SHA-1 should not be used in applications in which collision resistance is needed.

### 6.2.6. FCS\_COP.1/KeyedHash Cryptographic Operation (Keyed Hash)

FCS\_COP.1/KeyedHash Cryptographic Operation (Keyed Hash)

#### FCS\_COP.1.1/KeyedHash

The TSF shall perform [keyed hash message authentication] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [**selection:** *keyed hash algorithm*] and cryptographic key sizes [**selection:** *cryptographic key size*] that meet the following: [**selection:** *list of standards*].

Table 6. Keyed Hash

Keyed Hash Algorithm	Cryptographic Key Sizes	List of Standards
HMAC-SHA-1	[ <b>selection:</b> (ISO, FIPS) 160, (FIPS) 128] bits	[ <b>selection:</b> ISO/IEC 9797-2:2021 (Section 7 "MAC Algorithm 2"), FIPS PUB 198-1] [HMAC]  [ <b>selection:</b> ISO/IEC 10118-3:2018, FIPS PUB 180-4] [SHA]

Keyed Hash Algorithm	Cryptographic Key Sizes	List of Standards
HMAC-SHA-224	[selection: (ISO, FIPS) 224, (FIPS) 192, 128] bits	[selection: ISO/IEC 9797-2:2021 (Section 7 "MAC Algorithm 2"), FIPS PUB 198-1] [HMAC]  [selection: ISO/IEC 10118-3:2018, FIPS PUB 180-4] [SHA]
HMAC-SHA-256	[selection: (ISO, FIPS) 256, (FIPS) 192, 128] bits	[selection: ISO/IEC 9797-2:2021 (Section 7 "MAC Algorithm 2"), FIPS PUB 198-1] [HMAC]  [selection: ISO/IEC 10118-3:2018, FIPS PUB 180-4] [SHA]
HMAC-SHA-384	[selection: (ISO, FIPS) 384, (FIPS) 256, 192, 128] bits	[selection: ISO/IEC 9797-2:2021 (Section 7 "MAC Algorithm 2"), FIPS PUB 198-1] [HMAC]  [selection: ISO/IEC 10118-3:2018, FIPS PUB 180-4] [SHA]
HMAC-SHA-512	[selection: (ISO, FIPS) 512, (FIPS) 384, 256, 192, 128] bits	[selection: ISO/IEC 9797-2:2021 (Section 7 "MAC Algorithm 2"), FIPS PUB 198-1] [HMAC]  [selection: ISO/IEC 10118-3:2018, FIPS PUB 180-4] [SHA]
KMAC128	128 bits	[selection: ISO/IEC 9797-2:2021 (Section 9 "MAC Algorithm 4"), NIST SP 800-185 (Section 4 "KMAC")]
KMAC256	256 bits	[selection: ISO/IEC 9797-2:2021 (Section 9 "MAC Algorithm 4"), NIST SP 800-185 (Section 4 "KMAC")]
KMACXOF128	128 bits	[selection: ISO/IEC 9797-2:2021, (Section 9 "MAC Algorithm 4"), NIST SP 800-185, (Section 4 "KMAC")]
KMACXOF256	256 bits	[selection: ISO/IEC 9797-2:2021, (Section 9 "MAC Algorithm 4"), NIST SP 800-185, (Section 4 "KMAC")]

### Application Note 7

The HMAC minimum key sizes in the table are specified in the ISO 9797-2:2021 standard, which requires that the minimum key size be equal to the digest size. The FIPS standard specifies no minimum or maximum key sizes, so if FIPS PUB 198-1 is selected, larger or smaller key sizes may be used.

## 6.2.7. FCS\_COP.1/SigGen Cryptographic Operation (Signature Generation)

FCS\_COP.1/SigGen Cryptographic Operation (Signature Generation)

### FCS\_COP.1.1/SigGen

The TSF shall perform *digital signature generation* in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [selection: *cryptographic algorithm*] and cryptographic **algorithm parameters key sizes** [selection: *cryptographic algorithm parameters key sizes*] that meet the following: [Selection: *list of standards*].

Table 7. Signature Generation



Identifier	Cryptographic Algorithm	Cryptographic Algorithm Parameters	List of Standards
RSA-PKCS	RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5	Modulus of size [selection: 2048, 3072, 4096] bits, hash or XOF [selection: SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512, SHAKE-128, SHAKE-256]	[selection: RFC 8017, PKCS #1 v2.2 (Section 8.2), FIPS PUB 186-5 (Section 5.4)] [RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5]  [selection: ISO/IEC 10118-3:2018, FIPS PUB 180-4 [SHA2], FIPS PUB 202 [SHA3, SHAKE]]
RSA-PSS	RSASSA-PSS	Modulus of size [selection: 2048, 3072, 4096] bits, hash or XOF [selection: SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512, SHAKE-128, SHAKE-256]	[selection: RFC 8017, PKCS#1v2.2 (Section 8.1); FIPS PUB 186-5 (Section 5.4)] [RSASSA-PSS]  [selection: ISO/IEC 10118-3:2018, FIPS PUB 180-4 [SHA2], FIPS PUB 202 [SHA3]]
ECDSA	ECDSA	Elliptic Curve [selection: brainpoolP256r1, brainpoolP384r1, brainpoolP512r1, NIST P-256, NIST P-384, NIST P-521], per-message secret number generation [selection: extra random bits, rejection sampling, deterministic] and hash or XOF function using [selection: SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512, SHAKE-128, SHAKE-256]	[selection: ISO/IEC 14888-3:2018 (Sub Clause 6.6), FIPS PUB 186-5 (Sections 6.3.1, 6.4.1)] [ECDSA]  [selection: RFC 5639 (Section 3) [Brainpool Curves], NIST SP-800 186 (Section 4) [NIST Curves]]  [selection: ISO/IEC 10118-3:2018, FIPS PUB 180-4 [SHA2], FIPS PUB 202 [SHA3]], FIPS PUB 186-5 Appendix A3 [per-message secret number generation]
KCDSA	KCDSA	hash or XOF function using [selection: SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512, SHAKE-128, SHAKE-256]	ISO/IEC 14888-3:2018 (Sub Clause 6.3) [KCDSA]  [selection: ISO/IEC 10118-3:2018 (Clause 10, 14), FIPS PUB 180-4 [SHA2], FIPS PUB 202 [SHA3]]

Identifier	Cryptographic Algorithm	Cryptographic Algorithm Parameters	List of Standards
EC-KCDSA	EC-KCDSA	Elliptic Curve [selection: NIST P-224, NIST P-256, NIST B-233, NIST B-283, NIST K-233, NIST K-283] using hash or XOF [selection: SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512, SHAKE-128, SHAKE-256]	ISO/IEC 14888-3:2018 (Sub Clause 6.7) [EC-KCDSA]  NIST SP 800-186 (Section 3) [NIST Curves]  [selection: ISO/IEC 10118-3:2018 (Clause 10, 14), FIPS PUB 180-4 [SHA2], FIPS PUB 202 [SHA3]]
EddSA	Edwards-Curve Digital Signature Algorithm	Domain parameters approved for elliptic curves [selection: Edwards25519, Edwards448]	[selection: NIST FIPS 186-5 (section 7.6), RFC 8032]  [selection: ISO/IEC 10118-3:2018 (Clause 10, 14), FIPS PUB 180-4 [SHA2], FIPS PUB 202 [SHA3]]
LMS	LMS-OTS, LMS, HSS	Private key size = [selection: 192 bits with Hash/XOF [selection: SHA256/192, SHAKE256/192], 256 bits with Hash/XOF [selection: SHA256, SHAKE256]]	NIST SP 800-208, RFC 8554
XMSS	WOTS+, XMSS, XMSS <sup>MT</sup>	Private key size = [selection: 192 bits with Hash/XOF [selection: SHA256/192, SHAKE256/192], 256 bits with Hash/XOF [selection: SHA256, SHAKE256]]	NIST SP 800-208, RFC 8391

**Application Note 8**

*FIPS 186-5 allows the use of SHAKE128 and SHAKE256. Implementations must use the correct number of bits of output as specified in FIPS 186-5.*

*Elliptic Curve Algorithms, (e.g., ECDSA, EC-KCDSA) require random bits from an RBG per NIST FIPS PUB 186-5 sections A.3.1 and A.3.2.*

*FIPS 186-5 specifies that the same key generation algorithm applies to both ECDSA and deterministic ECDSA.*

*For LMS and XMSS, the key sizes do not represent the expected security strength. All key sizes given here correspond to an expected security strength of 128 bits, per NIST SP 800-208.*

## 6.2.8. FCS\_COP.1/SigVer Cryptographic Operation (Signature Verification)

FCS\_COP.1/SigVer Cryptographic Operation (Signature Verification)

### FCS\_COP.1.1/SigVer

The TSF shall perform *digital signature verification* in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [selection: *cryptographic algorithm*] and cryptographic **algorithm parameters key sizes** [selection: *cryptographic algorithm parameters key sizes*] that meet the following: [selection: *list of standards*].

Table 8. Signature Verification

Identifier	Cryptographic Algorithm	Cryptographic Algorithm Parameters	List of Standards
RSA-PKCS	RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5	Modulus of size [selection: 2048, 3072, 4096] bits, hash or XOF [selection: SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512, SHAKE-128, SHAKE-256]	[selection: RFC 8017, PKCS #1 v2.2 (Section 8.2), FIPS PUB 186-5 (Section 5.4)] [RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5]  [selection: ISO/IEC 10118-3:2018, FIPS 180-4 [SHA2], FIPS PUB 202 [SHA3]]
RSA-PSS	RSASSA-PSS	Modulus of size [selection: 2048, 3072, 4096] bits, hash or XOF [selection: SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512, SHAKE-128, SHAKE-256]	[selection: RFC 8017, PKCS#1 v2.2 (Section 8.1), FIPS PUB 186-5 (Section 5.4)] [RSASSA-PSS]  [selection: ISO/IEC 10118-3:2018, FIPS 180-4 [SHA2], FIPS PUB 202 [SHA3]]
DSA	DSA	Domain parameters for (L, N) = [selection: (2048, 224), (2048, 256), (3072, 256)] bits	FIPS PUB 186-4 (Section 4.7)
ECDSA	ECDSA	Elliptic Curve [selection: brainpoolP256r1, brainpoolP384r1, brainpoolP512r1, NIST P-256, NIST P-384, NIST P-521] using hash or XOF [selection: SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512]	[selection: ISO/IEC 14888-3:2018 (Sub Clause 6.6), FIPS PUB 186-5 (Section 6.4.2)] [ECDSA]  [selection: RFC 5639 (Section 3) [Brainpool Curves], NIST SP 800-186 (Section 3) [NIST Curves]]  [selection: ISO/IEC 10118-3:2018, FIPS 180-4 [SHA2], FIPS PUB 202 [SHA3]]

Identifier	Cryptographic Algorithm	Cryptographic Algorithm Parameters	List of Standards
KCDSA	KCDSA	hash or XOF function using [selection: SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512, SHAKE-128, SHAKE-256]	ISO/IEC 14888-3:2018 (Sub Clause 6.3) [KCDSA]  [selection: ISO/IEC 10118-3:2018 (Clause 10, 14), FIPS 180-4 [SHA2], FIPS PUB 202 [SHA3]]
EC-KCDSA	EC-KCDSA	Elliptic Curve [selection: NIST P-224, NIST P-256, NIST B-233, NIST B-283, NIST K-233, NIST K-283] using hash or XOF [selection: SHA-224, SHA-256 SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512, SHAKE-128, SHAKE-256]	ISO/IEC 14888-3:2018 (Sub Clause 6.7) [EC-KCDSA]  NIST SP 800-186 (Section 3) [NIST Curves]  [selection: ISO/IEC 10118-3:2018 (Clause 10, 14), FIPS 180-4 [SHA2], FIPS PUB 202 [SHA3]]
EdDSA	Edwards-Curve Digital Signature Algorithm	Domain parameters approved for elliptic curves [selection: Edwards25519, Edwards448]	[selection: NIST FIPS 186-5 (section 7.7), RFC 8032]  [selection: ISO/IEC 10118-3:2018 (Clause 10, 14), FIPS 180-4 [SHA2], FIPS PUB 202 [SHA3]]
LMS	LMS-OTS, LMS, HSS	Hash/XOF [selection: SHA256/192, SHAKE256/192]	NIST SP 800-208, RFC 8554
XMSS	WOTS+, XMSS, XMSS <sup>MT</sup>	Hash/XOF [selection: SHA256/192, SHAKE256/192]	NIST SP 800-208, RFC 8391

### **Application Note 9**

*FIPS PUB 186-5 deprecates DSS2 and DSS3. DSA is allowed for legacy purposes only.*

*FIPS 186-5 modifies RSA-PSS to allow use of SHAKE128 and SHAKE256.*

*The TOE may contain a public key which is integrity protected (e.g., in hardware), in which case the FDP\_ITC.1 and FDP\_ITC.2 dependencies do not apply. In this case, no dependencies may be chosen. For signature verifications, private keys are not necessary, so there are no dependencies required for generating or destroying cryptographic keys.*

## 6.2.9. FCS\_COP.1/SKC Cryptographic Operation (Symmetric-Key Cryptography)

FCS\_COP.1/SKC Cryptographic Operation (Symmetric-Key Cryptography)

### FCS\_COP.1.1/SKC

The TSF shall perform *symmetric-key encryption/decryption* in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [**selection: cryptographic algorithm**] and cryptographic key sizes [**selection: cryptographic key sizes**] that meet the following: [**selection: list of standards**].

Table 9. Symmetric-Key Cryptography

Identifier	Cryptographic Algorithm	Cryptographic Key Sizes	List of Standards
AES-CBC	AES in CBC mode with non-repeating and unpredictable IVs	[selection: 128, 192, 256] bits	[selection: ISO/IEC 18033-3 (Sub Clause 5.2), FIPS PUB 197] [AES]  [selection: ISO/IEC 10116:2017 (Clause 7), NIST SP 800-38A] [CBC]
XTS-AES	AES in XTS mode with unique tweak values that are consecutive non-negative integers starting at an arbitrary non-negative integer	[selection: 256, 512] bits	[selection: ISO/IEC 18033-3 (Sub Clause 5.2), FIPS PUB 197] [AES]  [selection: IEEE Std. 1619-2018, NIST SP 800-38E] [XTS]
AES-CTR	AES in Counter Mode with a non-repeating initial counter and with no repeated use of counter values across multiple messages with the same secret key	[selection: 128, 192, 256] bits	[selection: ISO/IEC 18033-3 (Sub Clause 5.2), FIPS PUB 197] [AES]  [selection: ISO/IEC 10116:2017 (Clause 10), NIST SP 800-38A] [CTR]
CAM-CBC	Camellia in CBC mode with non-repeating and unpredictable IVs	[selection: 128, 192, 256] bits	ISO/IEC 18033-3:2010 (Sub Clause 5.3) [Camellia]  [selection: ISO/IEC 10116:2017 (Clause 7), NIST SP 800-38A] [CBC]
XTS-CAM	Camellia in XTS mode with unique tweak values that are consecutive non-negative integers starting at an arbitrary non-negative integer	[selection: 256, 512] bits	ISO/IEC 18033-3:2010 (Sub Clause 5.3) [Camellia]  [selection: IEEE Std. 1619-2018, NIST SP 800-38E] [XTS]

<b>Identifier</b>	<b>Cryptographic Algorithm</b>	<b>Cryptographic Key Sizes</b>	<b>List of Standards</b>
SEED-CBC	SEED in CBC mode with non-repeating and unpredictable IVs	128 bits	ISO/IEC 18033-3:2010 (Sub Clause 5.4) [SEED]  [selection: ISO/IEC 10116:2017 (Clause 7), NIST SP 800-38A] [CBC]
SEED-CFB	SEED in CFB mode with non-repeating and unpredictable IVs	128 bits	ISO/IEC 18033-3:2010 (Sub Clause 5.4) [SEED]  [selection: ISO/IEC 10116:2017 (Clause 8), NIST SP 800-38A] [CFB]
SEED-OFB	SEED in OFB mode with unique IVs	128 bits	ISO/IEC 18033-3:2010 (Sub Clause 5.4) [SEED]  [selection: ISO/IEC 10116:2017 (Clause 9), NIST SP 800-38A] [OFB]
SEED-CTR	SEED in CTR mode with unique, incremental counter	128 bits	ISO/IEC 18033-3:2010 (Sub Clause 5.4) [SEED]  [selection: ISO/IEC 10116:2017 (Clause 10), NIST SP 800-38A] [CTR]
HIGHT-CBC	HIGHT in CBC mode with non-repeating and unpredictable IVs	128 bits	ISO/IEC 18033-3:2010 (Sub Clause 4.5) [HIGHT]  [selection: ISO/IEC 10116:2017 (Clause 7), NIST SP 800-38A] [CBC]
HIGHT-CFB	HIGHT in CFB mode with non-repeating and unpredictable IVs	128 bits	ISO/IEC 18033-3:2010 (Sub Clause 4.5) [HIGHT]  [selection: ISO/IEC 10116:2017 (Clause 8), NIST SP 800-38A] [CFB]
HIGHT-OFB	HIGHT in OFB mode with unique IVs	128 bits	ISO/IEC 18033-3:2010 (Sub Clause 4.5) [HIGHT]  [selection: ISO/IEC 10116:2017 (Clause 9), NIST SP 800-38A] [OFB]

Identifier	Cryptographic Algorithm	Cryptographic Key Sizes	List of Standards
HIGHT-CTR	HIGHT in CTR mode with unique, incremental counter	128 bits	ISO/IEC 18033-3:2010 (Sub Clause 4.5) [HIGHT]  [selection: ISO/IEC 10116:2017 (Clause 10), NIST SP 800-38A] [CTR]
LEA-CBC	LEA in CBC mode with non-repeating and unpredictable IVs	[selection: 128, 192, 256] bits	ISO/IEC 29192-2:2019 (Sub Clause 6.3) [LEA]  [selection: ISO/IEC 10116:2017 (Clause 7), NIST SP 800-38A] [CBC]
LEA-CFB	LEA in CFB mode with non-repeating and unpredictable IVs	[selection: 128, 192, 256] bits	ISO/IEC 29192-2:2019 (Sub Clause 6.3) [LEA]  [selection: ISO/IEC 10116:2017 (Clause 8), NIST SP 800-38A] [CFB]
LEA-OFB	LEA in OFB mode with unique IVs	[selection: 128, 192, 256] bits	ISO/IEC 29192-2:2019 (Sub Clause 6.3) [LEA]  [selection: ISO/IEC 10116:2017 (Clause 9), NIST SP 800-38A] [OFB]
LEA-CTR	LEA in CTR mode with unique, incremental counter	[selection: 128, 192, 256] bits	ISO/IEC 29192-2:2019 (Sub Clause 6.3) [LEA]  [selection: ISO/IEC 10116:2017 (Clause 10), NIST SP 800-38A] [CTR]

## 6.2.10. FCS\_RBG.1 Random Bit Generation (RBG)

FCS\_RBG.1 Random Bit Generation (RBG)

### FCS\_RBG.1.1

The TSF shall perform deterministic random bit generation services using [selection: *RBG algorithm*] in accordance with [selection: *list of standards*] after initialization with a seed.

Table 10. Random Bit Generation

Identifier	RBG Algorithm	List of Standards
HASH	Hash_DRBG with [selection: SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512]	[selection: ISO/IEC 18031: 2011 (Section C.2.2) [Hash_DRBG], NIST SP 800-90A Rev. 1 section 10.1.1 [Hash_DRBG], NIST SP 800-131A Rev. 2, FIPS PUB 180-4 [SHA]]  FIPS PUB 202 [SHA3]
HMAC	HMAC_DRBG with [selection: SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512, SHA3-256, SHA3-384, SHA3-512]	[selection: ISO/IEC 18031: 2011 (Section C.2.3) [HMAC_DRBG], NIST SP800-90A Rev. 1 section 10.1.2 [HMAC_DRBG], NIST SP 800-131A Rev. 2, FIPS PUB 180-4 [SHA]]  FIPS PUB 202 [SHA3]
CTR	CTR_DRBG with [selection: AES-128, AES-192, AES-256, SEED-128, HIGHT-128, LEA-128, LEA-192, LEA-256]	[selection: ISO/IEC 18031: 2011 (Section C.3.2) [CTR_DRBG], NIST SP800-90A Rev. 1 section 10.2.1 [CTR_DRBG], FIPS PUB 197[AES]]  ISO/IEC 18033-3:2010 (Sub Clause 5.4) [SEED]  ISO/IEC 18033-3:2010 (Sub Clause 4.5) [HIGHT]  ISO/IEC 29192-2:2019 (Sub Clause 6.3) [LEA]

### FCS\_RBG.1.2

The TSF shall use a [selection: *TSF noise source [assignment: name of noise source]*, *TSF interface for seeding*] for initialized seeding.

### FCS\_RBG.1.3

The TSF shall update the RBG state by [selection: *reseeding*, *uninstantiating and re-instantiating*] using a [selection: *TSF noise source [assignment: name of noise source]*, *TSF interface for seeding*] in the following situations: [selection:

- *never*,
- *on demand*,
- *on the condition: [assignment: condition]*,
- *after [assignment: time as supplied according to FPT\_STM\_EXT.1]*

in accordance with [assignment: *list of standards*].



## Application Note 10

No rationale is acceptable for not satisfying one of these dependencies.

If a reseeding is selected in the first selection and something other than “never” is selected in the third selection, but reseeding is not feasible, the TSF will unstantiate RBGs, rather than produce output that is of insufficient quality. The listed standards should specify the reseed interval and procedure for uninstantiating and reseeding. The remaining selection allows the PP Author to require application-specific conditions for reseeding.

“Unstantiate” means that the internal state of the DRBG is no longer available for use.

In the third selection for FCS\_RBG.1.3, “on demand” means, that a TOE presents an interface to reseed as a TSFI (e.g., an API call). The interface causes the DRBG to reseed at the request of an authorized user, either with an internal source, an external source, or from input provided through the TSFI (e.g., the API call).

### 6.2.11. FCS\_OTV\_EXT.1 One-Time Value

FCS\_OTV\_EXT.1 One-Time Value

#### FCS\_OTV\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall perform *cryptographic one-time value generation* for [**selection:** *algorithm or mode*] using the output of a [**selection:** *random bit generator as defined in FCS\_RBG.1, deterministic IV construction, [assignment: OTV construction method]*] and sizes of length that meet the following: [**selection:** *list of standards*].

Table 11. One-Time Value

Algorithm or Mode	List of Standards	Notes
HMAC	FIPS 198-1, NIST SP 800-56C Rev. 2	Depending on the use case, salts can be secret or known, randomly generated, or all zero; secret IVs may be required e.g., for key derivation. Please reference the relevant standards for your use case.
KMAC	NIST SP 800-185, NIST SP 800-56C Rev. 2	Depending on the use case, salts can be secret or known, randomly generated, or all zero; secret IVs may be required e.g., for key derivation. Please reference the relevant standards for your use case.
KDF	NIST SP 800-108 Rev. 1, NIST SP 800-135 Rev. 1	Salts and IVs as directed in use of HMAC and AES modes. Please reference the relevant standards.

Algorithm or Mode	List of Standards	Notes
CTR	SP 800-38A	"Initial Counter" (nonce) shall be non-repeating. No counter value shall be repeated across multiple messages with the same secret key.
CBC	SP 800-38A Appendix C	Depending on the use case, IVs shall be unpredictable. Repeating IVs leak information about whether the first one or more blocks are shared between two messages, so IVs should be non-repeating in such situations. Please reference the relevant standards for your use case.
OFB	SP 800-38A	IVs shall be non-repeating and shall not be generated by invoking the cipher on another IV. OFB may require the IV to be a nonce.
CFB	SP 800-38A	IVs should be non-repeating as repeating IVs leak information about the first plaintext block and about common shared prefixes in messages.
XTS	SP 800-38E, IEEE Std 1619-2007	Tweak values shall be non-negative integers, assigned consecutively, and starting at an arbitrary non-negative integer (i.e., sequential nonces).
CMAC	SP 800-38B	IV is all zeros.
KW, KWP	SP 800-38F	Depending on the use case, nonces may be required. Please reference the relevant standards for your use case.
CCM	SP 800-38C	Nonces shall be non-repeating.
GCM	SP 800-38D	For RBG-based IV construction (section 8.2.2) the number of invocations of GCM shall not exceed $2^{32}$ for a given secret key.
RSA-OAEP	SP 800-56B Rev. 2	Mask for padding shall be randomly generated.

