


Spoofing

An attacker could take over the port or socket that the server normally uses.














Spoofing

An attacker could try one credential after another and there's nothing to slow them down (online or offline)















Spoofing

An attacker can anonymously connect, because we expect authentication to be done at a higher level












Spoofing

An attacker can confuse a client because there are too many ways to identify a server












Spoofing

An attacker can spoof a server because identifiers aren't stored on the client and checked for consistency on re-connection (that is, there's no key persistence)












Spoofing


An attacker can connect to a server or peer over a link that isn't authenticated (and encrypted)


















Spoofing

An attacker who gets a password can reuse it (Use stronger authenticators)












Spoofing

An attacker can choose to use weaker or no authentication












J

Spoofing

An attacker could steal credentials stored on the client and reuse them

۲











Q

Spoofing

An attacker could go after the way credentials are updated or recovered (account recovery doesn't require disclosing the old password)

۲











K

Spoofing

Your system ships with a default admin password, and doesn't force a change

















Tampering

An attacker can take advantage of your custom key exchange or integrity control which you built instead of using standard crypto













Tampering

An attacker can modify your build system and produce signed builds of your software












Tampering

Your code makes access control decisions all over the place, rather than with a security kernel











Tampering

An attacker can replay data without detection because your code doesn't provide timestamps or sequence numbers


















Tampering

An attacker can bypass permissions because you don't make names canonical before checking access permissions













Tampering

An attacker can manipulate data because there's no integrity protection for data on the network
















Tampering

10

An attacker can alter information in a data store because it has weak/open permissions or includes a group which is equivalent to everyone ("anyone with a Facebook account")











J

Tampering

An attacker can write to some resource because permissions are granted to the world or there are no ACLs











Q

Tampering

An attacker can change parameters over a trust boundary and after validation (for example, important parameters in a hidden field in HTML, or passing a pointer to critical memory)











K

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Tampering


An attacker can load code inside your process via an extension point

















Repudiation

An attacker can pass data through the log to attack a log reader, and there's no documentation of what sorts of validation are done











Repudiation

A low privilege attacker can read interesting security information in the logs













Repudiation

An attacker can alter digital signatures because the digital signature system you're implementing is weak, or uses MACs where it should use a signature












Repudiation


An attacker can alter log messages on a network because they lack strong integrity controls
































Repudiation

An attacker can use a shared key to authenticate as different principals, confusing the information in the logs










Repudiation

An attacker can get arbitrary data into logs from unauthenticated (or weakly authenticated) outsiders without validation











Repudiation

An attacker can edit logs and there's no way to tell (perhaps because there's no heartbeat option for the logging system)











Q

Repudiation

An attacker can say "I didn't do that," and you'd have no way to prove them wrong

l didn't do that.










K Repudiation The system has no logs















A

Repudiation

You've invented a new Repudiation attack
























An attacker can read content because messages (say, an email or HTTP cookie) aren't encrypted even if the channel is encrypted









5

An attacker may be able to read a document or data because it's encrypted with a non-standard algorithm









An attacker can read data because it's hidden or occluded (for undo or change tracking) and the user might forget that it's there



6








An attacker can act as a 'man in the middle' because you don't authenticate endpoints of a network connection
















An attacker can read sensitive information in a file with permissive permissions






9













An attacker can discover the fixed key being used to encrypt













An attacker can read the entire channel because the channel (say, HTTP or SMTP) isn't encrypted

Don't tell anyone, but...













An attacker can read network information because there's no cryptography used

> What!*#@! No cryptography was used?




K


























Denial of Service

An attacker can drain our easily replacable battery (battery, temporary)

















An attacker can drain a battery that's hard to replace (sealed in a phone, an implanted medical device, or in a hard to reach location) (battery, persist)
















6


An attacker can make a server unavailable or unusable without ever authenticating but the problem goes away when the attacker stops (server, anonymous, temporary)















An attacker can make a server unavailable or unusable and the problem persists after the attacker goes away (server, auth, persist) (client, auth, persist)
















An attacker can make a server unavailable or unusable without ever authenticating and the problem persists after the attacker goes away *(server, anonymous, persistent).*



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






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An attacker can cause the logging subsystem to stop working













An attacker can amplify a Denial of Service attack through this component with amplification on the order of 10 to 1

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




An attacker can amplify a Denial of Service attack through this component with amplification on the order of 100 to 1

۲













You've invented a new Denial of Service attack



















Elevation of Privilege


An attacker can access the cloud service which manages your devices




































8

Elevation of Privilege

An attacker can enter data that is checked while still under their control and used later on the other side of a trust boundary








Elevation of Privilege

There's no reasonable way for a caller to figure out what validation of tainted data you perform before passing it to them







Elevation of Privilege

There's no reasonable way for a caller to figure out what security

assumptions you make



10









Elevation of Privilege

An attacker can reflect input back to a user, like cross site scripting











Q

Elevation of Privilege

You include user-generated content within your page, possibly including the content of random URLs











K

Elevation of Privilege

An attacker can inject a command that the system will run at a higher privilege level









