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Ongoing Face Recognition Vendor Test (FRVT)

Part 1: Verification

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ABOUT THIS REPORT

This report is a draft NIST Interagency Report, and is open for comment. It documents the verification-track of the ongoing Face Recognition Vendor Test. The report will be updated continuously as new algorithms are evaluated, as new datasets are added, and as new analyses are included. Comments and suggestions should be directed to frvt@nist.gov.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

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FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
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1 News

2017-04-03

- NIST's evaluation of 1:1 algorithms is now closed; it will reopen on May 14 and close again on June 14.
- We expect to produce another edition of this FRVT report in late June.
- There will be some major changes to FRVT 1:1 including to the API - see the homepage for details:
- https://www.nist.gov/programs-projects/face-recognition-vendor-test-frvt-ongoing.
- NIST's evaluation of 1:N identification algorithms is underway: Phase 1 is evaluating 62 algorithms from 28 developers.
- The 1:N evaluation is open to new and current participants: the window for submission is between June 14 an June 21. The API and concept document is linked from here.

2 Changelog

2018-04-03

- Added results for some algorithms applied to child exploitation images, including for the most accurate algorithm tested on that dataset so far.

2018-02-15

- Added results for algorithms from new developers Gorilla, Megvii.
- Added results for new algorithms from Dermalog, Neurotechnology, Visionlabs, Vocord.
- Retired results for early algorithms from those suppliers because FRVT lists only the two most recent algorithms per organization.
- Added a column to the FNMR summary Table 2 that gives FNMR for visa photos when FMR is set to 0.0001 for non-zero effort impostors i.e. those of the same sex, age group, and country of origin. This produces markedly higher FNMR over the zero-effort case because rejection of impostors becomes more difficult.

2018-01-24

- Added results for first algorithms from Gemalto Cogent, Intellivision and Ultinous.
- Added full or partial results for new algorithms from Idemia (Morpho), NTechLab, Shaman, Tevian, and Toshiba, and from Fudan and ITMO universities.
- Added entries for Fudan University which had incorrectly been omitted from Tables 1 and 3.
- Retired results for itmo-001, ntechlab-001, vocord-001, and vigilantsolutions-001 - FRVT lists only the two most recent algorithms per organization.
- Added GPU vs CPU shape designators to the tradeoff summaries in Figures 1 and 2.

2017-12-14

- Added results for algorithms from Aware, RankOne, Shaman, and Tevian.
- Retired results for RankOne-000 - FRVT lists only the two most recent algorithms per organization.
- New description of wild images in section 5.2
- New Figure 23 showing FMR for impostors of same age, sex and worst-case region.

2017-11-16

- ▷ Added results for algorithms from 3DiVi, Dermalog, Neurotechnology and Ping An.
- ▷ Retired results for 3DiVi-000, dermalog-002, and neurotechnology-000 - FRVT lists only two algorithms per organization.
- ▷ Retired results for vcognition-001 as the algorithm was inoperable on at least one dataset.
- ▷ Added cross-pose recognition heatmaps for the wild images, Figures 10 and 11.
- ▷ Added Figure 14 to compare effect of providing whole vs. face-cropped child exploitation images.

2017-10-03

- ▷ Added results for algorithms from 3DiVi, Camvi, Idemia, Noblis, N-TechLab, and Visionlabs.
- ▷ Added partial results for two algorithms from Zhuhai Yisheng.
- ▷ The ntechlab-000 algorithm has been retired - FRVT lists only two algorithms per organization.
- ▷ Corrected fixed FMR operating point in the legends of some DET plots.

2017-08-22

- ▷ Added results for three additional algorithms, rankone-002, neurotechnology-001, and itmo-002.
- ▷ The algorithms dermalog-001 and rank-001 have been retired - FRVT lists only two algorithms per organization
- ▷ The algorithm tupel-001 has been retired as it is not operable on all datasets
- ▷ Clarified the tradeoff Figures 1 and 2 plot only genuine comparison durations.
- ▷ Corrected image type label in section 4.5

2017-08-07

- ▷ Added results for 5 new algorithms
- ▷ Added Figure 3 giving simulated example images.
- ▷ Added Figure 1 showing an alternative view of the same tradeoff data in Figure 2
- ▷ Added Figure 5 showing accuracy on visa images just for low FMR.
- ▷ Added Figure 24 showing impostor distribution shifts from certain country pairs. Section 5.6.1 in this and prior reports documents high false match rates for individuals from certain countries. That effect, however, is often not confined to anomalously high impostor scores in the tails of the distribution, but arises from systematic shifts of the whole distribution. These shifts sometimes reach 2σ.

2017-07-29

- ▷ Added results for 8 new algorithms
- ▷ Added results for a child-exploitation dataset
- ▷ Added Table 2 a standalone tabulation of false non-match rates
- ▷ We have received additional CPU algorithms - Results should appear August 4, 2017
- ▷ We have received additional GPU algorithms - Results to appear as computational resources are released from the Face Recognition Prize Challenge

2017-06-19

- ▷ Added five new algorithms, three of which remain in-process

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- ▷ Added results for a "wild" dataset of images similar to non-cooperative photojournalism images
- ▷ Added Table 3 a standalone tabulation of failure to enrol rates
- ▷ Added Fig. 2 showing tradeoff between FNMR, template size, template generation time, and match duration.
- ▷ Added Fig. 19 showing how FMR is concentrated in certain images.
- ▷ Restated cross-region false match rates at nominal FMR = 0.0001 instead of 0.001
- ▷ Improved DET legends.