### **Application Note 11**

*TSFs frequently generate cryptographic one-time values, often non-secret, such as nonces, IVs, salts, and initial counters (sometimes called initial sequential nonces) using the output of an RBG specified in FCS\_RBG.1. If the TSF is generating OTVs, then this SFR is used. Otherwise, the TSF may obtain OTVs through importation and use FCS\_ITC\_EXT.1 or FDP\_ITC.1 for importing values for*

cryptographic operations. Table 11 contains a few examples of OTVs. TSFs that employ other algorithms or modes that require OTVs should include FCS\_OTV\_EXT.1.

Salts help protect against dictionary and other precomputation attacks. Systems often prepend or append salts to passwords and other long-term, potentially guessable, values to increase the size of a dictionary an attacker must build to attack it. Salts, once associated with a password, generally do not change for the life of that password. Salts should also be unique for each password and should not be reused. Therefore, systems should randomly generate salts with sufficient size such that the combined entropy of both the salt and the password meets the minimal key strength sizes of the chosen algorithms.

Nonces help protect against replay attacks in cryptographic authentication protocols and some encryption modes. A nonce should never repeat. Using a sequence of nonces with a counter embedded in the value will ensure a nonce will never repeat. In protocol sessions that require multiple nonces, using sequential nonces that increment for each message, the receiver can check for and only accept an increase in the nonce value to verify that the message has not been replayed. In some protocols, the initial sequential nonce only needs to be sent once at the beginning of the session and the receiver can predict the remaining nonces in that session, which saves transmission bandwidth. Randomly generated nonces protect against attacks against sessions in which multiple keys are expected to be used. Therefore, nonces should be both randomly generated and never repeat. However, sequential nonces may be predictable. NIST provides additional guidance for the composition of a nonce in NIST SP 800-38C, NIST SP 800-56A Rev. 3, NIST SP 800-56B Rev. 2, NIST SP 800-63B, and NIST SP 800-90A Rev. 1.

Initialization Vectors (IVs) help protect against attacks which depend on the reuse of static keys. Certain encryption modes often require IVs. They should be randomly generated in a nonpredictable way, cannot be sequential, and cannot repeat.

Each algorithm and mode have varying guidance on the lengths of the salts, nonces and initialization vectors used therein. Please consult the referenced standards documents for the appropriate guidance for each.

## 6.2.12. FCS\_STG\_EXT.1 Protected Storage

FCS\_STG\_EXT.1 Protected Storage

### FCS\_STG\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall provide [selection: mutable hardware-based, immutable hardware-based, software-based] protected storage for [selection: asymmetric private keys, symmetric keys] and [selection: persistent secrets, no other keys].

#### **Application Note 12**

If software-based is selected, the ST author is expected to select all software-based key storage in FCS\_CKM\_EXT.3.

### FCS\_STG\_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall support the capability of [selection: importing keys/secrets into the TOE, causing the TOE to generate keys/secrets] upon request of [selection: a client application, an administrator].

### FCS\_STG\_EXT.1.3

The TSF shall be capable of destroying keys/secrets in the protected storage upon request of [selection: a client application, an administrator].

### FCS\_STG\_EXT.1.4

The TSF shall have the capability to allow only the user that [selection: imported the key/secret, caused the key/secret to be generated] to use the key/secret. Exceptions may only be explicitly authorized by [selection: the client application, the administrator].

### FCS\_STG\_EXT.1.5

The TSF shall allow only the user that [selection: imported the key/secret, caused the key/secret to be generated] to request that the key/secret be destroyed. Exceptions may only be explicitly authorized by [selection: the client application, the administrator].

#### **Application Note 13**

*Not all conformant TOEs will have the ability to import pre-generated keys into the TOE. In these cases, the TOE's ability to receive commands to perform key generation is considered to be its implementation of the Parse service. A subject that caused a key to be generated is considered to be the 'owner' of that key in the same manner as they would be if they had imported it directly.*

## **6.3. User Data Protection**

### **6.3.1. FDP\_ACC.1 Subset Access Control**

FDP\_ACC.1 Subset Access Control

#### **FDP\_ACC.1.1**

The TSF shall enforce the [Access Control SFP] on [

- *Subjects: S.DSC, S.Admin, S.CApp, S.EPS*
- *Objects: OB.P\_SDO, OB.T\_SDO, OB.AuthData, OB.Pstate, OB.FAACntr, OB.AntiReplay, OB.Context*
- *Operations: OP.Import, OP.Create, OP.Use, OP.Modify, OP.Attest, OP.Store, OP.Export, OP.Destroy*].

#### **Application Note 14**

*The set of operations specified in the assignment can be collectively referred to as "access." Any subsequent use of the term "access" should be interpreted to refer to one or more of these events.*

### **6.3.2. FDP\_ACF.1 Security Attribute Based Access Control**

FDP\_ACF.1 Security Attribute Based Access Control

#### **FDP\_ACF.1.1**

The TSF shall enforce the [Access Control SFP] to objects based on the following: [subjects (defined in FDP\_ACC.1.1) attempt to perform operations (defined in FDP\_ACC.1.1) against objects (defined in FDP\_ACC.1.1)]. Subject and object attributes may be used to determine whether the

*desired operations are permitted.*

*The following are the SFP-relevant security attributes that are associated with the subjects and objects defined in FDP\_ACC.1.1, as well as any restrictions on the attribute values:*

- *S.DSC*
    - *DSC.ID*
  - *S.Admin - none*
  - *S.CApp*
    - *CApp.ID*
  - *S.EPS*
    - *EPS.ID*
  - *OB.P\_SDO*
    - *SDO.ID*
    - *SDO.Type*
    - *SDO.AuthData*
    - *SDO.Reauth*
    - *SDO.Conf*
    - *SDO.Export*
    - *SDO.Integrity*
    - *SDO.Bind*
  - *OB.T\_SDO - same as OB.P\_SDO*
  - *OB.AuthData - none*
  - *OB.Pstate - none*
  - *OB.FAACntr - none*
  - *OB.AntiReplay - none*
  - *OB.Context- none*
- ].

#### **FDP\_ACF.1.2**

The TSF shall enforce the following rules to determine if an operation among controlled subjects and controlled objects is allowed:

- *[Any subject that has been authorized to perform any operation against any OB.P\_SDO or OB.T\_SDO object can continue to perform this operation if one of the following conditions is true:*
  - *The object's SDO.Reauth attribute has a value of 'none', indicating that re-authorization is not required for subsequent interactions with the SDO;*
  - *The object's SDO.Reauth attribute has a value of 'each use', indicating that re-authorization*

*is required for each interaction with the SDO, and the subject has supplied valid authorization data to the TOE*

- *[assignment: rules automatically enforced by the TSF that always prohibit certain subject-object-operation actions]*
- *[assignment: rules automatically enforced by the TSF that always permit certain subject-object-operation actions]*
- *[assignment: rules automatically enforced by the TSF that conditionally permit certain subject-object-operation actions based on subject security attributes, object security attributes, or other conditions]*
- *[selection: [assignment: any configurable rules or parameters that can be modified to affect the behavior of the Access Control SFP], no configurable rules].*

### **FDP\_ACF.1.3**

*The TSF shall explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly authorize access of subjects to objects].*

### **FDP\_ACF.1.4**

*The TSF shall explicitly deny access of subjects to objects based on the following additional rules: [client applications can only access their own data, [assignment: rules, based on security attributes, that explicitly deny access of subjects to objects]].*

### **Application Note 15**

*The expectation of this SFR is that the reader is given sufficient information to determine, for each object controlled by the TOE, the operations that can be performed on it based on the subject attempting to perform the operation, and whether this is conditional based on attribute values or any other circumstances.*

*It is expected that many of the subject-object-operation combinations will always be prohibited by the TSF, either because the target object is not externally modifiable or because the subject lacks the ability to perform the operation in question.*

*The ST author is not expected to create an exhaustive list of subject-object-operation combinations; it is sufficient to list those that are always permitted and those that are conditionally permitted with the expectation that all remaining combinations are prohibited.*

*FDP\_ACF.1.3 and FDP\_ACF.1.4 allow the ST author to optionally specify override conditions to resolve otherwise contradictory Access Control SFP rules. For example, the rule "S.Admin may always modify the SDO.Conf attribute of any OB.P\_SDO or OB.T\_SDO object" may be overridden by a statement in FDP\_ACF.1.4 that identifies any particular SDO objects as non-modifiable regardless of subject authorizations.*

*The DSC may contain pre-installed SDOs. The DSC will enforce access control for pre-installed SDOs like any other SDO it contains or manages.*

### 6.3.3. FDP\_ETC\_EXT.2 Propagation of SDOs

FDP\_ETC\_EXT.2 Propagation of SDOs

#### FDP\_ETC\_EXT.2.1

The TSF shall propagate only SDO references, wrapped authorization data, and wrapped SDOs such that only [selection: the TOE, authorized users] can access them.

#### **Application Note 16**

*This SFR imposes security requirements on data being propagated (exported) outside the TOE. The "SDO reference" is a pointer to an object that resides in the TOE; this can be thought of as a token to the object. The "users" in the "authorized users" selection includes all roles (i.e. ADM-R, MFGADM-R, CApp-R).*

### 6.3.4. FDP\_FRS\_EXT.1 Factory Reset

FDP\_FRS\_EXT.1 Factory Reset

#### FDP\_FRS\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall permit a factory reset of the TOE upon: [selection: activation by external interface, presentation of [assignment: types of authorization data required and reference to their specification], no actions or conditions].

#### **Application Note 17**

*If the DSC provides factory reset and requires an authorization to carry out the operation, then the ST author selects presentation of ... and fills in the authorization data accepted (e.g. a PIN or a cryptographic token based on some specification referenced in the assigned value). If the DSC provides factory reset external to the DSC without requiring authorization, then the ST author selects activation by external interface. This selection is intended for use when the device containing the DSC takes responsibility for obtaining and checking the authorization for factory reset.*

*If any selection other than no actions or conditions is made in FDP\_FRS\_EXT.1.1, the selection-based SFR FDP\_FRS\_EXT.2 must be claimed.*

### 6.3.5. FDP\_ITC\_EXT.1 Parsing of SDEs

FDP\_ITC\_EXT.1 Parsing of SDEs

#### FDP\_ITC\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall support importing SDEs using [selection: physically protected channels as specified in FTP ITP EXT.1, encrypted data buffers as specified in FTP ITE EXT.1, cryptographically protected data channels as specified in FTP ITC EXT.1].

#### FDP\_ITC\_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall verify the integrity of the SDE using [selection: message authentication code as specified in FCS COP.1/CMAC, cryptographic hash as specified in FCS COP.1/Hash, keyed hash as specified in FCS COP.1/KeyedHash, key wrap encryption algorithm as specified in FCS COP.1/KeyWrap, authenticated encryption algorithm as specified in FCS COP.1/AEAD, digital

signature as specified in FCS COP.1/SigVer, integrity verification supported by FDP ITC EXT.1.1].

### **FDP\_ITC\_EXT.1.3**

The TSF shall ignore any security attributes associated with the user data when imported from outside the TOE.

### **FDP\_ITC\_EXT.1.4**

The TSF shall bind SDEs to security attributes using [*assignment: list of ways the TSF generates security attributes and binds them to the SDEs*].

### **Application Note 18**

*The way the TSF checks the integrity of the SDE depends on the method of importation. For example, the encrypted data channel may provide data integrity as part of its service.*

*When a TSF parses an SDE, it should generate security attributes and create an SDO by binding the security attributes to the SDE.*

*If physically protected channels as specified in FTP ITP EXT.1 is selected, the selection-based SFR FTP\_ITP\_EXT.1 must be claimed.*

*If encrypted data buffers as specified in FTP ITE EXT.1 is selected, the selection-based SFR FTP\_ITE\_EXT.1 must be claimed.*

*If cryptographically protected data channels as specified in FTP ITC EXT.1 is selected, the selection-based SFR FTP\_ITC\_EXT.1 must be claimed.*

## **6.3.6. FDP\_ITC\_EXT.2 Parsing of SDOs**

### **FDP\_ITC\_EXT.2 Parsing of SDOs**

#### **FDP\_ITC\_EXT.2.1**

The TSF shall support importing SDOs using [selection: physically protected channels as specified in FTP ITP EXT.1, encrypted data buffers as specified in FTP ITE EXT.1, cryptographically protected data channels as specified in FTP ITC EXT.1].

#### **FDP\_ITC\_EXT.2.2**

The TSF shall verify the integrity of the SDO using [selection: message authentication code as specified in FCS COP.1/CMAC, cryptographic hash as specified in FCS COP.1/Hash, keyed hash as specified in FCS COP.1/KeyedHash, key wrap encryption algorithm as specified in FCS COP.1/KeyWrap, authenticated encryption algorithm as specified in FCS COP.1/AEAD, digital signature as specified in FCS COP.1/SigVer, integrity verification supported by FDP ITC EXT.2.1].

#### **FDP\_ITC\_EXT.2.3**

The TSF shall use the security attributes associated with the imported user data.

#### **FDP\_ITC\_EXT.2.4**

The TSF shall ensure that the protocol used provides for the unambiguous association between the security attributes and the user data received.



## FDP\_ITC\_EXT.2.5

The TSF shall ensure that interpretation of the security attributes of the imported user data is as intended by the source of the user data.

### **Application Note 19**

*The way the TSF checks the integrity of the SDO depends on the method of importation. For example, the encrypted data channel may provide data integrity as part of its service.*

*When a TSF parses an SDO, it should already have a set of security attributes. However, the TSF may modify these attributes, if authorized, to comply with security policies on the TOE.*

*If physically protected channels as specified in FTP ITP EXT.1 is selected, the selection-based SFR FTP\_ITP\_EXT.1 must be claimed.*

*If encrypted data buffers as specified in FTP ITE EXT.1 is selected, the selection-based SFR FTP\_ITE\_EXT.1 must be claimed.*

*If cryptographically protected data channels as specified in FTP ITC EXT.1 is selected, the selection-based SFR FTP\_ITC\_EXT.1 must be claimed.*

## **6.3.7. FDP\_RIP.1 Subset Residual Information Protection**

FDP\_RIP.1 Subset Residual Information Protection

### **FDP\_RIP.1.1**

The TSF shall ensure that any previous information content of a resource is made unavailable upon the [deallocation of the resource from] the following objects: [

- SDOs
- SDEs].

### **Application Note 20**

*When an SDE is a key then it is also subject to the key destruction requirements in FCS\_CKM.6, depending on where and how it is stored. This SFR applies to authorization data that are SDEs and security attributes in SDOs.*

## **6.3.8. FDP\_SDC.2 Stored data confidentiality with dedicated method**

FDP\_SDC.2 Stored data confidentiality with dedicated method

### **FDP\_SDC.2.1**

The TSF shall ensure the confidentiality of the [authorization data and the following user data [assignment: list of internally and externally stored SDEs]] according to [assignment: SDEs identified in the Confidential SDE List attribute of an SDO] while it is stored under the control of the TSF.

### **FDP\_SDC.2.2**

The TSF shall ensure the confidentiality of the user data specified in FDP\_SDC.2.1 without user intervention.

### **Application Note 21**

*This SFR applies to SDOs with the confidential-SDE attribute set to require confidentiality, especially secret and private keys, Allowed Random Number Generators' state data, and vendor verification reference data. If SDEs do not require confidentiality, then its omission from this list indicates that confidentiality is not required. This SFR also applies to all authorization data appearing in the attribute list under SDO.AuthData as well as any administrator authorization data which may be stored implicitly.*

*If the TOE stores these parameters outside of its boundary, it must encrypt them according to the cryptographic requirements for key encryption, as required by FDP\_ETC\_EXT.2.*

## **6.3.9. FDP\_SDI.2 Stored Data Integrity Monitoring and Action**

### FDP\_SDI.2 Stored Data Integrity Monitoring and Action

#### **FDP\_SDI.2.1**

The TSF shall monitor SDOs and SDEs controlled by the TSF for [integrity errors] on all objects, based on the following attributes: **[selection: [assignment: attribute associated with presence in protected storage], message authentication code as specified in FCS COP.1/CMAC, cryptographic hash as specified in FCS COP.1/Hash, keyed hash as specified in FCS COP.1/KeyedHash, digital signature as specified in FCS COP.1/SigVer, key wrap encryption algorithm as specified in FCS COP.1/KeyWrap, authenticated encryption algorithm as specified in FCS COP.1/AEAD].**

#### **FDP\_SDI.2.2**

Upon detection of a data integrity error, the TSF shall [

- *prohibit the use of the altered data*
- *send notification of the error where applicable].*

### **Application Note 22**

*This SFR deals with the mechanism that protects the integrity of the SDEs and security attributes within an SDO. This provides the binding data that ensures the prevention of unauthorized changes to the SDEs and attributes. It is not expected that a single key will be protected from corruption by multiple of these methods; however, a product may use one integrity-protection method for one type of key and a different method for other types of keys.*

*The cryptographic requirements for cryptographic hashes and digital signatures apply here.*

*No specific requirement is placed here on the nature of the integrity protection data, but the Security Target shall describe this protection measure, and shall identify the iteration of FCS\_COP.1/CMAC, FCS\_COP.1/Hash, FCS\_COP.1/KeyedHash, FCS\_COP.1/KeyVer, FCS\_COP.1/KeyWrap or FCS\_COP.1/AEAD that covers any cryptographic algorithm used.*

*The integrity protection data in FDP\_SDI.2.1 is included in the list of attributes identified in FMT\_MSA.1, and protects the value of the SDEs and of the SDO security attributes.*

*When an SDO is parsed, its integrity is checked when it is imported into the TOE.*

## 6.4. Identification and Authentication

When a platform process requests the ability to create, use, modify, dispose of, etc., an SDE or SDO within the DSC, as a matter of policy, the DSC may expect or request authorization from the platform process, which may include authentication of the requester on whose behalf the platform process is acting. The DSC assumes the requester to be either a person, a process, or a device. The rules on how the requester formats the request will be outside the scope of this cPP. Upon request (or as a matter of an established protocol), the interface (on behalf of the user) presents to the DSC process those authorization values required to authorize execution of the event request. This may include one or more different types of authentication credentials. The DSC validates these items before acting upon the requested event. The validation may simply compare the authorization values to an expected value, or perform a more complex cryptographic protocol to verify the authenticity of the user. After validation, the DSC may then create and subsequently use an authorization value to represent the validation of these authorization values in anticipation of future requests.

Requirements related to the strength, quality, and performance of externally-generated authorization values supplied to the DSC, such as X.509 certificates and biometric templates, are all outside the scope of the DSC. It is expected that these will be generated according to best practices for the type of value and that this is met by the platform, where applicable. The DSC is only expected to enforce quality metrics on any authorization values it generates itself.

### 6.4.1. FIA\_AFL\_EXT.1 Authorization Failure Handling

FIA\_AFL\_EXT.1 Authorization Failure Handling

#### FIA\_AFL\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall maintain [selection: a unique counter for [selection, choose one of: each SDO, the following SDOs [assignment: list of SDOs]], one global counter covering [selection, choose one of: all SDOs, the following SDOs [assignment: list of SDOs]]], called the failed authorization attempt counters, that counts of the number of unsuccessful authorization attempts that occur related to authorizing access to these **SDOs**.

#### FIA\_AFL\_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall maintain a [selection, choose one of: static, administrator configurable variable] threshold of the minimal acceptable number of unsuccessful authorization attempts that occur related to authorizing access to these **SDOs**.

#### FIA\_AFL\_EXT.1.3

When the failed authorization attempt counters [selection, choose one of: meets, surpasses] the threshold for unsuccessful authorization attempts, the TSF shall [selection, choose one of:

- prevent future authorization attempts for a static prescribed amount of time as determined using FPT STM EXT.1;
- prevent future authorization attempts for an administrator configurable amount of time as determined using FPT STM EXT.1;
- prevent all future authorization attempts indefinitely (i.e., lock), as described by

FIA AFL EXT.2;

- factory reset the TOE wiping out all non-permanent SDEs and SDOs, as described by FDP FRS EXT.2

] for these **SDOs**.

#### **FIA\_AFL\_EXT.1.4**

The TSF shall increment the failed authorization attempt counter before it verifies the authorization.

#### **Application Note 23**

*The product validates the authorization factors prior to determining whether user (administrator or client application) access to the SDE/SDO is permitted. In cases where validation of the authorization factors fails, the product will not allow access to SDE/SDO. The product validates the authorization factors in such a way that it does not allow an attacker to circumvent the other requirements to gain knowledge about the SDE/SDO or other keying material that protects them from inadvertent exposure.*

*It is possible for the TOE to have different rules for the treatment of different SDOs or groups of SDOs. For example, some SDOs may trigger a factory reset in the event of excessive authorization failures while others may only temporarily block future authorization attempts. The ST author should iterate this SFR for each distinct response the TSF can make (as defined by the selections in FIA\_AFL\_EXT.1.3) and the SDOs whose authorization failures will trigger these responses.*

*If prevent all future authorization attempts indefinitely (i.e., lock), as described by FIA AFL EXT.2 is selected in FIA\_AFL\_EXT.1.3, the selection-based SFR FIA\_AFL\_EXT.2 must be claimed.*

*If either prevent future authorization attempts for a static prescribed amount of time as determined using FPT STM EXT.1 or prevent future authorization attempts for an administrator configurable amount of time as determined using FPT STM EXT.1 is selected, then the selection-based SFR FPT\_STM\_EXT.1 must be claimed.*

*If factory reset the TOE wiping out all non-permanent SDEs and SDOs, as described by FDP FRS EXT.2 is selected in FIA\_AFL\_EXT.1.3, the selection-based SFR FDP\_FRS\_EXT.2 must be claimed.*

### **6.4.2. FIA\_SOS.2 TSF Generation of Secrets**

FIA\_SOS.2 TSF Generation of Secrets

#### **FIA\_SOS.2.1**

The TSF shall provide a mechanism to generate **authorization data** that meet [*the metric where for each authentication attempt, the probability shall be less than one in 1,000,000 that a random attempt will be successful*].

#### **FIA\_SOS.2.2**

The TSF shall be able to enforce the use of TSF generated **authorization data** for [*assignment: non-empty list of TSF functions*].

#### **Application Note 24**

*This SFR expects the TSF must generate authorization data from a sufficiently large key space to ensure that users cannot employ random guessing as a statistically plausible method of authorizing actions within the TOE, both for a single event and over a session.*

### **6.4.3. FIA\_UAU.2 User Authentication before Any Action**

FIA\_UAU.2 User Authentication before Any Action

#### **FIA\_UAU.2.1**

The TSF shall require each user **and SDO owner** to be successfully authenticated before **authorizing** any ~~other~~ TSF-mediated actions on behalf of that user **or SDO owner**.

#### **Application Note 25**

*This SFR goes with FDP\_ACF.1, which authorizes access to SDOs (i.e. authorizes operations with or on SDOs). The security policies in FDP\_ACF.1 may require authentication of the subjects and owners of the SDOs before the TSF authorizes access to them. An authentication token is critical data bound to a user. Such data, when presented to the TOE and successfully verified by it, authenticates the user. The TOE may use the successful authentication of a user as an authorization to execute an action on its behalf, or to perform a requested operation on or with an SDO.*

*This requirement specifies the TSF exercise an authentication mechanism from FIA\_UAU.5 by which the TOE authenticates the identity of the user requesting the operation and the owner of the SDO which is an object in the operation. Such authentication is necessary to authorize it to operate with the SDOs. A user could present a unique authentication token. The TSF may accept authentication tokens with no further conditioning. The TSF validates the authentication token prior to granting the authorization to perform the requested operation with the SDO. The SDO security attribute SDO.Reauth determines whether or not the TOE may authenticate the user and the SDO owner only once or each time each time it operates with the SDO.*

*The means of validation may vary based on the type of authentication token.*

### **6.4.4. FIA\_UAU.5 Multiple Authentication Mechanisms**

FIA\_UAU.5 Multiple Authentication Mechanisms

#### **FIA\_UAU.5.1**

The TSF shall provide **[selection: no mechanism, an authentication token mechanism, a cryptographic signature mechanism, [assignment: list of authentication mechanisms]]** to support user authentication.

#### **FIA\_UAU.5.2**

The TSF shall authenticate any user's claimed identity according to the **following rule(s): [selection: all subject users and SDO owners shall successfully authenticate themselves using one of the mechanisms listed in FIA UAU.5.1, the Prove service shall not accept "no mechanism" as an authentication method, [assignment: rules describing how each authentication mechanism provides authentication]]**.

