

# NIST FRVT MORPH: Face Morphing Detection Evaluation

Mei Ngan  
Patrick Grother  
Kayee Hanaoka  
Jason Kuo

National Institute of Standards & Technology (NIST), US Department of Commerce

German TeleTrusT Biometrics Working Group  
September 14, 2020



National Institute of  
Standards and Technology  
U.S. Department of Commerce



INFORMATION  
TECHNOLOGY  
LABORATORY

# Agenda






- WHAT IS FACE MORPHING
- THREATS & CONSEQUENCES
- NIST FRVT MORPH EVALUATION



# Face Morphing



Subject A



Subject B



Subject A contribution (%) | Subject B contribution (%)



90% | 10%

70% | 30%

50% | 50%



30% | 70%

10% | 90%

# Morph Examples

NIST




+




[www.MorphThing.com](http://www.MorphThing.com)




FaceFusion Mobile  
App



Automated Method  
(UNIBO v1) [1-3]



FantaMorph + Photoshop



StyleGAN




StyleGAN2

- [1] M. Ferrara, A. Franco, and D. Maltoni, "Face Demorphing," *IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security*, vol. 13, no. 4, pp. 1008-1017, April 2018.
- [2] M. Ferrara, A. Franco, and D. Maltoni, "The Magic Passport," in *IEEE International Joint Conference on Biometrics (IJCB)*, Clearwater, Florida, USA, 2014, pp. 1-7.
- [3] M. Ferrara, A. Franco, and D. Maltoni, "On the Effects of Image Alterations on Face Recognition Accuracy," in *Face Recognition Across the Electromagnetic Spectrum*. Switzerland: Springer International Publishing, 2016, pp. 195-222.


# Automated FR: Genuines, Impostors, and Morphs

NIST



# Threats & Consequences

NIST



Source: Ferrara, Franco, and Maltoni, *The Magic Passport*, IEEE International Joint Conference on Biometrics, October 2014, pp. 1-7

Automated Border Control Gate



Source:  
<http://www.futuretravelexperience.com/2016/01/automated-border-control-e-gates-go-live-at-naples-airport/>



**Morphing poses a threat to entities that accept user-submitted photos for identity credentials**

# Current face recognition vulnerability

NIST

*Each dot represents an FR algorithm from NIST FRVT 1:1 Verification Test*

Fraction of morphs where both subjects  
matched morphed photo





- 2-person morphs
- Subject alpha: 50% each
- Morphed within sex and ethnicity label groups
- Morphing Method:  
Local Colorized Match – Face area is averaged after alignment and feature warping. Subject A provides the periphery and face area is adjusted to match Subject A's color histogram.
- 2 692 comparisons of morphs w/ other portrait photos of constituents
- 90 million non-morphed comparisons on mugshot photos

# Current face recognition vulnerability

NIST

*Each dot represents an FR algorithm from NIST FRVT 1:1 Verification Test*

Fraction of morphs where both subjects  
matched morphed photo





- 2-person morphs
- Subject alpha: 50% each
- Morphed within sex and ethnicity label groups
- Morphing Method:  
Local Colorized Match – Face area is averaged after alignment and feature warping. Subject A provides the periphery and face area is adjusted to match Subject A's color histogram.
- 2 692 comparisons of morphs w/ other portrait photos of constituents
- 90 million non-morphed comparisons on mugshot photos

# Current face recognition vulnerability

NIST

*Each dot represents an FR algorithm from NIST FRVT 1:1 Verification Test*


Fraction of morphs where both subjects  
matched morphed photo



- 2-person morphs
- Subject alpha: 50% each
- Morphed within sex and ethnicity label groups
- Morphing Method:  
Local Colorized Match – Face area is averaged after alignment and feature warping. Subject A provides the periphery and face area is adjusted to match Subject A's color histogram.
- 2 692 comparisons of morphs w/ other portrait photos of constituents
- 90 million non-morphed comparisons on mugshot photos

# Morphing in the wild


NIST



Sept. 22, 2018: Member of German activist group successfully applies for a passport with a morphed image (containing Federica Mogherini, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy)

Source (9/22/2018): <http://www.spiegel.de/netzwelt/netzpolitik/biometrie-im-reisepass-peng-kollektiv-schmuggelt-fotomontage-in-ausweis-a-1229418.html> via Google Translate

How many morphed face images has your country detected over the past 5 years?



