NISTIR XXXX Draft

Ongoing Face Recognition Vendor Test (FRVT)

Part 1: Verification

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This publication is available free of charge from:
https://www.nist.gov/programs-projects/face-recognition-vendor-test-frvt-ongoing

2020/01/06

National Institute of Standards and Technology
U.S. Department of Commerce

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The authors are grateful to staff in the NIST Biometrics Research Laboratory for infrastructure supporting rapid evaluation of algorithms.

DISCLAIMER

Specific hardware and software products identified in this report were used in order to perform the evaluations described in this document. In no case does identification of any commercial product, trade name, or vendor, imply recommendation or endorsement by the National Institute of Standards and Technology, nor does it imply that the products and equipment identified are necessarily the best available for the purpose.

INSTITUTIONAL REVIEW BOARD

The National Institute of Standards and Technology's Research Protections Office reviewed the protocol for this project and determined it is not human subjects research as defined in Department of Commerce Regulations, 15 CFR 27, also known as the Common Rule for the Protection of Human Subjects (45 CFR 46, Subpart A).

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

FRVT STATUS

This report is a draft NIST Interagency Report, and is open for comment. It is the sixteenth edition of the report since the first was published in June 2017. Prior editions of this report are maintained on the FRVT website, and may contain useful information about older algorithms and datasets no longer used in FRVT.

FRVT remains open: All four tracks of the FRVT remain open to new algorithm submissions indefinitely. This report will be updated as new algorithms are evaluated, as new datasets are added, and as new analyses are included. Comments and suggestions should be directed to frvt@nist.gov.

Changes since November 11, 2019:

- Table 5 has been updated to include runtime memory usage. This is the first time such a quantity has been reported. The value is the peak size of the resident set size logged during enrollment of single images.
- We have migrated summary results table to a new platform that supports sortable tables: https://pages.nist.gov/frvt/html/frvt11.html
- The report adds results for four new developers: Antheus Technologia, BioID Technologies SA, Canon Information Tech. (Beijing), and Samsung S1 (listed in the tables as S1).
- The report adds results for algorithms from 13 returning developers: Anke Investments, Chunghwa Telecom, Deepglint, Institute of Information Technologies, iQIYI, Kneron, Ping An Technology, Paravision, KanKan Ai, Rokid Corporation, Shanghai Universiy - Shanghai Film Academy, Veridas Digital Authentication Solutions, and Videonetics Technology.
- We have dropped results from this edition of the report per policy to only list results for two algorithms per developer: remarkai-000, veridas-001, sensetime-001, iit-000, anke-003, and everai-002. Results for these are available in prior editions of this report linked from the FRVT page.
- We issued **??**NIST Interagency Report 8280: FRVT Part 3: Demographics on 2019-12-19. It includes results for many of the algorithms covered by this report.

Changes since October 16, 2019:

- The report adds results for ten new developers: Ai-Union Technology, ASUSTek Computer, DiDi ChuXing Technology, Innovative Technology, Luxand, MVision, Pyramid Cyber Security + Forensic, Scanovate, Shenzhen AiMall Tech, and TUPU Technology.
- The report adds results for 12 returning developers: CTBC Bank Glory Gorilla Technology Guangzhou Pixel Solutions Imagus Technology Incode Technologies Lomonosov Moscow State University Rank One Computing Samtech InfoNet Shanghai Ulucu Electronics Technology Synesis, and Winsense.
- We have dropped results from this edition of the report per policy to only list results for two algorithms per developer: glory-000, gorilla-002, incode-003, rankone-006, and synesis-004.
- Results for five recently submitted algorithms will appear in the next report.

Changes since September 11, 2019:

- The report adds results for five new participants: Awidit Systems (Awiros), Momemtum Digital (Sertis), Trueface AI, Shanghai Jiao Tong University, and X-Laboratory.

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- ▷ The reports adds results for five new algorithms from returning developers: Cyberlink, Hengrui AI Technology, Idemia, Panasonic R+D Singapore, and Tevian. This causes three algorithm, to be de-listed from the report per policy to list results for two algorithms per developer.

Changes since July 31 2019:

- ▷ The HTML table on the FRVT 1:1 homepage has been updated to include a column for cross-domain Visa-Border verification. Results for this new dataset appeared in the July 29 report under the name "CrossEV" - these are now renamed "Visa-Border".
- ▷ The FRVT 1:1 homepage lists algorithms according to lowest mean rank accuracy:
  Rank($\text{FNMR}_{\text{VISA}}$ at FMR = 0.000001) +
  Rank($\text{FNMR}_{\text{VISA-BORDER}}$ at FMR = 0.000001) +
  Rank($\text{FNMR}_{\text{MUGSHOT}}$ at FMR = 0.00001 after 14 years) +
  Rank($\text{FNMR}_{\text{WILD}}$ at FMR = 0.00001)
  This ordering rewards high accuracy across all datasets.
- ▷ The main results in Table 10 is now in landscape format to accomodate extra columns for the Visa-Border set, and mugshot comparisons after at least 12 years.
- ▷ The report adds results for nine new participants: Alpha SSTG, Intel Research, ULSee, Chungwa Telecon, iSAP Solution, Rokid, Shenzhen EI Networks, CSA Intellicloud, Shenzhen Intellifusion Technologies.
- ▷ The reports adds results for six new algorithms from returning developers: Innovatrics, Dahua Technology, Tech5 SA, Intellivision, Nodeflux and Imperial College, London. One algorithm, from Imperial has been retired, per policy to list results for two algorithms per developer.
- ▷ The cross-country false match rate heatmaps starting from Figure 348 have been replotted to reveal more structure by listing countries by region instead of alphabetically.
- ▷ The next version of this report will be posted around October 18, 2019.

Changes since July 3 2019:

- ▷ The HTML table on the FRVT 1:1 homepage has been updated to list the 20 most accurate developers rather than algorithms, choosing the most accurate algorithm from each developer based on visa and mugshot results. Also, the algorithms are ordered in terms of lowest mean rank across mugshot, visa and wild datasets, rewarding broad accuracy over a good result on one particular dataset.
- ▷ This report includes results for a new dataset - see the column labelled "crossEV" in Table 5. It compares a new set of high quality visa portraits with a set webcam photos that exhibit moderately poor pose variations and background illumination. The two new sets are described in sections 2.3 and 2.5. The comparisons are "cross-domain" in that the algorithm must compare "visa" and "wild" images. Results for other algorithms will be added in future reports as they become available.
- ▷ This report adds results for algorithms from 9 developers submitted in early July 2019. These are from 3DiVi, Camvi, EverAI-Paravision, Facesoft, Farbar (F8), Institute of Information Technologies, Shanghai U. Film Academy, Via Technologies, and Ulucu Electronics Tech. Six of these are new participants.
- ▷ Several other algorithms have been submitted and are being evaluated. Results will be released in the next report, scheduled for September 5. That report will include results for new datasets.
- ▷ Older algorithms from Everai, Camvi and 3DiVi, have been retired, per the policy to list only two algorithms per developer.

Changes since June 20 2019:

- ▷ This report adds results for algorithms from 18 developers submitted in early June 2019. These are from CTBC Bank, Deep Glint, Thales Cogent, Ever AI Paravision, Gorilla Technology, Imagus, Incode, Kneron, N-Tech Lab, Neurotechnology, Notiontag Technologies, Star Hybrid, Videonetics, Vigilant Solutions, Winsense, Anke Investments, CEIEC, and DSK. Nine of these are new participants.

- ▷ Several other algorithms have been submitted and are being evaluated. Results will be released in the next report, scheduled for August 1.
- ▷ Older algorithms from Everai, Thales Cogent, Gorilla Technology, Incode, Neurotechnology, N-Tech Lab and Vigilant Solutions have been retired, per the policy to list only two algorithms per developer.

Changes since April 2019:

- ▷ This report adds results for nine algorithms from nine developers submitted in early June 2019. These are from Tencent Deepsea, Hengrui, Kedacom, Moontime, Guangzhou Pixel, Rank One Computing, Synesis, Sensetime and Vocord.
- ▷ Another 23 algorithms have been submitted and are being evaluated. Results will be released in the next report, scheduled for July 3.
- ▷ Older algorithms for Rank One, Synesis, and Vocord have been retired, per the policy to list only two algorithms per developer.

Changes since February 2019:

- ▷ This report adds results for 49 algorithms from 42 developers submitted in early March 2019.
- ▷ This report omits results for algorithms that we retired. We retired for three reasons: 1. The developer submitted a new algorithm, and we only list two. 2. The algorithm needs a GPU, and we no longer allow GPU-based algorithms. 3. Inoperable algorithms.
- ▷ Previous results for retired algorithms are available in older editions of this report linked here.
- ▷ The mugshot database used from February 2017 to January 2019 has been replaced with an extract of the mugshot database documented in NIST Interagency Report 8238, November 2018. The new mugshot set is described in section 2.4 and is adopted because:
  - ▷▷ It has much better identity label integrity, so that false non-match rates are substantially lower than those reported in FRVT 1:1 reports to date - see Figure 40.
  - ▷▷ It includes images collected over a 17 year period such that ageing can be much better characterized - - see Figure 146.
- ▷ Using the new mugshot database, Figure 146 shows accuracy for four demographic groups identified in the biographic metadata that accompanies the data: black females, black males, white females and white males.
- ▷ The report adds Figure 11 with results for the twenty human-difficult pairs used in the May 2018 paper *Face recognition accuracy of forensic examiners, superrecognizers, and face recognition algorithms* by Phillips et al. [1].
- ▷ The report uses an update to the wild image database that corrects some ground truth labels.
- ▷ Some results for the child exploitation database are not complete. They are typically updated less frequently than for other image sets.

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FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
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FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
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629 ALGORITHM PIXELALL-003 CROSS AGE FMR . . . 675
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634 ALGORITHM REALNETWORKS-003 CROSS AGE FMR . . . 680
635 ALGORITHM REMARKAI-001 CROSS AGE FMR . . . 681
636 ALGORITHM ROKID-000 CROSS AGE FMR . . . 682
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673 ALGORITHM VIDEONETICS-001 CROSS AGE FMR . . . 719
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677 ALGORITHM VISIONBOX-000 CROSS AGE FMR . . . 723
678 ALGORITHM VISIONBOX-001 CROSS AGE FMR . . . 724
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680 ALGORITHM VISIONLABS-007 CROSS AGE FMR . . . 726
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682 ALGORITHM VOCORD-007 CROSS AGE FMR . . . 728
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685 ALGORITHM X-LABORATORY-000 CROSS AGE FMR . . . 731
686 ALGORITHM YISHENG-004 CROSS AGE FMR . . . 732
687 ALGORITHM YITU-003 CROSS AGE FMR . . . 733

	Developer	Short	Seq.	Validation	Config[1]	Template			Comparison Time (ns)[4]	
	Name	Name	Num.	Date	Data (KB)	Memory (MB)[2]	Size (B)	Time (ms)[3]	Genuine	Impostor
1	3Divi	3divi	003	2018-10-09	191636	^{37}358	^{176}4096 ± 0	^{116}650 ± 90	^{16}627 ± 11	^{20}623 ± 32
2	3Divi	3divi	004	2019-07-22	263670	^{47}430	^{94}2048 ± 0	^{182}984 ± 131	^{28}794 ± 35	^{30}801 ± 40
3	ASUSTek Computer Inc	asusaics	000	2019-10-24	257418	^{75}603	^{83}2048 ± 0	^{70}488 ± 18	^{146}8118 ± 128	^{145}8053 ± 456
4	Adera Global PTE Ltd	adera	001	2019-06-17	0	^{20}190	^{161}2560 ± 0	^{4}97 ± 0	^{62}1604 ± 71	^{63}1649 ± 56
5	Ai First	aifirst	001	2019-11-21	224157	^{56}482	^{62}2048 ± 0	^{99}589 ± 4	^{100}3442 ± 40	^{99}3450 ± 123
6	AiUnion Technology Co Ltd	aiunionface	000	2019-10-22	241642	^{42}406	^{96}2048 ± 0	^{119}653 ± 32	^{99}3439 ± 47	^{105}3657 ± 167
7	Alchera Inc	alchera	000	2019-03-01	258450	^{79}614	^{80}2048 ± 0	^{97}587 ± 13	^{95}3189 ± 32	^{89}3031 ± 142
8	Alchera Inc	alchera	000	2019-03-01	174013	^{55}473	^{77}2048 ± 0	^{109}627 ± 11	^{97}3342 ± 81	^{93}3243 ± 47
9	Alivia / Innovation Sys	isystems	001	2018-06-12	274621	^{130}1091	^{61}2048 ± 0	^{35}291 ± 9	^{10}557 ± 16	^{12}564 ± 22
10	Alivia / Innovation Sys	isystems	002	2018-10-18	358984	^{159}1595	^{104}2048 ± 0	^{158}822 ± 8	^{26}749 ± 31	^{22}632 ± 28
11	AllGoVision	allgovision	000	2019-03-01	172509	^{71}561	^{111}2048 ± 0	^{55}384 ± 8	^{172}29903 ± 406	^{173}29735 ± 194
12	AlphaSSTG	alphaface	001	2019-09-03	259849	^{68}531	^{86}2048 ± 0	^{105}613 ± 3	^{102}3482 ± 41	^{95}3279 ± 91
13	Amplified Group	amplifiedgroup	001	2019-03-01	0	^{8}81	^{31}866 ± 2	^{3}93 ± 0	^{177}57803 ± 4210	^{177}56365 ± 1196
14	Anke Investments	anke	004	2019-06-27	349388	^{86}706	^{141}2056 ± 0	^{108}625 ± 1	^{17}633 ± 22	^{21}632 ± 34
15	Anke Investments	anke	005	2019-11-21	328553	^{134}1130	^{143}2056 ± 0	^{98}589 ± 2	^{92}3121 ± 44	^{96}3296 ± 71
16	Antheus Technologia Ltda	antheus	000	2019-12-05	119453	^{12}116	^{24}520 ± 0	^{6}109 ± 1	^{140}7085 ± 31	^{139}7082 ± 37
17	AnyVision	anyvision	002	2018-01-31	662659	^{52}468	^{40}1024 ± 0	^{23}248 ± 0	^{178}74069 ± 188	^{178}74019 ± 198
18	AnyVision	anyvision	004	2018-06-15	401001	^{132}1102	^{36}1024 ± 0	^{49}355 ± 1	^{71}1891 ± 51	^{68}1829 ± 85
19	Aware	aware	003	2018-10-19	377729	^{147}1348	^{166}3108 ± 0	^{152}783 ± 10	^{55}1392 ± 42	^{56}1334 ± 80
20	Aware	aware	004	2019-03-01	427829	^{164}1820	^{154}2084 ± 0	^{172}900 ± 10	^{51}1279 ± 50	^{55}1287 ± 100
21	Awidit Systems	awiros	001	2019-09-23	15499	^{9}88	^{16}512 ± 0	^{5}99 ± 8	^{69}1868 ± 100	^{83}2467 ± 78
22	Ayonix	ayonix	000	2017-06-22	58505	^{4}69	^{41}1036 ± 0	^{1}18 ± 2	^{15}621 ± 23	^{19}620 ± 26
23	Beijing Vion Technology Inc	vion	000	2018-10-19	228219	^{59}498	^{132}2052 ± 0	^{46}333 ± 1	^{174}39839 ± 3561	^{168}26830 ± 2241
24	BioID Technologies SA	bioidtechswiss	000	2019-11-15	758466	^{122}1041	^{10}256 ± 0	^{111}631 ± 2	^{173}34933 ± 139	^{174}34866 ± 121
25	Bitmain	bitmain	001	2018-10-17	287734	^{13}148	^{1}64 ± 0	^{66}444 ± 88	^{70}1887 ± 31	^{69}1877 ± 26
26	CSA IntelliCloud Technology	intellicloudai	001	2019-08-13	220831	^{83}655	^{121}2048 ± 0	^{69}479 ± 18	^{37}1010 ± 16	^{39}1024 ± 31
27	CTBC Bank Co Ltd	ctbcbank	000	2019-06-28	257208	^{72}570	^{81}2048 ± 0	^{91}568 ± 43	^{105}3551 ± 87	^{125}4805 ± 209
28	CTBC Bank Co Ltd	ctbcbank	001	2019-10-28	275511	^{81}624	^{115}2048 ± 0	^{121}654 ± 33	^{139}6321 ± 283	^{136}6218 ± 286
29	Camvi Technologies	camvitech	002	2018-10-19	236278	^{92}737	^{38}1024 ± 0	^{132}677 ± 7	^{14}612 ± 26	^{15}603 ± 20
30	Camvi Technologies	camvitech	004	2019-07-12	280733	^{116}919	^{105}2048 ± 0	^{147}759 ± 10	^{34}948 ± 40	^{36}963 ± 31
31	Canon Information Technology (Beijing) Co Ltd	cib	000	2019-12-11	340288	^{70}558	^{102}2048 ± 0	^{183}988 ± 40	^{170}26805 ± 83	^{169}26857 ± 177
32	China Electronics Import-Export Corp	ceiec	001	2019-03-01	159618	^{28}273	^{39}1024 ± 0	^{42}314 ± 3	^{165}22831 ± 108	^{165}22813 ± 120
33	China Electronics Import-Export Corp	ceiec	002	2019-06-12	269063	^{45}426	^{76}2048 ± 0	^{104}612 ± 17	^{78}2188 ± 57	^{78}2301 ± 56
34	China University of Petroleum	upc	001	2019-06-05	0	^{126}1077	^{43}1052 ± 0	^{89}551 ± 15	^{91}3114 ± 44	^{92}3165 ± 97
35	Chunghwa Telecom Co. Ltd	chtface	001	2019-08-06	94088	^{33}352	^{107}2048 ± 0	^{19}218 ± 12	^{75}2089 ± 45	^{74}2087 ± 23
36	Chunghwa Telecom Co. Ltd	chtface	002	2019-12-07	363153	^{131}1100	^{91}2048 ± 0	^{96}585 ± 14	^{122}4551 ± 41	^{121}4550 ± 80
37	Cognitec Systems GmbH	cognitec	000	2018-10-19	474759	^{58}495	^{128}2052 ± 0	^{20}224 ± 1	^{113}3835 ± 108	^{109}3782 ± 83
38	Cognitec Systems GmbH	cognitec	001	2019-03-01	476809	^{60}498	^{135}2052 ± 0	^{38}297 ± 17	^{119}4253 ± 59	^{115}4102 ± 167
39	Cyberextruder	cyberex	001	2017-08-02	121211	^{17}178	^{9}256 ± 0	^{171}893 ± 25	^{41}1083 ± 16	^{44}1079 ± 19
40	Cyberextruder	cyberex	002	2018-01-30	168909	^{22}194	^{63}2048 ± 0	^{78}532 ± 6	^{68}1803 ± 14	^{66}1779 ± 22
41	Cyberlink Corp	cyberlink	002	2019-06-12	222311	^{93}760	^{130}2052 ± 0	^{123}656 ± 22	^{81}2264 ± 71	^{86}2649 ± 195
42	Cyberlink Corp	cyberlink	003	2019-10-07	470949	^{105}822	^{127}2052 ± 0	^{62}424 ± 1	^{126}4857 ± 53	^{127}5168 ± 69
43	DSK	dsk	000	2019-06-28	11967	^{24}252	^{18}512 ± 0	^{40}304 ± 47	^{142}7152 ± 115	^{140}7134 ± 111
44	Dahua Technology Co Ltd	dahua	003	2019-08-14	605337	^{175}3754	^{106}2048 ± 0	^{80}537 ± 4	^{19}653 ± 28	^{16}606 ± 38

Notes	
1	The configuration size does not capture static data included in libraries. We do not count these because some algorithms include common ancilliary libraries for image processing (e.g. openCV) or numerical computation (e.g. blas).
2	The memory usage is the peak resident set size reported by the ps system call during template generation.
3	The median template creation times are measured on Intel®Xeon®CPU E5-2630 v4 @ 2.20GHz processors or, for GPU-enabled implementations, NVidia Tesla K40.
4	The comparison durations, in nanoseconds, are estimated using std::chrono::high_resolution_clock which on the machine in (2) counts 1ns clock ticks. Precision is somewhat worse than that however. The ± value is the median absolute deviation times 1.48 for Normal consistency.

Table 1: Summary of algorithms and properties included in this report. The red superscripts give ranking for the quantity in that column.

	Developer	Short	Seq.	Validation	Config[1]	Template			Comparison Time (ns)[4]	
	Name	Name	Num.	Date	Data (KB)	Memory (MB)[2]	Size (B)	Time (ms)[3]	Genuine	Impostor
45	Dahua Technology Co Ltd	dahua	004	2019-12-18	832455	^{178}4881	^{87}2048 ± 0	^{141}740 ± 11	^{90}3105 ± 56	^{90}3142 ± 115
46	Deepglint	deepglint	001	2019-06-21	569802	^{115}917	^{174}4096 ± 0	^{139}721 ± 4	^{108}3680 ± 35	^{100}3517 ± 182
47	Deepglint	deepglint	002	2019-11-15	459642	^{161}1693	^{172}4096 ± 0	^{126}667 ± 1	^{161}18395 ± 217	^{159}17399 ± 429
48	Dermalog	dermalog	005	2018-02-02	0	^{36}357	^{2}128 ± 0	^{9}130 ± 11	^{7}499 ± 22	^{9}500 ± 22
49	Dermalog	dermalog	006	2018-10-18	0	^{121}970	^{3}128 ± 0	^{77}532 ± 12	^{8}506 ± 23	^{7}459 ± 23
50	DiDi ChuXing Technology Co	didiglobalface	001	2019-10-23	259849	^{69}533	^{85}2048 ± 0	^{115}650 ± 13	^{106}3592 ± 32	^{102}3588 ± 83
51	Digital Barriers	barriers	002	2019-03-01	83002	^{167}1930	^{145}2056 ± 0	^{17}209 ± 11	^{154}13409 ± 228	^{154}13267 ± 206
52	FaceSoft Ltd	facesoft	000	2019-07-10	370120	^{101}796	^{123}2048 ± 0	^{131}675 ± 18	^{79}2239 ± 28	^{77}2277 ± 96
53	FarBar Inc	f8	001	2019-07-11	272977	^{141}1276	^{73}2048 ± 0	^{159}822 ± 39	^{157}15262 ± 139	^{156}15277 ± 212
54	Gemalto Cogent	cogent	003	2019-03-01	698290	^{152}1445	^{32}973 ± 0	^{179}952 ± 0	^{152}12496 ± 75	^{151}11822 ± 163
55	Gemalto Cogent	cogent	004	2019-06-14	722919	^{124}1059	^{60}1983 ± 0	^{177}941 ± 28	^{156}14448 ± 56	^{157}15882 ± 81
56	Glory Ltd	glory	001	2018-06-08	0	^{145}1331	^{57}1726 ± 0	^{57}393 ± 2	^{150}9607 ± 128	^{149}9539 ± 182
57	Glory Ltd	glory	002	2019-11-12	0	^{118}935	^{157}2106 ± 0	^{100}594 ± 5	^{149}8815 ± 105	^{147}8782 ± 78
58	Gorilla Technology	gorilla	003	2019-06-19	94409	^{84}668	^{45}1132 ± 0	^{47}334 ± 25	^{87}2840 ± 42	^{87}2865 ± 87
59	Gorilla Technology	gorilla	004	2019-11-04	186952	^{109}853	^{160}2192 ± 0	^{59}397 ± 3	^{132}5269 ± 84	^{130}5259 ± 105
60	Guangzhou Pixel Solutions Co Ltd	pixelall	002	2019-06-06	0	^{30}342	^{162}2560 ± 0	^{16}191 ± 1	^{47}1223 ± 56	^{51}1230 ± 47
61	Guangzhou Pixel Solutions Co Ltd	pixelall	003	2019-10-15	0	^{111}866	^{163}2560 ± 0	^{137}708 ± 21	^{118}4216 ± 257	^{120}4488 ± 56
62	Hengrui AI Technology Ltd	hr	001	2019-06-04	346156	^{160}1682	^{151}2057 ± 0	^{125}665 ± 3	^{159}17816 ± 260	^{160}17878 ± 464
63	Hengrui AI Technology Ltd	hr	001	2019-10-08	390059	^{144}1329	^{152}2057 ± 0	^{174}904 ± 4	^{167}24112 ± 766	^{166}23859 ± 739
64	Hikvision Research Institute	hik	001	2019-03-01	667866	^{180}6597	^{50}1408 ± 0	^{117}651 ± 0	^{6}488 ± 19	^{8}477 ± 22
65	ID3 Technology	id3	003	2018-10-05	265951	^{34}354	^{12}264 ± 0	^{43}316 ± 19	^{54}1330 ± 25	^{57}1354 ± 28
66	ID3 Technology	id3	004	2019-03-01	171526	^{78}613	^{11}264 ± 0	^{84}541 ± 11	^{42}1135 ± 23	^{49}1156 ± 32
67	ITMO University	itmo	005	2018-10-19	482155	^{146}1335	^{181}4173 ± 0	^{145}759 ± 1	^{153}13214 ± 164	^{153}12576 ± 257
68	ITMO University	itmo	006	2019-03-01	599187	^{155}1489	^{159}2121 ± 0	^{155}814 ± 1	^{168}26154 ± 148	^{167}26217 ± 260
69	Idemia	Idemia	004	2019-03-01	406924	^{61}501	^{14}352 ± 0	^{41}306 ± 5	^{133}5592 ± 518	^{132}5533 ± 426
70	Idemia	Idemia	005	2019-10-11	509824	^{80}623	^{29}588 ± 0	^{76}524 ± 20	^{143}7543 ± 370	^{150}10415 ± 174
71	Imagus Technology Pty Ltd	imagus	000	2019-06-19	183453	^{51}466	^{117}2048 ± 0	^{64}425 ± 24	^{43}1145 ± 25	^{65}1718 ± 63
72	Imagus Technology Pty Ltd	imagus	001	2019-10-22	282680	^{103}802	^{95}2048 ± 0	^{157}820 ± 45	^{109}3700 ± 34	^{101}3585 ± 238
73	Imperial College London	imperial	000	2019-03-01	370120	^{102}796	^{93}2048 ± 0	^{128}669 ± 1	^{76}2130 ± 32	^{73}2052 ± 100
74	Imperial College London	imperial	002	2019-08-28	472327	^{165}1824	^{65}2048 ± 0	^{92}570 ± 2	^{125}4827 ± 69	^{122}4557 ± 160
75	Incode Technologies Inc	incode	004	2019-06-12	260224	^{91}733	^{70}2048 ± 0	^{68}479 ± 23	^{72}1913 ± 60	^{81}2443 ± 114
76	Incode Technologies Inc	incode	004	2019-10-17	256242	^{129}1090	^{90}2048 ± 0	^{90}567 ± 4	^{121}4443 ± 91	^{124}4685 ± 72
77	Innovative Technology Ltd	innovativetechnologyltd	001	2019-10-22	177232	^{31}343	^{99}2048 ± 0	^{65}432 ± 7	^{123}4676 ± 34	^{119}4468 ± 169
78	Innovatrics	innovatrics	004	2018-10-19	0	^{149}1367	^{44}1076 ± 0	^{56}391 ± 0	^{148}8573 ± 274	^{144}7929 ± 244
79	Innovatrics	innovatrics	006	2019-08-13	0	^{133}1109	^{25}538 ± 0	^{160}824 ± 10	^{135}5763 ± 217	^{134}5631 ± 824
80	Institute of Information Technologies	iitvision	001	2019-07-05	269176	^{98}788	^{98}2048 ± 0	^{135}699 ± 4	^{39}1060 ± 48	^{42}1074 ± 54
81	Institute of Information Technologies	iitvision	002	2019-12-04	259579	^{90}731	^{114}2048 ± 0	^{75}516 ± 1	^{101}3447 ± 59	^{104}3649 ± 83
82	Intel Research Group	intelresearch	000	2019-07-08	388229	^{170}2406	^{66}2048 ± 0	^{173}902 ± 6	^{124}4800 ± 152	^{123}4561 ± 97
83	Intellivision	intellivision	001	2017-10-10	43692	^{6}74	^{147}2056 ± 0	^{2}62 ± 2	^{83}2573 ± 91	^{85}2544 ± 38
84	Intellivision	intellivision	002	2019-08-23	43692	^{7}80	^{142}2056 ± 0	^{48}342 ± 30	^{158}16049 ± 195	^{155}15136 ± 389
85	Is It You	isityou	000	2017-06-26	48010	^{10}110	^{184}19200 ± 0	^{7}113 ± 5	^{180}237517 ± 1318	^{180}237374 ± 1279
86	Kakao Corp	kakao	001	2019-03-01	107616	^{23}225	^{35}1024 ± 0	^{54}379 ± 1	^{31}930 ± 22	^{35}948 ± 38
87	Kakao Corp	kakao	002	2019-06-19	479406	^{76}603	^{124}2048 ± 0	^{142}747 ± 6	^{65}1720 ± 62	^{64}1715 ± 83
88	Kedacom International Pte	kedacom	000	2019-06-03	245292	^{184}23574	^{13}292 ± 0	^{73}506 ± 3	^{20}684 ± 14	^{23}682 ± 16