## **Application Note 26**

*This SFR describes the authentication mechanisms required for any user of any service as a precondition for providing authorization to execute the service. This includes the authentication of the owner of the SDOs of the service.*

### **6.4.5. FIA\_UAU.6 Re-Authenticating**

FIA\_UAU.6 Re-Authenticating

#### **FIA\_UAU.6.1**

The TSF shall re-authenticate the user **for access to an SDO** under the conditions: **according to the policy specified in SDO.Reauth.**

## **Application Note 27**

*The allowed values for the SDO.Reauth attribute of an SDO are defined in FMT\_MSA.3 and the SDO Attributes Initialization Table. The rules in FDP\_ACF.1.2 and also ensure that the need for re-authorization has been checked before access to an SDO.*

*An SDO.Reauth value of 'none' indicates that no authentication of the subject user nor of the SDO owners is necessary. It also indicates that no reauthorization for operations using the SDO is necessary.*

*An SDO.Reauth value of policy indicates that there may be a more complicated set of circumstances that trigger a re-auth (re-authentication of the users and owners as well as re-authorization of the operation). This could be a policy of a time limit for which a user can use an SDO before re-authentication (e.g. 10 minutes or 24 hours). The ST should indicate the policies allowed, and how the TOE evaluates the policies. The ST should also indicate the location of those policies, and how the TOE protects the integrity of those policies.*

*When the TSF binds a user to access an SDO, this means that the TSF has authenticated the user and that the TSF authorized the user to have the right to exercise one or more of the following actions: generate the SDO, modify the SDO, including its security attributes, use the SDO in a TOE operation, propagate or duplicate the SDO for use by a device external to the DSC, or destroy the SDO. The user may not have exclusive rights to exercise the operations listed.*

*Policy as represented by the attributes in the SDO dictates whether or not a user must authenticate itself in order to authorize access to the SDO.*

*It is possible that the attributes of some SDOs should remain unchanged, and that the attributes of other SDOs may be changed by authorized users. If this is the case, then the ST author should iterate this SFR and indicate in the TSS which SDOs apply to each iteration.*

## **6.5. Security Management**

### **6.5.1. FMT\_MOF\_EXT.1 Management of Security Functions Behavior**

FMT\_MOF\_EXT.1 Management of Security Functions Behavior

## FMT\_MOF\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall restrict the ability to perform the functions in FMT\_SMF.1 to authenticated administrators.

## 6.5.2. FMT\_MSA.1 Management of Security Attributes

### FMT\_MSA.1 Management of Security Attributes

#### FMT\_MSA.1.1

The TSF shall enforce the [Access Control SFP] to restrict the ability to modify the security attributes **[assignment: list of security attributes, to include attributes as specified in [Supported Methods for SDO Attributes](#)]** to **[the authorized identified roles as specified in [Supported Methods for SDO Attributes](#)]**.

Table 12. Supported Methods for SDO Attributes

SDO Attribute	Modification Constraints
SDO.ID	Cannot be modified
SDO.Type	Cannot be modified
SDO.AuthData	[selection: ADM-R, MFGADM-R, CApp-R] roles that are authorized to modify SDO reference authorization data
SDO.Reauth	[selection: ADM-R, MFGADM-R, CApp-R] roles that are authorized to modify re-authorization conditions
SDO.Conf	[selection: ADM-R, MFGADM-R, CApp-R] roles that are authorized to modify confidential SDE-list
SDO.Export	[selection: ADM-R, MFGADM-R, CApp-R] roles that are authorized to modify export flag
SDO.Integrity	Cannot be modified by users (maintained automatically by TSF)
SDO.Bind	Cannot be modified by users (maintained automatically by TSF)

#### Application Note 28

[Supported Methods for SDO Attributes](#) defines the required constraints on security attribute modification. The Security Target completes the other parts not specified here (along with any other information for other security attributes relevant to a particular TOE).

The assignments of authorized subjects in [Supported Methods for SDO Attributes](#) may be defined by the ST author in terms of roles or in terms of an action such as presentation of a valid authentication token of a particular type (in this case the ST author identifies in an Application Note the other SFRs that govern the action).

The TSF vendor may pre-install SDOs with default attributes. The Security Target should make clear which attributes may be changed or are prohibited from changing based on the ADM-R and MFGADM-R roles (as applicable). It should also distinguish between authorization values required to use pre-installed SDOs and authorization values required to change the attributes of pre-installed SDOs.

*Supported Methods for SDO Attributes* lists SDO ID as "cannot be modified". In some cases, a change in the attributes may cause a change in the SDO ID. In these cases, a change in the SDO ID causes the creation of a new SDO and possibly the loss of the old SDO.

Only authorized subjects can change the attributes of an SDO, and only as permitted in *Supported Methods for SDO Attributes*.

### 6.5.3. FMT\_MSA.3 Static Attribute Initialization

This SFR deals with the initialization of the attributes of an SDO when it is created by parsing or provisioning. The generation process includes SDOs created by the TSF (provisioned) and those imported via FDP\_ITC\_EXT.2 (parsed).

The TSF is expected to give an SDO a set of security attributes at the time of its creation. This set is expected to include at least the following attributes:

- SDO identifier
- SDO type
- SDO reference authorization data (i.e. the data that is used when determining whether to grant access to an SDO, for each relevant mode of access, on the basis of an authorization token presented to the DSC)
- Re-authorization conditions (i.e. event after which re-authorization is required)
- Confidential-SDE list (each SDE in this list is held encrypted when the SDO is stored)
- Export Flag (indicating whether the SDO is allowed to be propagated)
- Integrity protection data
- Binding Data (created by the TOE to strongly link or associate the SDO with other entities such as the TOE itself or with other SDOs in a hierarchy such as a child to a parent).

The TSF provides the capability to protect the contents of an SDO (i.e. the set of its SDEs together with the SDO attributes) from unauthorized modification. The DSC shall check for such modifications before using the SDO or any of its SDEs.

#### FMT\_MSA.3 Static Attribute Initialization

##### FMT\_MSA.3.1

The TSF shall enforce the [Access Control SFP] to provide [selection, choose one of: restrictive, permissive, [assignment: other property]] default values for security attributes that are used to enforce the SFP.

##### FMT\_MSA.3.2

The TSF shall allow the [authorized identified roles, according to *Supported Methods for SDO Attributes Initialization*] to specify alternative initial values to override the default values when an object or information is created.

Table 13. Supported Methods for SDO Attributes Initialization



SDO Attribute	Authorized Override Role	Initialization Method	Allowed Values
SDO.ID	None	Import and generation process	[assignment: range of allowed values]
SDO.Type	None	Import and generation process	[assignment: list of allowed types]
SDO.AuthData	[selection: <u>ADM-R, MFGADM-R, CApp-R</u> ]	Import process	[selection: <u>none, [assignment: list of types of authentication tokens allowed], [assignment: range of authorization values allowed]</u> ]
	None	Generation process	
SDO.Reauth	None	Import and generation process	[selection: <u>none, each access, policy</u> ]
SDO.Conf	None	Import and generation process	[assignment: list of SDEs of which the TOE must provide a confidentiality service]
SDO.Export	None	Import and generation process	[selection: <u>exportable, non-exportable</u> ]
SDO.Integrity	None	Import and generation process	[assignment: range of allowed values]
SDO.Bind	None	Import and generation process	[assignment: range of allowed values]

### **Application Note 29**

*The [Supported Methods for SDO Attributes Initialization](#) Table is referenced from FMT\_MSA.3 and matches the attributes covered by FMT\_MSA.1 (which defines controls on the modification of the attributes). The initialization of these security attributes occurs when an SDO is either parsed by the TOE or generated on the TOE.*

*An imported object contains the default values for each attribute, where allowed. The TSF can override default values for the following attributes of imported objects: SDO.ID, SDO.Type, SDO.Reauth, SDO.Export, and SDO.Integrity. The TSF may override default values in these cases to force the objects to comport to established structures within the TOE, or to comply with TOE-wide security policies. In these cases, the defined roles cannot override the default values. For SDO.AuthData, the TSF shall allow the CApp-R role to override authorization data that may arrive with the object. For SDO.Conf the TSF accepts the imported value for this attribute. SDO.Bind is explained below.*

*Unless otherwise noted, both the ADM-R and CApp-R roles can initiate the generation process. The ADM-R and CApp-R roles will provide the default values for the attributes. This SFR assumes the TSF checks SDO.Type, SDO.AuthData, SDO.Reauth, SDO.Conf, and SDO.Export for compliance with established security policies and refuses to create objects which do not comply with overriding the value of any of these attributes. In the cases of the SDO.ID and SDO.Integrity, the TSF generates these values and therefore there is no need or ability to override.*

*In the case of SDO.Bind for both import and generation processes, the TSF may override values that denote a binding to the TOE, but it should not override values that denote a binding to other keys. In the case of the import process, the defined roles cannot override the default values for any binding.*

*The SDO.AuthData attribute is data that is required in order to validate authorization of a subject to access the SDO (in each of the modes relevant to that SDO). The nature of this data will depend on the authorization mechanism used in the TOE, as described in FIA\_UAU.2.*

*The SDO.Reauth attribute for an individual SDO specifies the conditions where access to the SDO will require reauthorization to continue access to the SDO. Examples of TOE-specified events might be explicit revocation of authorization by a user, expiry of a time interval, or completion of a fixed number of uses since the last authorization. The re-authorization conditions are used in FIA\_UAU.6 and FDP\_ACF.1. These determine whether a single authorization by the SDO owner will allow any number of uses of the SDO until the end of the user's session (value 'none'), or whether each use of the SDO must be individually authorized (value 'each access'), or whether re-authorization must happen each time one of the TOE-specified events occurs.*

*The SDO.Conf attribute indicates which SDEs, if any, the TOE should encrypt when not in operational use. The TOE should use the methods in FCS\_COP.1/SKC, FCS\_STG\_EXT.1, or FCS\_CKM\_EXT.3 to protect the SDEs in this list.*

*The SDO.Integrity attribute includes evidence that the TSF can use to protect and verify the integrity of the SDO.*

*Attributes assigned by the TOE to any parsed SDOs must be described in the Security Target and in operational user guidance.*

*The TOE uses the Binding Data for an SDO to strongly link the SDO to the TOE, a parent SDO in a hierarchy, or to nothing at all. SDOs bound to nothing may freely travel from one TOE to another without restrictions. If bound to another SDO as a child to a parent in a hierarchy, it may travel only where the parent SDO travels. If bound to the TOE, it may travel to any other TOE for any reason, even if the TOE moves its parent to another TOE. Note that vendors will initialize attributes of pre-installed SDOs with default values. However, authorization values to change the attributes of pre-installed SDOs may differ from the authorization value required to use the pre-installed SDO.*

*The vendor should document the implicit attributes for pre-installed SDOs and SDOs stored in special locations.*

*In cases in which the SDO.ID is a cryptographic hash of the attributes and SDEs, that value may act as both SDO.ID and SDO.Integrity for the SDO.*

*When a remote peer sends an SDO to the TOE, it properly indicates through the SDE-confidentiality list of any authorization values and authentication tokens present in the SDO, whether they are present in the SDE or as attributes, which control access to the SDE.*

*When a TOE generates an SDO internally for the first time, it properly indicates through the SDE-confidentiality list any SDEs that are authorization values or authentication tokens. Similarly, if any of the attributes are authorization values or authentication tokens, the TOE will properly indicate through the SDE-confidentiality list that it will encrypt them prior to storing them.*

## 6.5.4. FMT\_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

### FMT\_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

#### FMT\_SMF.1.1

The TSF shall be capable of performing the following management functions: [

- *Reset TOE to factory state for FDP\_FRS\_EXT.1*
- *Configure authorization policies for TOE resources*

*[selection:*

- *set authorization failure parameters for FIA AFL\_EXT.1,*
- *update TOE firmware,*
- *update pre-installed SDOs,*
- *unlock access to SDO following excessive failed authorization attempts,*
- *no other functions]*.

#### **Application Note 30**

*If FPT\_MFW\_EXT.1 selects mutable firmware, then FMT\_SMF.1 must select Update TOE firmware and pre-installed SDOs.*

*Recall that resetting a TOE to factory state also wipes all user data, but may not wipe out pre-installed SDOs. Configuring authorization policies includes setting policies for allowed access to SDOs.*

*Protections for pre-installed SDEs/SDOs come through the firmware as well as through firmware updates. In the same vein, the authorized updates may also affect the SDEs as well, if the vendor so chooses. One could say that the authorized update binds the attributes present in the functionality of the firmware to the pre-installed SDEs.*

## 6.5.5. FMT\_SMR.1 Security Roles

### FMT\_SMR.1 Security Roles

#### FMT\_SMR.1.1

The TSF shall maintain the roles: [ADM-R, MFGADM-R, CApp-R].

#### FMT\_SMR.1.2

The TSF shall be able to associate users with roles.

#### **Application Note 31**

*This cPP uses the term "user" throughout to reference the ADM-R, MFGADM-R and CApp-R roles simultaneously.*

## 6.6. Protection of the TSF

### 6.6.1. FPT\_FLS.1/FI Failure with Preservation of Secure State (Fault Injection)

FPT\_FLS.1/FI Failure with Preservation of Secure State (Fault Injection)

#### FPT\_FLS.1.1/FI

The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of failures occur: [*fault injections*].

#### *Application Note 32*

*Note that a secure state does not imply the uninterrupted enforcement of all claimed security functionality it is appropriate for the TSF to "fail closed" and block the execution of security-relevant behavior if a fault injection attempt or other significant glitch occurs.*

### 6.6.2. FPT\_MFW\_EXT.1 Mutable/Immutable Firmware

FPT\_MFW\_EXT.1 Mutable/Immutable Firmware

#### FPT\_MFW\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall be maintained as [selection: immutable, mutable] firmware.

#### *Application Note 33*

*The ST author must include FPT\_MFW\_EXT.2, FPT\_MFW\_EXT.3, FPT\_FLS.1/FW, and FPT\_RPL.1/Rollback if mutable is selected.*

### 6.6.3. FPT\_MOD\_EXT.1 Debug Modes

FPT\_MOD\_EXT.1 Debug Modes

#### FPT\_MOD\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall provide no access to debug modes.

#### *Application Note 34*

*'Debug modes' may include, but are not limited to, any alternate mode of operation, such as developer mode, test mode, manufacturer mode, or altered boot mode. These modes may be available in some versions of the TOE, but not in the final production version.*

### 6.6.4. FPT\_PHP.3 Resistance to Physical Attack

FPT\_PHP.3 Resistance to Physical Attack

#### FPT\_PHP.3.1

The TSF shall resist [*data extraction via fault injection from extreme temperatures and abnormal voltage*] to the [*TSF storage elements that contain [selection: SDEs, SDOs, firmware]*] by responding automatically such that the SFRs are always enforced.

### **Application Note 35**

*Physical protection mechanisms as envisioned by this requirement are mechanisms that protect communications to the extent that encryption or other logical protections are not required to ensure confidentiality, integrity, and assured identification of endpoints. Such mechanisms may include, for example, physically isolated traces, or mechanisms that take advantage of physical properties of signals to ensure that communications are receivable only by the intended endpoint.*

*Any physical external casing or potting material of the TOE is considered an 'external interface', not just those interfaces over which data is transmitted. This ensures that the TSF will respond appropriately if, for example, an attacker penetrates the physical surface of the DSC in an attempt to access its stored data.*

*The TOE's protection against abnormal temperature and voltage can be considered equivalent to what is required by assertion AS07.77 of [ISO-TR].*

## **6.6.5. FPT\_PRO\_EXT.1 Root of Trust**

FPT\_PRO\_EXT.1 Root of Trust

### **FPT\_PRO\_EXT.1.1**

The TSF shall contain an SDO that contains the identity of the Root of Trust.

### **Application Note 36**

*Every DSC is expected to have a single RoT that comprises the DSC hardware and pre-installed SDOs, from which services (e.g. Storage, Authorization, etc.) can be offered.*

*Depending on the use case and the way status registers are used, unique identity keys may be bound to the TOE, the TOE platform, or both.*

*The sole presence of unique identity keys linking to the RoT does not prove authenticity without the use of digital signatures.*

### **FPT\_PRO\_EXT.1.2**

The TSF shall maintain Root of Trust data as [selection: immutable, mutable if and only if its mutability is controlled by a unique identifiable owner].

### **Application Note 37**

*One expects that only authorized sources can modify the single RoT, such as through a secure update.*

*The process of authenticating the source of a secure update may involve querying the identity of the manufacturer, contained on a pre-installed SDO. If this identity is in the form of an X.509 certificate containing a signature verification key signed by the manufacturer, then the authentication process is sufficient.*

*A unique identifiable owner is assumed to be one with an ADM-R role; however, there may be circumstances where the owner does not take on an ADM-R role, which should be documented.*

## 6.6.6. FPT\_ROT\_EXT.1 Root of Trust Services

FPT\_ROT\_EXT.1 Root of Trust Services

### FPT\_ROT\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall provide a Root of Trust for Storage, a Root of Trust for Authorization, and [selection: Root of Trust for Measurement, Root of Trust for Reporting, no others] based on the Root of Trust identified in FPT\_PRO\_EXT.1.1.

#### **Application Note 38**

*This document uses the [GP\_ROT] definitions for RoT for Storage (denoted as the combination of RoT for Confidentiality and RoT for Integrity), Authorization, Measurement, and Reporting. DSCs use Roots of Trust for Storage to protect SDOs. Section 6.4 has a number of requirements for ensuring the TSF has functionality to authorize a user in order to access an SDO, including FIA\_UAU.6.*

*If both Root of Trust for Measurement and Root of Trust for Reporting are selected in FPT\_ROT\_EXT.1.1, the selection-based SFR FDP\_DAU.1/Prove must also be claimed.*

## 6.6.7. FPT\_ROT\_EXT.2 Root of Trust for Storage

FPT\_ROT\_EXT.2 Root of Trust for Storage

### FPT\_ROT\_EXT.2.1

The TSF shall prevent unauthorized access to SDOs associated with the Root of Trust for Storage.

#### **Application Note 39**

*TOEs may use shielded locations or cryptographic protections to prevent unauthorized access to SDOs. Unauthorized access includes unauthorized disclosure of secret SDOs (e.g. secret keys, private keys) and unauthorized modification of both secret and non-secret SDOs (e.g. public keys, certificates). Use FDP\_SDC.2 to protect the confidentiality of secret SDOs associated with the RoT for Storage. Use FDP\_SDI.2 to protect the integrity of SDOs associated with the RoT for Storage.*

## 6.6.8. FPT\_RPL.1/Authorization Replay Prevention

FPT\_RPL.1/Authorization Replay Prevention

### FPT\_RPL.1.1/Authorization

The TSF shall detect replay for the following entities: [user authorization of operations on SDOs].

### FPT\_RPL.1.2/Authorization

The TSF shall perform [denial of the requested operation on the SDO] when a replay is detected **using the following methods [selection: monotonic counters, random nonces, [assignment: other methods as specified]**.

#### **Application Note 40**

*The TSF receives authorization from an external source to the TOE to perform an operation on an SDO. If the operation on the SDO is restricted to authorized users, then anyone observing the communication to the TOE can copy the authorization and replay it. Random nonces and*

monotonic counters are but two mechanisms the TSF can use to mitigate replay. In this requirement, operations on SDOs include generating, using, modifying, propagating, and destroying. Besides monotonic counters and random nonces, the TSF could employ other methods to prevent replay of user authorizations, which the Security Target should describe.

## 6.6.9. FPT\_TST.1 TSF Testing

FPT\_TST.1 TSF Testing

### FPT\_TST.1.1

The TSF shall run a suite of self tests **during power-on start-up**, [selection: periodically during normal operation, at the request of the authorized user, **at no other condition**, at the conditions [assignment: conditions under which self test should occur]] to demonstrate the correct operation of [the TSF].

### FPT\_TST.1.2

The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to verify the integrity of [TSF data].

### FPT\_TST.1.3

The TSF shall provide authorized users with the capability to verify the integrity of **the** [TSF].

#### **Application Note 41**

*This requirement intends to cover integrity of the TSF functionality (i.e. runtime checks).*

*TSF integrity testing provides the ability to test the TSF's correct operation. These tests are expected to be performed automatically and autonomously at start-up but may also be performed periodically during operation, at the request of the authorized user, or when other conditions are met. It also provides the ability to verify the integrity of TSF data and executable code.*

*All cryptographic functions come with known answer tests (KATs). In addition to verifying the integrity of the firmware executing the TSF, the DSC should also verify the integrity of any data associated with the TSF (such as constants for cryptographic algorithms) as well as performing the KATs.*

## 6.7. Resource Utilization

### 6.7.1. FRU\_FLT.1 Degraded Fault Tolerance

FRU\_FLT.1 Degraded Fault Tolerance

#### FRU\_FLT.1.1

The TSF shall ensure the operation of [*protection of TSF data*] when the following failures occur: [*fault injection*].

#### **Application Note 42**

*TSF data may be protected in response to a fault injection either by providing a method to ensure that the data remains protected or by logically destroying the data or any part of a key chain that encrypts it. This behavior may differ based on the type of fault.*

## 6.8. TOE Security Functional Requirements Rationale

The following rationale provides justification for each security objective for the TOE, showing that the SFRs are suitable to meet and achieve the security objectives:

Table 14. SFR-Objective Rationale

Objective	Addressed by	Rationale
O.AUTH_FAILURES	FIA_AFL_EXT.1	This requirement enforces authentication failure handling capabilities to ensure that brute force attacks on the TSF are not possible.
	FIA_SOS.2	This requirement protects against brute force authentication by generating secrets that are statistically impossible to guess.
	FPT_STM_EXT.1	This requirement provides reliable system time services that may be used to determine when excessive authentication failure attempts have been made.
	FIA_AFL_EXT.2 (selection-based)	This requirement defines how access to an SDO is restored if excessive authentication failures trigger a lock on it.



Objective	Addressed by	Rationale
O.AUTHORIZATION	FCS_STG_EXT.1	This requirement ensures that key data is placed into protected storage and cannot be modified by untrusted subjects.
	FDP_ACC.1	This requirement defines an access control policy that governs the authorization required to interact with SDOs.
	FDP_ACF.1	This requirement defines the rules enforced by the access control policy defined in FDP_ACC.1 to control access to SDOs.
	FDP_ETC_EXT.2	This requirement ensures that protected data propagated outside the TOE is not disclosed to any unauthorized subjects.
	FIA_UAU.2	This requirement defines the methods by which users authenticate to the TOE to prove their identity prior to interacting with any protected data.
	FIA_UAU.5	This requirement provides the TSF with the ability to specify the use of multiple authentication mechanisms as a prerequisite to granting access to protected functions or data.
	FIA_UAU.6	This requirement defines when authorization checks are performed for user requests to access SDOs.
	FMT_MOF_EXT.1	This requirement enforces access control on the management functions provided by the TOE.
	FMT_MSA.1	This requirement enforces restrictions on the subjects that can interact with SDOs and their attributes.
	FMT_MSA.3	This requirement defines the default access restrictions that are enforced on SDO attributes if not overridden by specific access control policy rules.

Objective	Addressed by	Rationale
O.AUTHORIZATION	FMT_SMF.1	This requirement defines the management functions that are provided by the TOE to authorized subjects.
	FMT_SMR.1	This requirement defines the roles used by the TSF for enforcement of access control to protected functions and data.
	FPT_FLS.1/FI	This requirement ensures that fault injections cannot be used to circumvent access control policy restrictions preventing a user from accessing protected functions or data.
	FPT_MOD_EXT.1	This requirement ensures that there are no accessible debug modes that could be used to circumvent access control policy restrictions preventing a user from accessing protected functions or data.
	FPT_PHP.3	This requirement ensures that some mechanism is in place to thwart unauthorized attempts to access protected functions or data through physical tampering of the TOE.
	FPT_PRO_EXT.1	This requirement defines the RoT for the TOE, which is used to derive all access control functionality.
	FPT_ROT_EXT.2	This requirement enforces the RoT for Storage to enforce access control against SDOs.
	FRU_FLT.1	This requirement ensures that fault injection attempts do not interfere with the enforcement of access control against protected data.
	FIA_AFL_EXT.2 (selection-based)	This requirement defines the access control that is enforced on an SDO if excessive authentication failures block access to it.

<b>Objective</b>	<b>Addressed by</b>	<b>Rationale</b>
O.DATA_PROTECTION	FCS_COP.1/Hash	This requirement provides a cryptographic operation for asserting the integrity of SDOs.
	FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash	This requirement provides a cryptographic operation for asserting the authenticity of SDOs.
	FCS_COP.1/SigGen	This requirement provides a cryptographic operation for preserving the authenticity of SDOs.
	FCS_COP.1/SigVer	This requirement provides a cryptographic operation for asserting the authenticity of SDOs.
	FCS_COP.1/SKC	This requirement provides a cryptographic operation for maintaining the confidentiality of SDOs.
	FCS_STG_EXT.1	This requirement ensures that key data is placed into protected storage and cannot be modified by untrusted subjects.
	FDP_ETC_EXT.2	This requirement ensures that the confidentiality of protected data propagated outside the TOE is maintained.
	FDP_ITC_EXT.1	This requirement ensures that all SDEs parsed by the TOE have verifiable integrity.

