From 0a473dabcc9d3b64ca833f59190a9a5f5305dc91 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jason Baldridge <jasonbaldridge@gmail.com>
Date: Sun, 17 Feb 2013 14:56:51 -0600
Subject: [PATCH] Added files for homework 3.

---
 bin/anlp                                      |    54 +
 build.sbt                                     |    15 +-
 data/cluster/countries/README.txt             |    10 +
 data/cluster/countries/birth.dat              |    70 +
 data/cluster/federalist/federalist.txt        | 25975 ++++++++++++++++
 data/cluster/generated/README.txt             |    14 +
 .../generated/clusters_bigger_x_variance.dat  |   100 +
 .../generated/clusters_bigger_x_variance.png  |   Bin 0 -> 71095 bytes
 .../generated/clusters_equal_variance.dat     |   100 +
 .../generated/clusters_equal_variance.png     |   Bin 0 -> 68823 bytes
 data/cluster/generated/generate_clusters.R    |    53 +
 data/cluster/schools/README.txt               |    18 +
 data/cluster/schools/achieve.dat              |    25 +
 homework/hw3/hw3_answers.txt                  |    52 +
 lib/pca_transform-0.7.2.jar                   |   Bin 0 -> 11760 bytes
 src/main/scala/appliednlp/app/Cluster.scala   |    72 +
 .../appliednlp/cluster/PointCreator.scala     |   139 +
 17 files changed, 26696 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100755 bin/anlp
 create mode 100644 data/cluster/countries/README.txt
 create mode 100644 data/cluster/countries/birth.dat
 create mode 100644 data/cluster/federalist/federalist.txt
 create mode 100644 data/cluster/generated/README.txt
 create mode 100644 data/cluster/generated/clusters_bigger_x_variance.dat
 create mode 100644 data/cluster/generated/clusters_bigger_x_variance.png
 create mode 100644 data/cluster/generated/clusters_equal_variance.dat
 create mode 100644 data/cluster/generated/clusters_equal_variance.png
 create mode 100644 data/cluster/generated/generate_clusters.R
 create mode 100644 data/cluster/schools/README.txt
 create mode 100644 data/cluster/schools/achieve.dat
 create mode 100644 homework/hw3/hw3_answers.txt
 create mode 100644 lib/pca_transform-0.7.2.jar
 create mode 100644 src/main/scala/appliednlp/app/Cluster.scala
 create mode 100644 src/main/scala/appliednlp/cluster/PointCreator.scala

diff --git a/bin/anlp b/bin/anlp
new file mode 100755
index 0000000..3a1ad95
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bin/anlp
@@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+
+EXIT_CODE=0
+
+if [ -z $ANLP_DIR ] 
+then
+   ANLP_DIR=`dirname $0`/../
+fi
+
+if [ -z $JAVA_MEM_FLAG ] 
+then
+    JAVA_MEM_FLAG=-Xmx4g
+fi
+
+#JARS="`find $HOME/.ivy2/ -name '*.jar' -print | tr '\n' ':'`"
+MANAGED_JARS="`find $ANLP_DIR/lib_managed -name '*.jar' -print | tr '\n' ':'`"
+UNMANAGED_JARS="`find $ANLP_DIR/lib -name '*.jar' -print | tr '\n' ':'`"
+
+SCALA_LIB="$HOME/.sbt/boot/scala-2.10.0/lib/scala-library.jar"
+
+CP="$ANLP_DIR/target/classes:$SCALA_LIB:$ANLP_DIR/src/main/resources:$MANAGED_JARS:$UNMANAGED_JARS"
+
+JAVA="$JAVA_HOME/bin/java"
+JAVA_COMMAND="$JAVA -classpath $CP -Danlp.dir=$ANLP_DIR"
+
+CMD=$1
+shift
+
+help()
+{
+cat <<EOF
+anlp 0.2 commands: 
+
+  run           run the main method of a given class
+  app           run the main method of a class in appliednlp.app
+
+Include --help with any option for more information
+EOF
+}
+
+CLASS=
+
+case $CMD in
+    run) CLASS=$1; shift;;
+    app) CLASS=appliednlp.app.$1; shift;;
+    help) help; exit 1;;
+    *) echo "Unrecognized command: $CMD"; help; exit 1;;
+esac
+
+$JAVA_COMMAND $CLASS ${1+"$@"} 
+(( EXIT_CODE += $? ))
+
+exit $EXIT_CODE
+
diff --git a/build.sbt b/build.sbt
index b5c803e..171d717 100644
--- a/build.sbt
+++ b/build.sbt
@@ -1,9 +1,22 @@
 name := "applied-nlp"
 
-version := "0.1-SNAPSHOT"
+version := "0.2-SNAPSHOT"
 
 organization := "edu.utexas"
 
 scalaVersion := "2.10.0"
 
+retrieveManaged := true
+
 crossPaths := false
+
+resolvers ++= Seq(
+   "Sonatype Snapshots" at "https://oss.sonatype.org/content/repositories/releases/"
+)
+
+libraryDependencies ++= Seq(
+  "org.scalanlp" % "nak" % "1.1.0",
+  "org.scalanlp" % "chalk" % "1.1.1",
+  "org.rogach" %% "scallop" % "0.8.0",
+  "gov.nist.math" % "jama" % "1.0.2"
+)
diff --git a/data/cluster/countries/README.txt b/data/cluster/countries/README.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..9cf8830
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/cluster/countries/README.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+Birth and Death Rates
+
+The data set contains
+
+    birth rate (in percent),
+    death rate (in percent), 
+
+of 70 countries. 
+
+Data obtained from: http://www.uni-koeln.de/themen/statistik/data/cluster/
diff --git a/data/cluster/countries/birth.dat b/data/cluster/countries/birth.dat
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..782176f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/cluster/countries/birth.dat
@@ -0,0 +1,70 @@
+ALGERIA        36.4   14.6
+CONGO          37.3    8.0               
+EGYPT          42.1   15.3               
+GHANA          55.8   25.6               
+IVORY COAST    56.1   33.1               
+MALAGASY       41.8   15.8               
+MOROCCO        46.1   18.7               
+TUNISIA        41.7   10.1               
+CAMBODIA       41.4   19.7               
+CEYLON         35.8    8.5               
+CHINA          34.0   11.0               
+TAIWAN         36.3    6.1               
+HONG KONG      32.1    5.5               
+INDIA          20.9    8.8               
+INDONESIA      27.7   10.2               
+IRAQ           20.5    3.9               
+FRANCE         25.0    6.2               
+JAPAN          17.3    7.0               
+JORDAN         46.3    6.4               
+KOREA          14.8    5.7               
+MALAYSIA       33.5    6.4               
+MONGOLIA       39.2   11.2               
+PHILLIPINES    28.4    7.1               
+SYRIA          26.2    4.3               
+THAILAND       34.8    7.9               
+VIETNAM        23.4    5.1               
+CANADA         24.8    7.8               
+COSTA RICA     49.9    8.5               
+DOMINICAN R    33.0    8.4               
+GUATEMALA      47.7   17.3               
+HONDURAS       46.6    9.7               
+MEXICO         45.1   10.5               
+NICARAGUA      42.9    7.1               
+PANAMA         40.1    8.0               
+UNITED STATES  21.7    9.6               
+ARGENTINA      21.8    8.1
+BOLIVIA        17.4    5.8
+BRAZIL         45.0   13.5
+CHILE          33.6   11.8
+COLOMBIA       44.0   11.7
+ECUADOR        44.2   13.5
+PERU           27.7    8.2
+URUGUAY        22.5    7.8
+VENEZUELA      42.8    6.7
+AUSTRIA        18.8   12.8
+BELGIUM        17.1   12.7
+BRITAIN        18.2   12.2
+BULGARIA       16.4    8.2
+CZECHOSLOVAKIA 16.9    9.5
+DENMARK        17.6   19.8
+FINLAND        18.1    9.2
+FRANCE         18.2   11.7
+E.GERMANY      17.5   13.7
+W.GERMANY      18.5   11.4
+GREECE         17.4    7.8
+HUNGARY        13.1    9.9
+IRELAND        22.3   11.9
+ITALY          19.0   10.2
+NETHERLANDS    20.9    8.0
+NORWAY         17.5   10.0
+POLAND         19.0    7.5
+PORTUGAL       23.5   10.8
+ROMANIA        15.7    8.3
+SPAIN          21.5    9.1
+SWEDEN         14.8   10.1
+SWITZERLAND    18.9    9.6
+U.S.S.R.       21.2    7.2
+YUGOSLAVIA     21.4    8.9
+AUSTRALIA      21.6    8.7
+NEW ZEALAND    25.5    8.8
diff --git a/data/cluster/federalist/federalist.txt b/data/cluster/federalist/federalist.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..da2659f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/cluster/federalist/federalist.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,25975 @@
+The Project Gutenberg EBook of The Federalist Papers, by 
+Alexander Hamilton and John Jay and James Madison
+
+This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere at no cost and with
+almost no restrictions whatsoever.  You may copy it, give it away or
+re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included
+with this eBook or online at www.gutenberg.net
+
+
+Title: The Federalist Papers
+
+Author: Alexander Hamilton
+        John Jay
+        James Madison
+
+Posting Date: December 12, 2011 [EBook #18]
+Release Date: August, 1991
+Last Updated: July 10, 2004
+
+Language: English
+
+
+*** START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK THE FEDERALIST PAPERS ***
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+         This is the Project Gutenberg 1.5 release of
+                   The Federalist Papers
+
+
+
+
+FEDERALIST. No. 1
+
+
+General Introduction
+
+For the Independent Journal.
+
+
+
+HAMILTON
+
+
+To the People of the State of New York:
+
+AFTER an unequivocal experience of the inefficacy of the
+subsisting federal government, you are called upon to deliberate on
+a new Constitution for the United States of America. The subject
+speaks its own importance; comprehending in its consequences
+nothing less than the existence of the UNION, the safety and welfare
+of the parts of which it is composed, the fate of an empire in many
+respects the most interesting in the world. It has been frequently
+remarked that it seems to have been reserved to the people of this
+country, by their conduct and example, to decide the important
+question, whether societies of men are really capable or not of
+establishing good government from reflection and choice, or whether
+they are forever destined to depend for their political
+constitutions on accident and force. If there be any truth in the
+remark, the crisis at which we are arrived may with propriety be
+regarded as the era in which that decision is to be made; and a
+wrong election of the part we shall act may, in this view, deserve
+to be considered as the general misfortune of mankind.
+
+This idea will add the inducements of philanthropy to those of
+patriotism, to heighten the solicitude which all considerate and
+good men must feel for the event. Happy will it be if our choice
+should be directed by a judicious estimate of our true interests,
+unperplexed and unbiased by considerations not connected with the
+public good. But this is a thing more ardently to be wished than
+seriously to be expected. The plan offered to our deliberations
+affects too many particular interests, innovates upon too many local
+institutions, not to involve in its discussion a variety of objects
+foreign to its merits, and of views, passions and prejudices little
+favorable to the discovery of truth.
+
+Among the most formidable of the obstacles which the new
+Constitution will have to encounter may readily be distinguished the
+obvious interest of a certain class of men in every State to resist
+all changes which may hazard a diminution of the power, emolument,
+and consequence of the offices they hold under the State
+establishments; and the perverted ambition of another class of men,
+who will either hope to aggrandize themselves by the confusions of
+their country, or will flatter themselves with fairer prospects of
+elevation from the subdivision of the empire into several partial
+confederacies than from its union under one government.
+
+It is not, however, my design to dwell upon observations of this
+nature. I am well aware that it would be disingenuous to resolve
+indiscriminately the opposition of any set of men (merely because
+their situations might subject them to suspicion) into interested or
+ambitious views. Candor will oblige us to admit that even such men
+may be actuated by upright intentions; and it cannot be doubted
+that much of the opposition which has made its appearance, or may
+hereafter make its appearance, will spring from sources, blameless
+at least, if not respectable--the honest errors of minds led astray
+by preconceived jealousies and fears. So numerous indeed and so
+powerful are the causes which serve to give a false bias to the
+judgment, that we, upon many occasions, see wise and good men on the
+wrong as well as on the right side of questions of the first
+magnitude to society. This circumstance, if duly attended to, would
+furnish a lesson of moderation to those who are ever so much
+persuaded of their being in the right in any controversy. And a
+further reason for caution, in this respect, might be drawn from the
+reflection that we are not always sure that those who advocate the
+truth are influenced by purer principles than their antagonists.
+Ambition, avarice, personal animosity, party opposition, and many
+other motives not more laudable than these, are apt to operate as
+well upon those who support as those who oppose the right side of a
+question. Were there not even these inducements to moderation,
+nothing could be more ill-judged than that intolerant spirit which
+has, at all times, characterized political parties. For in
+politics, as in religion, it is equally absurd to aim at making
+proselytes by fire and sword. Heresies in either can rarely be
+cured by persecution.
+
+And yet, however just these sentiments will be allowed to be, we
+have already sufficient indications that it will happen in this as
+in all former cases of great national discussion. A torrent of
+angry and malignant passions will be let loose. To judge from the
+conduct of the opposite parties, we shall be led to conclude that
+they will mutually hope to evince the justness of their opinions,
+and to increase the number of their converts by the loudness of
+their declamations and the bitterness of their invectives. An
+enlightened zeal for the energy and efficiency of government will be
+stigmatized as the offspring of a temper fond of despotic power and
+hostile to the principles of liberty. An over-scrupulous jealousy
+of danger to the rights of the people, which is more commonly the
+fault of the head than of the heart, will be represented as mere
+pretense and artifice, the stale bait for popularity at the expense
+of the public good. It will be forgotten, on the one hand, that
+jealousy is the usual concomitant of love, and that the noble
+enthusiasm of liberty is apt to be infected with a spirit of narrow
+and illiberal distrust. On the other hand, it will be equally
+forgotten that the vigor of government is essential to the security
+of liberty; that, in the contemplation of a sound and well-informed
+judgment, their interest can never be separated; and that a
+dangerous ambition more often lurks behind the specious mask of zeal
+for the rights of the people than under the forbidden appearance of
+zeal for the firmness and efficiency of government. History will
+teach us that the former has been found a much more certain road to
+the introduction of despotism than the latter, and that of those men
+who have overturned the liberties of republics, the greatest number
+have begun their career by paying an obsequious court to the people;
+commencing demagogues, and ending tyrants.
+
+In the course of the preceding observations, I have had an eye,
+my fellow-citizens, to putting you upon your guard against all
+attempts, from whatever quarter, to influence your decision in a
+matter of the utmost moment to your welfare, by any impressions
+other than those which may result from the evidence of truth. You
+will, no doubt, at the same time, have collected from the general
+scope of them, that they proceed from a source not unfriendly to the
+new Constitution. Yes, my countrymen, I own to you that, after
+having given it an attentive consideration, I am clearly of opinion
+it is your interest to adopt it. I am convinced that this is the
+safest course for your liberty, your dignity, and your happiness. I
+affect not reserves which I do not feel. I will not amuse you with
+an appearance of deliberation when I have decided. I frankly
+acknowledge to you my convictions, and I will freely lay before you
+the reasons on which they are founded. The consciousness of good
+intentions disdains ambiguity. I shall not, however, multiply
+professions on this head. My motives must remain in the depository
+of my own breast. My arguments will be open to all, and may be
+judged of by all. They shall at least be offered in a spirit which
+will not disgrace the cause of truth.
+
+I propose, in a series of papers, to discuss the following
+interesting particulars:
+
+THE UTILITY OF THE UNION TO YOUR POLITICAL PROSPERITY
+
+THE INSUFFICIENCY OF THE PRESENT CONFEDERATION
+TO PRESERVE THAT UNION  THE NECESSITY OF A GOVERNMENT AT LEAST
+EQUALLY ENERGETIC WITH THE ONE PROPOSED, TO THE ATTAINMENT OF THIS
+OBJECT  THE CONFORMITY OF THE PROPOSED CONSTITUTION TO THE TRUE
+PRINCIPLES OF REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT
+ITS ANALOGY TO YOUR OWN STATE CONSTITUTION
+and lastly, THE ADDITIONAL SECURITY WHICH ITS
+ADOPTION WILL AFFORD TO THE PRESERVATION OF THAT SPECIES OF
+GOVERNMENT, TO LIBERTY, AND TO PROPERTY.
+
+In the progress of this discussion I shall endeavor to give a
+satisfactory answer to all the objections which shall have made
+their appearance, that may seem to have any claim to your attention.
+
+It may perhaps be thought superfluous to offer arguments to
+prove the utility of the UNION, a point, no doubt, deeply engraved
+on the hearts of the great body of the people in every State, and
+one, which it may be imagined, has no adversaries. But the fact is,
+that we already hear it whispered in the private circles of those
+who oppose the new Constitution, that the thirteen States are of too
+great extent for any general system, and that we must of necessity
+resort to separate confederacies of distinct portions of the
+whole.1 This doctrine will, in all probability, be gradually
+propagated, till it has votaries enough to countenance an open
+avowal of it. For nothing can be more evident, to those who are
+able to take an enlarged view of the subject, than the alternative
+of an adoption of the new Constitution or a dismemberment of the
+Union. It will therefore be of use to begin by examining the
+advantages of that Union, the certain evils, and the probable
+dangers, to which every State will be exposed from its dissolution.
+This shall accordingly constitute the subject of my next address.
+
+
+PUBLIUS.
+
+1 The same idea, tracing the arguments to their consequences, is
+held out in several of the late publications against the new
+Constitution.
+
+
+
+
+FEDERALIST No. 2
+
+
+Concerning Dangers from Foreign Force and Influence
+
+For the Independent Journal.
+
+JAY
+
+
+
+To the People of the State of New York:
+
+WHEN the people of America reflect that they are now called upon
+to decide a question, which, in its consequences, must prove one of
+the most important that ever engaged their attention, the propriety
+of their taking a very comprehensive, as well as a very serious,
+view of it, will be evident.
+
+Nothing is more certain than the indispensable necessity of
+government, and it is equally undeniable, that whenever and however
+it is instituted, the people must cede to it some of their natural
+rights in order to vest it with requisite powers. It is well worthy
+of consideration therefore, whether it would conduce more to the
+interest of the people of America that they should, to all general
+purposes, be one nation, under one federal government, or that they
+should divide themselves into separate confederacies, and give to
+the head of each the same kind of powers which they are advised to
+place in one national government.
+
+It has until lately been a received and uncontradicted opinion
+that the prosperity of the people of America depended on their
+continuing firmly united, and the wishes, prayers, and efforts of
+our best and wisest citizens have been constantly directed to that
+object. But politicians now appear, who insist that this opinion is
+erroneous, and that instead of looking for safety and happiness in
+union, we ought to seek it in a division of the States into distinct
+confederacies or sovereignties. However extraordinary this new
+doctrine may appear, it nevertheless has its advocates; and certain
+characters who were much opposed to it formerly, are at present of
+the number. Whatever may be the arguments or inducements which have
+wrought this change in the sentiments and declarations of these
+gentlemen, it certainly would not be wise in the people at large to
+adopt these new political tenets without being fully convinced that
+they are founded in truth and sound policy.
+
+It has often given me pleasure to observe that independent
+America was not composed of detached and distant territories, but
+that one connected, fertile, widespreading country was the portion
+of our western sons of liberty. Providence has in a particular
+manner blessed it with a variety of soils and productions, and
+watered it with innumerable streams, for the delight and
+accommodation of its inhabitants. A succession of navigable waters
+forms a kind of chain round its borders, as if to bind it together;
+while the most noble rivers in the world, running at convenient
+distances, present them with highways for the easy communication of
+friendly aids, and the mutual transportation and exchange of their
+various commodities.
+
+With equal pleasure I have as often taken notice that Providence
+has been pleased to give this one connected country to one united
+people--a people descended from the same ancestors, speaking the same
+language, professing the same religion, attached to the same
+principles of government, very similar in their manners and customs,
+and who, by their joint counsels, arms, and efforts, fighting side
+by side throughout a long and bloody war, have nobly established
+general liberty and independence.
+
+This country and this people seem to have been made for each
+other, and it appears as if it was the design of Providence, that an
+inheritance so proper and convenient for a band of brethren, united
+to each other by the strongest ties, should never be split into a
+number of unsocial, jealous, and alien sovereignties.
+
+Similar sentiments have hitherto prevailed among all orders and
+denominations of men among us. To all general purposes we have
+uniformly been one people each individual citizen everywhere
+enjoying the same national rights, privileges, and protection. As a
+nation we have made peace and war; as a nation we have vanquished
+our common enemies; as a nation we have formed alliances, and made
+treaties, and entered into various compacts and conventions with
+foreign states.
+
+A strong sense of the value and blessings of union induced the
+people, at a very early period, to institute a federal government to
+preserve and perpetuate it. They formed it almost as soon as they
+had a political existence; nay, at a time when their habitations
+were in flames, when many of their citizens were bleeding, and when
+the progress of hostility and desolation left little room for those
+calm and mature inquiries and reflections which must ever precede
+the formation of a wise and wellbalanced government for a free
+people. It is not to be wondered at, that a government instituted
+in times so inauspicious, should on experiment be found greatly
+deficient and inadequate to the purpose it was intended to answer.
+
+This intelligent people perceived and regretted these defects.
+Still continuing no less attached to union than enamored of
+liberty, they observed the danger which immediately threatened the
+former and more remotely the latter; and being pursuaded that ample
+security for both could only be found in a national government more
+wisely framed, they as with one voice, convened the late convention
+at Philadelphia, to take that important subject under consideration.
+
+This convention composed of men who possessed the confidence of
+the people, and many of whom had become highly distinguished by
+their patriotism, virtue and wisdom, in times which tried the minds
+and hearts of men, undertook the arduous task. In the mild season
+of peace, with minds unoccupied by other subjects, they passed many
+months in cool, uninterrupted, and daily consultation; and finally,
+without having been awed by power, or influenced by any passions
+except love for their country, they presented and recommended to the
+people the plan produced by their joint and very unanimous councils.
+
+Admit, for so is the fact, that this plan is only RECOMMENDED,
+not imposed, yet let it be remembered that it is neither recommended
+to BLIND approbation, nor to BLIND reprobation; but to that sedate
+and candid consideration which the magnitude and importance of the
+subject demand, and which it certainly ought to receive. But this
+(as was remarked in the foregoing number of this paper) is more to
+be wished than expected, that it may be so considered and examined.
+Experience on a former occasion teaches us not to be too sanguine
+in such hopes. It is not yet forgotten that well-grounded
+apprehensions of imminent danger induced the people of America to
+form the memorable Congress of 1774. That body recommended certain
+measures to their constituents, and the event proved their wisdom;
+yet it is fresh in our memories how soon the press began to teem
+with pamphlets and weekly papers against those very measures. Not
+only many of the officers of government, who obeyed the dictates of
+personal interest, but others, from a mistaken estimate of
+consequences, or the undue influence of former attachments, or whose
+ambition aimed at objects which did not correspond with the public
+good, were indefatigable in their efforts to pursuade the people to
+reject the advice of that patriotic Congress. Many, indeed, were
+deceived and deluded, but the great majority of the people reasoned
+and decided judiciously; and happy they are in reflecting that they
+did so.
+
+They considered that the Congress was composed of many wise and
+experienced men. That, being convened from different parts of the
+country, they brought with them and communicated to each other a
+variety of useful information. That, in the course of the time they
+passed together in inquiring into and discussing the true interests
+of their country, they must have acquired very accurate knowledge on
+that head. That they were individually interested in the public
+liberty and prosperity, and therefore that it was not less their
+inclination than their duty to recommend only such measures as,
+after the most mature deliberation, they really thought prudent and
+advisable.
+
+These and similar considerations then induced the people to rely
+greatly on the judgment and integrity of the Congress; and they
+took their advice, notwithstanding the various arts and endeavors
+used to deter them from it. But if the people at large had reason
+to confide in the men of that Congress, few of whom had been fully
+tried or generally known, still greater reason have they now to
+respect the judgment and advice of the convention, for it is well
+known that some of the most distinguished members of that Congress,
+who have been since tried and justly approved for patriotism and
+abilities, and who have grown old in acquiring political
+information, were also members of this convention, and carried into
+it their accumulated knowledge and experience.