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	Developer	Short	Seq.	Validation	Config[1]	Template			Comparison Time (ns)[4]	
	Name	Name	Num.	Date	Data (KB)	Memory (MB)[2]	Size (B)	Time (ms)[3]	Genuine	Impostor
89	Kneron Inc	kenron	003	2019-07-01	58366	^{18}188	^{88}2048 ± 0	^{32}281 ± 3	^{131}5237 ± 63	^{131}5274 ± 99
90	Kneron Inc	kenron	004	2019-12-03	272218	^{106}828	^{100}2048 ± 0	^{185}1455 ± 5	^{120}4345 ± 59	^{117}4373 ± 105
91	Lomonosov Moscow State University	intsysmsu	000	2019-06-18	650193	^{125}1066	^{68}2048 ± 0	^{79}535 ± 20	^{12}610 ± 22	^{18}613 ± 31
92	Lomonosov Moscow State University	intsysmsu	001	2019-10-22	384409	^{99}789	^{89}2048 ± 0	^{106}617 ± 5	^{93}3135 ± 26	^{98}3440 ± 235
93	Lookman Electroplast Industries	lookman	002	2018-06-13	138200	^{181}16518	^{27}548 ± 0	^{12}173 ± 1	^{13}610 ± 19	^{17}612 ± 22
94	Lookman Electroplast Industries	lookman	004	2019-06-03	244775	^{183}23548	^{26}548 ± 0	^{74}507 ± 5	^{30}871 ± 29	^{34}878 ± 29
95	Luxand Inc	luxand	000	2019-11-07	0	^{150}1369	^{42}1040 ± 0	^{61}406 ± 22	^{80}2240 ± 32	^{76}2234 ± 25
96	MVision	mvision	001	2019-11-12	227502	^{88}712	^{21}512 ± 0	^{134}690 ± 21	^{67}1797 ± 38	^{67}1788 ± 32
97	Megvii/Face++	megvii	001	2018-06-15	1361523	^{151}1426	^{120}2048 ± 0	^{85}543 ± 0	^{130}5228 ± 32	^{128}5252 ± 60
98	Megvii/Face++	megvii	002	2018-10-19	1809564	^{166}1879	^{179}4100 ± 0	^{113}644 ± 0	^{176}50630 ± 183	^{176}47591 ± 716
99	MicroFocus	microfocus	001	2018-06-13	104524	^{19}190	^{8}256 ± 0	^{27}264 ± 18	^{1}215 ± 8	^{1}217 ± 10
100	MicroFocus	microfocus	002	2018-10-17	96288	^{15}176	^{6}256 ± 0	^{25}259 ± 18	^{3}337 ± 34	^{2}230 ± 25
101	Momentum Digital Co Ltd	sertis	000	2019-10-07	265572	^{46}427	^{67}2048 ± 0	^{144}755 ± 0	^{114}3883 ± 44	^{111}3884 ± 66
102	Moontime Smart Technology	mt	000	2019-06-03	372169	^{123}1056	^{125}2049 ± 0	^{140}724 ± 12	^{64}1678 ± 47	^{62}1614 ± 85
103	N-Tech Lab	ntech	006	2019-03-01	7901590	^{182}16739	^{164}2600 ± 0	^{143}749 ± 1	^{38}1055 ± 93	^{32}844 ± 48
104	N-Tech Lab	ntech	007	2019-06-25	2509686	^{179}5070	^{167}3348 ± 0	^{153}792 ± 3	^{46}1209 ± 59	^{53}1267 ± 65
105	Neurotechnology	neurotech	005	2019-03-01	270450	^{96}773	^{7}256 ± 0	^{60}399 ± 0	^{2}238 ± 10	^{3}237 ± 7
106	Neurotechnology	neurotech	006	2019-06-26	525541	^{157}1538	^{19}512 ± 0	^{133}678 ± 56	^{9}513 ± 14	^{11}535 ± 26
107	Nodeflux	nodeflux	001	2019-03-01	262553	^{39}363	^{103}2048 ± 0	^{22}247 ± 1	^{96}3242 ± 81	^{94}3255 ± 93
108	Nodeflux	nodeflux	002	2019-08-13	774668	^{54}471	^{122}2048 ± 0	^{138}717 ± 16	^{136}5922 ± 170	^{143}7911 ± 367
109	NotionTag Technologies Private Limited	notiontag	000	2019-06-12	92753	^{67}525	^{28}584 ± 0	^{88}548 ± 64	^{175}44672 ± 269	^{175}44593 ± 358
110	Panasonic R+D Center Singapore	psl	002	2019-02-28	804934	^{163}1814	^{131}2052 ± 0	^{169}888 ± 9	^{61}1590 ± 48	^{45}1133 ± 78
111	Panasonic R+D Center Singapore	psl	003	2019-10-01	1159643	^{177}3961	^{158}2120 ± 0	^{165}867 ± 7	^{115}3915 ± 50	^{112}3899 ± 226
112	Paravision (EverAI)	everai paravision	003	2019-07-01	539802	^{138}1225	^{173}4096 ± 0	^{130}674 ± 4	^{24}699 ± 20	^{25}713 ± 47
113	Paravision (EverAI)	everai paravision	004	2019-12-11	556670	^{158}1570	^{171}4096 ± 0	^{167}879 ± 34	^{137}5997 ± 29	^{135}5682 ± 185
114	Ping An Technology	Pingan	004	2019-11-20	257981	^{100}795	^{74}2048 ± 0	^{184}1011 ± 2	^{112}3806 ± 335	^{114}4086 ± 60
115	Pyramid Cyber Security + Forensic (P) Ltd	pyramid	000	2019-11-04	372608	^{104}804	^{139}2056 ± 0	^{95}583 ± 2	^{141}7147 ± 59	^{141}7586 ± 425
116	Rank One Computing	rankone	007	2019-06-03	0	^{3}67	^{5}165 ± 0	^{21}245 ± 5	^{21}688 ± 20	^{14}601 ± 16
117	Rank One Computing	rankone	008	2019-11-12	0	^{5}70	^{4}165 ± 0	^{30}272 ± 4	^{33}944 ± 29	^{33}864 ± 26
118	Realnetworks Inc	realnetworks	002	2019-02-28	95328	^{40}370	^{59}1848 ± 0	^{24}250 ± 2	^{52}1285 ± 17	^{52}1247 ± 42
119	Realnetworks Inc	realnetworks	003	2019-06-12	95334	^{32}345	^{58}1848 ± 0	^{14}177 ± 10	^{59}1516 ± 29	^{60}1522 ± 60
120	Remark Holdings	remarkai	001	2019-03-01	241857	^{89}730	^{134}2052 ± 0	^{161}831 ± 6	^{48}1229 ± 20	^{31}805 ± 56
121	Remark Holdings	remarkai	001	2019-11-21	224157	^{49}446	^{79}2048 ± 0	^{178}952 ± 4	^{107}3614 ± 40	^{103}3632 ± 32
122	Rokid Corporation Ltd	rokid	000	2019-08-01	258612	^{136}1197	^{148}2056 ± 0	^{86}547 ± 2	^{110}3711 ± 88	^{108}3746 ± 209
123	Saffe Ltd	saffe	001	2018-10-19	85973	^{14}168	^{48}1280 ± 0	^{31}281 ± 1	^{50}1274 ± 19	^{54}1277 ± 26
124	Saffe Ltd	saffe	002	2019-03-01	260622	^{110}855	^{113}2048 ± 0	^{156}817 ± 11	^{25}717 ± 7	^{26}714 ± 29
125	Samsung S1 Corp	s1	001	2019-12-06	435491	^{95}773	^{156}2092 ± 0	^{101}602 ± 21	^{117}4151 ± 44	^{118}4428 ± 246
126	Samtech InfoNet Limited	samtech	001	2019-10-15	288082	^{77}605	^{144}2056 ± 0	^{36}294 ± 3	^{144}7694 ± 59	^{142}7678 ± 91
127	Scanovate Ltd	scanovate	001	2019-11-12	257083	^{74}595	^{71}2048 ± 0	^{94}579 ± 24	^{155}14306 ± 352	^{158}16031 ± 538
128	Sensetime Group Ltd	sensetime	002	2018-10-19	531783	^{168}2094	^{137}2052 ± 0	^{154}797 ± 3	^{86}2713 ± 90	^{79}2301 ± 25
129	Sensetime Group Ltd	sensetime	003	2019-06-04	787853	^{172}2539	^{136}2052 ± 0	^{175}910 ± 4	^{128}5017 ± 137	^{129}5258 ± 51
130	Shaman Software	shaman	000	2017-12-05	0	^{63}507	^{175}4096 ± 0	^{120}653 ± 16	^{4}380 ± 25	^{5}379 ± 31
131	Shaman Software	shaman	001	2018-01-13	0	^{65}511	^{170}4096 ± 0	^{37}294 ± 2	^{18}635 ± 19	^{6}441 ± 25
132	Shanghai Jiao Tong University	sjtu	001	2019-09-27	347115	^{48}437	^{64}2048 ± 0	^{118}651 ± 4	^{184}2674654 ± 64798	^{184}2376946 ± 202419

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	Name	Name	Num.	Date	Data (KB)	Memory (MB)[2]	Size (B)	Time (ms)[3]	Genuine	Impostor
133	Shanghai Ulucu Electronics Technology Co. Ltd	uluface	002	2019-07-10	0	^{128}1088	^{97}2048 ± 0	^{166}873 ± 42	^{164}19207 ± 1114	^{162}18501 ± 274
134	Shanghai Ulucu Electronics Technology Co. Ltd	uluface	003	2019-11-12	97357	^{140}1259	^{165}3072 ± 0	^{180}970 ± 15	^{171}27666 ± 198	^{172}29560 ± 244
135	Shanghai Universiy - Shanghai Film Academy	shu	001	2019-06-17	329513	^{41}402	^{119}2048 ± 0	^{103}612 ± 5	^{85}2619 ± 19	^{88}2987 ± 143
136	Shanghai Universiy - Shanghai Film Academy	shu	002	2019-12-10	731250	^{113}890	^{169}4096 ± 0	^{146}759 ± 5	^{185}2926869 ± 49960	^{185}2926507 ± 48716
137	Shanghai Yitu Technology	yitu	003	2019-03-01	1525719	^{174}3737	^{153}2082 ± 0	^{164}860 ± 0	^{160}18305 ± 71	^{161}18286 ± 62
138	Shenzhen AiMall Tech Ltd	aimall	001	2019-11-12	128820	^{16}178	^{37}1024 ± 0	^{45}328 ± 0	^{129}5038 ± 40	^{138}6849 ± 401
139	Shenzhen EI Networks Limited	einetworks	000	2019-08-13	372608	^{112}880	^{149}2056 ± 0	^{114}645 ± 3	^{127}4876 ± 66	^{126}5156 ± 77
140	Shenzhen Inst Adv Integrated Tech CAS	SIAT	002	2018-06-13	486842	^{171}2434	^{138}2052 ± 0	^{93}579 ± 0	^{27}769 ± 13	^{28}750 ± 13
141	Shenzhen Inst Adv Integrated Tech CAS	SIAT	004	2019-03-01	940063	^{176}3860	^{178}4100 ± 0	^{129}670 ± 0	^{116}4013 ± 45	^{110}3782 ± 173
142	Shenzhen Intellifusion Technologies Co Ltd	intellifusion	001	2019-08-22	271872	^{94}762	^{69}2048 ± 0	^{149}778 ± 61	^{111}3756 ± 59	^{113}3953 ± 126
143	Smilart	smilart	002	2018-02-06	111826	^{25}263	^{34}1024 ± 0	^{13}176 ± 16	^{162}18784 ± 136	^{163}18795 ± 151
144	Smilart	smilart	003	2018-06-18	67339	^{21}192	^{17}512 ± 0	^{15}180 ± 12	^{56}1395 ± 74	^{40}1027 ± 66
145	Star Hybrid Limited	starhybrid	001	2019-06-19	100509	^{108}845	^{82}2048 ± 0	^{51}358 ± 82	^{40}1075 ± 51	^{43}1078 ± 53
146	Synesis	synesis	005	2019-06-06	146509	^{82}638	^{101}2048 ± 0	^{18}211 ± 9	^{11}599 ± 23	^{13}581 ± 32
147	Synesis	synesis	006	2019-10-10	731941	^{154}1468	^{180}4104 ± 0	^{87}547 ± 1	^{134}5658 ± 17	^{133}5603 ± 148
148	Synology Inc	synology	000	2019-10-23	221021	^{50}453	^{72}2048 ± 0	^{63}425 ± 25	^{166}23628 ± 206	^{171}29262 ± 4987
149	TUPU Technology Co Ltd	tuputech	000	2019-10-11	11476	^{1}33	^{78}2048 ± 0	^{8}124 ± 7	^{169}26308 ± 269	^{170}28022 ± 2594
150	Taiwan AI Labs	ailabs	001	2019-12-18	1054663	^{139}1256	^{75}2048 ± 0	^{124}664 ± 4	^{179}100635 ± 999	^{179}100995 ± 1587
151	Tech5 SA	tech5	002	2019-03-01	1150887	^{153}1461	^{49}1280 ± 0	^{150}780 ± 10	^{58}1406 ± 120	^{41}1048 ± 57
152	Tech5 SA	tech5	003	2019-08-19	1427464	^{162}1735	^{51}1536 ± 0	^{176}937 ± 39	^{53}1313 ± 35	^{58}1360 ± 41
153	Tencent Deepsea Lab	deepsea	001	2019-06-03	147497	^{38}358	^{33}1024 ± 0	^{110}630 ± 7	^{57}1401 ± 37	^{59}1467 ± 50
154	Tevian	tevian	004	2019-03-01	863474	^{97}774	^{84}2048 ± 0	^{72}506 ± 30	^{5}474 ± 31	^{4}326 ± 20
155	Tevian	tevian	005	2019-09-21	921043	^{127}1082	^{110}2048 ± 0	^{112}642 ± 32	^{89}3097 ± 31	^{106}3700 ± 278
156	TigerIT Americas LLC	tiger	002	2018-06-13	341638	^{66}522	^{146}2056 ± 0	^{58}393 ± 20	^{77}2135 ± 29	^{75}2137 ± 38
157	TigerIT Americas LLC	tiger	003	2018-10-16	426164	^{87}708	^{140}2056 ± 0	^{67}458 ± 21	^{74}2031 ± 35	^{72}2029 ± 38
158	TongYi Transportation Technology	tongyi	005	2019-06-12	1140701	^{169}2121	^{155}2089 ± 0	^{10}165 ± 1	^{163}18924 ± 65	^{164}20158 ± 103
159	Toshiba	toshiba	002	2018-10-19	813606	-	^{54}1560 ± 0	^{83}541 ± 0	^{103}3521 ± 369	^{82}2449 ± 124
160	Toshiba	toshiba	003	2019-03-01	984125	^{135}1197	^{55}1560 ± 0	^{82}540 ± 0	^{82}2390 ± 41	^{80}2407 ± 81
161	Trueface.ai	trueface	000	2019-10-08	255123	^{57}493	^{116}2048 ± 0	^{52}368 ± 11	^{88}3040 ± 26	^{91}3144 ± 51
162	ULSee Inc	ulsee	001	2019-07-31	370519	^{43}416	^{112}2048 ± 0	^{122}654 ± 2	^{138}6065 ± 94	^{137}6228 ± 77
163	VCognition	vcog	002	2017-06-12	3229434	^{173}3666	^{185}61504 ± 5	^{50}357 ± 25	^{181}296154 ± 3077	^{181}296436 ± 4183
164	Veridas Digital Authentication Solutions S.L.	veridas	002	2019-03-01	193466	^{62}505	^{23}512 ± 0	^{127}669 ± 20	^{66}1733 ± 81	^{70}1934 ± 44
165	Veridas Digital Authentication Solutions S.L.	veridas	003	2019-11-27	293109	^{53}468	^{92}2048 ± 0	^{170}892 ± 33	^{145}7974 ± 51	^{148}9463 ± 206
166	Via Technologies Inc.	via	000	2019-07-08	124422	^{120}964	^{108}2048 ± 0	^{136}707 ± 8	^{36}966 ± 28	^{38}1021 ± 44
167	Videonetics Technology Pvt Ltd	videonetics	001	2019-06-19	30875	^{2}61	^{15}512 ± 0	^{26}262 ± 3	^{44}1153 ± 38	^{46}1142 ± 65
168	Videonetics Technology Pvt Ltd	videonetics	002	2019-11-21	121981	^{11}115	^{133}2052 ± 0	^{33}281 ± 5	^{104}3533 ± 57	^{107}3742 ± 65
169	Vigilant Solutions	vigilant	006	2019-03-01	343048	^{143}1316	^{53}1548 ± 0	^{163}841 ± 8	^{32}939 ± 32	^{24}711 ± 37
170	Vigilant Solutions	vigilant	007	2019-06-27	255600	^{114}912	^{52}1548 ± 0	^{71}493 ± 6	^{29}803 ± 35	^{29}800 ± 40
171	Visidon	visidon	001	2019-02-26	170262	^{29}281	^{129}2052 ± 0	^{44}316 ± 6	^{49}1258 ± 38	^{47}1148 ± 109
172	Vision-Box	visionbox	000	2019-02-26	176501	^{35}355	^{118}2048 ± 0	^{39}304 ± 7	^{63}1648 ± 57	^{50}1192 ± 42
173	Vision-Box	visionbox	001	2019-03-01	256869	^{73}579	^{109}2048 ± 0	^{181}983 ± 7	^{45}1161 ± 22	^{48}1154 ± 20
174	VisionLabs	visionlabs	006	2019-03-01	353044	^{26}264	^{22}512 ± 0	^{28}270 ± 0	^{23}698 ± 19	^{27}734 ± 28
175	VisionLabs	visionlabs	007	2019-06-12	357204	^{27}266	^{20}512 ± 0	^{29}272 ± 0	^{35}965 ± 41	^{37}972 ± 31
176	Vocord	vocord	006	2019-03-01	559457	^{137}1216	^{30}768 ± 0	^{168}886 ± 1	^{73}2020 ± 72	^{71}1969 ± 62

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	Name	Name	Num.	Date	Data (KB)	Memory (MB)[2]	Size (B)	Time (ms)[3]	Genuine	Impostor
177	Vocord	vocord	007	2019-06-06	587489	^{148}1352	^{56}1664 ± 0	^{151}780 ± 2	^{84}2593 ± 83	^{84}2526 ± 59
178	Winsense Co Ltd	winsense	000	2019-06-17	270819	^{107}833	^{46}1280 ± 0	^{34}283 ± 1	^{60}1551 ± 31	^{61}1532 ± 42
179	Winsense Co Ltd	winsense	001	2019-10-16	264428	^{117}922	^{47}1280 ± 0	^{148}768 ± 9	^{94}3143 ± 32	^{116}4230 ± 226
180	X-Laboratory	x-laboratory	000	2019-09-03	520020	^{156}1524	^{150}2056 ± 0	^{162}832 ± 38	^{98}3380 ± 91	^{97}3314 ± 253
181	Xiamen Meiya Pico Information Co. Ltd	meiya	001	2019-03-01	280055	^{64}507	^{126}2049 ± 0	^{107}622 ± 12	^{147}8356 ± 615	^{146}8134 ± 97
182	Zhuhai Yisheng Electronics Technology	yisheng	004	2018-06-12	486351	^{142}1279	^{168}3704 ± 0	^{53}378 ± 12	^{22}693 ± 137	^{10}526 ± 34
183	iQIYI Inc	iqface	000	2019-06-04	268819	^{85}704	^{182}4750 ± 32	^{81}538 ± 26	^{183}636433 ± 38446	^{182}632654 ± 85615
184	iQIYI Inc	iqface	001	2019-12-11	1145590	^{119}939	^{183}4752 ± 35	^{102}603 ± 1	^{182}634025 ± 5555	^{183}633845 ± 4950
185	iSAP Solution Corporation	isap	001	2019-08-07	99049	^{44}420	^{177}4096 ± 0	^{11}171 ± 12	^{151}12413 ± 154	^{152}12251 ± 382