Objective	Addressed by	Rationale
O.DATA_PROTECTION	FDP_ITC_EXT.2	This requirement ensures that all SDOs parsed by the TOE have verifiable integrity.
	FDP_SDC.2	This requirement ensures that SDEs/SDOs are stored with confidentiality and that all authorization data is protected prior to storage.
	FDP_SDI.2	This requirement ensures that SDEs/SDOs are monitored for integrity violations.
	FPT_ROT_EXT.1	This requirement defines the RoT services that are available for the protection of data.
	FPT_RPL.1/Authorization	This requirement ensures that access control restrictions cannot be bypassed through replay of operations.
	FPT_ITT.1 (optional)	This requirement ensures that confidentiality and integrity is maintained in cases where data is transmitted between physically separate parts of a distributed TOE.
	FPT_PRO_EXT.2 (optional)	This requirement ensures that the TSF can measure the integrity of its stored data.
	FPT_ROT_EXT.3 (optional)	This requirement allows the TSF to provide a RoT for Reporting that can provide assured information about the stored SDEs.
FDP_DAU.1/Prove (selection-based)	This requirement defines the Prove service that can be used to invoke the Roots of Trust for Measurement and Reporting and provide affirmation of the validity of stored data.	

Objective	Addressed by	Rationale
O.FW_INTEGRITY	FPT_MFW_EXT.1	This requirement specifies whether the TOE's firmware is mutable or immutable, to determine the extent to which this is objective must be satisfied by other SFRs.
	FPT_ROT_EXT.1	This requirement defines the RoT services that are available in the TOE, which can include Roots of Trust for measurement and reporting.
	FPT_TST.1	This requirement defines the mechanisms used to verify and attest to the integrity of the TSF.
	FDP_DAU.1/Prove (selection-based)	This requirement defines the Prove service that can be used to invoke the Roots of Trust for Measurement and Reporting and provide affirmation of the validity of the TSF.
	FPT_MFW_EXT.2 (selection-based)	This requirement ensures that the TSF can generate evidence that its mutable firmware integrity remains intact.
	FPT_MFW_EXT.3 (selection-based)	This requirement ensures that any firmware updates to the TSF are genuine.
	FPT_FLS.1/FW (selection-based)	This requirement requires the TSF to take action to preserve its secure operation if any violations to its firmware integrity are detected.
O.PARSE_PROTECTION	FDP_ITC_EXT.1	This requirement ensures that all SDEs parsed by the TOE are transmitted over a secure channel.
	FDP_ITC_EXT.2	This requirement ensures that all SDOs parsed by the TOE are transmitted over a secure channel.
	FDP_SDC.2	This requirement ensures that the confidentiality of authorization data is protected prior to storage.
	FTP_ITC_EXT.1 (selection-based)	This requirement defines a cryptographically protected channel that the TSF can use to securely parse data being imported into it.
	FTP_ITE_EXT.1 (selection-based)	This requirement defines the cryptographic method used to transfer data between the TOE and external entities.
	FTP_ITP_EXT.1 (selection-based)	This requirement defines a physically protected channel that the TSF can use to securely parse data being imported into it.

<b>Objective</b>	<b>Addressed by</b>	<b>Rationale</b>
O.PURGE_PROTECTION	FCS_CKM.6	This requirement ensures that key data is destroyed in a manner that prevents its future recovery.
	FDP_FRS_EXT.1	This requirement defines the condition in which a factory reset will be initiated, which triggers a purge of stored SDEs.
	FDP_RIP.1	This requirement ensures that any purged SDEs/SDOs are erased in residual memory so that their future recovery is prevented.
	FDP_FRS_EXT.2 (selection-based)	This requirement ensures that all user-specific SDOs are purged upon factory reset and may indicate any factory default SDOs that are reset to their initial values.
O.SECURE_UPDATE	FPT_MFW_EXT.1	This requirement specifies whether the TOE's firmware is mutable or immutable.
	FPT_FLS.1/FW (selection-based)	This requirement requires the TSF to take action to preserve its secure operation if a rollback attempt or invalid firmware update is detected.
	FPT_RPL.1/Rollback (selection-based)	This requirement ensures that the TSF will not permit rollback attempts of its firmware.
O.STRONG_BINDING	FDP_ITC_EXT.1	This requirement ensures that all SDEs parsed by the TOE include appropriate binding metadata.

Objective	Addressed by	Rationale
O.STRONG_CRYPTO	FCS_CKM.1	This requirement specifies the supported methods of key generation.
	FCS_CKM_EXT.7	This requirement ensures the use of strong key agreement mechanisms.
	FCS_COP.1/Hash	This requirement ensures the use of strong hash mechanisms.
	FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash	This requirement ensures the use of strong HMAC mechanisms.
	FCS_COP.1/KeyEncap	This requirement ensures the use of strong methods to perform key encapsulation.
	FCS_COP.1/KeyWrap	This requirement ensures the use of strong methods to perform key wrapping.
	FCS_COP.1/SigGen	This requirement ensures the use of strong digital signature services.
	FCS_COP.1/SigVer	This requirement ensures the use of strong digital signature services.
	FCS_COP.1/SKC	This requirement ensures the use of strong methods to encrypt sensitive data.
	FCS_RBG.1	This requirement ensures the use of strong random bit generation mechanisms.

Objective	Addressed by	Rationale
O.STRONG_CRYPTO	FCS_OTV_EXT.1	This requirement ensures that salts and nonces used by the TOE do not negatively impact key strength.
	FPT_STM_EXT.1	This requirement provides reliable system time services that may be used as inputs to cryptographic functions.
	FCS_RBG.2 (optional)	This requirement provides an external interface to seed the random bit generator that enforces strong cryptography by requiring a minimum amount of input.
	FCS_RBG.3 (optional)	This requirement provides an internal interface to seed the random bit generator that enforces strong cryptography by requiring a minimum amount of input.
	FCS_RBG.4 (optional)	This requirement provides multiple internal interfaces to seed the random bit generator that enforces strong cryptography by requiring a minimum amount of input.
	FCS_RBG.5 (optional)	This requirement ensures that combining multiple sources of noise are combined in a way that enforces strong cryptography by requiring a minimum amount of input to the random bit generator.
	FCS_RBG.6 (optional)	This requirement provides an interface to access entropy data so that the TSF can support the use of strong cryptography in its operational environment.
	FCS_CKM.1/AKG (selection-based)	This requirement ensures the generation of strong asymmetric keys.
	FCS_CKM.1/SKG (selection-based)	This requirement ensures the generation of strong symmetric keys.
	FCS_CKM.5 (selection-based)	This requirement ensures the use of strong mechanisms to perform key derivation.



Objective	Addressed by	Rationale
O.STRONG_CRYPTO	FCS_CKM_EXT.8 (selection-based)	This requirement ensures the use of strong methods to derive keys from password data.
	FTP_CCMP_EXT.1 (selection-based)	This requirement defines the implementation of CCMP (IEEE 802.11i) using strong cryptography.
	FTP_GCMP_EXT.1 (selection-based)	This requirement defines the implementation of GCMP (IEEE 802.11ad) using strong cryptography.
	FTP_ITE_EXT.1 (selection-based)	This requirement defines the cryptographic method used to transfer data between the TOE and external entities.

# Chapter 7. Security Assurance Requirements

This cPP identifies the Security Assurance Requirements (SARs) to frame the extent to which the evaluator assesses the documentation applicable for the evaluation and performs independent testing.

This section lists the set of SARs from CC part 3 that are required in evaluations against this cPP. Individual Evaluation Activities to be performed are specified in [DSC SD].

The general model for evaluation of TOEs against STs written to conform to this cPP is as follows:

After the ST has been approved for evaluation, the ITSEF will obtain the TOE, supporting environmental IT (if required), and the administrative/user guides for the TOE. The ITSEF is expected to perform actions mandated by the Common Evaluation Methodology (CEM) and the Evaluation Activities contained within the SD.

The actions for ALC Class (ALC\_CMC.1 and ALC\_CMS.1) are specified solely within the CEM, while the remaining Assurance Classes are extended beyond the CEM as described in the SD. The SD is intended to be an interpretation of the other CEM assurance requirements as they apply to the specific technology instantiated in the TOE. The Evaluation Activities that are captured in the SD also provide clarification as to what the developer needs to provide to demonstrate the TOE is compliant with the cPP.

*Table 15. Security Assurance Requirements*

<b>Assurance Class</b>	<b>Assurance Components</b>
Security Target (ASE)	Conformance Claims (ASE_CCL.1)
	Extended Components Definition (ASE_ECD.1)
	ST Introduction (ASE_INT.1)
	Security Objectives (ASE_OBJ.2)
	Derived Security Requirements (ASE_REQ.2)
	Security Problem Definition (ASE_SPD.1)
	TOE Summary Specification (ASE_TSS.1)
Development (ADV)	Basic Functional Specification (ADV_FSP.1)
Guidance Documents (AGD)	Operational User Guidance (AGD_OPE.1)
	Preparative Procedures (AGD_PRE.1)
Life cycle Support (ALC)	Labelling of the TOE (ALC_CMC.1)
	TOE CM Coverage (ALC_CMS.1)
Tests (ATE)	Independent Testing - Conformance (ATE_IND.1)
Vulnerability Assessment (AVA)	Vulnerability Survey (AVA_VAN.1)

## 7.1. ASE: Security Target

The ST is evaluated as per ASE activities defined in the CEM. In addition, there may be Evaluation Activities specified within the SD that call for necessary descriptions to be included in the TSS that are specific to the TOE technology type.

In addition to using the ST to demonstrate that ASE\_TSS.1 has been satisfied, this cPP requires the creation of supplemental documentation to justify how the TOE satisfies certain SFRs. This documentation is separated from the ST because the required level of detail may include information that is proprietary to the developer of the TOE. The required supplemental documentation includes entropy documentation and key management documentation. The requirements for the entropy documentation are described in [Appendix D, Entropy Documentation and Assessment](#) of this cPP. The requirements for the key management documentation are described in the SD under the SFRs that require a detailed description of the TSF's key management.

## 7.2. ADV: Development

The design information about the TOE is contained in the guidance documentation available to the end user as well as the TSS portion of the ST, and any additional information required by this cPP that is not to be made public (e.g., Entropy Essay). The DSC cPP requires only basic functional specification of interfaces presented in the AGD documentation (see [Section 7.2.1](#)) and specification of interfaces that can be invoked by a dependent component in a composed evaluation where the DSC is the base component.

### 7.2.1. Basic Functional Specification (ADV\_FSP.1)

The functional specification describes the TOE Security Functions Interfaces (TSFIs). It is not necessary to have a formal or complete specification of these interfaces. For this cPP, the Evaluation Activities for this family focus on understanding the interfaces presented in the TSS in response to the functional requirements and the interfaces presented in the AGD documentation.

The Evaluation Activities in the SD are associated with the applicable SFRs; since these are directly associated with the SFRs, the tracing in element ADV\_FSP.1.2D is implicitly already done and no additional documentation is necessary.

### 7.2.2. Specification of DSC Interface for Use in Composite Evaluations

For the DSC to serve as a base component in a composed evaluation, all DSC interfaces that may be invoked by a dependent component to satisfy dependent component SFRs must be documented.

A DSC that complies with this cPP must make services available to a dependent component through interfaces. The DSC ST author must describe these interfaces in order for a dependent component evaluation to properly map the DSC-provided services to SFRs within the dependent component PP, and to ensure that dependent component implementations properly use the service interfaces.

The Evaluation Activities in the SD require specifying each such interface exported.

## 7.3. AGD: Guidance Documentation

The guidance documents will be provided with the ST. Guidance must include a description of how the IT personnel verifies that the Operational Environment can fulfill its role for the security functionality. The documentation should be in an informal style and readable by the IT personnel.

Guidance must be provided for every operational environment that the product supports as claimed in the ST. This guidance includes:

- instructions to successfully install the TSF in that environment; and
- instructions to manage the security of the TSF as a product and as a component of the larger operational environment; and
- Instructions to provide a protected administrative capability.

Guidance pertaining to particular security functionality must also be provided; requirements on such guidance are contained in the Evaluation Activities specified in the SD.

### 7.3.1. Operational User Guidance (AGD\_OPE.1)

The operational user guidance does not have to be contained in a single document. Guidance to users, administrators and application developers can be spread among documents or web pages.

The developer should review the Evaluation Activities contained in the SD to ascertain the specifics of the guidance that the evaluator will be checking for. This will provide the necessary information for the preparation of acceptable guidance.

### 7.3.2. Preparative Procedures (AGD\_PRE.1)

As with the operational guidance, the developer should look to the Evaluation Activities to determine the required content with respect to preparative procedures.

## 7.4. Class ALC: Life-cycle Support

At the assurance level provided for TOEs conformant to this cPP, life-cycle support is limited to end-user-visible aspects of the life cycle, rather than an examination of the TOE vendor's development and configuration management process. This is not meant to diminish the critical role that a developer's practices play in contributing to the overall trustworthiness of a product; rather, it is a reflection on the information to be made available for evaluation at this assurance level.

### 7.4.1. Labelling of the TOE (ALC\_CMC.1)

This component is targeted at identifying the TOE such that it can be distinguished from other products or versions from the same vendor and can be easily specified when being procured by an end user. The evaluator performs the CEM work units associated with ALC\_CMC.1

### 7.4.2. TOE CM Coverage (ALC\_CMS.1)

Given the scope of the TOE and its associated evaluation evidence requirements, the evaluator

performs the CEM work units associated with ALC\_CMS.1.

## 7.5. Class ATE: Tests

Testing is specified for functional aspects of the system as well as aspects that take advantage of design or implementation weaknesses. The former is done through the ATE\_IND family, while the latter is through the AVA\_VAN family. For this cPP, testing is based on advertised functionality and interfaces with dependency on the availability of design information. One of the primary outputs of the evaluation process is the test report as specified in the following requirement.

### 7.5.1. Independent Testing - Conformance (ATE\_IND.1)

Testing is performed to confirm the functionality described in the TSS as well as the operational guidance (includes "evaluated configuration" instructions). The focus of the testing is to confirm that the requirements specified in [Section 6](#) are being met. The Evaluation Activities in the SD identify the specific testing activities necessary to verify compliance with the SFRs. The evaluator produces a test report documenting the plan for and results of testing, as well as coverage arguments focused on the platform/TOE combinations that are claiming conformance to this cPP.

## 7.6. Class AVA: Vulnerability Assessment

For the current generation of this cPP, the iTC is expected to survey open sources to discover what vulnerabilities have been discovered in these types of products and provide that content into the AVA\_VAN discussion. In most cases, these vulnerabilities will require sophistication beyond that of a basic attacker. This information will be used in the development of future Protection Profiles.

### 7.6.1. Vulnerability Survey (AVA\_VAN.1)

As with ATE\_IND, the evaluator shall generate a report to document their findings with respect to this requirement. This report could physically be part of the overall test report mentioned in ATE\_IND, or a separate document. The evaluator performs a search of public information to determine the vulnerabilities that have been found in components similar to the component under evaluation (such as a secure element) and when applicable, implemented communication protocols in general, as well as those that pertain to the particular TOE. The evaluator documents the sources consulted and the vulnerabilities found in the report. For each vulnerability found, the evaluator either provides a rationale with respect to its non-applicability, or the evaluator formulates a test (using the guidelines provided in ATE\_IND) to confirm the vulnerability, if suitable. Suitability is determined by assessing the attack vector needed to take advantage of the vulnerability. If exploiting the vulnerability requires expert skills and an electron microscope, for instance, then a test would not be suitable and an appropriate justification would be formulated.

# Appendix A: Optional Requirements

## A.1. Cryptographic Support

### A.1.1. FCS\_RBG.2 Random Bit Generation (External Seeding)

FCS\_RBG.2 Random Bit Generation (External Seeding)

#### FCS\_RBG.2.1

The TSF shall be able to accept a minimum input of [assignment: *minimum input length greater than zero*] from a TSF interface for the purpose of seeding.

#### **Application Note 43**

*In order to maintain compliance with NIST SP 800-90A Rev. 1, the TSF accepts enough bits input from an external noise source to satisfy the entropy requirements of the DRBG. The TSF should also protect the integrity and confidentiality of the entropy it receives from the external noise source.*

*The TSF interface for the purpose of seeding here is the interface used to gather entropy for initializing the seed.*

### A.1.2. FCS\_RBG.3 Random Bit Generation (Internal Seeding - Single Source)

FCS\_RBG.3 Random Bit Generation (Internal Seeding - Single Source)

#### FCS\_RBG.3.1

The TSF shall be able to seed the RBG using a [selection: choose one of: *TSF software-based noise source, TSF hardware-based noise source*] [assignment: *\_name of noise source*] with a minimum of [assignment: *number of bits*] bits of min-entropy.

#### **Application Note 44**

*If an ST Author wishes to use multiple internal noise sources, they iterate this requirement for each noise source used by the TSF.*

*Hardware-based noise sources are entropy sources whose primary function is noise generation, such as ring oscillators, diodes, and thermal noise. While a TOE may use software to collect the noise from these hardware sources, these are not software-based. Software-based noise sources are those sources that have some other primary function, and the noise is a byproduct of their normal operation. Examples of software-based noise sources are user or system-based events, reading the least significant bits from an event timer, etc.*

*Hardware-based noise sources may be stochastically modelled, in which case the amount of entropy is well understood. Software-based noise sources are usually less well understood and therefore will typically take a more conservative approach, gathering larger numbers of bits than required, then performing a compression function to derive the final output. Software-based noise sources often rely on an entropy estimator.*

### **A.1.3. FCS\_RBG.4 Random Bit Generation (Internal Seeding - Multiple Sources)**

FCS\_RBG.4 Random Bit Generation (Internal Seeding - Multiple Sources)

#### **FCS\_RBG.4.1**

The TSF shall be able to seed the RBG using [selection: *[assignment: number]* TSF software-based noise source(s), *[assignment: number]* TSF hardware-based noise source(s)].

### **A.1.4. FCS\_RBG.5 Random Bit Generation (Combining Noise Sources)**

FCS\_RBG.5 Random Bit Generation (Combining Noise Sources)

#### **FCS\_RBG.5.1**

The TSF shall [selection: *hash, concatenate and hash, xor, input into a linear feedback shift register, [assignment: combining operation]*] [selection: *output from TSF noise source(s), input from TSF interface(s) for seeding*] to create the entropy input into the derivation function as defined in [selection: *ISO/IEC 18031: 2011, NIST SP 800-90A Rev. 1*], resulting in a minimum of [assignment: *number of bits*] bits of min-entropy.

#### **Application Note 45**

*One can apply NIST SP 800-90B (or AIS-31) statistical tests against internal noise sources (a.k.a. raw entropy) to confirm the min-entropy of the noise sources either in aggregate or individually. One should not apply NIST SP 800-90B (or AIS-31) statistical tests against external noise sources since the TOE is unable to enforce entropy requirements or conditioning requirements against external sources of entropy. However, the TSS may include estimates for min-entropy from external sources that contribute to the overall entropy requirements for either the DRBG or for FCS\_OTV\_EXT.1.*

*FCS\_RBG.5 specifies the combining operation such that the combined min-entropy of all the internal sources and the estimated entropy of the external sources is greater than or equal to the desired entropy of the output of the combining operation. The output could be used as a nonce, or a seed for a DRBG. The combining operation should avoid crushing the entropy of the sources such that the desired entropy of the output cannot be met.*

*The TSF interface(s) for seeding here is the interface used to gather entropy for initializing the seed.*

### **A.1.5. FCS\_RBG.6 Random Bit Generation Service**

FCS\_RBG.6 Random Bit Generation Service

#### **FCS\_RBG.6.1**

The TSF shall provide a [selection: *hardware, software, [assignment: other interface type]*] interface to make the RBG output, as specified in FCS\_RBG.1 Random Bit Generation (RBG), available as a service to entities outside of the TOE.

## A.2. Protection of the TSF

### A.2.1. FPT\_ITT.1 Basic Internal TSF Data Transfer Protection

FPT\_ITT.1 Basic Internal TSF Data Transfer Protection

#### FPT\_ITT.1.1

The TSF shall protect TSF data from [disclosure] and [selection: modification, no other actions] when it is transmitted between separate parts of the TOE.

### A.2.2. FPT\_PRO\_EXT.2 Data Integrity Measurements

FPT\_PRO\_EXT.2 Data Integrity Measurements

#### FPT\_PRO\_EXT.2.1

The TSF shall be able to quantify the integrity of the data protected by the TOE by generating integrity measurements and assertions.

#### **Application Note 46**

*The generation of these integrity measurements and assertions is the creation of OB.Pstate.*

*Data protected by the TOE includes DSC firmware, DSC configuration data, and user data. DSC configuration data may include permanent SDEs or SDOs such as immutable or mutable root keys, authorization values, and authentication tokens (i.e. DSC.ID, OB.P\_SDO, OB.FAACntr, OB.AntiReplay, and OB.Context). User data may include transient SDEs and SDOs as well as authorization values and authentication tokens bound to these SDEs and SDOs (i.e. OB.T\_SDO).*

#### FPT\_PRO\_EXT.2.2

The TSF shall accumulate platform characteristics using a consistent [assignment: description of process for accumulating platform characteristics] process in which verified quantifiable measurements and assertions are accumulated by the RoT for Measurement to prove the integrity of its SDOs.

#### **Application Note 47**

*Although a platform may enter any state possible — including undesirable or insecure states — it can use platform characteristics, including integrity measurements and assertions, along with logging and reporting to accurately report the state derived from data attributing to those states. In this context, platform characteristics can include, but is not limited to, cryptographic hashes of binary data, security-critical configurations, register values (including status registers) and milestones, such as verification of firmware, or transitioning from a boot phase to an operational phase. A platform characteristic may also represent the state of some entity outside the DSC. A process independent from the DSC or the host containing the DSC may evaluate the platform characteristics and determine an appropriate action.*

### A.2.3. FPT\_ROT\_EXT.3 Root of Trust for Reporting Mechanisms

FPT\_ROT\_EXT.3 Root of Trust for Reporting Mechanisms



### FPT\_ROT\_EXT.3.1

The TSF shall be able to attest to a state as represented by platform characteristics with a Root of Trust for Reporting mechanism that uses for its identity [selection: a cryptographically verifiable identity in FPT PRO EXT.1, an alias key bound to the cryptographically verifiable identity in FPT PRO EXT.1] and using a signature algorithm as specified in FCS\_COP.1/SigGen.

#### **Application Note 48**

*While it is possible for a group of components to share a single unique group identifier, it is important to ensure that individual components have their own unique identifiers relative to each other.*

*Resident keys or aliases are designed such that they are never visible outside the subset of DSC scope containing the RoT services and are only to be used for encryption. Therefore, possession of such aliases or keys can only be proved indirectly by using it to decrypt a value that has been encrypted with a corresponding public key. In this way, these resident keys or aliases can provide for authentication based on decryption operations instead of producing a digital signature.*

*The DSC responds to requests from an external entity to attest to the provenance and integrity of platform characteristics contained within the DSC.*

*Integrity reporting is the process of attesting to platform characteristics (including those recorded in status registers in a DSC). The philosophy behind integrity measurement, logging, and reporting is that a platform may enter any state possible—including undesirable or insecure states—but can still accurately report measurements derived from data attributing to those states. In this context, data can include, but is not limited to, code, security-critical configurations, values of registers, including status registers. An independent process may evaluate the integrity states and determine an appropriate response.*

## **A.3. Flaw Remediation**

The following SARs for ALC\_FLR are purely optional and are not required to be added to any ST conformant to this collaborative Protection Profile. If the ST author decides to add ALC\_FLR to the ST, only one out of the following SAR components shall be selected.

### **A.3.1. ALC\_FLR.1 Basic flaw remediation**

This component is targeted at the flaw remediation procedures applied by the developer to ensure that all reported security flaws in each release of the TOE are tracked and corrected. The evaluator performs the CEM work units associated with ALC\_FLR.1.

### **A.3.2. ALC\_FLR.2 Flaw reporting procedures**

This component is targeted at the flaw remediation procedures applied by the developer to ensure that all reported security flaws in each release of the TOE are tracked and corrected. In addition, the developer's flaw remediation guidance is analysed to ensure that users are aware how to correctly report security flaws to the developer. The evaluator performs the CEM work units associated with ALC\_FLR.2.