+
+It is worthy of remark that not only the first, but every
+succeeding Congress, as well as the late convention, have invariably
+joined with the people in thinking that the prosperity of America
+depended on its Union. To preserve and perpetuate it was the great
+object of the people in forming that convention, and it is also the
+great object of the plan which the convention has advised them to
+adopt. With what propriety, therefore, or for what good purposes,
+are attempts at this particular period made by some men to
+depreciate the importance of the Union? Or why is it suggested that
+three or four confederacies would be better than one? I am
+persuaded in my own mind that the people have always thought right
+on this subject, and that their universal and uniform attachment to
+the cause of the Union rests on great and weighty reasons, which I
+shall endeavor to develop and explain in some ensuing papers. They
+who promote the idea of substituting a number of distinct
+confederacies in the room of the plan of the convention, seem
+clearly to foresee that the rejection of it would put the
+continuance of the Union in the utmost jeopardy. That certainly
+would be the case, and I sincerely wish that it may be as clearly
+foreseen by every good citizen, that whenever the dissolution of the
+Union arrives, America will have reason to exclaim, in the words of
+the poet: "FAREWELL! A LONG FAREWELL TO ALL MY GREATNESS."
+
+PUBLIUS.
+
+
+
+
+FEDERALIST No. 3
+
+
+The Same Subject Continued
+
+(Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence)
+
+For the Independent Journal.
+
+
+
+JAY
+
+
+
+To the People of the State of New York:
+
+IT IS not a new observation that the people of any country (if,
+like the Americans, intelligent and wellinformed) seldom adopt and
+steadily persevere for many years in an erroneous opinion respecting
+their interests. That consideration naturally tends to create great
+respect for the high opinion which the people of America have so
+long and uniformly entertained of the importance of their continuing
+firmly united under one federal government, vested with sufficient
+powers for all general and national purposes.
+
+The more attentively I consider and investigate the reasons
+which appear to have given birth to this opinion, the more I become
+convinced that they are cogent and conclusive.
+
+Among the many objects to which a wise and free people find it
+necessary to direct their attention, that of providing for their
+SAFETY seems to be the first. The SAFETY of the people doubtless
+has relation to a great variety of circumstances and considerations,
+and consequently affords great latitude to those who wish to define
+it precisely and comprehensively.
+
+At present I mean only to consider it as it respects security
+for the preservation of peace and tranquillity, as well as against
+dangers from FOREIGN ARMS AND INFLUENCE, as from dangers of the LIKE
+KIND arising from domestic causes. As the former of these comes
+first in order, it is proper it should be the first discussed. Let
+us therefore proceed to examine whether the people are not right in
+their opinion that a cordial Union, under an efficient national
+government, affords them the best security that can be devised
+against HOSTILITIES from abroad.
+
+The number of wars which have happened or will happen in the
+world will always be found to be in proportion to the number and
+weight of the causes, whether REAL or PRETENDED, which PROVOKE or
+INVITE them. If this remark be just, it becomes useful to inquire
+whether so many JUST causes of war are likely to be given by UNITED
+AMERICA as by DISUNITED America; for if it should turn out that
+United America will probably give the fewest, then it will follow
+that in this respect the Union tends most to preserve the people in
+a state of peace with other nations.
+
+The JUST causes of war, for the most part, arise either from
+violation of treaties or from direct violence. America has already
+formed treaties with no less than six foreign nations, and all of
+them, except Prussia, are maritime, and therefore able to annoy and
+injure us. She has also extensive commerce with Portugal, Spain,
+and Britain, and, with respect to the two latter, has, in addition,
+the circumstance of neighborhood to attend to.
+
+It is of high importance to the peace of America that she
+observe the laws of nations towards all these powers, and to me it
+appears evident that this will be more perfectly and punctually done
+by one national government than it could be either by thirteen
+separate States or by three or four distinct confederacies.
+
+Because when once an efficient national government is
+established, the best men in the country will not only consent to
+serve, but also will generally be appointed to manage it; for,
+although town or country, or other contracted influence, may place
+men in State assemblies, or senates, or courts of justice, or
+executive departments, yet more general and extensive reputation for
+talents and other qualifications will be necessary to recommend men
+to offices under the national government,--especially as it will have
+the widest field for choice, and never experience that want of
+proper persons which is not uncommon in some of the States. Hence,
+it will result that the administration, the political counsels, and
+the judicial decisions of the national government will be more wise,
+systematical, and judicious than those of individual States, and
+consequently more satisfactory with respect to other nations, as
+well as more SAFE with respect to us.
+
+Because, under the national government, treaties and articles of
+treaties, as well as the laws of nations, will always be expounded
+in one sense and executed in the same manner,--whereas, adjudications
+on the same points and questions, in thirteen States, or in three or
+four confederacies, will not always accord or be consistent; and
+that, as well from the variety of independent courts and judges
+appointed by different and independent governments, as from the
+different local laws and interests which may affect and influence
+them. The wisdom of the convention, in committing such questions to
+the jurisdiction and judgment of courts appointed by and responsible
+only to one national government, cannot be too much commended.
+
+Because the prospect of present loss or advantage may often
+tempt the governing party in one or two States to swerve from good
+faith and justice; but those temptations, not reaching the other
+States, and consequently having little or no influence on the
+national government, the temptation will be fruitless, and good
+faith and justice be preserved. The case of the treaty of peace
+with Britain adds great weight to this reasoning.
+
+Because, even if the governing party in a State should be
+disposed to resist such temptations, yet as such temptations may,
+and commonly do, result from circumstances peculiar to the State,
+and may affect a great number of the inhabitants, the governing
+party may not always be able, if willing, to prevent the injustice
+meditated, or to punish the aggressors. But the national
+government, not being affected by those local circumstances, will
+neither be induced to commit the wrong themselves, nor want power or
+inclination to prevent or punish its commission by others.
+
+So far, therefore, as either designed or accidental violations
+of treaties and the laws of nations afford JUST causes of war, they
+are less to be apprehended under one general government than under
+several lesser ones, and in that respect the former most favors the
+SAFETY of the people.
+
+As to those just causes of war which proceed from direct and
+unlawful violence, it appears equally clear to me that one good
+national government affords vastly more security against dangers of
+that sort than can be derived from any other quarter.
+
+Because such violences are more frequently caused by the
+passions and interests of a part than of the whole; of one or two
+States than of the Union. Not a single Indian war has yet been
+occasioned by aggressions of the present federal government, feeble
+as it is; but there are several instances of Indian hostilities
+having been provoked by the improper conduct of individual States,
+who, either unable or unwilling to restrain or punish offenses, have
+given occasion to the slaughter of many innocent inhabitants.
+
+The neighborhood of Spanish and British territories, bordering
+on some States and not on others, naturally confines the causes of
+quarrel more immediately to the borderers. The bordering States, if
+any, will be those who, under the impulse of sudden irritation, and
+a quick sense of apparent interest or injury, will be most likely,
+by direct violence, to excite war with these nations; and nothing
+can so effectually obviate that danger as a national government,
+whose wisdom and prudence will not be diminished by the passions
+which actuate the parties immediately interested.
+
+But not only fewer just causes of war will be given by the
+national government, but it will also be more in their power to
+accommodate and settle them amicably. They will be more temperate
+and cool, and in that respect, as well as in others, will be more in
+capacity to act advisedly than the offending State. The pride of
+states, as well as of men, naturally disposes them to justify all
+their actions, and opposes their acknowledging, correcting, or
+repairing their errors and offenses. The national government, in
+such cases, will not be affected by this pride, but will proceed
+with moderation and candor to consider and decide on the means most
+proper to extricate them from the difficulties which threaten them.
+
+Besides, it is well known that acknowledgments, explanations,
+and compensations are often accepted as satisfactory from a strong
+united nation, which would be rejected as unsatisfactory if offered
+by a State or confederacy of little consideration or power.
+
+In the year 1685, the state of Genoa having offended Louis XIV.,
+endeavored to appease him. He demanded that they should send their
+Doge, or chief magistrate, accompanied by four of their
+senators, to FRANCE, to ask his pardon and receive his terms. They
+were obliged to submit to it for the sake of peace. Would he on any
+occasion either have demanded or have received the like humiliation
+from Spain, or Britain, or any other POWERFUL nation?
+
+PUBLIUS.
+
+
+
+
+FEDERALIST No. 4
+
+
+
+The Same Subject Continued
+
+(Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence)
+
+For the Independent Journal.
+
+
+
+JAY
+
+
+
+To the People of the State of New York:
+
+MY LAST paper assigned several reasons why the safety of the
+people would be best secured by union against the danger it may be
+exposed to by JUST causes of war given to other nations; and those
+reasons show that such causes would not only be more rarely given,
+but would also be more easily accommodated, by a national government
+than either by the State governments or the proposed little
+confederacies.
+
+But the safety of the people of America against dangers from
+FOREIGN force depends not only on their forbearing to give JUST
+causes of war to other nations, but also on their placing and
+continuing themselves in such a situation as not to INVITE hostility
+or insult; for it need not be observed that there are PRETENDED as
+well as just causes of war.
+
+It is too true, however disgraceful it may be to human nature,
+that nations in general will make war whenever they have a prospect
+of getting anything by it; nay, absolute monarchs will often make
+war when their nations are to get nothing by it, but for the
+purposes and objects merely personal, such as thirst for military
+glory, revenge for personal affronts, ambition, or private compacts
+to aggrandize or support their particular families or partisans.
+These and a variety of other motives, which affect only the mind of
+the sovereign, often lead him to engage in wars not sanctified by
+justice or the voice and interests of his people. But, independent
+of these inducements to war, which are more prevalent in absolute
+monarchies, but which well deserve our attention, there are others
+which affect nations as often as kings; and some of them will on
+examination be found to grow out of our relative situation and
+circumstances.
+
+With France and with Britain we are rivals in the fisheries, and
+can supply their markets cheaper than they can themselves,
+notwithstanding any efforts to prevent it by bounties on their own
+or duties on foreign fish.
+
+With them and with most other European nations we are rivals in
+navigation and the carrying trade; and we shall deceive ourselves
+if we suppose that any of them will rejoice to see it flourish;
+for, as our carrying trade cannot increase without in some degree
+diminishing theirs, it is more their interest, and will be more
+their policy, to restrain than to promote it.
+
+In the trade to China and India, we interfere with more than one
+nation, inasmuch as it enables us to partake in advantages which
+they had in a manner monopolized, and as we thereby supply ourselves
+with commodities which we used to purchase from them.
+
+The extension of our own commerce in our own vessels cannot give
+pleasure to any nations who possess territories on or near this
+continent, because the cheapness and excellence of our productions,
+added to the circumstance of vicinity, and the enterprise and
+address of our merchants and navigators, will give us a greater
+share in the advantages which those territories afford, than
+consists with the wishes or policy of their respective sovereigns.
+
+Spain thinks it convenient to shut the Mississippi against us on
+the one side, and Britain excludes us from the Saint Lawrence on the
+other; nor will either of them permit the other waters which are
+between them and us to become the means of mutual intercourse and
+traffic.
+
+From these and such like considerations, which might, if
+consistent with prudence, be more amplified and detailed, it is easy
+to see that jealousies and uneasinesses may gradually slide into the
+minds and cabinets of other nations, and that we are not to expect
+that they should regard our advancement in union, in power and
+consequence by land and by sea, with an eye of indifference and
+composure.
+
+The people of America are aware that inducements to war may
+arise out of these circumstances, as well as from others not so
+obvious at present, and that whenever such inducements may find fit
+time and opportunity for operation, pretenses to color and justify
+them will not be wanting. Wisely, therefore, do they consider union
+and a good national government as necessary to put and keep them in
+SUCH A SITUATION as, instead of INVITING war, will tend to repress
+and discourage it. That situation consists in the best possible
+state of defense, and necessarily depends on the government, the
+arms, and the resources of the country.
+
+As the safety of the whole is the interest of the whole, and
+cannot be provided for without government, either one or more or
+many, let us inquire whether one good government is not, relative to
+the object in question, more competent than any other given number
+whatever.
+
+One government can collect and avail itself of the talents and
+experience of the ablest men, in whatever part of the Union they may
+be found. It can move on uniform principles of policy. It can
+harmonize, assimilate, and protect the several parts and members,
+and extend the benefit of its foresight and precautions to each. In
+the formation of treaties, it will regard the interest of the whole,
+and the particular interests of the parts as connected with that of
+the whole. It can apply the resources and power of the whole to the
+defense of any particular part, and that more easily and
+expeditiously than State governments or separate confederacies can
+possibly do, for want of concert and unity of system. It can place
+the militia under one plan of discipline, and, by putting their
+officers in a proper line of subordination to the Chief Magistrate,
+will, as it were, consolidate them into one corps, and thereby
+render them more efficient than if divided into thirteen or into
+three or four distinct independent companies.
+
+What would the militia of Britain be if the English militia
+obeyed the government of England, if the Scotch militia obeyed the
+government of Scotland, and if the Welsh militia obeyed the
+government of Wales? Suppose an invasion; would those three
+governments (if they agreed at all) be able, with all their
+respective forces, to operate against the enemy so effectually as
+the single government of Great Britain would?
+
+We have heard much of the fleets of Britain, and the time may
+come, if we are wise, when the fleets of America may engage
+attention. But if one national government, had not so regulated the
+navigation of Britain as to make it a nursery for seamen--if one
+national government had not called forth all the national means and
+materials for forming fleets, their prowess and their thunder would
+never have been celebrated. Let England have its navigation and
+fleet--let Scotland have its navigation and fleet--let Wales have its
+navigation and fleet--let Ireland have its navigation and fleet--let
+those four of the constituent parts of the British empire be
+under four independent governments, and it is easy to perceive how
+soon they would each dwindle into comparative insignificance.
+
+Apply these facts to our own case. Leave America divided into
+thirteen or, if you please, into three or four independent
+governments--what armies could they raise and pay--what fleets could
+they ever hope to have? If one was attacked, would the others fly
+to its succor, and spend their blood and money in its defense?
+Would there be no danger of their being flattered into neutrality
+by its specious promises, or seduced by a too great fondness for
+peace to decline hazarding their tranquillity and present safety for
+the sake of neighbors, of whom perhaps they have been jealous, and
+whose importance they are content to see diminished? Although such
+conduct would not be wise, it would, nevertheless, be natural. The
+history of the states of Greece, and of other countries, abounds
+with such instances, and it is not improbable that what has so often
+happened would, under similar circumstances, happen again.
+
+But admit that they might be willing to help the invaded State
+or confederacy. How, and when, and in what proportion shall aids of
+men and money be afforded? Who shall command the allied armies, and
+from which of them shall he receive his orders? Who shall settle
+the terms of peace, and in case of disputes what umpire shall decide
+between them and compel acquiescence? Various difficulties and
+inconveniences would be inseparable from such a situation; whereas
+one government, watching over the general and common interests, and
+combining and directing the powers and resources of the whole, would
+be free from all these embarrassments, and conduce far more to the
+safety of the people.
+
+But whatever may be our situation, whether firmly united under
+one national government, or split into a number of confederacies,
+certain it is, that foreign nations will know and view it exactly as
+it is; and they will act toward us accordingly. If they see that
+our national government is efficient and well administered, our
+trade prudently regulated, our militia properly organized and
+disciplined, our resources and finances discreetly managed, our
+credit re-established, our people free, contented, and united, they
+will be much more disposed to cultivate our friendship than provoke
+our resentment. If, on the other hand, they find us either
+destitute of an effectual government (each State doing right or
+wrong, as to its rulers may seem convenient), or split into three or
+four independent and probably discordant republics or confederacies,
+one inclining to Britain, another to France, and a third to Spain,
+and perhaps played off against each other by the three, what a poor,
+pitiful figure will America make in their eyes! How liable would
+she become not only to their contempt but to their outrage, and how
+soon would dear-bought experience proclaim that when a people or
+family so divide, it never fails to be against themselves.
+
+PUBLIUS.
+
+
+
+
+
+FEDERALIST No. 5
+
+
+
+The Same Subject Continued
+
+(Concerning Dangers From Foreign Force and Influence)
+
+For the Independent Journal.
+
+
+
+JAY
+
+
+
+To the People of the State of New York:
+
+QUEEN ANNE, in her letter of the 1st July, 1706, to the Scotch
+Parliament, makes some observations on the importance of the UNION
+then forming between England and Scotland, which merit our attention.
+I shall present the public with one or two extracts from it: "An
+entire and perfect union will be the solid foundation of lasting
+peace: It will secure your religion, liberty, and property; remove
+the animosities amongst yourselves, and the jealousies and
+differences betwixt our two kingdoms. It must increase your
+strength, riches, and trade; and by this union the whole island,
+being joined in affection and free from all apprehensions of
+different interest, will be ENABLED TO RESIST ALL ITS ENEMIES."
+"We most earnestly recommend to you calmness and unanimity in this
+great and weighty affair, that the union may be brought to a happy
+conclusion, being the only EFFECTUAL way to secure our present and
+future happiness, and disappoint the designs of our and your
+enemies, who will doubtless, on this occasion, USE THEIR UTMOST
+ENDEAVORS TO PREVENT OR DELAY THIS UNION."
+
+It was remarked in the preceding paper, that weakness and
+divisions at home would invite dangers from abroad; and that
+nothing would tend more to secure us from them than union, strength,
+and good government within ourselves. This subject is copious and
+cannot easily be exhausted.
+
+The history of Great Britain is the one with which we are in
+general the best acquainted, and it gives us many useful lessons.
+We may profit by their experience without paying the price which it
+cost them. Although it seems obvious to common sense that the
+people of such an island should be but one nation, yet we find that
+they were for ages divided into three, and that those three were
+almost constantly embroiled in quarrels and wars with one another.
+Notwithstanding their true interest with respect to the continental
+nations was really the same, yet by the arts and policy and
+practices of those nations, their mutual jealousies were perpetually
+kept inflamed, and for a long series of years they were far more
+inconvenient and troublesome than they were useful and assisting to
+each other.
+
+Should the people of America divide themselves into three or
+four nations, would not the same thing happen? Would not similar
+jealousies arise, and be in like manner cherished? Instead of their
+being "joined in affection" and free from all apprehension of
+different "interests," envy and jealousy would soon extinguish
+confidence and affection, and the partial interests of each
+confederacy, instead of the general interests of all America, would
+be the only objects of their policy and pursuits. Hence, like most
+other BORDERING nations, they would always be either involved in
+disputes and war, or live in the constant apprehension of them.
+
+The most sanguine advocates for three or four confederacies
+cannot reasonably suppose that they would long remain exactly on an
+equal footing in point of strength, even if it was possible to form
+them so at first; but, admitting that to be practicable, yet what
+human contrivance can secure the continuance of such equality?
+Independent of those local circumstances which tend to beget and
+increase power in one part and to impede its progress in another, we
+must advert to the effects of that superior policy and good
+management which would probably distinguish the government of one
+above the rest, and by which their relative equality in strength and
+consideration would be destroyed. For it cannot be presumed that
+the same degree of sound policy, prudence, and foresight would
+uniformly be observed by each of these confederacies for a long
+succession of years.
+
+Whenever, and from whatever causes, it might happen, and happen
+it would, that any one of these nations or confederacies should rise
+on the scale of political importance much above the degree of her
+neighbors, that moment would those neighbors behold her with envy
+and with fear. Both those passions would lead them to countenance,
+if not to promote, whatever might promise to diminish her
+importance; and would also restrain them from measures calculated
+to advance or even to secure her prosperity. Much time would not be
+necessary to enable her to discern these unfriendly dispositions.
+She would soon begin, not only to lose confidence in her neighbors,
+but also to feel a disposition equally unfavorable to them.
+Distrust naturally creates distrust, and by nothing is good-will
+and kind conduct more speedily changed than by invidious jealousies
+and uncandid imputations, whether expressed or implied.
+
+The North is generally the region of strength, and many local
+circumstances render it probable that the most Northern of the
+proposed confederacies would, at a period not very distant, be
+unquestionably more formidable than any of the others. No sooner
+would this become evident than the NORTHERN HIVE would excite the
+same ideas and sensations in the more southern parts of America
+which it formerly did in the southern parts of Europe. Nor does it
+appear to be a rash conjecture that its young swarms might often be
+tempted to gather honey in the more blooming fields and milder air
+of their luxurious and more delicate neighbors.
+
+They who well consider the history of similar divisions and
+confederacies will find abundant reason to apprehend that those in
+contemplation would in no other sense be neighbors than as they
+would be borderers; that they would neither love nor trust one
+another, but on the contrary would be a prey to discord, jealousy,
+and mutual injuries; in short, that they would place us exactly in
+the situations in which some nations doubtless wish to see us, viz.,
+FORMIDABLE ONLY TO EACH OTHER.
+
+From these considerations it appears that those gentlemen are
+greatly mistaken who suppose that alliances offensive and defensive
+might be formed between these confederacies, and would produce that
+combination and union of wills of arms and of resources, which would
+be necessary to put and keep them in a formidable state of defense
+against foreign enemies.
+
+When did the independent states, into which Britain and Spain
+were formerly divided, combine in such alliance, or unite their
+forces against a foreign enemy? The proposed confederacies will be
+DISTINCT NATIONS. Each of them would have its commerce with
+foreigners to regulate by distinct treaties; and as their
+productions and commodities are different and proper for different
+markets, so would those treaties be essentially different.
+Different commercial concerns must create different interests, and
+of course different degrees of political attachment to and
+connection with different foreign nations. Hence it might and
+probably would happen that the foreign nation with whom the SOUTHERN
+confederacy might be at war would be the one with whom the NORTHERN
+confederacy would be the most desirous of preserving peace and
+friendship. An alliance so contrary to their immediate interest
+would not therefore be easy to form, nor, if formed, would it be
+observed and fulfilled with perfect good faith.
+
+Nay, it is far more probable that in America, as in Europe,
+neighboring nations, acting under the impulse of opposite interests
+and unfriendly passions, would frequently be found taking different
+sides. Considering our distance from Europe, it would be more
+natural for these confederacies to apprehend danger from one another
+than from distant nations, and therefore that each of them should be
+more desirous to guard against the others by the aid of foreign
+alliances, than to guard against foreign dangers by alliances
+between themselves. And here let us not forget how much more easy
+it is to receive foreign fleets into our ports, and foreign armies
+into our country, than it is to persuade or compel them to depart.
+How many conquests did the Romans and others make in the characters
+of allies, and what innovations did they under the same character
+introduce into the governments of those whom they pretended to
+protect.
+
+Let candid men judge, then, whether the division of America into
+any given number of independent sovereignties would tend to secure
+us against the hostilities and improper interference of foreign
+nations.
+
+PUBLIUS.
+
+
+
+
+
+FEDERALIST No. 6
+
+
+
+Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States
+
+For the Independent Journal.
+
+
+
+HAMILTON
+
+
+
+To the People of the State of New York:
+
+THE three last numbers of this paper have been dedicated to an
+enumeration of the dangers to which we should be exposed, in a state
+of disunion, from the arms and arts of foreign nations. I shall now
+proceed to delineate dangers of a different and, perhaps, still more
+alarming kind--those which will in all probability flow from
+dissensions between the States themselves, and from domestic
+factions and convulsions. These have been already in some instances
+slightly anticipated; but they deserve a more particular and more
+full investigation.
+
+A man must be far gone in Utopian speculations who can seriously
+doubt that, if these States should either be wholly disunited, or
+only united in partial confederacies, the subdivisions into which
+they might be thrown would have frequent and violent contests with
+each other. To presume a want of motives for such contests as an
+argument against their existence, would be to forget that men are
+ambitious, vindictive, and rapacious. To look for a continuation of
+harmony between a number of independent, unconnected sovereignties
+in the same neighborhood, would be to disregard the uniform course
+of human events, and to set at defiance the accumulated experience
+of ages.
+
+The causes of hostility among nations are innumerable. There
+are some which have a general and almost constant operation upon the
+collective bodies of society. Of this description are the love of
+power or the desire of pre-eminence and dominion--the jealousy of
+power, or the desire of equality and safety. There are others which
+have a more circumscribed though an equally operative influence
+within their spheres. Such are the rivalships and competitions of
+commerce between commercial nations. And there are others, not less
+numerous than either of the former, which take their origin entirely
+in private passions; in the attachments, enmities, interests,
+hopes, and fears of leading individuals in the communities of which
+they are members. Men of this class, whether the favorites of a
+king or of a people, have in too many instances abused the
+confidence they possessed; and assuming the pretext of some public
+motive, have not scrupled to sacrifice the national tranquillity to
+personal advantage or personal gratification.
+
+The celebrated Pericles, in compliance with the resentment of a
+prostitute,1 at the expense of much of the blood and treasure of
+his countrymen, attacked, vanquished, and destroyed the city of the
+SAMNIANS. The same man, stimulated by private pique against the
+MEGARENSIANS,2 another nation of Greece, or to avoid a
+prosecution with which he was threatened as an accomplice of a
+supposed theft of the statuary Phidias,3 or to get rid of the
+accusations prepared to be brought against him for dissipating the
+funds of the state in the purchase of popularity,4 or from a
+combination of all these causes, was the primitive author of that
+famous and fatal war, distinguished in the Grecian annals by the
+name of the PELOPONNESIAN war; which, after various vicissitudes,
+intermissions, and renewals, terminated in the ruin of the Athenian
+commonwealth.