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		FALSE NON-MATCH RATE (FNMR)															
	Algorithm	CONSTRAINED, COOPERATIVE												LESS CONSTRAINED, NON-COOP.			
	Name	VISAMC		VISA		VISA		MUGSHOT		MUGSHOT12+YRS		VISABORDER		WILD		CHILDEXP	
	FMR	0.0001		1E-06		0.0001		1E-05		1E-05		1E-06		0.0001		0.01	
1	3divi-003	0.0318	134	0.0588	135	0.0097	123	0.0389	137	0.0639	134	0.0619	130	0.0867	128	0.5365	36
2	3divi-004	0.0095	50	0.0153	54	0.0049	72	0.0097	53	0.0145	51	0.0175	61	0.0665	120	0.5025	28
3	adera-001	0.1021	152	0.1757	150	0.0368	152	0.1823	158	0.2967	156	0.1714	146	0.1965	145	0.7202	68
4	aifirst-001	0.0119	69	0.0170	59	0.0067	100	0.0084	40	0.0127	38	0.0131	39	0.0432	94	0.4301	17
5	ailabs-001	0.0158	95	0.0276	102	0.0065	92	0.0192	112	0.0317	107	0.0352	108	-		-	
6	aimall-001	0.0176	105	0.0324	112	0.0074	112	0.0225	119	0.0407	117	-		0.0344	75	0.6587	56
7	aiunionface-000	0.0104	57	0.0154	56	0.0051	76	0.0082	39	0.0122	36	0.0141	40	0.0306	50	-	
8	alchera-000	0.0165	100	0.0243	92	0.0086	117	0.0125	84	0.0186	77	0.0204	72	0.0370	82	-	
9	alchera-001	0.0183	107	0.0299	106	0.0078	113	0.0142	90	0.0234	95	0.0239	87	0.0372	83	-	
10	allgovision-000	0.0346	136	0.0527	131	0.0210	142	0.0232	121	0.0339	109	0.0372	111	0.0607	116	-	
11	alphaface-001	0.0065	26	0.0097	27	0.0025	31	0.0039	8	0.0063	12	0.0083	12	0.0280	11	-	
12	amplifiedgroup-001	0.5034	173	0.5848	174	0.2999	176	0.6973	172	0.8316	170	0.7807	166	0.4250	164	-	
13	anke-004	0.0080	41	0.0154	55	0.0031	38	0.0073	26	0.0112	31	0.0102	24	0.0288	28	0.3577	8
14	anke-005	0.0070	32	0.0109	36	0.0022	26	0.0059	20	0.0094	21	0.0105	25	0.0289	30	0.3337	6
15	antheus-000	0.2564	162	0.3776	164	0.1059	164	0.7240	173	0.8699	173	0.8899	170	0.7668	167	0.9233	92
16	anyvision-002	0.0660	146	0.0898	142	0.0387	153	0.0928	151	0.1512	148	0.0899	138	0.2227	149	0.6960	62
17	anyvision-004	0.0267	128	0.0385	125	0.0081	115	0.0258	126	0.0487	128	0.0234	84	0.0470	104	0.4633	21
18	asusaics-000	0.0125	74	0.0209	76	0.0043	55	0.0085	41	0.0134	43	0.0143	42	0.0295	36	-	
19	aware-003	0.0793	148	0.1161	148	0.0288	150	0.1028	152	0.1708	151	0.1698	145	0.3180	160	0.8512	82
20	aware-004	0.0690	147	0.0949	145	0.0257	145	0.0837	149	0.1436	147	0.1171	142	0.0516	109	-	
21	awiros-001	0.4044	167	0.4622	167	0.2880	175	0.5530	166	0.6518	164	0.2008	147	0.5584	166	-	
22	ayonix-000	0.4351	170	0.4872	168	0.2299	170	0.6150	169	0.7510	167	0.6557	162	0.3635	161	0.8434	80
23	bioidtechswiss-000	0.0066	28	0.0082	22	0.0015	12	0.0113	73	0.0225	89	0.0078	10	0.0278	7	-	
24	bm-001	0.7431	179	0.9494	181	0.6188	181	0.9586	177	0.9843	175	0.9049	171	0.9935	172	0.8845	87
25	camvi-002	0.0125	75	0.0221	81	0.0049	74	0.0089	46	0.0145	53	0.0142	41	0.0288	26	0.5760	44
26	camvi-004	0.0171	103	0.0316	111	0.0049	71	0.0042	10	0.0049	7	0.0097	22	0.0284	18	0.5788	46
27	ceiec-001	0.0328	135	0.0475	128	0.0163	137	0.0295	132	0.0478	127	0.0621	131	0.0847	124	-	
28	ceiec-002	0.0161	98	0.0193	70	0.0124	132	0.0122	81	0.0164	66	0.0270	91	0.0465	103	0.5156	33
29	chtface-001	0.9993	183	0.9994	184	0.9993	184	0.9999	180	-		1.0000	174	0.9980	173	-	
30	chtface-002	0.0150	90	0.0268	99	0.0054	80	0.0096	52	0.0140	47	0.0186	63	0.0306	51	-	
31	cib-000	0.0084	43	0.0156	57	0.0053	77	0.0049	12	0.0051	8	0.0275	94	0.0294	35	-	
32	cogent-003	0.0091	46	0.0188	67	0.0032	39	0.0098	55	0.0132	42	0.0187	64	0.0406	89	-	
33	cogent-004	0.0064	25	0.0116	39	0.0024	30	0.0096	50	0.0134	44	0.0157	46	0.0379	84	0.7177	67
34	cognitec-000	0.0116	65	0.0177	60	0.0036	45	0.0118	77	0.0167	68	0.0285	97	0.0953	131	0.8365	79
35	cognitec-001	0.0126	76	0.0185	66	0.0047	67	0.0120	79	0.0168	69	0.0270	90	0.0598	115	-	
36	ctbcbank-000	0.0168	101	0.0250	97	0.0064	90	0.0146	93	0.0224	88	0.0211	75	1.0000	181	0.8803	85
37	ctbcbank-001	0.0155	93	0.0235	89	0.0060	87	0.0148	97	0.0243	97	0.0207	73	1.0000	183	-	
38	cyberextruder-001	0.1972	158	0.2547	157	0.0755	159	0.4686	165	0.6387	163	0.3807	158	0.1747	142	0.7804	77
39	cyberextruder-002	0.0811	149	0.1336	149	0.0265	147	0.1465	156	0.2266	155	0.2086	150	0.1000	134	0.6105	50
40	cyberlink-002	0.0114	64	0.0195	71	0.0044	56	0.0101	59	0.0163	63	0.0160	48	0.0298	40	0.5003	27
41	cyberlink-003	0.0118	67	0.0192	69	0.0042	52	0.0098	56	0.0161	61	0.0153	45	0.0303	45	-	
42	dahua-003	0.0052	16	0.0068	14	0.0023	29	0.0056	16	0.0062	11	0.0113	31	0.0285	20	0.6253	52
43	dahua-004	0.0045	13	0.0058	8	0.0019	21	0.0036	5	0.0048	6	0.0051	2	0.0281	13	-	
44	deepglint-001	0.0040	9	0.0062	11	0.0014	11	0.0047	11	0.0067	13	0.0069	7	0.0278	6	0.4006	12

Table 6: FNMR is the proportion of mated comparisons below a threshold set to achieve the FMR given in the header on the fourth row. FMR is the proportion of impostor comparisons at or above that threshold. The light grey values give rank over all algorithms in that column. The pink columns use only same-sex impostors; others are selected regardless of demographics. The exception, in the green column, uses "matched-covariates" i.e. impostors of the same sex, age group, and country of birth. The second pink column includes effects of extended ageing. Missing entries for border, visa, mugshot and wild images generally mean the algorithm did not run to completion. For child exploitation, missing entries arise because NIST executes those runs only infrequently.

		FALSE NON-MATCH RATE (FNMR)															
	Algorithm	CONSTRAINED, COOPERATIVE												LESS CONSTRAINED, NON-COOP.			
	Name	VISAMC		VISA		VISA		MUGSHOT		MUGSHOT12+YRS		VISABORDER		WILD		CHILDEXP	
	FMR	0.0001		1E-06		0.0001		1E-05		1E-05		1E-06		0.0001		0.01	
45	deepglint-002	0.0016	2	0.0027	3	0.0004	2	0.0032	4	0.0033	2	0.0043	1	0.0280	10	0.3422	7
46	deepsea-001	0.0136	81	0.0215	78	0.0071	109	0.0142	91	0.0214	84	0.0163	52	0.0347	76	0.5606	41
47	dermalog-005	0.1526	156	0.1823	153	0.0658	158	0.2580	160	0.4018	158	-		0.0855	126	0.6842	59
48	dermalog-006	0.0253	126	0.0369	123	0.0172	139	0.0171	105	0.0283	103	0.0217	78	0.0623	118	0.5852	47
49	didiglobalface-001	0.0055	19	0.0092	24	0.0016	13	0.0030	2	0.0045	4	0.0088	15	0.0282	17	0.4270	15
50	digitalbarriers-002	0.3360	165	0.3690	162	0.0968	163	0.0877	150	0.1557	149	0.0971	141	0.0436	97	-	
51	dsk-000	0.1526	155	0.2169	154	0.0765	160	0.3787	163	0.5426	162	0.3115	153	0.2201	147	0.7313	70
52	einetworks-000	0.0099	53	0.0180	63	0.0047	66	0.0088	44	0.0140	49	0.0130	37	0.0293	33	-	
53	everai-paravision-003	0.0034	5	0.0050	6	0.0011	5	0.0036	7	0.0052	9	0.0092	18	0.0278	8	0.2669	2
54	f8-001	0.0249	125	0.0336	114	0.0182	140	0.0178	108	0.0232	94	0.0303	104	0.0475	105	0.5272	34
55	facesoft-000	0.0085	44	0.0112	38	0.0032	41	0.0064	23	0.0107	27	0.0091	16	0.0275	3	0.4992	26
56	glory-001	0.0902	150	0.1082	147	0.0410	154	0.1642	157	0.2065	154	0.2186	151	0.4261	165	0.8831	86
57	glory-002	0.0241	120	0.0311	110	0.0188	141	0.0116	75	0.0151	56	0.0157	47	0.1265	137	-	
58	gorilla-003	0.0165	99	0.0291	104	0.0053	78	0.0205	116	0.0437	120	0.0297	102	0.0359	80	0.9756	95
59	gorilla-004	0.0138	82	0.0239	91	0.0049	73	0.0243	123	0.0444	121	0.0275	93	0.0287	25	-	
60	hik-001	0.0096	51	0.0125	43	0.0036	47	0.0093	49	0.0164	65	0.0108	28	0.0271	1	-	
61	hr-001	0.0044	12	0.0072	16	0.0019	19	0.0073	28	0.0108	29	0.0125	34	0.0303	44	0.5499	38
62	hr-002	0.0043	10	0.0059	9	0.0017	15	0.0054	13	0.0076	15	0.0076	9	0.0338	72	-	
63	id3-003	0.0361	137	0.0757	139	0.0104	130	0.0292	130	0.0476	124	0.0447	119	0.0848	125	0.5865	48
64	id3-004	0.0198	115	0.0344	117	0.0084	116	0.0238	122	0.0423	119	0.0289	99	-		-	
65	idemia-004	0.0160	97	0.0244	94	0.0065	93	0.0199	114	0.0354	112	0.0268	89	0.0309	54	-	
66	idemia-005	0.0132	77	0.0216	79	0.0057	84	0.0121	80	0.0218	87	0.0215	77	0.0294	34	0.4343	18
67	iit-001	0.0104	58	0.0179	62	0.0048	70	0.0099	58	0.0142	50	0.1222	143	0.3092	159	0.4836	24
68	iit-002	0.0111	62	0.0177	61	0.0054	79	0.0085	42	0.0140	48	0.0193	68	0.1373	138	-	
69	imagus-000	0.0642	144	0.0882	140	0.0330	151	0.0497	140	0.0905	138	0.0848	136	0.1158	135	0.6936	61
70	imagus-001	0.0245	122	0.0407	126	0.0091	120	0.0257	125	0.0497	130	0.0514	123	0.0971	132	-	
71	imperial-000	0.0067	30	0.0108	35	0.0022	27	0.0080	35	0.0134	45	0.0087	14	0.0281	14	-	
72	imperial-002	0.0058	21	0.0081	20	0.0027	32	0.0055	15	0.0085	18	0.0083	13	0.0273	2	0.5151	30
73	incode-004	0.0077	39	0.0132	45	0.0034	43	0.0096	51	0.0160	59	0.0171	58	0.0313	56	0.5102	29
74	incode-005	0.0111	63	0.0189	68	0.0042	53	0.0156	102	0.0304	105	0.0195	69	0.0562	113	-	
75	innovativetechnologyltd-001	0.0578	142	0.0938	144	0.0258	146	0.0501	142	0.0981	140	-		0.0449	99	-	
76	innovatrics-004	0.0194	111	0.0292	105	0.0068	102	0.0344	134	0.0617	133	0.0562	127	0.0454	102	0.4650	22
77	innovatrics-006	0.0058	22	0.0089	23	0.0021	23	0.0061	22	0.0096	24	0.0096	21	0.0281	12	0.3056	4
78	intellicloudai-001	0.0142	85	0.0234	88	0.0064	91	0.0092	48	0.0145	52	0.0162	50	0.0409	90	-	
79	intellifusion-001	0.0072	35	0.0094	25	0.0028	36	0.0056	17	0.0085	19	0.0111	30	0.0289	29	0.5454	37
80	intellivision-001	0.1335	154	0.2205	155	0.0417	155	0.1090	154	0.1670	150	0.1385	144	0.2445	151	0.7766	76
81	intellivision-002	0.1000	151	0.1775	151	0.0265	148	0.0610	145	0.1009	141	0.0805	135	0.0768	123	-	
82	intelresearch-000	0.0307	131	0.0578	134	0.0093	121	0.0385	136	0.0751	137	0.0409	113	0.0324	61	-	
83	intsysmsu-000	0.0135	79	0.0204	73	0.0069	104	0.0112	69	0.0161	60	0.0148	43	0.2330	150	-	
84	intsysmsu-001	0.9543	182	0.9888	183	0.9165	183	0.9923	178	-		0.9977	172	0.7871	168	-	
85	iqface-000	0.0091	47	0.0143	49	0.0043	54	0.0075	31	0.0110	30	0.0171	59	0.0381	85	0.6490	54
86	iqface-001	0.0088	45	0.0117	40	0.0047	65	0.0177	106	0.0230	93	0.0165	55	0.0597	114	-	
87	isap-001	0.5092	174	0.6588	176	0.2338	172	0.6899	171	0.7978	168	0.7200	163	0.1931	144	-	
88	isityou-000	0.5682	176	0.7033	177	0.4145	179	1.0000	181	-		1.0000	177	1.0000	176	1.0000	98

Table 7: FNMR is the proportion of mated comparisons below a threshold set to achieve the FMR given in the header on the fourth row. FMR is the proportion of impostor comparisons at or above that threshold. The light grey values give rank over all algorithms in that column. The pink columns use only same-sex impostors; others are selected regardless of demographics. The exception, in the green column, uses "matched-covariates" i.e. impostors of the same sex, age group, and country of birth. The second pink column includes effects of extended ageing. Missing entries for border, visa, mugshot and wild images generally mean the algorithm did not run to completion. For child exploitation, missing entries arise because NIST executes those runs only infrequently.

		FALSE NON-MATCH RATE (FNMR)															
	Algorithm	CONSTRAINED, COOPERATIVE												LESS CONSTRAINED, NON-COOP.			
	Name	VISAMC		VISA		VISA		MUGSHOT		MUGSHOT12+YRS		VISABORDER		WILD		CHILDEXP	
	FMR	0.0001		1E-06		0.0001		1E-05		1E-05		1E-06		0.0001		0.01	
89	isystems-001	0.0149	89	0.0245	95	0.0067	98	0.0138	89	0.0210	83	0.0209	74	0.0524	112	0.5152	32
90	isystems-002	0.0118	66	0.0182	65	0.0066	94	0.0111	66	0.0162	62	0.0166	56	0.0516	110	0.4876	25
91	itmo-005	0.0182	106	0.0345	118	0.0067	99	0.0181	109	0.0348	111	0.0225	80	0.0433	95	0.4808	23
92	itmo-006	0.0125	73	0.0220	80	0.0046	61	0.0149	98	0.0266	102	0.0233	82	0.0329	65	-	
93	kakao-001	0.4553	172	0.5532	173	0.2034	168	0.6580	170	0.8150	169	0.4831	159	1.0000	185	-	
94	kakao-002	0.0625	143	0.1779	152	0.0168	138	0.0791	148	0.1381	146	0.0636	132	1.0000	178	1.0000	104
95	kedacom-000	0.0055	18	0.0081	21	0.0027	33	0.0111	68	0.0120	34	0.0415	114	0.2511	153	0.7650	74
96	kneron-003	0.0542	140	0.0902	143	0.0218	143	0.0346	135	0.0562	132	0.0919	139	0.3053	158	0.6962	63
97	kneron-004	0.0197	112	0.0283	103	0.0101	127	0.0129	87	0.0201	80	0.0452	120	0.0670	121	-	
98	lookman-002	0.0297	130	0.0547	133	0.0102	129	0.0339	133	0.0562	131	0.0614	129	0.2640	156	-	
99	lookman-004	0.0074	37	0.0099	29	0.0037	48	0.0124	83	0.0149	54	0.0430	117	0.2516	154	0.7664	75
100	luxand-000	0.2056	160	0.2814	158	0.0895	162	0.4053	164	0.5365	161	0.3497	155	0.2222	148	-	
101	megvii-001	0.0157	94	0.0244	93	0.0045	60	0.0392	138	0.0671	135	0.0168	57	0.0916	130	0.4418	19
102	megvii-002	0.0104	59	0.0145	51	0.0036	46	0.0225	118	0.0345	110	0.0099	23	0.0692	122	0.3013	3
103	meiya-001	0.0171	102	0.0275	101	0.0066	96	0.0159	103	0.0261	101	0.0311	105	0.0363	81	-	
104	microfocus-001	0.4482	171	0.5524	172	0.2309	171	0.7256	174	0.8416	171	0.7301	164	0.2567	155	0.6890	60
105	microfocus-002	0.3605	166	0.5057	169	0.1566	167	0.5783	167	0.7223	165	0.5909	161	0.1582	141	0.6517	55
106	mt-000	0.0100	54	0.0170	58	0.0047	64	0.0074	30	0.0118	33	0.0127	35	0.0326	63	0.3773	11
107	mvision-001	0.0191	109	0.0233	86	0.0131	133	0.0204	115	0.0356	113	0.0198	70	0.0431	93	-	
108	neurotechnology-005	0.0141	84	0.0300	107	0.0051	75	0.0108	64	0.0163	64	0.0204	71	0.0332	67	-	
109	neurotechnology-006	0.0098	52	0.0136	46	0.0040	51	0.0105	61	0.0182	74	0.0164	53	0.0303	46	0.5911	49
110	nodeflux-001	1.0000	185	1.0000	185	1.0000	185	1.0000	185	-		0.5169	160	1.0000	184	-	
111	nodeflux-002	0.0186	108	0.0340	115	0.0070	106	0.0261	127	0.0451	123	0.0548	126	0.0299	42	-	
112	notiontag-000	0.6669	177	0.7885	178	0.3222	178	0.3715	162	0.4978	160	0.8571	168	0.1807	143	0.6479	53
113	ntechlab-006	0.0078	40	0.0111	37	0.0021	24	0.0112	70	0.0227	92	0.0108	27	0.0275	4	-	
114	ntechlab-007	0.0056	20	0.0076	17	0.0018	17	0.0073	29	0.0128	40	0.0079	11	0.0276	5	0.3316	5
115	pa-004	0.0375	138	0.0514	129	0.0156	136	0.0501	141	0.0918	139	0.0526	125	0.0343	74	-	
116	paravision-004	0.0030	4	0.0046	4	0.0012	7	0.0030	3	0.0036	3	0.0091	17	0.0288	27	0.2467	1
117	pixelall-002	0.0193	110	0.0340	116	0.0066	95	0.0127	86	0.0209	81	0.0234	85	0.0342	73	0.8963	89
118	pixelall-003	0.0074	38	0.0118	41	0.0032	40	0.0057	18	0.0079	16	0.0121	33	0.0285	22	-	
119	psl-002	0.0107	60	0.0180	64	0.0048	69	0.0089	45	0.0120	35	0.0790	134	0.0295	37	-	
120	psl-003	0.0065	27	0.0099	30	0.0028	34	0.0055	14	0.0075	14	1.0000	176	0.0296	39	-	
121	pyramid-000	0.0136	80	0.0233	87	0.0056	82	0.0117	76	0.0192	79	0.0185	62	0.0304	47	-	
122	rankone-007	0.0197	114	0.0366	122	0.0057	85	0.0113	72	0.0177	72	0.0286	98	0.0450	100	0.6686	57
123	rankone-008	0.0124	71	0.0232	85	0.0045	59	0.0082	38	0.0107	26	0.0188	66	0.0420	91	-	
124	realnetworks-002	0.0248	123	0.0358	119	0.0099	125	0.0513	143	0.1127	142	0.0371	110	0.0334	68	-	
125	realnetworks-003	0.0259	127	0.0372	124	0.0100	126	0.0541	144	0.1208	144	0.0378	112	0.0335	70	0.5152	31
126	remarkai-001	0.0144	86	0.0256	98	0.0061	88	0.0102	60	0.0159	58	0.0162	51	0.0308	53	-	
127	remarkai-002	0.0151	92	0.0197	72	0.0102	128	0.0075	32	0.0108	28	0.0119	32	0.0426	92	-	
128	rokid-000	0.0093	49	0.0145	50	0.0038	49	0.0073	27	0.0102	25	0.0164	54	0.0857	127	-	
129	s1-001	0.0314	133	0.0651	138	0.0099	124	0.0252	124	0.0357	114	0.0444	118	0.8493	169	-	
130	saffe-001	0.4339	169	0.5261	170	0.2340	173	0.7539	176	0.8736	174	0.7977	167	0.3887	162	0.8973	90
131	saffe-002	0.0119	70	0.0206	74	0.0054	81	0.0107	63	0.0177	71	0.0244	88	0.0308	52	-	
132	samtech-001	0.0197	113	0.0365	120	0.0066	97	0.0146	95	0.0241	96	0.0238	86	0.0337	71	-	

Table 8: FNMR is the proportion of mated comparisons below a threshold set to achieve the FMR given in the header on the fourth row. FMR is the proportion of impostor comparisons at or above that threshold. The light grey values give rank over all algorithms in that column. The pink columns use only same-sex impostors; others are selected regardless of demographics. The exception, in the green column, uses "matched-covariates" i.e. impostors of the same sex, age group, and country of birth. The second pink column includes effects of extended ageing. Missing entries for border, visa, mugshot and wild images generally mean the algorithm did not run to completion. For child exploitation, missing entries arise because NIST executes those runs only infrequently.

		FALSE NON-MATCH RATE (FNMR)															
	Algorithm	CONSTRAINED, COOPERATIVE												LESS CONSTRAINED, NON-COOP.			
	Name	VISAMC		VISA		VISA		MUGSHOT		MUGSHOT12+YRS		VISABORDER		WILD		CHILDEXP	
	FMR	0.0001		1E-06		0.0001		1E-05		1E-05		1E-06		0.0001		0.01	
133	scanovate-001	0.0175	104	0.0331	113	0.0061	89	0.0163	104	0.0248	98	0.2476	152	0.4060	163	-	
134	sensetime-002	0.0068	31	0.0098	28	0.0035	44	0.0143	92	-		0.0278	96	0.9999	174	0.5309	35
135	sensetime-003	0.0021	3	0.0027	2	0.0005	3	0.0027	1	0.0027	1	0.0051	3	0.0329	64	0.3683	9
136	sertis-000	0.0118	68	0.0208	75	0.0047	62	0.0080	34	0.0127	37	0.0110	29	0.0285	21	-	
137	shaman-000	0.9297	181	0.9774	182	0.9128	182	0.9990	179	-		0.9999	173	0.9575	171	0.9618	93
138	shaman-001	0.3346	164	0.4616	166	0.1360	166	0.2368	159	0.3723	157	0.3574	156	0.1498	140	0.8990	91
139	shu-001	0.0103	56	0.0140	48	0.0044	57	0.0293	131	0.0688	136	0.0172	60	0.0986	133	0.4590	20
140	shu-002	-		0.0079	18	0.0017	16	0.0146	94	0.0308	106	1.0000	175	0.0284	19	-	
141	siat-002	0.0091	48	0.0126	44	0.0039	50	0.0109	65	0.0190	78	0.0276	95	0.0520	111	0.4277	16
142	siat-004	0.0067	29	0.0099	31	0.0028	35	0.0152	100	-		0.0275	92	1.0000	175	-	
143	sjtu-001	0.0051	15	0.0080	19	0.0019	18	0.0211	117	0.0446	122	0.0131	38	0.0289	31	-	
144	smilart-002	0.2440	161	0.3532	161	0.0821	161	-		-		0.3785	157	-		0.6999	64
145	smilart-003	0.6944	178	0.8836	179	0.1088	165	0.0695	146	0.1193	143	0.0894	137	0.1190	136	-	
146	starhybrid-001	0.0108	61	0.0138	47	0.0058	86	0.0081	36	0.0113	32	0.0152	44	0.0350	78	0.5584	39
147	synesis-005	0.0147	87	0.0226	83	0.0073	111	0.0153	101	0.0226	90	0.0213	76	0.0334	69	0.5601	40
148	synesis-006	0.0070	33	0.0096	26	0.0023	28	0.0107	62	0.0166	67	-		0.0292	32	-	
149	synology-000	0.0149	88	0.0238	90	0.0067	101	0.0148	96	0.0261	100	0.0221	79	0.0330	66	-	
150	tech5-002	0.0046	14	0.0063	12	0.0009	4	0.0113	74	0.0216	86	0.0233	83	0.0310	55	-	
151	tech5-003	0.0053	17	0.0070	15	0.0014	10	0.0099	57	0.0185	75	0.0095	20	0.0306	48	0.8963	88
152	tevian-004	0.0228	118	0.0304	108	0.0069	103	0.0226	120	0.0478	125	0.0128	36	0.0394	87	-	
153	tevian-005	0.0043	11	0.0062	10	0.0020	22	0.0057	19	0.0085	20	0.0070	8	0.0300	43	0.5625	43
154	tiger-002	0.0658	145	0.0889	141	0.0227	144	0.1083	153	0.1766	152	0.0952	140	0.0512	108	0.7862	78
155	tiger-003	0.0313	132	0.0602	137	0.0087	118	0.0188	111	0.0359	115	0.0344	106	0.0482	107	0.5610	42
156	tongyi-005	0.0073	36	0.0146	52	0.0019	20	0.0187	110	0.0421	118	0.0161	49	0.0399	88	0.6195	51
157	toshiba-002	0.0134	78	0.0222	82	0.0048	68	0.0097	54	0.0154	57	-		0.0434	96	0.7103	65
158	toshiba-003	0.0125	72	0.0214	77	0.0047	63	0.0085	43	0.0131	41	-		0.0282	15	-	
159	trueface-000	0.0249	124	0.4321	165	0.0069	105	0.0119	78	0.0180	73	0.0297	103	0.0614	117	-	
160	tuputech-000	0.3218	163	0.3696	163	0.2779	174	-		-		0.3237	154	0.9415	170	-	
161	ulsee-001	0.0151	91	0.0246	96	0.0080	114	0.0113	71	0.0185	76	0.0187	65	0.0316	58	-	
162	uluface-002	0.0081	42	0.0123	42	0.0033	42	0.0071	25	0.0095	23	0.0107	26	0.0444	98	0.6729	58
163	uluface-003	0.0100	55	0.0150	53	0.0044	58	0.0079	33	0.0128	39	-		0.0635	119	-	
164	upc-001	0.0234	119	0.0519	130	0.0071	108	0.0291	129	0.0490	129	0.0294	100	0.0314	57	0.4224	14
165	vcog-002	0.7522	180	0.9033	180	0.5040	180	-		-		-		-		0.7523	72
166	vd-001	0.0243	121	0.0452	127	0.0093	122	0.0271	128	0.0402	116	0.0424	116	0.1389	139	-	
167	veridas-002	0.1733	157	0.2257	156	0.0528	157	0.2617	161	0.4147	159	0.2073	149	0.0450	101	-	
168	veridas-003	0.0557	141	0.0983	146	0.0154	135	0.0734	147	0.1267	145	0.0694	133	0.0299	41	0.5785	45
169	via-000	0.0216	117	0.0365	121	0.0088	119	0.0177	107	0.0287	104	0.0296	101	0.0349	77	0.7638	73
170	videonetics-001	0.5483	175	0.6446	175	0.3063	177	0.7517	175	0.8607	172	0.8664	169	0.2986	157	0.7297	69
171	videonetics-002	0.4274	168	0.5329	171	0.2168	169	0.6081	168	0.7438	166	0.7775	165	0.1976	146	0.7435	71
172	vigilantsolutions-006	0.1264	153	0.3221	159	0.0136	134	0.0150	99	0.0254	99	0.0493	122	0.0321	60	-	
173	vigilantsolutions-007	0.0202	116	0.0307	109	0.0070	107	0.0136	88	0.0227	91	0.0356	109	0.0306	49	1.0000	174
174	vion-000	0.0419	139	0.0590	136	0.0288	149	0.0422	139	0.0478	126	0.0581	128	0.2479	152	0.8765	84
175	visionbox-000	0.0293	129	0.0541	132	0.0110	131	0.0197	113	0.0339	108	0.0349	107	0.0476	106	-	
176	visionbox-001	0.0159	96	0.0270	100	0.0072	110	0.0111	67	0.0173	70	0.0190	67	0.0389	86	-	

Table 9: FNMR is the proportion of mated comparisons below a threshold set to achieve the FMR given in the header on the fourth row. FMR is the proportion of impostor comparisons at or above that threshold. The light grey values give rank over all algorithms in that column. The pink columns use only same-sex impostors; others are selected regardless of demographics. The exception, in the green column, uses "matched-covariates" i.e. impostors of the same sex, age group, and country of birth. The second pink column includes effects of extended ageing. Missing entries for border, visa, mugshot and wild images generally mean the algorithm did not run to completion. For child exploitation, missing entries arise because NIST executes those runs only infrequently.