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	Developer	Short	Seq.	Validation	Config[1]	Template		GPU	Comparison Time (ns)[3]	
	Name	Name	Num.	Date	Data (KB)	Size (B)	Time (ms)[2]		Genuine	Impostor
1	3DiVi	3divi	001	2017-06-22	190867	^{49}4096 ± 0	^{33}274 ± 47	Yes	^{14}636 ± 19	^{15}634 ± 16
2	3DiVi	3divi	002	2017-10-20	190867	^{51}4096 ± 0	^{34}279 ± 48	Yes	^{16}692 ± 22	^{18}707 ± 26
3	AnyVision	anyvision	001	2018-01-31	662659	^{20}1024 ± 0	^{27}244 ± 0	No	^{57}74285 ± 212	^{57}74145 ± 200
4	AnyVision	anyvision	002	2018-01-31	662659	^{19}1024 ± 0	^{29}248 ± 0	No	^{56}74069 ± 188	^{56}74019 ± 198
5	Aware	aware	000	2017-10-27	240240	^{28}1572 ± 0	^{55}655 ± 26	No	^{35}4030 ± 83	^{34}2984 ± 152
6	Aware	aware	001	2017-10-27	240240	^{29}1572 ± 0	^{56}656 ± 26	No	^{31}2902 ± 51	^{32}2810 ± 111
7	Ayonix	ayonix	000	2017-06-22	58505	^{23}1036 ± 0	^{1}18 ± 2	No	^{11}621 ± 23	^{14}620 ± 26
8	Camvi Technologies	camvitech	001	2017-09-13	118759	^{21}1024 ± 0	^{22}181 ± 6	No	^{7}481 ± 16	^{10}487 ± 23
9	Gemalto Cogent	cogent	000	2018-01-12	633812	^{11}439 ± 0	^{46}511 ± 7	No	^{40}9541 ± 54	^{41}9500 ± 51
10	Cyberextruder	cyberex	001	2017-08-02	121211	^{6}256 ± 0	^{62}893 ± 25	No	^{22}1083 ± 16	^{24}1079 ± 19
11	Cyberextruder	cyberex	002	2018-01-30	168909	^{34}2048 ± 0	^{48}532 ± 6	No	^{27}1803 ± 14	^{28}1779 ± 22
12	Dermalog	dermalog	004	2017-10-26	0	^{2}128 ± 0	^{17}149 ± 5	No	^{8}490 ± 26	^{9}471 ± 26
13	Dermalog	dermalog	005	2018-02-02	0	^{3}128 ± 0	^{14}130 ± 11	No	^{9}499 ± 22	^{11}500 ± 22
14	Digital Barriers	barriers	000	2017-05-31	157794	^{37}2056 ± 0	^{9}104 ± 0	No	^{43}13232 ± 166	^{44}13226 ± 146
15	Digital Barriers	barriers	001	2017-07-20	236915	^{39}2056 ± 0	^{35}294 ± 1	No	^{42}12311 ± 164	^{43}12347 ± 197
16	Fudan University	fudan	000	2017-11-22	202296	^{16}534 ± 0	^{7}84 ± 0	Yes	^{26}1713 ± 28	^{27}1715 ± 20
17	Fudan University	fudan	001	2018-01-11	345583	^{30}1808 ± 0	^{15}131 ± 0	Yes	^{24}1288 ± 26	^{25}1281 ± 22
18	Gorilla Technology	gorilla	000	2018-02-13	98290	^{55}4204 ± 0	^{30}256 ± 14	No	^{34}3875 ± 29	^{36}3872 ± 51
19	ID3 Technology	id3	001	2017-08-04	225574	^{14}520 ± 0	^{25}238 ± 19	No	^{21}1058 ± 32	^{23}1049 ± 28
20	ID3 Technology	id3	002	2017-08-04	225574	^{13}520 ± 0	^{45}482 ± 34	No	^{23}1100 ± 59	^{22}1048 ± 32
21	Innovatrics	innova	001	2017-07-25	0	^{9}284 ± 0	^{53}645 ± 5	No	^{38}5506 ± 131	^{39}4975 ± 308
22	Innovatrics	innova	002	2018-02-05	0	^{15}530 ± 0	^{18}153 ± 0	Yes	^{44}14384 ± 260	^{45}14497 ± 207
23	Intellivision	intellivision	001	2017-10-10	43692	^{40}2056 ± 0	^{4}62 ± 2	No	^{29}2573 ± 91	^{31}2544 ± 38
24	Is It You	isityou	000	2017-06-26	48010	^{61}19200 ± 0	^{11}113 ± 5	No	^{61}237517 ± 1318	^{61}237374 ± 1279
25	Innovation Systems	isystems	000	2018-01-11	209270	^{18}1024 ± 0	^{19}154 ± 4	No	^{4}398 ± 14	^{5}396 ± 16
26	ITMO University	itmo	002	2017-08-07	1923215	^{54}4162 ± 0	^{51}611 ± 17	No	^{39}7423 ± 96	^{40}7451 ± 94
27	ITMO University	itmo	003	2018-01-23	579961	^{44}2114 ± 0	^{6}79 ± 2	Yes	^{41}10038 ± 180	^{42}10030 ± 134
28	Megvii/Face++	megvii	000	2018-02-13	1358915	^{36}2048 ± 0	^{59}785 ± 0	No	^{47}19816 ± 158	^{49}19805 ± 174
29	Idemia	Idemia	000	2017-07-11	100806	^{1}116 ± 0	^{10}109 ± 1	No	^{20}993 ± 31	^{21}1000 ± 34
30	Idemia	Idemia	002	2017-12-28	383021	^{10}352 ± 0	^{44}411 ± 7	No	^{33}3620 ± 94	^{30}2481 ± 65
31	Neurotechnology	neurotech	002	2017-11-02	280771	^{46}2718 ± 0	^{50}581 ± 6	No	^{53}68738 ± 748	^{54}68905 ± 993
32	Neurotechnology	neurotech	003	2018-02-02	339962	^{56}5214 ± 0	^{49}580 ± 5	No	^{55}73589 ± 2548	^{55}72837 ± 1546
33	Noblis	noblis	000	2017-07-05	713573	^{24}1061 ± 0	^{20}174 ± 20	Yes	^{25}1343 ± 45	^{26}1373 ± 56
34	N-Tech Lab	ntech	002	2017-08-23	894169	^{57}6744 ± 1	^{40}330 ± 11	No	^{58}82508 ± 213	^{58}82524 ± 220
35	N-Tech Lab	ntech	003	2017-12-29	1422738	^{47}2906 ± 1	^{13}128 ± 3	Yes	^{49}35327 ± 117	^{50}35371 ± 123
36	Ping An Technology	Pingan	002	2017-09-25	442564	^{60}18436 ± 0	^{16}132 ± 7	Yes	^{32}3088 ± 32	^{35}3051 ± 28
37	Rank One Computing	rankone	002	2017-08-18	0	^{4}224 ± 0	^{5}75 ± 1	No	^{54}69113 ± 3802	^{3}369 ± 26
38	Rank One Computing	rankone	003	2017-11-28	0	^{5}228 ± 0	^{2}37 ± 1	No	^{1}322 ± 20	^{1}324 ± 19
39	Samtech InfoNet Limited	samtech	000	2017-05-02	109774	^{38}2056 ± 0	^{31}262 ± 2	No	^{37}4550 ± 26	^{38}4541 ± 28
40	Shaman Software	shaman	000	2017-12-05	0	^{50}4096 ± 0	^{54}653 ± 16	No	^{3}380 ± 25	^{4}379 ± 31
41	Shaman Software	shaman	001	2018-01-13	0	^{48}4096 ± 0	^{36}294 ± 2	No	^{13}635 ± 19	^{7}441 ± 25
42	Smilart	smilart	002	2018-02-06	111826	^{22}1024 ± 0	^{21}176 ± 16	No	^{46}18784 ± 136	^{48}18795 ± 151
43	Synesis	synesis	000	2018-02-09	340264	^{12}512 ± 0	^{12}117 ± 0	No	^{17}775 ± 206	^{12}568 ± 48
44	Tevian	tevian	000	2017-12-10	455746	^{35}2048 ± 0	^{26}242 ± 14	No	^{5}430 ± 38	^{6}427 ± 23
45	Tevian	tevian	001	2018-01-19	682319	^{33}2048 ± 0	^{28}245 ± 13	No	^{2}350 ± 22	^{2}327 ± 13
46	TigerIT Americas LLC	tiger	001	2018-01-23	171041	^{58}8632 ± 0	^{39}312 ± 12	No	^{60}98339 ± 34	^{60}98327 ± 32
47	TongYi Transportation Technology	tongyi	001	2017-04-01	625339	^{41}2058 ± 0	^{38}310 ± 20	No	^{45}17769 ± 74	^{46}17750 ± 63
48	TongYi Transportation Technology	tongyi	002	2017-07-15	625336	^{42}2058 ± 0	^{42}356 ± 35	No	^{48}29816 ± 281	^{47}17799 ± 127
49	Toshiba	toshiba	000	2018-01-11	3893310	^{31}1812 ± 0	^{47}528 ± 3	Yes	^{28}2255 ± 60	^{29}2251 ± 53
50	Toshiba	toshiba	001	2018-01-11	3893310	^{45}2580 ± 0	^{52}615 ± 3	Yes	^{30}2900 ± 80	^{33}2881 ± 60
51	Ultinous	ultinous	000	2017-12-18	90803	^{52}4100 ± 0	^{3}53 ± 0	Yes	^{36}4263 ± 50	^{37}4262 ± 42
52	Ultinous	ultinous	001	2018-02-02	403572	^{59}12304 ± 0	^{23}200 ± 0	Yes	^{51}36357 ± 223	^{52}36332 ± 210
53	VCognition	vcog	002	2017-06-12	3229434	^{62}61504 ± 5	^{43}357 ± 25	No	^{62}296154 ± 3077	^{62}296436 ± 4183
54	Vigilant Solutions	vigilant	002	2017-09-28	344137	^{43}2060 ± 0	^{61}844 ± 2	No	^{15}679 ± 10	^{17}680 ± 7
55	Vigilant Solutions	vigilant	003	2018-01-23	343048	^{27}1548 ± 0	^{60}824 ± 3	No	^{12}634 ± 19	^{16}638 ± 17
56	VisionLabs	visionlabs	002	2017-09-08	591936	^{8}264 ± 0	^{32}265 ± 8	No	^{18}796 ± 35	^{19}799 ± 31
57	VisionLabs	visionlabs	003	2018-02-02	639849	^{7}260 ± 0	^{24}231 ± 5	No	^{6}439 ± 23	^{8}454 ± 20
58	Vocord	vocord	002	2017-06-07	918292	^{25}1330 ± 0	^{58}782 ± 36	Yes	^{59}83063 ± 517	^{59}83072 ± 714
59	Vocord	vocord	003	2018-01-23	900909	^{17}817 ± 0	^{37}296 ± 3	Yes	^{52}46683 ± 378	^{51}36007 ± 292
60	Zhuhai Yisheng Electronics Technology	yisheng	001	2017-08-17	120112	^{32}2048 ± 0	^{8}103 ± 1	Yes	^{19}906 ± 31	^{20}905 ± 25
61	Zhuhai Yisheng Electronics Technology	yisheng	002	2018-02-01	604097	^{26}1348 ± 0	^{41}332 ± 1	Yes	^{10}613 ± 40	^{13}588 ± 26
62	Shanghai Yitu Technology	yitu	000	2017-05-23	2211068	^{53}4130 ± 0	^{57}672 ± 2	No	^{50}35352 ± 114	^{53}37848 ± 1773

Notes	
1	The configuration size does not capture static data included in libraries. We do not count these because some algorithms include common ancilliary libraries for image processing (e.g. openCV) or numerical computation (e.g. blas).
2	The median template creation times are measured on Intel®Xeon®CPU E5-2630 v4 @ 2.20GHz processors or, for GPU-enabled implementations, NVidia Tesla K40.
3	The comparison durations, in nanoseconds, are estimated using std::chrono::high_resolution_clock which on the machine in (2) counts 1ns clock ticks. Precision is somewhat worse than that however. The ± value is the median absolute deviation times 1.48 for Normal consistency.

Table 1: Summary of algorithms and properties included in this report. The red superscripts give ranking for the quantity in that column.