+
+The ambitious cardinal, who was prime minister to Henry VIII.,
+permitting his vanity to aspire to the triple crown,5
+entertained hopes of succeeding in the acquisition of that splendid
+prize by the influence of the Emperor Charles V. To secure the
+favor and interest of this enterprising and powerful monarch, he
+precipitated England into a war with France, contrary to the
+plainest dictates of policy, and at the hazard of the safety and
+independence, as well of the kingdom over which he presided by his
+counsels, as of Europe in general. For if there ever was a
+sovereign who bid fair to realize the project of universal monarchy,
+it was the Emperor Charles V., of whose intrigues Wolsey was at once
+the instrument and the dupe.
+
+The influence which the bigotry of one female,6 the
+petulance of another,7 and the cabals of a third,8 had in
+the contemporary policy, ferments, and pacifications, of a
+considerable part of Europe, are topics that have been too often
+descanted upon not to be generally known.
+
+To multiply examples of the agency of personal considerations in
+the production of great national events, either foreign or domestic,
+according to their direction, would be an unnecessary waste of time.
+Those who have but a superficial acquaintance with the sources from
+which they are to be drawn, will themselves recollect a variety of
+instances; and those who have a tolerable knowledge of human nature
+will not stand in need of such lights to form their opinion either
+of the reality or extent of that agency. Perhaps, however, a
+reference, tending to illustrate the general principle, may with
+propriety be made to a case which has lately happened among
+ourselves. If Shays had not been a DESPERATE DEBTOR, it is much to
+be doubted whether Massachusetts would have been plunged into a
+civil war.
+
+But notwithstanding the concurring testimony of experience, in
+this particular, there are still to be found visionary or designing
+men, who stand ready to advocate the paradox of perpetual peace
+between the States, though dismembered and alienated from each other.
+The genius of republics (say they) is pacific; the spirit of
+commerce has a tendency to soften the manners of men, and to
+extinguish those inflammable humors which have so often kindled into
+wars. Commercial republics, like ours, will never be disposed to
+waste themselves in ruinous contentions with each other. They will
+be governed by mutual interest, and will cultivate a spirit of
+mutual amity and concord.
+
+Is it not (we may ask these projectors in politics) the true
+interest of all nations to cultivate the same benevolent and
+philosophic spirit? If this be their true interest, have they in
+fact pursued it? Has it not, on the contrary, invariably been found
+that momentary passions, and immediate interest, have a more active
+and imperious control over human conduct than general or remote
+considerations of policy, utility or justice? Have republics in
+practice been less addicted to war than monarchies? Are not the
+former administered by MEN as well as the latter? Are there not
+aversions, predilections, rivalships, and desires of unjust
+acquisitions, that affect nations as well as kings? Are not popular
+assemblies frequently subject to the impulses of rage, resentment,
+jealousy, avarice, and of other irregular and violent propensities?
+Is it not well known that their determinations are often governed
+by a few individuals in whom they place confidence, and are, of
+course, liable to be tinctured by the passions and views of those
+individuals? Has commerce hitherto done anything more than change
+the objects of war? Is not the love of wealth as domineering and
+enterprising a passion as that of power or glory? Have there not
+been as many wars founded upon commercial motives since that has
+become the prevailing system of nations, as were before occasioned
+by the cupidity of territory or dominion? Has not the spirit of
+commerce, in many instances, administered new incentives to the
+appetite, both for the one and for the other? Let experience, the
+least fallible guide of human opinions, be appealed to for an answer
+to these inquiries.
+
+Sparta, Athens, Rome, and Carthage were all republics; two of
+them, Athens and Carthage, of the commercial kind. Yet were they as
+often engaged in wars, offensive and defensive, as the neighboring
+monarchies of the same times. Sparta was little better than a
+wellregulated camp; and Rome was never sated of carnage and
+conquest.
+
+Carthage, though a commercial republic, was the aggressor in the
+very war that ended in her destruction. Hannibal had carried her
+arms into the heart of Italy and to the gates of Rome, before
+Scipio, in turn, gave him an overthrow in the territories of
+Carthage, and made a conquest of the commonwealth.
+
+Venice, in later times, figured more than once in wars of
+ambition, till, becoming an object to the other Italian states, Pope
+Julius II. found means to accomplish that formidable league,9
+which gave a deadly blow to the power and pride of this haughty
+republic.
+
+The provinces of Holland, till they were overwhelmed in debts
+and taxes, took a leading and conspicuous part in the wars of Europe.
+They had furious contests with England for the dominion of the
+sea, and were among the most persevering and most implacable of the
+opponents of Louis XIV.
+
+In the government of Britain the representatives of the people
+compose one branch of the national legislature. Commerce has been
+for ages the predominant pursuit of that country. Few nations,
+nevertheless, have been more frequently engaged in war; and the
+wars in which that kingdom has been engaged have, in numerous
+instances, proceeded from the people.
+
+There have been, if I may so express it, almost as many popular
+as royal wars. The cries of the nation and the importunities of
+their representatives have, upon various occasions, dragged their
+monarchs into war, or continued them in it, contrary to their
+inclinations, and sometimes contrary to the real interests of the
+State. In that memorable struggle for superiority between the rival
+houses of AUSTRIA and BOURBON, which so long kept Europe in a flame,
+it is well known that the antipathies of the English against the
+French, seconding the ambition, or rather the avarice, of a favorite
+leader,10 protracted the war beyond the limits marked out by
+sound policy, and for a considerable time in opposition to the views
+of the court.
+
+The wars of these two last-mentioned nations have in a great
+measure grown out of commercial considerations,--the desire of
+supplanting and the fear of being supplanted, either in particular
+branches of traffic or in the general advantages of trade and
+navigation.
+
+From this summary of what has taken place in other countries,
+whose situations have borne the nearest resemblance to our own, what
+reason can we have to confide in those reveries which would seduce
+us into an expectation of peace and cordiality between the members
+of the present confederacy, in a state of separation? Have we not
+already seen enough of the fallacy and extravagance of those idle
+theories which have amused us with promises of an exemption from the
+imperfections, weaknesses and evils incident to society in every
+shape? Is it not time to awake from the deceitful dream of a golden
+age, and to adopt as a practical maxim for the direction of our
+political conduct that we, as well as the other inhabitants of the
+globe, are yet remote from the happy empire of perfect wisdom and
+perfect virtue?
+
+Let the point of extreme depression to which our national
+dignity and credit have sunk, let the inconveniences felt everywhere
+from a lax and ill administration of government, let the revolt of a
+part of the State of North Carolina, the late menacing disturbances
+in Pennsylvania, and the actual insurrections and rebellions in
+Massachusetts, declare--!
+
+So far is the general sense of mankind from corresponding with
+the tenets of those who endeavor to lull asleep our apprehensions of
+discord and hostility between the States, in the event of disunion,
+that it has from long observation of the progress of society become
+a sort of axiom in politics, that vicinity or nearness of situation,
+constitutes nations natural enemies. An intelligent writer
+expresses himself on this subject to this effect: "NEIGHBORING
+NATIONS (says he) are naturally enemies of each other unless their
+common weakness forces them to league in a CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC, and
+their constitution prevents the differences that neighborhood
+occasions, extinguishing that secret jealousy which disposes all
+states to aggrandize themselves at the expense of their
+neighbors."11 This passage, at the same time, points out the
+EVIL and suggests the REMEDY.
+
+PUBLIUS.
+
+1 Aspasia, vide "Plutarch's Life of Pericles."
+
+2 Ibid.
+
+3 Ibid.
+
+4 ] Ibid. Phidias was supposed to have stolen some public
+gold, with the connivance of Pericles, for the embellishment of the
+statue of Minerva.
+
+5 P Worn by the popes.
+
+6 Madame de Maintenon.
+
+7 Duchess of Marlborough.
+
+8 Madame de Pompadour.
+
+9 The League of Cambray, comprehending the Emperor, the King of
+France, the King of Aragon, and most of the Italian princes and
+states.
+
+10 The Duke of Marlborough.
+
+11 Vide "Principes des Negociations" par l'Abbe de Mably.
+
+
+
+
+
+FEDERALIST. No. 7
+
+
+
+The Same Subject Continued
+
+(Concerning Dangers from Dissensions Between the States)
+
+For the Independent Journal.
+
+
+
+HAMILTON
+
+
+
+To the People of the State of New York:
+
+IT IS sometimes asked, with an air of seeming triumph, what
+inducements could the States have, if disunited, to make war upon
+each other? It would be a full answer to this question to
+say--precisely the same inducements which have, at different times,
+deluged in blood all the nations in the world. But, unfortunately
+for us, the question admits of a more particular answer. There are
+causes of differences within our immediate contemplation, of the
+tendency of which, even under the restraints of a federal
+constitution, we have had sufficient experience to enable us to form
+a judgment of what might be expected if those restraints were
+removed.
+
+Territorial disputes have at all times been found one of the
+most fertile sources of hostility among nations. Perhaps the
+greatest proportion of wars that have desolated the earth have
+sprung from this origin. This cause would exist among us in full
+force. We have a vast tract of unsettled territory within the
+boundaries of the United States. There still are discordant and
+undecided claims between several of them, and the dissolution of the
+Union would lay a foundation for similar claims between them all.
+It is well known that they have heretofore had serious and animated
+discussion concerning the rights to the lands which were ungranted
+at the time of the Revolution, and which usually went under the name
+of crown lands. The States within the limits of whose colonial
+governments they were comprised have claimed them as their property,
+the others have contended that the rights of the crown in this
+article devolved upon the Union; especially as to all that part of
+the Western territory which, either by actual possession, or through
+the submission of the Indian proprietors, was subjected to the
+jurisdiction of the king of Great Britain, till it was relinquished
+in the treaty of peace. This, it has been said, was at all events
+an acquisition to the Confederacy by compact with a foreign power.
+It has been the prudent policy of Congress to appease this
+controversy, by prevailing upon the States to make cessions to the
+United States for the benefit of the whole. This has been so far
+accomplished as, under a continuation of the Union, to afford a
+decided prospect of an amicable termination of the dispute. A
+dismemberment of the Confederacy, however, would revive this
+dispute, and would create others on the same subject. At present, a
+large part of the vacant Western territory is, by cession at least,
+if not by any anterior right, the common property of the Union. If
+that were at an end, the States which made the cession, on a
+principle of federal compromise, would be apt when the motive of the
+grant had ceased, to reclaim the lands as a reversion. The other
+States would no doubt insist on a proportion, by right of
+representation. Their argument would be, that a grant, once made,
+could not be revoked; and that the justice of participating in
+territory acquired or secured by the joint efforts of the
+Confederacy, remained undiminished. If, contrary to probability, it
+should be admitted by all the States, that each had a right to a
+share of this common stock, there would still be a difficulty to be
+surmounted, as to a proper rule of apportionment. Different
+principles would be set up by different States for this purpose;
+and as they would affect the opposite interests of the parties,
+they might not easily be susceptible of a pacific adjustment.
+
+In the wide field of Western territory, therefore, we perceive
+an ample theatre for hostile pretensions, without any umpire or
+common judge to interpose between the contending parties. To reason
+from the past to the future, we shall have good ground to apprehend,
+that the sword would sometimes be appealed to as the arbiter of
+their differences. The circumstances of the dispute between
+Connecticut and Pennsylvania, respecting the land at Wyoming,
+admonish us not to be sanguine in expecting an easy accommodation of
+such differences. The articles of confederation obliged the parties
+to submit the matter to the decision of a federal court. The
+submission was made, and the court decided in favor of Pennsylvania.
+But Connecticut gave strong indications of dissatisfaction with
+that determination; nor did she appear to be entirely resigned to
+it, till, by negotiation and management, something like an
+equivalent was found for the loss she supposed herself to have
+sustained. Nothing here said is intended to convey the slightest
+censure on the conduct of that State. She no doubt sincerely
+believed herself to have been injured by the decision; and States,
+like individuals, acquiesce with great reluctance in determinations
+to their disadvantage.
+
+Those who had an opportunity of seeing the inside of the
+transactions which attended the progress of the controversy between
+this State and the district of Vermont, can vouch the opposition we
+experienced, as well from States not interested as from those which
+were interested in the claim; and can attest the danger to which
+the peace of the Confederacy might have been exposed, had this State
+attempted to assert its rights by force. Two motives preponderated
+in that opposition: one, a jealousy entertained of our future
+power; and the other, the interest of certain individuals of
+influence in the neighboring States, who had obtained grants of
+lands under the actual government of that district. Even the States
+which brought forward claims, in contradiction to ours, seemed more
+solicitous to dismember this State, than to establish their own
+pretensions. These were New Hampshire, Massachusetts, and
+Connecticut. New Jersey and Rhode Island, upon all occasions,
+discovered a warm zeal for the independence of Vermont; and
+Maryland, till alarmed by the appearance of a connection between
+Canada and that State, entered deeply into the same views. These
+being small States, saw with an unfriendly eye the perspective of
+our growing greatness. In a review of these transactions we may
+trace some of the causes which would be likely to embroil the States
+with each other, if it should be their unpropitious destiny to
+become disunited.
+
+The competitions of commerce would be another fruitful source of
+contention. The States less favorably circumstanced would be
+desirous of escaping from the disadvantages of local situation, and
+of sharing in the advantages of their more fortunate neighbors.
+Each State, or separate confederacy, would pursue a system of
+commercial policy peculiar to itself. This would occasion
+distinctions, preferences, and exclusions, which would beget
+discontent. The habits of intercourse, on the basis of equal
+privileges, to which we have been accustomed since the earliest
+settlement of the country, would give a keener edge to those causes
+of discontent than they would naturally have independent of this
+circumstance. WE SHOULD BE READY TO DENOMINATE INJURIES THOSE
+THINGS WHICH WERE IN REALITY THE JUSTIFIABLE ACTS OF INDEPENDENT
+SOVEREIGNTIES CONSULTING A DISTINCT INTEREST. The spirit of
+enterprise, which characterizes the commercial part of America, has
+left no occasion of displaying itself unimproved. It is not at all
+probable that this unbridled spirit would pay much respect to those
+regulations of trade by which particular States might endeavor to
+secure exclusive benefits to their own citizens. The infractions of
+these regulations, on one side, the efforts to prevent and repel
+them, on the other, would naturally lead to outrages, and these to
+reprisals and wars.
+
+The opportunities which some States would have of rendering
+others tributary to them by commercial regulations would be
+impatiently submitted to by the tributary States. The relative
+situation of New York, Connecticut, and New Jersey would afford an
+example of this kind. New York, from the necessities of revenue,
+must lay duties on her importations. A great part of these duties
+must be paid by the inhabitants of the two other States in the
+capacity of consumers of what we import. New York would neither be
+willing nor able to forego this advantage. Her citizens would not
+consent that a duty paid by them should be remitted in favor of the
+citizens of her neighbors; nor would it be practicable, if there
+were not this impediment in the way, to distinguish the customers in
+our own markets. Would Connecticut and New Jersey long submit to be
+taxed by New York for her exclusive benefit? Should we be long
+permitted to remain in the quiet and undisturbed enjoyment of a
+metropolis, from the possession of which we derived an advantage so
+odious to our neighbors, and, in their opinion, so oppressive?
+Should we be able to preserve it against the incumbent weight of
+Connecticut on the one side, and the co-operating pressure of New
+Jersey on the other? These are questions that temerity alone will
+answer in the affirmative.
+
+The public debt of the Union would be a further cause of
+collision between the separate States or confederacies. The
+apportionment, in the first instance, and the progressive
+extinguishment afterward, would be alike productive of ill-humor and
+animosity. How would it be possible to agree upon a rule of
+apportionment satisfactory to all? There is scarcely any that can
+be proposed which is entirely free from real objections. These, as
+usual, would be exaggerated by the adverse interest of the parties.
+There are even dissimilar views among the States as to the general
+principle of discharging the public debt. Some of them, either less
+impressed with the importance of national credit, or because their
+citizens have little, if any, immediate interest in the question,
+feel an indifference, if not a repugnance, to the payment of the
+domestic debt at any rate. These would be inclined to magnify the
+difficulties of a distribution. Others of them, a numerous body of
+whose citizens are creditors to the public beyond proportion of the
+State in the total amount of the national debt, would be strenuous
+for some equitable and effective provision. The procrastinations of
+the former would excite the resentments of the latter. The
+settlement of a rule would, in the meantime, be postponed by real
+differences of opinion and affected delays. The citizens of the
+States interested would clamour; foreign powers would urge for the
+satisfaction of their just demands, and the peace of the States
+would be hazarded to the double contingency of external invasion and
+internal contention.
+
+Suppose the difficulties of agreeing upon a rule surmounted, and
+the apportionment made. Still there is great room to suppose that
+the rule agreed upon would, upon experiment, be found to bear harder
+upon some States than upon others. Those which were sufferers by it
+would naturally seek for a mitigation of the burden. The others
+would as naturally be disinclined to a revision, which was likely to
+end in an increase of their own incumbrances. Their refusal would
+be too plausible a pretext to the complaining States to withhold
+their contributions, not to be embraced with avidity; and the
+non-compliance of these States with their engagements would be a
+ground of bitter discussion and altercation. If even the rule
+adopted should in practice justify the equality of its principle,
+still delinquencies in payments on the part of some of the States
+would result from a diversity of other causes--the real deficiency of
+resources; the mismanagement of their finances; accidental
+disorders in the management of the government; and, in addition to
+the rest, the reluctance with which men commonly part with money for
+purposes that have outlived the exigencies which produced them, and
+interfere with the supply of immediate wants. Delinquencies, from
+whatever causes, would be productive of complaints, recriminations,
+and quarrels. There is, perhaps, nothing more likely to disturb the
+tranquillity of nations than their being bound to mutual
+contributions for any common object that does not yield an equal and
+coincident benefit. For it is an observation, as true as it is
+trite, that there is nothing men differ so readily about as the
+payment of money.
+
+Laws in violation of private contracts, as they amount to
+aggressions on the rights of those States whose citizens are injured
+by them, may be considered as another probable source of hostility.
+We are not authorized to expect that a more liberal or more
+equitable spirit would preside over the legislations of the
+individual States hereafter, if unrestrained by any additional
+checks, than we have heretofore seen in too many instances
+disgracing their several codes. We have observed the disposition to
+retaliation excited in Connecticut in consequence of the enormities
+perpetrated by the Legislature of Rhode Island; and we reasonably
+infer that, in similar cases, under other circumstances, a war, not
+of PARCHMENT, but of the sword, would chastise such atrocious
+breaches of moral obligation and social justice.
+
+The probability of incompatible alliances between the different
+States or confederacies and different foreign nations, and the
+effects of this situation upon the peace of the whole, have been
+sufficiently unfolded in some preceding papers. From the view they
+have exhibited of this part of the subject, this conclusion is to be
+drawn, that America, if not connected at all, or only by the feeble
+tie of a simple league, offensive and defensive, would, by the
+operation of such jarring alliances, be gradually entangled in all
+the pernicious labyrinths of European politics and wars; and by the
+destructive contentions of the parts into which she was divided,
+would be likely to become a prey to the artifices and machinations
+of powers equally the enemies of them all. Divide et
+impera1 must be the motto of every nation that either hates or
+fears us.2 PUBLIUS.
+
+1 Divide and command.
+
+2 In order that the whole subject of these papers may as soon as
+possible be laid before the public, it is proposed to publish them
+four times a week--on Tuesday in the New York Packet and on
+Thursday in the Daily Advertiser.
+
+
+
+
+
+FEDERALIST No. 8
+
+
+
+The Consequences of Hostilities Between the States
+
+From the New York Packet.
+
+Tuesday, November 20, 1787.
+
+
+
+HAMILTON
+
+
+
+To the People of the State of New York:
+
+ASSUMING it therefore as an established truth that the several
+States, in case of disunion, or such combinations of them as might
+happen to be formed out of the wreck of the general Confederacy,
+would be subject to those vicissitudes of peace and war, of
+friendship and enmity, with each other, which have fallen to the lot
+of all neighboring nations not united under one government, let us
+enter into a concise detail of some of the consequences that would
+attend such a situation.
+
+War between the States, in the first period of their separate
+existence, would be accompanied with much greater distresses than it
+commonly is in those countries where regular military establishments
+have long obtained. The disciplined armies always kept on foot on
+the continent of Europe, though they bear a malignant aspect to
+liberty and economy, have, notwithstanding, been productive of the
+signal advantage of rendering sudden conquests impracticable, and of
+preventing that rapid desolation which used to mark the progress of
+war prior to their introduction. The art of fortification has
+contributed to the same ends. The nations of Europe are encircled
+with chains of fortified places, which mutually obstruct invasion.
+Campaigns are wasted in reducing two or three frontier garrisons,
+to gain admittance into an enemy's country. Similar impediments
+occur at every step, to exhaust the strength and delay the progress
+of an invader. Formerly, an invading army would penetrate into the
+heart of a neighboring country almost as soon as intelligence of its
+approach could be received; but now a comparatively small force of
+disciplined troops, acting on the defensive, with the aid of posts,
+is able to impede, and finally to frustrate, the enterprises of one
+much more considerable. The history of war, in that quarter of the
+globe, is no longer a history of nations subdued and empires
+overturned, but of towns taken and retaken; of battles that decide
+nothing; of retreats more beneficial than victories; of much
+effort and little acquisition.
+
+In this country the scene would be altogether reversed. The
+jealousy of military establishments would postpone them as long as
+possible. The want of fortifications, leaving the frontiers of one
+state open to another, would facilitate inroads. The populous
+States would, with little difficulty, overrun their less populous
+neighbors. Conquests would be as easy to be made as difficult to be
+retained. War, therefore, would be desultory and predatory.
+PLUNDER and devastation ever march in the train of irregulars. The
+calamities of individuals would make the principal figure in the
+events which would characterize our military exploits.
+
+This picture is not too highly wrought; though, I confess, it
+would not long remain a just one. Safety from external danger is
+the most powerful director of national conduct. Even the ardent
+love of liberty will, after a time, give way to its dictates. The
+violent destruction of life and property incident to war, the
+continual effort and alarm attendant on a state of continual danger,
+will compel nations the most attached to liberty to resort for
+repose and security to institutions which have a tendency to destroy
+their civil and political rights. To be more safe, they at length
+become willing to run the risk of being less free.
+
+The institutions chiefly alluded to are STANDING ARMIES and the
+correspondent appendages of military establishments. Standing
+armies, it is said, are not provided against in the new
+Constitution; and it is therefore inferred that they may exist
+under it.1 Their existence, however, from the very terms of the
+proposition, is, at most, problematical and uncertain. But standing
+armies, it may be replied, must inevitably result from a dissolution
+of the Confederacy. Frequent war and constant apprehension, which
+require a state of as constant preparation, will infallibly produce
+them. The weaker States or confederacies would first have recourse
+to them, to put themselves upon an equality with their more potent
+neighbors. They would endeavor to supply the inferiority of
+population and resources by a more regular and effective system of
+defense, by disciplined troops, and by fortifications. They would,
+at the same time, be necessitated to strengthen the executive arm of
+government, in doing which their constitutions would acquire a
+progressive direction toward monarchy. It is of the nature of war
+to increase the executive at the expense of the legislative
+authority.
+
+The expedients which have been mentioned would soon give the
+States or confederacies that made use of them a superiority over
+their neighbors. Small states, or states of less natural strength,
+under vigorous governments, and with the assistance of disciplined
+armies, have often triumphed over large states, or states of greater
+natural strength, which have been destitute of these advantages.
+Neither the pride nor the safety of the more important States or
+confederacies would permit them long to submit to this mortifying
+and adventitious superiority. They would quickly resort to means
+similar to those by which it had been effected, to reinstate
+themselves in their lost pre-eminence. Thus, we should, in a little
+time, see established in every part of this country the same engines
+of despotism which have been the scourge of the Old World. This, at
+least, would be the natural course of things; and our reasonings
+will be the more likely to be just, in proportion as they are
+accommodated to this standard.
+
+These are not vague inferences drawn from supposed or
+speculative defects in a Constitution, the whole power of which is
+lodged in the hands of a people, or their representatives and
+delegates, but they are solid conclusions, drawn from the natural
+and necessary progress of human affairs.