### **A.3.3. ALC\_FLR.3 Systematic flaw remediation**

This component is targeted at the flaw remediation procedures applied by the developer to ensure that all reported security flaws in each release of the TOE are tracked and corrected. In addition, the developer's flaw remediation guidance is analysed to ensure that users are aware how to correctly report security flaws to the developer. Flaw remediation procedures of the developer need to describe how users can register to receive flaw reports and corrections. The procedures also need to ensure timely responses to reports of security flaws and automatic distribution of security flaw reports. The evaluator performs the CEM work units associated with ALC\_FLR.3.

# Appendix B: Selection-Based Requirements

As indicated in the introduction to this cPP, the baseline requirements (those that must be performed by the TOE or its underlying platform) are contained in the body of this cPP. There are additional requirements based on selections in the body of the cPP: if certain selections are made, then additional requirements below will need to be included.

## B.1. Cryptographic Support

### B.1.1. FCS\_CKM.1/AKG Cryptographic Key Generation (Asymmetric Keys)

FCS\_CKM.1/AKG Cryptographic Key Generation (Asymmetric Keys)

#### FCS\_CKM.1.1/AKG

The TSF shall generate **asymmetric** cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [**selection:** *cryptographic key generation algorithm*] and specified cryptographic **algorithm parameters** ~~key-sizes~~ [**selection:** *cryptographic algorithm parameters*] that meet the following: [**selection:** *list of standards*].

Table 16. Asymmetric Cryptographic Key Generation

Cryptographic Key Generation Algorithm	Cryptographic Algorithm Parameters	List of Standards
RSA	Modulus of size [selection: 2048 bit, 3072 bit]	NIST FIPS PUB 186-5 (Section A.1.1)
ECDSA - Extra Random Bits	Elliptic Curve [selection: 256 bits (P-256, brainpoolP256r1), 384 bits (P-384, brainpoolP384r1), 512 bits (P-521, brainpoolP512r1)]	[selection: NIST FIPS PUB 186-5 (Section A.2.1), NIST SP 800-56A Rev. 3 (Section 5.6.1.2.1)]  [selection: NIST SP 800-186 (Section 4) [NIST Curves], RFC 5639 (section 3) [brainpool curves]]
ECDSA - Rejection Sampling	Elliptic Curve [selection: 256 bits (P-256, brainpoolP256r1), 384 bits (P-384, brainpoolP384r1), 512 bits (P-521, brainpoolP512r1)]	[selection: NIST FIPS PUB 186-5 (Section A.2.2), NIST SP 800-56A Rev. 3 (Section 5.6.1.2.2)]  [selection: NIST SP 800-186 (Section 4) [NIST Curves], RFC 5639 (section 3) [brainpool curves]]
FFC - Extra Random Bits	Static domain parameters approved for [selection: IKE groups [selection: MODP-2048, MODP-3072, MODP-4096, MODP-6144, MODP-8192], TLS groups [selection: ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072, ffdhe4096, ffdhe6144, ffdhe8192]]]	NIST SP 800-56A Rev. 3 [approved FFC domain parameters]  NIST SP 800-56A (Section 5.6.1.1.3) [key pair generation]

<b>Cryptographic Key Generation Algorithm</b>	<b>Cryptographic Algorithm Parameters</b>	<b>List of Standards</b>
FFC - Rejection Sampling	Static domain parameters approved for [selection: IKE groups [selection: MODP-2048, MODP-3072, MODP-4096, MODP-6144, MODP-8192], TLS groups [selection: ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072, ffdhe4096, ffdhe6144, ffdhe8192]]]	NIST SP 800-56A Rev. 3 [approved FFC domain parameters]  NIST SP 800-56A (Section 5.6.1.1.4) [key pair generation]
EdDSA	Domain parameters approved for elliptic curves [selection: 256 (Edwards25519), 448 (Edwards448)]	[selection: FIPS PUB 186-5 (Section A.2.3), RFC 8032]
KCDSA	Domain parameters generation with (L, N) = [selection: (2048, 224), (2048, 256)] bits, and key generation using FCC - [selection: Extra Random Bits, Rejection Sampling]	ISO/IEC 14888-3:2018 (subclause 6.3) [KCDSA], NIST SP 800-56A (Section 5.6.1.1.3) [Extra Random Bits], and (Section 5.6.1.1.4) [Rejection Sampling]
EC-KCDSA	Elliptic Curves [selection: P-224, B-233, K-233, P-256, B-283, K-283]	ISO/IEC 14888-3:2018 (subclause 6.7) [EC-KCDSA], NIST SP 800-186 (Section 3) [NIST Curves]
LM-OTS, LMS, HSS	Private key size = [selection: 192 bits with Hash/XOF [selection: SHA256/192, SHAKE256/192], 256 bits with Hash/XOF [selection: SHA256, SHAKE256]]	NIST SP 800-208, RFC 8554
WOTS <sup>+</sup> , XMSS, XMSS <sup>MT</sup>	Private key size = [selection: 192 bits with Hash/XOF [selection: SHA256/192, SHAKE256/192], 256 bits with Hash/XOF [selection: SHA256, SHAKE256]]	NIST SP 800-208, RFC 8391

#### **Application Note 49**

*For RSA the choice of the modulus implies the resulting key sizes of the public and private keys generated using the specified standard methods.*

*For Finite Field Cryptography (FFC) DSA, PP authors should consult schemes for guidelines on use. FIPS PUB 186-5 does not approve DSA for digital signature generation but allows DSA for digital signature verification for legacy purposes.*

*When generating ECC key pairs for key establishment, choose NIST SP 800-56A Section 5.6.1.2.1 or 5.6.1.2.2. When generating ECC key pairs for digital signature generation, choose NIST FIPS PUB 186-5 Section A.2.1 or A.2.2. The intended security strengths for elliptic curves P-224, B-233, and K-233 is 112 bits, for P-256, brainpoolP256r1, Edwards25519, B-283, and K-283 is 128 bits, for P-384 and brainpoolP384r1 is 192 bits, for Edwards448 is 224, and for P-521 and brainpool512r1 is 256 bits. The sizes of the private key, which is a scalar, and the public key, which is a point on the*

elliptic curve, are determined by the choice of the curve.

When generating EdDSA key pairs for digital signatures, choose NIST FIPS PUB 186-5 Section A.2.3. The chosen domain parameters determine the size of the private keys and the public keys.

For hash-based signatures, the choice of the hash or XOF determines the security of the system. For 192 bits of security strength, choose SHA256/192 or SHAKE256/192. For 256 bits of security strength, choose SHA256 or SHAKE 256.

### B.1.2. FCS\_CKM.1/SKG Cryptographic Key Generation (Symmetric Key)

FCS\_CKM.1/SKG Cryptographic Key Generation (Symmetric Key)

#### FCS\_CKM.1.1/SKG

The TSF shall generate **symmetric** cryptographic keys in accordance with a specified cryptographic key generation algorithm [**selection:** *cryptographic key generation algorithm*] and specified cryptographic key sizes [**selection:** *cryptographic key sizes*] that meet the following: [**selection:** *list of standards*].

Table 17. Symmetric Cryptographic Key Generation

Cryptographic Key Generation Algorithm	Cryptographic Key Sizes	List of Standards
Direct Generation from a Random Bit Generator as specified in FCS_RBG.1	[selection: 128, 192, 256, 512] bits	NIST SP 800-133 Rev. 2 (Section 6.1).

#### Application Note 50

Include this requirement if the TOE supports creating symmetric keys directly from the output of an RBG without further conditioning.

To derive symmetric keys from other keying material, see FCS\_CKM.5. To derive symmetric keys from passwords, see FCS\_CKM\_EXT.8. To derive symmetric keys from keying material contributed from two parties, see FCS\_CKM\_EXT.7.

See FCS\_RBG.1 for requirements about appropriate entropy for selected cryptographic key sizes.

### B.1.3. FCS\_CKM\_EXT.3 Cryptographic Key Access

FCS\_CKM\_EXT.3 Cryptographic Key Access

#### FCS\_CKM\_EXT.3.1

The TSF shall use specified cryptographic key access methods [**selection:** *key encapsulation, key wrapping, key encryption*] to access keys when performing [**selection:** *cryptographic key usage in cryptographic operations, cryptographic key storage, cryptographic key recovery, modifications to attributes of cryptographic keys, cryptographic key destruction*].

## B.1.4. FCS\_CKM.5 Cryptographic Key Derivation

### FCS\_CKM.5 Cryptographic Key Derivation

#### FCS\_CKM.5.1

The TSF shall derive cryptographic keys [**selection:** *key type*] from [**selection:** *input parameters*], in accordance with a specified cryptographic key derivation algorithm [**selection:** *key derivation algorithm*] and specified cryptographic key sizes [**selection:** *key sizes*] that meet the following: [**selection:** *list of standards*].

Table 18. Cryptographic Key Derivation

Key Type	Input Parameters	Key Derivation Algorithm	Key Sizes	List of Standards
KDF-CTR	[selection: Direct Generation from a Random Bit Generator as specified in FCS_RBG.1, Concatenated keys]	KPF2 - KDF in Counter Mode using [selection: AES-128-CMAC, AES-192-CMAC, AES-256-CMAC, CMAC-HIGHT-128, CMAC-LEA-128, CMAC-LEA-256, CMAC-SEED-128, HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-512] as the PRF	[selection: 128, 192, 256] bits	ISO/IEC 11770-6:2016 (subclause 7.3.2) [KPF2]  NIST SP 800-108 Rev. 1 (Section 4.1) [KDF in Counter Mode] [selection: ISO/IEC 9797-1:2011 (CMAC), NIST SP 800-38B (CMAC)] [selection: ISO/IEC 18033-3:2010 (AES), FIPS PUB 197 (AES), ISO/IEC 18033-3:2010 (subclause 4.5) [HIGHT], ISO/IEC 29192-2:2019 (subclause 6.3) [LEA], ISO/IEC 18033-3:2010 (subclause 5.4) [SEED]],  [selection: ISO/IEC 9797-2:2021 (HMAC), FIPS PUB 198-1 (HMAC)],  [selection: ISO/IEC 10118-3:2018 (SHA), FIPS PUB 180-4 (SHA)]

Key Type	Input Parameters	Key Derivation Algorithm	Key Sizes	List of Standards
KDF-FB	[selection: Direct Generation from a Random Bit Generator as specified in FCS_RBG.1, Concatenated keys]	KPF3 - KDF in Feedback Mode using [selection: AES-128-CMAC, AES-192-CMAC, AES-256-CMAC, CMAC-HIGHT-128, CMAC-LEA-128, CMAC-LEA-256, CMAC-SEED-128, HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-512] as the PRF	[selection: 128, 192, 256] bits	<p>ISO/IEC 11770-6:2016 (subclause 7.3.3) [KPF3]</p> <p>NIST SP 800-108 Rev. 1 (Section 4.2) [KDF in Feedback Mode] [selection: ISO/IEC 9797-1:2011 (CMAC), NIST SP 800-38B (CMAC)] [selection: ISO/IEC 18033-3:2010 (AES), FIPS PUB 197 (AES), ISO/IEC 18033-3:2010 (subclause 4.5) [HIGHT], ISO/IEC 29192-2:2019 (subclause 6.3) [LEA], ISO/IEC 18033-3:2010 (subclause 5.4) [SEED]],</p> <p>[selection: ISO/IEC 9797-2:2021 (HMAC), FIPS PUB 198-1 (HMAC)],</p> <p>[selection: ISO/IEC 10118-3:2018 (SHA), FIPS PUB 180-4 (SHA)]</p>

Key Type	Input Parameters	Key Derivation Algorithm	Key Sizes	List of Standards
KDF-DPI	[selection: Direct Generation from a Random Bit Generator as specified in FCS_RBG.1, Concatenated keys]	KPF4 - KDF in Double-Pipeline Iteration Mode using [selection: AES-128-CMAC, AES-192-CMAC, AES-256-CMAC, CMAC-HIGHT-128, CMAC-LEA-128, CMAC-LEA-256, CMAC-SEED-128, HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-512] as the PRF	[selection: 128, 192, 256] bits	ISO/IEC 11770-6:2016 (subclause 7.3.4) [KPF4]  NIST SP 800-108 Rev. 1 (Section 4.3) [KDF in Double-Pipeline Iteration Mode] [selection: ISO/IEC 9797-1:2011 (CMAC), NIST SP 800-38B (CMAC)] [selection: ISO/IEC 18033-3:2010 (AES), FIPS PUB 197 (AES), ISO/IEC 18033-3:2010 (subclause 4.5) [HIGHT], ISO/IEC 29192-2:2019 (subclause 6.3) [LEA], ISO/IEC 18033-3:2010 (subclause 5.4) [SEED]],  [selection: ISO/IEC 9797-2:2021 (HMAC), FIPS PUB 198-1 (HMAC)],  [selection: ISO/IEC 10118-3:2018 (SHA), FIPS PUB 180-4 (SHA)]
KDF-XOR	More than one intermediary keys	exclusive OR (XOR)	[selection: 128, 192, 256] bits	N/A
KDF-ENC	Two keys	Encrypting using an algorithm specified in FCS_COP.1/SKC	[selection: 128, 192, 256] bits	N/A
KDF-HASH	Shared secret	Hash function from FCS_COP.1/Hash	[selection: 128, 192, 256] bits	NIST SP 800-56C Rev. 2 (Section 4, Option 1)
KDF-MAC-1S	Shared secret, salt, output length, fixed information	Keyed Hash function from FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash	[selection: 128, 192, 256] bits	NIST SP 800-56C Rev. 2 (Section 4, Options 2, 3)



Key Type	Input Parameters	Key Derivation Algorithm	Key Sizes	List of Standards
KDF-MAC-2S	Shared secret, salt, IV, output length, fixed information	<p>[MAC Step]</p> <p>[selection: AES-128-CMAC, AES-192-CMAC, AES-256-CMAC, HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-512] as the MAC and;</p> <p>[KDF Step]</p> <p>[selection: KDF-CTR, KDF-FB, KDF-DPI] using [selection: AES-128-CMAC, AES-192-CMAC, AES-256-CMAC, HMAC-SHA-1, HMAC-SHA-256, HMAC-SHA-512] as PRF</p>	[selection: 128, 192, 256] bits	<p>NIST SP 800-56C Rev. 2 (Section 5)</p> <p>[selection: ISO/IEC 9797-1:2011 (CMAC), NIST SP 800-38B (CMAC), ISO/IEC 18033-3:2010 (AES), FIPS PUB 197 (AES), ISO/IEC 9797-2:2021 (HMAC), FIPS PUB 198-1 (HMAC), ISO/IEC 10118-3:2018 (SHA), FIPS PUB 180-4 (SHA)]</p>
KDF-KMAC	See NIST 800-108 Rev. 1, Section 4.4	[selection: KMAC128, KMAC256, KMACXOF128, KMACXOF256]	[selection: 128, 256] bits	[selection: ISO/IEC 9797-2:2021 (Section 9 "MAC Algorithm 4"); NIST SP 800-185 (Section 4 "KMAC")]

### Application Note 51

*The protocol- and application-specific KDFs specified in NIST SP 800-135 Rev. 1 (e.g., IKE, TLS) and other standards should be covered by SFRs tailored for those protocols. We do expect the cryptographic primitives of application specific KDFs to be validated, e.g., HMAC, SHA. Proper parameters to protocols need to be validated by protocol testing, not cryptographic testing.*

*There are no standards that specify how to derive a key from two keys using XOR (KDF-XOR) or encryption (KDF-ENC). If KDF-XOR is selected, the ST Author should describe this method in the documentation. If KDF-ENC is selected, the ST Author should document the encryption algorithm used from FCS\_COP.1/SKC, and which of the inputs is the plaintext and which is the key.*

*In KDF-MAC-2S, if a CMAC is selected in the MAC step, then select AES-128-CMAC in the KDF step and select 128 as the output key size. If HMAC is selected in the MAC step, then select the same HMAC in the KDF.*

*If deriving a symmetric key, select any of the above rows.*

*If deriving an initialization vector, an authentication secret, HMAC key, or KMAC key, select KDF-CTR, KDF-FB, KDF-DPI, KDF-HASH, KDF-XOR, or KDF-ENC.*

*If deriving a secret IV or seed, select KDF-HASH, KDF-MAC-1S, or KDF-MAC-2S.*

## B.1.5. FCS\_CKM\_EXT.8 Password-Based Key Derivation

### FCS\_CKM\_EXT.8 Password-Based Key Derivation

#### FCS\_CKM\_EXT.8.1

The TSF shall perform password-based key derivation functions in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [*HMAC-[selection: SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512]*], with iteration count of [*assignment: number of iterations*] using a randomly generated salt of length [*selection: 128, [assignment: greater than 128]*] and output cryptographic key sizes [*selection: 128, 192, 256*] bits that meet the following standard: [NIST SP 800-132 Section 5.3 (PBKDF2)].

#### **Application Note 52**

*The TSF must condition a password into a string of bits prior to using it as input to algorithms that form SKs and KEKs. The TSF can perform conditioning using one of the identified hash functions or the process described in NIST SP 800-132 Section 5.3 (PBKDF2); the ST author selects the method used. NIST SP 800-132 Section 5.3 (PBKDF2) requires the use of a pseudo-random function (PRF) consisting of HMAC with an approved hash function.*

## B.1.6. FCS\_COP.1/AEAD Cryptographic Operation (Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data)

### FCS\_COP.1/AEAD Cryptographic Operation (Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data)

#### FCS\_COP.1.1/AEAD

The TSF shall perform *authenticated encryption with associated data* in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [**selection: cryptographic algorithm**] and cryptographic key sizes [**selection: cryptographic key sizes**] that meet the following: [**selection: list of standards**].

Table 19. AEAD Symmetric-Key Cryptography

Identifier	Cryptographic Algorithm	Cryptographic Key Sizes	List of Standards
AES-CCM	AES in CCM mode with unpredictable, non-repeating nonce, minimum size of 64 bits	[selection: 128, 192, 256] bits	[selection: ISO/IEC 18033-3 (Sub Clause 5.2), FIPS PUB 197] [AES]  [selection: ISO/IEC 19772:2020 (Clause 7), NIST SP 800-38C] [CCM]
AES-GCM	AES in GCM mode with non-repeating IVs using [selection: deterministic, RBG-based] IV construction; the tag must be of length [selection: 96, 104, 112, 120, or 128] bits.	[selection: 128, 192, 256], bits	[selection: ISO/IEC 18033-3 (Sub Clause 5.2), FIPS PUB 197] [AES]  [selection: ISO/IEC 19772:2020 (Clause 10), NIST SP 800-38D] [GCM]

Identifier	Cryptographic Algorithm	Cryptographic Key Sizes	List of Standards
CAM-CCM	Camellia in CCM mode with unpredictable, non-repeating nonce, minimum size of 64 bits	[selection: 128, 192, 256] bits	ISO/IEC 18033-3:2010 (Sub Clause 5.3) [Camellia]  [selection: ISO/IEC 19772:2020 (Clause 7), NIST SP 800-38C] [CCM]
CAM-GCM	Camellia in GCM mode with non-repeating IVs using [selection: deterministic, RBG-based] IV construction; the tag must be of length [selection: 96, 104, 112, 120, or 128] bits.	[selection: 128, 192, 256] bits	ISO/IEC 18033-3:2010 (Sub Clause 5.3) [Camellia]  [selection: ISO/IEC 19772:2020 (Clause 10), NIST SP 800-38D] [GCM]
SEED-CCM	SEED in CCM mode with unpredictable, non-repeating nonce, minimum size of 64 bits	128 bits	ISO/IEC 18033-3:2010 (Sub Clause 5.4) [SEED]  [selection: ISO/IEC 19772:2020 (Clause 7), NIST SP 800-38C] [CCM]
SEED-GCM	SEED in GCM mode with non-repeating IVs using [selection: deterministic, RBG-based] IV construction; the tag must be of length [selection: 96, 104, 112, 120, or 128] bits.	128 bits	ISO/IEC 18033-3:2010 (Sub Clause 5.4) [SEED]  [selection: ISO/IEC 19772:2020 (Clause 10), NIST SP 800-38D] [GCM]
LEA-CCM	LEA in CCM mode with unpredictable, non-repeating nonce, minimum size of 64 bits	[selection: 128, 192, 256] bits	ISO/IEC 29192-2:2019 (Sub Clause 6.3) [LEA]  [selection: ISO/IEC 19772:2020 (Clause 7), NIST SP 800-38C] [CCM]
LEA-GCM	LEA in GCM mode with non-repeating IVs using [selection: deterministic, RBG-based] IV construction; the tag must be of length [selection: 96, 104, 112, 120, or 128] bits.	[selection: 128, 192, 256] bits	ISO/IEC 29192-2:2019 (Sub Clause 6.3) [LEA]  [selection: ISO/IEC 19772:2020 (Clause 10), NIST SP 800-38D] [GCM]

### B.1.7. FCS\_COP.1/CMAC Cryptographic Operation (CMAC)

FCS\_COP.1/CMAC Cryptographic Operation (CMAC)

## FCS\_COP.1.1/CMAC

The TSF shall perform [CMAC] in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [AES-CMAC] and cryptographic key sizes [**selection:** 128 bits, 192 bits, 256 bits] that meet the following: [**selection:** ISO/IEC 9797-1:2011 sub clause 7.6 (CMAC) and ISO/IEC 18033-3:2010 sub clause 5.2 (AES), NIST SP 800-38B (CMAC) and NIST FIPS 197 (AES)].

## B.1.8. FCS\_COP.1/KeyEncap Cryptographic Operation (Key Encapsulation)

FCS\_COP.1/KeyEncap Cryptographic Operation (Key Encapsulation)

### FCS\_COP.1.1/KeyEncap

The TSF shall perform *key encapsulation* in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [**selection:** *cryptographic algorithm*] and cryptographic key sizes [**selection:** *cryptographic key sizes*] that meet the following: [**selection:** *list of standards*].

Table 20. Key Encapsulation

Cryptographic Algorithm	Cryptographic Key Sizes	List of Standards
KAS1 [RSA-single party]	[ <b>selection:</b> 2048, 3072, 4096, 8192] bits	NIST SP 800-56B Rev. 2 (Sections 6.3 & 8.2)
KTS-OAEP [RSA-OAEP]	[ <b>selection:</b> 2048, 3072, 4096, 8192] bits	NIST SP 800-56B Rev. 2 (Sections 6.3 & 9)

## B.1.9. FCS\_COP.1/KeyWrap Cryptographic Operation (Key Wrap)

FCS\_COP.1/KeyWrap Cryptographic Operation (Key Wrap)

### FCS\_COP.1.1/KeyWrap

The TSF shall perform *key wrapping* in accordance with a specified cryptographic algorithm [**selection:** *cryptographic algorithm*] and cryptographic key sizes [**selection:** *cryptographic key sizes*] that meet the following: [**selection:** *list of standards*].

Table 21. Key Wrap

Identifier	Cryptographic Algorithm	Cryptographic Key Sizes	List of Standards
KW	[selection: AES, CAM, SEED, LEA] in KW mode	[selection: (AES, CAM, SEED, LEA) 128, (AES, CAM, LEA) 192, (AES, CAM, LEA) 256] bits	<p>[selection: ISO/IEC 19772:2020 (clause 6) [Key Wrap], NIST SP 800-38F (Section 6.2) [KW]]</p> <p>ISO/IEC 18033-3 (Sub Clause 5.2) [AES]</p> <p>ISO/IEC 18033-3:2010 (Sub Clause 5.3) [Camellia]</p> <p>ISO/IEC 18033-3:2010 (Sub Clause 5.4) [SEED]</p> <p>ISO/IEC 29192-2:2019 (Sub Clause 6.3) [LEA]</p>
KWP	[selection: AES, CAM, SEED, LEA] in KWP mode	[selection: (AES, CAM, SEED, LEA) 128, (AES, CAM, LEA) 192, (AES, CAM, LEA) 256] bits	<p>NIST SP 800-38F (Section 6.3) [KWP]</p> <p>ISO/IEC 18033-3 (Sub Clause 5.2) [AES]</p> <p>ISO/IEC 18033-3:2010 (Sub Clause 5.3) [Camellia]</p> <p>ISO/IEC 18033-3:2010 (Sub Clause 5.4) [SEED]</p> <p>ISO/IEC 29192-2:2019 (Sub Clause 6.3) [LEA]</p>

## B.2. User Data Protection

### B.2.1. FDP\_DAU.1/Prove Basic Data Authentication (for Use with the Prove Service)

FDP\_DAU.1/Prove Basic Data Authentication (for Use with the Prove Service)

#### FDP\_DAU.1.1/Prove

The TSF shall provide a capability to generate evidence that can be used as a guarantee of the validity of [selection: *assignment: list of objects or information types*] declared valid by the TSF, *assignment: list of objects or information types* declared valid by an authenticated user].

#### FDP\_DAU.1.2/Prove

The TSF shall provide [*assignment: list of subjects*] with the ability to verify evidence of the

validity of the indicated information.

