
Model Answer to Q(C)

(c) Assume that there is a trusted third party T to assist in this fair trade. A protocol based on T is described below, where it is assumed that T shares a conventional (or symmetric) key k_{CT} with C, and k_{MT} with M. Purchase-details_M=Purchase-details_C if all is authentic; C and C and C and C and C are a purchase contract containing information such as the buyer ID (IDentity), the seller/merchant's ID, date/time of the purchase, description of the purchased item, the price to be paid. Signature verification keys are certified by a trusted CA and are valid.



Where PID (Identifier of this Purchase)= $H(Purchase-details_M)$ (or $Purchase-details_M$), which is used to bind A's signature to this transaction. As $Purchase-details_M=Purchase-details_C$ if all is authentic, both C and M can verify these receipts (received in the Confirmations).

- ♦ In the step of Payment, C sends the Payment Request containing purchase details and encrypted Slip to T instead of to M; the Payment Request is encrypted with shared key k_{CT}; inside this encryption contained a hash value of the Request and this hash value serves as the checksum to ensure integrity of the Request by C to T.
- In the step of Charge Request, M sends the purchase details and electronic goods E-goods, encrypted with shared key k_{MT} , to T and the authenticity of the message is protected by the hash value inside the encryption.
- ◆ In the step of Authorisation Request, if the purchase details, which *T* has recovered by the decryption of the messages from *C* and *M*, match, and *E-goods* meet the purchase details, then *T* signs and forwards the received message including encrypted *Slip* to *A*. Otherwise, *T* terminates the protocol, and informs *C* and *M*.
- In the steps of Confirmation to C and M, T forwards A's signature to both C and M. In addition, T sends E-goods encrypted with k_{CT} to C only if the payment has been confirmed by A.
- ◆ The above description shows that if *M* receives the payment, *C* can receive *E-goods*. This is because *T* would only forward *C*'s encrypted *Slip* to *A* after having received *E-goods* from *M* which meets *C*'s purchase details. Similarly, if *C* receives *E-goods*, *M* will receive the payment. If the protocol is terminated at the step of authorisation request, or *A* dis-approves the purchase, then neither of them can get anything from the other.