+
+It may, perhaps, be asked, by way of objection to this, why did
+not standing armies spring up out of the contentions which so often
+distracted the ancient republics of Greece? Different answers,
+equally satisfactory, may be given to this question. The
+industrious habits of the people of the present day, absorbed in the
+pursuits of gain, and devoted to the improvements of agriculture and
+commerce, are incompatible with the condition of a nation of
+soldiers, which was the true condition of the people of those
+republics. The means of revenue, which have been so greatly
+multiplied by the increase of gold and silver and of the arts of
+industry, and the science of finance, which is the offspring of
+modern times, concurring with the habits of nations, have produced
+an entire revolution in the system of war, and have rendered
+disciplined armies, distinct from the body of the citizens, the
+inseparable companions of frequent hostility.
+
+There is a wide difference, also, between military
+establishments in a country seldom exposed by its situation to
+internal invasions, and in one which is often subject to them, and
+always apprehensive of them. The rulers of the former can have a
+good pretext, if they are even so inclined, to keep on foot armies
+so numerous as must of necessity be maintained in the latter. These
+armies being, in the first case, rarely, if at all, called into
+activity for interior defense, the people are in no danger of being
+broken to military subordination. The laws are not accustomed to
+relaxations, in favor of military exigencies; the civil state
+remains in full vigor, neither corrupted, nor confounded with the
+principles or propensities of the other state. The smallness of the
+army renders the natural strength of the community an over-match for
+it; and the citizens, not habituated to look up to the military
+power for protection, or to submit to its oppressions, neither love
+nor fear the soldiery; they view them with a spirit of jealous
+acquiescence in a necessary evil, and stand ready to resist a power
+which they suppose may be exerted to the prejudice of their rights.
+The army under such circumstances may usefully aid the magistrate
+to suppress a small faction, or an occasional mob, or insurrection;
+but it will be unable to enforce encroachments against the united
+efforts of the great body of the people.
+
+In a country in the predicament last described, the contrary of
+all this happens. The perpetual menacings of danger oblige the
+government to be always prepared to repel it; its armies must be
+numerous enough for instant defense. The continual necessity for
+their services enhances the importance of the soldier, and
+proportionably degrades the condition of the citizen. The military
+state becomes elevated above the civil. The inhabitants of
+territories, often the theatre of war, are unavoidably subjected to
+frequent infringements on their rights, which serve to weaken their
+sense of those rights; and by degrees the people are brought to
+consider the soldiery not only as their protectors, but as their
+superiors. The transition from this disposition to that of
+considering them masters, is neither remote nor difficult; but it
+is very difficult to prevail upon a people under such impressions,
+to make a bold or effectual resistance to usurpations supported by
+the military power.
+
+The kingdom of Great Britain falls within the first description.
+An insular situation, and a powerful marine, guarding it in a great
+measure against the possibility of foreign invasion, supersede the
+necessity of a numerous army within the kingdom. A sufficient force
+to make head against a sudden descent, till the militia could have
+time to rally and embody, is all that has been deemed requisite. No
+motive of national policy has demanded, nor would public opinion
+have tolerated, a larger number of troops upon its domestic
+establishment. There has been, for a long time past, little room
+for the operation of the other causes, which have been enumerated as
+the consequences of internal war. This peculiar felicity of
+situation has, in a great degree, contributed to preserve the
+liberty which that country to this day enjoys, in spite of the
+prevalent venality and corruption. If, on the contrary, Britain had
+been situated on the continent, and had been compelled, as she would
+have been, by that situation, to make her military establishments at
+home coextensive with those of the other great powers of Europe,
+she, like them, would in all probability be, at this day, a victim
+to the absolute power of a single man. 'T is possible, though not
+easy, that the people of that island may be enslaved from other
+causes; but it cannot be by the prowess of an army so
+inconsiderable as that which has been usually kept up within the
+kingdom.
+
+If we are wise enough to preserve the Union we may for ages
+enjoy an advantage similar to that of an insulated situation.
+Europe is at a great distance from us. Her colonies in our
+vicinity will be likely to continue too much disproportioned in
+strength to be able to give us any dangerous annoyance. Extensive
+military establishments cannot, in this position, be necessary to
+our security. But if we should be disunited, and the integral parts
+should either remain separated, or, which is most probable, should
+be thrown together into two or three confederacies, we should be, in
+a short course of time, in the predicament of the continental powers
+of Europe --our liberties would be a prey to the means of defending
+ourselves against the ambition and jealousy of each other.
+
+This is an idea not superficial or futile, but solid and weighty.
+It deserves the most serious and mature consideration of every
+prudent and honest man of whatever party. If such men will make a
+firm and solemn pause, and meditate dispassionately on the
+importance of this interesting idea; if they will contemplate it in
+all its attitudes, and trace it to all its consequences, they will
+not hesitate to part with trivial objections to a Constitution, the
+rejection of which would in all probability put a final period to
+the Union. The airy phantoms that flit before the distempered
+imaginations of some of its adversaries would quickly give place to
+the more substantial forms of dangers, real, certain, and formidable.
+
+PUBLIUS.
+
+1 This objection will be fully examined in its proper place, and
+it will be shown that the only natural precaution which could have
+been taken on this subject has been taken; and a much better one
+than is to be found in any constitution that has been heretofore
+framed in America, most of which contain no guard at all on this
+subject.
+
+
+
+
+
+FEDERALIST No. 9
+
+
+
+The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and Insurrection
+
+For the Independent Journal.
+
+
+
+HAMILTON
+
+
+
+To the People of the State of New York:
+
+A FIRM Union will be of the utmost moment to the peace and
+liberty of the States, as a barrier against domestic faction and
+insurrection. It is impossible to read the history of the petty
+republics of Greece and Italy without feeling sensations of horror
+and disgust at the distractions with which they were continually
+agitated, and at the rapid succession of revolutions by which they
+were kept in a state of perpetual vibration between the extremes of
+tyranny and anarchy. If they exhibit occasional calms, these only
+serve as short-lived contrast to the furious storms that are to
+succeed. If now and then intervals of felicity open to view, we
+behold them with a mixture of regret, arising from the reflection
+that the pleasing scenes before us are soon to be overwhelmed by the
+tempestuous waves of sedition and party rage. If momentary rays of
+glory break forth from the gloom, while they dazzle us with a
+transient and fleeting brilliancy, they at the same time admonish us
+to lament that the vices of government should pervert the direction
+and tarnish the lustre of those bright talents and exalted
+endowments for which the favored soils that produced them have been
+so justly celebrated.
+
+From the disorders that disfigure the annals of those republics
+the advocates of despotism have drawn arguments, not only against
+the forms of republican government, but against the very principles
+of civil liberty. They have decried all free government as
+inconsistent with the order of society, and have indulged themselves
+in malicious exultation over its friends and partisans. Happily for
+mankind, stupendous fabrics reared on the basis of liberty, which
+have flourished for ages, have, in a few glorious instances, refuted
+their gloomy sophisms. And, I trust, America will be the broad and
+solid foundation of other edifices, not less magnificent, which will
+be equally permanent monuments of their errors.
+
+But it is not to be denied that the portraits they have sketched
+of republican government were too just copies of the originals from
+which they were taken. If it had been found impracticable to have
+devised models of a more perfect structure, the enlightened friends
+to liberty would have been obliged to abandon the cause of that
+species of government as indefensible. The science of politics,
+however, like most other sciences, has received great improvement.
+The efficacy of various principles is now well understood, which
+were either not known at all, or imperfectly known to the ancients.
+The regular distribution of power into distinct departments; the
+introduction of legislative balances and checks; the institution of
+courts composed of judges holding their offices during good
+behavior; the representation of the people in the legislature by
+deputies of their own election: these are wholly new discoveries,
+or have made their principal progress towards perfection in modern
+times. They are means, and powerful means, by which the excellences
+of republican government may be retained and its imperfections
+lessened or avoided. To this catalogue of circumstances that tend
+to the amelioration of popular systems of civil government, I shall
+venture, however novel it may appear to some, to add one more, on a
+principle which has been made the foundation of an objection to the
+new Constitution; I mean the ENLARGEMENT of the ORBIT within which
+such systems are to revolve, either in respect to the dimensions of
+a single State or to the consolidation of several smaller States
+into one great Confederacy. The latter is that which immediately
+concerns the object under consideration. It will, however, be of
+use to examine the principle in its application to a single State,
+which shall be attended to in another place.
+
+The utility of a Confederacy, as well to suppress faction and to
+guard the internal tranquillity of States, as to increase their
+external force and security, is in reality not a new idea. It has
+been practiced upon in different countries and ages, and has
+received the sanction of the most approved writers on the subject of
+politics. The opponents of the plan proposed have, with great
+assiduity, cited and circulated the observations of Montesquieu on
+the necessity of a contracted territory for a republican government.
+But they seem not to have been apprised of the sentiments of that
+great man expressed in another part of his work, nor to have
+adverted to the consequences of the principle to which they
+subscribe with such ready acquiescence.
+
+When Montesquieu recommends a small extent for republics, the
+standards he had in view were of dimensions far short of the limits
+of almost every one of these States. Neither Virginia,
+Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, New York, North Carolina, nor Georgia
+can by any means be compared with the models from which he reasoned
+and to which the terms of his description apply. If we therefore
+take his ideas on this point as the criterion of truth, we shall be
+driven to the alternative either of taking refuge at once in the
+arms of monarchy, or of splitting ourselves into an infinity of
+little, jealous, clashing, tumultuous commonwealths, the wretched
+nurseries of unceasing discord, and the miserable objects of
+universal pity or contempt. Some of the writers who have come
+forward on the other side of the question seem to have been aware of
+the dilemma; and have even been bold enough to hint at the division
+of the larger States as a desirable thing. Such an infatuated
+policy, such a desperate expedient, might, by the multiplication of
+petty offices, answer the views of men who possess not
+qualifications to extend their influence beyond the narrow circles
+of personal intrigue, but it could never promote the greatness or
+happiness of the people of America.
+
+Referring the examination of the principle itself to another
+place, as has been already mentioned, it will be sufficient to
+remark here that, in the sense of the author who has been most
+emphatically quoted upon the occasion, it would only dictate a
+reduction of the SIZE of the more considerable MEMBERS of the Union,
+but would not militate against their being all comprehended in one
+confederate government. And this is the true question, in the
+discussion of which we are at present interested.
+
+So far are the suggestions of Montesquieu from standing in
+opposition to a general Union of the States, that he explicitly
+treats of a CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC as the expedient for extending the
+sphere of popular government, and reconciling the advantages of
+monarchy with those of republicanism.
+
+"It is very probable," (says he1) "that mankind would
+have been obliged at length to live constantly under the government
+of a single person, had they not contrived a kind of constitution
+that has all the internal advantages of a republican, together with
+the external force of a monarchical government. I mean a
+CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC.
+
+"This form of government is a convention by which several
+smaller STATES agree to become members of a larger ONE, which they
+intend to form. It is a kind of assemblage of societies that
+constitute a new one, capable of increasing, by means of new
+associations, till they arrive to such a degree of power as to be
+able to provide for the security of the united body.
+
+"A republic of this kind, able to withstand an external force,
+may support itself without any internal corruptions. The form of
+this society prevents all manner of inconveniences.
+
+"If a single member should attempt to usurp the supreme
+authority, he could not be supposed to have an equal authority and
+credit in all the confederate states. Were he to have too great
+influence over one, this would alarm the rest. Were he to subdue a
+part, that which would still remain free might oppose him with
+forces independent of those which he had usurped and overpower him
+before he could be settled in his usurpation.
+
+"Should a popular insurrection happen in one of the confederate
+states the others are able to quell it. Should abuses creep into
+one part, they are reformed by those that remain sound. The state
+may be destroyed on one side, and not on the other; the confederacy
+may be dissolved, and the confederates preserve their sovereignty.
+
+"As this government is composed of small republics, it enjoys
+the internal happiness of each; and with respect to its external
+situation, it is possessed, by means of the association, of all the
+advantages of large monarchies."
+
+I have thought it proper to quote at length these interesting
+passages, because they contain a luminous abridgment of the
+principal arguments in favor of the Union, and must effectually
+remove the false impressions which a misapplication of other parts
+of the work was calculated to make. They have, at the same time, an
+intimate connection with the more immediate design of this paper;
+which is, to illustrate the tendency of the Union to repress
+domestic faction and insurrection.
+
+A distinction, more subtle than accurate, has been raised
+between a CONFEDERACY and a CONSOLIDATION of the States. The
+essential characteristic of the first is said to be, the restriction
+of its authority to the members in their collective capacities,
+without reaching to the individuals of whom they are composed. It
+is contended that the national council ought to have no concern with
+any object of internal administration. An exact equality of
+suffrage between the members has also been insisted upon as a
+leading feature of a confederate government. These positions are,
+in the main, arbitrary; they are supported neither by principle nor
+precedent. It has indeed happened, that governments of this kind
+have generally operated in the manner which the distinction taken
+notice of, supposes to be inherent in their nature; but there have
+been in most of them extensive exceptions to the practice, which
+serve to prove, as far as example will go, that there is no absolute
+rule on the subject. And it will be clearly shown in the course of
+this investigation that as far as the principle contended for has
+prevailed, it has been the cause of incurable disorder and
+imbecility in the government.
+
+The definition of a CONFEDERATE REPUBLIC seems simply to be "an
+assemblage of societies," or an association of two or more states
+into one state. The extent, modifications, and objects of the
+federal authority are mere matters of discretion. So long as the
+separate organization of the members be not abolished; so long as
+it exists, by a constitutional necessity, for local purposes;
+though it should be in perfect subordination to the general
+authority of the union, it would still be, in fact and in theory, an
+association of states, or a confederacy. The proposed Constitution,
+so far from implying an abolition of the State governments, makes
+them constituent parts of the national sovereignty, by allowing them
+a direct representation in the Senate, and leaves in their
+possession certain exclusive and very important portions of
+sovereign power. This fully corresponds, in every rational import
+of the terms, with the idea of a federal government.
+
+In the Lycian confederacy, which consisted of twenty-three
+CITIES or republics, the largest were entitled to THREE votes in the
+COMMON COUNCIL, those of the middle class to TWO, and the smallest
+to ONE. The COMMON COUNCIL had the appointment of all the judges
+and magistrates of the respective CITIES. This was certainly the
+most, delicate species of interference in their internal
+administration; for if there be any thing that seems exclusively
+appropriated to the local jurisdictions, it is the appointment of
+their own officers. Yet Montesquieu, speaking of this association,
+says: "Were I to give a model of an excellent Confederate
+Republic, it would be that of Lycia." Thus we perceive that the
+distinctions insisted upon were not within the contemplation of this
+enlightened civilian; and we shall be led to conclude, that they
+are the novel refinements of an erroneous theory.
+
+PUBLIUS.
+
+1 "Spirit of Lawa," vol. i., book ix., chap. i.
+
+
+
+
+
+FEDERALIST No. 10
+
+
+
+The Same Subject Continued
+
+(The Union as a Safeguard Against Domestic Faction and
+Insurrection)
+
+From the New York Packet.
+
+Friday, November 23, 1787.
+
+
+
+MADISON
+
+
+
+To the People of the State of New York:
+
+AMONG the numerous advantages promised by a wellconstructed
+Union, none deserves to be more accurately developed than its
+tendency to break and control the violence of faction. The friend
+of popular governments never finds himself so much alarmed for their
+character and fate, as when he contemplates their propensity to this
+dangerous vice. He will not fail, therefore, to set a due value on
+any plan which, without violating the principles to which he is
+attached, provides a proper cure for it. The instability,
+injustice, and confusion introduced into the public councils, have,
+in truth, been the mortal diseases under which popular governments
+have everywhere perished; as they continue to be the favorite and
+fruitful topics from which the adversaries to liberty derive their
+most specious declamations. The valuable improvements made by the
+American constitutions on the popular models, both ancient and
+modern, cannot certainly be too much admired; but it would be an
+unwarrantable partiality, to contend that they have as effectually
+obviated the danger on this side, as was wished and expected.
+Complaints are everywhere heard from our most considerate and
+virtuous citizens, equally the friends of public and private faith,
+and of public and personal liberty, that our governments are too
+unstable, that the public good is disregarded in the conflicts of
+rival parties, and that measures are too often decided, not
+according to the rules of justice and the rights of the minor party,
+but by the superior force of an interested and overbearing majority.
+However anxiously we may wish that these complaints had no
+foundation, the evidence, of known facts will not permit us to deny
+that they are in some degree true. It will be found, indeed, on a
+candid review of our situation, that some of the distresses under
+which we labor have been erroneously charged on the operation of our
+governments; but it will be found, at the same time, that other
+causes will not alone account for many of our heaviest misfortunes;
+and, particularly, for that prevailing and increasing distrust of
+public engagements, and alarm for private rights, which are echoed
+from one end of the continent to the other. These must be chiefly,
+if not wholly, effects of the unsteadiness and injustice with which
+a factious spirit has tainted our public administrations.
+
+By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether
+amounting to a majority or a minority of the whole, who are united
+and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest,
+adversed to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and
+aggregate interests of the community.
+
+There are two methods of curing the mischiefs of faction: the
+one, by removing its causes; the other, by controlling its effects.
+
+There are again two methods of removing the causes of faction:
+the one, by destroying the liberty which is essential to its
+existence; the other, by giving to every citizen the same opinions,
+the same passions, and the same interests.
+
+It could never be more truly said than of the first remedy, that
+it was worse than the disease. Liberty is to faction what air is to
+fire, an aliment without which it instantly expires. But it could
+not be less folly to abolish liberty, which is essential to
+political life, because it nourishes faction, than it would be to
+wish the annihilation of air, which is essential to animal life,
+because it imparts to fire its destructive agency.
+
+The second expedient is as impracticable as the first would be
+unwise. As long as the reason of man continues fallible, and he is
+at liberty to exercise it, different opinions will be formed. As
+long as the connection subsists between his reason and his
+self-love, his opinions and his passions will have a reciprocal
+influence on each other; and the former will be objects to which
+the latter will attach themselves. The diversity in the faculties
+of men, from which the rights of property originate, is not less an
+insuperable obstacle to a uniformity of interests. The protection
+of these faculties is the first object of government. From the
+protection of different and unequal faculties of acquiring property,
+the possession of different degrees and kinds of property
+immediately results; and from the influence of these on the
+sentiments and views of the respective proprietors, ensues a
+division of the society into different interests and parties.
+
+The latent causes of faction are thus sown in the nature of man;
+and we see them everywhere brought into different degrees of
+activity, according to the different circumstances of civil society.
+A zeal for different opinions concerning religion, concerning
+government, and many other points, as well of speculation as of
+practice; an attachment to different leaders ambitiously contending
+for pre-eminence and power; or to persons of other descriptions
+whose fortunes have been interesting to the human passions, have, in
+turn, divided mankind into parties, inflamed them with mutual
+animosity, and rendered them much more disposed to vex and oppress
+each other than to co-operate for their common good. So strong is
+this propensity of mankind to fall into mutual animosities, that
+where no substantial occasion presents itself, the most frivolous
+and fanciful distinctions have been sufficient to kindle their
+unfriendly passions and excite their most violent conflicts. But
+the most common and durable source of factions has been the various
+and unequal distribution of property. Those who hold and those who
+are without property have ever formed distinct interests in society.
+Those who are creditors, and those who are debtors, fall under a
+like discrimination. A landed interest, a manufacturing interest, a
+mercantile interest, a moneyed interest, with many lesser interests,
+grow up of necessity in civilized nations, and divide them into
+different classes, actuated by different sentiments and views. The
+regulation of these various and interfering interests forms the
+principal task of modern legislation, and involves the spirit of
+party and faction in the necessary and ordinary operations of the
+government.
+
+No man is allowed to be a judge in his own cause, because his
+interest would certainly bias his judgment, and, not improbably,
+corrupt his integrity. With equal, nay with greater reason, a body
+of men are unfit to be both judges and parties at the same time;
+yet what are many of the most important acts of legislation, but so
+many judicial determinations, not indeed concerning the rights of
+single persons, but concerning the rights of large bodies of
+citizens? And what are the different classes of legislators but
+advocates and parties to the causes which they determine? Is a law
+proposed concerning private debts? It is a question to which the
+creditors are parties on one side and the debtors on the other.
+Justice ought to hold the balance between them. Yet the parties
+are, and must be, themselves the judges; and the most numerous
+party, or, in other words, the most powerful faction must be
+expected to prevail. Shall domestic manufactures be encouraged, and
+in what degree, by restrictions on foreign manufactures? are
+questions which would be differently decided by the landed and the
+manufacturing classes, and probably by neither with a sole regard to
+justice and the public good. The apportionment of taxes on the
+various descriptions of property is an act which seems to require
+the most exact impartiality; yet there is, perhaps, no legislative
+act in which greater opportunity and temptation are given to a
+predominant party to trample on the rules of justice. Every
+shilling with which they overburden the inferior number, is a
+shilling saved to their own pockets.
+
+It is in vain to say that enlightened statesmen will be able to
+adjust these clashing interests, and render them all subservient to
+the public good. Enlightened statesmen will not always be at the
+helm. Nor, in many cases, can such an adjustment be made at all
+without taking into view indirect and remote considerations, which
+will rarely prevail over the immediate interest which one party may
+find in disregarding the rights of another or the good of the whole.
+
+The inference to which we are brought is, that the CAUSES of
+faction cannot be removed, and that relief is only to be sought in
+the means of controlling its EFFECTS.
+
+If a faction consists of less than a majority, relief is
+supplied by the republican principle, which enables the majority to
+defeat its sinister views by regular vote. It may clog the
+administration, it may convulse the society; but it will be unable
+to execute and mask its violence under the forms of the Constitution.
+When a majority is included in a faction, the form of popular
+government, on the other hand, enables it to sacrifice to its ruling
+passion or interest both the public good and the rights of other
+citizens. To secure the public good and private rights against the
+danger of such a faction, and at the same time to preserve the
+spirit and the form of popular government, is then the great object
+to which our inquiries are directed. Let me add that it is the
+great desideratum by which this form of government can be rescued
+from the opprobrium under which it has so long labored, and be
+recommended to the esteem and adoption of mankind.
+
+By what means is this object attainable? Evidently by one of
+two only. Either the existence of the same passion or interest in a
+majority at the same time must be prevented, or the majority, having
+such coexistent passion or interest, must be rendered, by their
+number and local situation, unable to concert and carry into effect
+schemes of oppression. If the impulse and the opportunity be
+suffered to coincide, we well know that neither moral nor religious
+motives can be relied on as an adequate control. They are not found
+to be such on the injustice and violence of individuals, and lose
+their efficacy in proportion to the number combined together, that
+is, in proportion as their efficacy becomes needful.
+
+From this view of the subject it may be concluded that a pure
+democracy, by which I mean a society consisting of a small number of
+citizens, who assemble and administer the government in person, can
+admit of no cure for the mischiefs of faction. A common passion or
+interest will, in almost every case, be felt by a majority of the
+whole; a communication and concert result from the form of
+government itself; and there is nothing to check the inducements to
+sacrifice the weaker party or an obnoxious individual. Hence it is
+that such democracies have ever been spectacles of turbulence and
+contention; have ever been found incompatible with personal
+security or the rights of property; and have in general been as
+short in their lives as they have been violent in their deaths.
+Theoretic politicians, who have patronized this species of
+government, have erroneously supposed that by reducing mankind to a
+perfect equality in their political rights, they would, at the same
+time, be perfectly equalized and assimilated in their possessions,
+their opinions, and their passions.
+
+A republic, by which I mean a government in which the scheme of
+representation takes place, opens a different prospect, and promises
+the cure for which we are seeking. Let us examine the points in
+which it varies from pure democracy, and we shall comprehend both
+the nature of the cure and the efficacy which it must derive from
+the Union.
+
+The two great points of difference between a democracy and a
+republic are: first, the delegation of the government, in the
+latter, to a small number of citizens elected by the rest;
+secondly, the greater number of citizens, and greater sphere of
+country, over which the latter may be extended.