		FALSE NON-MATCH RATE (FNMR)															
	Algorithm	CONSTRAINED, COOPERATIVE												LESS CONSTRAINED, NON-COOP.			
	Name	VISAMC		VISA		VISA		MUGSHOT		MUGSHOT12+YRS		VISABORDER		WILD		CHILDEXP	
	FMR	0.0001		1E-06		0.0001		1E-05		1E-05		1E-06		0.0001		0.01	
177	visionlabs-006	0.0037	6	0.0066	13	0.0012	6	0.0041	9	0.0060	10	0.0061	5	0.0285	23	-	
178	visionlabs-007	0.0038	7	0.0048	5	0.0012	9	0.0036	6	0.0048	5	0.0057	4	0.0286	24	0.3708	10
179	vocord-006	0.0062	23	0.0102	33	0.0016	14	0.0082	37	0.0151	55	0.0475	121	0.0282	16	-	
180	vocord-007	0.0039	8	0.0053	7	0.0012	8	0.0061	21	0.0094	22	0.0520	124	0.0280	9	0.8468	81
181	winsense-000	0.0140	83	0.0228	84	0.0056	83	0.0125	85	0.0215	85	0.0226	81	0.0352	79	0.8600	83
182	winsense-001	0.0062	24	0.0099	32	0.0022	25	0.0092	47	0.0210	82	0.0093	19	0.0320	59	0.4155	13
183	x-laboratory-000	0.0071	34	0.0106	34	0.0030	37	0.0123	82	0.0138	46	0.0419	115	0.0295	38	0.9686	94
184	yisheng-004	0.1988	159	0.3329	160	0.0475	156	0.1147	155	0.1849	153	0.2044	148	0.0908	129	0.7152	66
185	yitu-003	0.0015	1	0.0026	1	0.0003	1	0.0066	24	0.0085	17	0.0064	6	0.0325	62	-	

Table 10: FNMR is the proportion of mated comparisons below a threshold set to achieve the FMR given in the header on the fourth row. FMR is the proportion of impostor comparisons at or above that threshold. The light grey values give rank over all algorithms in that column. The pink columns use only same-sex impostors; others are selected regardless of demographics. The exception, in the green column, uses "matched-covariates" i.e. impostors of the same sex, age group, and country of birth. The second pink column includes effects of extended ageing. Missing entries for border, visa, mugshot and wild images generally mean the algorithm did not run to completion. For child exploitation, missing entries arise because NIST executes those runs only infrequently.

Figure 1: The points show false non-match rates (FNMR) versus the size of the encoded template. FNMR is the geometric mean of FNMR values for visa and mugshot images (from Figs. 30 and 40) at a false match rate (FMR) of 0.0001. The color of the points encodes template generation time - which spans at least one order of magnitude. Durations are measured on a single core of a c. 2016 Intel Xeon CPU E5-2630 v4 running at 2.20GHz. Algorithms with poor FNMR are omitted.

Figure 2: The points show false non-match rates (FNMR) versus the duration of the template generation operation. FNMR is the geometric mean of FNMR values for visa and mugshot images (from Figs. 30 and 40) at a false match rate (FMR) of 0.0001. Template generation time is a median estimated over 640 x 480 pixel portraits. It is measured on a single core of a c. 2016 Intel Xeon CPU E5-2630 v4 running at 2.20GHz. The color of the points encodes template size - which span two orders of magnitude. Algorithms with poor FNMR are omitted.

1 Metrics

1.1 Core accuracy

Given a vector of N genuine scores, u, the false non-match rate (FNMR) is computed as the proportion below some threshold, T:

$$\text{FNMR}(T) = 1 - \frac{1}{N}\sum_{i=1}^{N} H(u_i - T) \tag{1}$$

where $H(x)$ is the unit step function, and $H(0)$ taken to be 1.

Similarly, given a vector of N impostor scores, v, the false match rate (FMR) is computed as the proportion above T:

$$\text{FMR}(T) = \frac{1}{N}\sum_{i=1}^{N} H(v_i - T) \tag{2}$$

The threshold, T, can take on any value. We typically generate a set of thresholds from quantiles of the observed impostor scores, v, as follows. Given some interesting false match rate range, $[\text{FMR}_L, \text{FMR}_U]$, we form a vector of K thresholds corresponding to FMR measurements evenly spaced on a logarithmic scale

$$T_k = Q_v(1 - \text{FMR}_k) \tag{3}$$

where Q is the quantile function, and FMR_k comes from

$$\log_{10}\text{FMR}_k = \log_{10}\text{FMR}_L + \frac{k}{K}\,[\log_{10}\text{FMR}_U - \log_{10}\text{FMR}_L] \tag{4}$$

Error tradeoff characteristics are plots of FNMR(T) vs. FMR(T). These are plotted with $\text{FMR}_U \to 1$ and FMR_L as low as is sustained by the number of impostor comparisons, N. This is somewhat higher than the "rule of three" limit $3/N$ because samples are not independent, due to re-use of images.

2 Datasets

2.1 Child exploitation images

- ▷ The number of images is on the order of 10^4.
- ▷ The number of subjects is on the order of 10^3.
- ▷ The number of subjects with two images on the order of 10^3.
- ▷ The images are operational. They are taken from ongoing investigations of child exploitation crimes. The images are arbitrarily unconstrained. Pose varies considerably around all three axes, including subject lying down. Resolution varies very widely. Faces can be occluded by other objects, including hair and hands. Lighting varies, although the images are intended for human viewing. Mis-focus is rare. Images are given to the algorithm without any cropping; faces may occupy widely varying areas.
- ▷ The images are usually large from contemporary cameras. The mean interocular distance (IOD) is 70 pixels.
- ▷ The images are of subjects from several countries, due to the global production of this imagery.
- ▷ The images are of children, from infancy to late adolescence.
- ▷ All of the images are live capture, none are scanned. Many have been cropped.
- ▷ When these images are input to the algorithm, they are labelled as being of type ”EXPLOITATION” - see Table 4 of the FRVT API.

2.2 Visa images

- ▷ The number of images is on the order of 10^5.
- ▷ The number of subjects is on the order of 10^5.
- ▷ The number of subjects with two images on the order of 10^4.
- ▷ The images have geometry in reasonable conformance with the ISO/IEC 19794-5 Full Frontal image type. Pose is generally excellent.
- ▷ The images are of size 252x300 pixels. The mean interocular distance (IOD) is 69 pixels.
- ▷ The images are of subjects from greater than 100 countries, with significant imbalance due to visa issuance patterns.
- ▷ The images are of subjects of all ages, including children, again with imbalance due to visa issuance demand.
- ▷ Many of the images are live capture. A substantial number of the images are photographs of paper photographs.
- ▷ When these images are input to the algorithm, they are labelled as being of type ”ISO” - see Table 4 of the FRVT API.

2.3 Visa images II

- ▷ The number of images is on the order of 10^6.
- ▷ The number of subjects is on the order of 10^6.
- ▷ The number of subjects with two images on the order of 10^6.

- ▷ The images have geometry in good conformance with the ISO/IEC 19794-5 Full Frontal image type. Pose is generally excellent.
- ▷ The images are of size 300x300 pixels. The mean interocular distance (IOD) is 61 pixels.
- ▷ The images are of subjects from greater than 100 countries, with significant imbalance due to population and immigration patterns.
- ▷ The images are of subjects of all ages, including children, again with imbalance due due to population and immigration patterns and demand.
- ▷ All of the images are live capture.
- ▷ When these images are input to the algorithm, they are labelled as being of type "ISO" - see Table 4 of the FRVT API.

2.4 Mugshot images

- ▷ The number of images is on the order of 10^6.
- ▷ The number of subjects is on the order of 10^6.
- ▷ The number of subjects with two images on the order of 10^6.
- ▷ The images have geometry in reasonable conformance with the ISO/IEC 19794-5 Full Frontal image type.
- ▷ The images are of variable sizes. The median IOD is 105 pixels. The mean IOD is 113 pixels. The 1-st, 5-th, 10-th, 25-th, 75-th, 90-th and 99-th percentiles are 34, 58, 70, 87, 121, 161 and 297 pixels.
- ▷ The images are of subjects from the United States.
- ▷ The images are of adults.
- ▷ The images are all live capture.
- ▷ When these images are input to the algorithm, they are labelled as being of type "mugshot" - see Table 4 of the FRVT API.

2.5 Webcam images

- ▷ The number of images is on the order of 10^6.
- ▷ The number of subjects is on the order of 10^6.
- ▷ All subjects have a webcam image, and a portrait image.
- ▷ The portrait images are in poor conformance with the ISO/IEC 19794-5 Full Frontal image type.
- ▷ The webcam images are taken with at camera oriented by an attendant toward a cooperating subject. This is done under time constraints so there are role, pitch and yaw angle variation. Also background illumination is sometimes strong, so the face is under exposed. There is sometimes perspective distortion due to close range images.
- ▷ The images have mean IOD of 38 pixels.
- ▷ The images are all live capture.
- ▷ When these images are input to the algorithm, they are labelled as being of type "WILD" - see Table 4 of the FRVT API.

(a) Visa (b) Mugshot (c) Wild

Figure 3: The figure gives simulated samples of image types used in this report.

2.6 Wild images

- The number of images is on the order of 10^5.
- The number of subjects is on the order of 10^3.
- The number of subjects with two images on the order of 10^3.
- The images include many photojournalism-style images. Images are given to the algorithm using a variable but generally tight crop of the head. Resolution varies very widely. The images are very unconstrained, with wide yaw and pitch pose variation. Faces can be occluded, including hair and hands.
- The images are of adults.
- All of the images are live capture, none are scanned.
- When these images are input to the algorithm, they are labelled as being of type "WILD" - see Table 4 of the FRVT API.

3 Results

3.1 Test goals

- To state overall accuracy.
- To compare algorithms.

3.2 Test design

Method: For visa images:

- The comparisons are of visa photos against visa photos.
- The number of genuine comparisons is on the order of 10^4.
- The number of impostor comparisons is on the order of 10^{10}.
- The comparisons are fully zero-effort, meaning impostors are paired without attention to sex, age or other covariates. However, later analysis is conducted on subsets.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

- ▷ The number of persons is on the order of 10^5.
- ▷ The number of images used to make 1 template is 1.
- ▷ The number of templates used to make each comparison score is two corresponding to simple one-to-one verification.

For mugshot images:

- ▷ The comparisons are of mugshot photos against mugshot photos.
- ▷ The number of genuine comparisons is on the order of 10^6.
- ▷ The number of impostor comparisons is on the order of 10^8.
- ▷ The impostors are paired by sex, but not by age or other covariates.
- ▷ The number of persons is on the order of 10^6.
- ▷ The number of images used to make 1 template is 1.
- ▷ The number of templates used to make each comparison score is two corresponding to simple one-to-one verification.

Method: For wild images:

- ▷ The comparisons are of wild photos against wild photos.
- ▷ The number of genuine comparisons is on the order of 10^6.
- ▷ The number of impostor comparisons is on the order of 10^7.
- ▷ The comparisons are fully zero-effort, meaning impostors are paired without attention to sex, age or other covariates.
- ▷ The number of persons is on the order of 10^4.
- ▷ The number of images used to make 1 template is 1.
- ▷ The number of templates used to make each comparison score is two corresponding to simple one-to-one verification.

For child exploitation images:

- ▷ The comparisons are of unconstrained child exploitation photos against others of the same type.
- ▷ The number of genuine comparisons is on the order of 10^4.
- ▷ The number of impostor comparisons is on the order of 10^7.
- ▷ The comparisons are fully zero-effort, meaning impostors are paired without attention to sex, age or other covariates.
- ▷ The number of persons is on the order of 10^3.
- ▷ The number of images used to make 1 template is 1.
- ▷ The number of templates used to make each comparison score is two corresponding to simple one-to-one verification.

▷ We produce two performance statements. First, is a DET as used for visa and mugshot images. The second is a cumulative match characteristic (CMC) summarizing a simulated one-to-many search process. This is done as follows.

- We regard M enrollment templates as items in a gallery.
- These M templates come from $M > N$ individuals, because multiple images of a subject are present in the gallery under separate identifiers.
- We regard the verification templates as search templates.
- For each search we compute the rank of the highest scoring mate.
- This process should properly be conducted with a 1:N algorithm, such as those tested in NIST IR 8009. We use the 1:1 algorithms in a simulated 1:N mode here to a) better reflect what a child exploitation analyst does, and b) to show algorithm efficacy is better than that revealed in the verification DETs.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

3.3 Failure to enroll

	Algorithm	Failure to Enrol Rate[1]							
	Name	CHILD-EXPLOIT		MUGSHOT		VISA		WILD	
1	3divi-003	0.1806	71	0.0007	137	0.0006	131	0.0294	153
2	3divi-004	0.2302	82	0.0008	141	0.0006	133	0.0222	150
3	adera-001	0.1928	75	0.0003	107	0.0005	125	0.0505	165
4	aifirst-001	0.0000	4	0.0000	2	0.0000	2	0.0000	39
5	ailabs-001	-	185	0.0007	140	0.0005	114	-	185
6	aimall-001	0.0000	20	0.0000	16	0.0000	17	0.0001	47
7	aiunionface-000	-	185	0.0000	23	0.0000	25	0.0000	42
8	alchera-000	-	185	0.0004	121	0.0014	164	0.0038	117
9	alchera-001	-	185	0.0004	120	0.0014	163	0.0038	116
10	allgovision-000	-	185	0.0026	171	0.0052	181	0.0131	139
11	alphaface-001	-	185	0.0000	61	0.0004	101	0.0004	66
12	amplifiedgroup-001	-	185	0.0189	184	0.0279	187	0.1390	179
13	anke-004	0.0944	55	0.0001	77	0.0004	102	0.0006	84
14	anke-005	0.1228	62	0.0001	87	0.0004	107	0.0007	86
15	antheus-000	0.0000	18	0.0000	40	0.0000	43	0.0242	151
16	anyvision-002	0.4866	100	0.0070	181	0.0090	184	0.1146	175
17	anyvision-004	0.1660	68	0.0001	86	0.0004	93	0.0080	129
18	asusaics-000	-	185	0.0000	18	0.0000	19	0.0000	14
19	aware-003	0.3314	92	0.0016	165	0.0013	160	0.0745	172
20	aware-004	-	185	0.0002	93	0.0005	112	0.0014	106
21	awiros-001	-	185	0.0386	185	0.0872	188	0.3415	183
22	ayonix-000	0.0000	3	0.0113	182	0.0137	186	0.1194	176
23	bioidtechswiss-000	-	185	0.0003	106	0.0004	109	0.0006	80
24	bm-001	0.0000	22	0.0000	46	0.0000	20	0.0000	15
25	camvi-002	0.0000	5	0.0000	29	0.0000	31	0.0000	24
26	camvi-004	0.0000	10	0.0000	33	0.0000	36	0.0000	29
27	ceiec-001	-	185	0.0029	174	0.0023	170	0.0068	126
28	ceiec-002	0.2482	86	0.0036	176	0.0031	177	0.0081	130
29	chtface-001	-	185	0.0000	36	0.0000	39	0.0000	32
30	chtface-002	-	185	0.0002	103	0.0007	137	0.0014	104
31	cib-000	-	185	0.0001	88	0.0000	33	0.0000	26
32	cogent-003	-	185	0.0001	72	0.0004	90	0.0009	99
33	cogent-004	0.0000	7	0.0000	4	0.0000	4	0.0000	2
34	cognitec-000	0.6342	104	0.0007	138	0.0007	141	0.0388	161
35	cognitec-001	-	185	0.0008	145	0.0010	145	0.0185	145
36	ctbcbank-000	0.3285	91	0.0011	153	0.0019	168	0.0868	174
37	ctbcbank-001	-	185	0.0005	131	0.0010	146	0.0844	173
38	cyberextruder-001	0.5338	102	0.0024	169	0.0029	175	0.0597	169
39	cyberextruder-002	0.2672	89	0.0027	172	0.0028	174	0.0335	158
40	cyberlink-002	0.1463	67	0.0004	114	0.0004	111	0.0007	88
41	cyberlink-003	-	185	0.0001	64	0.0004	77	0.0008	91
42	dahua-003	0.2222	81	0.0002	99	0.0003	57	0.0002	51
43	dahua-004	-	185	0.0001	85	0.0003	53	0.0002	52
44	deepglint-001	0.0000	23	0.0000	19	0.0000	21	0.0000	16
45	deepglint-002	0.0669	49	0.0002	100	0.0004	79	0.0003	58
46	deepsea-001	0.0000	11	0.0000	7	0.0000	7	0.0000	5
47	dermalog-005	0.1796	69	0.0013	159	0.0041	178	0.0163	143
48	dermalog-006	0.1797	70	0.0013	158	0.0041	179	0.0163	144
49	didiglobalface-001	0.2175	78	0.0000	60	0.0004	100	0.0004	65
50	digitalbarriers-002	-	185	0.0028	173	0.0027	173	0.0071	127
51	dsk-000	0.0000	17	0.0000	13	0.0000	13	0.0000	10
52	einetworks-000	-	185	0.0002	97	0.0005	123	0.0008	92
53	everai-paravision-003	0.0705	51	0.0002	92	0.0004	78	0.0004	72
54	f8-001	0.2026	77	0.0035	175	0.0030	176	0.0087	133
55	facesoft-000	0.0000	29	0.0000	44	0.0000	47	0.0000	37
56	glory-001	0.0000	14	0.0051	179	0.0010	147	0.1651	180
57	glory-002	-	185	0.0015	161	0.0011	157	0.0557	167
58	gorilla-003	0.1347	63	0.0003	113	0.0004	110	0.0043	120
59	gorilla-004	-	185	0.0000	50	0.0003	61	0.0004	69
60	hik-001	-	185	0.0000	35	0.0000	38	0.0000	31

Table 11: FTE is the proportion of failed template generation attempts. Failures can occur because the software throws an exception, or because the software electively refuses to process the input image. This would typically occur if a face is not detected. FTE is measured as the number of function calls that give EITHER a non-zero error code OR that give a "small" template. This is defined as one whose size is less than 0.3 times the median template size for that algorithm. This second rule is needed because some algorithms incorrectly fail to return a non-zero error code when template generation fails.

[1] The effects of FTE are included in the accuracy results of this report by regarding any template comparison involving a failed template to produce a low similarity score. Thus higher FTE results in higher FNMR and lower FMR.

	Algorithm	Failure to Enrol Rate[1]							
	Name	CHILD-EXPLOIT		MUGSHOT		VISA		WILD	
61	hr-001	0.1198	61	0.0001	63	0.0004	81	0.0003	61
62	hr-002	-	185	0.0002	96	0.0004	103	0.0004	64
63	id3-003	0.3032	90	0.0016	166	0.0011	156	0.0317	156
64	id3-004	-	185	0.0015	164	0.0011	155	-	185
65	idemia-004	-	185	0.0000	52	0.0004	74	0.0003	62
66	idemia-005	0.0239	34	0.0000	49	0.0003	63	0.0003	57
67	iit-001	0.0843	54	0.0001	90	0.0004	96	0.0104	134
68	iit-002	-	185	0.0009	148	0.0005	128	0.0443	163
69	imagus-000	0.1107	59	0.0010	152	0.0012	159	0.0347	159
70	imagus-001	-	185	0.0001	78	0.0004	97	0.0396	162
71	imperial-000	-	185	0.0000	22	0.0000	24	0.0000	19
72	imperial-002	0.0000	9	0.0000	6	0.0000	6	0.0000	4
73	incode-004	0.2202	79	0.0004	125	0.0007	135	0.0014	105
74	incode-005	-	185	0.0001	73	0.0004	95	0.0007	89
75	innovativetechnologyltd-001	-	185	0.0024	170	0.0025	172	0.0055	124
76	innovatrics-004	0.1170	60	0.0000	59	0.0004	98	0.0041	119
77	innovatrics-006	0.0350	37	0.0000	54	0.0004	71	0.0003	63
78	intellicloudai-001	-	185	0.0000	43	0.0000	46	0.0001	48
79	intellifusion-001	0.0949	56	0.0001	69	0.0003	66	0.0005	78
80	intellivision-001	0.5495	103	0.0048	178	0.0042	180	0.1358	177
81	intellivision-002	-	185	0.0012	155	0.0005	129	0.0146	140
82	intelresearch-000	-	185	0.0000	56	0.0003	65	0.0001	49
83	intsysmsu-000	-	185	0.0004	119	0.0012	158	0.0031	115
84	intsysmsu-001	-	185	0.0001	76	0.0004	94	0.0004	70
85	iqface-000	0.0000	12	0.0000	34	0.0000	37	0.0000	30
86	iqface-001	-	185	0.0000	45	0.0000	14	0.0000	11
87	isap-001	-	185	0.0000	32	0.0000	35	0.0000	28
88	isityou-000	0.4714	98	0.0023	167	0.0010	149	0.0663	171
89	isystems-001	0.1421	65	0.0010	150	0.0007	138	0.0128	137
90	isystems-002	0.1421	66	0.0010	151	0.0007	139	0.0128	138
91	itmo-005	0.1353	64	0.0005	128	0.0002	49	0.0075	128
92	itmo-006	-	185	0.0004	124	0.0004	92	0.0006	83
93	kakao-001	-	185	0.0002	101	0.0005	116	0.0310	154
94	kakao-002	0.2494	87	0.0002	102	0.0005	120	0.0310	155
95	kedacom-000	0.0000	21	0.0000	17	0.0000	18	0.0000	13
96	kneron-003	0.4883	101	0.0044	177	0.0016	167	0.1823	181
97	kneron-004	-	185	0.0015	163	0.0007	142	0.0201	146
98	lookman-002	-	185	0.0000	31	0.0000	34	0.0000	27
99	lookman-004	0.0000	1	0.0000	27	0.0000	29	0.0000	22
100	luxand-000	-	185	0.0000	8	0.0000	8	0.0000	6
101	megvii-001	0.0274	36	0.0007	139	0.0004	76	0.0152	142
102	megvii-002	0.0274	35	0.0054	180	0.0004	75	0.0126	136
103	meiya-001	-	185	0.0004	126	0.0010	150	0.0025	112
104	microfocus-001	0.0791	53	0.0008	144	0.0016	166	0.0220	149
105	microfocus-002	0.0791	52	0.0008	143	0.0016	165	0.0220	148
106	mt-000	0.1043	57	0.0002	98	0.0004	104	0.0004	67
107	mvision-001	-	185	0.0000	28	0.0000	30	0.0000	23
108	neurotechnology-005	-	185	0.0004	117	0.0004	83	0.0018	108
109	neurotechnology-006	0.1068	58	0.0004	118	0.0004	84	0.0018	109
110	nodeflux-001	-	185	0.0001	79	0.0002	52	0.0003	56
111	nodeflux-002	-	185	0.0008	142	0.0005	122	0.0008	96
112	notiontag-000	0.0000	27	0.0000	24	0.0000	26	0.0000	20
113	ntechlab-006	-	185	0.0000	48	0.0004	69	0.0003	55
114	ntechlab-007	0.0682	50	0.0001	66	0.0004	72	0.0005	77
115	pa-004	-	185	0.0001	65	0.0004	99	0.0006	79
116	paravision-004	0.0570	44	0.0002	95	0.0004	87	0.0008	90
117	pixelall-002	0.0001	30	0.0000	12	0.0000	12	0.0001	44
118	pixelall-003	-	185	0.0000	38	0.0000	41	0.0000	33
119	psl-002	-	185	0.0000	15	0.0000	16	0.0000	12
120	psl-003	-	185	0.0000	57	0.0004	91	0.0003	60

Table 12: FTE is the proportion of failed template generation attempts. Failures can occur because the software throws an exception, or because the software electively refuses to process the input image. This would typically occur if a face is not detected. FTE is measured as the number of function calls that give EITHER a non-zero error code OR that give a "small" template. This is defined as one whose size is less than 0.3 times the median template size for that algorithm. This second rule is needed because some algorithms incorrectly fail to return a non-zero error code when template generation fails.