		FALSE NON-MATCH RATE (FNMR)															
	Algorithm	CONSTRAINED, COOPERATIVE										LESS CONSTRAINED, NON-COOPERATIVE					
	Name	VISA		VISA		VISAMC		MUGSHOT		WEBCAM		SELFIE		WILD		CHILD EXP	
	FMR	1E-06		0.0001		0.0001		0.0001		0.0001		0.0001		0.0001		0.01	
1	3divi-001	0.154	25	0.020	12	0.078	18	0.030	20	0.001	18	0.046	31	0.492	13	0.549	5
2	3divi-002	0.154	24	0.021	14	0.079	19	0.033	23	0.001	19	0.049	37	0.495	14	0.561	7
3	anyvision-001	0.086	14	0.044	31	0.072	16	0.034	24	0.012	37	0.075	48	0.684	30	0.685	21
4	anyvision-002	0.090	16	0.039	28	0.066	15	0.034	25	0.012	36	0.075	46	0.689	31	0.696	25
5	aware-000	0.309	43	0.054	36	0.197	44	0.045	39	0.003	25	0.046	33	0.948	54	0.808	50
6	aware-001	0.309	44	0.054	35	0.197	43	0.045	40	0.004	27	0.046	32	0.993	57	0.952	56
7	ayonix-000	0.487	55	0.230	59	0.435	57	0.309	56	0.172	52	0.360	58	0.807	44	0.843	52
8	camvi-001	0.538	57	0.183	57	0.382	55	0.323	57	0.106	50	0.268	57	0.743	37	0.763	41
9	cogent-000	0.084	13	0.012	5	0.043	10	0.018	4	0.001	16	0.014	10	0.508	16	0.759	39
10	cyberextruder-001	0.255	38	0.076	44	0.197	45	0.165	54	0.029	45	0.144	53	0.853	46	0.780	47
11	cyberextruder-002	0.134	20	0.027	18	0.081	21	0.042	35	0.010	32	0.023	20	0.486	12	0.610	13
12	dermalog-004	0.240	36	0.093	50	0.181	39	0.131	53	0.016	39	0.121	52	0.996	59	0.960	57
13	dermalog-005	0.182	29	0.066	40	0.153	33	0.072	47	0.027	44	0.072	45	0.519	17	0.684	19
14	digitalbarriers-000	0.463	54	0.161	55	0.368	54	0.184	55	0.045	49	0.170	54	0.741	36	0.771	43
15	digitalbarriers-001	0.502	56	0.155	54	0.468	59	0.041	33	0.029	46	0.115	50	0.678	29	0.731	31
16	fdu-000	0.058	8	0.016	8	0.039	9	0.021	10	0.001	15	0.009	4	0.549	18	0.706	27
17	fdu-001	0.044	6	0.017	9	0.035	7	0.024	15	0.001	12	0.014	12	0.344	3	0.657	16
18	gorilla-000	0.141	23	0.023	16	0.080	20	0.079	49	0.249	53	0.187	55	0.913	52	0.969	59
19	id3-001	0.250	37	0.063	39	0.170	37	0.036	26	0.002	22	0.040	27	0.765	39	0.688	23
20	id3-002	0.239	35	0.057	38	0.161	36	0.032	22	0.003	26	0.037	22	0.810	45	0.686	22
21	innovatrics-001	0.183	30	0.034	23	0.108	28	0.043	36	0.001	17	0.043	28	0.643	25	0.815	51
22	innovatrics-002	0.614	59	0.086	48	0.405	56	0.024	14	0.000	4	0.014	11	0.768	40	0.636	15
23	intellivision-001	0.221	34	0.042	29	0.133	32	0.037	27	0.021	43	0.066	43	0.878	48	0.777	44
24	isityou-000	0.703	60	0.414	60	0.568	60	0.680	60	0.690	55	-	61	1.000	60	-	60
25	isystems-000	0.179	28	0.043	30	0.127	31	0.064	46	0.008	30	0.049	36	0.678	28	0.736	32
26	itmo-002	0.287	41	0.050	34	0.161	35	0.047	41	0.036	48	0.069	44	0.892	50	0.783	48
27	itmo-003	0.140	22	0.020	11	0.075	17	0.023	13	0.000	2	0.017	14	0.450	10	0.599	11
28	megvii-000	0.025	1	0.005	1	0.016	1	0.017	1	0.000	8	0.006	3	0.746	38	0.477	3
29	morpho-000	0.134	21	0.026	17	0.102	26	0.028	19	0.007	29	0.012	7	0.893	51	0.846	53
30	morpho-002	0.068	11	0.009	3	0.038	8	0.019	7	0.000	7	0.006	2	0.607	21	0.631	14
31	neurotechnology-002	0.166	27	0.036	24	0.112	29	0.041	32	0.000	10	0.020	18	0.427	7	0.683	18
32	neurotechnology-003	0.088	15	0.018	10	0.062	13	0.027	17	0.000	3	0.017	15	0.421	6	0.691	24
33	noblis-000	0.542	58	0.212	58	0.442	58	0.349	58	0.153	51	0.239	56	0.875	47	0.757	38
34	ntechlab-002	0.065	9	0.021	13	0.056	12	0.023	12	0.003	23	0.014	9	0.324	2	0.459	2
35	ntechlab-003	0.039	5	0.011	4	0.029	5	0.019	6	0.003	24	0.014	13	0.271	1	0.433	1
36	pa-002	0.286	40	0.086	47	0.185	40	0.041	34	0.010	33	0.043	30	0.633	24	0.722	29
37	rankone-002	0.217	33	0.049	33	0.155	34	0.032	21	0.000	11	0.052	38	0.705	33	0.778	46
38	rankone-003	0.184	31	0.038	27	0.117	30	0.028	18	0.000	9	0.040	24	0.674	26	0.777	45
39	samtech-000	0.443	52	0.161	56	0.342	53	0.044	37	0.021	42	0.063	42	0.878	49	0.765	42
40	shaman-000	0.977	62	0.913	62	0.930	62	0.968	62	0.992	56	0.997	60	0.995	58	0.962	58
41	shaman-001	0.462	53	0.136	52	0.335	52	0.083	50	0.030	47	0.115	51	0.775	41	0.899	54
42	smilart-002	0.353	48	0.082	46	0.244	49	0.098	52	-	61	-	62	-	62	0.700	26
43	synesis-000	0.324	46	0.045	32	0.175	38	0.040	30	0.021	41	0.063	41	1.000	61	-	61
44	tevian-000	0.129	19	0.036	25	0.087	23	0.022	11	0.002	21	0.009	5	0.500	15	0.601	12
45	tevian-001	0.127	18	0.033	22	0.081	22	0.021	9	0.002	20	0.006	1	0.448	9	0.598	10
46	tiger-001	0.397	50	0.137	53	0.312	51	0.524	59	0.015	38	0.046	34	0.593	20	0.586	8
47	tongyitrans-001	0.072	12	0.038	26	0.062	14	0.041	31	0.009	31	0.063	39	0.704	32	0.743	34
48	tongyitrans-002	0.066	10	0.030	19	0.044	11	0.039	28	0.010	34	0.063	40	0.725	35	0.746	35
49	toshiba-000	0.290	42	0.069	42	0.191	42	0.039	29	-	60	0.040	25	0.719	34	0.743	33
50	toshiba-001	0.193	32	0.033	21	0.106	27	0.044	38	-	58	0.049	35	0.795	43	0.783	49
51	ultinous-000	0.348	47	0.076	45	0.234	48	0.073	48	0.005	28	0.040	26	0.979	56	0.945	55
52	ultinous-001	0.400	51	0.075	43	0.249	50	0.049	43	-	62	0.029	21	0.486	11	0.685	20
53	vcog-002	0.903	61	0.504	61	0.752	61	0.692	61	0.559	54	0.666	59	0.778	42	0.752	36
54	vigilantsolutions-002	0.321	45	0.087	49	0.229	47	0.092	51	0.018	40	0.075	47	0.675	27	0.722	30
55	vigilantsolutions-003	0.267	39	0.068	41	0.188	41	0.057	45	0.001	13	0.037	23	0.571	19	0.671	17
56	visionlabs-002	0.051	7	0.014	7	0.033	6	0.020	8	0.001	14	0.017	17	0.397	5	0.556	6
57	visionlabs-003	0.029	2	0.009	2	0.018	2	0.018	3	0.000	5	0.017	16	0.369	4	0.524	4
58	vocord-002	0.034	4	0.013	6	0.023	3	0.019	5	0.011	35	0.012	8	0.948	55	0.762	40
59	vocord-003	0.109	17	0.094	51	0.100	25	0.056	44	-	59	0.104	49	0.620	22	-	62
60	yisheng-001	0.160	26	0.032	20	0.089	24	0.048	42	0.000	6	0.043	29	0.628	23	0.756	37
61	yisheng-002	0.380	49	0.055	37	0.224	46	0.024	16	-	57	0.023	19	0.931	53	0.709	28
62	yitu-000	0.033	3	0.021	15	0.028	4	0.017	2	0.000	1	0.012	6	0.431	8	0.586	9

Table 2: FNMR is the proportion of mated comparisons below a threshold set to achieve the FMR given in the header on the fourth row. FMR is the proportion of impostor comparisons at or above that threshold. The green column applies to impostors of the same sex, age group, and country of birth. All other columns use fully zero effort impostors Note that the webcam and selfie values apply to images collected on the same day, and that will often yield optimisticlly low FNMR values.