October 25, 2019: A poll from the Security Printers 2019 Conference, Copenhagen

## Automated Face Morph Detection Evaluation

- Independent, sequestered evaluation of morph detection capabilities across diverse datasets
- “Black-box” testing
- Ongoing testing + public reporting (report + interactive webpage)



## Use Cases

- Single-image morph detection
- Two-image differential morph detection
- 1:1 morph acceptance (FR resistance against morphing)

## Collaborators

- Department of State, USA
- Otto von Guericke University of Magdeburg, Germany
- Australian Defence Science and Technology Group
- University of Lincoln, United Kingdom
- University of Bologna, Italy
- Hochschule Darmstadt
- Norwegian University of Science and Technology
- FBI and DHS S&T, USA

## BREAKING NEWS

FRVT MORPH Report published as NIST Interagency Report 8292 (last updated July 2020)  
Ongoing morph detection submissions accepted! Google: FRVT MORPH



# FRVT MORPH Test Data

NIST

From non-expert  
tools + apps  
*Visible artifacts*




*“Less sophisticated” morphs*




*“More Sophisticated” morphs*

From commercial-graphics tools  
Print + scanned  
*Very minimal artifacts*



From automated methods  
*Moderate to minimal artifacts*



[1] Makrushin, A., Neubert, T., Dittmann, J., 2017. Automatic generation and detection of visually faultless facial morphs, In Proc. 12th Int. Joint Conf. on Computer Vision, Imaging and Computer Graphics Theory and Applications - Volume 6: VISAPP, pp. 39-50.

[2] Neubert, T., Makrushin, A., Hildebrandt, M., Kraetzer, C., Dittmann, J., 2018. Extended StirTrace Benchmarking of Biometric and Forensic Qualities of Morphed Face Images, IET Biometrics, Vol. 7, Issue 4, pp. 325-332.

[3] M. Ferrara, A. Franco, and D. Maltoni, "Face Demorphing," IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, vol. 13, no. 4, pp. 1008-1017, April 2018.

[4] M. Ferrara, A. Franco, and D. Maltoni, "The Magic Passport," in IEEE International Joint Conference on Biometrics (IJCB), Clearwater, Florida, USA, 2014, pp. 1-7.

[5] M. Ferrara, A. Franco, and D. Maltoni, "On the Effects of Image Alterations on Face Recognition Accuracy," in Face Recognition Across the Electromagnetic Spectrum. Switzerland: Springer International Publishing, 2016, pp. 195-222.

[6] Robin S. S. Kramer, Michael O. Mireku, Tessa R. Flack, and Kay L. Ritchie. Face morphing attacks: Investigating detection with humans and computers. *Cognitive Research: Principles and Implications*, 4(1):28, 2019.

# Single-Image Morph Detection: *Morphed image or not?* **NIST**



## Use Case: Attack on enrollment

- Untrusted capture
- Upload to server

## Protocol: Given **single image X** in isolation, produce

- 1) Morph decision => APCER, BPCER
- 2) “morphiness” score => DET analysis

$$\text{Morphiness} = F(X)$$



## Evaluation: ISO/IEC 30107-3 metrics

- Attack Presentation Classification Error Rate (APCER): proportion of morph attack samples incorrectly classified as bona fide presentation (missed detection rate over morphed images) => **System Insecurity**
- Bona Fide Presentation Classification Error Rate (BPCER): proportion of bona fide samples incorrectly classified as morphed samples (false detection rate over non-morphed images) => **User Inconvenience**

Source: NIST

# Two-Image Differential Morph Detection: *Morph detection given live image?*

NIST

**Use Case:** Attack during verification (e.g., at eGate)

- Prior morph enrolled e.g. on identity document



Source: NIST

Goal: Determine that image on passport is morphed by using the additional information available in the live capture image.

**Protocol:** Given suspected morph X and **live image Y**, produce

- 1) Morph decision
- 2) “morphiness” score

**Evaluation:** ISO/IEC 30107-3 metrics

- BPCER/False Detection Rate
- APCER/Morph Miss Rate


# 1:1 Morph Acceptance: *Do subjects verify against morphed image?*

NIST



**Use Case:** Test FR algorithm resistance against morphing

**Protocol:** Given image X and image Y, produce verification similarity score



**Evaluation:** ISO/IEC 30107-3 metrics

- Mated Morph Presentation Match Rate (MMPMR)
- False non-match rate
- False match rate

Source: NIST

Involvement from commercial face recognition community!