[1] The effects of FTE are included in the accuracy results of this report by regarding any template comparison involving a failed template to produce a low similarity score. Thus higher FTE results in higher FNMR and lower FMR.

	Algorithm	Failure to Enrol Rate[1]							
	Name	CHILD-EXPLOIT		MUGSHOT		VISA		WILD	
121	pyramid-000	-	185	0.0005	130	0.0007	140	0.0015	107
122	rankone-007	0.3518	94	0.0003	109	0.0004	106	0.0043	121
123	rankone-008	-	185	0.0003	104	0.0004	67	0.0040	118
124	realnetworks-002	-	185	0.0004	116	0.0003	59	0.0004	71
125	realnetworks-003	0.0076	32	0.0004	115	0.0003	58	0.0004	73
126	remarkai-001	-	185	0.0000	26	0.0000	28	0.0000	43
127	remarkai-002	-	185	0.0000	14	0.0000	15	0.0000	40
128	rokid-000	-	185	0.0001	75	0.0005	121	0.0354	160
129	s1-001	-	185	0.0013	156	0.0007	136	0.0600	170
130	saffe-001	0.0000	26	0.0000	21	0.0000	23	0.0000	18
131	saffe-002	-	185	0.0000	41	0.0000	44	0.0000	34
132	samtech-001	-	185	0.0004	123	0.0008	143	0.0013	103
133	scanovate-001	-	185	0.0024	168	0.0014	162	0.2751	182
134	sensetime-002	0.3345	93	0.0011	154	0.0005	127	0.0218	147
135	sensetime-003	0.0554	42	0.0000	47	0.0004	88	0.0004	74
136	sertis-000	-	185	0.0000	62	0.0004	80	0.0004	68
137	shaman-000	0.0000	6	0.0000	30	0.0000	32	0.0000	25
138	shaman-001	0.0000	2	0.0000	1	0.0000	1	0.0000	38
139	shu-001	0.1822	72	0.0010	149	0.0006	130	0.0499	164
140	shu-002	-	185	0.0005	127	0.0004	105	0.0007	87
141	siat-002	0.0616	46	0.0000	55	0.0004	89	0.0048	123
142	siat-004	-	185	0.0000	53	0.0004	86	0.0003	59
143	sjtu-001	-	185	0.0005	129	0.0004	108	0.0008	94
144	smilart-002	0.2422	84	0.0003	112	0.0011	152	0.0575	168
145	smilart-003	-	185	0.0014	160	0.0013	161	0.0555	166
146	starhybrid-001	0.2340	83	0.0009	147	0.0023	171	0.0044	122
147	synesis-005	0.1862	73	0.0001	74	0.0005	113	0.0021	110
148	synesis-006	-	185	0.0000	58	0.0003	55	0.0002	54
149	synology-000	-	185	0.0000	10	0.0000	10	0.0000	8
150	tech5-002	-	185	0.0001	71	0.0003	54	0.0000	41
151	tech5-003	0.0016	31	0.0001	70	0.0003	56	0.0002	50
152	tevian-004	-	185	0.0002	94	0.0005	124	0.0057	125
153	tevian-005	0.3606	95	0.0006	135	0.0006	134	0.0012	101
154	tiger-002	0.0619	47	0.0001	82	0.0004	85	0.0082	132
155	tiger-003	0.0619	48	0.0001	80	0.0004	82	0.0082	131
156	tongyi-005	0.0000	8	0.0000	5	0.0000	5	0.0000	3
157	toshiba-002	0.0000	16	0.0000	11	0.0000	11	0.0000	9
158	toshiba-003	-	185	0.0001	83	0.0001	48	0.0002	53
159	trueface-000	-	185	0.0000	42	0.0000	45	0.0000	35
160	tuputech-000	-	185	0.0632	186	0.0081	183	0.6383	184
161	ulsee-001	-	185	0.0000	39	0.0000	42	0.0001	45
162	uluface-002	0.0000	28	0.0000	25	0.0000	27	0.0000	21
163	uluface-003	-	185	0.0002	91	0.0002	50	0.0244	152
164	upc-001	0.0450	39	0.0003	105	0.0003	64	0.0011	100
165	vd-001	-	185	0.0004	122	0.0009	144	0.0024	111
166	veridas-002	-	185	0.0001	84	0.0005	119	0.0006	82
167	veridas-003	0.1893	74	0.0001	81	0.0005	117	0.0006	81
168	via-000	0.0000	13	0.0000	37	0.0000	40	0.0001	46
169	videonetics-001	0.4799	99	0.0015	162	0.0010	148	0.0112	135
170	videonetics-002	0.4598	97	0.0006	136	0.0005	126	0.0013	102
171	vigilantsolutions-006	-	185	0.0001	68	0.0004	73	0.0005	76
172	vigilantsolutions-007	0.2538	88	0.0001	67	0.0004	70	0.0005	75
173	vion-000	0.6388	105	0.0130	183	0.0078	182	0.1389	178
174	visionbox-000	-	185	0.0005	134	0.0011	154	0.0028	114
175	visionbox-001	-	185	0.0005	133	0.0011	153	0.0028	113
176	visionlabs-006	-	185	0.0003	111	0.0005	118	0.0009	98
177	visionlabs-007	0.1939	76	0.0003	110	0.0005	115	0.0008	95
178	vocord-006	-	185	0.0003	108	0.0003	62	0.0008	93
179	vocord-007	0.0000	19	0.0001	89	0.0004	68	0.0009	97
180	winsense-000	0.0000	15	0.0000	9	0.0000	9	0.0000	7

Table 13: FTE is the proportion of failed template generation attempts. Failures can occur because the software throws an exception, or because the software electively refuses to process the input image. This would typically occur if a face is not detected. FTE is measured as the number of function calls that give EITHER a non-zero error code OR that give a "small" template. This is defined as one whose size is less than 0.3 times the median template size for that algorithm. This second rule is needed because some algorithms incorrectly fail to return a non-zero error code when template generation fails.

[1] *The effects of FTE are included in the accuracy results of this report by regarding any template comparison involving a failed template to produce a low similarity score. Thus higher FTE results in higher FNMR and lower FMR.*

	Algorithm	Failure to Enrol Rate[1]							
	Name	CHILD-EXPLOIT		MUGSHOT		VISA		WILD	
181	winsense-001	0.0000	24	0.0000	20	0.0000	22	0.0000	17
182	x-laboratory-000	0.0000	25	0.0005	132	0.0002	51	0.0000	36
183	yisheng-004	0.4279	96	0.0013	157	0.0006	132	0.0321	157
184	yitu-003	-	185	0.0009	146	0.0000	3	0.0000	1

Table 14: FTE is the proportion of failed template generation attempts. Failures can occur because the software throws an exception, or because the software electively refuses to process the input image. This would typically occur if a face is not detected. FTE is measured as the number of function calls that give EITHER a non-zero error code OR that give a "small" template. This is defined as one whose size is less than 0.3 times the median template size for that algorithm. This second rule is needed because some algorithms incorrectly fail to return a non-zero error code when template generation fails.
[1] The effects of FTE are included in the accuracy results of this report by regarding any template comparison involving a failed template to produce a low similarity score. Thus higher FTE results in higher FNMR and lower FMR.

3.4 Recognition accuracy

Core algorithm accuracy is stated via:

- ▷ **Cooperative subjects**
  - The summary table of Figure 10;
  - The visa image DETs of Figure 30;
  - The mugshot DETs of Figure 40;
  - The mugshot ageing profiles of Figure 146;
  - The human-difficult pairs of Figure 11
- ▷ **Non-cooperative subjects**
  - The photojournalism DET of Figure 48
  - The child-exploitation DET of Figure 53;
  - The child-exploitation CMC of Figure 57.

Figure 119 shows dependence of false match rate on algorithm score threshold. This allows a deployer to set a threshold to target a particular false match rate appropriate to the security objectives of the application.

Figure 100 likewise shows FMR(T) but for mugshots, and specially four subsets of the population.

Note that in both the mugshot and visa sets false match rates vary with the ethnicity, age, and sex, of the enrollee and impostor - see section 3.6. For example figure 67 summarizes FMR for impostors paired from four groups black females, black males, white females, white males.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 4: The Figure shows, in blue, algorithms that correctly separate the 12 genuine and 8 impostor pairs used in the May 2018 paper Face recognition accuracy of forensic examiners, superrecognizers, and face recognition algorithms *(Phillips et al. [1]). In red are algorithms that are imperfect. Some algorithms fail only because they failed to make a template e.g. due to face detection failure (shown as a triangle). Others fail because the pairs were selected for that study because they had been difficult for three leading algorithms used in FRVT 2006. Caution: Given the small sample size (n=20) the figure may change substantially if larger or different sets were used. The images can be downloaded from the* Supplemental Information *page provided with that publication.*

Figure 5: The Figure shows, in blue, algorithms that correctly separate the 12 genuine and 8 impostor pairs used in the May 2018 paper Face recognition accuracy of forensic examiners, superrecognizers, and face recognition algorithms *(Phillips et al. [1]). In red are algorithms that are imperfect. Some algorithms fail only because they failed to make a template e.g. due to face detection failure (shown as a triangle). Others fail because the pairs were selected for that study because they had been difficult for three leading algorithms used in FRVT 2006. Caution: Given the small sample size (n=20) the figure may change substantially if larger or different sets were used. The images can be downloaded from the* Supplemental Information *page provided with that publication.*

Figure 6: The Figure shows, in blue, algorithms that correctly separate the 12 genuine and 8 impostor pairs used in the May 2018 paper Face recognition accuracy of forensic examiners, superrecognizers, and face recognition algorithms *(Phillips et al. [1]). In red are algorithms that are imperfect. Some algorithms fail only because they failed to make a template e.g. due to face detection failure (shown as a triangle). Others fail because the pairs were selected for that study because they had been difficult for three leading algorithms used in FRVT 2006. Caution: Given the small sample size (n=20) the figure may change substantially if larger or different sets were used. The images can be downloaded from the* Supplemental Information *page provided with that publication.*

Figure 7: The Figure shows, in blue, algorithms that correctly separate the 12 genuine and 8 impostor pairs used in the May 2018 paper Face recognition accuracy of forensic examiners, superrecognizers, and face recognition algorithms *(Phillips et al. [1]). In red are algorithms that are imperfect. Some algorithms fail only because they failed to make a template e.g. due to face detection failure (shown as a triangle). Others fail because the pairs were selected for that study because they had been difficult for three leading algorithms used in FRVT 2006. Caution: Given the small sample size (n=20) the figure may change substantially if larger or different sets were used. The images can be downloaded from the* Supplemental Information *page provided with that publication.*

Figure 8: The Figure shows, in blue, algorithms that correctly separate the 12 genuine and 8 impostor pairs used in the May 2018 paper Face recognition accuracy of forensic examiners, superrecognizers, and face recognition algorithms *(Phillips et al. [1]). In red are algorithms that are imperfect. Some algorithms fail only because they failed to make a template e.g. due to face detection failure (shown as a triangle). Others fail because the pairs were selected for that study because they had been difficult for three leading algorithms used in FRVT 2006. Caution: Given the small sample size (n=20) the figure may change substantially if larger or different sets were used. The images can be downloaded from the* Supplemental Information *page provided with that publication.*

Figure 9: The Figure shows, in blue, algorithms that correctly separate the 12 genuine and 8 impostor pairs used in the May 2018 paper Face recognition accuracy of forensic examiners, superrecognizers, and face recognition algorithms *(Phillips et al. [1]). In red are algorithms that are imperfect. Some algorithms fail only because they failed to make a template e.g. due to face detection failure (shown as a triangle). Others fail because the pairs were selected for that study because they had been difficult for three leading algorithms used in FRVT 2006. Caution: Given the small sample size (n=20) the figure may change substantially if larger or different sets were used. The images can be downloaded from the* Supplemental Information *page provided with that publication.*

Figure 10: The Figure shows, in blue, algorithms that correctly separate the 12 genuine and 8 impostor pairs used in the May 2018 paper Face recognition accuracy of forensic examiners, superrecognizers, and face recognition algorithms *(Phillips et al. [1]). In red are algorithms that are imperfect. Some algorithms fail only because they failed to make a template e.g. due to face detection failure (shown as a triangle). Others fail because the pairs were selected for that study because they had been difficult for three leading algorithms used in FRVT 2006. Caution: Given the small sample size (n=20) the figure may change substantially if larger or different sets were used. The images can be downloaded from the* Supplemental Information *page provided with that publication.*

Figure 11: The Figure shows, in blue, algorithms that correctly separate the 12 genuine and 8 impostor pairs used in the May 2018 paper Face recognition accuracy of forensic examiners, superrecognizers, and face recognition algorithms *(Phillips et al. [1]). In red are algorithms that are imperfect. Some algorithms fail only because they failed to make a template e.g. due to face detection failure (shown as a triangle). Others fail because the pairs were selected for that study because they had been difficult for three leading algorithms used in FRVT 2006. Caution: Given the small sample size (n=20) the figure may change substantially if larger or different sets were used. The images can be downloaded from the* Supplemental Information *page provided with that publication.*

Figure 12: For the visa images, detection error tradeoff (DET) characteristics showing false non-match rate vs. false match rate plotted parametrically on threshold, T. The scales are logarithmic in order to show many decades of FMR.

Figure 13: For the visa images, detection error tradeoff (DET) characteristics showing false non-match rate vs. false match rate plotted parametrically on threshold, T. The scales are logarithmic in order to show many decades of FMR.

Figure 14: For the visa images, detection error tradeoff (DET) characteristics showing false non-match rate vs. false match rate plotted parametrically on threshold, T. The scales are logarithmic in order to show many decades of FMR.

Figure 15: For the visa images, detection error tradeoff (DET) characteristics showing false non-match rate vs. false match rate plotted parametrically on threshold, T. The scales are logarithmic in order to show many decades of FMR.

Figure 16: For the visa images, detection error tradeoff (DET) characteristics showing false non-match rate vs. false match rate plotted parametrically on threshold, T. The scales are logarithmic in order to show many decades of FMR.

Figure 17: For the visa images, detection error tradeoff (DET) characteristics showing false non-match rate vs. false match rate plotted parametrically on threshold, T. The scales are logarithmic in order to show many decades of FMR.

Figure 18: For the visa images, detection error tradeoff (DET) characteristics showing false non-match rate vs. false match rate plotted parametrically on threshold, T. The scales are logarithmic in order to show many decades of FMR.

Figure 19: For the visa images, detection error tradeoff (DET) characteristics showing false non-match rate vs. false match rate plotted parametrically on threshold, T. The scales are logarithmic in order to show many decades of FMR.

Figure 20: For the visa images, detection error tradeoff (DET) characteristics showing false non-match rate vs. false match rate plotted parametrically on threshold, T. The scales are logarithmic in order to show many decades of FMR.

Figure 21: For the visa images, detection error tradeoff (DET) characteristics showing false non-match rate vs. false match rate plotted parametrically on threshold, T. The scales are logarithmic in order to show many decades of FMR.

Figure 22: For the visa images, detection error tradeoff (DET) characteristics showing false non-match rate vs. false match rate plotted parametrically on threshold, T. The scales are logarithmic in order to show many decades of FMR.

Figure 23: For the visa images, detection error tradeoff (DET) characteristics showing false non-match rate vs. false match rate plotted parametrically on threshold, T. The scales are logarithmic in order to show many decades of FMR.

Figure 24: For the visa images, detection error tradeoff (DET) characteristics showing false non-match rate vs. false match rate plotted parametrically on threshold, T. The scales are logarithmic in order to show many decades of FMR.

Figure 25: For the visa images, detection error tradeoff (DET) characteristics showing false non-match rate vs. false match rate plotted parametrically on threshold, T. The scales are logarithmic in order to show many decades of FMR.

Figure 26: For the visa images, detection error tradeoff (DET) characteristics showing false non-match rate vs. false match rate plotted parametrically on threshold, T. The scales are logarithmic in order to show many decades of FMR.

Figure 27: For the visa images, detection error tradeoff (DET) characteristics showing false non-match rate vs. false match rate plotted parametrically on threshold, T. The scales are logarithmic in order to show many decades of FMR.

Figure 28: For the visa images, detection error tradeoff (DET) characteristics showing false non-match rate vs. false match rate plotted parametrically on threshold, T. The scales are logarithmic in order to show many decades of FMR.

Figure 29: For the visa images, detection error tradeoff (DET) characteristics showing false non-match rate vs. false match rate plotted parametrically on threshold, T. The scales are logarithmic in order to show many decades of FMR.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 30: For the visa images, detection error tradeoff (DET) characteristics showing false non-match rate vs. false match rate plotted parametrically on threshold, T. The scales are logarithmic in order to show many decades of FMR.

Figure 31: For the mugshot images, detection error tradeoff (DET) characteristics showing false non-match rate vs. false match rate plotted parametrically on threshold, T. The scales are logarithmic in order to show decades of FMR.

Figure 32: For the mugshot images, detection error tradeoff (DET) characteristics showing false non-match rate vs. false match rate plotted parametrically on threshold, T. The scales are logarithmic in order to show decades of FMR.

Figure 33: For the mugshot images, detection error tradeoff (DET) characteristics showing false non-match rate vs. false match rate plotted parametrically on threshold, T. The scales are logarithmic in order to show decades of FMR.

Figure 34: For the mugshot images, detection error tradeoff (DET) characteristics showing false non-match rate vs. false match rate plotted parametrically on threshold, T. The scales are logarithmic in order to show decades of FMR.

Figure 35: For the mugshot images, detection error tradeoff (DET) characteristics showing false non-match rate vs. false match rate plotted parametrically on threshold, T. The scales are logarithmic in order to show decades of FMR.

Figure 36: For the mugshot images, detection error tradeoff (DET) characteristics showing false non-match rate vs. false match rate plotted parametrically on threshold, T. The scales are logarithmic in order to show decades of FMR.

Figure 37: For the mugshot images, detection error tradeoff (DET) characteristics showing false non-match rate vs. false match rate plotted parametrically on threshold, T. The scales are logarithmic in order to show decades of FMR.

Figure 38: For the mugshot images, detection error tradeoff (DET) characteristics showing false non-match rate vs. false match rate plotted parametrically on threshold, T. The scales are logarithmic in order to show decades of FMR.

Figure 39: For the mugshot images, detection error tradeoff (DET) characteristics showing false non-match rate vs. false match rate plotted parametrically on threshold, T. The scales are logarithmic in order to show decades of FMR.

Figure 40: For the mugshot images, detection error tradeoff (DET) characteristics showing false non-match rate vs. false match rate plotted parametrically on threshold, T. The scales are logarithmic in order to show decades of FMR.

Figure 41: For the 2018 wild image comparisons, detection error tradeoff (DET) characteristics showing false non-match rate vs. false match rate plotted parametrically on threshold, T. The scales are logarithmic in order to show several decades of FMR.

Figure 42: For the 2018 wild image comparisons, detection error tradeoff (DET) characteristics showing false non-match rate vs. false match rate plotted parametrically on threshold, T. The scales are logarithmic in order to show several decades of FMR.

Figure 43: For the 2018 wild image comparisons, detection error tradeoff (DET) characteristics showing false non-match rate vs. false match rate plotted parametrically on threshold, T. The scales are logarithmic in order to show several decades of FMR.

Figure 44: For the 2018 wild image comparisons, detection error tradeoff (DET) characteristics showing false non-match rate vs. false match rate plotted parametrically on threshold, T. The scales are logarithmic in order to show several decades of FMR.

Figure 45: For the 2018 wild image comparisons, detection error tradeoff (DET) characteristics showing false non-match rate vs. false match rate plotted parametrically on threshold, T. The scales are logarithmic in order to show several decades of FMR.

Figure 46: For the 2018 wild image comparisons, detection error tradeoff (DET) characteristics showing false non-match rate vs. false match rate plotted parametrically on threshold, T. The scales are logarithmic in order to show several decades of FMR.

Figure 47: For the 2018 wild image comparisons, detection error tradeoff (DET) characteristics showing false non-match rate vs. false match rate plotted parametrically on threshold, T. The scales are logarithmic in order to show several decades of FMR.

Figure 48: For the 2018 wild image comparisons, detection error tradeoff (DET) characteristics showing false non-match rate vs. false match rate plotted parametrically on threshold, T. The scales are logarithmic in order to show several decades of FMR.

Figure 49: For child exploitation images, detection error tradeoff (DET) characteristics showing false non-match rate vs. false match rate plotted parametrically on threshold, T. The scales are logarithmic in order to show many decades of FMR. Accuracy is poor because many images have adverse quality characteristics, and because detection and enrollment fails.

Figure 50: For child exploitation images, detection error tradeoff (DET) characteristics showing false non-match rate vs. false match rate plotted parametrically on threshold, T. The scales are logarithmic in order to show many decades of FMR. Accuracy is poor because many images have adverse quality characteristics, and because detection and enrollment fails.

Figure 51: For child exploitation images, detection error tradeoff (DET) characteristics showing false non-match rate vs. false match rate plotted parametrically on threshold, T. The scales are logarithmic in order to show many decades of FMR. Accuracy is poor because many images have adverse quality characteristics, and because detection and enrollment fails.

Figure 52: For child exploitation images, detection error tradeoff (DET) characteristics showing false non-match rate vs. false match rate plotted parametrically on threshold, T. The scales are logarithmic in order to show many decades of FMR. Accuracy is poor because many images have adverse quality characteristics, and because detection and enrollment fails.

Figure 53: For child exploitation images, detection error tradeoff (DET) characteristics showing false non-match rate vs. false match rate plotted parametrically on threshold, T. The scales are logarithmic in order to show many decades of FMR. Accuracy is poor because many images have adverse quality characteristics, and because detection and enrollment fails.

Figure 54: For child exploitation images, cumulative match characteristics (CMC) showing true positive identification rate vs. rank. This is simulation of a one-to-many search experiment - see discussion in section 3.2. The scales are logarithmic in order to show the effect of long candidate lists. Accuracy is poor but much improved relative to the 1:1 DETs of Fig. 53 because a search can succeed if any of a subject's several enrolled images matches the search image with a high score.

Figure 55: For child exploitation images, cumulative match characteristics (CMC) showing true positive identification rate vs. rank. This is simulation of a one-to-many search experiment - see discussion in section 3.2. The scales are logarithmic in order to show the effect of long candidate lists. Accuracy is poor but much improved relative to the 1:1 DETs of Fig. 53 because a search can succeed if any of a subject's several enrolled images matches the search image with a high score.

Figure 56: For child exploitation images, cumulative match characteristics (CMC) showing true positive identification rate vs. rank. This is simulation of a one-to-many search experiment - see discussion in section 3.2. The scales are logarithmic in order to show the effect of long candidate lists. Accuracy is poor but much improved relative to the 1:1 DETs of Fig. 53 because a search can succeed if any of a subject's several enrolled images matches the search image with a high score.

Figure 57: For child exploitation images, cumulative match characteristics (CMC) showing true positive identification rate vs. rank. This is simulation of a one-to-many search experiment - see discussion in section 3.2. The scales are logarithmic in order to show the effect of long candidate lists. Accuracy is poor but much improved relative to the 1:1 DETs of Fig. 53 because a search can succeed if any of a subject's several enrolled images matches the search image with a high score.

Figure 58: For child exploitation images, cumulative match characteristics (CMC) showing true positive identification rate vs. rank for two cases: 1. Whole image provided to the algorithm; 2. Human annotated rectangular region, cropped and provided to the algorithm. The difference between the traces is associated with detection of difficult faces, and fine localization.