Figure 1: The points show false non-match rates (FNMR) versus the duration of the template generation operation. FNMR is the geometric mean of FNMR values for visa and mugshot images (from Figs. 4 and 6) at a false match rate (FMR) of 0.0001. Template generation time is a median estimated over 640 x 480 pixel portraits. The size of the points encodes template generation time - which spans one order of magnitude. The color of the points encodes one-to-one genuine template comparison duration - which span three orders of magnitude.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 2: The points show false non-match rates (FNMR) versus the duration of the template generation operation. Some algorithms run on GPU, most on CPU - see Table 1. FNMR is the geometric mean of FNMR values for visa and mugshot images (from Figs. 4 and 6) at a false match rate (FMR) of 0.0001. Template generation time is a median estimated over 640 x 480 pixel portraits. The size of the points encodes template size - which span two orders of magnitude. The color of the points encodes one-to-one genuine template comparison duration - which span three orders of magnitude.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

3 Metrics

3.1 Core accuracy

Given a vector of N genuine scores, u, the false non-match rate (FNMR) is computed as the proportion below some threshold, T:

$$\text{FNMR}(T) = 1 - \frac{1}{N}\sum_{i=1}^{N} H(u_i - T) \tag{1}$$

where $H(x)$ is the unit step function, and $H(0)$ taken to be 1.

Similarly, given a vector of N impostor scores, v, the false match rate (FMR) is computed as the proportion above T:

$$\text{FMR}(T) = \frac{1}{N}\sum_{i=1}^{N} H(v_i - T) \tag{2}$$

The threshold, T, can take on any value. We typically generate a set of thresholds from quantiles of the observed impostor scores, v, as follows. Given some interesting false match rate range, $[\text{FMR}_L, \text{FMR}_U]$, we form a vector of K thresholds corresponding to FMR measurements evenly spaced on a logarithmic scale

$$T_k = Q_v(1 - \text{FMR}_k) \tag{3}$$

where Q is the quantile function, and FMR_k comes from

$$\log_{10}\text{FMR}_k = \log_{10}\text{FMR}_L + \frac{k}{K}\,[\log_{10}\text{FMR}_U - \log_{10}\text{FMR}_L] \tag{4}$$

Error tradeoff characteristics are plots of FNMR(T) vs. FMR(T). These are plotted with $\text{FMR}_U \to 1$ and FMR_L as low as is sustained by the number of impostor comparisons, N. This is somewhat higher than the "rule of three" limit $3/N$ because samples are not independent, due to re-use of images.

4 Datasets

4.1 Child exploitation images

- ▷ The number of images is O(10^4).
- ▷ The number of subjects is O(10^3).
- ▷ The number of subjects with two images O(10^3).
- ▷ The images are operational. They are taken from ongoing investigations of child exploitation crimes. The images are arbitrarily unconstrained. Pose varies considerably around all three axes, including subject lying down. Resolution varies very widely. Faces can be occluded by other objects, including hair and hands. Lighting varies, although the images are intended for human viewing. Mis-focus is rare. Images are given to the algorithm without any cropping; faces may occupy widely varying areas.
- ▷ The images are usually large from contemporary cameras. The mean interocular distance (IOD) is 70 pixels.
- ▷ The images are of subjects from several countries, due to the global production of this imagery.
- ▷ The images are of children, from infancy to late adolescence.
- ▷ All of the images are live capture, none are scanned. Many have been cropped.
- ▷ When these images are input to the algorithm, they are labelled as being of type "EXPLOITATION" - see Table 4 of the FRVT API.

4.2 Visa images

- ▷ The number of images is O(10^5).
- ▷ The number of subjects is O(10^5).
- ▷ The number of subjects with two images O(10^4).
- ▷ The images have geometry in reasonable conformance with the ISO/IEC 19794-5 Full Frontal image type. Pose is generally excellent.
- ▷ The images are of size 252x300 pixels. The mean interocular distance (IOD) is 69 pixels.
- ▷ The images are of subjects from greater than 100 countries, with significant imbalance due to visa issuance patterns.
- ▷ The images are of subjects of all ages, including children, again with imbalance due to visa issuance demand.
- ▷ Many of the images are live capture. A substantial number of the images are photographs of paper photographs.
- ▷ When these images are input to the algorithm, they are labelled as being of type "ISO" - see Table 4 of the FRVT API.

4.3 Mugshot images

- ▷ The number of images is O(10^6).
- ▷ The number of subjects is O(10^5).
- ▷ The number of subjects with two images O(10^5).

- ▷ The images have geometry in reasonable conformance with the ISO/IEC 19794-5 Full Frontal image type.
- ▷ The images are of variable sizes. The median IOD is 104 pixels. The mean IOD is 123 pixels.
- ▷ The images are of subjects from the United States.
- ▷ The images are of adults.
- ▷ The images are all live capture.
- ▷ When these images are input to the algorithm, they are labelled as being of type ”mugshot” - see Table 4 of the FRVT API.

4.4 Selfie images

- ▷ The number of images is below 500.
- ▷ The number of subjects is below 500.
- ▷ All subjects have a selfie image, and a portrait image.
- ▷ The portrait images are in reasonable conformance with the ISO/IEC 19794-5 Full Frontal image type.
- ▷ The selfie images vary: taken with camera above and below eye level, with one hand or two hands. Pitch angles vary more than yaw angles, which are frontal. Some perspective distortion is evident.
- ▷ The images have mean IOD of 140 pixels.
- ▷ The images are of subjects from the United States.
- ▷ The images are of adults.
- ▷ The images are all live capture.
- ▷ When these images are input to the algorithm, they are labelled as being of type ”WILD” - see Table 4 of the FRVT API.

4.5 Webcam images

- ▷ The number of images is below 1500.
- ▷ The number of subjects is below 1500.
- ▷ All subjects have a webcam image, and a portrait image.
- ▷ The portrait images are in reasonable conformance with the ISO/IEC 19794-5 Full Frontal image type.
- ▷ The webcam images are taken with camera at a typical head height, with mild pitch angles, low yaw angles, but some variation in range, such that low perspective distortion is sometimes evident.
- ▷ The images have mean IOD of 68 pixels (sd=12).
- ▷ The images are of subjects from the United States.
- ▷ The images are of adults.
- ▷ The images are all live capture.
- ▷ When these images are input to the algorithm, they are labelled as being of type ”MUGSHOT” - see Table 4 of the FRVT API.

(a) Visa (b) Mugshot (c) Webcam (d) Selfie (e) Wild

Figure 3: The figure gives simulated samples of image types used in this report.

4.6 Wild images

- ▷ The number of images is O(10^5).
- ▷ The number of subjects is O(10^3).
- ▷ The number of subjects with two images O(10^3).
- ▷ The images include many photojournalism-style images. Images are given to the algorithm using a variable but generally tight crop of the head. Resolution varies very widely. The images are very unconstrained, with wide yaw and pitch pose variation. Faces can be occluded, including hair and hands.
- ▷ The images are of adults.
- ▷ All of the images are live capture, none are scanned.
- ▷ When these images are input to the algorithm, they are labelled as being of type "WILD" - see Table 4 of the FRVT API.

5 Results

5.1 Test goals

- ▷ To state overall accuracy.
- ▷ To compare algorithms.

5.2 Test design

Method: For wild images:

- ▷ The comparisons are of wild photos against wild photos.
- ▷ The number of genuine comparisons is O(10^6).
- ▷ The number of impostor comparisons is O(10^7).

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

- ▷ The comparisons are fully zero-effort, meaning impostors are paired without attention to sex, age or other covariates.
- ▷ The number of persons is O(10^4).
- ▷ The number of images used to make 1 template is 1.
- ▷ The number of templates used to make each comparison score is two corresponding to simple one-to-one verification.

Method: For visa images:

- ▷ The comparisons are of visa photos against visa photos.
- ▷ The number of genuine comparisons is O(10^4).
- ▷ The number of impostor comparisons is O(10^{10}).
- ▷ The comparisons are fully zero-effort, meaning impostors are paired without attention to sex, age or other covariates. However, later analysis is conducted on subsets.
- ▷ The number of persons is O(10^5).
- ▷ The number of images used to make 1 template is 1.
- ▷ The number of templates used to make each comparison score is two corresponding to simple one-to-one verification.

For mugshot images:

- ▷ The comparisons are of mugshot photos against mugshot photos.
- ▷ The number of genuine comparisons is O(10^5).
- ▷ The number of impostor comparisons is O(10^7).
- ▷ The comparisons are fully zero-effort, meaning impostors are paired without attention to sex, age or other covariates.
- ▷ The number of persons is O(10^6).
- ▷ The number of images used to make 1 template is 1.
- ▷ The number of templates used to make each comparison score is two corresponding to simple one-to-one verification.

For selfie images:

- ▷ The comparisons are of selfie photos against portrait photos.
- ▷ The number of genuine comparisons is O(10^2).
- ▷ The number of impostor comparisons is O(10^8) selfies are compared with portraits of O(10^6) other subjects.
- ▷ The comparisons are fully zero-effort, meaning impostors are paired without attention to sex, age or other covariates.
- ▷ The number of persons is O(10^6).
- ▷ The number of images used to make 1 template is 1.