### **Application Note 53**

*This SFR describes the output of the Prove service provided by the DSC. The evidence of validity or authenticity, or other evidence derived, is expected to be processed by the RoT for Measurement. Additionally, the use of a RoT for Reporting presupposes a logging capability or other means of generating state information that could be conveyed to external entities. Therefore, FDP\_DAU.1.1/Prove must be selected if-and-only-if the RoT for Measurement and the RoT for Reporting are both selected in FPT\_ROT\_EXT.1.1. An 'authenticated user' in the sense of the selection in FDP\_DAU.1.1/Prove means a user who has been authenticated by the DSC according to the mechanisms of FIA\_UAU.5.*

*In FDP\_DAU.1.1/Prove, the DSC will issue a validity-stamped or authenticity-stamped piece of data. In this case, validity-stamped means that the form of the issued data enables an external entity to verify that the data has been issued via the DSC's Prove service. The implementation might be via a DSC cryptographic signature, or a MAC using a symmetric key shared with the receiver, for example. Authenticity-stamped means that the receiver of the data can verify that the user providing this data is authentic.*

*Data that would need to be validity-stamped includes data over which the DSC is the authority, such as the state of its own firmware. Data that would need to be authenticity-stamped includes data about which the DSC knows nothing, but where it will issue the data with a statement that the DSC has authenticated the source of this data.*

*For data that is validity-stamped, the DSC does nothing but respond to a request to issue the data; thus, authentication of the user issuing the data is not needed and is covered by FDP\_DAU.1/Prove. Otherwise, in the case the DSC has no understanding of this data, a step is needed via FIA\_UAU.5 by which the DSC authenticates the user for this service, and that the DSC or Prove service will therefore vouch for the user, not the validity of the data itself.*

## **B.2.2. FDP\_FRS\_EXT.2 Factory Reset Behavior**

FDP\_FRS\_EXT.2 Factory Reset Behavior

### **FDP\_FRS\_EXT.2.1**

Upon initiation of a factory reset, the TSF shall destroy [all non-permanent SDEs and SDOs] and restore the following **pre-installed SDOs** to their factory settings: [assignment: pre-installed SDOs to be restored during a factory reset].

### **Application Note 54**

*Not all DSCs permit factory reset functionality. Those that do are expected to perform a factory reset in a manner that prevents any inadvertent disclosure of security-relevant data that was present on the DSC prior to the factory reset. For DSCs that permit factory reset functionality (as indicated by selection of factory reset the TOE wiping out all non-permanent SDEs and SDOs, as described by FDP\_FRS\_EXT.2 in FIA\_AFL\_EXT.1.3, or by no actions or conditions NOT being selected in FDP\_FRS\_EXT.1.1), this SFR must be included in the TOE boundary.*

## B.3. Identification and Authentication

### B.3.1. FIA\_AFL\_EXT.2 Authorization Failure Response

FIA\_AFL\_EXT.2 Authorization Failure Response

#### FIA\_AFL\_EXT.2.1

When the TSF locks an **SDO** (i.e. prevents authorization attempts for an **SDO**) due to a user exceeding the allowed threshold for unsuccessful authorization attempts, then only an administrator may unlock access to the **SDO** and reset the corresponding failed authorization attempt counter.

#### *Application Note 55*

*This SFR is applicable only when the TSF's response to excessive authorization failures selects prevent all future authorization attempts indefinitely (i.e., lock) as specified by FIA\_AFL\_EXT.1.3.*

## B.4. Protection of the TSF

### B.4.1. FPT\_FLS.1/FW Failure with Preservation of Secure State (Firmware)

#### FPT\_FLS.1/FW

Failure with Preservation of Secure State (Firmware)

#### FPT\_FLS.1.1/FW

The TSF shall preserve a secure state when the following types of **firmware** failures occur: [authenticity violation, integrity violation, rollback violation].

#### *Application Note 56*

*A DSC's ability to handle failures related to authenticity, integrity, and invalid versions of firmware is not applicable in all cases because some DSCs will have immutable firmware. This SFR must be claimed if mutable is selected in FPT\_MFW\_EXT.1.1.*

*The phrase "secure state" refers to a state in which the TOE has consistent TSF data and a TSF that can correctly enforce the policy. The TOE must ensure that no further processing of TSF or user data takes place while in an insecure state. This state may be the initial "boot" of a clean system, or it might be some check-pointed state. It is expected that in most cases, the TOE will halt and require a reset or re-initialization to return to a known secure state.*

### B.4.2. FPT\_MFW\_EXT.2 Basic Firmware Integrity

FPT\_MFW\_EXT.2 Basic Firmware Integrity

#### FPT\_MFW\_EXT.2.1

The TSF shall have the ability to verify the integrity of the firmware.

#### FPT\_MFW\_EXT.2.2

The TSF shall provide a capability to generate evidence of the integrity of the firmware.

### **Application Note 57**

*Data and firmware integrity is not a required component of this cPP in all cases because some DSCs will have immutable firmware. This SFR must be claimed if mutable is selected in FPT\_MFW\_EXT.1.1.*

*The TOE guarantees the integrity of the firmware by verifying its integrity.*

*Verifying the integrity of the firmware could be accomplished by guaranteeing the validity of firmware within the TOE prior to execution.*

*This requirement covers the case of ensuring the firmware is trustworthy in immutable form or mutable through any firmware updates, since the integrity and authenticity are checked prior to execution.*

*FCS\_COP.1/SigVer applies if the TOE provides the capability to update the TOE firmware and uses digital signatures and MAC verification for update verification. The ST Author should choose the algorithm implemented to perform digital signatures. For the algorithms chosen, the ST author should make the appropriate assignments/selections to specify the parameters that are implemented for that algorithm.*

## **B.4.3. FPT\_MFW\_EXT.3 Firmware Authentication with Identity of Guarantor**

FPT\_MFW\_EXT.3 Firmware Authentication with Identity of Guarantor

### **FPT\_MFW\_EXT.3.1**

The TSF shall have the ability to verify the authenticity of the firmware.

### **FPT\_MFW\_EXT.3.2**

The TSF shall provide a capability to generate evidence of the authenticity of the firmware.

### **Application Note 58**

*Firmware authentication is not a required component of this cPP in all cases because some DSCs will have immutable firmware. This SFR must be claimed if mutable is selected in FPT\_MFW\_EXT.1.1.*

*The TOE guarantees the authenticity of the firmware by verifying its signature.*

*Verifying the authenticity of the firmware could be accomplished by guaranteeing the validity of firmware within the TOE prior to execution.*

*This requirement covers the case of ensuring the firmware is trustworthy in immutable form or mutable through any firmware updates, since the integrity and authenticity are checked prior to execution.*

*FCS\_COP.1/SigVer applies if the TOE provides the capability to update the TOE firmware and uses digital signatures and MAC verification for update verification. The ST Author should choose the algorithm implemented to perform digital signatures. For the algorithms chosen, the ST author should make the appropriate assignments/selections to specify the parameters that are implemented for that algorithm.*



## B.4.4. FPT\_RPL.1/Rollback Replay Detection (Rollback)

FPT\_RPL.1/Rollback Replay Detection (Rollback)

### FPT\_RPL.1.1/Rollback

The TSF shall detect replay for the following entities: [*previous firmware builds*].

### FPT\_RPL.1.2/Rollback

The TSF shall **prevent the execution of the loaded firmware and** perform **[selection, choose one of: assignment: other actions, no other actions]** when replay is detected.

#### *Application Note 59*

*This SFR must be claimed if mutable is selected in FPT\_MFW\_EXT.1.1.*

*The TSF data is used as a guarantee of the ordinal identifier of the firmware instance. When a firmware load is requested, the TSF ensures the authenticated firmware ordinal identifier is greater than or equal to the previously authenticated firmware identifier. For example, this could be accomplished by ensuring the validated instance of the firmware to be loaded is greater than or equal to the instance previously validated and loaded into the TOE. By loading a previous instance of firmware, it potentially opens up the device to known vulnerabilities.*

## B.4.5. FPT\_STM\_EXT.1 Reliable Time Counting

FPT\_STM\_EXT.1 Reliable Time Counting

### FPT\_STM\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall be able to provide a reliable [**selection**: internal time stamp, external time stamp, monotonically increasing counter] to measure the passage of time.

#### *Application Note 60*

*It is acceptable for the TSF to provide timestamp data either through an internal clock or a counter. It is also permissible for the TSF to obtain time data from a clock contained within the same physical enclosure in which the TOE is embedded (e.g. a mobile device).*

## B.5. Trusted Path/Channels

### B.5.1. FTP\_CCMP\_EXT.1 CCM Protocol

FTP\_CCMP\_EXT.1 CCM Protocol

#### FTP\_CCMP\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall implement CCMP using AES in CCM mode and key size [selection: 128-bits, 256-bits] as defined in [selection: IEEE 802.11i, IEEE 802.11ac].

#### FTP\_CCMP\_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall discard incoming messages if authentication fails.

### FTP\_CCMP\_EXT.1.3

The TSF shall discard incoming messages that are malformed or invalid.

#### **Application Note 61**

*This SFR must be claimed if CCMP is selected in FTP\_ITC\_EXT.1.*

*Inclusion of this SFR requires inclusion of AES-CCM or CAM-CCM in FCS\_COP.1/AEAD.*

*CCMP is defined in IEEE 802.11i. CCMP-256 is defined in IEEE 802.11ac.*

## **B.5.2. FTP\_GCMP\_EXT.1 GCM Protocol**

FTP\_GCMP\_EXT.1 GCM Mode Protocol

### FTP\_GCMP\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall implement GCMP using AES in GCM mode and key size [selection: 128-bits, 256-bits] as defined in [IEEE 802.11ad].

### FTP\_GCMP\_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall discard incoming messages if authentication fails.

### FTP\_GCMP\_EXT.1.3

The TSF shall discard incoming messages that are malformed or invalid.

#### **Application Note 62**

*This SFR must be claimed if GCMP is selected in FTP\_ITC\_EXT.1.*

*Inclusion of this SFR requires inclusion of AES-GCM or CAM-GCM in FCS\_COP.1/AEAD.*

## **B.5.3. FTP\_ITC\_EXT.1 Cryptographically Protected Communications Channels**

FTP\_ITC\_EXT.1 Cryptographically Protected Communications Channels

### FTP\_ITC\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall use [selection: CCMP, GCMP] protocol to provide a communication channel between itself and [assignment: *list of entities external to the TOE*] that protects channel data from disclosure and ensures the integrity of channel data.

#### **Application Note 63**

*This SFR must be claimed if cryptographically protected data channels as specified in FTP\_ITC\_EXT.1 is selected in either FDP\_ITC\_EXT.1 or FDP\_ITC\_EXT.2.*

*Entities external to the TOE include applications that communicate with the TOE such as authentication capabilities (e.g. biometrics reader), external storage, and interfaces with an external DSC.*

*If CCMP is selected, the ST author must include FTP\_CCMP\_EXT.1.*

If GCMP is selected, the ST author must include FTP\_GCMP\_EXT.1.

## B.5.4. FTP\_ITE\_EXT.1 Encrypted Data Communications

FTP\_ITE\_EXT.1 Encrypted Data Communications

### FTP\_ITE\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall encrypt data for transfer between the TOE and [assignment: list of entities external to the TOE] using a cryptographic algorithm and key size as specified in FCS\_COP.1/SKC, and using [selection:

- Pre-shared keys;
- Key agreement according to FCS\_CKM\_EXT.7;
- Keys exchanged using a physically protected communication mechanism conformant with FTP\_ITP\_EXT.1

].

#### **Application Note 64**

*This SFR must be claimed if encrypted data buffers as specified in FTP\_ITE\_EXT.1 is selected in either FDP\_ITC\_EXT.1 or FDP\_ITC\_EXT.2.*

*This requirement applies to encrypted data communications between the TOE and external entities that do not use a physically protected mechanism conforming to FTP\_ITP\_EXT.1, or a cryptographically protected data channel as conforming to FDP\_ITC\_EXT.1. For example, if data is transferred through encrypted buffers (or blobs) then this requirement applies. If data is transferred through a physically protected channel, then FTP\_ITP\_EXT.1 applies. This requirement would apply, for example, for communications implemented through a shared data buffer.*

## B.5.5. FTP\_ITP\_EXT.1 Physically Protected Channel

FTP\_ITP\_EXT.1 Physically Protected Channel

### FTP\_ITP\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall provide a **physically protected** communication channel between itself and [assignment: list of other IT entities within the same platform].

#### **Application Note 65**

*This SFR must be claimed if physically protected channels as specified in FTP\_ITP\_EXT.1 is selected in either FDP\_ITC\_EXT.1 or FDP\_ITC\_EXT.2.*

# Appendix C: Extended Component Definitions

This appendix contains the definitions for the extended requirements that are used in the cPP, including those used in [Appendix A](#) and [Appendix B](#).

(Note: formatting conventions for selections and assignments in this Appendix are those in [CC2].)

This Appendix provides a definition for all of the extended components introduced in this PP-Module. These components are identified in the following table:

Table 22. Extended Components Definitions

Functional Class	Functional Components
Cryptographic Support (FCS)	FCS_CKM_EXT Cryptographic Key Management
	FCS_OTV_EXT One-Time Value
	FCS_STG_EXT Cryptographic Key Storage
User Data Protection (FDP)	FDP_ETC_EXT Export from the TOE
	FDP_FRS_EXT Factory Reset
	FDP_ITC_EXT Import from Outside of the TOE
Identification and Authentication (FIA)	FIA_AFL_EXT Authorization Failure Handling
Security Management (FMT)	FMT_MOF_EXT Management of Functions in TSF
Protection of the TSF (FPT)	FPT_MFW_EXT Mutable/Immutable Firmware
	FPT_MOD_EXT Debug Modes
	FPT_PRO_EXT Root of Trust
	FPT_ROT_EXT Root of Trust Services
	FPT_STM_EXT Reliable Time Counting
Trusted Path/Channels (FTP)	FTP_CCMP_EXT CCM Protocol
	FTP_GCMP_EXT GCM Protocol
	FTP_ITC_EXT Inter-TSF Trusted Channel
	FTP_ITE_EXT Encrypted Data Communications
	FTP_ITP_EXT Physically Protected Channel


## C.1. Class FCS: Cryptographic Support

### C.1.1. FCS\_CKM\_EXT Cryptographic Key Management

#### Family Behavior

This family defines requirements for key life cycle operations.

## Component Leveling



FCS\_CKM\_EXT.3 The cryptographic key access applies primarily to the storage of keys for future use and retrieval of keys for immediate use by the TOE. There may be some overlap in primitives used in other SFRs, but the end goals here are to protect the confidentiality and authenticity of the keys while in storage.

FCS\_CKM\_EXT.7 This SFR captures methods for key agreement in which multiple parties contribute material used to derive the shared key used by each party to encrypt and decrypt messages to and from each other. The derived key can be used either as a symmetric key, keyed-hash key, or cryptographic key for key derivation functions.

FCS\_CKM\_EXT.8 Password key derivation is different from regular key derivation since for key derivation it is expected that the input parameters have full entropy compared to the expected key strength and the passwords for password-based key derivation have limited entropy. One must add additional constraints, work, or entropy to increase the security of password-based key derivation algorithms that suffer from a lack of entropy induced by passwords sourced by human memory. These password-based key derivation algorithms should result in derived keys that have sufficient security.

**Management:** FCS\_CKM\_EXT.3, FCS\_CKM\_EXT.7, FCS\_CKM\_EXT.8

No specific management functions are identified.

**Audit:** FCS\_CKM\_EXT.3, FCS\_CKM\_EXT.7, FCS\_CKM\_EXT.8

There are no auditable events foreseen.

### FCS\_CKM\_EXT.3 Cryptographic Key Access

**Hierarchical to** No other components.

**Dependencies** [FDP\_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP\_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS\_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation, or FCS\_CKM.5 Cryptographic key derivation, or FCS\_CKM\_EXT.8 Password-based key derivation] FCS\_CKM.6 Timing and event of cryptographic key destruction, [FCS\_COP.1/KeyEncap Cryptographic Operation (Key Encapsulation), or FCS\_COP.1/KeyWrap Cryptographic Operation (Key Wrap), or FCS\_COP.1/SKC Cryptographic Operation (Symmetric-Key Cryptography)]

### FCS\_CKM\_EXT.3.1

The TSF shall use specified cryptographic key access methods [selection: *key encapsulation, key wrapping, key encryption*] to access keys when performing [selection: *cryptographic key usage in cryptographic operations, cryptographic key storage, cryptographic key recovery, modifications to attributes of cryptographic keys, cryptographic key destruction*].

### FCS\_CKM\_EXT.7 Cryptographic Key Agreement

**Hierarchical to** No other components.

**Dependencies** [FDP\_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP\_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS\_CKM.1 Cryptographic key generation, or FCS\_CKM.5 Cryptographic key derivation, or FCS\_CKM\_EXT.8 Password-based key derivation] [FCS\_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or FCS\_COP.1 Cryptographic operation] FCS\_CKM.6 Timing and event of cryptographic key destruction

### FCS\_CKM\_EXT.7.1

The TSF shall derive shared cryptographic keys with input from multiple parties in accordance with specified cryptographic key derivation algorithms [**selection:** *cryptographic algorithm*] and specified key sizes [**selection:** *key sizes*] that meets the following: [**selection:** *list of standards*].

### FCS\_CKM\_EXT.8 Password-Based Key Derivation

**Hierarchical to** No other components.

**Dependencies** [FDP\_ITC.1 Import of user data without security attributes, or FDP\_ITC.2 Import of user data with security attributes, or FCS\_ITC\_EXT.1 Import of Key] [FCS\_CKM.2 Cryptographic key distribution, or FCS\_COP.1 Cryptographic operation, or FCS\_CKM\_EXT.7 Cryptographic Key Agreement] FCS\_COP.1/KeyedHash Cryptographic Operation (Keyed Hash) FCS\_CKM.6 Timing and event of cryptographic key destruction

### FCS\_CKM\_EXT.8.1

The TSF shall perform password-based key derivation functions in accordance with a specified


cryptographic algorithm [*HMAC-[selection: SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512]*], with iteration count of [*assignment: number of iterations*] using a randomly generated salt of length [*selection: 128, [assignment: greater than 128]*] and output cryptographic key sizes [*selection: 128, 192, 256*] bits that meet the following standard: [NIST SP 800-132 Section 5.3 (PBKDF2)].

### C.1.2. FCS\_OTV\_EXT One-Time Value

#### Family Behavior

This family defines requirements for salt and nonce usage.

#### Component Leveling



FCS\_OTV\_EXT.1 One-Time Value, requires the TSF to use salts and nonces that are created by the TOE's deterministic random bit generator.

#### Management: FCS\_OTV\_EXT.1

No specific management functions are identified.

#### Audit: FCS\_OTV\_EXT.1

There are no auditable events foreseen.

#### FCS\_OTV\_EXT.1 One-Time Value

**Hierarchical to** No other components.

**Dependencies** FCS\_RBG.1 Random Bit Generation (RBG)

#### FCS\_OTV\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall perform *cryptographic one-time value generation* for [**selection:** *algorithm or mode*] using the output of a [**selection:** *random bit generator as defined in FCS\_RBG.1, deterministic IV construction, [assignment: OTV construction method]*] and sizes of length that meet the following: [**selection:** *list of standards*].

### C.1.3. FCS\_STG\_EXT Cryptographic Key Storage

#### Family Behavior

This family defines requirements for ensuring the protection of keys and secrets.

#### Component Leveling

## FCS\_STG\_EXT Cryptographic Key Storage

1

FCS\_STG\_EXT.1 Protected Storage, requires the TSF to enforce protected storage for keys and secrets so that they cannot be accessed or destroyed without authorization.

### Management: FCS\_STG\_EXT.1

No specific management functions are identified.

### Audit: FCS\_STG\_EXT.1

There are no auditable events foreseen.

### FCS\_STG\_EXT.1 Protected Storage

**Hierarchical to** No other components.

**Dependencies** No dependencies.

#### FCS\_STG\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall provide [*assignment: protection method*] protected storage for asymmetric private keys and [*selection: symmetric keys, persistent secrets, no other keys*].

#### FCS\_STG\_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall support the capability of [*selection: importing keys/secrets into the TOE, causing the TOE to generate keys/secrets*] upon request of [*assignment: authorized subject*].

#### FCS\_STG\_EXT.1.4

The TSF shall have the capability to allow only the user that [*selection: imported the key/secret, caused the key/secret to be generated*] to use the key/secret. Exceptions may only be explicitly authorized by [*assignment: authorized subject*].

#### FCS\_STG\_EXT.1.4

The TSF shall have the capability to allow only the user that [*selection: imported the key/secret, caused the key/secret to be generated*] to use the key/secret. Exceptions may only be explicitly authorized by [*assignment: authorized subject*].

#### FCS\_STG\_EXT.1.5

The TSF shall allow only the user that [*selection: imported the key/secret, caused the key/secret to be generated*] to request that the key/secret be destroyed. Exceptions may only be explicitly authorized by [*assignment: authorized subject*].




## C.2. Class FDP: User Data Protection

### C.2.1. FDP\_ETC\_EXT Export from the TOE

#### Family Behavior

This family defines requirements for export of TSF data outside the TOE boundary that allows for the security of that data to be maintained.

#### Component Leveling



FDP\_ETC\_EXT.2 Propagation of SDOs, requires the TSF to transmit data outside of the TOE boundary with protections applied so that they cannot be accessed by unauthorized subjects.

#### Management: FDP\_ETC\_EXT.2

No specific management functions are identified.

#### Audit: FDP\_ETC\_EXT.2

There are no auditable events foreseen.

#### FDP\_ETC\_EXT.2 Propagation of SDOs

**Hierarchical to** No other components.

**Dependencies** FCS\_COP.1 Cryptographic Operation

#### FDP\_ETC\_EXT.2.1

The TSF shall propagate only SDO references, wrapped authorization data, and wrapped SDOs such that only [selection: the TOE, authorized users] can access them.

### C.2.2. FDP\_FRS\_EXT Factory Reset

#### Family Behavior

This family defines requirements for the conditions that may trigger TOE factory reset and for identifying the data that is destroyed or restored as part of the factory reset operation.

#### Component Leveling



FDP\_FRS\_EXT.1 Factory Reset, requires the TSF to allow factory resets under specified conditions.

FDP\_FRS\_EXT.2 Factory Reset Behavior, requires the TSF to destroy certain TSF data and restore other TSF data after a factory reset is initiated.

**Management: FDP\_FRS\_EXT.1**

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

- Reset TOE to factory state.

**Management: FDP\_FRS\_EXT.2**

No specific management functions are identified.

**Audit: FDP\_FRS\_EXT.1, FDP\_FRS\_EXT.2**

There are no auditable events foreseen.

**FDP\_FRS\_EXT.1 Factory Reset**

**Hierarchical to** No other components.

**Dependencies** FDP\_FRS\_EXT.2 Factory Reset Behavior

**FDP\_FRS\_EXT.1.1**

The TSF shall permit a factory reset of the TOE upon: *[assignment: conditions under which a factory reset is authorized]*.

**FDP\_FRS\_EXT.2 Factory Reset Behavior**

**Hierarchical to** No other components.

**Dependencies** FDP\_FRS\_EXT.1 Factory Reset

**FDP\_FRS\_EXT.2.1**


Upon initiation of a factory reset, the TSF shall destroy *[assignment: TSF data that is destroyed by factory reset]* and restore the following TSF data to their factory settings: *[assignment: TSF data that is restored by factory reset]*.

### C.2.3. FDP\_ITC\_EXT Import from Outside of the TOE

Family Behavior

This family defines requirements for handling data that is imported from outside the TOE.

Component Leveling



FDP\_ITC\_EXT.1 Parsing of SDEs, requires the TSF to support the import of SDEs from outside the TOE and to verify their integrity when imported.

FDP\_ITC\_EXT.2 Parsing of SDOs, requires the TSF to support the import of SDOs from outside the TOE and to verify their integrity when imported.

**Management: FDP\_ITC\_EXT.1, FDP\_ITC\_EXT.2**

No specific management functions are identified.

**Audit: FDP\_ITC\_EXT.1, FDP\_ITC\_EXT.2**

There are no auditable events foreseen.

#### FDP\_ITC\_EXT.1 Parsing of SDEs

**Hierarchical to** No other components.

**Dependencies** FCS\_COP.1 Cryptographic Operation  
[FTP\_ITC\_EXT.1 Cryptographically Protected Communications Channels,  
FTP\_ITE\_EXT.1 Encrypted Data Communications, or  
FTP\_ITP\_EXT.1 Physically Protected Channel]

##### FDP\_ITC\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall support importing SDEs using [*assignment: import method that maintains confidentiality and integrity of imported data*].