Figure 59: For the mugshot images, FMR *for same-sex impostor pairs of images annotated with codes for black female, black male, white female, white male. The threshold is set for each algorithm to give* FMR *= 0.001 for white males which is the demographc that usually gives the lowest* FMR*. This means the top right box is the same color in all panels. The panels are sorted over multiple pages in order of* FMR *on black females, which is the demographc that usually gives the highest* FMR*.*

Figure 60: For the mugshot images, FMR *for same-sex impostor pairs of images annotated with codes for black female, black male, white female, white male. The threshold is set for each algorithm to give* FMR *= 0.001 for white males which is the demographc that usually gives the lowest* FMR*. This means the top right box is the same color in all panels. The panels are sorted over multiple pages in order of* FMR *on black females, which is the demographc that usually gives the highest* FMR*.*

Figure 61: For the mugshot images, FMR *for same-sex impostor pairs of images annotated with codes for black female, black male, white female, white male. The threshold is set for each algorithm to give* FMR *= 0.001 for white males which is the demographc that usually gives the lowest* FMR*. This means the top right box is the same color in all panels. The panels are sorted over multiple pages in order of* FMR *on black females, which is the demographc that usually gives the highest* FMR*.*

Figure 62: For the mugshot images, FMR *for same-sex impostor pairs of images annotated with codes for black female, black male, white female, white male. The threshold is set for each algorithm to give* FMR *= 0.001 for white males which is the demographc that usually gives the lowest* FMR*. This means the top right box is the same color in all panels. The panels are sorted over multiple pages in order of* FMR *on black females, which is the demographc that usually gives the highest* FMR*.*

Figure 63: For the mugshot images, FMR *for same-sex impostor pairs of images annotated with codes for black female, black male, white female, white male. The threshold is set for each algorithm to give* FMR *= 0.001 for white males which is the demographc that usually gives the lowest* FMR*. This means the top right box is the same color in all panels. The panels are sorted over multiple pages in order of* FMR *on black females, which is the demographc that usually gives the highest* FMR*.*

Figure 64: For the mugshot images, FMR *for same-sex impostor pairs of images annotated with codes for black female, black male, white female, white male. The threshold is set for each algorithm to give* FMR *= 0.001 for white males which is the demographc that usually gives the lowest* FMR*. This means the top right box is the same color in all panels. The panels are sorted over multiple pages in order of* FMR *on black females, which is the demographc that usually gives the highest* FMR*.*

Figure 65: For the mugshot images, FMR *for same-sex impostor pairs of images annotated with codes for black female, black male, white female, white male. The threshold is set for each algorithm to give* FMR *= 0.001 for white males which is the demographc that usually gives the lowest* FMR*. This means the top right box is the same color in all panels. The panels are sorted over multiple pages in order of* FMR *on black females, which is the demographc that usually gives the highest* FMR*.*

Figure 66: For the mugshot images, FMR *for same-sex impostor pairs of images annotated with codes for black female, black male, white female, white male. The threshold is set for each algorithm to give* FMR *= 0.001 for white males which is the demographc that usually gives the lowest* FMR*. This means the top right box is the same color in all panels. The panels are sorted over multiple pages in order of* FMR *on black females, which is the demographc that usually gives the highest* FMR*.*

Figure 67: For the mugshot images, FMR *for same-sex impostor pairs of images annotated with codes for black female, black male, white female, white male. The threshold is set for each algorithm to give* FMR *= 0.001 for white males which is the demographc that usually gives the lowest* FMR*. This means the top right box is the same color in all panels. The panels are sorted over multiple pages in order of* FMR *on black females, which is the demographc that usually gives the highest* FMR*.*

Figure 68: For the mugshot images, error tradeoff characteristics for white females, black females, black males and white males. The Z-shaped grey lines correspond to fixed thresholds, showing both *FNMR and FMR vary at one T value. Note: Many of the plots will naively be read as saying women gives worse error rates than men because the solid traces lie above the dotted ones. However, this is misleading and incomplete: The grey lines show the traces reveal horizontal shifts. Thus for the cogent-003 algorithm FNMR for men is* higher *than for women* at a fixed threshold *but, at the same time, FMR is higher for women - see Figure 100. As access control systems almost always operate at a fixed threshold, the naive interpretation is incorrect.*

Figure 69: For the mugshot images, error tradeoff characteristics for white females, black females, black males and white males. The Z-shaped grey lines correspond to fixed thresholds, showing both *FNMR and FMR vary at one T value. Note: Many of the plots will naively be read as saying women gives worse error rates than men because the solid traces lie above the dotted ones. However, this is misleading and incomplete: The grey lines show the traces reveal horizontal shifts. Thus for the cogent-003 algorithm FNMR for men is* higher *than for women* at a fixed threshold *but, at the same time, FMR is higher for women - see Figure 100. As access control systems almost always operate at a fixed threshold, the naive interpretation is incorrect.*

Figure 70: For the mugshot images, error tradeoff characteristics for white females, black females, black males and white males. The Z-shaped grey lines correspond to fixed thresholds, showing both *FNMR and FMR vary at one T value. Note: Many of the plots will naively be read as saying women gives worse error rates than men because the solid traces lie above the dotted ones. However, this is misleading and incomplete: The grey lines show the traces reveal horizontal shifts. Thus for the cogent-003 algorithm FNMR for men is* higher *than for women* at a fixed threshold *but, at the same time, FMR is higher for women - see Figure 100. As access control systems almost always operate at a fixed threshold, the naive interpretation is incorrect.*

Figure 71: For the mugshot images, error tradeoff characteristics for white females, black females, black males and white males. The Z-shaped grey lines correspond to fixed thresholds, showing both *FNMR and FMR vary at one T value. Note: Many of the plots will naively be read as saying women gives worse error rates than men because the solid traces lie above the dotted ones. However, this is misleading and incomplete: The grey lines show the traces reveal horizontal shifts. Thus for the cogent-003 algorithm FNMR for men is* higher *than for women* at a fixed threshold *but, at the same time, FMR is higher for women - see Figure 100. As access control systems almost always operate at a fixed threshold, the naive interpretation is incorrect.*

Figure 72: For the mugshot images, error tradeoff characteristics for white females, black females, black males and white males. The Z-shaped grey lines correspond to fixed thresholds, showing both *FNMR and FMR vary at one T value. Note: Many of the plots will naively be read as saying women gives worse error rates than men because the solid traces lie above the dotted ones. However, this is misleading and incomplete: The grey lines show the traces reveal horizontal shifts. Thus for the cogent-003 algorithm FNMR for men is* higher *than for women* at a fixed threshold *but, at the same time, FMR is higher for women - see Figure 100. As access control systems almost always operate at a fixed threshold, the naive interpretation is incorrect.*

Figure 73: For the mugshot images, error tradeoff characteristics for white females, black females, black males and white males. The Z-shaped grey lines correspond to fixed thresholds, showing both *FNMR and FMR vary at one T value. Note: Many of the plots will naively be read as saying women gives worse error rates than men because the solid traces lie above the dotted ones. However, this is misleading and incomplete: The grey lines show the traces reveal horizontal shifts. Thus for the cogent-003 algorithm FNMR for men is* higher *than for women* at a fixed threshold *but, at the same time, FMR is higher for women - see Figure 100. As access control systems almost always operate at a fixed threshold, the naive interpretation is incorrect.*

Figure 74: For the mugshot images, error tradeoff characteristics for white females, black females, black males and white males. The Z-shaped grey lines correspond to fixed thresholds, showing both *FNMR and FMR vary at one T value. Note: Many of the plots will naively be read as saying women gives worse error rates than men because the solid traces lie above the dotted ones. However, this is misleading and incomplete: The grey lines show the traces reveal horizontal shifts. Thus for the cogent-003 algorithm FNMR for men is* higher *than for women* at a fixed threshold *but, at the same time, FMR is higher for women - see Figure 100. As access control systems almost always operate at a fixed threshold, the naive interpretation is incorrect.*

Figure 75: For the mugshot images, error tradeoff characteristics for white females, black females, black males and white males. The Z-shaped grey lines correspond to fixed thresholds, showing both *FNMR and FMR vary at one T value. Note: Many of the plots will naively be read as saying women gives worse error rates than men because the solid traces lie above the dotted ones. However, this is misleading and incomplete: The grey lines show the traces reveal horizontal shifts. Thus for the cogent-003 algorithm FNMR for men is* higher *than for women* at a fixed threshold *but, at the same time, FMR is higher for women - see Figure 100. As access control systems almost always operate at a fixed threshold, the naive interpretation is incorrect.*

Figure 76: For the mugshot images, error tradeoff characteristics for white females, black females, black males and white males. The Z-shaped grey lines correspond to fixed thresholds, showing both *FNMR and FMR vary at one T value. Note: Many of the plots will naively be read as saying women gives worse error rates than men because the solid traces lie above the dotted ones. However, this is misleading and incomplete: The grey lines show the traces reveal horizontal shifts. Thus for the cogent-003 algorithm FNMR for men is* higher *than for women* at a fixed threshold *but, at the same time, FMR is higher for women - see Figure 100. As access control systems almost always operate at a fixed threshold, the naive interpretation is incorrect.*

Figure 77: For the mugshot images, error tradeoff characteristics for white females, black females, black males and white males. The Z-shaped grey lines correspond to fixed thresholds, showing both *FNMR and FMR vary at one T value. Note: Many of the plots will naively be read as saying women gives worse error rates than men because the solid traces lie above the dotted ones. However, this is misleading and incomplete: The grey lines show the traces reveal horizontal shifts. Thus for the cogent-003 algorithm FNMR for men is* higher *than for women* at a fixed threshold *but, at the same time, FMR is higher for women - see Figure 100. As access control systems almost always operate at a fixed threshold, the naive interpretation is incorrect.*

Figure 78: For the visa images, FNMR and FMR at six operating points along the DET characteristic. At each point a line is drawn between (FMR,FNMR)$_{\text{MALE}}$ and (FMR,FNMR)$_{\text{FEMALE}}$ showing how which sex has lower FMR and/or FNMR. The "M" label denotes male, the other end of the line corresponds to female. The six operating thresholds are selected to give the nominal false match rates given in the legend, and are computed over all impostor pairs regardless of age, sex, and place of birth. The plotted FMR values are broadly an order of magnitude larger than the nominal rates because FMR is computed over demographically-matched impostor pairs i.e individuals of the same sex, from the same geographic region (see section 3.6.1), and the same age group (see section 3.6.2).

Figure 79: For the visa images, FNMR and FMR at six operating points along the DET characteristic. At each point a line is drawn between (FMR,FNMR)$_{\text{MALE}}$ and (FMR,FNMR)$_{\text{FEMALE}}$ showing how which sex has lower FMR and/or FNMR. The "M" label denotes male, the other end of the line corresponds to female. The six operating thresholds are selected to give the nominal false match rates given in the legend, and are computed over all impostor pairs regardless of age, sex, and place of birth. The plotted FMR values are broadly an order of magnitude larger than the nominal rates because FMR is computed over demographically-matched impostor pairs i.e individuals of the same sex, from the same geographic region (see section 3.6.1), and the same age group (see section 3.6.2).

Figure 80: For the visa images, FNMR and FMR at six operating points along the DET characteristic. At each point a line is drawn between (FMR,FNMR)$_{\text{MALE}}$ and (FMR,FNMR)$_{\text{FEMALE}}$ showing how which sex has lower FMR and/or FNMR. The "M" label denotes male, the other end of the line corresponds to female. The six operating thresholds are selected to give the nominal false match rates given in the legend, and are computed over all impostor pairs regardless of age, sex, and place of birth. The plotted FMR values are broadly an order of magnitude larger than the nominal rates because FMR is computed over demographically-matched impostor pairs i.e individuals of the same sex, from the same geographic region (see section 3.6.1), and the same age group (see section 3.6.2).

Figure 81: For the visa images, FNMR and FMR at six operating points along the DET characteristic. At each point a line is drawn between (FMR,FNMR)$_{\text{MALE}}$ and (FMR,FNMR)$_{\text{FEMALE}}$ showing how which sex has lower FMR and/or FNMR. The "M" label denotes male, the other end of the line corresponds to female. The six operating thresholds are selected to give the nominal false match rates given in the legend, and are computed over all impostor pairs regardless of age, sex, and place of birth. The plotted FMR values are broadly an order of magnitude larger than the nominal rates because FMR is computed over demographically-matched impostor pairs i.e individuals of the same sex, from the same geographic region (see section 3.6.1), and the same age group (see section 3.6.2).

Figure 82: For the visa images, FNMR and FMR at six operating points along the DET characteristic. At each point a line is drawn between (FMR,FNMR)$_{\text{MALE}}$ and (FMR,FNMR)$_{\text{FEMALE}}$ showing how which sex has lower FMR and/or FNMR. The "M" label denotes male, the other end of the line corresponds to female. The six operating thresholds are selected to give the nominal false match rates given in the legend, and are computed over all impostor pairs regardless of age, sex, and place of birth. The plotted FMR values are broadly an order of magnitude larger than the nominal rates because FMR is computed over demographically-matched impostor pairs i.e individuals of the same sex, from the same geographic region (see section 3.6.1), and the same age group (see section 3.6.2).

Figure 83: For the visa images, FNMR and FMR at six operating points along the DET characteristic. At each point a line is drawn between (FMR,FNMR)$_{\text{MALE}}$ and (FMR,FNMR)$_{\text{FEMALE}}$ showing how which sex has lower FMR and/or FNMR. The "M" label denotes male, the other end of the line corresponds to female. The six operating thresholds are selected to give the nominal false match rates given in the legend, and are computed over all impostor pairs regardless of age, sex, and place of birth. The plotted FMR values are broadly an order of magnitude larger than the nominal rates because FMR is computed over demographically-matched impostor pairs i.e individuals of the same sex, from the same geographic region (see section 3.6.1), and the same age group (see section 3.6.2).

Figure 84: For the visa images, FNMR and FMR at six operating points along the DET characteristic. At each point a line is drawn between (FMR,FNMR)$_{\text{MALE}}$ and (FMR,FNMR)$_{\text{FEMALE}}$ showing how which sex has lower FMR and/or FNMR. The "M" label denotes male, the other end of the line corresponds to female. The six operating thresholds are selected to give the nominal false match rates given in the legend, and are computed over all impostor pairs regardless of age, sex, and place of birth. The plotted FMR values are broadly an order of magnitude larger than the nominal rates because FMR is computed over demographically-matched impostor pairs i.e individuals of the same sex, from the same geographic region (see section 3.6.1), and the same age group (see section 3.6.2).

Figure 85: For the visa images, FNMR and FMR at six operating points along the DET characteristic. At each point a line is drawn between (FMR,FNMR)$_{\text{MALE}}$ and (FMR,FNMR)$_{\text{FEMALE}}$ showing how which sex has lower FMR and/or FNMR. The "M" label denotes male, the other end of the line corresponds to female. The six operating thresholds are selected to give the nominal false match rates given in the legend, and are computed over all impostor pairs regardless of age, sex, and place of birth. The plotted FMR values are broadly an order of magnitude larger than the nominal rates because FMR is computed over demographically-matched impostor pairs i.e individuals of the same sex, from the same geographic region (see section 3.6.1), and the same age group (see section 3.6.2).

Figure 86: For the visa images, FNMR and FMR at six operating points along the DET characteristic. At each point a line is drawn between (FMR,FNMR)$_{\text{MALE}}$ and (FMR,FNMR)$_{\text{FEMALE}}$ showing how which sex has lower FMR and/or FNMR. The "M" label denotes male, the other end of the line corresponds to female. The six operating thresholds are selected to give the nominal false match rates given in the legend, and are computed over all impostor pairs regardless of age, sex, and place of birth. The plotted FMR values are broadly an order of magnitude larger than the nominal rates because FMR is computed over demographically-matched impostor pairs i.e individuals of the same sex, from the same geographic region (see section 3.6.1), and the same age group (see section 3.6.2).

Figure 87: For the visa images, FNMR and FMR at six operating points along the DET characteristic. At each point a line is drawn between (FMR,FNMR)$_{\text{MALE}}$ and (FMR,FNMR)$_{\text{FEMALE}}$ showing how which sex has lower FMR and/or FNMR. The "M" label denotes male, the other end of the line corresponds to female. The six operating thresholds are selected to give the nominal false match rates given in the legend, and are computed over all impostor pairs regardless of age, sex, and place of birth. The plotted FMR values are broadly an order of magnitude larger than the nominal rates because FMR is computed over demographically-matched impostor pairs i.e individuals of the same sex, from the same geographic region (see section 3.6.1), and the same age group (see section 3.6.2).

Figure 88: For the visa images, FNMR and FMR at six operating points along the DET characteristic. At each point a line is drawn between (FMR,FNMR)$_{\text{MALE}}$ and (FMR,FNMR)$_{\text{FEMALE}}$ showing how which sex has lower FMR and/or FNMR. The "M" label denotes male, the other end of the line corresponds to female. The six operating thresholds are selected to give the nominal false match rates given in the legend, and are computed over all impostor pairs regardless of age, sex, and place of birth. The plotted FMR values are broadly an order of magnitude larger than the nominal rates because FMR is computed over demographically-matched impostor pairs i.e individuals of the same sex, from the same geographic region (see section 3.6.1), and the same age group (see section 3.6.2).

Figure 89: For the visa images, FNMR and FMR at six operating points along the DET characteristic. At each point a line is drawn between (FMR,FNMR)$_{\text{MALE}}$ and (FMR,FNMR)$_{\text{FEMALE}}$ showing how which sex has lower FMR and/or FNMR. The "M" label denotes male, the other end of the line corresponds to female. The six operating thresholds are selected to give the nominal false match rates given in the legend, and are computed over all impostor pairs regardless of age, sex, and place of birth. The plotted FMR values are broadly an order of magnitude larger than the nominal rates because FMR is computed over demographically-matched impostor pairs i.e individuals of the same sex, from the same geographic region (see section 3.6.1), and the same age group (see section 3.6.2).

Figure 90: For the visa images, FNMR and FMR at six operating points along the DET characteristic. At each point a line is drawn between (FMR,FNMR)$_{\text{MALE}}$ and (FMR,FNMR)$_{\text{FEMALE}}$ showing how which sex has lower FMR and/or FNMR. The "M" label denotes male, the other end of the line corresponds to female. The six operating thresholds are selected to give the nominal false match rates given in the legend, and are computed over all impostor pairs regardless of age, sex, and place of birth. The plotted FMR values are broadly an order of magnitude larger than the nominal rates because FMR is computed over demographically-matched impostor pairs i.e individuals of the same sex, from the same geographic region (see section 3.6.1), and the same age group (see section 3.6.2).

Figure 91: For the mugshot images, the false match calibration curves show false match rate vs. threshold. Separate curves appear for white females, black females, black males and white males.

Figure 92: For the mugshot images, the false match calibration curves show false match rate vs. threshold. Separate curves appear for white females, black females, black males and white males.

Figure 93: For the mugshot images, the false match calibration curves show false match rate vs. threshold. Separate curves appear for white females, black females, black males and white males.

Figure 94: For the mugshot images, the false match calibration curves show false match rate vs. threshold. Separate curves appear for white females, black females, black males and white males.

Figure 95: For the mugshot images, the false match calibration curves show false match rate vs. threshold. Separate curves appear for white females, black females, black males and white males.

Figure 96: For the mugshot images, the false match calibration curves show false match rate vs. threshold. Separate curves appear for white females, black females, black males and white males.

Figure 97: For the mugshot images, the false match calibration curves show false match rate vs. threshold. Separate curves appear for white females, black females, black males and white males.

Figure 98: For the mugshot images, the false match calibration curves show false match rate vs. threshold. Separate curves appear for white females, black females, black males and white males.

Figure 99: For the mugshot images, the false match calibration curves show false match rate vs. threshold. Separate curves appear for white females, black females, black males and white males.

Figure 100: For the mugshot images, the false match calibration curves show false match rate vs. threshold. Separate curves appear for white females, black females, black males and white males.

Figure 101: For the visa images, the false match calibration curves show FMR vs. threshold, T. The blue (lower) curves are for zero-effort impostors (i.e. comparing all images against all). The red (upper) curves are for persons of the same-sex, same-age, and same national-origin. This shows that FMR is underestimated (by a factor of 10 or more) by using a zero-effort impostor calculation to calibrate T. As shown later (sec. 3.6), FMR is higher for demographic-matched impostors.

Figure 102: For the visa images, the false match calibration curves show FMR vs. threshold, T. The blue (lower) curves are for zero-effort impostors (i.e. comparing all images against all). The red (upper) curves are for persons of the same-sex, same-age, and same national-origin. This shows that FMR is underestimated (by a factor of 10 or more) by using a zero-effort impostor calculation to calibrate T. As shown later (sec. 3.6), FMR is higher for demographic-matched impostors.

Figure 103: For the visa images, the false match calibration curves show FMR vs. threshold, T. The blue (lower) curves are for zero-effort impostors (i.e. comparing all images against all). The red (upper) curves are for persons of the same-sex, same-age, and same national-origin. This shows that FMR is underestimated (by a factor of 10 or more) by using a zero-effort impostor calculation to calibrate T. As shown later (sec. 3.6), FMR is higher for demographic-matched impostors.

Figure 104: For the visa images, the false match calibration curves show FMR vs. threshold, T. The blue (lower) curves are for zero-effort impostors (i.e. comparing all images against all). The red (upper) curves are for persons of the same-sex, same-age, and same national-origin. This shows that FMR is underestimated (by a factor of 10 or more) by using a zero-effort impostor calculation to calibrate T. As shown later (sec. 3.6), FMR is higher for demographic-matched impostors.

Figure 105: For the visa images, the false match calibration curves show FMR vs. threshold, T. The blue (lower) curves are for zero-effort impostors (i.e. comparing all images against all). The red (upper) curves are for persons of the same-sex, same-age, and same national-origin. This shows that FMR is underestimated (by a factor of 10 or more) by using a zero-effort impostor calculation to calibrate T. As shown later (sec. 3.6), FMR is higher for demographic-matched impostors.

Figure 106: For the visa images, the false match calibration curves show FMR vs. threshold, T. The blue (lower) curves are for zero-effort impostors (i.e. comparing all images against all). The red (upper) curves are for persons of the same-sex, same-age, and same national-origin. This shows that FMR is underestimated (by a factor of 10 or more) by using a zero-effort impostor calculation to calibrate T. As shown later (sec. 3.6), FMR is higher for demographic-matched impostors.

Figure 107: For the visa images, the false match calibration curves show FMR vs. threshold, T. The blue (lower) curves are for zero-effort impostors (i.e. comparing all images against all). The red (upper) curves are for persons of the same-sex, same-age, and same national-origin. This shows that FMR is underestimated (by a factor of 10 or more) by using a zero-effort impostor calculation to calibrate T. As shown later (sec. 3.6), FMR is higher for demographic-matched impostors.

Figure 108: For the visa images, the false match calibration curves show FMR vs. threshold, T. The blue (lower) curves are for zero-effort impostors (i.e. comparing all images against all). The red (upper) curves are for persons of the same-sex, same-age, and same national-origin. This shows that FMR is underestimated (by a factor of 10 or more) by using a zero-effort impostor calculation to calibrate T. As shown later (sec. 3.6), FMR is higher for demographic-matched impostors.

Figure 109: For the visa images, the false match calibration curves show FMR vs. threshold, T. The blue (lower) curves are for zero-effort impostors (i.e. comparing all images against all). The red (upper) curves are for persons of the same-sex, same-age, and same national-origin. This shows that FMR is underestimated (by a factor of 10 or more) by using a zero-effort impostor calculation to calibrate T. As shown later (sec. 3.6), FMR is higher for demographic-matched impostors.

Figure 110: For the visa images, the false match calibration curves show FMR vs. threshold, T. The blue (lower) curves are for zero-effort impostors (i.e. comparing all images against all). The red (upper) curves are for persons of the same-sex, same-age, and same national-origin. This shows that FMR is underestimated (by a factor of 10 or more) by using a zero-effort impostor calculation to calibrate T. As shown later (sec. 3.6), FMR is higher for demographic-matched impostors.

Figure 111: For the visa images, the false match calibration curves show FMR vs. threshold, T. The blue (lower) curves are for zero-effort impostors (i.e. comparing all images against all). The red (upper) curves are for persons of the same-sex, same-age, and same national-origin. This shows that FMR is underestimated (by a factor of 10 or more) by using a zero-effort impostor calculation to calibrate T. As shown later (sec. 3.6), FMR is higher for demographic-matched impostors.

Figure 112: For the visa images, the false match calibration curves show FMR vs. threshold, T. The blue (lower) curves are for zero-effort impostors (i.e. comparing all images against all). The red (upper) curves are for persons of the same-sex, same-age, and same national-origin. This shows that FMR is underestimated (by a factor of 10 or more) by using a zero-effort impostor calculation to calibrate T. As shown later (sec. 3.6), FMR is higher for demographic-matched impostors.

Figure 113: For the visa images, the false match calibration curves show FMR vs. threshold, T. The blue (lower) curves are for zero-effort impostors (i.e. comparing all images against all). The red (upper) curves are for persons of the same-sex, same-age, and same national-origin. This shows that FMR is underestimated (by a factor of 10 or more) by using a zero-effort impostor calculation to calibrate T. As shown later (sec. 3.6), FMR is higher for demographic-matched impostors.

Figure 114: For the visa images, the false match calibration curves show FMR vs. threshold, T. The blue (lower) curves are for zero-effort impostors (i.e. comparing all images against all). The red (upper) curves are for persons of the same-sex, same-age, and same national-origin. This shows that FMR is underestimated (by a factor of 10 or more) by using a zero-effort impostor calculation to calibrate T. As shown later (sec. 3.6), FMR is higher for demographic-matched impostors.

Figure 115: For the visa images, the false match calibration curves show FMR vs. threshold, T. The blue (lower) curves are for zero-effort impostors (i.e. comparing all images against all). The red (upper) curves are for persons of the same-sex, same-age, and same national-origin. This shows that FMR is underestimated (by a factor of 10 or more) by using a zero-effort impostor calculation to calibrate T. As shown later (sec. 3.6), FMR is higher for demographic-matched impostors.

Figure 116: For the visa images, the false match calibration curves show FMR vs. threshold, T. The blue (lower) curves are for zero-effort impostors (i.e. comparing all images against all). The red (upper) curves are for persons of the same-sex, same-age, and same national-origin. This shows that FMR is underestimated (by a factor of 10 or more) by using a zero-effort impostor calculation to calibrate T. As shown later (sec. 3.6), FMR is higher for demographic-matched impostors.

Figure 117: For the visa images, the false match calibration curves show FMR vs. threshold, T. The blue (lower) curves are for zero-effort impostors (i.e. comparing all images against all). The red (upper) curves are for persons of the same-sex, same-age, and same national-origin. This shows that FMR is underestimated (by a factor of 10 or more) by using a zero-effort impostor calculation to calibrate T. As shown later (sec. 3.6), FMR is higher for demographic-matched impostors.

Figure 118: For the visa images, the false match calibration curves show FMR vs. threshold, T. The blue (lower) curves are for zero-effort impostors (i.e. comparing all images against all). The red (upper) curves are for persons of the same-sex, same-age, and same national-origin. This shows that FMR is underestimated (by a factor of 10 or more) by using a zero-effort impostor calculation to calibrate T. As shown later (sec. 3.6), FMR is higher for demographic-matched impostors.

Figure 119: For the visa images, the false match calibration curves show FMR vs. threshold, T. The blue (lower) curves are for zero-effort impostors (i.e. comparing all images against all). The red (upper) curves are for persons of the same-sex, same-age, and same national-origin. This shows that FMR is underestimated (by a factor of 10 or more) by using a zero-effort impostor calculation to calibrate T. As shown later (sec. 3.6), FMR is higher for demographic-matched impostors.

Figure 120: For the visa images, the curves show how false matches are concentrated in certain images. Specifically each line plots FMR(k) with k the number of images rejected in decreasing order of how many false matches that image was involved in. FMR$(0) = 10^{-4}$. In terms of the biometric zoo, the most "wolf-ish" images are rejected first i.e. those enrollment or verification images most often involved in false matches. A flatter response is considered superior. A steeply descending response indicates that certain kinds of images false match against others, e.g. if hypothetically images of men with particular mustaches would falsely match others.