- ▷ The number of templates used to make each comparison score is two corresponding to simple one-to-one verification.

For webcam images:

- ▷ The comparisons are of webcam photos against portrait photos.
- ▷ The number of genuine comparisons is O(10^3).
- ▷ The number of impostor comparisons is O(10^9) webcams are compared with portraits of O(10^6) other subjects.
- ▷ The comparisons are fully zero-effort, meaning impostors are paired without attention to sex, age or other covariates.
- ▷ The number of persons is O(10^6).
- ▷ The number of images used to make 1 template is 1.
- ▷ The number of templates used to make each comparison score is two corresponding to simple one-to-one verification.

For child exploitation images:

- ▷ The comparisons are of unconstrained child exploitation photos against others of the same type.
- ▷ The number of genuine comparisons is O(10^4).
- ▷ The number of impostor comparisons is O(10^7).
- ▷ The comparisons are fully zero-effort, meaning impostors are paired without attention to sex, age or other covariates.
- ▷ The number of persons is O(10^3).
- ▷ The number of images used to make 1 template is 1.
- ▷ The number of templates used to make each comparison score is two corresponding to simple one-to-one verification.
- ▷ We produce two performance statements. First, is a DET as used for visa and mugshot images. The second is a cumulative match characteristic (CMC) summarizing a simulated one-to-many search process. This is done as follows.
  - We regard M enrollment templates as items in a gallery.
  - These M templates come from $M > N$ individuals, because multiple images of a subject are present in the gallery under separate identifiers.
  - We regard the verification templates as search templates.
  - For each search we compute the rank of the highest scoring mate.
  - This process should properly be conducted with a 1:N algorithm, such as those tested in NIST IR 8009. We use the 1:1 algorithms in a simulated 1:N mode here to a) better reflect what a child exploitation analyst does, and b) to do show algorithm efficacy is better than that revealed in the verification DETs.

5.3 Failure to enrol

Algorithm	Failure to Enrol Rate[1]											
Name	CHILD-EXPLOIT		MUGSHOT		SELFIES		VISA		WEBCAM		WILD	
3divi-001	0.2006	28	0.0019	37	0.0202	41	0.0007	32	0.0020	29	0.1898	39
3divi-002	0.3103	40	0.0039	51	0.0376	49	0.0010	35	0.0027	40	0.2413	45
anyvision-001	0.4864	59	0.0070	60	0.0578	55	0.0091	63	0.0089	48	0.5569	61
anyvision-002	0.4866	60	0.0070	59	0.0578	54	0.0090	62	0.0095	49	0.5575	62
aware-000	0.4663	54	0.0018	36	0.0231	43	0.0005	24	0.0055	44	0.2444	47
aware-001	0.1897	27	0.0010	22	0.0145	38	0.0002	11	0.0048	43	0.1431	26
ayonix-000	0.0000	2	0.0109	62	0.0751	58	0.0137	65	0.0109	51	0.0000	2
camvi-001	0.3931	51	0.0033	49	0.0231	44	0.0010	38	0.0027	41	0.3767	53
cogent-000	0.2914	36	0.0011	25	0.0029	19	0.0005	27	0.0020	33	0.2200	43
cyberextruder-001	0.5338	63	0.0036	50	0.0376	48	0.0029	51	0.0205	56	0.5730	63
cyberextruder-002	0.2672	35	0.0026	46	0.0058	26	0.0028	50	0.0123	53	0.1164	24
dermalog-004	0.3110	41	0.0031	48	0.0087	34	0.0090	61	0.0020	38	0.2050	41
dermalog-005	0.1796	25	0.0016	35	0.0000	12	0.0041	57	0.0014	25	0.1498	28
digitalbarriers-000	0.5469	64	0.0043	53	0.0925	60	0.0019	46	0.0184	55	0.5170	60
digitalbarriers-001	0.5102	62	0.0044	54	0.0925	61	0.0018	45	0.0232	57	0.4593	58
fdu-000	0.4992	61	0.0025	44	0.0029	22	0.0011	41	0.0020	35	0.3437	52
fdu-001	0.1380	24	0.0015	30	0.0000	10	0.0009	34	0.0007	15	0.0674	20
gorilla-000	0.1347	23	0.0009	19	0.0029	25	0.0004	22	0.0007	20	0.1644	32
id3-001	0.3411	45	0.0043	52	0.0260	46	0.0043	60	0.0014	23	0.2090	42
id3-002	0.3168	42	0.0030	47	0.0202	42	0.0032	53	0.0020	32	0.1496	27
innovatrics-001	0.3392	44	0.0013	29	0.0087	32	0.0004	21	0.0027	39	0.3337	51
innovatrics-002	0.0372	15	0.0003	13	0.0000	11	0.0004	18	0.0000	8	0.2435	46
intellivision-001	0.5495	66	0.0052	55	0.0491	52	0.0042	58	0.0252	58	0.7025	66
isityou-000	0.4714	56	0.0022	41	0.0665	57	0.0010	37	0.0116	52	0.4586	57
isystems-000	0.4757	57	0.0025	45	0.0260	45	0.0010	36	0.0068	47	0.4544	56
itmo-002	0.5751	67	0.0068	58	0.0636	56	0.0029	52	0.0498	61	0.6985	64
itmo-003	0.3606	48	0.0023	43	0.0058	29	0.0008	33	0.0014	27	0.2345	44
megvii-000	0.0199	14	0.0007	15	0.0000	18	0.0003	13	0.0007	21	0.0258	15
morpho-000	0.0000	9	0.0000	7	0.0000	17	0.0000	8	0.0000	13	0.0000	12
morpho-002	0.0572	19	0.0009	20	0.0000	6	0.0004	19	0.0007	14	0.0238	14
neurotechnology-002	0.2043	29	0.0000	8	0.0058	28	0.0000	6	0.0014	26	0.1525	29
neurotechnology-003	0.2371	31	0.0011	24	0.0058	30	0.0005	23	0.0020	37	0.1698	34
noblis-000	0.0000	7	0.0000	6	0.0000	15	0.0000	7	0.0000	11	0.0000	10
ntechlab-002	0.0926	21	0.0009	17	0.0029	23	0.0005	25	0.0007	16	0.0584	18
ntechlab-003	0.0926	22	0.0009	18	0.0029	24	0.0005	26	0.0007	19	0.0584	19
pa-002	0.0000	5	0.0000	4	0.0000	13	0.0000	4	0.0000	9	0.0000	7
rankone-002	0.0009	13	0.0001	10	0.0000	16	0.0000	10	0.0000	12	0.0855	22
rankone-003	0.0009	12	0.0001	9	0.0000	7	0.0000	9	0.0000	6	0.0855	21
samtech-000	0.5474	65	0.0052	56	0.0491	53	0.0042	59	0.0252	59	0.7023	65
shaman-000	0.0000	3	0.0000	2	0.0000	3	0.0000	2	0.0000	3	0.0000	3
shaman-001	0.0000	1	0.0000	1	0.0000	1	0.0000	1	0.0000	1	0.0000	1
smilart-002	0.2422	32	0.0012	28	-	62	0.0011	40	-	62	-	62
synesis-000	0.4807	58	0.0022	42	0.0347	47	0.0007	31	0.0095	50	0.4111	54
tevian-000	0.3373	43	0.0011	27	0.0000	9	0.0012	43	0.0020	34	0.2661	48
tevian-001	0.3030	38	0.0011	26	0.0000	8	0.0012	42	0.0020	31	0.1809	37
tiger-001	0.1847	26	0.4639	65	0.0087	31	0.0006	30	0.0000	7	0.1116	23
tongyitrans-001	0.0000	8	0.0068	57	0.0462	51	0.0040	56	0.0055	46	0.0000	11
tongyitrans-002	0.3609	49	0.0078	61	0.0462	50	0.0040	55	0.0055	45	0.0000	5
toshiba-000	0.0000	4	0.0000	3	0.0000	5	0.0000	3	0.0000	5	0.0000	4
toshiba-001	0.0000	6	0.0000	5	0.0000	14	0.0000	5	0.0000	10	0.0000	9
ultinous-000	0.0007	10	0.0002	11	0.0000	2	0.0003	15	0.0000	2	0.0497	16
ultinous-001	0.0007	11	0.0002	12	0.0000	4	0.0003	16	0.0000	4	0.0497	17
vcog-002	0.2209	30	0.0021	39	0.0087	35	0.0019	47	0.0007	18	0.1672	33
vigilantsolutions-002	0.3585	47	0.0010	23	0.0116	37	0.0004	20	0.0048	42	0.3262	50
vigilantsolutions-003	0.2538	34	0.0008	16	0.0058	27	0.0004	17	0.0014	24	0.1336	25
visionlabs-002	0.3063	39	0.0021	40	0.0087	33	0.0026	49	0.0007	17	0.1865	38
visionlabs-003	0.3010	37	0.0020	38	0.0087	36	0.0025	48	0.0014	28	0.1580	30
vocord-002	0.3782	50	0.0015	31	0.0029	21	0.0037	54	0.0171	54	0.1992	40
vocord-003	0.4677	55	0.0256	63	0.0867	59	0.0776	67	0.0437	60	0.4808	59
yisheng-001	0.4277	53	0.0016	34	0.0173	40	0.0006	29	0.0020	36	0.1770	36
yisheng-002	0.4277	52	0.0016	33	0.0173	39	0.0006	28	0.0020	30	0.1770	35
yitu-000	0.3475	46	0.0015	32	0.0029	20	0.0013	44	0.0014	22	0.1591	31

Table 3: FTE is the proportion of failed template generation attempts. Failures can occur because the software throws an exception, or because the software electively refuses to process the input image. This would typically occur if a face is not detected. FTE is measured as the number of function calls that give a non-zero error code, OR that give a "small" template. This is defined as one whose size is less than 0.3 times the median template size. This second rule is needed because some algorithms incorrectly fail to return a non-zero error code when template generation fails.