##### FDP\_ITC\_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall verify the integrity of the SDE using [*assignment: method of integrity verification*].

##### FDP\_ITC\_EXT.1.3

The TSF shall ignore any security attributes associated with the user data when imported from outside the TOE.

#### **FDP\_ITC\_EXT.1.4**

The TSF shall bind SDEs to security attributes using [*assignment: list of ways the TSF generates security attributes and binds them to the SDEs*].

#### **FDP\_ITC\_EXT.2 Parsing of SDOs**

**Hierarchical to** No other components.

**Dependencies** FCS\_COP.1 Cryptographic Operation  
[FTP\_ITC\_EXT.1 Cryptographically Protected Communications Channels,  
FTP\_ITE\_EXT.1 Encrypted Data Communications, or  
FTP\_ITP\_EXT.1 Physically Protected Channel]

#### **FDP\_ITC\_EXT.2.1**

The TSF shall support importing SDOs using [*assignment: import method that maintains confidentiality and integrity of imported data*].

#### **FDP\_ITC\_EXT.2.2**

The TSF shall verify the integrity of the SDO using [*assignment: method of integrity verification*].

#### **FDP\_ITC\_EXT.2.3**

The TSF shall use the security attributes associated with the imported user data.

#### **FDP\_ITC\_EXT.2.4**

The TSF shall ensure that the protocol used provides for the unambiguous association between the security attributes and the user data received.

#### **FDP\_ITC\_EXT.2.5**

The TSF shall ensure that interpretation of the security attributes of the imported user data is as intended by the source of the user data.


## **C.3. Class FIA: Identification and Authentication**

### **C.3.1. FIA\_AFL\_EXT Authorization Failure Handling**

#### **Family Behavior**

This family defines requirements for the TOE's behavior when repeated failed attempts to gain authorization to access TSF data occur.

#### **Component Leveling**



FIA\_AFL\_EXT.1 Authorization Failure Handling, requires the TSF to monitor authorization attempts, including counting and limiting the number of attempts at failed or passed authorizations.

FIA\_AFL\_EXT.2 Authorization Failure Response, requires the TSF to control who is authorized to unlock failed authorization attempts.

**Management: FIA\_AFL\_EXT.1**

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

- Set authorization failure parameters.

**Management: FIA\_AFL\_EXT.2**

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

- Unlock access to SDO following excessive failed authorization attempts.

**Audit: FIA\_AFL\_EXT.1, FIA\_AFL\_EXT.2**

There are no auditable events foreseen.

**FIA\_AFL\_EXT.1 Authorization Failure Handling**

**Hierarchical to** No other components.

**Dependencies** No dependencies.

**FIA\_AFL\_EXT.1.1**

The TSF shall maintain [selection: a unique counter for [assignment: multiple separate objects each requiring authorization], one global counter covering [assignment: objects requiring authorization]], called the failed authorization attempt counters, that counts of the number of unsuccessful authorization attempts that occur related to authorizing access to these objects.

**FIA\_AFL\_EXT.1.2**

The TSF shall maintain a [selection, choose one of: static, administrator configurable variable] threshold of the minimal acceptable number of unsuccessful authorization attempts that occur related to authorizing access to these objects.

**FIA\_AFL\_EXT.1.3**

When the failed authorization attempt counters [selection, choose one of: meets, surpasses] the

threshold for unsuccessful authorization attempts, the TSF shall [*assignment: perform action that temporarily or permanently prevents access to the object*] for these objects.

#### **FIA\_AFL\_EXT.1.4**

The TSF shall increment the failed authorization attempt counter before it verifies the authorization.

#### **FIA\_AFL\_EXT.2 Authorization Failure Response**

**Hierarchical to** No other components.

**Dependencies** FIA\_AFL\_EXT.1 Authorization Failure Handling

#### **FIA\_AFL\_EXT.2.1**

When the TSF locks an object (i.e. prevents authorization attempts for an object) due to a user exceeding the allowed threshold for unsuccessful authorization attempts, then only an administrator may unlock access to the object and reset the corresponding failed authorization attempt counter.


## **C.4. Class FMT: Security Management**

### **C.4.1. FMT\_MOF\_EXT Management of Functions in TSF**

#### **Family Behavior**

This family defines requirements for who is allowed to perform administrative functions.

#### **Component Leveling**



FMT\_MOF\_EXT.1 Management of Security Functions Behavior, requires the TSF to restrict management functionality to authorized administrators.

#### **Management: FMT\_MOF\_EXT.1**

No specific management functions are identified.

#### **Audit: FMT\_MOF\_EXT.1**

There are no auditable events foreseen.

#### **FMT\_MOF\_EXT.1 Management of Security Functions Behavior**

**Hierarchical to** No other components.

**Dependencies** FMT\_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions

#### FMT\_MOF\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall restrict the ability to perform the functions in FMT\_SMF.1 to authenticated administrators.

## C.5. Class FPT: Protection of the TSF

### C.5.1. FPT\_MFW\_EXT Mutable/Immutable Firmware

#### Family Behavior

This family defines requirements for specified types of firmware and the management of integrity and authenticity.

#### Component Leveling



FPT\_MFW\_EXT.1 Mutable/Immutable Firmware, requires the TSF to identify whether its firmware resides in mutable or immutable storage.

FPT\_MFW\_EXT.2 Basic Firmware Integrity, requires the TSF to assert the integrity of the firmware.

FPT\_MFW\_EXT.3 Firmware Authentication with Identity of Guarantor, requires the TSF to assert the authenticity of the firmware.

#### **Management: FPT\_MFW\_EXT.1**

The following actions could be considered for the management functions in FMT:

- Update TOE firmware and pre-installed SDOs.

#### **Management: FPT\_MFW\_EXT.2, FPT\_MFW\_EXT.3**

No specific management functions are identified.

#### **Audit: FPT\_MFW\_EXT.1, FPT\_MFW\_EXT.2, FPT\_MFW\_EXT.3**

There are no auditable events foreseen.

### **FPT\_MFW\_EXT.1 Mutable/Immutable Firmware**

**Hierarchical to** No other components.

**Dependencies** No dependencies.

#### **FPT\_MFW\_EXT.1.1**

The TSF shall be maintained as [selection: immutable, mutable] firmware.

### **FPT\_MFW\_EXT.2 Basic Firmware Integrity**

**Hierarchical to** No other components.

**Dependencies** FPT\_MFW\_EXT.1 Mutable/Immutable Firmware  
FCS\_COP.1 Cryptographic Operation

#### **FPT\_MFW\_EXT.2.1**

The TSF shall have the ability to verify the integrity of the firmware.

#### **FPT\_MFW\_EXT.2.2**

The TSF shall provide a capability to generate evidence of the integrity of the firmware.

### **FPT\_MFW\_EXT.3 Firmware Authentication with Identity of Guarantor**

**Hierarchical to** No other components.

**Dependencies** FPT\_MFW\_EXT.1 Mutable/Immutable Firmware  
FCS\_COP.1 Cryptographic Operation

#### **FPT\_MFW\_EXT.3.1**

The TSF shall have the ability to verify the authenticity of the firmware.

#### **FPT\_MFW\_EXT.3.2**

The TSF shall provide a capability to generate evidence of the authenticity of the firmware.

## **C.5.2. FPT\_MOD\_EXT Debug Modes**

### **Family Behavior**

This family defines requirements for debug modes.

### **Component Leveling**





FPT\_MOD\_EXT.1 Debug Modes, requires the TSF to deny access to debug modes.

**Management: FPT\_MOD\_EXT.1**

No specific management functions are identified.

**Audit: FPT\_MOD\_EXT.1**

There are no auditable events foreseen.

**FPT\_MOD\_EXT.1 Debug Modes**

**Hierarchical to** No other components.

**Dependencies** No dependencies.

**FPT\_MOD\_EXT.1.1**

The TSF shall provide no access to debug modes.

### C.5.3. FPT\_PRO\_EXT Root of Trust

#### Family Behavior

This family defines requirements for the TOE's implementation of a Root of Trust and its ability to use this to assert the integrity of its stored data.

#### Component Leveling



FPT\_PRO\_EXT.1 Root of Trust, requires the TSF to maintain a Root of Trust and identify how it is stored in memory.

FPT\_PRO\_EXT.2 Data Integrity Measurements, requires the TSF to generate integrity measurements to assert its own integrity.

**Management: FPT\_PRO\_EXT.1, FPT\_PRO\_EXT.2**

No specific management functions are identified.

**Audit: FPT\_PRO\_EXT.1, FPT\_PRO\_EXT.2**

There are no auditable events foreseen.

## FPT\_PRO\_EXT.1 Root of Trust

**Hierarchical to** No other components.

**Dependencies** No dependencies.

### FPT\_PRO\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall contain an SDO that contains the identity of the Root of Trust.

### FPT\_PRO\_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall maintain Root of Trust data as [selection: immutable, mutable if and only if its mutability is controlled by a unique identifiable owner].

## FPT\_PRO\_EXT.2 Data Integrity Measurements

**Hierarchical to** No other components.

**Dependencies** No dependencies.

### FPT\_PRO\_EXT.2.1

The TSF shall be able to quantify the integrity of the data protected by the TOE by generating integrity measurements and assertions.

### FPT\_PRO\_EXT.2.2

The TSF shall accumulate platform characteristics using a consistent [*assignment: description of process for accumulating platform characteristics*] process in which verified quantifiable measurements and assertions are accumulated by the RoT for Measurement to prove the integrity of its SDOs.

## C.5.4. FPT\_ROT\_EXT Root of Trust Services

### Family Behavior

This family defines requirements for individual Root of Trust services that the TSF may implement.

### Component Leveling



FPT\_ROT\_EXT.1 Root of Trust Services, requires the TSF to identify the specific Roots of Trust it provides.

FPT\_ROT\_EXT.2 Root of Trust for Storage, requires the TSF to prevent unauthorized access to SDOs associated with its Root of Trust for Storage.

FPT\_ROT\_EXT.3 Root of Trust for Reporting Mechanisms, requires the TSF to implement a Root of Trust for Reporting in the specified manner.

**Management: FPT\_ROT\_EXT.1, FPT\_ROT\_EXT.2, FPT\_ROT\_EXT.3**

No specific management functions are identified.

**Audit: FPT\_ROT\_EXT.1, FPT\_ROT\_EXT.2, FPT\_ROT\_EXT.3**

There are no auditable events foreseen.

### **FPT\_ROT\_EXT.1 Root of Trust Services**

**Hierarchical to** No other components.

**Dependencies** FPT\_PRO\_EXT.1 Root of Trust

#### **FPT\_ROT\_EXT.1.1**

The TSF shall provide a Root of Trust for Storage, a Root of Trust for Authorization, and [selection: Root of Trust for Measurement, Root of Trust for Reporting, no others].

### **FPT\_ROT\_EXT.2 Root of Trust for Storage**

**Hierarchical to** No other components.

**Dependencies** FPT\_PRO\_EXT.1 Root of Trust

#### **FPT\_ROT\_EXT.2.1**

The TSF shall prevent unauthorized access to SDOs associated with the Root of Trust for Storage.

### **FPT\_ROT\_EXT.3 Root of Trust for Reporting Mechanisms**

**Hierarchical to** No other components.

**Dependencies** FCS\_COP.1 Cryptographic Operation  
FPT\_PRO\_EXT.1 Root of Trust  
FPT\_ROT\_EXT.1 Root of Trust Services

#### **FPT\_ROT\_EXT.3.1**

The TSF shall be able to attest to a state as represented by platform characteristics with a Root of Trust for Reporting mechanism that uses for its identity [selection: a cryptographically verifiable identity in FPT\_PRO\_EXT.1, an alias key bound to the cryptographically verifiable identity in FPT\_PRO\_EXT.1] and using a signature algorithm as specified in FCS\_COP.1.

## **C.5.5. FPT\_STM\_EXT Reliable Time Counting**

### **Family Behavior**

This family defines requirements for time counting.

### Component Leveling



FPT\_STM\_EXT.1 provides various methods for providing reliable time services.

#### Management: FPT\_STM\_EXT.1

No specific management functions are identified.

#### Audit: FPT\_STM\_EXT.1

There are no auditable events foreseen.

#### FPT\_STM\_EXT.1 Reliable Time Counting

**Hierarchical to** No other components.

**Dependencies** No dependencies.

FPT\_STM\_EXT.1 Reliable Time Counting

##### FPT\_STM\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall be able to provide a reliable [**selection:** internal time stamp, external time stamp, monotonically increasing counter] to measure the passage of time.

## C.6. Class FTP: Trusted Path/Channels

### C.6.1. FTP\_CCMP\_EXT CCM Protocol

#### Family Behavior

This family defines requirements for the implementation of CCMP.

#### Component Leveling



FTP\_CCMP\_EXT.1 CCM Protocol, requires the TSF to implement CCMP in the specified manner.

**Management: FTP\_CCMP\_EXT.1**

No specific management functions are identified.

**Audit: FTP\_CCMP\_EXT.1**

There are no auditable events foreseen.

**FTP\_CCMP\_EXT.1 CCM Protocol**

**Hierarchical to** No other components.

**Dependencies** FCS\_COP.1 Cryptographic Operation

**FTP\_CCMP\_EXT.1.1**

The TSF shall implement CCMP using AES in CCM mode and key size [assignment: key sizes] as defined in [assignment: list of standards].

**FTP\_CCMP\_EXT.1.2**

The TSF shall discard incoming messages if authentication fails.

**FTP\_CCMP\_EXT.1.3**


The TSF shall discard incoming messages that are malformed or invalid.

## C.6.2. FTP\_GCMP\_EXT GCM Protocol

### Family Behavior

This family defines requirements for the implementation of GCMP.

### Component Leveling



FTP\_GCMP\_EXT GCM Protocol, requires the TSF to implement GCMP in the specified manner.

**Management: FTP\_GCMP\_EXT.1**

No specific management functions are identified.

**Audit: FTP\_GCMP\_EXT.1**

There are no auditable events foreseen.

## FTP\_GCMP\_EXT.1 GCM Protocol

**Hierarchical to** No other components.

**Dependencies** FCS\_COP.1 Cryptographic Operation

### FTP\_GCMP\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall implement GCMP using AES in GCM mode and key size [*assignment: key sizes*] as defined in [*assignment: list of standards*].

### FTP\_GCMP\_EXT.1.2

The TSF shall discard incoming messages if authentication fails.

### FTP\_GCMP\_EXT.1.3

The TSF shall discard incoming messages that are malformed or invalid.

## C.6.3. FTP\_ITC\_EXT Inter-TSF Trusted Channel

### Family Behavior

This family defines requirements for the implementation of trusted communications with entities external to the TOE.

### Component Leveling



FTP\_ITC\_EXT.1 Cryptographically Protected Communications Channels, requires the TSF to implement either CCMP or GCMP as a method of communicating securely with external entities.

### Management: FTP\_ITC\_EXT.1

No specific management functions are identified.

### Audit: FTP\_ITC\_EXT.1

There are no auditable events foreseen.

## FTP\_ITC\_EXT.1 Cryptographically Protected Communications Channels

**Hierarchical to** No other components.

**Dependencies** FCS\_COP.1 Cryptographic Operation

### FTP\_ITC\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall use [*assignment: cryptographic protocol*] protocol to provide a communication channel between itself and [*assignment: list of entities external to the TOE*] that protects channel data from disclosure and ensures the integrity of channel data.

## C.6.4. FTP\_ITE\_EXT Encrypted Data Communications

### Family Behavior

This family defines requirements for encryption of TSF data that is transmitted to an external entity over an insecure channel.

### Component Leveling



FTP\_ITE\_EXT.1 Encrypted Data Communications, requires the TSF to encrypt data in the specified manner using key data that is provided to an external entity in the specified manner.

### Management: FTP\_ITE\_EXT.1

No specific management functions are identified.

### Audit: FTP\_ITE\_EXT.1

There are no auditable events foreseen.

### FTP\_ITE\_EXT.1 Encrypted Data Communications

**Hierarchical to** No other components.

**Dependencies** FCS\_COP.1 Cryptographic Operation

### FTP\_ITE\_EXT.1.1

The TSF shall encrypt data for transfer between the TOE and [*assignment: list of entities external to the TOE*] using a cryptographic algorithm and key size as specified in FCS\_COP.1, and using [*assignment: keys, identified by how they are generated by or imported into the TOE*].

## C.6.5. FTP\_ITP\_EXT Physically Protected Channel

### Family Behavior

This family defines requirements for use of physically protected communications mechanisms.

### Component Leveling



FTP\_ITP\_EXT.1 Physically Protected Channel, requires the TSF to use a physically protected channel for transmission of data to an external entity.

**Management: FTP\_ITP\_EXT.1**

No specific management functions are identified.

**Audit: FTP\_ITP\_EXT.1**

There are no auditable events foreseen.

**FTP\_ITP\_EXT.1 Physically Protected Channel**

**Hierarchical to** No other components.

**Dependencies** No dependencies.

**FTP\_ITP\_EXT.1.1**

The TSF shall provide a physically protected communication channel between itself and [assignment: list of other IT entities within the same platform].



# Appendix D: Entropy Documentation and Assessment

This appendix describes the required supplementary information for each entropy source used by the TOE.

The documentation of the entropy sources should be detailed enough that, after reading, the evaluator will thoroughly understand the entropy source and why it can be relied upon to provide sufficient entropy. This documentation should include multiple detailed sections: design description, entropy justification, operating conditions, and health testing. This documentation is not required to be part of the TSS in the public facing ST.

## D.1. Design Description

Documentation shall include the design of each entropy source as a whole, including the interaction of all entropy source components. Any information that can be shared regarding the design should also be included for any third-party entropy sources that are included in the product.

The documentation will describe the operation of the entropy source to include how entropy is produced, and how unprocessed (raw) data can be obtained from within the entropy source for testing purposes. The documentation should walk through the entropy source design indicating where the entropy comes from, where the entropy output is passed next, any post-processing of the raw outputs (hash, XOR, etc.), if/where it is stored, and finally, how it is output from the entropy source. Any conditions placed on the process (e.g., blocking) should also be described in the entropy source design. Diagrams and examples are encouraged.

This design must also include a description of the content of the security boundary of the entropy source and a description of how the security boundary ensures that an adversary outside the boundary cannot affect the entropy rate.

If implemented, the design description shall include a description of how third-party applications can add entropy to the RBG. A description of any RBG state saving between power-off and power-on shall be included.

## D.2. Entropy Justification

There should be a technical argument for where the unpredictability in the source comes from and why there is confidence in the entropy source exhibiting probabilistic behavior (an explanation of the probability distribution and justification for that distribution given the particular source is one way to describe this). This argument will include a description of the expected entropy rate and explain how you ensure that sufficient entropy is going into the TOE randomizer seeding process. This discussion will be part of a justification for why the entropy source can be relied upon to produce bits with entropy.

The entropy justification shall not include any data added from any third-party application or from any state saving between restarts.

## **D.3. Operating Conditions**

Documentation will also include the range of operating conditions under which the entropy source is expected to generate random data. It will clearly describe the measures that have been taken in the system design to ensure the entropy source continues to operate under those conditions. Similarly, documentation shall describe the conditions under which the entropy source is known to malfunction or become inconsistent. Methods used to detect failure or degradation of the source shall be included.

## **D.4. Health Testing**

More specifically, all entropy source health tests and their rationale will be documented. This will include a description of the health tests, the rate and conditions under which each health test is performed (e.g., at startup, continuously, or on-demand), the expected results for each health test, TOE behavior upon entropy source failure, and rationale indicating why each test is believed to be appropriate for detecting one or more failures in the entropy source.

# Appendix E: SFR Dependencies Analysis

The dependencies between SFRs implemented by the TOE are addressed as follows.

Table 23. SFR Dependencies Rationale for Mandatory SFRs

SFR	Dependencies	Rationale Statement
FCS_CKM.1	[FCS_CKM.2, FCS_CKM.5, FCS_CKM_EXT.7 or FCS_COP.1]  [FCS_RBG.1 or FCS_RNG.1]  FCS_CKM.6	FCS_CKM.2, FCS_CKM.6, FCS_CKM_EXT.7, FCS_COP.1 and FCS_RBG.1 are required by the PP.
FCS_CKM.2	[FDP_ITC.1, FDP_ITC.2, FCS_CKM.1 or FCS_CKM.5]	FCS_CKM.1 is required by the PP. FDP_ITC_EXT.1 and FDP_ITC_EXT.2 are also required by the PP and equivalent to FDP_ITC.1 in this case because they all relate to a mechanism by which key data can be imported into the TSF.
FCS_CKM_EXT. 7	[FDP_ITC.1, FDP_ITC.2, or FCS_CKM.1]  FCS_CKM.6	FCS_CKM.1 and FCS_CKM.6 are required by the PP. FDP_ITC_EXT.1 and FDP_ITC_EXT.2 are also required by the PP and equivalent to FDP_ITC.1 in this case because they all relate to a mechanism by which key data can be imported into the TSF.
FCS_CKM.6	[FDP_ITC.1, FDP_ITC.2, FCS_CKM.1, or FCS_CKM.5]	FCS_CKM.1 is required by the PP. FDP_ITC_EXT.1 and FDP_ITC_EXT.2 are also required by the PP and equivalent to FDP_ITC.1 in this case because they all relate to a mechanism by which key data can be imported into the TSF.
FCS_COP.1/Has h	[FDP_ITC.1, FDP_ITC.2, FCS_CKM.1, or FCS_CKM.5]  FCS_CKM.6	FCS_CKM.1 and FCS_CKM.6 are required by the PP. FDP_ITC_EXT.1 and FDP_ITC_EXT.2 are also required by the PP and equivalent to FDP_ITC.1 in this case because they all relate to a mechanism by which key data can be imported into the TSF.
FCS_COP.1/Key edHash	[FDP_ITC.1, FDP_ITC.2, FCS_CKM.1, or FCS_CKM.5]  FCS_CKM.6	FCS_CKM.1 and FCS_CKM.6 are required by the PP. FDP_ITC_EXT.1 and FDP_ITC_EXT.2 are also required by the PP and equivalent to FDP_ITC.1 in this case because they all relate to a mechanism by which key data can be imported into the TSF.

<b>SFR</b>	<b>Dependencies</b>	<b>Rationale Statement</b>
FCS_COP.1/Key Wrap	[FDP_ITC.1, FDP_ITC.2, FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.5, FCS_CKM_EXT.7, or FCS_CKM_EXT.8]  FCS_CKM.6	FCS_CKM.1 and FCS_CKM.6 are required by the PP. FDP_ITC_EXT.1 and FDP_ITC_EXT.2 are also required by the PP and equivalent to FDP_ITC.1 in this case because they all relate to a mechanism by which key data can be imported into the TSF.
FCS_COP.1/SigGen	[FDP_ITC.1, FDP_ITC.2, FCS_CKM.1, or FCS_CKM.5]  FCS_CKM.6	FCS_CKM.1 and FCS_CKM.6 are required by the PP. FDP_ITC_EXT.1 and FDP_ITC_EXT.2 are also required by the PP and equivalent to FDP_ITC.1 in this case because they all relate to a mechanism by which key data can be imported into the TSF.
FCS_COP.1/SigVer	[FDP_ITC.1, FDP_ITC.2, FCS_CKM.1, or FCS_CKM.5]  FCS_CKM.6	FCS_CKM.1 and FCS_CKM.6 are required by the PP. FDP_ITC_EXT.1 and FDP_ITC_EXT.2 are also required by the PP and equivalent to FDP_ITC.1 in this case because they all relate to a mechanism by which key data can be imported into the TSF.
FCS_COP.1/SKC	[FDP_ITC.1, FDP_ITC.2, FCS_CKM.1, or FCS_CKM.5]  FCS_CKM.6	FCS_CKM.1 and FCS_CKM.6 are required by the PP. FDP_ITC_EXT.1 and FDP_ITC_EXT.2 are also required by the PP and equivalent to FDP_ITC.1 in this case because they all relate to a mechanism by which key data can be imported into the TSF.
FCS_RBG.1	FCS_COP.1	FCS_COP.1 is required by the PP.
FCS_OTV_EXT.1	FCS_RBG.1	FCS_RBG.1 is required by the PP.
FCS_STG_EXT.1	No dependencies.	N/A
FDP_ACC.1	FDP_ACF.1	FDP_ACF.1 is required by the PP.
FDP_ACF.1	FDP_ACC.1  FMT_MSA.3	FDP_ACC.1 and FMT_MSA.3 are required by the PP.
FDP_ETC_EXT.2	FCS_COP.1	FCS_COP.1 is required by the PP.
FDP_FRS_EXT.1	FDP_FRS_EXT.2	FDP_FRS_EXT.2 is an optional SFR in the PP. It does not need to be required because the PP's definition of FDP_FRS_EXT.1 allows the ST author to specify that no factory reset is possible, in which case the behavior described by FDP_FRS_EXT.2 is not triggered.