+
+The effect of the first difference is, on the one hand, to
+refine and enlarge the public views, by passing them through the
+medium of a chosen body of citizens, whose wisdom may best discern
+the true interest of their country, and whose patriotism and love of
+justice will be least likely to sacrifice it to temporary or partial
+considerations. Under such a regulation, it may well happen that
+the public voice, pronounced by the representatives of the people,
+will be more consonant to the public good than if pronounced by the
+people themselves, convened for the purpose. On the other hand, the
+effect may be inverted. Men of factious tempers, of local
+prejudices, or of sinister designs, may, by intrigue, by corruption,
+or by other means, first obtain the suffrages, and then betray the
+interests, of the people. The question resulting is, whether small
+or extensive republics are more favorable to the election of proper
+guardians of the public weal; and it is clearly decided in favor of
+the latter by two obvious considerations:
+
+In the first place, it is to be remarked that, however small the
+republic may be, the representatives must be raised to a certain
+number, in order to guard against the cabals of a few; and that,
+however large it may be, they must be limited to a certain number,
+in order to guard against the confusion of a multitude. Hence, the
+number of representatives in the two cases not being in proportion
+to that of the two constituents, and being proportionally greater in
+the small republic, it follows that, if the proportion of fit
+characters be not less in the large than in the small republic, the
+former will present a greater option, and consequently a greater
+probability of a fit choice.
+
+In the next place, as each representative will be chosen by a
+greater number of citizens in the large than in the small republic,
+it will be more difficult for unworthy candidates to practice with
+success the vicious arts by which elections are too often carried;
+and the suffrages of the people being more free, will be more
+likely to centre in men who possess the most attractive merit and
+the most diffusive and established characters.
+
+It must be confessed that in this, as in most other cases, there
+is a mean, on both sides of which inconveniences will be found to
+lie. By enlarging too much the number of electors, you render the
+representatives too little acquainted with all their local
+circumstances and lesser interests; as by reducing it too much, you
+render him unduly attached to these, and too little fit to
+comprehend and pursue great and national objects. The federal
+Constitution forms a happy combination in this respect; the great
+and aggregate interests being referred to the national, the local
+and particular to the State legislatures.
+
+The other point of difference is, the greater number of citizens
+and extent of territory which may be brought within the compass of
+republican than of democratic government; and it is this
+circumstance principally which renders factious combinations less to
+be dreaded in the former than in the latter. The smaller the
+society, the fewer probably will be the distinct parties and
+interests composing it; the fewer the distinct parties and
+interests, the more frequently will a majority be found of the same
+party; and the smaller the number of individuals composing a
+majority, and the smaller the compass within which they are placed,
+the more easily will they concert and execute their plans of
+oppression. Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of
+parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of
+the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other
+citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more
+difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to
+act in unison with each other. Besides other impediments, it may be
+remarked that, where there is a consciousness of unjust or
+dishonorable purposes, communication is always checked by distrust
+in proportion to the number whose concurrence is necessary.
+
+Hence, it clearly appears, that the same advantage which a
+republic has over a democracy, in controlling the effects of
+faction, is enjoyed by a large over a small republic,--is enjoyed by
+the Union over the States composing it. Does the advantage consist
+in the substitution of representatives whose enlightened views and
+virtuous sentiments render them superior to local prejudices and
+schemes of injustice? It will not be denied that the representation
+of the Union will be most likely to possess these requisite
+endowments. Does it consist in the greater security afforded by a
+greater variety of parties, against the event of any one party being
+able to outnumber and oppress the rest? In an equal degree does the
+increased variety of parties comprised within the Union, increase
+this security. Does it, in fine, consist in the greater obstacles
+opposed to the concert and accomplishment of the secret wishes of an
+unjust and interested majority? Here, again, the extent of the
+Union gives it the most palpable advantage.
+
+The influence of factious leaders may kindle a flame within
+their particular States, but will be unable to spread a general
+conflagration through the other States. A religious sect may
+degenerate into a political faction in a part of the Confederacy;
+but the variety of sects dispersed over the entire face of it must
+secure the national councils against any danger from that source. A
+rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an equal
+division of property, or for any other improper or wicked project,
+will be less apt to pervade the whole body of the Union than a
+particular member of it; in the same proportion as such a malady is
+more likely to taint a particular county or district, than an entire
+State.
+
+In the extent and proper structure of the Union, therefore, we
+behold a republican remedy for the diseases most incident to
+republican government. And according to the degree of pleasure and
+pride we feel in being republicans, ought to be our zeal in
+cherishing the spirit and supporting the character of Federalists.
+
+PUBLIUS.
+
+
+
+
+
+FEDERALIST No. 11
+
+
+
+The Utility of the Union in Respect to Commercial Relations and a
+Navy
+
+For the Independent Journal.
+
+
+
+HAMILTON
+
+
+
+To the People of the State of New York:
+
+THE importance of the Union, in a commercial light, is one of
+those points about which there is least room to entertain a
+difference of opinion, and which has, in fact, commanded the most
+general assent of men who have any acquaintance with the subject.
+This applies as well to our intercourse with foreign countries as
+with each other.
+
+There are appearances to authorize a supposition that the
+adventurous spirit, which distinguishes the commercial character of
+America, has already excited uneasy sensations in several of the
+maritime powers of Europe. They seem to be apprehensive of our too
+great interference in that carrying trade, which is the support of
+their navigation and the foundation of their naval strength. Those
+of them which have colonies in America look forward to what this
+country is capable of becoming, with painful solicitude. They
+foresee the dangers that may threaten their American dominions from
+the neighborhood of States, which have all the dispositions, and
+would possess all the means, requisite to the creation of a powerful
+marine. Impressions of this kind will naturally indicate the policy
+of fostering divisions among us, and of depriving us, as far as
+possible, of an ACTIVE COMMERCE in our own bottoms. This would
+answer the threefold purpose of preventing our interference in their
+navigation, of monopolizing the profits of our trade, and of
+clipping the wings by which we might soar to a dangerous greatness.
+Did not prudence forbid the detail, it would not be difficult to
+trace, by facts, the workings of this policy to the cabinets of
+ministers.
+
+If we continue united, we may counteract a policy so unfriendly
+to our prosperity in a variety of ways. By prohibitory regulations,
+extending, at the same time, throughout the States, we may oblige
+foreign countries to bid against each other, for the privileges of
+our markets. This assertion will not appear chimerical to those who
+are able to appreciate the importance of the markets of three
+millions of people--increasing in rapid progression, for the most
+part exclusively addicted to agriculture, and likely from local
+circumstances to remain so--to any manufacturing nation; and the
+immense difference there would be to the trade and navigation of
+such a nation, between a direct communication in its own ships, and
+an indirect conveyance of its products and returns, to and from
+America, in the ships of another country. Suppose, for instance, we
+had a government in America, capable of excluding Great Britain
+(with whom we have at present no treaty of commerce) from all our
+ports; what would be the probable operation of this step upon her
+politics? Would it not enable us to negotiate, with the fairest
+prospect of success, for commercial privileges of the most valuable
+and extensive kind, in the dominions of that kingdom? When these
+questions have been asked, upon other occasions, they have received
+a plausible, but not a solid or satisfactory answer. It has been
+said that prohibitions on our part would produce no change in the
+system of Britain, because she could prosecute her trade with us
+through the medium of the Dutch, who would be her immediate
+customers and paymasters for those articles which were wanted for
+the supply of our markets. But would not her navigation be
+materially injured by the loss of the important advantage of being
+her own carrier in that trade? Would not the principal part of its
+profits be intercepted by the Dutch, as a compensation for their
+agency and risk? Would not the mere circumstance of freight
+occasion a considerable deduction? Would not so circuitous an
+intercourse facilitate the competitions of other nations, by
+enhancing the price of British commodities in our markets, and by
+transferring to other hands the management of this interesting
+branch of the British commerce?
+
+A mature consideration of the objects suggested by these
+questions will justify a belief that the real disadvantages to
+Britain from such a state of things, conspiring with the
+pre-possessions of a great part of the nation in favor of the
+American trade, and with the importunities of the West India
+islands, would produce a relaxation in her present system, and would
+let us into the enjoyment of privileges in the markets of those
+islands elsewhere, from which our trade would derive the most
+substantial benefits. Such a point gained from the British
+government, and which could not be expected without an equivalent in
+exemptions and immunities in our markets, would be likely to have a
+correspondent effect on the conduct of other nations, who would not
+be inclined to see themselves altogether supplanted in our trade.
+
+A further resource for influencing the conduct of European
+nations toward us, in this respect, would arise from the
+establishment of a federal navy. There can be no doubt that the
+continuance of the Union under an efficient government would put it
+in our power, at a period not very distant, to create a navy which,
+if it could not vie with those of the great maritime powers, would
+at least be of respectable weight if thrown into the scale of either
+of two contending parties. This would be more peculiarly the case
+in relation to operations in the West Indies. A few ships of the
+line, sent opportunely to the reinforcement of either side, would
+often be sufficient to decide the fate of a campaign, on the event
+of which interests of the greatest magnitude were suspended. Our
+position is, in this respect, a most commanding one. And if to this
+consideration we add that of the usefulness of supplies from this
+country, in the prosecution of military operations in the West
+Indies, it will readily be perceived that a situation so favorable
+would enable us to bargain with great advantage for commercial
+privileges. A price would be set not only upon our friendship, but
+upon our neutrality. By a steady adherence to the Union we may
+hope, erelong, to become the arbiter of Europe in America, and to be
+able to incline the balance of European competitions in this part of
+the world as our interest may dictate.
+
+But in the reverse of this eligible situation, we shall discover
+that the rivalships of the parts would make them checks upon each
+other, and would frustrate all the tempting advantages which nature
+has kindly placed within our reach. In a state so insignificant our
+commerce would be a prey to the wanton intermeddlings of all nations
+at war with each other; who, having nothing to fear from us, would
+with little scruple or remorse, supply their wants by depredations
+on our property as often as it fell in their way. The rights of
+neutrality will only be respected when they are defended by an
+adequate power. A nation, despicable by its weakness, forfeits even
+the privilege of being neutral.
+
+Under a vigorous national government, the natural strength and
+resources of the country, directed to a common interest, would
+baffle all the combinations of European jealousy to restrain our
+growth. This situation would even take away the motive to such
+combinations, by inducing an impracticability of success. An active
+commerce, an extensive navigation, and a flourishing marine would
+then be the offspring of moral and physical necessity. We might
+defy the little arts of the little politicians to control or vary
+the irresistible and unchangeable course of nature.
+
+But in a state of disunion, these combinations might exist and
+might operate with success. It would be in the power of the
+maritime nations, availing themselves of our universal impotence, to
+prescribe the conditions of our political existence; and as they
+have a common interest in being our carriers, and still more in
+preventing our becoming theirs, they would in all probability
+combine to embarrass our navigation in such a manner as would in
+effect destroy it, and confine us to a PASSIVE COMMERCE. We should
+then be compelled to content ourselves with the first price of our
+commodities, and to see the profits of our trade snatched from us to
+enrich our enemies and persecutors. That unequaled spirit of
+enterprise, which signalizes the genius of the American merchants
+and navigators, and which is in itself an inexhaustible mine of
+national wealth, would be stifled and lost, and poverty and disgrace
+would overspread a country which, with wisdom, might make herself
+the admiration and envy of the world.
+
+There are rights of great moment to the trade of America which
+are rights of the Union--I allude to the fisheries, to the navigation
+of the Western lakes, and to that of the Mississippi. The
+dissolution of the Confederacy would give room for delicate
+questions concerning the future existence of these rights; which
+the interest of more powerful partners would hardly fail to solve to
+our disadvantage. The disposition of Spain with regard to the
+Mississippi needs no comment. France and Britain are concerned with
+us in the fisheries, and view them as of the utmost moment to their
+navigation. They, of course, would hardly remain long indifferent
+to that decided mastery, of which experience has shown us to be
+possessed in this valuable branch of traffic, and by which we are
+able to undersell those nations in their own markets. What more
+natural than that they should be disposed to exclude from the lists
+such dangerous competitors?
+
+This branch of trade ought not to be considered as a partial
+benefit. All the navigating States may, in different degrees,
+advantageously participate in it, and under circumstances of a
+greater extension of mercantile capital, would not be unlikely to do
+it. As a nursery of seamen, it now is, or when time shall have more
+nearly assimilated the principles of navigation in the several
+States, will become, a universal resource. To the establishment of
+a navy, it must be indispensable.
+
+To this great national object, a NAVY, union will contribute in
+various ways. Every institution will grow and flourish in
+proportion to the quantity and extent of the means concentred
+towards its formation and support. A navy of the United States, as
+it would embrace the resources of all, is an object far less remote
+than a navy of any single State or partial confederacy, which would
+only embrace the resources of a single part. It happens, indeed,
+that different portions of confederated America possess each some
+peculiar advantage for this essential establishment. The more
+southern States furnish in greater abundance certain kinds of naval
+stores--tar, pitch, and turpentine. Their wood for the construction
+of ships is also of a more solid and lasting texture. The
+difference in the duration of the ships of which the navy might be
+composed, if chiefly constructed of Southern wood, would be of
+signal importance, either in the view of naval strength or of
+national economy. Some of the Southern and of the Middle States
+yield a greater plenty of iron, and of better quality. Seamen must
+chiefly be drawn from the Northern hive. The necessity of naval
+protection to external or maritime commerce does not require a
+particular elucidation, no more than the conduciveness of that
+species of commerce to the prosperity of a navy.
+
+An unrestrained intercourse between the States themselves will
+advance the trade of each by an interchange of their respective
+productions, not only for the supply of reciprocal wants at home,
+but for exportation to foreign markets. The veins of commerce in
+every part will be replenished, and will acquire additional motion
+and vigor from a free circulation of the commodities of every part.
+Commercial enterprise will have much greater scope, from the
+diversity in the productions of different States. When the staple
+of one fails from a bad harvest or unproductive crop, it can call to
+its aid the staple of another. The variety, not less than the
+value, of products for exportation contributes to the activity of
+foreign commerce. It can be conducted upon much better terms with a
+large number of materials of a given value than with a small number
+of materials of the same value; arising from the competitions of
+trade and from the fluctations of markets. Particular articles may
+be in great demand at certain periods, and unsalable at others; but
+if there be a variety of articles, it can scarcely happen that they
+should all be at one time in the latter predicament, and on this
+account the operations of the merchant would be less liable to any
+considerable obstruction or stagnation. The speculative trader will
+at once perceive the force of these observations, and will
+acknowledge that the aggregate balance of the commerce of the United
+States would bid fair to be much more favorable than that of the
+thirteen States without union or with partial unions.
+
+It may perhaps be replied to this, that whether the States are
+united or disunited, there would still be an intimate intercourse
+between them which would answer the same ends; this intercourse
+would be fettered, interrupted, and narrowed by a multiplicity of
+causes, which in the course of these papers have been amply detailed.
+A unity of commercial, as well as political, interests, can only
+result from a unity of government.
+
+There are other points of view in which this subject might be
+placed, of a striking and animating kind. But they would lead us
+too far into the regions of futurity, and would involve topics not
+proper for a newspaper discussion. I shall briefly observe, that
+our situation invites and our interests prompt us to aim at an
+ascendant in the system of American affairs. The world may
+politically, as well as geographically, be divided into four parts,
+each having a distinct set of interests. Unhappily for the other
+three, Europe, by her arms and by her negotiations, by force and by
+fraud, has, in different degrees, extended her dominion over them
+all. Africa, Asia, and America, have successively felt her
+domination. The superiority she has long maintained has tempted her
+to plume herself as the Mistress of the World, and to consider the
+rest of mankind as created for her benefit. Men admired as profound
+philosophers have, in direct terms, attributed to her inhabitants a
+physical superiority, and have gravely asserted that all animals,
+and with them the human species, degenerate in America--that even
+dogs cease to bark after having breathed awhile in our
+atmosphere.1 Facts have too long supported these arrogant
+pretensions of the Europeans. It belongs to us to vindicate the
+honor of the human race, and to teach that assuming brother,
+moderation. Union will enable us to do it. Disunion will will add
+another victim to his triumphs. Let Americans disdain to be the
+instruments of European greatness! Let the thirteen States, bound
+together in a strict and indissoluble Union, concur in erecting one
+great American system, superior to the control of all transatlantic
+force or influence, and able to dictate the terms of the connection
+between the old and the new world!
+
+PUBLIUS.
+
+"Recherches philosophiques sur les Americains."
+
+
+
+
+
+FEDERALIST No. 12
+
+
+
+The Utility of the Union In Respect to Revenue
+
+From the New York Packet.
+
+Tuesday, November 27, 1787.
+
+
+
+HAMILTON
+
+
+
+To the People of the State of New York:
+
+THE effects of Union upon the commercial prosperity of the
+States have been sufficiently delineated. Its tendency to promote
+the interests of revenue will be the subject of our present inquiry.
+
+The prosperity of commerce is now perceived and acknowledged by
+all enlightened statesmen to be the most useful as well as the most
+productive source of national wealth, and has accordingly become a
+primary object of their political cares. By multiplying the means of
+gratification, by promoting the introduction and circulation of the
+precious metals, those darling objects of human avarice and
+enterprise, it serves to vivify and invigorate the channels of
+industry, and to make them flow with greater activity and
+copiousness. The assiduous merchant, the laborious husbandman, the
+active mechanic, and the industrious manufacturer,--all orders of
+men, look forward with eager expectation and growing alacrity to
+this pleasing reward of their toils. The often-agitated question
+between agriculture and commerce has, from indubitable experience,
+received a decision which has silenced the rivalship that once
+subsisted between them, and has proved, to the satisfaction of their
+friends, that their interests are intimately blended and interwoven.
+It has been found in various countries that, in proportion as
+commerce has flourished, land has risen in value. And how could it
+have happened otherwise? Could that which procures a freer vent for
+the products of the earth, which furnishes new incitements to the
+cultivation of land, which is the most powerful instrument in
+increasing the quantity of money in a state--could that, in fine,
+which is the faithful handmaid of labor and industry, in every
+shape, fail to augment that article, which is the prolific parent of
+far the greatest part of the objects upon which they are exerted?
+It is astonishing that so simple a truth should ever have had an
+adversary; and it is one, among a multitude of proofs, how apt a
+spirit of ill-informed jealousy, or of too great abstraction and
+refinement, is to lead men astray from the plainest truths of reason
+and conviction.
+
+The ability of a country to pay taxes must always be
+proportioned, in a great degree, to the quantity of money in
+circulation, and to the celerity with which it circulates.
+Commerce, contributing to both these objects, must of necessity
+render the payment of taxes easier, and facilitate the requisite
+supplies to the treasury. The hereditary dominions of the Emperor
+of Germany contain a great extent of fertile, cultivated, and
+populous territory, a large proportion of which is situated in mild
+and luxuriant climates. In some parts of this territory are to be
+found the best gold and silver mines in Europe. And yet, from the
+want of the fostering influence of commerce, that monarch can boast
+but slender revenues. He has several times been compelled to owe
+obligations to the pecuniary succors of other nations for the
+preservation of his essential interests, and is unable, upon the
+strength of his own resources, to sustain a long or continued war.
+
+But it is not in this aspect of the subject alone that Union
+will be seen to conduce to the purpose of revenue. There are other
+points of view, in which its influence will appear more immediate
+and decisive. It is evident from the state of the country, from the
+habits of the people, from the experience we have had on the point
+itself, that it is impracticable to raise any very considerable sums
+by direct taxation. Tax laws have in vain been multiplied; new
+methods to enforce the collection have in vain been tried; the
+public expectation has been uniformly disappointed, and the
+treasuries of the States have remained empty. The popular system of
+administration inherent in the nature of popular government,
+coinciding with the real scarcity of money incident to a languid and
+mutilated state of trade, has hitherto defeated every experiment for
+extensive collections, and has at length taught the different
+legislatures the folly of attempting them.
+
+No person acquainted with what happens in other countries will
+be surprised at this circumstance. In so opulent a nation as that
+of Britain, where direct taxes from superior wealth must be much
+more tolerable, and, from the vigor of the government, much more
+practicable, than in America, far the greatest part of the national
+revenue is derived from taxes of the indirect kind, from imposts,
+and from excises. Duties on imported articles form a large branch
+of this latter description.
+
+In America, it is evident that we must a long time depend for
+the means of revenue chiefly on such duties. In most parts of it,
+excises must be confined within a narrow compass. The genius of the
+people will ill brook the inquisitive and peremptory spirit of
+excise laws. The pockets of the farmers, on the other hand, will
+reluctantly yield but scanty supplies, in the unwelcome shape of
+impositions on their houses and lands; and personal property is too
+precarious and invisible a fund to be laid hold of in any other way
+than by the inperceptible agency of taxes on consumption.
+
+If these remarks have any foundation, that state of things which
+will best enable us to improve and extend so valuable a resource
+must be best adapted to our political welfare. And it cannot admit
+of a serious doubt, that this state of things must rest on the basis
+of a general Union. As far as this would be conducive to the
+interests of commerce, so far it must tend to the extension of the
+revenue to be drawn from that source. As far as it would contribute
+to rendering regulations for the collection of the duties more
+simple and efficacious, so far it must serve to answer the purposes
+of making the same rate of duties more productive, and of putting it
+into the power of the government to increase the rate without
+prejudice to trade.
+
+The relative situation of these States; the number of rivers
+with which they are intersected, and of bays that wash there shores;
+the facility of communication in every direction; the affinity of
+language and manners; the familiar habits of intercourse; --all
+these are circumstances that would conspire to render an illicit
+trade between them a matter of little difficulty, and would insure
+frequent evasions of the commercial regulations of each other. The
+separate States or confederacies would be necessitated by mutual
+jealousy to avoid the temptations to that kind of trade by the
+lowness of their duties. The temper of our governments, for a long
+time to come, would not permit those rigorous precautions by which
+the European nations guard the avenues into their respective
+countries, as well by land as by water; and which, even there, are
+found insufficient obstacles to the adventurous stratagems of
+avarice.
+
+In France, there is an army of patrols (as they are called)
+constantly employed to secure their fiscal regulations against the
+inroads of the dealers in contraband trade. Mr. Neckar computes the
+number of these patrols at upwards of twenty thousand. This shows
+the immense difficulty in preventing that species of traffic, where
+there is an inland communication, and places in a strong light the
+disadvantages with which the collection of duties in this country
+would be encumbered, if by disunion the States should be placed in a
+situation, with respect to each other, resembling that of France
+with respect to her neighbors. The arbitrary and vexatious powers
+with which the patrols are necessarily armed, would be intolerable
+in a free country.
+
+If, on the contrary, there be but one government pervading all
+the States, there will be, as to the principal part of our commerce,
+but ONE SIDE to guard--the ATLANTIC COAST. Vessels arriving directly
+from foreign countries, laden with valuable cargoes, would rarely
+choose to hazard themselves to the complicated and critical perils
+which would attend attempts to unlade prior to their coming into
+port. They would have to dread both the dangers of the coast, and
+of detection, as well after as before their arrival at the places of
+their final destination. An ordinary degree of vigilance would be
+competent to the prevention of any material infractions upon the
+rights of the revenue. A few armed vessels, judiciously stationed
+at the entrances of our ports, might at a small expense be made
+useful sentinels of the laws. And the government having the same
+interest to provide against violations everywhere, the co-operation
+of its measures in each State would have a powerful tendency to
+render them effectual. Here also we should preserve by Union, an
+advantage which nature holds out to us, and which would be
+relinquished by separation. The United States lie at a great
+distance from Europe, and at a considerable distance from all other
+places with which they would have extensive connections of foreign
+trade. The passage from them to us, in a few hours, or in a single
+night, as between the coasts of France and Britain, and of other
+neighboring nations, would be impracticable. This is a prodigious
+security against a direct contraband with foreign countries; but a
+circuitous contraband to one State, through the medium of another,
+would be both easy and safe. The difference between a direct
+importation from abroad, and an indirect importation through the
+channel of a neighboring State, in small parcels, according to time
+and opportunity, with the additional facilities of inland
+communication, must be palpable to every man of discernment.
+
+It is therefore evident, that one national government would be
+able, at much less expense, to extend the duties on imports, beyond
+comparison, further than would be practicable to the States
+separately, or to any partial confederacies. Hitherto, I believe,
+it may safely be asserted, that these duties have not upon an
+average exceeded in any State three per cent. In France they are
+estimated to be about fifteen per cent., and in Britain they exceed
+this proportion.1 There seems to be nothing to hinder their
+being increased in this country to at least treble their present
+amount. The single article of ardent spirits, under federal
+regulation, might be made to furnish a considerable revenue. Upon a
+ratio to the importation into this State, the whole quantity
+imported into the United States may be estimated at four millions of
+gallons; which, at a shilling per gallon, would produce two hundred
+thousand pounds. That article would well bear this rate of duty;
+and if it should tend to diminish the consumption of it, such an
+effect would be equally favorable to the agriculture, to the
+economy, to the morals, and to the health of the society. There is,
+perhaps, nothing so much a subject of national extravagance as these
+spirits.