[1] *The effects of FTE are included in the accuracy results of this report by regarding any template comparison involving a failed template enrollment to produce a low similarity score. Thus higher FTE results in higher FNMR.*

5.4 Recognition accuracy

Core algorithm accuracy is stated via:

- ▷ **Cooperative subjects**
  - The summary table of Figure 2;
  - The visa image DETs of Figures 4 and 5;
  - The mugshot DETs of Figure 6 ;
  - The selfie-portrait DETs of Figure 7;
  - The webcam-portrait DETs of Figure 8;
- ▷ **Non-cooperative subjects**
  - The photojournalism DET of Figure 9
  - The sensitivity of photojournalism FNMR to relative yaw angles in Figure 10.
  - The sensitivity of photojournalism FMR to relative yaw angles in Figure 11.
  - The child-exploitation DET of Figure 12;
  - The child-exploitation CMC of Figure 13.

Figure 18 shows dependence of false match rate on algorithm score threshold. This allows a deployer to set a threshold to target a particular false match rate appropriate to the security objectives of the application.

Figure 20 likewise shows FMR(T) but for mugshots, and specially four subsets of the population.

Note that in both the mugshot and visa sets false match rates vary with the ethnicity, age, and sex, of the enrollee and impostor - see section 5.6.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 4: For the visa images, detection error tradeoff (DET) *characteristics showing false non-match rate vs. false match rate plotted parametrically on threshold, T. The scales are logarithmic in order to show many decades of* FMR.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 5: For the visa images, but now just for low FMR*, detection error tradeoff* (DET) *characteristics showing false non-match rate vs. false match rate plotted parametrically on threshold, T. The scales are logarithmic in order to show many decades of* FMR*.*

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 6: For the mugshot images, detection error tradeoff (DET) characteristics showing false non-match rate vs. false match rate plotted parametrically on threshold, T. The scales are logarithmic in order to show decades of FMR.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 7: For the selfie-to-portrait comparisons, detection error tradeoff (DET) characteristics showing false non-match rate vs. false match rate plotted parametrically on threshold, T. The scales are logarithmic in order to show several decades of FMR. Caution: The FNMR values here are optimistic statements of accuracy because the image pairs were collected on the same day. This is known across biometrics to give better accuracy, and is operationally relevant only in special cases.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 8: For the webcam-to-portrait comparisons, detection error tradeoff (DET) characteristics showing false non-match rate vs. false match rate plotted parametrically on threshold, T. The scales are logarithmic in order to show several decades of FMR. Caution: The FNMR values here are optimistic statements of accuracy because the image pairs were collected on the same day. This is known across biometrics to give better accuracy, and is operationally relevant only in special cases.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 9: For the wild image comparisons, detection error tradeoff (DET) characteristics showing false non-match rate vs. false match rate plotted parametrically on threshold, T. The scales are logarithmic in order to show several decades of FMR.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 10: For wild images, the heatmap show FNMR *as a function of the yaw of the enrollment and verification images. The threshold is the same in all cells, and is set to the value that yeilds* FMR *= 0.003 on near frontal pairs i.e. where yaw is in the interval* $(-15, 15]$*. Poor algorithms give generally red figures. The better algorithms show a) diagonal dominance, indicating ability to authenticate when pairs have the same yaw angle, and b) off-diagonal cross-pose capability also. The yaw estimates are from an automated pose estimator, and are themselves noisy. The figure assumes that the pose estimates are not systematically incorrect.*

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 11: For wild images, the heatmaps show FMR *dependence on the yaw of the enrollment and verification images. The threshold is the same in all cells, and is set to the value that yields* FMR *= 0.003 on near frontal pairs, i.e. where yaw is in the interval* $(-15, 15]$*. Thus the center of each panel is grey. The desired behavior is that* FMR *does not vary with relative yaw. However, some algorithms gives elevated* FMR *when yaw differs. The yaw estimates are from an automated pose estimator, and are themselves noisy. The figure assumes that the pose estimates are not systematically incorrect.*

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 12: For child exploitation images, detection error tradeoff (DET) characteristics showing false non-match rate vs. false match rate plotted parametrically on threshold, T. The scales are logarithmic in order to show many decades of FMR. Accuracy is poor because many images have adverse quality characteristics, and because detection and enrollment fails.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 13: For child exploitation images, cumulative match characteristics (CMC) showing true positive identification rate vs. rank. This is simulation of a one-to-many search experiment - see discussion in section 5.2. The scales are logarithmic in order to show the effect of long candidate lists. Accuracy is poor but much improved relative to the 1:1 DETs of Fig. 12 because a search can succeed if any of a subject's several enrolled images matches the search image with a high score.

Figure 14: For child exploitation images, cumulative match characteristics (CMC) showing true positive identification rate vs. rank for two cases: 1. Whole image provided to the algorithm; 2. Human annotated rectangular region, cropped and provided to the algorithm. The difference between the traces is associated with detection of difficult faces, and fine localization. The CMC is simulation of a one-to-many search experiment - see discussion in section 5.2. The scales are logarithmic in order to show the effect of long candidate lists. Accuracy is poor but much improved relative to the 1:1 DETs of Fig. 12 because a search can succeed if any of a subject's several enrolled images matches the search image with a high score.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 15: For the mugshot images, error tradeoff characteristics for white females, black females, black males and white males. The grey lines correspond to fixed thresholds, showing how both FNMR and FMR vary at one operating threshold. Important: Many of the plots will naively be read as saying whites gives lower error rates than blacks because the blue traces lie beneath the red ones. However, this is misleading and incomplete: The grey lines show the traces are generally shifted horizontally. Thus for the dermalog-001 algorithm FNMR for whites is higher than for blacks at a fixed threshold but, at the same time, FMR is higher for blacks - see Figure 20. As access control systems almost always operate at a fixed threshold, the naive interpretation is incorrect.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 16: For the visa images, FNMR and FMR at six operating points along the DET characteristic. At each point a line is drawn between (FMR,FNMR)$_{\text{MALE}}$ and (FMR,FNMR)$_{\text{FEMALE}}$ showing how which sex has lower FMR and/or FNMR. The "M" label denotes male, the other end of the line corresponds to female. The six operating thresholds are selected to give the nominal false match rates given in the legend, and are computed over all impostor pairs regardless of age, sex, and place of birth. The plotted FMR values are broadly an order of magnitude larger than the nominal rates because FMR is computed over demographically-matched impostor pairs i.e individuals of the same sex, from the same geographic region (see section 5.6.1), and the same age group (see section 5.6.2).

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 17: For the wild image comparisons, detection error tradeoff (DET) characteristics showing false non-match rate vs. false match rate plotted parametrically on threshold, T. Error rates are higher here than in the generic wild DET (Fig 9) becuase the impostor pairs here are same-sex only. The scales are logarithmic in order to show several decades of FMR.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 18: For the visa images, the false match calibration curves show false match rate vs. threshold. These curves apply to zero-effort impostors. As shown later (sec. 5.6), FMR is higher for demographic-matched impostors.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 19: For the visa images, the curves show how false matches are concentrated in certain images. Specifically each line plots $FMR(k)$ with k the number of images rejected in decreasing order of how many false matches that image was involved in. $FMR(0) = 10^{-4}$. In terms of the biometric zoo, the most "wolf-ish" images are rejected first i.e. those enrollment or verification images most often involved in false matches. A flatter response is considered superior. A steeply descending response indicates that certain kinds of images false match against others, e.g. if hypothetically images of men with particular mustaches would falsely match others.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 20: For the mugshot images, the false match calibration curves show false match rate vs. threshold. Separate curves appear for white females, black females, black males and white males.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

5.5 Genuine distribution stability

5.5.1 Effect of birth place on the genuine distribution

Background: Both skin tone and bone structure vary geographically. Prior studies have reported variations in FNMR and FMR.

Goal: To measure false non-match rate (FNMR) variation with country of birth.

Methods: Thresholds are determined that give FMR = $\{0.001, 0.0001\}$ over the entire impostor set. Then FNMR is measured over 1000 bootstrap replications of the genuine scores. Only those countries with at least 140 individuals are included in the analysis.

Results: Figure 21 shows FNMR by country of birth for the two thresholds.