<b>SFR</b>	<b>Dependencies</b>	<b>Rationale Statement</b>
FDP_ITC_EXT.1	FCS_COP.1 [FTP_ITC_EXT.1, FTP_ITE_EXT.1, or FTP_ITP_EXT.1]	FCS_COP.1 is required by the PP. FTP_ITC_EXT.1, FTP_ITE_EXT.1, and FTP_ITP_EXT.1 are each selection-based SFRs in the PP but the PP's definition of FDP_ITC_EXT.1 requires at least one of them to be selected so the dependency is always addressed.
FDP_ITC_EXT.2	FCS_COP.1 [FTP_ITC_EXT.1, FTP_ITE_EXT.1, or FTP_ITP_EXT.1]	FCS_COP.1 is required by the PP. FTP_ITC_EXT.1, FTP_ITE_EXT.1, and FTP_ITP_EXT.1 are each selection-based SFRs in the PP but the PP's definition of FDP_ITC_EXT.1 requires at least one of them to be selected so the dependency is always addressed.
FDP_RIP.1	No dependencies.	N/A
FDP_SDC.2	FCS_COP.1	FCS_COP.1 is required by this PP.
FDP_SDI.2	No dependencies.	N/A
FIA_AFL_EXT.1	No dependencies.	N/A
FIA_SOS.2	No dependencies.	N/A
FIA_UAU.2	FIA_UID.1	This dependency is not present in the PP because all of the methods used to access the TSF (physically protected channels, encrypted data buffers, or cryptographically protected data channels) all implicitly identify the subject that is attempting to authenticate to the TOE. Therefore, it is not necessary to include a separate SFR that requires subjects to be identified.
FIA_UAU.5	No dependencies.	N/A
FIA_UAU.6	No dependencies.	N/A
FMT_MOF_EXT.1	FMT_SMF.1	FMT_SMF.1 is required by this PP.
FMT_MSA.1	[FDP_ACC.1 or FDP_IFC.1] FMT_SMR.1 FMT_SMF.1	FDP_ACC.1, FMT_SMF.1 and FMT_SMR.1 are required by the PP.
FMT_MSA.3	FMT_MSA.1 FMT_SMR.1	FMT_MSA.1 and FMT_SMR.1 are required by the PP.
FMT_SMF.1	No dependencies.	N/A

<b>SFR</b>	<b>Dependencies</b>	<b>Rationale Statement</b>
FMT_SMR.1	FIA_UID.1	This dependency is not present in the PP because all of the methods used to access the TSF (physically protected channels, encrypted data buffers, or cryptographically protected data channels) all implicitly identify the subject that is attempting to authenticate to the TOE. Therefore, it is not necessary to include a separate SFR that requires subjects to be identified.
FPT_FLS.1/FI	No dependencies.	N/A
FPT_MFW_EXT.1	No dependencies.	N/A
FPT_MOD_EXT.1	No dependencies.	N/A
FPT_PHP.3	No dependencies.	N/A
FPT_PRO_EXT.1	No dependencies.	N/A
FPT_ROT_EXT.1	FPT_PRO_EXT.1	FPT_PRO_EXT.1 is required by this PP.
FPT_ROT_EXT.2	FPT_PRO_EXT.1	FPT_PRO_EXT.1 is required by this PP.
FPT_RPL.1/Aut horization	No dependencies.	N/A
FPT_TST.1	No dependencies.	N/A
FRU_FLT.1	FPT_FLS.1	FPT_FLS.1 (as FPT_FLS.1/FI) is required by the PP.

Table 24. SFR Dependencies Rationale for Optional SFRs

<b>SFR</b>	<b>Dependencies</b>	<b>Rationale Statement</b>
FCS_RBG.6	FCS_RBG.1	FCS_RBG.1 is required by this PP.
FCS_RBG.2	FCS_RBG.1	FCS_RBG.1 is required by this PP.
FCS_RBG.3	FCS_RBG.1	FCS_RBG.1 is required by this PP.
FCS_RBG.4	FCS_RBG.1, FCS_RBG.5	FCS_RBG.1 is required by this PP. FCS_RBG.5 is required when combining multiple entropy sources.
FCS_RBG.5	FCS_RBG.1 and any of FCS_RBG.2, FCS_RBG.3 or RCS_RBG.4	FCS_RBG.1 is required by this PP. A second source is required for combining sources of entropy.
FPT_ITT.1	No dependencies.	N/A
FPT_PRO_EXT.2	No dependencies.	N/A

SFR	Dependencies	Rationale Statement
FPT_ROT_EXT.3	FCS_COP.1 FPT_PRO_EXT.1 FPT_ROT_EXT.1	All of FCS_COP.1, FPT_PRO_EXT.1, and FPT_ROT_EXT.1 are required by this PP.

Table 25. SFR Dependencies Rationale for Selection-Based SFRs

SFR	Dependencies	Rationale Statement
FCS_CKM.1/AK G	[FCS_CKM_EXT.7 or FCS_COP.1] FCS_CKM.6	All of FCS_CKM_EXT.7, FCS_CKM.6, and FCS_COP.1 are required by the PP.
FCS_CKM.1/SK G	[FCS_CKM_EXT.7 or FCS_COP.1] FCS_CKM.6	All of FCS_CKM_EXT.7, FCS_CKM.6, and FCS_COP.1 are required by the PP.
FCS_CKM.5	FCS_CKM.1 FCS_COP.1 FDP_SDC.2	All of FCS_CKM.1, FCS_COP.1, and FDP_SDC.2 are required by the PP.
FCS_CKM_EXT. 8	[FDP_ITC.1, FDP_ITC.2, or FCS_ITC_EXT.1] [FCS_CKM.2 or FCS_COP.1 or FCS_CKM_EXT.7] FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash FCS_CKM.6	FCS_CKM.1/KeyedHash and FCS_CKM.6 are required by the PP. FDP_ITC_EXT.1 and FDP_ITC_EXT.2 are also required by the PP and equivalent to FDP_ITC.1 in this case because they all relate to a mechanism by which key data can be imported into the TSF.
FCS_COP.1/AEA D	[FDP_ITC.1, FDP_ITC.2, FCS_CKM.1, FCS_CKM.5, FCS_CKM_EXT.7, FCS_CKM_EXT.8] FCS_CKM.6 FCS_OTV_EXT.1	FCS_CKM.1 and FCS_CKM.6 are required by the PP. FDP_ITC_EXT.1 and FDP_ITC_EXT.2 are also required by the PP and equivalent to FDP_ITC.1 in this case because they all relate to a mechanism by which key data can be imported into the TSF.
FDP_DAU.1/Pro ve	No dependencies.	N/A
FDP_FRS_EXT.2	FDP_FRS_EXT.1	FDP_FRS_EXT.1 is required by the PP.
FIA_AFL_EXT.2	FIA_AFL_EXT.1	FIA_AFL_EXT.1 is required by the PP.
FPT_FLS.1/FW	No dependencies.	N/A

<b>SFR</b>	<b>Dependencies</b>	<b>Rationale Statement</b>
FPT_MFW_EXT.2	FPT_MFW_EXT.1 FCS_COP.1	FPT_MFW_EXT.1 and FCS_COP.1 are required by the PP.
FPT_MFW_EXT.3	FPT_MFW_EXT.1 FCS_COP.1	FPT_MFW_EXT.1 and FCS_COP.1 are required by the PP.
FPT_RPL.1/Roll back	No dependencies.	N/A
FPT_STM_EXT.1	No dependencies.	N/A
FTP_CCMP_EXT.1	FCS_COP.1	FCS_COP.1 is required by the PP.
FTP_GCMP_EXT.1	FCS_COP.1	FCS_COP.1 is required by the PP.
FTP_ITC_EXT.1	FCS_COP.1	FCS_COP.1 is required by the PP.
FTP_ITE_EXT.1	FCS_COP.1	FCS_COP.1 is required by the PP.
FTP_ITP_EXT.1	No dependencies.	N/A



# Appendix F: SFR Architecture

A DSC implements all seven services in [Table 26](#) as well as self-protection functionality that protects against a compromise or degradation of these services.

Table 26. SFR Architecture

Service	Applicable Requirements
Parse	FCS_CKM.1 Cryptographic Key Generation
	FCS_CKM_EXT.7 Cryptographic Key Agreement
	FCS_CKM_EXT.8 Password-Based Key Derivation
	FCS_COP.1/AEAD Cryptographic Operation (Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data)
	FCS_COP.1/Hash Cryptographic Operation (Hashing)
	FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash Cryptographic Operation (Keyed Hash)
	FCS_COP.1/KeyEncap Cryptographic Operation (Key Encapsulation)
	FCS_COP.1/KeyWrap Cryptographic Operation (Key Wrap)
	FCS_COP.1/SKC Cryptographic Operation (Symmetric-Key Cryptography)
	FDP_ACC.1 Subset Access Control
	FDP_ACF.1 Security Attribute Based Access Control
	FDP_ITC_EXT.1 Parsing of SDEs
	FDP_ITC_EXT.2 Parsing of SDOs
	FTP_ITP_EXT.1 Physically Protected Channel
	FTP_ITC_EXT.1 Cryptographically Protected Communications Channels
	FTP_CCMP_EXT.1 CCM Protocol
	FTP_GCMP_EXT.1 GCM Protocol
	FTP_ITE_EXT.1 Encrypted Data Communications

Service	Applicable Requirements
Provision	FCS_CKM.1/AKG Cryptographic key generation - Asymmetric Key
	FCS_CKM.5 Cryptographic Key Derivation
	FCS_COP.1/Hash Cryptographic Operation (Hashing)
	FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash Cryptographic Operation (Keyed Hash)
	FCS_COP.1/SKC Cryptographic Operation (Symmetric-Key Cryptography)
	FCS_RBG.1 Random Bit Generation (RBG)
	FDP_ACC.1 Subset Access Control
	FDP_ACF.1 Security Attribute Based Access Control
	FIA_SOS.2 TSF Generation of Secrets
	FMT_MSA.3 Static Attribute Initialization
	FPT_STM_EXT.1 Reliable Time Counting
	FCS_RBG.6 Random Bit Generation Service
	FCS_RBG.2 Random Bit Generation (External Seeding)
	FCS_RBG.3 Random Bit Generation (Internal Seeding - Single Source)
	FCS_RBG.4 FCS_RBG.4 Random Bit Generation (Internal Seeding - Multiple Sources)
	FCS_RBG.5 Random Bit Generation (Combining Noise Sources)
	FCS_CKM.1/SKG Cryptographic key generation - Symmetric Key

Service	Applicable Requirements
Protect	FCS_COP.1/Hash Cryptographic Operation (Hashing)
	FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash Cryptographic Operation (Keyed Hash)
	FCS_COP.1/SKC Cryptographic Operation (Symmetric-Key Cryptography)
	FCS_STG_EXT.1 Protected Storage
	FDP_SDC.2 Stored data confidentiality with dedicated method
	FDP_SDI.2 Stored Data Integrity Monitoring and Action
	FMT_SMR.1 Separation of Roles
	FPT_FLS.1/FI Failure with Preservation of Secure State (Fault Injection)
	FPT_MOD_EXT.1 Debug Modes
	FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to Physical Attack
	FPT_ROT_EXT.1 Root of Trust Services
	FPT_ROT_EXT.2 Root of Trust for Storage
	FPT_PRO_EXT.2 Data Integrity Measurements
	FDP_FRS_EXT.2 Factory Reset Behavior
	FIA_AFL_EXT.2 Authorization Failure Response
	FPT_FLS.1/FW Failure with Preservation of Secure State (Firmware)
	FPT_ITT.1 Basic Internal TSF Data Transfer Protection

Service	Applicable Requirements
Process	FCS_COP.1/Hash Cryptographic Operation (Hashing)
	FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash Cryptographic Operation (Keyed Hash)
	FCS_COP.1/KeyEnc Cryptographic Operation (Key Encryption)
	FCS_COP.1/SigGen Cryptographic Operation (Signature Generation)
	FCS_COP.1/SigVer Cryptographic Operation (Signature Verification)
	FCS_COP.1/SKC Cryptographic Operation (Symmetric-Key Cryptography)
	FCS_OTV_EXT.1 One-Time Value
	FDP_ACC.1 Subset Access Control
	FDP_ACF.1 Security Attribute Based Access Control
	FIA_AFL_EXT.1 Authorization Failure Handling
	FIA_SOS.2 TSF Generation of Secrets
	FIA_UAU.2 User Authentication before any Action
	FIA_UAU.5 Multiple Authentication Mechanisms
	FIA_UAU.6 Re-Authenticating
	FMT_MOF_EXT.1 Management of Security Functions Behavior
	FMT_MSA.1 Management of Security Attributes
	FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
	FMT_SMR.1 Separation of Roles
	FPT_ROT_EXT.1 Root of Trust Services
	FPT_RPL.1/Authorization Replay Prevention
FPT_STM.1 Reliable Time Counting	
FIA_AFL_EXT.2 Authorization Failure Response	

Service	Applicable Requirements
Prove	FCS_COP.1/Hash Cryptographic Operation (Hashing)
	FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash Cryptographic Operation (Keyed Hash)
	FCS_RBG.1 Random Bit Generation (RBG)
	FCS_OTV_EXT.1 One-Time Value
	FDP_ACC.1 Subset Access Control
	FDP_ACF.1 Security Attribute Based Access Control
	FPT_PRO_EXT.1 Root of Trust
	FPT_RPL.1/Authorization Replay Prevention
	FPT_STM_EXT.1 Reliable Time Counting
	FCS_RBG.2 Random Bit Generation (External Seeding)
	FCS_RBG.3 Random Bit Generation (Internal Seeding - Single Source)
	FCS_RBG.4 FCS_RBG.4 Random Bit Generation (Internal Seeding - Multiple Sources)
	FCS_RBG.5 Random Bit Generation (Combining Noise Sources)
	FPT_ROT_EXT.3 Root of Trust for Reporting Mechanisms
	FDP_DAU.1/Prove Basic Data Authentication (for Use with the Prove Service)
	FPT_MFW_EXT.1 Mutable/Immutable Firmware
	FPT_MFW_EXT.2 Basic Firmware Integrity
	FPT_MFW_EXT.3 Firmware Authentication with Identity of Guarantor

Service	Applicable Requirements
Propagate	FCS_COP.1/Hash Cryptographic Operation (Hashing)
	FCS_COP.1/KeyedHash Cryptographic Operation (Keyed Hash)
	FCS_COP.1/KeyEnc Cryptographic Operation (Key Encryption)
	FCS_COP.1/SKC Cryptographic Operation (Symmetric-Key Cryptography)
	FCS_RBG.1 Random Bit Generation (RBG)
	FCS_OTV_EXT.1 One-Time Value
	FDP_ACC.1 Subset Access Control
	FDP_ACF.1 Security Attribute Based Access Control
	FDP_ETC_EXT.2 Propagation of SDOs
	FCS_RBG.2 Random Bit Generation (External Seeding)
	FCS_RBG.3 Random Bit Generation (Internal Seeding - Single Source)
	FCS_RBG.4 Random Bit Generation (Internal Seeding - Multiple Sources)
	FCS_RBG.5 Random Bit Generation (Combining Noise Sources)
	FPT_ITT.1 Basic Internal TSF Data Transfer Protection
	FTP_ITP_EXT.1 Physically Protected Channel
	FTP_ITC_EXT.1 Cryptographically Protected Communications Channels
	FTP_CCMP_EXT.1 CCM Protocol
	FTP_GCMP_EXT.1 GCM Protocol
FTP_ITE_EXT.1 Encrypted Data Communications	
Purge	FCS_CKM.6 Timing and event of cryptographic key destruction
	FCS_RBG.1 Random Bit Generation (RBG)
	FDP_RIP.1 Subset Residual Information Protection
	FCS_RBG.2 Random Bit Generation (External Seeding)
	FCS_RBG.3 Random Bit Generation (Internal Seeding - Single Source)
	FCS_RBG.4 Random Bit Generation (Internal Seeding - Multiple Sources)
	FCS_RBG.5 Random Bit Generation (Combining Noise Sources)
	FDP_FRS_EXT.2 Factory Reset Behavior

Service	Applicable Requirements
TSF Security	FDP_FRS_EXT.1 Factory Reset
	FPT_MFW_EXT.1 Mutable/Immutable Firmware
	FMT_SMF.1 Specification of Management Functions
	FPT_FLS.1/FI Failure with Preservation of Secure State (Fault Injection)
	FPT_MOD_EXT.1 Debug Modes
	FPT_PHP.3 Resistance to Physical Attack
	FPT_TST.1 TSF Testing
	FRU_FLT.1 Degraded Fault Tolerance
	FPT_PRO_EXT.2 Data Integrity Measurements
	FPT_MFW_EXT.2 Basic Firmware Integrity
	FPT_MFW_EXT.3 Firmware Authentication with Identity of Guarantor
	FDP_FRS_EXT.2 Factory Reset Behavior
	FPT_FLS.1/FW Failure with Preservation of Secure State (Firmware)
	FPT_RPL.1/Rollback k

# Appendix G: Glossary

Table 27. Glossary

Term	Meaning
Access	In the context of SDOs, access to an SDO represents the list of actions permissible with an SDO, including its generation, use, modification, propagation, and destruction.
Administrator	A type of user that has special privileges to manage the TSF.
Attestation	The process of presenting verifiable evidence describing those characteristics that affect integrity. Examples of these characteristics are boot firmware and boot critical data which, combined, describe the way the DSC booted. [SA]
Attributes	Indications of characteristics or properties of the SDEs bound in an SDO.
Authorization Value	Critical data bound to an action by itself or to action on a subject. Such data, when presented to the TOE, authorizes the action by itself or authorizes the action on or with the subject respectively.
Authorization Data	Collective term for authentication tokens and authorization values.
Authentication Token	Critical data bound to a user. Such data, when presented to the TOE and successfully verified by it, authenticates the user. The TOE may use the successful authentication of a user as an authorization to execute an action on its behalf.
Authenticator	A shortened name for Authentication Token.
Boot Critical Data	Critical data that persists across power cycles and determines characteristics of the DSC. Examples of boot critical data can be DSC configuration settings, certificates, and the results of measurements obtained by the RoT for measurement.
Boot Firmware	The first firmware that executes during the boot process.
Chain of Trust	A Chain of Trust is anchored in a RoT and extends a trust boundary by verifying the authenticity and integrity of successive components before passing control to those components. [SA]
Client Application	Entity who relies on the services provided by the platform or DSC.
Data Encryption Key	An encryption key, usually for a symmetric algorithm, that encrypts data that is not keying material.
Integrity	Assurance of trustworthiness and accuracy.
Immutable	Unchangeable.
Key Encryption Key	An encryption key that encrypts other keying material. This is sometimes called a key wrapping key. A KEK can be either symmetric or asymmetric.
Known Answer Tests (KATs)	Test vectors or data generated to determine the correctness of an implementation.



<b>Term</b>	<b>Meaning</b>
Operator	Human being who has physical possession of the platform on which the DSC is located. [GD]
Owner	Human being who controls/manages the platform on which the DSC is located. May be remote. [GD]
Permanent Keys/Seeds	Keys or seeds that are provisioned to the device during manufacturing or initial setup that remain even after a factory reset.
Persistent Secrets	Persistent secrets are long term keys or key material that are maintained longer than a single cryptographic operation. Persistent secrets do not remain after a factory reset.
Platform	A platform consists of the hardware and firmware of a computing entity.
Pre-installed SDO	An SDO installed on the DSC by the manufacturer. The SDO consists of an SDE and attributes, which if not explicitly expressed in a data structure, are implicit based on the functions that have exclusive access to the SDE.
Privileged Function	Functions restricted to the ADM-R role, which may include, but are not limited to, provisioning keys, provisioning user authorization values, de-provisioning user authorization values, provisioning administrator authorization values, changing authorization values, disabling key escrow, and configuring cryptography.
Protected Data Blob	Data in an encrypted structure that protects its confidentiality or integrity (as required by the context in which it is used).
Protected Storage	Protected Storage usually refers to DSC hardware used to store SDEs or SDOs, and provide integrity protection for all items and confidentiality for those items that require it. Protected Storage may also refer to storage external to the DSC, which is usually encrypted by keys maintained by the DSC's internal protected storage capabilities.
Protections	Mechanisms that ensure components of a DSC (executable firmware code and critical data) remain in a state of integrity and are protected from modification outside of authorized, authenticated processes and entities. [NIST-ROTM]
Remote Secure Channel	Logical channel to the DSC from a remote entity, which cryptographically protects the confidentiality and integrity of the channel content.
Root Encryption Key	An encryption key that serves as the anchor of a hierarchy of keys.
Root of Trust (RoT)	A RoT performs one or more security specific functions; establishing the foundation on which all trust in a system is placed. [NIST-ROTM]
RoT for Authorization	(As defined by [GP_ROT]) The RoT for Authorization provides reliable capabilities to assess authorization tokens and determine whether or not they satisfy policies for access control.
RoT for Confidentiality	(As defined by [GP_ROT]) The RoT for Confidentiality maintains shielded locations for the purpose of storing sensitive data, such as secret keys and passwords.

<b>Term</b>	<b>Meaning</b>
RoT for Integrity	(As defined by [GP_ROT]) The RoT for Integrity maintains shielded locations for the purpose of storing and protecting the integrity of non-secret critical security parameters and platform characteristics. Critical security parameters include, but are not limited to, authorization values, public keys, and public key certificates.
RoT for Measurement	(As defined by [GP_ROT]) The RoT for Measurement provides the ability to reliably create platform characteristics.
RoT for Reporting	(As defined by [GP_ROT]) The RoT for Reporting reliably reports platform characteristics. It provides an interface that limits its services to providing reports on its platform characteristics authenticated by a platform identity.
RoT for Storage	A RoT that acts as the RoT for Confidentiality and the RoT for Integrity.
RoT for Update	A RoT responsible for updating the firmware.
RoT for Verification	A RoT responsible for verifying digital signatures.
Security Data Element (SDE)	A Critical Security Parameter, such as a cryptographic key or authorization token.
Security Data Object (SDO)	An SDO may include one or more SDEs. SDOs bind SDEs with a set of attributes.
Symmetric Encryption Key	A value intend to input as a key to a symmetric encryption algorithm, such as AES.
System	A system consists of the platform hardware and firmware in addition to the higher-level software running on top of it (kernel, user-space processes, etc.).
Trusted Local Channel	Physical channel to the DSC within the platform of which the DSC is a part, which is protected by the operational environment to ensure confidentiality and integrity.
User	An administrator or client application.

See [CC1] for other Common Criteria abbreviations and terminology.

# Appendix H: Acronyms

Table 28. Acronyms

Acronym	Meaning
AES	Advanced Encryption Standard
CApp	Client Application
CBC	Cipher Block Chaining
CCM	Counter with CBC-Message Authentication Code
CCMP	CCM Protocol
CPU	Central Processing Unit
CSP	Critical Security Parameter
DAR	Data-At-Rest
DEK	Data Encryption Key
DH	Diffie-Hellman
DSA	Digital Signature Algorithm
ECDH	Elliptic Curve Diffie Hellman
ECDSA	Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm
EEPROM	Electrically Erasable Programmable Read-Only Memory
FIPS	Federal Information Processing Standards
FQDN	Fully Qualified Domain Name
GCM	Galois Counter Mode
HMAC	Keyed-Hash Message Authentication Code
HTTPS	Hypertext Transfer Protocol Secure
IEEE	Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers
IP	Internet Protocol
ITSEF	Information Technology Security Evaluation Facility
KEK	Key Encryption Key
KMAC	KECCACK Message Authentication Code
NIST	National Institute of Standards and Technology
OS	Operating System
PBKDF	Password-Based Key Derivation Function
PP	Protection Profile
RA	Registration Authority
RBG	Random Bit Generator
REK	Root Encryption Key

<b>Acronym</b>	<b>Meaning</b>
ROM	Read-only memory
RSA	Rivest Shamir Adleman Algorithm
SDE	Security Data Element
SDO	Security Data Object
SFP	Security Function Policy
SFR	Security Functional Requirement
SHA	Secure Hash Algorithm
SK	Symmetric Key or Symmetric Encryption Key
SPI	Security Parameter Index
SSH	Secure Shell
ST	Security Target
TLS	Transport Layer Security
TOE	Target of Evaluation
TSF	TOE Security Functionality
TSS	TOE Summary Specification
USB	Universal Serial Bus

# Appendix I: References

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