+
+What will be the consequence, if we are not able to avail
+ourselves of the resource in question in its full extent? A nation
+cannot long exist without revenues. Destitute of this essential
+support, it must resign its independence, and sink into the degraded
+condition of a province. This is an extremity to which no
+government will of choice accede. Revenue, therefore, must be had
+at all events. In this country, if the principal part be not drawn
+from commerce, it must fall with oppressive weight upon land. It
+has been already intimated that excises, in their true
+signification, are too little in unison with the feelings of the
+people, to admit of great use being made of that mode of taxation;
+nor, indeed, in the States where almost the sole employment is
+agriculture, are the objects proper for excise sufficiently numerous
+to permit very ample collections in that way. Personal estate (as
+has been before remarked), from the difficulty in tracing it, cannot
+be subjected to large contributions, by any other means than by
+taxes on consumption. In populous cities, it may be enough the
+subject of conjecture, to occasion the oppression of individuals,
+without much aggregate benefit to the State; but beyond these
+circles, it must, in a great measure, escape the eye and the hand of
+the tax-gatherer. As the necessities of the State, nevertheless,
+must be satisfied in some mode or other, the defect of other
+resources must throw the principal weight of public burdens on the
+possessors of land. And as, on the other hand, the wants of the
+government can never obtain an adequate supply, unless all the
+sources of revenue are open to its demands, the finances of the
+community, under such embarrassments, cannot be put into a situation
+consistent with its respectability or its security. Thus we shall
+not even have the consolations of a full treasury, to atone for the
+oppression of that valuable class of the citizens who are employed
+in the cultivation of the soil. But public and private distress
+will keep pace with each other in gloomy concert; and unite in
+deploring the infatuation of those counsels which led to disunion.
+
+PUBLIUS.
+
+1 If my memory be right they amount to twenty per cent.
+
+
+
+
+
+FEDERALIST No. 13
+
+
+
+Advantage of the Union in Respect to Economy in Government
+
+For the Independent Journal.
+
+
+
+HAMILTON
+
+
+
+To the People of the State of New York:
+
+As CONNECTED with the subject of revenue, we may with propriety
+consider that of economy. The money saved from one object may be
+usefully applied to another, and there will be so much the less to
+be drawn from the pockets of the people. If the States are united
+under one government, there will be but one national civil list to
+support; if they are divided into several confederacies, there will
+be as many different national civil lists to be provided for--and
+each of them, as to the principal departments, coextensive with that
+which would be necessary for a government of the whole. The entire
+separation of the States into thirteen unconnected sovereignties is
+a project too extravagant and too replete with danger to have many
+advocates. The ideas of men who speculate upon the dismemberment of
+the empire seem generally turned toward three confederacies--one
+consisting of the four Northern, another of the four Middle, and a
+third of the five Southern States. There is little probability that
+there would be a greater number. According to this distribution,
+each confederacy would comprise an extent of territory larger than
+that of the kingdom of Great Britain. No well-informed man will
+suppose that the affairs of such a confederacy can be properly
+regulated by a government less comprehensive in its organs or
+institutions than that which has been proposed by the convention.
+When the dimensions of a State attain to a certain magnitude, it
+requires the same energy of government and the same forms of
+administration which are requisite in one of much greater extent.
+This idea admits not of precise demonstration, because there is no
+rule by which we can measure the momentum of civil power necessary
+to the government of any given number of individuals; but when we
+consider that the island of Britain, nearly commensurate with each
+of the supposed confederacies, contains about eight millions of
+people, and when we reflect upon the degree of authority required to
+direct the passions of so large a society to the public good, we
+shall see no reason to doubt that the like portion of power would be
+sufficient to perform the same task in a society far more numerous.
+Civil power, properly organized and exerted, is capable of
+diffusing its force to a very great extent; and can, in a manner,
+reproduce itself in every part of a great empire by a judicious
+arrangement of subordinate institutions.
+
+The supposition that each confederacy into which the States
+would be likely to be divided would require a government not less
+comprehensive than the one proposed, will be strengthened by another
+supposition, more probable than that which presents us with three
+confederacies as the alternative to a general Union. If we attend
+carefully to geographical and commercial considerations, in
+conjunction with the habits and prejudices of the different States,
+we shall be led to conclude that in case of disunion they will most
+naturally league themselves under two governments. The four Eastern
+States, from all the causes that form the links of national sympathy
+and connection, may with certainty be expected to unite. New York,
+situated as she is, would never be unwise enough to oppose a feeble
+and unsupported flank to the weight of that confederacy. There are
+other obvious reasons that would facilitate her accession to it.
+New Jersey is too small a State to think of being a frontier, in
+opposition to this still more powerful combination; nor do there
+appear to be any obstacles to her admission into it. Even
+Pennsylvania would have strong inducements to join the Northern
+league. An active foreign commerce, on the basis of her own
+navigation, is her true policy, and coincides with the opinions and
+dispositions of her citizens. The more Southern States, from
+various circumstances, may not think themselves much interested in
+the encouragement of navigation. They may prefer a system which
+would give unlimited scope to all nations to be the carriers as well
+as the purchasers of their commodities. Pennsylvania may not choose
+to confound her interests in a connection so adverse to her policy.
+As she must at all events be a frontier, she may deem it most
+consistent with her safety to have her exposed side turned towards
+the weaker power of the Southern, rather than towards the stronger
+power of the Northern, Confederacy. This would give her the fairest
+chance to avoid being the Flanders of America. Whatever may be the
+determination of Pennsylvania, if the Northern Confederacy includes
+New Jersey, there is no likelihood of more than one confederacy to
+the south of that State.
+
+Nothing can be more evident than that the thirteen States will
+be able to support a national government better than one half, or
+one third, or any number less than the whole. This reflection must
+have great weight in obviating that objection to the proposed plan,
+which is founded on the principle of expense; an objection,
+however, which, when we come to take a nearer view of it, will
+appear in every light to stand on mistaken ground.
+
+If, in addition to the consideration of a plurality of civil
+lists, we take into view the number of persons who must necessarily
+be employed to guard the inland communication between the different
+confederacies against illicit trade, and who in time will infallibly
+spring up out of the necessities of revenue; and if we also take
+into view the military establishments which it has been shown would
+unavoidably result from the jealousies and conflicts of the several
+nations into which the States would be divided, we shall clearly
+discover that a separation would be not less injurious to the
+economy, than to the tranquillity, commerce, revenue, and liberty of
+every part.
+
+PUBLIUS.
+
+
+
+
+
+FEDERALIST No. 14
+
+
+
+Objections to the Proposed Constitution From Extent of Territory
+Answered
+
+From the New York Packet.
+
+Friday, November 30, 1787.
+
+
+
+MADISON
+
+
+
+To the People of the State of New York:
+
+WE HAVE seen the necessity of the Union, as our bulwark against
+foreign danger, as the conservator of peace among ourselves, as the
+guardian of our commerce and other common interests, as the only
+substitute for those military establishments which have subverted
+the liberties of the Old World, and as the proper antidote for the
+diseases of faction, which have proved fatal to other popular
+governments, and of which alarming symptoms have been betrayed by
+our own. All that remains, within this branch of our inquiries, is
+to take notice of an objection that may be drawn from the great
+extent of country which the Union embraces. A few observations on
+this subject will be the more proper, as it is perceived that the
+adversaries of the new Constitution are availing themselves of the
+prevailing prejudice with regard to the practicable sphere of
+republican administration, in order to supply, by imaginary
+difficulties, the want of those solid objections which they endeavor
+in vain to find.
+
+The error which limits republican government to a narrow
+district has been unfolded and refuted in preceding papers. I
+remark here only that it seems to owe its rise and prevalence
+chiefly to the confounding of a republic with a democracy, applying
+to the former reasonings drawn from the nature of the latter. The
+true distinction between these forms was also adverted to on a
+former occasion. It is, that in a democracy, the people meet and
+exercise the government in person; in a republic, they assemble and
+administer it by their representatives and agents. A democracy,
+consequently, will be confined to a small spot. A republic may be
+extended over a large region.
+
+To this accidental source of the error may be added the artifice
+of some celebrated authors, whose writings have had a great share in
+forming the modern standard of political opinions. Being subjects
+either of an absolute or limited monarchy, they have endeavored to
+heighten the advantages, or palliate the evils of those forms, by
+placing in comparison the vices and defects of the republican, and
+by citing as specimens of the latter the turbulent democracies of
+ancient Greece and modern Italy. Under the confusion of names, it
+has been an easy task to transfer to a republic observations
+applicable to a democracy only; and among others, the observation
+that it can never be established but among a small number of people,
+living within a small compass of territory.
+
+Such a fallacy may have been the less perceived, as most of the
+popular governments of antiquity were of the democratic species;
+and even in modern Europe, to which we owe the great principle of
+representation, no example is seen of a government wholly popular,
+and founded, at the same time, wholly on that principle. If Europe
+has the merit of discovering this great mechanical power in
+government, by the simple agency of which the will of the largest
+political body may be concentred, and its force directed to any
+object which the public good requires, America can claim the merit
+of making the discovery the basis of unmixed and extensive republics.
+It is only to be lamented that any of her citizens should wish to
+deprive her of the additional merit of displaying its full efficacy
+in the establishment of the comprehensive system now under her
+consideration.
+
+As the natural limit of a democracy is that distance from the
+central point which will just permit the most remote citizens to
+assemble as often as their public functions demand, and will include
+no greater number than can join in those functions; so the natural
+limit of a republic is that distance from the centre which will
+barely allow the representatives to meet as often as may be
+necessary for the administration of public affairs. Can it be said
+that the limits of the United States exceed this distance? It will
+not be said by those who recollect that the Atlantic coast is the
+longest side of the Union, that during the term of thirteen years,
+the representatives of the States have been almost continually
+assembled, and that the members from the most distant States are not
+chargeable with greater intermissions of attendance than those from
+the States in the neighborhood of Congress.
+
+That we may form a juster estimate with regard to this
+interesting subject, let us resort to the actual dimensions of the
+Union. The limits, as fixed by the treaty of peace, are: on the
+east the Atlantic, on the south the latitude of thirty-one degrees,
+on the west the Mississippi, and on the north an irregular line
+running in some instances beyond the forty-fifth degree, in others
+falling as low as the forty-second. The southern shore of Lake Erie
+lies below that latitude. Computing the distance between the
+thirty-first and forty-fifth degrees, it amounts to nine hundred and
+seventy-three common miles; computing it from thirty-one to
+forty-two degrees, to seven hundred and sixty-four miles and a half.
+Taking the mean for the distance, the amount will be eight hundred
+and sixty-eight miles and three-fourths. The mean distance from the
+Atlantic to the Mississippi does not probably exceed seven hundred
+and fifty miles. On a comparison of this extent with that of
+several countries in Europe, the practicability of rendering our
+system commensurate to it appears to be demonstrable. It is not a
+great deal larger than Germany, where a diet representing the whole
+empire is continually assembled; or than Poland before the late
+dismemberment, where another national diet was the depositary of the
+supreme power. Passing by France and Spain, we find that in Great
+Britain, inferior as it may be in size, the representatives of the
+northern extremity of the island have as far to travel to the
+national council as will be required of those of the most remote
+parts of the Union.
+
+Favorable as this view of the subject may be, some observations
+remain which will place it in a light still more satisfactory.
+
+In the first place it is to be remembered that the general
+government is not to be charged with the whole power of making and
+administering laws. Its jurisdiction is limited to certain
+enumerated objects, which concern all the members of the republic,
+but which are not to be attained by the separate provisions of any.
+The subordinate governments, which can extend their care to all
+those other subjects which can be separately provided for, will
+retain their due authority and activity. Were it proposed by the
+plan of the convention to abolish the governments of the particular
+States, its adversaries would have some ground for their objection;
+though it would not be difficult to show that if they were
+abolished the general government would be compelled, by the
+principle of self-preservation, to reinstate them in their proper
+jurisdiction.
+
+A second observation to be made is that the immediate object of
+the federal Constitution is to secure the union of the thirteen
+primitive States, which we know to be practicable; and to add to
+them such other States as may arise in their own bosoms, or in their
+neighborhoods, which we cannot doubt to be equally practicable. The
+arrangements that may be necessary for those angles and fractions of
+our territory which lie on our northwestern frontier, must be left
+to those whom further discoveries and experience will render more
+equal to the task.
+
+Let it be remarked, in the third place, that the intercourse
+throughout the Union will be facilitated by new improvements. Roads
+will everywhere be shortened, and kept in better order;
+accommodations for travelers will be multiplied and meliorated; an
+interior navigation on our eastern side will be opened throughout,
+or nearly throughout, the whole extent of the thirteen States. The
+communication between the Western and Atlantic districts, and
+between different parts of each, will be rendered more and more easy
+by those numerous canals with which the beneficence of nature has
+intersected our country, and which art finds it so little difficult
+to connect and complete.
+
+A fourth and still more important consideration is, that as
+almost every State will, on one side or other, be a frontier, and
+will thus find, in regard to its safety, an inducement to make some
+sacrifices for the sake of the general protection; so the States
+which lie at the greatest distance from the heart of the Union, and
+which, of course, may partake least of the ordinary circulation of
+its benefits, will be at the same time immediately contiguous to
+foreign nations, and will consequently stand, on particular
+occasions, in greatest need of its strength and resources. It may
+be inconvenient for Georgia, or the States forming our western or
+northeastern borders, to send their representatives to the seat of
+government; but they would find it more so to struggle alone
+against an invading enemy, or even to support alone the whole
+expense of those precautions which may be dictated by the
+neighborhood of continual danger. If they should derive less
+benefit, therefore, from the Union in some respects than the less
+distant States, they will derive greater benefit from it in other
+respects, and thus the proper equilibrium will be maintained
+throughout.
+
+I submit to you, my fellow-citizens, these considerations, in
+full confidence that the good sense which has so often marked your
+decisions will allow them their due weight and effect; and that you
+will never suffer difficulties, however formidable in appearance, or
+however fashionable the error on which they may be founded, to drive
+you into the gloomy and perilous scene into which the advocates for
+disunion would conduct you. Hearken not to the unnatural voice
+which tells you that the people of America, knit together as they
+are by so many cords of affection, can no longer live together as
+members of the same family; can no longer continue the mutual
+guardians of their mutual happiness; can no longer be
+fellowcitizens of one great, respectable, and flourishing empire.
+Hearken not to the voice which petulantly tells you that the form
+of government recommended for your adoption is a novelty in the
+political world; that it has never yet had a place in the theories
+of the wildest projectors; that it rashly attempts what it is
+impossible to accomplish. No, my countrymen, shut your ears against
+this unhallowed language. Shut your hearts against the poison which
+it conveys; the kindred blood which flows in the veins of American
+citizens, the mingled blood which they have shed in defense of their
+sacred rights, consecrate their Union, and excite horror at the idea
+of their becoming aliens, rivals, enemies. And if novelties are to
+be shunned, believe me, the most alarming of all novelties, the most
+wild of all projects, the most rash of all attempts, is that of
+rendering us in pieces, in order to preserve our liberties and
+promote our happiness. But why is the experiment of an extended
+republic to be rejected, merely because it may comprise what is new?
+Is it not the glory of the people of America, that, whilst they
+have paid a decent regard to the opinions of former times and other
+nations, they have not suffered a blind veneration for antiquity,
+for custom, or for names, to overrule the suggestions of their own
+good sense, the knowledge of their own situation, and the lessons of
+their own experience? To this manly spirit, posterity will be
+indebted for the possession, and the world for the example, of the
+numerous innovations displayed on the American theatre, in favor of
+private rights and public happiness. Had no important step been
+taken by the leaders of the Revolution for which a precedent could
+not be discovered, no government established of which an exact model
+did not present itself, the people of the United States might, at
+this moment have been numbered among the melancholy victims of
+misguided councils, must at best have been laboring under the weight
+of some of those forms which have crushed the liberties of the rest
+of mankind. Happily for America, happily, we trust, for the whole
+human race, they pursued a new and more noble course. They
+accomplished a revolution which has no parallel in the annals of
+human society. They reared the fabrics of governments which have no
+model on the face of the globe. They formed the design of a great
+Confederacy, which it is incumbent on their successors to improve
+and perpetuate. If their works betray imperfections, we wonder at
+the fewness of them. If they erred most in the structure of the
+Union, this was the work most difficult to be executed; this is the
+work which has been new modelled by the act of your convention, and
+it is that act on which you are now to deliberate and to decide.
+
+PUBLIUS.
+
+
+
+
+
+FEDERALIST No. 15
+
+
+
+The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the
+Union
+
+For the Independent Journal.
+
+
+
+HAMILTON
+
+
+
+To the People of the State of New York.
+
+IN THE course of the preceding papers, I have endeavored, my
+fellow-citizens, to place before you, in a clear and convincing
+light, the importance of Union to your political safety and
+happiness. I have unfolded to you a complication of dangers to
+which you would be exposed, should you permit that sacred knot which
+binds the people of America together be severed or dissolved by
+ambition or by avarice, by jealousy or by misrepresentation. In the
+sequel of the inquiry through which I propose to accompany you, the
+truths intended to be inculcated will receive further confirmation
+from facts and arguments hitherto unnoticed. If the road over which
+you will still have to pass should in some places appear to you
+tedious or irksome, you will recollect that you are in quest of
+information on a subject the most momentous which can engage the
+attention of a free people, that the field through which you have to
+travel is in itself spacious, and that the difficulties of the
+journey have been unnecessarily increased by the mazes with which
+sophistry has beset the way. It will be my aim to remove the
+obstacles from your progress in as compendious a manner as it can be
+done, without sacrificing utility to despatch.
+
+In pursuance of the plan which I have laid down for the
+discussion of the subject, the point next in order to be examined is
+the "insufficiency of the present Confederation to the preservation
+of the Union." It may perhaps be asked what need there is of
+reasoning or proof to illustrate a position which is not either
+controverted or doubted, to which the understandings and feelings of
+all classes of men assent, and which in substance is admitted by the
+opponents as well as by the friends of the new Constitution. It
+must in truth be acknowledged that, however these may differ in
+other respects, they in general appear to harmonize in this
+sentiment, at least, that there are material imperfections in our
+national system, and that something is necessary to be done to
+rescue us from impending anarchy. The facts that support this
+opinion are no longer objects of speculation. They have forced
+themselves upon the sensibility of the people at large, and have at
+length extorted from those, whose mistaken policy has had the
+principal share in precipitating the extremity at which we are
+arrived, a reluctant confession of the reality of those defects in
+the scheme of our federal government, which have been long pointed
+out and regretted by the intelligent friends of the Union.
+
+We may indeed with propriety be said to have reached almost the
+last stage of national humiliation. There is scarcely anything that
+can wound the pride or degrade the character of an independent
+nation which we do not experience. Are there engagements to the
+performance of which we are held by every tie respectable among men?
+These are the subjects of constant and unblushing violation. Do we
+owe debts to foreigners and to our own citizens contracted in a time
+of imminent peril for the preservation of our political existence?
+These remain without any proper or satisfactory provision for their
+discharge. Have we valuable territories and important posts in the
+possession of a foreign power which, by express stipulations, ought
+long since to have been surrendered? These are still retained, to
+the prejudice of our interests, not less than of our rights. Are we
+in a condition to resent or to repel the aggression? We have
+neither troops, nor treasury, nor government.1 Are we even in a
+condition to remonstrate with dignity? The just imputations on our
+own faith, in respect to the same treaty, ought first to be removed.
+Are we entitled by nature and compact to a free participation in
+the navigation of the Mississippi? Spain excludes us from it. Is
+public credit an indispensable resource in time of public danger?
+We seem to have abandoned its cause as desperate and irretrievable.
+Is commerce of importance to national wealth? Ours is at the
+lowest point of declension. Is respectability in the eyes of
+foreign powers a safeguard against foreign encroachments? The
+imbecility of our government even forbids them to treat with us.
+Our ambassadors abroad are the mere pageants of mimic sovereignty.
+Is a violent and unnatural decrease in the value of land a symptom
+of national distress? The price of improved land in most parts of
+the country is much lower than can be accounted for by the quantity
+of waste land at market, and can only be fully explained by that
+want of private and public confidence, which are so alarmingly
+prevalent among all ranks, and which have a direct tendency to
+depreciate property of every kind. Is private credit the friend and
+patron of industry? That most useful kind which relates to
+borrowing and lending is reduced within the narrowest limits, and
+this still more from an opinion of insecurity than from the scarcity
+of money. To shorten an enumeration of particulars which can afford
+neither pleasure nor instruction, it may in general be demanded,
+what indication is there of national disorder, poverty, and
+insignificance that could befall a community so peculiarly blessed
+with natural advantages as we are, which does not form a part of the
+dark catalogue of our public misfortunes?
+
+This is the melancholy situation to which we have been brought
+by those very maxims and councils which would now deter us from
+adopting the proposed Constitution; and which, not content with
+having conducted us to the brink of a precipice, seem resolved to
+plunge us into the abyss that awaits us below. Here, my countrymen,
+impelled by every motive that ought to influence an enlightened
+people, let us make a firm stand for our safety, our tranquillity,
+our dignity, our reputation. Let us at last break the fatal charm
+which has too long seduced us from the paths of felicity and
+prosperity.
+
+It is true, as has been before observed that facts, too stubborn
+to be resisted, have produced a species of general assent to the
+abstract proposition that there exist material defects in our
+national system; but the usefulness of the concession, on the part
+of the old adversaries of federal measures, is destroyed by a
+strenuous opposition to a remedy, upon the only principles that can
+give it a chance of success. While they admit that the government
+of the United States is destitute of energy, they contend against
+conferring upon it those powers which are requisite to supply that
+energy. They seem still to aim at things repugnant and
+irreconcilable; at an augmentation of federal authority, without a
+diminution of State authority; at sovereignty in the Union, and
+complete independence in the members. They still, in fine, seem to
+cherish with blind devotion the political monster of an imperium
+in imperio. This renders a full display of the principal defects
+of the Confederation necessary, in order to show that the evils we
+experience do not proceed from minute or partial imperfections, but
+from fundamental errors in the structure of the building, which
+cannot be amended otherwise than by an alteration in the first
+principles and main pillars of the fabric.
+
+The great and radical vice in the construction of the existing
+Confederation is in the principle of LEGISLATION for STATES or
+GOVERNMENTS, in their CORPORATE or COLLECTIVE CAPACITIES, and as
+contradistinguished from the INDIVIDUALS of which they consist.
+Though this principle does not run through all the powers delegated
+to the Union, yet it pervades and governs those on which the
+efficacy of the rest depends. Except as to the rule of appointment,
+the United States has an indefinite discretion to make requisitions
+for men and money; but they have no authority to raise either, by
+regulations extending to the individual citizens of America. The
+consequence of this is, that though in theory their resolutions
+concerning those objects are laws, constitutionally binding on the
+members of the Union, yet in practice they are mere recommendations
+which the States observe or disregard at their option.
+
+It is a singular instance of the capriciousness of the human
+mind, that after all the admonitions we have had from experience on
+this head, there should still be found men who object to the new
+Constitution, for deviating from a principle which has been found
+the bane of the old, and which is in itself evidently incompatible
+with the idea of GOVERNMENT; a principle, in short, which, if it is
+to be executed at all, must substitute the violent and sanguinary
+agency of the sword to the mild influence of the magistracy.
+
+There is nothing absurd or impracticable in the idea of a league
+or alliance between independent nations for certain defined purposes
+precisely stated in a treaty regulating all the details of time,
+place, circumstance, and quantity; leaving nothing to future
+discretion; and depending for its execution on the good faith of
+the parties. Compacts of this kind exist among all civilized
+nations, subject to the usual vicissitudes of peace and war, of
+observance and non-observance, as the interests or passions of the
+contracting powers dictate. In the early part of the present
+century there was an epidemical rage in Europe for this species of
+compacts, from which the politicians of the times fondly hoped for
+benefits which were never realized. With a view to establishing the
+equilibrium of power and the peace of that part of the world, all
+the resources of negotiation were exhausted, and triple and
+quadruple alliances were formed; but they were scarcely formed
+before they were broken, giving an instructive but afflicting lesson
+to mankind, how little dependence is to be placed on treaties which
+have no other sanction than the obligations of good faith, and which
+oppose general considerations of peace and justice to the impulse of
+any immediate interest or passion.
+
+If the particular States in this country are disposed to stand
+in a similar relation to each other, and to drop the project of a
+general DISCRETIONARY SUPERINTENDENCE, the scheme would indeed be
+pernicious, and would entail upon us all the mischiefs which have
+been enumerated under the first head; but it would have the merit
+of being, at least, consistent and practicable Abandoning all views
+towards a confederate government, this would bring us to a simple
+alliance offensive and defensive; and would place us in a situation
+to be alternate friends and enemies of each other, as our mutual
+jealousies and rivalships, nourished by the intrigues of foreign
+nations, should prescribe to us.