Caveats: The results may not relate to subject-specific properties. Instead they could reflect image-specific quality differences, which could occur due to collection protocol or software processing variations.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 21: For the visa images, the dots show FNMR by country of birth for two operating thresholds corresponding to FMR = $\{0.001, 0.0001\}$ computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor scores. The figures shows an order of magnitude variation in FNMR across country of birth; these effects are due to quality variations. The least accurate countries vary by algorithm.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

5.5.2 Effect of age on genuine subjects

Background: Faces change appearance throughout life. Face recognition algorithms have previously beeen reported to give better accuracy on older individuals (See NIST IR 8009).

Goal: To quantify false non-match rates (FNMR) as a function of age. We do not aim to quantify ageing effects here as the separation between two samples is limited to just a few years.

Methods: Using the visa images, thresholds are determined that give FMR = 0.001 and 0.0001 over the entire impostor set. Then FNMR is measured over 1000 bootstrap replications of the genuine scores.

Results: For the visa images, Figure 22 shows how false non-match rates for genuine users, as a function of age group.

The notable aspects are:

- ▷ Younger subjects give considerably higher FNMR. This is likely due to rapid growth and change in facial appearance.
- ▷ FNMR trends down throughout life. The last bin, AGE $>$ 72, contains fewer than 140 mated pairs, and may be affected by small sample size.

Caveats: None.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 22: For the visa images, the dots show FNMR by age group for two operating thresholds corresponding to FMR = $\{0.001, 0.0001\}$ computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor scores. Given a pair of face images taken at different times, we assign a false non-match to the bin that is the arithmetic average of the subject's ages. This plot shows only the effect of age, not ageing. The number of comparisons in each bin is generally in the thousands. However the FNMR for the first and last bins are each computed over fewer than 150 comparisons.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

5.6 Impostor distribution stability

5.6.1 Effect of birth place on the impostor distribution

Background: Facial appearance varies geographically, both in terms of skin tone, cranio-facial structure and size. This section addresses whether false match rates vary intra- and inter-regionally.

Goals:

- ▷ To show the effect of birth region of the impostor and enrollee on false match rates.
- ▷ To determine whether some algorithms give better impostor distribution stability.

Methods:

- ▷ For the visa images, NIST defined 10 regions: Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, Polynesia, North Africa, Middle East, Europe, East Asia, Central and South America, Central Asia, and the Caribbean.
- ▷ For the visa images, NIST mapped each country of birth to a region. There is some arbitrariness to this. For example, Egypt could reasonably be assigned to the Middle East instead of North Africa. An alternative methodology could, for example, assign the Philippines to *both* Polynesia and East Asia.
- ▷ FMR is computed for cases where all face images of impostors born in region r_2 are compared with enrolled face images of persons born in region r_1.

$$\text{FMR}(r_1, r_2, T) = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{N_{r_1,r_2}} H(s_i - T)}{N_{r_1,r_2}} \tag{5}$$

  where the same threshold, T, is used in all cells, and H is the unit step function. The threshold is set to give FMR(T) = 0.001 over the entire set of visa image impostor comparisons.

- ▷ This analysis is then repeated by country-pair, but only for those country pairs where both have at least 1000 images available. The countries[1] appear in the axes of graphs that follow.
- ▷ The mean number of impostor scores in any cross-region bin is 33 million. The smallest number of impostor scores in any bin is 135000, for Central Asia - North Africa. While these counts are large enough to support reasonable significance, the number of individual faces is much smaller, O($N^{0.5}$).
- ▷ The numbers of impostor scores in any cross-country bin is shown in Figure 149.

Results: Subsequent figures show heatmaps that use color to represent the base-10 logarithm of the false match rate. Red colors indicate high (bad) false match rates. Dark colors indicate benign false match rates. There are two series of graphs corresponding to aggregated geographical regions, and to countries. The notable observations are:

- ▷ The on-diagonal elements correspond to within-region impostors. FMR is generally above the nominal value of FMR = 0.001. Particularly there is usually higher FMR in, Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and the Caribbean. Europe and Central Asia, on the other hand, usually give FMR closer to the nominal value.
- ▷ The off-diagonal elements correspond to across-region impostors. The highest FMR is produced between the Caribbean and Sub-Saharan Africa.
- ▷ Algorithms vary.

[1] These are Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Chile, China, Costa Rica, Cuba, Czech Republic, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Germany, Ghana, Great Britain, Greece, Guatamala, Haiti, Hong Kong, Honduras, Indonesia, India, Israel, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Korea, Lebanon, Mexico, Malaysia, Nepal, Nigeria, Peru, Philippines, Pakistan, Poland, Romania, Russia, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, Trinidad, Turkey, Taiwan, Ukraine, Venezuela, and Vietnam.

Figure 23: For the visa images, the dots show FMR for impostor comparisons of individuals of the same sex and same age group for the region of the world that gives the worst (highest) FMR when the threshold is set to give FMR = 0.001 (red vertical line) over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor scores i.e. zero-effort. The shift of the dots to right shows massive increases in FMR when impostors have the same sex, age, and region of birth. The color code indicates which region gives the worst case FMR. If the observed variation is due to the prevalence of one kind of images in the training imagery, then algorithms developed on one kind of data might be expected to give higher FMR on other kinds.

- ▷ We computed the same quantities for a global FMR = 0.0001. The effects are similar.

Caveats:

- ▷ The effects of variable impostor rates on one-to-many identification systems may well differ from what's implied by these one-to-one verification results. Two reasons for this are a) the enrollment galleries are usually imbalanced across countries of birth, age and sex; b) one-to-many identification algorithms often implement techniques aimed at stabilizing the impostor distribution. Further research is necessary.
- ▷ In principle, the effects seen in this subsection could be due to differences in the image capture process. We consider this unlikely since the effects are maintained across geography - e.g. Caribbean vs. Africa, or Japan vs. China.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 24: For visa images, the heatmap shows how the mean of the impostor distribution for the country pair (a,b) is shifted relative to the mean of the global impostor distribution, expressed as a number of standard deviations of the global impostor distribution. This statistic is designed to show shifts in the entire impostor distribution, not just tail effects that manifest as the anomalously high (or low) false match rates that appear in the subsequent figures. The countries are chosen to show that skin tone alone does not explain impostor distribution shifts. The reduced shift in Asian populations with the Yitu and TongYiTrans algorithms, is accompanied by positive shifts in the European populations. This reversal relative to most other algorithms, may derive from use of nationally weighted training sets. The Visionlabs algorithm appears most insensitive to country effects. The figure is computed from same-sex and same-age impostor pairs.

Figure 25: For algorithm 3divi-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 26: For algorithm 3divi-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 27: For algorithm anyvision-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 28: For algorithm anyvision-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 29: For algorithm aware-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 30: For algorithm aware-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 31: For algorithm ayonix-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 32: For algorithm camvi-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 33: For algorithm cogent-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 34: For algorithm cyberextruder-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 35: For algorithm cyberextruder-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 36: For algorithm dermalog-004 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 37: For algorithm dermalog-005 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 38: For algorithm digitalbarriers-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 39: For algorithm digitalbarriers-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 40: For algorithm fdu-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 41: For algorithm fdu-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 42: For algorithm gorilla-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 43: For algorithm id3-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 44: For algorithm id3-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 45: For algorithm innovatrics-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 46: For algorithm innovatrics-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 47: For algorithm intellivision-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 48: For algorithm isityou-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 49: For algorithm isystems-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 50: For algorithm itmo-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 51: For algorithm itmo-003 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 52: For algorithm megvii-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 53: For algorithm morpho-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 54: For algorithm morpho-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 55: For algorithm neurotechnology-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 56: For algorithm neurotechnology-003 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 57: For algorithm noblis-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 58: For algorithm ntechlab-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 59: For algorithm ntechlab-003 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 60: For algorithm pa-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 61: For algorithm rankone-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 62: For algorithm rankone-003 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 63: For algorithm samtech-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 64: For algorithm shaman-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 65: For algorithm shaman-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 66: For algorithm smilart-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 67: For algorithm synesis-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 68: For algorithm tevian-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 69: For algorithm tevian-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 70: For algorithm tiger-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 71: For algorithm tongyitrans-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 72: For algorithm tongyitrans-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 73: For algorithm toshiba-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 74: For algorithm toshiba-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 75: For algorithm ultinous-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 76: For algorithm ultinous-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 77: For algorithm vcog-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 78: For algorithm vigilantsolutions-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 79: For algorithm vigilantsolutions-003 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 80: For algorithm visionlabs-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 81: For algorithm visionlabs-003 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 82: For algorithm vocord-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 83: For algorithm vocord-003 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 84: For algorithm yisheng-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 85: For algorithm yisheng-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 86: For algorithm yitu-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given region pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 87: For algorithm 3divi-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 88: For algorithm 3divi-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 89: For algorithm anyvision-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 90: For algorithm anyvision-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 91: For algorithm aware-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 92: For algorithm aware-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 93: For algorithm ayonix-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 94: For algorithm camvi-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 95: For algorithm cogent-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 96: For algorithm cyberextruder-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 97: For algorithm cyberextruder-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 98: For algorithm dermalog-004 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 99: For algorithm dermalog-005 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 100: For algorithm digitalbarriers-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 101: For algorithm digitalbarriers-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 102: For algorithm fdu-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 103: For algorithm fdu-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 104: For algorithm gorilla-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 105: For algorithm id3-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 106: For algorithm id3-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 107: For algorithm innovatrics-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 108: For algorithm innovatrics-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 109: For algorithm intellivision-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 110: For algorithm isityou-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 111: For algorithm isystems-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 112: For algorithm itmo-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 113: For algorithm itmo-003 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 114: For algorithm megvii-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 115: For algorithm morpho-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 116: For algorithm morpho-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 117: For algorithm neurotechnology-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 118: For algorithm neurotechnology-003 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 119: For algorithm noblis-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 120: For algorithm ntechlab-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 121: For algorithm ntechlab-003 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 122: For algorithm pa-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 123: For algorithm rankone-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 124: For algorithm rankone-003 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 125: For algorithm samtech-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 126: For algorithm shaman-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 127: For algorithm shaman-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 128: For algorithm smilart-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 129: For algorithm synesis-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 130: For algorithm tevian-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 131: For algorithm tevian-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 132: For algorithm tiger-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 133: For algorithm tongyitrans-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 134: For algorithm tongyitrans-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 135: For algorithm toshiba-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 136: For algorithm toshiba-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 137: For algorithm ultinous-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 138: For algorithm ultinous-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 139: For algorithm vcog-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 140: For algorithm vigilantsolutions-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 141: For algorithm vigilantsolutions-003 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 142: For algorithm visionlabs-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 143: For algorithm visionlabs-003 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 144: For algorithm vocord-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