# FRVT MORPH Participation [June 2018 – current]




- Single-image morph detection – *9 submissions*
  - Hochschule Darmstadt
  - Norwegian University of Science and Technology
  - University of Bologna
- Two-image differential morph detection – *8 submissions*
  - Hochschule Darmstadt
- Currently all prototypes from European academic entities
- Expecting submissions from US DHS S&T sponsored CITeR research efforts
  - Clarkson University
  - West Virginia University

# Measuring BPCER (false detection rates)

NIST

What false detection rates are operationally acceptable?



Method: Use large sets of live-capture photos

- Enables measurement of accuracy at low BPCER
- Bona fide datasets of
  - 1 047 389 live-capture mugshot photos
  - 871 984 live-capture visa photos

Source: Survey from participants of the ICBB 2019: Morphing and Morphing Attack Detection Methods Conference


**Goal: HIGH morph detection rates with LOW false detection rates**

# Accuracy gains since 2019

NIST

September 2019


False Detection Rate



Morph Miss Rate

July 2020

Bona Fide Classification Error Rate (BPCER)




# Accuracy gains since 2019

NIST


September 2019

False Detection Rate




Morph Miss Rate

July 2020



# Differential bona fide morph detection scores vs. time elapsed


NIST



Bona Fide




Webcam Probe



# Differential bona fide morph detection scores vs. time elapsed

NIST




Bona Fide




Webcam Probe

Morph detection scores on non-morphed images increase as time between capture increases




# Impact of Image Resolution (single-image morph detection)




# Image Resolution - Caveats

Morph Miss Rate



False Detection Rate



**Increased** morph miss rates at higher resolution  
(at same threshold)

**Decreased** false detection rates at higher resolution  
(at same threshold)

# Other Potential Mitigations



## 1 Live Enrollment

- Is it politically tenable in large countries?
- Doesn't address morphs that are already in circulation

## 3 Eliminate print + scanned photos

Community consensus that print and scanned photos introduces artifacts that make it very difficult for humans and algorithms to do morph detection

## 2 Trusted external capture

- Signed photobooths (what about presentation attacks?)
- Certified photographers

## 4 Use FR on centralized database

- Perform 1:N duplicate check; look for multiple high scoring candidates
- Ineffective unless multiple subjects have been previously encountered

## 5 Additional biometric checks

Additional biometric checks (e.g. fingerprints) to confirm identity

# IFPC 2020 – we've gone virtual!

NIST

## International Face Performance Conference (IFPC) 2020



NIST is pleased to announce the IFPC 2020, which is focused on all technical factors affecting the deployment and use of high performance face recognition applications, including applications, standards, quality assessment, human aspects, demographic effects, age and ageing effects, presentation attack detection, morphing, datasets, their preparation, training and tuning, non-cooperative uses, accuracy measurement, and performance tests.

With support from the Department of Homeland Security's Science and Technology Directorate, the conference aims to assemble a set of speakers from across the globe involved in face recognition development, procurement,

October 27 - 29, 2020 EDT

Virtual Conference--Eastern Time

### [REGISTER](#)

Registration closes on **October 21, 2020**.

The cost to attend IFPC 2020 is **FREE**.

#### **Technical Contacts:**

Patrick Grother, Mei Ngan, Kayee Hanaoka (NIST)  
Tony Mansfield (NPL)  
Christoph Busch (EAB)


Email: [ifpc2020@nist.gov](mailto:ifpc2020@nist.gov)

### IFPC 2020 Organizers

- NIST
- DHS S&T
- EAB
- NPL

<https://www.nist.gov/news-events/events/2020/10/international-face-performance-conference-ifpc-2020>

Draft agenda is now available!



# Thank you!

**Mei Ngan**

National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)

[mei@nist.gov](mailto:mei@nist.gov) | [frvt@nist.gov](mailto:frvt@nist.gov)



**National Institute of  
Standards and Technology**  
U.S. Department of Commerce

FRVT 1:1 Verification: <https://pages.nist.gov/frvt/html/frvt11.html>  
FRVT 1:N Identification: <https://pages.nist.gov/frvt/html/frvt1N.html>  
FRVT MORPH: [https://pages.nist.gov/frvt/html/frvt\\_morph.html](https://pages.nist.gov/frvt/html/frvt_morph.html)  
FRVT Quality Assessment: [https://pages.nist.gov/frvt/html/frvt\\_quality.html](https://pages.nist.gov/frvt/html/frvt_quality.html)  
FRVT Face Masks: [https://pages.nist.gov/frvt/html/frvt\\_facemask.html](https://pages.nist.gov/frvt/html/frvt_facemask.html)