+
+But if we are unwilling to be placed in this perilous situation;
+if we still will adhere to the design of a national government, or,
+which is the same thing, of a superintending power, under the
+direction of a common council, we must resolve to incorporate into
+our plan those ingredients which may be considered as forming the
+characteristic difference between a league and a government; we
+must extend the authority of the Union to the persons of the
+citizens, --the only proper objects of government.
+
+Government implies the power of making laws. It is essential to
+the idea of a law, that it be attended with a sanction; or, in
+other words, a penalty or punishment for disobedience. If there be
+no penalty annexed to disobedience, the resolutions or commands
+which pretend to be laws will, in fact, amount to nothing more than
+advice or recommendation. This penalty, whatever it may be, can
+only be inflicted in two ways: by the agency of the courts and
+ministers of justice, or by military force; by the COERCION of the
+magistracy, or by the COERCION of arms. The first kind can
+evidently apply only to men; the last kind must of necessity, be
+employed against bodies politic, or communities, or States. It is
+evident that there is no process of a court by which the observance
+of the laws can, in the last resort, be enforced. Sentences may be
+denounced against them for violations of their duty; but these
+sentences can only be carried into execution by the sword. In an
+association where the general authority is confined to the
+collective bodies of the communities, that compose it, every breach
+of the laws must involve a state of war; and military execution
+must become the only instrument of civil obedience. Such a state of
+things can certainly not deserve the name of government, nor would
+any prudent man choose to commit his happiness to it.
+
+There was a time when we were told that breaches, by the States,
+of the regulations of the federal authority were not to be expected;
+that a sense of common interest would preside over the conduct of
+the respective members, and would beget a full compliance with all
+the constitutional requisitions of the Union. This language, at the
+present day, would appear as wild as a great part of what we now
+hear from the same quarter will be thought, when we shall have
+received further lessons from that best oracle of wisdom, experience.
+It at all times betrayed an ignorance of the true springs by which
+human conduct is actuated, and belied the original inducements to
+the establishment of civil power. Why has government been
+instituted at all? Because the passions of men will not conform to
+the dictates of reason and justice, without constraint. Has it been
+found that bodies of men act with more rectitude or greater
+disinterestedness than individuals? The contrary of this has been
+inferred by all accurate observers of the conduct of mankind; and
+the inference is founded upon obvious reasons. Regard to reputation
+has a less active influence, when the infamy of a bad action is to
+be divided among a number than when it is to fall singly upon one.
+A spirit of faction, which is apt to mingle its poison in the
+deliberations of all bodies of men, will often hurry the persons of
+whom they are composed into improprieties and excesses, for which
+they would blush in a private capacity.
+
+In addition to all this, there is, in the nature of sovereign
+power, an impatience of control, that disposes those who are
+invested with the exercise of it, to look with an evil eye upon all
+external attempts to restrain or direct its operations. From this
+spirit it happens, that in every political association which is
+formed upon the principle of uniting in a common interest a number
+of lesser sovereignties, there will be found a kind of eccentric
+tendency in the subordinate or inferior orbs, by the operation of
+which there will be a perpetual effort in each to fly off from the
+common centre. This tendency is not difficult to be accounted for.
+It has its origin in the love of power. Power controlled or
+abridged is almost always the rival and enemy of that power by which
+it is controlled or abridged. This simple proposition will teach us
+how little reason there is to expect, that the persons intrusted
+with the administration of the affairs of the particular members of
+a confederacy will at all times be ready, with perfect good-humor,
+and an unbiased regard to the public weal, to execute the
+resolutions or decrees of the general authority. The reverse of
+this results from the constitution of human nature.
+
+If, therefore, the measures of the Confederacy cannot be
+executed without the intervention of the particular administrations,
+there will be little prospect of their being executed at all. The
+rulers of the respective members, whether they have a constitutional
+right to do it or not, will undertake to judge of the propriety of
+the measures themselves. They will consider the conformity of the
+thing proposed or required to their immediate interests or aims;
+the momentary conveniences or inconveniences that would attend its
+adoption. All this will be done; and in a spirit of interested and
+suspicious scrutiny, without that knowledge of national
+circumstances and reasons of state, which is essential to a right
+judgment, and with that strong predilection in favor of local
+objects, which can hardly fail to mislead the decision. The same
+process must be repeated in every member of which the body is
+constituted; and the execution of the plans, framed by the councils
+of the whole, will always fluctuate on the discretion of the
+ill-informed and prejudiced opinion of every part. Those who have
+been conversant in the proceedings of popular assemblies; who have
+seen how difficult it often is, where there is no exterior pressure
+of circumstances, to bring them to harmonious resolutions on
+important points, will readily conceive how impossible it must be to
+induce a number of such assemblies, deliberating at a distance from
+each other, at different times, and under different impressions,
+long to co-operate in the same views and pursuits.
+
+In our case, the concurrence of thirteen distinct sovereign
+wills is requisite, under the Confederation, to the complete
+execution of every important measure that proceeds from the Union.
+It has happened as was to have been foreseen. The measures of the
+Union have not been executed; the delinquencies of the States have,
+step by step, matured themselves to an extreme, which has, at
+length, arrested all the wheels of the national government, and
+brought them to an awful stand. Congress at this time scarcely
+possess the means of keeping up the forms of administration, till
+the States can have time to agree upon a more substantial substitute
+for the present shadow of a federal government. Things did not come
+to this desperate extremity at once. The causes which have been
+specified produced at first only unequal and disproportionate
+degrees of compliance with the requisitions of the Union. The
+greater deficiencies of some States furnished the pretext of example
+and the temptation of interest to the complying, or to the least
+delinquent States. Why should we do more in proportion than those
+who are embarked with us in the same political voyage? Why should
+we consent to bear more than our proper share of the common burden?
+These were suggestions which human selfishness could not withstand,
+and which even speculative men, who looked forward to remote
+consequences, could not, without hesitation, combat. Each State,
+yielding to the persuasive voice of immediate interest or
+convenience, has successively withdrawn its support, till the frail
+and tottering edifice seems ready to fall upon our heads, and to
+crush us beneath its ruins.
+
+PUBLIUS.
+
+1 "I mean for the Union."
+
+
+
+
+
+FEDERALIST No. 16
+
+
+
+The Same Subject Continued
+
+(The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the
+Union)
+
+From the New York Packet.
+
+Tuesday, December 4, 1787.
+
+
+
+HAMILTON
+
+
+
+To the People of the State of New York:
+
+THE tendency of the principle of legislation for States, or
+communities, in their political capacities, as it has been
+exemplified by the experiment we have made of it, is equally
+attested by the events which have befallen all other governments of
+the confederate kind, of which we have any account, in exact
+proportion to its prevalence in those systems. The confirmations of
+this fact will be worthy of a distinct and particular examination.
+I shall content myself with barely observing here, that of all the
+confederacies of antiquity, which history has handed down to us, the
+Lycian and Achaean leagues, as far as there remain vestiges of them,
+appear to have been most free from the fetters of that mistaken
+principle, and were accordingly those which have best deserved, and
+have most liberally received, the applauding suffrages of political
+writers.
+
+This exceptionable principle may, as truly as emphatically, be
+styled the parent of anarchy: It has been seen that delinquencies
+in the members of the Union are its natural and necessary offspring;
+and that whenever they happen, the only constitutional remedy is
+force, and the immediate effect of the use of it, civil war.
+
+It remains to inquire how far so odious an engine of government,
+in its application to us, would even be capable of answering its end.
+If there should not be a large army constantly at the disposal of
+the national government it would either not be able to employ force
+at all, or, when this could be done, it would amount to a war
+between parts of the Confederacy concerning the infractions of a
+league, in which the strongest combination would be most likely to
+prevail, whether it consisted of those who supported or of those who
+resisted the general authority. It would rarely happen that the
+delinquency to be redressed would be confined to a single member,
+and if there were more than one who had neglected their duty,
+similarity of situation would induce them to unite for common
+defense. Independent of this motive of sympathy, if a large and
+influential State should happen to be the aggressing member, it
+would commonly have weight enough with its neighbors to win over
+some of them as associates to its cause. Specious arguments of
+danger to the common liberty could easily be contrived; plausible
+excuses for the deficiencies of the party could, without difficulty,
+be invented to alarm the apprehensions, inflame the passions, and
+conciliate the good-will, even of those States which were not
+chargeable with any violation or omission of duty. This would be
+the more likely to take place, as the delinquencies of the larger
+members might be expected sometimes to proceed from an ambitious
+premeditation in their rulers, with a view to getting rid of all
+external control upon their designs of personal aggrandizement; the
+better to effect which it is presumable they would tamper beforehand
+with leading individuals in the adjacent States. If associates
+could not be found at home, recourse would be had to the aid of
+foreign powers, who would seldom be disinclined to encouraging the
+dissensions of a Confederacy, from the firm union of which they had
+so much to fear. When the sword is once drawn, the passions of men
+observe no bounds of moderation. The suggestions of wounded pride,
+the instigations of irritated resentment, would be apt to carry the
+States against which the arms of the Union were exerted, to any
+extremes necessary to avenge the affront or to avoid the disgrace of
+submission. The first war of this kind would probably terminate in
+a dissolution of the Union.
+
+This may be considered as the violent death of the Confederacy.
+Its more natural death is what we now seem to be on the point of
+experiencing, if the federal system be not speedily renovated in a
+more substantial form. It is not probable, considering the genius
+of this country, that the complying States would often be inclined
+to support the authority of the Union by engaging in a war against
+the non-complying States. They would always be more ready to pursue
+the milder course of putting themselves upon an equal footing with
+the delinquent members by an imitation of their example. And the
+guilt of all would thus become the security of all. Our past
+experience has exhibited the operation of this spirit in its full
+light. There would, in fact, be an insuperable difficulty in
+ascertaining when force could with propriety be employed. In the
+article of pecuniary contribution, which would be the most usual
+source of delinquency, it would often be impossible to decide
+whether it had proceeded from disinclination or inability. The
+pretense of the latter would always be at hand. And the case must
+be very flagrant in which its fallacy could be detected with
+sufficient certainty to justify the harsh expedient of compulsion.
+It is easy to see that this problem alone, as often as it should
+occur, would open a wide field for the exercise of factious views,
+of partiality, and of oppression, in the majority that happened to
+prevail in the national council.
+
+It seems to require no pains to prove that the States ought not
+to prefer a national Constitution which could only be kept in motion
+by the instrumentality of a large army continually on foot to
+execute the ordinary requisitions or decrees of the government. And
+yet this is the plain alternative involved by those who wish to deny
+it the power of extending its operations to individuals. Such a
+scheme, if practicable at all, would instantly degenerate into a
+military despotism; but it will be found in every light
+impracticable. The resources of the Union would not be equal to the
+maintenance of an army considerable enough to confine the larger
+States within the limits of their duty; nor would the means ever be
+furnished of forming such an army in the first instance. Whoever
+considers the populousness and strength of several of these States
+singly at the present juncture, and looks forward to what they will
+become, even at the distance of half a century, will at once dismiss
+as idle and visionary any scheme which aims at regulating their
+movements by laws to operate upon them in their collective
+capacities, and to be executed by a coercion applicable to them in
+the same capacities. A project of this kind is little less romantic
+than the monster-taming spirit which is attributed to the fabulous
+heroes and demi-gods of antiquity.
+
+Even in those confederacies which have been composed of members
+smaller than many of our counties, the principle of legislation for
+sovereign States, supported by military coercion, has never been
+found effectual. It has rarely been attempted to be employed, but
+against the weaker members; and in most instances attempts to
+coerce the refractory and disobedient have been the signals of
+bloody wars, in which one half of the confederacy has displayed its
+banners against the other half.
+
+The result of these observations to an intelligent mind must be
+clearly this, that if it be possible at any rate to construct a
+federal government capable of regulating the common concerns and
+preserving the general tranquillity, it must be founded, as to the
+objects committed to its care, upon the reverse of the principle
+contended for by the opponents of the proposed Constitution. It
+must carry its agency to the persons of the citizens. It must stand
+in need of no intermediate legislations; but must itself be
+empowered to employ the arm of the ordinary magistrate to execute
+its own resolutions. The majesty of the national authority must be
+manifested through the medium of the courts of justice. The
+government of the Union, like that of each State, must be able to
+address itself immediately to the hopes and fears of individuals;
+and to attract to its support those passions which have the
+strongest influence upon the human heart. It must, in short,
+possess all the means, and have aright to resort to all the methods,
+of executing the powers with which it is intrusted, that are
+possessed and exercised by the government of the particular States.
+
+To this reasoning it may perhaps be objected, that if any State
+should be disaffected to the authority of the Union, it could at any
+time obstruct the execution of its laws, and bring the matter to the
+same issue of force, with the necessity of which the opposite scheme
+is reproached.
+
+The plausibility of this objection will vanish the moment we
+advert to the essential difference between a mere NON-COMPLIANCE and
+a DIRECT and ACTIVE RESISTANCE. If the interposition of the State
+legislatures be necessary to give effect to a measure of the Union,
+they have only NOT TO ACT, or to ACT EVASIVELY, and the measure is
+defeated. This neglect of duty may be disguised under affected but
+unsubstantial provisions, so as not to appear, and of course not to
+excite any alarm in the people for the safety of the Constitution.
+The State leaders may even make a merit of their surreptitious
+invasions of it on the ground of some temporary convenience,
+exemption, or advantage.
+
+But if the execution of the laws of the national government
+should not require the intervention of the State legislatures, if
+they were to pass into immediate operation upon the citizens
+themselves, the particular governments could not interrupt their
+progress without an open and violent exertion of an unconstitutional
+power. No omissions nor evasions would answer the end. They would
+be obliged to act, and in such a manner as would leave no doubt that
+they had encroached on the national rights. An experiment of this
+nature would always be hazardous in the face of a constitution in
+any degree competent to its own defense, and of a people enlightened
+enough to distinguish between a legal exercise and an illegal
+usurpation of authority. The success of it would require not merely
+a factious majority in the legislature, but the concurrence of the
+courts of justice and of the body of the people. If the judges were
+not embarked in a conspiracy with the legislature, they would
+pronounce the resolutions of such a majority to be contrary to the
+supreme law of the land, unconstitutional, and void. If the people
+were not tainted with the spirit of their State representatives,
+they, as the natural guardians of the Constitution, would throw
+their weight into the national scale and give it a decided
+preponderancy in the contest. Attempts of this kind would not often
+be made with levity or rashness, because they could seldom be made
+without danger to the authors, unless in cases of a tyrannical
+exercise of the federal authority.
+
+If opposition to the national government should arise from the
+disorderly conduct of refractory or seditious individuals, it could
+be overcome by the same means which are daily employed against the
+same evil under the State governments. The magistracy, being
+equally the ministers of the law of the land, from whatever source
+it might emanate, would doubtless be as ready to guard the national
+as the local regulations from the inroads of private licentiousness.
+As to those partial commotions and insurrections, which sometimes
+disquiet society, from the intrigues of an inconsiderable faction,
+or from sudden or occasional illhumors that do not infect the great
+body of the community the general government could command more
+extensive resources for the suppression of disturbances of that kind
+than would be in the power of any single member. And as to those
+mortal feuds which, in certain conjunctures, spread a conflagration
+through a whole nation, or through a very large proportion of it,
+proceeding either from weighty causes of discontent given by the
+government or from the contagion of some violent popular paroxysm,
+they do not fall within any ordinary rules of calculation. When
+they happen, they commonly amount to revolutions and dismemberments
+of empire. No form of government can always either avoid or control
+them. It is in vain to hope to guard against events too mighty for
+human foresight or precaution, and it would be idle to object to a
+government because it could not perform impossibilities.
+
+PUBLIUS.
+
+
+
+
+
+FEDERALIST No. 17
+
+
+
+The Same Subject Continued
+
+(The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the
+Union)
+
+For the Independent Journal.
+
+
+
+HAMILTON
+
+
+
+To the People of the State of New York:
+
+AN OBJECTION, of a nature different from that which has been
+stated and answered, in my last address, may perhaps be likewise
+urged against the principle of legislation for the individual
+citizens of America. It may be said that it would tend to render
+the government of the Union too powerful, and to enable it to absorb
+those residuary authorities, which it might be judged proper to
+leave with the States for local purposes. Allowing the utmost
+latitude to the love of power which any reasonable man can require,
+I confess I am at a loss to discover what temptation the persons
+intrusted with the administration of the general government could
+ever feel to divest the States of the authorities of that
+description. The regulation of the mere domestic police of a State
+appears to me to hold out slender allurements to ambition.
+Commerce, finance, negotiation, and war seem to comprehend all the
+objects which have charms for minds governed by that passion; and
+all the powers necessary to those objects ought, in the first
+instance, to be lodged in the national depository. The
+administration of private justice between the citizens of the same
+State, the supervision of agriculture and of other concerns of a
+similar nature, all those things, in short, which are proper to be
+provided for by local legislation, can never be desirable cares of a
+general jurisdiction. It is therefore improbable that there should
+exist a disposition in the federal councils to usurp the powers with
+which they are connected; because the attempt to exercise those
+powers would be as troublesome as it would be nugatory; and the
+possession of them, for that reason, would contribute nothing to the
+dignity, to the importance, or to the splendor of the national
+government.
+
+But let it be admitted, for argument's sake, that mere
+wantonness and lust of domination would be sufficient to beget that
+disposition; still it may be safely affirmed, that the sense of the
+constituent body of the national representatives, or, in other
+words, the people of the several States, would control the
+indulgence of so extravagant an appetite. It will always be far
+more easy for the State governments to encroach upon the national
+authorities than for the national government to encroach upon the
+State authorities. The proof of this proposition turns upon the
+greater degree of influence which the State governments if they
+administer their affairs with uprightness and prudence, will
+generally possess over the people; a circumstance which at the same
+time teaches us that there is an inherent and intrinsic weakness in
+all federal constitutions; and that too much pains cannot be taken
+in their organization, to give them all the force which is
+compatible with the principles of liberty.
+
+The superiority of influence in favor of the particular
+governments would result partly from the diffusive construction of
+the national government, but chiefly from the nature of the objects
+to which the attention of the State administrations would be
+directed.
+
+It is a known fact in human nature, that its affections are
+commonly weak in proportion to the distance or diffusiveness of the
+object. Upon the same principle that a man is more attached to his
+family than to his neighborhood, to his neighborhood than to the
+community at large, the people of each State would be apt to feel a
+stronger bias towards their local governments than towards the
+government of the Union; unless the force of that principle should
+be destroyed by a much better administration of the latter.
+
+This strong propensity of the human heart would find powerful
+auxiliaries in the objects of State regulation.
+
+The variety of more minute interests, which will necessarily
+fall under the superintendence of the local administrations, and
+which will form so many rivulets of influence, running through every
+part of the society, cannot be particularized, without involving a
+detail too tedious and uninteresting to compensate for the
+instruction it might afford.
+
+There is one transcendant advantage belonging to the province of
+the State governments, which alone suffices to place the matter in a
+clear and satisfactory light,--I mean the ordinary administration of
+criminal and civil justice. This, of all others, is the most
+powerful, most universal, and most attractive source of popular
+obedience and attachment. It is that which, being the immediate and
+visible guardian of life and property, having its benefits and its
+terrors in constant activity before the public eye, regulating all
+those personal interests and familiar concerns to which the
+sensibility of individuals is more immediately awake, contributes,
+more than any other circumstance, to impressing upon the minds of
+the people, affection, esteem, and reverence towards the government.
+This great cement of society, which will diffuse itself almost
+wholly through the channels of the particular governments,
+independent of all other causes of influence, would insure them so
+decided an empire over their respective citizens as to render them
+at all times a complete counterpoise, and, not unfrequently,
+dangerous rivals to the power of the Union.
+
+The operations of the national government, on the other hand,
+falling less immediately under the observation of the mass of the
+citizens, the benefits derived from it will chiefly be perceived and
+attended to by speculative men. Relating to more general interests,
+they will be less apt to come home to the feelings of the people;
+and, in proportion, less likely to inspire an habitual sense of
+obligation, and an active sentiment of attachment.
+
+The reasoning on this head has been abundantly exemplified by
+the experience of all federal constitutions with which we are
+acquainted, and of all others which have borne the least analogy to
+them.
+
+Though the ancient feudal systems were not, strictly speaking,
+confederacies, yet they partook of the nature of that species of
+association. There was a common head, chieftain, or sovereign,
+whose authority extended over the whole nation; and a number of
+subordinate vassals, or feudatories, who had large portions of land
+allotted to them, and numerous trains of INFERIOR vassals or
+retainers, who occupied and cultivated that land upon the tenure of
+fealty or obedience, to the persons of whom they held it. Each
+principal vassal was a kind of sovereign, within his particular
+demesnes. The consequences of this situation were a continual
+opposition to authority of the sovereign, and frequent wars between
+the great barons or chief feudatories themselves. The power of the
+head of the nation was commonly too weak, either to preserve the
+public peace, or to protect the people against the oppressions of
+their immediate lords. This period of European affairs is
+emphatically styled by historians, the times of feudal anarchy.
+
+When the sovereign happened to be a man of vigorous and warlike
+temper and of superior abilities, he would acquire a personal weight
+and influence, which answered, for the time, the purpose of a more
+regular authority. But in general, the power of the barons
+triumphed over that of the prince; and in many instances his
+dominion was entirely thrown off, and the great fiefs were erected
+into independent principalities or States. In those instances in
+which the monarch finally prevailed over his vassals, his success
+was chiefly owing to the tyranny of those vassals over their
+dependents. The barons, or nobles, equally the enemies of the
+sovereign and the oppressors of the common people, were dreaded and
+detested by both; till mutual danger and mutual interest effected a
+union between them fatal to the power of the aristocracy. Had the
+nobles, by a conduct of clemency and justice, preserved the fidelity
+and devotion of their retainers and followers, the contests between
+them and the prince must almost always have ended in their favor,
+and in the abridgment or subversion of the royal authority.
+
+This is not an assertion founded merely in speculation or
+conjecture. Among other illustrations of its truth which might be
+cited, Scotland will furnish a cogent example. The spirit of
+clanship which was, at an early day, introduced into that kingdom,
+uniting the nobles and their dependants by ties equivalent to those
+of kindred, rendered the aristocracy a constant overmatch for the
+power of the monarch, till the incorporation with England subdued
+its fierce and ungovernable spirit, and reduced it within those
+rules of subordination which a more rational and more energetic
+system of civil polity had previously established in the latter
+kingdom.
+
+The separate governments in a confederacy may aptly be compared
+with the feudal baronies; with this advantage in their favor, that
+from the reasons already explained, they will generally possess the
+confidence and good-will of the people, and with so important a
+support, will be able effectually to oppose all encroachments of the
+national government. It will be well if they are not able to
+counteract its legitimate and necessary authority. The points of
+similitude consist in the rivalship of power, applicable to both,
+and in the CONCENTRATION of large portions of the strength of the
+community into particular DEPOSITS, in one case at the disposal of
+individuals, in the other case at the disposal of political bodies.
+
+A concise review of the events that have attended confederate
+governments will further illustrate this important doctrine; an
+inattention to which has been the great source of our political
+mistakes, and has given our jealousy a direction to the wrong side.
+This review shall form the subject of some ensuing papers.
+
+PUBLIUS.
+
+
+
+
+
+FEDERALIST No. 18
+
+
+
+The Same Subject Continued
+
+(The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the
+Union)
+
+For the Independent Journal.
+
+
+
+HAMILTON AND MADISON
+
+
+
+To the People of the State of New York:
+
+AMONG the confederacies of antiquity, the most considerable was
+that of the Grecian republics, associated under the Amphictyonic
+council. From the best accounts transmitted of this celebrated
+institution, it bore a very instructive analogy to the present
+Confederation of the American States.
+
+The members retained the character of independent and sovereign
+states, and had equal votes in the federal council. This council
+had a general authority to propose and resolve whatever it judged
+necessary for the common welfare of Greece; to declare and carry on
+war; to decide, in the last resort, all controversies between the
+members; to fine the aggressing party; to employ the whole force
+of the confederacy against the disobedient; to admit new members.
+The Amphictyons were the guardians of religion, and of the immense
+riches belonging to the temple of Delphos, where they had the right
+of jurisdiction in controversies between the inhabitants and those
+who came to consult the oracle. As a further provision for the
+efficacy of the federal powers, they took an oath mutually to defend
+and protect the united cities, to punish the violators of this oath,
+and to inflict vengeance on sacrilegious despoilers of the temple.