Figure 145: For algorithm vocord-003 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 146: For algorithm yisheng-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 147: For algorithm yisheng-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 148: For algorithm yitu-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match rates observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give the target FMR in the plot title, computed over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. If text appears in each box it give the same quantity as that coded by the color. Grey indicates FMR is at the intended FMR target level. Light red colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate. Each +1 increase in log10 FMR corresponds to a factor of 10 increase in FMR. The matrix is not quite symmetric because images in the enrollment and verification sets are different.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 149: For visa images, the heatmap shows the count of impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who were born in the given country pair.

5.6.2 Effect of age on impostors

Background: This section shows the effect of age on the impostor distribution. The ideal behaviour is that the age of the enrollee and the impostor would not affect impostor scores. This would support FMR stability over sub-populations.

Goals:

- ▷ To show the effect of relative ages of the impostor and enrollee on false match rates.
- ▷ To determine whether some algorithms have better impostor distribution stability.

Methods:

- ▷ Define 14 age group bins, spanning 0 to over 100 years old.
- ▷ Compute FMR over all impostor comparisons for which the subjects in the enrollee and impostor images have ages in two bins.
- ▷ Compute FMR over all impostor comparisons for which the subjects are additionally of the same sex, and born in the same geographic region.

Results:

The notable aspects are:

- ▷ Diagonal dominance: Impostors are more likely to be matched against their same age group.
- ▷ Same sex and same region impostors are more successful. On the diagonal, an impostor is more likely to succeed by posing as someone of the same sex. If $\Delta \log_{10} \text{FMR} = 0.2$, then same-sex same-region FMR exceeds the all-pairs FMR by factor of $10^{0.2} = 1.6$.
- ▷ Young children impostors give elevated FMR against young children. Older adult impostor give elevated FMR against older adults. These effects are quite large, for example if $\Delta \log_{10} \text{FMR} = 1.0$ larger than a 32 year old, then these groups have higher FMR by a factor of $10^1 = 10$. This would imply an FMR above 0.01 for a nominal (global) FMR = 0.001.
- ▷ Algorithms vary.
- ▷ We computed the same quantities for a global FMR = 0.0001. The effects are similar.

Note the calculations in this section include impostors paired across all countries of birth.

Figure 150: For algorithm 3divi-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.001 over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 151: For algorithm 3divi-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.001 over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 152: For algorithm anyvision-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.001 over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 153: For algorithm anyvision-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.001 over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 154: For algorithm aware-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.001 over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 155: For algorithm aware-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.001 over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 156: For algorithm ayonix-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.001 over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 157: For algorithm camvi-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.001 over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 158: For algorithm cogent-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.001 over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 159: For algorithm cyberextruder-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.001 over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 160: For algorithm cyberextruder-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.001 over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 161: For algorithm dermalog-004 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.001 over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 162: For algorithm dermalog-005 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.001 over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 163: For algorithm digitalbarriers-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.001 over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 164: For algorithm digitalbarriers-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.001 over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 165: For algorithm fdu-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.001 over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 166: For algorithm fdu-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.001 over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 167: For algorithm gorilla-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.001 over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 168: For algorithm id3-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.001 over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 169: For algorithm id3-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.001 over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 170: For algorithm innovatrics-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.001 over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 171: For algorithm innovatrics-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.001 over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 172: For algorithm intellivision-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.001 over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 173: For algorithm isityou-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.001 over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 174: For algorithm isystems-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.001 over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 175: For algorithm itmo-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.001 over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 176: For algorithm itmo-003 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.001 over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 177: For algorithm megvii-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.001 over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 178: For algorithm morpho-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.001 over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 179: For algorithm morpho-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.001 over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 180: For algorithm neurotechnology-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.001 over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 181: For algorithm neurotechnology-003 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.001 over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 182: For algorithm noblis-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.001 over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 183: For algorithm ntechlab-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.001 over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 184: For algorithm ntechlab-003 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.001 over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 185: For algorithm pa-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.001 over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 186: For algorithm rankone-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.001 over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 187: For algorithm rankone-003 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.001 over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 188: For algorithm samtech-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.001 over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 189: For algorithm shaman-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.001 over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 190: For algorithm shaman-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.001 over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 191: For algorithm smilart-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.001 over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 192: For algorithm synesis-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.001 over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 193: For algorithm tevian-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.001 over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 194: For algorithm tevian-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.001 over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 195: For algorithm tiger-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.001 over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 196: For algorithm tongyitrans-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.001 over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 197: For algorithm tongyitrans-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.001 over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 198: For algorithm toshiba-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.001 over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 199: For algorithm toshiba-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.001 over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 200: For algorithm ultinous-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.001 over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 201: For algorithm ultinous-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.001 over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 202: For algorithm vcog-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.001 over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 203: For algorithm vigilantsolutions-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.001 over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 204: For algorithm vigilantsolutions-003 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.001 over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 205: For algorithm visionlabs-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.001 over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 206: For algorithm visionlabs-003 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.001 over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 207: For algorithm vocord-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.001 over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 208: For algorithm vocord-003 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.001 over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 209: For algorithm yisheng-001 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.001 over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 210: For algorithm yisheng-002 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.001 over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

FNMR(T) "False non-match rate"
FMR(T) "False match rate"

Figure 211: For algorithm yitu-000 operating on visa images, the heatmap shows false match observed over impostor comparisons of faces from different individuals who have the given age pair. False matches are counted against a recognition threshold fixed globally to give FMR = 0.001 over all $O(10^{10})$ impostor comparisons. The text in each box gives the same quantity as that coded by the color. Light colors present a security vulnerability to, for example, a passport gate.

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Accuracy Terms + Definitions

In biometrics, Type II errors occur when two samples of one person do not match – this is called a **false negative**. Correspondingly, Type I errors occur when samples from two persons do match – this is called a **false positive**. Matches are declared by a biometric system when the native comparison score from the recognition algorithm meets some **threshold**. Comparison scores can be either **similarity scores**, in which case higher values indicate that the samples are more likely to come from the same person, or **dissimilarity scores**, in which case higher values indicate different people. Similarity scores are traditionally computed by **fingerprint** and **face** recognition algorithms, while dissimilarities are used in **iris recognition**. In some cases, the dissimilarity score is a distance; this applies only when **metric** properties are obeyed. In any case, scores can be either **mate** scores, coming from a comparison of one person's samples, or **nonmate** scores, coming from comparison of different persons' samples. The words **genuine** or **authentic** are synonyms for mate, and the word **impostor** is used a synonym for nonmate. The words mate and nonmate are traditionally used in identification applications (such as law enforcement search, or background checks) while genuine and impostor are used in verification applications (such as access control).

A **error tradeoff** characteristic represents the tradeoff between Type II and Type I classification errors. For verification this plots false non-match rate (FNMR) vs. false match rate (FMR) parametrically with T.

The error tradeoff plots are often called **detection error tradeoff (DET)** characteristics or **receiver operating characteristic** (ROC). These serve the same function but differ, for example, in plotting the complement of an error rate (e.g. TMR = 1 – FNMR) and in transforming the axes most commonly using logarithms, to show multiple decades of FMR. More rarely, the function might be the inverse Gaussian function.

More detail and generality is provided in formal biometrics testing standards, see the various parts of ISO/IEC 19795 Biometrics Testing and Reporting. More terms, including and beyond those to do with accuracy, see ISO/IEC 2382-37 Information technology -- Vocabulary -- Part 37: Harmonized biometric vocabulary

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