3.5 Genuine distribution stability

3.5.1 Effect of birth place on the genuine distribution

Background: Both skin tone and bone structure vary geographically. Prior studies have reported variations in FNMR and FMR.

Goal: To measure false non-match rate (FNMR) variation with country of birth.

Methods: Thresholds are determined that give FMR = $\{0.001, 0.0001\}$ over the entire impostor set. Then FNMR is measured over 1000 bootstrap replications of the genuine scores. Only those countries with at least 140 individuals are included in the analysis.

Results: Figure 135 shows FNMR by country of birth for the two thresholds.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 121: For the visa images, the dots show FNMR by country of birth for two globally set operating thresholds corresponding to FMR = $\{0.001, 0.0001\}$ computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor scores. The FMR in each bin will vary also - see subsequent impostor heatmaps in sec. 3.6.1. The figures shows an order of magnitude variation in FNMR across country of birth; these effects are likely due quality variations, then demographics like age and race. The error rates in some cases are zero, and in others the DET is flat so the error rates at the two thresholds are identical. The lines span 1% and 99% of boostrap replicated FNMR estimates.

Figure 122: For the visa images, the dots show FNMR by country of birth for two globally set operating thresholds corresponding to FMR = $\{0.001, 0.0001\}$ computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor scores. The FMR in each bin will vary also - see subsequent impostor heatmaps in sec. 3.6.1. The figures shows an order of magnitude variation in FNMR across country of birth; these effects are likely due quality variations, then demographics like age and race. The error rates in some cases are zero, and in others the DET is flat so the error rates at the two thresholds are identical. The lines span 1% and 99% of boostrap replicated FNMR estimates.

Figure 123: For the visa images, the dots show FNMR by country of birth for two globally set operating thresholds corresponding to FMR = $\{0.001, 0.0001\}$ computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor scores. The FMR in each bin will vary also - see subsequent impostor heatmaps in sec. 3.6.1. The figures shows an order of magnitude variation in FNMR across country of birth; these effects are likely due quality variations, then demographics like age and race. The error rates in some cases are zero, and in others the DET is flat so the error rates at the two thresholds are identical. The lines span 1% and 99% of boostrap replicated FNMR estimates.

Figure 124: For the visa images, the dots show FNMR by country of birth for two globally set operating thresholds corresponding to FMR = $\{0.001, 0.0001\}$ computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor scores. The FMR in each bin will vary also - see subsequent impostor heatmaps in sec. 3.6.1. The figures shows an order of magnitude variation in FNMR across country of birth; these effects are likely due quality variations, then demographics like age and race. The error rates in some cases are zero, and in others the DET is flat so the error rates at the two thresholds are identical. The lines span 1% and 99% of boostrap replicated FNMR estimates.

Figure 125: For the visa images, the dots show FNMR by country of birth for two globally set operating thresholds corresponding to FMR = $\{0.001, 0.0001\}$ computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor scores. The FMR in each bin will vary also - see subsequent impostor heatmaps in sec. 3.6.1. The figures shows an order of magnitude variation in FNMR across country of birth; these effects are likely due quality variations, then demographics like age and race. The error rates in some cases are zero, and in others the DET is flat so the error rates at the two thresholds are identical. The lines span 1% and 99% of boostrap replicated FNMR estimates.

Figure 126: For the visa images, the dots show FNMR by country of birth for two globally set operating thresholds corresponding to FMR = $\{0.001, 0.0001\}$ computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor scores. The FMR in each bin will vary also - see subsequent impostor heatmaps in sec. 3.6.1. The figures shows an order of magnitude variation in FNMR across country of birth; these effects are likely due quality variations, then demographics like age and race. The error rates in some cases are zero, and in others the DET is flat so the error rates at the two thresholds are identical. The lines span 1% and 99% of boostrap replicated FNMR estimates.

Figure 127: For the visa images, the dots show FNMR by country of birth for two globally set operating thresholds corresponding to FMR = $\{0.001, 0.0001\}$ computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor scores. The FMR in each bin will vary also - see subsequent impostor heatmaps in sec. 3.6.1. The figures shows an order of magnitude variation in FNMR across country of birth; these effects are likely due quality variations, then demographics like age and race. The error rates in some cases are zero, and in others the DET is flat so the error rates at the two thresholds are identical. The lines span 1% and 99% of boostrap replicated FNMR estimates.

Figure 128: For the visa images, the dots show FNMR by country of birth for two globally set operating thresholds corresponding to FMR = $\{0.001, 0.0001\}$ computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor scores. The FMR in each bin will vary also - see subsequent impostor heatmaps in sec. 3.6.1. The figures shows an order of magnitude variation in FNMR across country of birth; these effects are likely due quality variations, then demographics like age and race. The error rates in some cases are zero, and in others the DET is flat so the error rates at the two thresholds are identical. The lines span 1% and 99% of boostrap replicated FNMR estimates.

Figure 129: For the visa images, the dots show FNMR by country of birth for two globally set operating thresholds corresponding to FMR = $\{0.001, 0.0001\}$ computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor scores. The FMR in each bin will vary also - see subsequent impostor heatmaps in sec. 3.6.1. The figures shows an order of magnitude variation in FNMR across country of birth; these effects are likely due quality variations, then demographics like age and race. The error rates in some cases are zero, and in others the DET is flat so the error rates at the two thresholds are identical. The lines span 1% and 99% of boostrap replicated FNMR estimates.

Figure 130: For the visa images, the dots show FNMR by country of birth for two globally set operating thresholds corresponding to FMR = $\{0.001, 0.0001\}$ computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor scores. The FMR in each bin will vary also - see subsequent impostor heatmaps in sec. 3.6.1. The figures shows an order of magnitude variation in FNMR across country of birth; these effects are likely due quality variations, then demographics like age and race. The error rates in some cases are zero, and in others the DET is flat so the error rates at the two thresholds are identical. The lines span 1% and 99% of boostrap replicated FNMR estimates.

Figure 131: For the visa images, the dots show FNMR by country of birth for two globally set operating thresholds corresponding to FMR = $\{0.001, 0.0001\}$ computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor scores. The FMR in each bin will vary also - see subsequent impostor heatmaps in sec. 3.6.1. The figures shows an order of magnitude variation in FNMR across country of birth; these effects are likely due quality variations, then demographics like age and race. The error rates in some cases are zero, and in others the DET is flat so the error rates at the two thresholds are identical. The lines span 1% and 99% of boostrap replicated FNMR estimates.

Figure 132: For the visa images, the dots show FNMR by country of birth for two globally set operating thresholds corresponding to FMR = $\{0.001, 0.0001\}$ computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor scores. The FMR in each bin will vary also - see subsequent impostor heatmaps in sec. 3.6.1. The figures shows an order of magnitude variation in FNMR across country of birth; these effects are likely due quality variations, then demographics like age and race. The error rates in some cases are zero, and in others the DET is flat so the error rates at the two thresholds are identical. The lines span 1% and 99% of boostrap replicated FNMR estimates.

Figure 133: For the visa images, the dots show FNMR by country of birth for two globally set operating thresholds corresponding to FMR = $\{0.001, 0.0001\}$ computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor scores. The FMR in each bin will vary also - see subsequent impostor heatmaps in sec. 3.6.1. The figures shows an order of magnitude variation in FNMR across country of birth; these effects are likely due quality variations, then demographics like age and race. The error rates in some cases are zero, and in others the DET is flat so the error rates at the two thresholds are identical. The lines span 1% and 99% of boostrap replicated FNMR estimates.

Figure 134: For the visa images, the dots show FNMR by country of birth for two globally set operating thresholds corresponding to FMR = $\{0.001, 0.0001\}$ computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor scores. The FMR in each bin will vary also - see subsequent impostor heatmaps in sec. 3.6.1. The figures shows an order of magnitude variation in FNMR across country of birth; these effects are likely due quality variations, then demographics like age and race. The error rates in some cases are zero, and in others the DET is flat so the error rates at the two thresholds are identical. The lines span 1% and 99% of boostrap replicated FNMR estimates.

Figure 135: For the visa images, the dots show FNMR by country of birth for two globally set operating thresholds corresponding to FMR = $\{0.001, 0.0001\}$ computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor scores. The FMR in each bin will vary also - see subsequent impostor heatmaps in sec. 3.6.1. The figures shows an order of magnitude variation in FNMR across country of birth; these effects are likely due quality variations, then demographics like age and race. The error rates in some cases are zero, and in others the DET is flat so the error rates at the two thresholds are identical. The lines span 1% and 99% of boostrap replicated FNMR estimates.

Caveats: The results may not relate to subject-specific properties. Instead they could reflect image-specific quality differences, which could occur due to collection protocol or software processing variations.

3.5.2 Effect of ageing

Background: Faces change appearance throughout life. This change gradually reduces similarity of a new image to an earlier image. Face recognition algorithms give reduced similarity scores and more frequent false rejections.

Goal: To quantify false non-match rates (FNMR) as a function of elapsed time in an adult population.

Methods: Using the mugshot images, a threshold is set to give FMR = 0.00001 over the entire impostor set. Then FNMR is measured over 1000 bootstrap replications of the genuine scores.

Results: For the visa images, Figure 146 shows how false non-match rates for genuine users, as a function of age group.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 136: For the mugshot images, FNMR *as a function of elapsed time between initial enrollment and second verification images. The panels appear most accurate first, and vertical scale changes on each page. The four traces correspond to images annotated with codes for black female, black male, white female, white male. The threshold is fixed for each algorithm to give FMR = 0.00001 over all ($\widetilde{10}^8$) impostor comparisons. For short time-lapses, the most accurate algorithms give very few errors (FNMR < 0.001) so that the uncertainty estimates are high.*

Figure 137: For the mugshot images, FNMR *as a function of elapsed time between initial enrollment and second verification images. The panels appear most accurate first, and vertical scale changes on each page. The four traces correspond to images annotated with codes for black female, black male, white female, white male. The threshold is fixed for each algorithm to give FMR = 0.00001 over all ($\widetilde{10}^8$) impostor comparisons. For short time-lapses, the most accurate algorithms give very few errors (FNMR < 0.001) so that the uncertainty estimates are high.*

Figure 138: For the mugshot images, FNMR *as a function of elapsed time between initial enrollment and second verification images. The panels appear most accurate first, and vertical scale changes on each page. The four traces correspond to images annotated with codes for black female, black male, white female, white male. The threshold is fixed for each algorithm to give FMR = 0.00001 over all (10^8) impostor comparisons. For short time-lapses, the most accurate algorithms give very few errors (FNMR < 0.001) so that the uncertainty estimates are high.*

Figure 139: For the mugshot images, FNMR *as a function of elapsed time between initial enrollment and second verification images. The panels appear most accurate first, and vertical scale changes on each page. The four traces correspond to images annotated with codes for black female, black male, white female, white male. The threshold is fixed for each algorithm to give FMR = 0.00001 over all (10^8) impostor comparisons. For short time-lapses, the most accurate algorithms give very few errors (FNMR < 0.001) so that the uncertainty estimates are high.*

Figure 140: For the mugshot images, FNMR *as a function of elapsed time between initial enrollment and second verification images. The panels appear most accurate first, and vertical scale changes on each page. The four traces correspond to images annotated with codes for black female, black male, white female, white male. The threshold is fixed for each algorithm to give FMR = 0.00001 over all ($\widetilde{10}^8$) impostor comparisons. For short time-lapses, the most accurate algorithms give very few errors (FNMR < 0.001) so that the uncertainty estimates are high.*

Figure 141: For the mugshot images, FNMR *as a function of elapsed time between initial enrollment and second verification images. The panels appear most accurate first, and vertical scale changes on each page. The four traces correspond to images annotated with codes for black female, black male, white female, white male. The threshold is fixed for each algorithm to give FMR = 0.00001 over all (10^8) impostor comparisons. For short time-lapses, the most accurate algorithms give very few errors (FNMR < 0.001) so that the uncertainty estimates are high.*

Figure 142: For the mugshot images, FNMR *as a function of elapsed time between initial enrollment and second verification images. The panels appear most accurate first, and vertical scale changes on each page. The four traces correspond to images annotated with codes for black female, black male, white female, white male. The threshold is fixed for each algorithm to give FMR = 0.00001 over all ($\tilde{10}^8$) impostor comparisons. For short time-lapses, the most accurate algorithms give very few errors (FNMR < 0.001) so that the uncertainty estimates are high.*

Figure 143: For the mugshot images, FNMR *as a function of elapsed time between initial enrollment and second verification images. The panels appear most accurate first, and vertical scale changes on each page. The four traces correspond to images annotated with codes for black female, black male, white female, white male. The threshold is fixed for each algorithm to give FMR = 0.00001 over all ($\widetilde{10}^8$) impostor comparisons. For short time-lapses, the most accurate algorithms give very few errors (FNMR < 0.001) so that the uncertainty estimates are high.*

Figure 144: For the mugshot images, FNMR *as a function of elapsed time between initial enrollment and second verification images. The panels appear most accurate first, and vertical scale changes on each page. The four traces correspond to images annotated with codes for black female, black male, white female, white male. The threshold is fixed for each algorithm to give FMR = 0.00001 over all (10^8) impostor comparisons. For short time-lapses, the most accurate algorithms give very few errors (FNMR < 0.001) so that the uncertainty estimates are high.*

Figure 145: For the mugshot images, FNMR *as a function of elapsed time between initial enrollment and second verification images. The panels appear most accurate first, and vertical scale changes on each page. The four traces correspond to images annotated with codes for black female, black male, white female, white male. The threshold is fixed for each algorithm to give FMR = 0.00001 over all ($\widetilde{10}^8$) impostor comparisons. For short time-lapses, the most accurate algorithms give very few errors (FNMR < 0.001) so that the uncertainty estimates are high.*

Figure 146: For the mugshot images, FNMR *as a function of elapsed time between initial enrollment and second verification images. The panels appear most accurate first, and vertical scale changes on each page. The four traces correspond to images annotated with codes for black female, black male, white female, white male. The threshold is fixed for each algorithm to give FMR = 0.00001 over all ($\widetilde{10}^8$) impostor comparisons. For short time-lapses, the most accurate algorithms give very few errors (FNMR < 0.001) so that the uncertainty estimates are high.*

3.5.3 Effect of age on genuine subjects

Background: Faces change appearance throughout life. Face recognition algorithms have previously beeen reported to give better accuracy on older individuals (See NIST IR 8009).

Goal: To quantify false non-match rates (FNMR) as a function of age, without an ageing component.

Methods: Using the visa images, which span fewer than five years, thresholds are determined that give FMR = 0.001 and 0.0001 over the entire impostor set. Then FNMR is measured over 1000 bootstrap replications of the genuine scores.

Results: For the visa images, Figure 161 shows how false non-match rates for genuine users, as a function of age group.

The notable aspects are:

- ▷ Younger subjects give considerably higher FNMR. This is likely due to rapid growth and change in facial appearance.
- ▷ FNMR trends down throughout life. The last bin, AGE $>$ 72, contains fewer than 140 mated pairs, and may be affected by small sample size.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 147: For the visa images, the dots show FNMR by age group for two operating thresholds corresponding to FMR = $\{0.001, 0.0001\}$ computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor scores. The FMR in each bin will vary also - see subsequent impostor heatmaps in sec. 3.6.2. Given a pair of face images taken at different times, we assign the comparison to the bin that is the arithmetic average of the subject's ages. This plot shows only the effect of age, not ageing. The number of comparisons in each bin is generally in the thousands, however the first and last bins are computed over 149 and 124 respectively. The error rates in some (adult) cases are zero, and in others the DET is flat so the error rates at the two thresholds are identical. The lines span 1% and 99% of boostrap replicated FNMR estimates.

Figure 148: For the visa images, the dots show FNMR by age group for two operating thresholds corresponding to FMR = $\{0.001, 0.0001\}$ computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor scores. The FMR in each bin will vary also - see subsequent impostor heatmaps in sec. 3.6.2. Given a pair of face images taken at different times, we assign the comparison to the bin that is the arithmetic average of the subject's ages. This plot shows only the effect of age, not ageing. The number of comparisons in each bin is generally in the thousands, however the first and last bins are computed over 149 and 124 respectively. The error rates in some (adult) cases are zero, and in others the DET is flat so the error rates at the two thresholds are identical. The lines span 1% and 99% of boostrap replicated FNMR estimates.

Figure 149: For the visa images, the dots show FNMR by age group for two operating thresholds corresponding to FMR = $\{0.001, 0.0001\}$ computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor scores. The FMR in each bin will vary also - see subsequent impostor heatmaps in sec. 3.6.2. Given a pair of face images taken at different times, we assign the comparison to the bin that is the arithmetic average of the subject's ages. This plot shows only the effect of age, not ageing. The number of comparisons in each bin is generally in the thousands, however the first and last bins are computed over 149 and 124 respectively. The error rates in some (adult) cases are zero, and in others the DET is flat so the error rates at the two thresholds are identical. The lines span 1% and 99% of boostrap replicated FNMR estimates.

Figure 150: For the visa images, the dots show FNMR by age group for two operating thresholds corresponding to FMR = $\{0.001, 0.0001\}$ computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor scores. The FMR in each bin will vary also - see subsequent impostor heatmaps in sec. 3.6.2. Given a pair of face images taken at different times, we assign the comparison to the bin that is the arithmetic average of the subject's ages. This plot shows only the effect of age, not ageing. The number of comparisons in each bin is generally in the thousands, however the first and last bins are computed over 149 and 124 respectively. The error rates in some (adult) cases are zero, and in others the DET is flat so the error rates at the two thresholds are identical. The lines span 1% and 99% of boostrap replicated FNMR estimates.

Figure 151: For the visa images, the dots show FNMR by age group for two operating thresholds corresponding to FMR = $\{0.001, 0.0001\}$ computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor scores. The FMR in each bin will vary also - see subsequent impostor heatmaps in sec. 3.6.2. Given a pair of face images taken at different times, we assign the comparison to the bin that is the arithmetic average of the subject's ages. This plot shows only the effect of age, not ageing. The number of comparisons in each bin is generally in the thousands, however the first and last bins are computed over 149 and 124 respectively. The error rates in some (adult) cases are zero, and in others the DET is flat so the error rates at the two thresholds are identical. The lines span 1% and 99% of boostrap replicated FNMR estimates.

Figure 152: For the visa images, the dots show FNMR by age group for two operating thresholds corresponding to FMR = $\{0.001, 0.0001\}$ computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor scores. The FMR in each bin will vary also - see subsequent impostor heatmaps in sec. 3.6.2. Given a pair of face images taken at different times, we assign the comparison to the bin that is the arithmetic average of the subject's ages. This plot shows only the effect of age, not ageing. The number of comparisons in each bin is generally in the thousands, however the first and last bins are computed over 149 and 124 respectively. The error rates in some (adult) cases are zero, and in others the DET is flat so the error rates at the two thresholds are identical. The lines span 1% and 99% of boostrap replicated FNMR estimates.

Figure 153: For the visa images, the dots show FNMR by age group for two operating thresholds corresponding to FMR = $\{0.001, 0.0001\}$ computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor scores. The FMR in each bin will vary also - see subsequent impostor heatmaps in sec. 3.6.2. Given a pair of face images taken at different times, we assign the comparison to the bin that is the arithmetic average of the subject's ages. This plot shows only the effect of age, not ageing. The number of comparisons in each bin is generally in the thousands, however the first and last bins are computed over 149 and 124 respectively. The error rates in some (adult) cases are zero, and in others the DET is flat so the error rates at the two thresholds are identical. The lines span 1% and 99% of boostrap replicated FNMR estimates.

Figure 154: For the visa images, the dots show FNMR by age group for two operating thresholds corresponding to FMR = $\{0.001, 0.0001\}$ computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor scores. The FMR in each bin will vary also - see subsequent impostor heatmaps in sec. 3.6.2. Given a pair of face images taken at different times, we assign the comparison to the bin that is the arithmetic average of the subject's ages. This plot shows only the effect of age, not ageing. The number of comparisons in each bin is generally in the thousands, however the first and last bins are computed over 149 and 124 respectively. The error rates in some (adult) cases are zero, and in others the DET is flat so the error rates at the two thresholds are identical. The lines span 1% and 99% of boostrap replicated FNMR estimates.

Figure 155: For the visa images, the dots show FNMR by age group for two operating thresholds corresponding to FMR = $\{0.001, 0.0001\}$ computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor scores. The FMR in each bin will vary also - see subsequent impostor heatmaps in sec. 3.6.2. Given a pair of face images taken at different times, we assign the comparison to the bin that is the arithmetic average of the subject's ages. This plot shows only the effect of age, not ageing. The number of comparisons in each bin is generally in the thousands, however the first and last bins are computed over 149 and 124 respectively. The error rates in some (adult) cases are zero, and in others the DET is flat so the error rates at the two thresholds are identical. The lines span 1% and 99% of boostrap replicated FNMR estimates.

Figure 156: For the visa images, the dots show FNMR by age group for two operating thresholds corresponding to FMR = $\{0.001, 0.0001\}$ computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor scores. The FMR in each bin will vary also - see subsequent impostor heatmaps in sec. 3.6.2. Given a pair of face images taken at different times, we assign the comparison to the bin that is the arithmetic average of the subject's ages. This plot shows only the effect of age, not ageing. The number of comparisons in each bin is generally in the thousands, however the first and last bins are computed over 149 and 124 respectively. The error rates in some (adult) cases are zero, and in others the DET is flat so the error rates at the two thresholds are identical. The lines span 1% and 99% of boostrap replicated FNMR estimates.

Figure 157: For the visa images, the dots show FNMR by age group for two operating thresholds corresponding to FMR = $\{0.001, 0.0001\}$ computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor scores. The FMR in each bin will vary also - see subsequent impostor heatmaps in sec. 3.6.2. Given a pair of face images taken at different times, we assign the comparison to the bin that is the arithmetic average of the subject's ages. This plot shows only the effect of age, not ageing. The number of comparisons in each bin is generally in the thousands, however the first and last bins are computed over 149 and 124 respectively. The error rates in some (adult) cases are zero, and in others the DET is flat so the error rates at the two thresholds are identical. The lines span 1% and 99% of boostrap replicated FNMR estimates.

Figure 158: For the visa images, the dots show FNMR by age group for two operating thresholds corresponding to FMR = $\{0.001, 0.0001\}$ computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor scores. The FMR in each bin will vary also - see subsequent impostor heatmaps in sec. 3.6.2. Given a pair of face images taken at different times, we assign the comparison to the bin that is the arithmetic average of the subject's ages. This plot shows only the effect of age, not ageing. The number of comparisons in each bin is generally in the thousands, however the first and last bins are computed over 149 and 124 respectively. The error rates in some (adult) cases are zero, and in others the DET is flat so the error rates at the two thresholds are identical. The lines span 1% and 99% of boostrap replicated FNMR estimates.

Figure 159: For the visa images, the dots show FNMR by age group for two operating thresholds corresponding to FMR = $\{0.001, 0.0001\}$ computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor scores. The FMR in each bin will vary also - see subsequent impostor heatmaps in sec. 3.6.2. Given a pair of face images taken at different times, we assign the comparison to the bin that is the arithmetic average of the subject's ages. This plot shows only the effect of age, not ageing. The number of comparisons in each bin is generally in the thousands, however the first and last bins are computed over 149 and 124 respectively. The error rates in some (adult) cases are zero, and in others the DET is flat so the error rates at the two thresholds are identical. The lines span 1% and 99% of boostrap replicated FNMR estimates.

Figure 160: For the visa images, the dots show FNMR by age group for two operating thresholds corresponding to FMR = $\{0.001, 0.0001\}$ computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor scores. The FMR in each bin will vary also - see subsequent impostor heatmaps in sec. 3.6.2. Given a pair of face images taken at different times, we assign the comparison to the bin that is the arithmetic average of the subject's ages. This plot shows only the effect of age, not ageing. The number of comparisons in each bin is generally in the thousands, however the first and last bins are computed over 149 and 124 respectively. The error rates in some (adult) cases are zero, and in others the DET is flat so the error rates at the two thresholds are identical. The lines span 1% and 99% of boostrap replicated FNMR estimates.

Figure 161: For the visa images, the dots show FNMR by age group for two operating thresholds corresponding to FMR = $\{0.001, 0.0001\}$ computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor scores. The FMR in each bin will vary also - see subsequent impostor heatmaps in sec. 3.6.2. Given a pair of face images taken at different times, we assign the comparison to the bin that is the arithmetic average of the subject's ages. This plot shows only the effect of age, not ageing. The number of comparisons in each bin is generally in the thousands, however the first and last bins are computed over 149 and 124 respectively. The error rates in some (adult) cases are zero, and in others the DET is flat so the error rates at the two thresholds are identical. The lines span 1% and 99% of boostrap replicated FNMR estimates.

Caveats: None.

3.6 Impostor distribution stability

3.6.1 Effect of birth place on the impostor distribution

Background: Facial appearance varies geographically, both in terms of skin tone, cranio-facial structure and size. This section addresses whether false match rates vary intra- and inter-regionally.

Goals:

- ▷ To show the effect of birth region of the impostor and enrollee on false match rates.
- ▷ To determine whether some algorithms give better impostor distribution stability.

Methods:

- ▷ For the visa images, NIST defined 10 regions: Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, Polynesia, North Africa, Middle East, Europe, East Asia, Central and South America, Central Asia, and the Caribbean.
- ▷ For the visa images, NIST mapped each country of birth to a region. There is some arbitrariness to this. For example, Egypt could reasonably be assigned to the Middle East instead of North Africa. An alternative methodology could, for example, assign the Philippines to *both* Polynesia and East Asia.
- ▷ FMR is computed for cases where all face images of impostors born in region r_2 are compared with enrolled face images of persons born in region r_1.

$$\text{FMR}(r_1, r_2, T) = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{N_{r_1,r_2}} H(s_i - T)}{N_{r_1,r_2}} \tag{5}$$

  where the same threshold, T, is used in all cells, and H is the unit step function. The threshold is set to give FMR(T) = 0.001 over the entire set of visa image impostor comparisons.
- ▷ This analysis is then repeated by country-pair, but only for those country pairs where both have at least 1000 images available. The countries[1] appear in the axes of graphs that follow.
- ▷ The mean number of impostor scores in any cross-region bin is 33 million. The smallest number of impostor scores in any bin is 135000, for Central Asia - North Africa. While these counts are large enough to support reasonable significance, the number of individual faces is much smaller, on the order of $N^{0.5}$.
- ▷ The numbers of impostor scores in any cross-country bin is shown in Figure 532.

Results: Subsequent figures show heatmaps that use color to represent the base-10 logarithm of the false match rate. Red colors indicate high (bad) false match rates. Dark colors indicate benign false match rates. There are two series of graphs corresponding to aggregated geographical regions, and to countries. The notable observations are:

- ▷ The on-diagonal elements correspond to within-region impostors. FMR is generally above the nominal value of FMR = 0.001. Particularly there is usually higher FMR in, Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and the Caribbean. Europe and Central Asia, on the other hand, usually give FMR closer to the nominal value.
- ▷ The off-diagonal elements correspond to across-region impostors. The highest FMR is produced between the Caribbean and Sub-Saharan Africa.
- ▷ Algorithms vary.

[1] These are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Chile, China, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Germany, Ghana, Great Britain, Greece, Guatamala, Haiti, Hong Kong, Honduras, Indonesia, India, Israel, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Korea, Lebanon, Mexico, Malaysia, Nepal, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Russia, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, Trinidad, Turkey, Taiwan, Ukraine, Venezuela, and Vietnam.

Figure 162: For the visa images, the dots show FMR for impostor comparisons of individuals of the same sex and same age group for the region of the world that gives the worst (highest) FMR when the threshold is set to give FMR = 0.001 (red vertical line) over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor scores i.e. zero-effort. The shift of the dots to right shows massive increases in FMR when impostors have the same sex, age, and region of birth. The color code indicates which region gives the worst case FMR. If the observed variation is due to the prevalence of one kind of images in the training imagery, then algorithms developed on one kind of data might be expected to give higher FMR on other kinds.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

- We computed the same quantities for a global FMR = 0.0001. The effects are similar.

Caveats:

- The effects of variable impostor rates on one-to-many identification systems may well differ from what's implied by these one-to-one verification results. Two reasons for this are a) the enrollment galleries are usually imbalanced across countries of birth, age and sex; b) one-to-many identification algorithms often implement techniques aimed at stabilizing the impostor distribution. Further research is necessary.
- In principle, the effects seen in this subsection could be due to differences in the image capture process. We consider this unlikely since the effects are maintained across geography - e.g. Caribbean vs. Africa, or Japan vs. China.

Figure 163: For visa images, the heatmap shows how the mean of the impostor distribution for the country pair (a,b) is shifted relative to the mean of the global impostor distribution, expressed as a number of standard deviations of the global impostor distribution. This statistic is designed to show shifts in the entire impostor distribution, not just tail effects that manifest as the anomalously high (or low) false match rates that appear in the subsequent figures. The countries are chosen to show that skin tone alone does not explain impostor distribution shifts. The reduced shift in Asian populations with the Yitu and TongYiTrans algorithms, is accompanied by positive shifts in the European populations. This reversal relative to most other algorithms, may derive from use of nationally weighted training sets. The Visionlabs algorithm appears most insensitive to country effects. The figure is computed from same-sex and same-age impostor pairs.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 164: For algorithm 3divi-003 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 165: For algorithm 3divi-004 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 166: For algorithm adera-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 167: For algorithm aifirst-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 168: For algorithm ailabs-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 169: For algorithm aimall-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 170: For algorithm aiunionface-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 171: For algorithm alchera-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 172: For algorithm alchera-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 173: For algorithm allgovision-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 174: For algorithm alphaface-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 175: For algorithm amplifiedgroup-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 176: For algorithm anke-004 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 177: For algorithm anke-005 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 178: For algorithm antheus-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 179: For algorithm anyvision-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 180: For algorithm anyvision-004 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 181: For algorithm asusaics-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 182: For algorithm aware-003 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 183: For algorithm aware-004 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 184: For algorithm awiros-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 185: For algorithm ayonix-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 186: For algorithm bioidtechswiss-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 187: For algorithm bm-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 188: For algorithm camvi-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 189: For algorithm camvi-004 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 190: For algorithm ceiec-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 191: For algorithm ceiec-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 192: For algorithm chtface-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 193: For algorithm chtface-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 194: For algorithm cib-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 195: For algorithm cogent-003 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 196: For algorithm cogent-004 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 197: For algorithm cognitec-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 198: For algorithm cognitec-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 199: For algorithm ctbcbank-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 200: For algorithm ctbcbank-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 201: For algorithm cyberextruder-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 202: For algorithm cyberextruder-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 203: For algorithm cyberlink-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 204: For algorithm cyberlink-003 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 205: For algorithm dahua-003 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 206: For algorithm dahua-004 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 207: For algorithm deepglint-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 208: For algorithm deepglint-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 209: For algorithm deepsea-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 210: For algorithm dermalog-005 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 211: For algorithm dermalog-006 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 212: For algorithm didiglobalface-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 213: For algorithm digitalbarriers-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 214: For algorithm dsk-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 215: For algorithm einetworks-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 216: For algorithm f8-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 217: For algorithm facesoft-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 218: For algorithm glory-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 219: For algorithm glory-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 220: For algorithm gorilla-003 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 221: For algorithm gorilla-004 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 222: For algorithm hik-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 223: For algorithm hr-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 224: For algorithm hr-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 225: For algorithm id3-003 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 226: For algorithm id3-004 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 227: For algorithm idemia-004 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 228: For algorithm idemia-005 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 229: For algorithm iit-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 230: For algorithm iit-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 231: For algorithm imagus-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 232: For algorithm imagus-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 233: For algorithm imperial-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 234: For algorithm imperial-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 235: For algorithm incode-004 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 236: For algorithm incode-005 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 237: For algorithm innovativetechnologyltd-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 238: For algorithm innovatrics-004 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 239: For algorithm innovatrics-006 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 240: For algorithm intellicloudai-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 241: For algorithm intellifusion-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 242: For algorithm intellivision-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 243: For algorithm intellivision-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 244: For algorithm intelresearch-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 245: For algorithm intsysmsu-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 246: For algorithm intsysmsu-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 247: For algorithm iqface-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 248: For algorithm iqface-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 249: For algorithm isap-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 250: For algorithm isityou-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 251: For algorithm isystems-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 252: For algorithm isystems-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 253: For algorithm itmo-005 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 254: For algorithm itmo-006 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 255: For algorithm kakao-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 256: For algorithm kakao-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 257: For algorithm kedacom-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 258: For algorithm kneron-003 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 259: For algorithm kneron-004 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 260: For algorithm lookman-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 261: For algorithm lookman-004 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 262: For algorithm luxand-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 263: For algorithm megvii-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 264: For algorithm megvii-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 265: For algorithm meiya-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 266: For algorithm microfocus-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 267: For algorithm microfocus-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 268: For algorithm mt-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 269: For algorithm mvision-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 270: For algorithm neurotechnology-005 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 271: For algorithm neurotechnology-006 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 272: For algorithm nodeflux-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 273: For algorithm nodeflux-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 274: For algorithm notiontag-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 275: For algorithm ntechlab-006 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 276: For algorithm ntechlab-007 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 277: For algorithm pa-004 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 278: For algorithm paravision-004 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 279: For algorithm pixelall-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 280: For algorithm pixelall-003 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 281: For algorithm psl-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 282: For algorithm psl-003 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 283: For algorithm pyramid-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 284: For algorithm rankone-007 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 285: For algorithm rankone-008 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 286: For algorithm realnetworks-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 287: For algorithm realnetworks-003 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 288: For algorithm remarkai-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 289: For algorithm remarkai-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 290: For algorithm rokid-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 291: For algorithm s1-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 292: For algorithm saffe-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 293: For algorithm saffe-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 294: For algorithm samtech-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 295: For algorithm scanovate-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 296: For algorithm sensetime-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 297: For algorithm sensetime-003 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 298: For algorithm sertis-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 299: For algorithm shaman-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 300: For algorithm shaman-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 301: For algorithm shu-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 302: For algorithm shu-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 303: For algorithm siat-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 304: For algorithm siat-004 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 305: For algorithm sjtu-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 306: For algorithm smilart-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 307: For algorithm smilart-003 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 308: For algorithm starhybrid-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 309: For algorithm synesis-005 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 310: For algorithm synesis-006 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 311: For algorithm synology-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 312: For algorithm tech5-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 313: For algorithm tech5-003 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 314: For algorithm tevian-004 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 315: For algorithm tevian-005 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 316: For algorithm tiger-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 317: For algorithm tiger-003 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 318: For algorithm tongyi-005 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 319: For algorithm toshiba-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 320: For algorithm toshiba-003 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 321: For algorithm trueface-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 322: For algorithm tuputech-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 323: For algorithm ulsee-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 324: For algorithm uluface-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 325: For algorithm uluface-003 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 326: For algorithm upc-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 327: For algorithm vcog-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 328: For algorithm vd-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 329: For algorithm veridas-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 330: For algorithm veridas-003 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 331: For algorithm via-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 332: For algorithm videonetics-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 333: For algorithm videonetics-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 334: For algorithm vigilantsolutions-006 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 335: For algorithm vigilantsolutions-007 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 336: For algorithm vion-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 337: For algorithm visionbox-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 338: For algorithm visionbox-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 339: For algorithm visionlabs-006 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 340: For algorithm visionlabs-007 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 341: For algorithm vocord-006 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 342: For algorithm vocord-007 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 343: For algorithm winsense-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 344: For algorithm winsense-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 345: For algorithm x-laboratory-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 346: For algorithm yisheng-004 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 347: For algorithm yitu-003 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 348: For algorithm 3divi-003 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 349: For algorithm 3divi-004 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 350: For algorithm adera-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 351: For algorithm aifirst-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 352: For algorithm ailabs-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 353: For algorithm aimall-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 354: For algorithm aiunionface-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 355: For algorithm alchera-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 356: For algorithm alchera-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 357: For algorithm allgovision-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 358: For algorithm alphaface-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 359: For algorithm amplifiedgroup-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 360: For algorithm anke-004 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 361: For algorithm anke-005 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 362: For algorithm antheus-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 363: For algorithm anyvision-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 364: For algorithm anyvision-004 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 365: For algorithm asusaics-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 366: For algorithm aware-003 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 367: For algorithm aware-004 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 368: For algorithm awiros-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 369: For algorithm ayonix-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 370: For algorithm bioidtechswiss-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 371: For algorithm bm-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 372: For algorithm camvi-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 373: For algorithm camvi-004 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 374: For algorithm ceiec-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 375: For algorithm ceiec-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 376: For algorithm chtface-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 377: For algorithm chtface-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 378: For algorithm cib-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 379: For algorithm cogent-003 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 380: For algorithm cogent-004 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 381: For algorithm cognitec-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 382: For algorithm cognitec-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 383: For algorithm ctbcbank-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 384: For algorithm ctbcbank-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 385: For algorithm cyberextruder-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 386: For algorithm cyberextruder-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 387: For algorithm cyberlink-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 388: For algorithm cyberlink-003 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 389: For algorithm dahua-003 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 390: For algorithm dahua-004 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 391: For algorithm deepglint-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 392: For algorithm deepglint-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 393: For algorithm deepsea-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 394: For algorithm dermalog-005 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 395: For algorithm dermalog-006 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 396: For algorithm didiglobalface-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 397: For algorithm digitalbarriers-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 398: For algorithm dsk-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 399: For algorithm einetworks-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 400: For algorithm f8-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 401: For algorithm facesoft-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 402: For algorithm glory-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 403: For algorithm glory-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 404: For algorithm gorilla-003 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 405: For algorithm gorilla-004 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 406: For algorithm hik-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 407: For algorithm hr-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 408: For algorithm hr-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 409: For algorithm id3-003 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 410: For algorithm id3-004 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 411: For algorithm idemia-004 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 412: For algorithm idemia-005 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 413: For algorithm iit-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 414: For algorithm iit-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 415: For algorithm imagus-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 416: For algorithm imagus-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 417: For algorithm imperial-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 418: For algorithm imperial-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 419: For algorithm incode-004 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 420: For algorithm incode-005 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 421: For algorithm innovativetechnologyltd-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 422: For algorithm innovatrics-004 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 423: For algorithm innovatrics-006 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 424: For algorithm intellicloudai-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 425: For algorithm intellifusion-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 426: For algorithm intellivision-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 427: For algorithm intellivision-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 428: For algorithm intelresearch-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 429: For algorithm intsysmsu-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 430: For algorithm intsysmsu-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 431: For algorithm iqface-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 432: For algorithm iqface-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 433: For algorithm isap-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 434: For algorithm isityou-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 435: For algorithm isystems-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 436: For algorithm isystems-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 437: For algorithm itmo-005 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 438: For algorithm itmo-006 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 439: For algorithm kakao-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 440: For algorithm kakao-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 441: For algorithm kedacom-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 442: For algorithm kneron-003 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 443: For algorithm kneron-004 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 444: For algorithm lookman-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 445: For algorithm lookman-004 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 446: For algorithm luxand-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 447: For algorithm megvii-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 448: For algorithm megvii-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 449: For algorithm meiya-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 450: For algorithm microfocus-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 451: For algorithm microfocus-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 452: For algorithm mt-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 453: For algorithm mvision-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 454: For algorithm neurotechnology-005 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 455: For algorithm neurotechnology-006 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 456: For algorithm nodeflux-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 457: For algorithm nodeflux-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 458: For algorithm notiontag-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 459: For algorithm ntechlab-006 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 460: For algorithm ntechlab-007 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 461: For algorithm pa-004 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 462: For algorithm paravision-004 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 463: For algorithm pixelall-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 464: For algorithm pixelall-003 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 465: For algorithm psl-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 466: For algorithm psl-003 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 467: For algorithm pyramid-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 468: For algorithm rankone-007 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 469: For algorithm rankone-008 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 470: For algorithm realnetworks-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 471: For algorithm realnetworks-003 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 472: For algorithm remarkai-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 473: For algorithm remarkai-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 474: For algorithm rokid-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 475: For algorithm s1-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 476: For algorithm saffe-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 477: For algorithm saffe-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 478: For algorithm samtech-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 479: For algorithm scanovate-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 480: For algorithm sensetime-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 481: For algorithm sensetime-003 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 482: For algorithm sertis-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 483: For algorithm shaman-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 484: For algorithm shaman-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 485: For algorithm shu-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 486: For algorithm shu-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 487: For algorithm siat-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 488: For algorithm siat-004 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 489: For algorithm sjtu-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 490: For algorithm smilart-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 491: For algorithm smilart-003 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 492: For algorithm starhybrid-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 493: For algorithm synesis-005 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 494: For algorithm synesis-006 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 495: For algorithm synology-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 496: For algorithm tech5-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 497: For algorithm tech5-003 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 498: For algorithm tevian-004 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 499: For algorithm tevian-005 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 500: For algorithm tiger-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 501: For algorithm tiger-003 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 502: For algorithm tongyi-005 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 503: For algorithm toshiba-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 504: For algorithm toshiba-003 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 505: For algorithm trueface-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 506: For algorithm tuputech-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 507: For algorithm ulsee-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 508: For algorithm uluface-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 509: For algorithm uluface-003 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 510: For algorithm upc-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 511: For algorithm vcog-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 512: For algorithm vd-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 513: For algorithm veridas-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 514: For algorithm veridas-003 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 515: For algorithm via-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 516: For algorithm videonetics-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 517: For algorithm videonetics-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 518: For algorithm vigilantsolutions-006 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 519: For algorithm vigilantsolutions-007 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 520: For algorithm vion-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 521: For algorithm visionbox-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 522: For algorithm visionbox-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 523: For algorithm visionlabs-006 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 524: For algorithm visionlabs-007 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 525: For algorithm vocord-006 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 526: For algorithm vocord-007 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 527: For algorithm winsense-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 528: For algorithm winsense-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 529: For algorithm x-laboratory-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 530: For algorithm yisheng-004 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 531: For algorithm yitu-003 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 532: For visa images, the heatmap shows the count of impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

3.6.2 Effect of age on impostors

Background: This section shows the effect of age on the impostor distribution. The ideal behaviour is that the age of the enrollee and the impostor would not affect impostor scores. This would support FMR stability over sub-populations.

Goals:

- ▷ To show the effect of relative ages of the impostor and enrollee on false match rates.
- ▷ To determine whether some algorithms have better impostor distribution stability.

Methods:

- ▷ Define 14 age group bins, spanning 0 to over 100 years old.
- ▷ Compute FMR over all impostor comparisons for which the subjects in the enrollee and impostor images have ages in two bins.
- ▷ Compute FMR over all impostor comparisons for which the subjects are additionally of the same sex, and born in the same geographic region.

Results:

The notable aspects are:

- ▷ Diagonal dominance: Impostors are more likely to be matched against their same age group.
- ▷ Same sex and same region impostors are more successful. On the diagonal, an impostor is more likely to succeed by posing as someone of the same sex. If $\Delta \log_{10} \text{FMR} = 0.2$, then same-sex same-region FMR exceeds the all-pairs FMR by factor of $10^{0.2} = 1.6$.
- ▷ Young children impostors give elevated FMR against young children. Older adult impostor give elevated FMR against older adults. These effects are quite large, for example if $\Delta \log_{10} \text{FMR} = 1.0$ larger than a 32 year old, then these groups have higher FMR by a factor of $10^1 = 10$. This would imply an FMR above 0.01 for a nominal (global) FMR = 0.001.
- ▷ Algorithms vary.
- ▷ We computed the same quantities for a global FMR = 0.0001. The effects are similar.

Note the calculations in this section include impostors paired across all countries of birth.

Figure 533: For algorithm 3divi-003 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

Figure 534: For algorithm 3divi-004 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

Figure 535: For algorithm adera-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 536: For algorithm aiunionface-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 537: For algorithm alchera-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 538: For algorithm alchera-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 539: For algorithm allgovision-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 540: For algorithm alphaface-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

Figure 541: For algorithm amplifiedgroup-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 542: For algorithm anke-004 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

Figure 543: For algorithm anyvision-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 544: For algorithm anyvision-004 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

Figure 545: For algorithm asusaics-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

Figure 546: For algorithm aware-003 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

Figure 547: For algorithm aware-004 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

Figure 548: For algorithm awiros-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

Figure 549: For algorithm ayonix-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 550: For algorithm bm-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

Figure 551: For algorithm camvi-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 552: For algorithm camvi-004 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

Figure 553: For algorithm ceiec-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 554: For algorithm ceiec-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 555: For algorithm chtface-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

Figure 556: For algorithm cogent-003 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 557: For algorithm cogent-004 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

Figure 558: For algorithm cognitec-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 559: For algorithm cognitec-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

Figure 560: For algorithm ctbcbank-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

Figure 561: For algorithm ctbcbank-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

Figure 562: For algorithm cyberextruder-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

Figure 563: For algorithm cyberextruder-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 564: For algorithm cyberlink-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

Figure 565: For algorithm cyberlink-003 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 566: For algorithm dahua-003 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 567: For algorithm deepglint-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 568: For algorithm deepsea-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 569: For algorithm dermalog-005 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 570: For algorithm dermalog-006 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 571: For algorithm didiglobalface-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 572: For algorithm digitalbarriers-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 573: For algorithm dsk-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

Figure 574: For algorithm einetworks-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 575: For algorithm f8-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 576: For algorithm facesoft-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 577: For algorithm glory-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 578: For algorithm gorilla-003 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 579: For algorithm hik-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

Figure 580: For algorithm hr-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

Figure 581: For algorithm hr-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 582: For algorithm id3-003 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

Figure 583: For algorithm id3-004 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

Figure 584: For algorithm idemia-004 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 585: For algorithm idemia-005 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 586: For algorithm iit-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

Figure 587: For algorithm imagus-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 588: For algorithm imperial-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 589: For algorithm imperial-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 590: For algorithm incode-004 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 591: For algorithm incode-005 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 592: For algorithm innovativetechnologyltd-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 593: For algorithm innovatrics-004 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 594: For algorithm innovatrics-006 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 595: For algorithm intellicloudai-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 596: For algorithm intellifusion-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 597: For algorithm intellivision-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 598: For algorithm intellivision-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 599: For algorithm intelresearch-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 600: For algorithm intsysmsu-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 601: For algorithm intsysmsu-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 602: For algorithm iqface-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

Figure 603: For algorithm isap-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 604: For algorithm isityou-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 605: For algorithm isystems-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 606: For algorithm isystems-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

Figure 607: For algorithm itmo-005 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 608: For algorithm itmo-006 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 609: For algorithm kakao-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 610: For algorithm kakao-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 611: For algorithm kedacom-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 612: For algorithm kneron-003 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 613: For algorithm lookman-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

Figure 614: For algorithm lookman-004 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

Figure 615: For algorithm megvii-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

Figure 616: For algorithm megvii-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

Figure 617: For algorithm meiya-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 618: For algorithm microfocus-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 619: For algorithm microfocus-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 620: For algorithm mt-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

Figure 621: For algorithm neurotechnology-005 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 622: For algorithm neurotechnology-006 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 623: For algorithm nodeflux-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

Figure 624: For algorithm nodeflux-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 625: For algorithm notiontag-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

Figure 626: For algorithm ntechlab-006 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

Figure 627: For algorithm ntechlab-007 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 628: For algorithm pixelall-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 629: For algorithm pixelall-003 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 630: For algorithm psl-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 631: For algorithm psl-003 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 632: For algorithm rankone-007 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 633: For algorithm realnetworks-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 634: For algorithm realnetworks-003 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 635: For algorithm remarkai-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 636: For algorithm rokid-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 637: For algorithm saffe-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 638: For algorithm saffe-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 639: For algorithm samtech-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 640: For algorithm sensetime-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 641: For algorithm sensetime-003 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 642: For algorithm sertis-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

Figure 643: For algorithm shaman-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

Figure 644: For algorithm shaman-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 645: For algorithm shu-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 646: For algorithm siat-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 647: For algorithm siat-004 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

Figure 648: For algorithm sjtu-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

Figure 649: For algorithm smilart-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 650: For algorithm smilart-003 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 651: For algorithm starhybrid-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 652: For algorithm synesis-005 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

Figure 653: For algorithm synesis-006 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 654: For algorithm synology-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

Figure 655: For algorithm tech5-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 656: For algorithm tech5-003 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

Figure 657: For algorithm tevian-004 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 658: For algorithm tevian-005 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 659: For algorithm tiger-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 660: For algorithm tiger-003 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 661: For algorithm tongyi-005 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 662: For algorithm toshiba-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

Figure 663: For algorithm toshiba-003 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 664: For algorithm trueface-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 665: For algorithm tuputech-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 666: For algorithm ulsee-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 667: For algorithm uluface-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 668: For algorithm upc-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

Figure 669: For algorithm vcog-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 670: For algorithm vd-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

Figure 671: For algorithm veridas-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 672: For algorithm via-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

Figure 673: For algorithm videonetics-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 674: For algorithm vigilantsolutions-006 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 675: For algorithm vigilantsolutions-007 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 676: For algorithm vion-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 677: For algorithm visionbox-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 678: For algorithm visionbox-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 679: For algorithm visionlabs-006 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 680: For algorithm visionlabs-007 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

Figure 681: For algorithm vocord-006 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 682: For algorithm vocord-007 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 683: For algorithm winsense-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

Figure 684: For algorithm winsense-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 685: For algorithm x-laboratory-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 686: For algorithm yisheng-004 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 687: For algorithm yitu-003 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.0001 over all on the order of 10^{10} impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

Accuracy Terms + Definitions

In biometrics, Type II errors occur when two samples of one person do not match – this is called a **false negative**. Correspondingly, Type I errors occur when samples from two persons do match – this is called a **false positive**. Matches are declared by a biometric system when the native comparison score from the recognition algorithm meets some **threshold**. Comparison scores can be either **similarity scores**, in which case higher values indicate that the samples are more likely to come from the same person, or **dissimilarity scores**, in which case higher values indicate different people. Similarity scores are traditionally computed by **fingerprint** and **face** recognition algorithms, while dissimilarities are used in **iris recognition**. In some cases, the dissimilarity score is a distance; this applies only when **metric** properties are obeyed. In any case, scores can be either **mate** scores, coming from a comparison of one person's samples, or **nonmate** scores, coming from comparison of different persons' samples. The words **genuine** or **authentic** are synonyms for mate, and the word **impostor** is used a synonym for nonmate. The words mate and nonmate are traditionally used in identification applications (such as law enforcement search, or background checks) while genuine and impostor are used in verification applications (such as access control).

A **error tradeoff** characteristic represents the tradeoff between Type II and Type I classification errors. For verification this plots false non-match rate (FNMR) vs. false match rate (FMR) parametrically with T.

The error tradeoff plots are often called **detection error tradeoff (DET)** characteristics or **receiver operating characteristic** (ROC). These serve the same function but differ, for example, in plotting the complement of an error rate (e.g. TMR = 1 – FNMR) and in transforming the axes most commonly using logarithms, to show multiple decades of FMR. More rarely, the function might be the inverse Gaussian function.

More detail and generality is provided in formal biometrics testing standards, see the various parts of ISO/IEC 19795 Biometrics Testing and Reporting. More terms, including and beyond those to do with accuracy, see ISO/IEC 2382-37 Information technology -- Vocabulary -- Part 37: Harmonized biometric vocabulary

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