+
+In theory, and upon paper, this apparatus of powers seems amply
+sufficient for all general purposes. In several material instances,
+they exceed the powers enumerated in the articles of confederation.
+The Amphictyons had in their hands the superstition of the times,
+one of the principal engines by which government was then
+maintained; they had a declared authority to use coercion against
+refractory cities, and were bound by oath to exert this authority on
+the necessary occasions.
+
+Very different, nevertheless, was the experiment from the theory.
+The powers, like those of the present Congress, were administered
+by deputies appointed wholly by the cities in their political
+capacities; and exercised over them in the same capacities. Hence
+the weakness, the disorders, and finally the destruction of the
+confederacy. The more powerful members, instead of being kept in
+awe and subordination, tyrannized successively over all the rest.
+Athens, as we learn from Demosthenes, was the arbiter of Greece
+seventy-three years. The Lacedaemonians next governed it
+twenty-nine years; at a subsequent period, after the battle of
+Leuctra, the Thebans had their turn of domination.
+
+It happened but too often, according to Plutarch, that the
+deputies of the strongest cities awed and corrupted those of the
+weaker; and that judgment went in favor of the most powerful party.
+
+Even in the midst of defensive and dangerous wars with Persia
+and Macedon, the members never acted in concert, and were, more or
+fewer of them, eternally the dupes or the hirelings of the common
+enemy. The intervals of foreign war were filled up by domestic
+vicissitudes convulsions, and carnage.
+
+After the conclusion of the war with Xerxes, it appears that the
+Lacedaemonians required that a number of the cities should be turned
+out of the confederacy for the unfaithful part they had acted. The
+Athenians, finding that the Lacedaemonians would lose fewer
+partisans by such a measure than themselves, and would become
+masters of the public deliberations, vigorously opposed and defeated
+the attempt. This piece of history proves at once the inefficiency
+of the union, the ambition and jealousy of its most powerful
+members, and the dependent and degraded condition of the rest. The
+smaller members, though entitled by the theory of their system to
+revolve in equal pride and majesty around the common center, had
+become, in fact, satellites of the orbs of primary magnitude.
+
+Had the Greeks, says the Abbe Milot, been as wise as they were
+courageous, they would have been admonished by experience of the
+necessity of a closer union, and would have availed themselves of
+the peace which followed their success against the Persian arms, to
+establish such a reformation. Instead of this obvious policy,
+Athens and Sparta, inflated with the victories and the glory they
+had acquired, became first rivals and then enemies; and did each
+other infinitely more mischief than they had suffered from Xerxes.
+Their mutual jealousies, fears, hatreds, and injuries ended in the
+celebrated Peloponnesian war; which itself ended in the ruin and
+slavery of the Athenians who had begun it.
+
+As a weak government, when not at war, is ever agitated by
+internal dissentions, so these never fail to bring on fresh
+calamities from abroad. The Phocians having ploughed up some
+consecrated ground belonging to the temple of Apollo, the
+Amphictyonic council, according to the superstition of the age,
+imposed a fine on the sacrilegious offenders. The Phocians, being
+abetted by Athens and Sparta, refused to submit to the decree. The
+Thebans, with others of the cities, undertook to maintain the
+authority of the Amphictyons, and to avenge the violated god. The
+latter, being the weaker party, invited the assistance of Philip of
+Macedon, who had secretly fostered the contest. Philip gladly
+seized the opportunity of executing the designs he had long planned
+against the liberties of Greece. By his intrigues and bribes he won
+over to his interests the popular leaders of several cities; by
+their influence and votes, gained admission into the Amphictyonic
+council; and by his arts and his arms, made himself master of the
+confederacy.
+
+Such were the consequences of the fallacious principle on which
+this interesting establishment was founded. Had Greece, says a
+judicious observer on her fate, been united by a stricter
+confederation, and persevered in her union, she would never have
+worn the chains of Macedon; and might have proved a barrier to the
+vast projects of Rome.
+
+The Achaean league, as it is called, was another society of
+Grecian republics, which supplies us with valuable instruction.
+
+The Union here was far more intimate, and its organization much
+wiser, than in the preceding instance. It will accordingly appear,
+that though not exempt from a similar catastrophe, it by no means
+equally deserved it.
+
+The cities composing this league retained their municipal
+jurisdiction, appointed their own officers, and enjoyed a perfect
+equality. The senate, in which they were represented, had the sole
+and exclusive right of peace and war; of sending and receiving
+ambassadors; of entering into treaties and alliances; of
+appointing a chief magistrate or praetor, as he was called, who
+commanded their armies, and who, with the advice and consent of ten
+of the senators, not only administered the government in the recess
+of the senate, but had a great share in its deliberations, when
+assembled. According to the primitive constitution, there were two
+praetors associated in the administration; but on trial a single
+one was preferred.
+
+It appears that the cities had all the same laws and customs,
+the same weights and measures, and the same money. But how far this
+effect proceeded from the authority of the federal council is left
+in uncertainty. It is said only that the cities were in a manner
+compelled to receive the same laws and usages. When Lacedaemon was
+brought into the league by Philopoemen, it was attended with an
+abolition of the institutions and laws of Lycurgus, and an adoption
+of those of the Achaeans. The Amphictyonic confederacy, of which
+she had been a member, left her in the full exercise of her
+government and her legislation. This circumstance alone proves a
+very material difference in the genius of the two systems.
+
+It is much to be regretted that such imperfect monuments remain
+of this curious political fabric. Could its interior structure and
+regular operation be ascertained, it is probable that more light
+would be thrown by it on the science of federal government, than by
+any of the like experiments with which we are acquainted.
+
+One important fact seems to be witnessed by all the historians
+who take notice of Achaean affairs. It is, that as well after the
+renovation of the league by Aratus, as before its dissolution by the
+arts of Macedon, there was infinitely more of moderation and justice
+in the administration of its government, and less of violence and
+sedition in the people, than were to be found in any of the cities
+exercising SINGLY all the prerogatives of sovereignty. The Abbe
+Mably, in his observations on Greece, says that the popular
+government, which was so tempestuous elsewhere, caused no disorders
+in the members of the Achaean republic, BECAUSE IT WAS THERE
+TEMPERED BY THE GENERAL AUTHORITY AND LAWS OF THE CONFEDERACY.
+
+We are not to conclude too hastily, however, that faction did
+not, in a certain degree, agitate the particular cities; much less
+that a due subordination and harmony reigned in the general system.
+The contrary is sufficiently displayed in the vicissitudes and fate
+of the republic.
+
+Whilst the Amphictyonic confederacy remained, that of the
+Achaeans, which comprehended the less important cities only, made
+little figure on the theatre of Greece. When the former became a
+victim to Macedon, the latter was spared by the policy of Philip and
+Alexander. Under the successors of these princes, however, a
+different policy prevailed. The arts of division were practiced
+among the Achaeans. Each city was seduced into a separate interest;
+the union was dissolved. Some of the cities fell under the tyranny
+of Macedonian garrisons; others under that of usurpers springing
+out of their own confusions. Shame and oppression erelong awaken
+their love of liberty. A few cities reunited. Their example was
+followed by others, as opportunities were found of cutting off their
+tyrants. The league soon embraced almost the whole Peloponnesus.
+Macedon saw its progress; but was hindered by internal dissensions
+from stopping it. All Greece caught the enthusiasm and seemed ready
+to unite in one confederacy, when the jealousy and envy in Sparta
+and Athens, of the rising glory of the Achaeans, threw a fatal damp
+on the enterprise. The dread of the Macedonian power induced the
+league to court the alliance of the Kings of Egypt and Syria, who,
+as successors of Alexander, were rivals of the king of Macedon.
+This policy was defeated by Cleomenes, king of Sparta, who was led
+by his ambition to make an unprovoked attack on his neighbors, the
+Achaeans, and who, as an enemy to Macedon, had interest enough with
+the Egyptian and Syrian princes to effect a breach of their
+engagements with the league.
+
+The Achaeans were now reduced to the dilemma of submitting to
+Cleomenes, or of supplicating the aid of Macedon, its former
+oppressor. The latter expedient was adopted. The contests of the
+Greeks always afforded a pleasing opportunity to that powerful
+neighbor of intermeddling in their affairs. A Macedonian army
+quickly appeared. Cleomenes was vanquished. The Achaeans soon
+experienced, as often happens, that a victorious and powerful ally
+is but another name for a master. All that their most abject
+compliances could obtain from him was a toleration of the exercise
+of their laws. Philip, who was now on the throne of Macedon, soon
+provoked by his tyrannies, fresh combinations among the Greeks. The
+Achaeans, though weakened by internal dissensions and by the
+revolt of Messene, one of its members, being joined by the AEtolians
+and Athenians, erected the standard of opposition. Finding
+themselves, though thus supported, unequal to the undertaking, they
+once more had recourse to the dangerous expedient of introducing the
+succor of foreign arms. The Romans, to whom the invitation was
+made, eagerly embraced it. Philip was conquered; Macedon subdued.
+A new crisis ensued to the league. Dissensions broke out among it
+members. These the Romans fostered. Callicrates and other popular
+leaders became mercenary instruments for inveigling their countrymen.
+The more effectually to nourish discord and disorder the Romans
+had, to the astonishment of those who confided in their sincerity,
+already proclaimed universal liberty1 throughout Greece. With
+the same insidious views, they now seduced the members from the
+league, by representing to their pride the violation it committed on
+their sovereignty. By these arts this union, the last hope of
+Greece, the last hope of ancient liberty, was torn into pieces; and
+such imbecility and distraction introduced, that the arms of Rome
+found little difficulty in completing the ruin which their arts had
+commenced. The Achaeans were cut to pieces, and Achaia loaded with
+chains, under which it is groaning at this hour.
+
+I have thought it not superfluous to give the outlines of this
+important portion of history; both because it teaches more than one
+lesson, and because, as a supplement to the outlines of the Achaean
+constitution, it emphatically illustrates the tendency of federal
+bodies rather to anarchy among the members, than to tyranny in the
+head.
+
+PUBLIUS.
+
+1 This was but another name more specious for the independence
+of the members on the federal head.
+
+
+
+
+
+FEDERALIST No. 19
+
+
+
+The Same Subject Continued
+
+(The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the
+Union)
+
+For the Independent Journal.
+
+
+
+HAMILTON AND MADISON
+
+
+
+To the People of the State of New York:
+
+THE examples of ancient confederacies, cited in my last paper,
+have not exhausted the source of experimental instruction on this
+subject. There are existing institutions, founded on a similar
+principle, which merit particular consideration. The first which
+presents itself is the Germanic body.
+
+In the early ages of Christianity, Germany was occupied by seven
+distinct nations, who had no common chief. The Franks, one of the
+number, having conquered the Gauls, established the kingdom which
+has taken its name from them. In the ninth century Charlemagne, its
+warlike monarch, carried his victorious arms in every direction;
+and Germany became a part of his vast dominions. On the
+dismemberment, which took place under his sons, this part was
+erected into a separate and independent empire. Charlemagne and his
+immediate descendants possessed the reality, as well as the ensigns
+and dignity of imperial power. But the principal vassals, whose
+fiefs had become hereditary, and who composed the national diets
+which Charlemagne had not abolished, gradually threw off the yoke
+and advanced to sovereign jurisdiction and independence. The force
+of imperial sovereignty was insufficient to restrain such powerful
+dependants; or to preserve the unity and tranquillity of the empire.
+The most furious private wars, accompanied with every species of
+calamity, were carried on between the different princes and states.
+The imperial authority, unable to maintain the public order,
+declined by degrees till it was almost extinct in the anarchy, which
+agitated the long interval between the death of the last emperor of
+the Suabian, and the accession of the first emperor of the Austrian
+lines. In the eleventh century the emperors enjoyed full
+sovereignty: In the fifteenth they had little more than the symbols
+and decorations of power.
+
+Out of this feudal system, which has itself many of the
+important features of a confederacy, has grown the federal system
+which constitutes the Germanic empire. Its powers are vested in a
+diet representing the component members of the confederacy; in the
+emperor, who is the executive magistrate, with a negative on the
+decrees of the diet; and in the imperial chamber and the aulic
+council, two judiciary tribunals having supreme jurisdiction in
+controversies which concern the empire, or which happen among its
+members.
+
+The diet possesses the general power of legislating for the
+empire; of making war and peace; contracting alliances; assessing
+quotas of troops and money; constructing fortresses; regulating
+coin; admitting new members; and subjecting disobedient members to
+the ban of the empire, by which the party is degraded from his
+sovereign rights and his possessions forfeited. The members of the
+confederacy are expressly restricted from entering into compacts
+prejudicial to the empire; from imposing tolls and duties on their
+mutual intercourse, without the consent of the emperor and diet;
+from altering the value of money; from doing injustice to one
+another; or from affording assistance or retreat to disturbers of
+the public peace. And the ban is denounced against such as shall
+violate any of these restrictions. The members of the diet, as
+such, are subject in all cases to be judged by the emperor and diet,
+and in their private capacities by the aulic council and imperial
+chamber.
+
+The prerogatives of the emperor are numerous. The most
+important of them are: his exclusive right to make propositions to
+the diet; to negative its resolutions; to name ambassadors; to
+confer dignities and titles; to fill vacant electorates; to found
+universities; to grant privileges not injurious to the states of
+the empire; to receive and apply the public revenues; and
+generally to watch over the public safety. In certain cases, the
+electors form a council to him. In quality of emperor, he possesses
+no territory within the empire, nor receives any revenue for his
+support. But his revenue and dominions, in other qualities,
+constitute him one of the most powerful princes in Europe.
+
+From such a parade of constitutional powers, in the
+representatives and head of this confederacy, the natural
+supposition would be, that it must form an exception to the general
+character which belongs to its kindred systems. Nothing would be
+further from the reality. The fundamental principle on which it
+rests, that the empire is a community of sovereigns, that the diet
+is a representation of sovereigns and that the laws are addressed to
+sovereigns, renders the empire a nerveless body, incapable of
+regulating its own members, insecure against external dangers, and
+agitated with unceasing fermentations in its own bowels.
+
+The history of Germany is a history of wars between the emperor
+and the princes and states; of wars among the princes and states
+themselves; of the licentiousness of the strong, and the oppression
+of the weak; of foreign intrusions, and foreign intrigues; of
+requisitions of men and money disregarded, or partially complied
+with; of attempts to enforce them, altogether abortive, or attended
+with slaughter and desolation, involving the innocent with the
+guilty; of general inbecility, confusion, and misery.
+
+In the sixteenth century, the emperor, with one part of the
+empire on his side, was seen engaged against the other princes and
+states. In one of the conflicts, the emperor himself was put to
+flight, and very near being made prisoner by the elector of Saxony.
+The late king of Prussia was more than once pitted against his
+imperial sovereign; and commonly proved an overmatch for him.
+Controversies and wars among the members themselves have been so
+common, that the German annals are crowded with the bloody pages
+which describe them. Previous to the peace of Westphalia, Germany
+was desolated by a war of thirty years, in which the emperor, with
+one half of the empire, was on one side, and Sweden, with the other
+half, on the opposite side. Peace was at length negotiated, and
+dictated by foreign powers; and the articles of it, to which
+foreign powers are parties, made a fundamental part of the Germanic
+constitution.
+
+If the nation happens, on any emergency, to be more united by
+the necessity of self-defense, its situation is still deplorable.
+Military preparations must be preceded by so many tedious
+discussions, arising from the jealousies, pride, separate views, and
+clashing pretensions of sovereign bodies, that before the diet can
+settle the arrangements, the enemy are in the field; and before the
+federal troops are ready to take it, are retiring into winter
+quarters.
+
+The small body of national troops, which has been judged
+necessary in time of peace, is defectively kept up, badly paid,
+infected with local prejudices, and supported by irregular and
+disproportionate contributions to the treasury.
+
+The impossibility of maintaining order and dispensing justice
+among these sovereign subjects, produced the experiment of dividing
+the empire into nine or ten circles or districts; of giving them an
+interior organization, and of charging them with the military
+execution of the laws against delinquent and contumacious members.
+This experiment has only served to demonstrate more fully the
+radical vice of the constitution. Each circle is the miniature
+picture of the deformities of this political monster. They either
+fail to execute their commissions, or they do it with all the
+devastation and carnage of civil war. Sometimes whole circles are
+defaulters; and then they increase the mischief which they were
+instituted to remedy.
+
+We may form some judgment of this scheme of military coercion
+from a sample given by Thuanus. In Donawerth, a free and imperial
+city of the circle of Suabia, the Abb 300 de St. Croix enjoyed
+certain immunities which had been reserved to him. In the exercise
+of these, on some public occasions, outrages were committed on him
+by the people of the city. The consequence was that the city was
+put under the ban of the empire, and the Duke of Bavaria, though
+director of another circle, obtained an appointment to enforce it.
+He soon appeared before the city with a corps of ten thousand
+troops, and finding it a fit occasion, as he had secretly intended
+from the beginning, to revive an antiquated claim, on the pretext
+that his ancestors had suffered the place to be dismembered from his
+territory,1 he took possession of it in his own name, disarmed,
+and punished the inhabitants, and reannexed the city to his domains.
+
+It may be asked, perhaps, what has so long kept this disjointed
+machine from falling entirely to pieces? The answer is obvious:
+The weakness of most of the members, who are unwilling to expose
+themselves to the mercy of foreign powers; the weakness of most of
+the principal members, compared with the formidable powers all
+around them; the vast weight and influence which the emperor
+derives from his separate and heriditary dominions; and the
+interest he feels in preserving a system with which his family pride
+is connected, and which constitutes him the first prince in Europe;
+--these causes support a feeble and precarious Union; whilst the
+repellant quality, incident to the nature of sovereignty, and which
+time continually strengthens, prevents any reform whatever, founded
+on a proper consolidation. Nor is it to be imagined, if this
+obstacle could be surmounted, that the neighboring powers would
+suffer a revolution to take place which would give to the empire the
+force and preeminence to which it is entitled. Foreign nations have
+long considered themselves as interested in the changes made by
+events in this constitution; and have, on various occasions,
+betrayed their policy of perpetuating its anarchy and weakness.
+
+If more direct examples were wanting, Poland, as a government
+over local sovereigns, might not improperly be taken notice of. Nor
+could any proof more striking be given of the calamities flowing
+from such institutions. Equally unfit for self-government and
+self-defense, it has long been at the mercy of its powerful
+neighbors; who have lately had the mercy to disburden it of one
+third of its people and territories.
+
+The connection among the Swiss cantons scarcely amounts to a
+confederacy; though it is sometimes cited as an instance of the
+stability of such institutions.
+
+They have no common treasury; no common troops even in war; no
+common coin; no common judicatory; nor any other common mark of
+sovereignty.
+
+They are kept together by the peculiarity of their topographical
+position; by their individual weakness and insignificancy; by the
+fear of powerful neighbors, to one of which they were formerly
+subject; by the few sources of contention among a people of such
+simple and homogeneous manners; by their joint interest in their
+dependent possessions; by the mutual aid they stand in need of, for
+suppressing insurrections and rebellions, an aid expressly
+stipulated and often required and afforded; and by the necessity of
+some regular and permanent provision for accomodating disputes among
+the cantons. The provision is, that the parties at variance shall
+each choose four judges out of the neutral cantons, who, in case of
+disagreement, choose an umpire. This tribunal, under an oath of
+impartiality, pronounces definitive sentence, which all the cantons
+are bound to enforce. The competency of this regulation may be
+estimated by a clause in their treaty of 1683, with Victor Amadeus
+of Savoy; in which he obliges himself to interpose as mediator in
+disputes between the cantons, and to employ force, if necessary,
+against the contumacious party.
+
+So far as the peculiarity of their case will admit of comparison
+with that of the United States, it serves to confirm the principle
+intended to be established. Whatever efficacy the union may have
+had in ordinary cases, it appears that the moment a cause of
+difference sprang up, capable of trying its strength, it failed.
+The controversies on the subject of religion, which in three
+instances have kindled violent and bloody contests, may be said, in
+fact, to have severed the league. The Protestant and Catholic
+cantons have since had their separate diets, where all the most
+important concerns are adjusted, and which have left the general
+diet little other business than to take care of the common bailages.
+
+That separation had another consequence, which merits attention.
+It produced opposite alliances with foreign powers: of Berne, at
+the head of the Protestant association, with the United Provinces;
+and of Luzerne, at the head of the Catholic association, with
+France.
+
+PUBLIUS.
+
+1 Pfeffel, "Nouvel Abreg. Chronol. de l'Hist., etc.,
+d'Allemagne," says the pretext was to indemnify himself for the
+expense of the expedition.
+
+
+
+
+
+FEDERALIST No. 20
+
+
+
+The Same Subject Continued
+
+(The Insufficiency of the Present Confederation to Preserve the
+Union)
+
+From the New York Packet.
+
+Tuesday, December 11, 1787.
+
+
+
+HAMILTON AND MADISON
+
+
+
+To the People of the State of New York:
+
+THE United Netherlands are a confederacy of republics, or rather
+of aristocracies of a very remarkable texture, yet confirming all
+the lessons derived from those which we have already reviewed.
+
+The union is composed of seven coequal and sovereign states, and
+each state or province is a composition of equal and independent
+cities. In all important cases, not only the provinces but the
+cities must be unanimous.
+
+The sovereignty of the Union is represented by the
+States-General, consisting usually of about fifty deputies appointed
+by the provinces. They hold their seats, some for life, some for
+six, three, and one years; from two provinces they continue in
+appointment during pleasure.
+
+The States-General have authority to enter into treaties and
+alliances; to make war and peace; to raise armies and equip
+fleets; to ascertain quotas and demand contributions. In all these
+cases, however, unanimity and the sanction of their constituents are
+requisite. They have authority to appoint and receive ambassadors;
+to execute treaties and alliances already formed; to provide for
+the collection of duties on imports and exports; to regulate the
+mint, with a saving to the provincial rights; to govern as
+sovereigns the dependent territories. The provinces are restrained,
+unless with the general consent, from entering into foreign
+treaties; from establishing imposts injurious to others, or
+charging their neighbors with higher duties than their own subjects.
+A council of state, a chamber of accounts, with five colleges of
+admiralty, aid and fortify the federal administration.
+
+The executive magistrate of the union is the stadtholder, who is
+now an hereditary prince. His principal weight and influence in the
+republic are derived from this independent title; from his great
+patrimonial estates; from his family connections with some of the
+chief potentates of Europe; and, more than all, perhaps, from his
+being stadtholder in the several provinces, as well as for the
+union; in which provincial quality he has the appointment of town
+magistrates under certain regulations, executes provincial decrees,
+presides when he pleases in the provincial tribunals, and has
+throughout the power of pardon.
+
+As stadtholder of the union, he has, however, considerable
+prerogatives.
+
+In his political capacity he has authority to settle disputes
+between the provinces, when other methods fail; to assist at the
+deliberations of the States-General, and at their particular
+conferences; to give audiences to foreign ambassadors, and to keep
+agents for his particular affairs at foreign courts.
+
+In his military capacity he commands the federal troops,
+provides for garrisons, and in general regulates military affairs;
+disposes of all appointments, from colonels to ensigns, and of the
+governments and posts of fortified towns.
+
+In his marine capacity he is admiral-general, and superintends
+and directs every thing relative to naval forces and other naval
+affairs; presides in the admiralties in person or by proxy;
+appoints lieutenant-admirals and other officers; and establishes
+councils of war, whose sentences are not executed till he approves
+them.
+
+His revenue, exclusive of his private income, amounts to three
+hundred thousand florins. The standing army which he commands
+consists of about forty thousand men.
+
+Such is the nature of the celebrated Belgic confederacy, as
+delineated on parchment. What are the characters which practice has
+stamped upon it? Imbecility in the government; discord among the
+provinces; foreign influence and indignities; a precarious
+existence in peace, and peculiar calamities from war.
+
+It was long ago remarked by Grotius, that nothing but the hatred
+of his countrymen to the house of Austria kept them from being
+ruined by the vices of their constitution.
+
+The union of Utrecht, says another respectable writer, reposes
+an authority in the States-General, seemingly sufficient to secure
+harmony, but the jealousy in each province renders the practice very
+different from the theory.
+
+The same instrument, says another, obliges each province to levy
+certain contributions; but this article never could, and probably
+never will, be executed; because the inland provinces, who have
+little commerce, cannot pay an equal quota.
+
+In matters of contribution, it is the practice to waive the
+articles of the constitution. The danger of delay obliges the
+consenting provinces to furnish their quotas, without waiting for
+the others; and then to obtain reimbursement from the others, by
+deputations, which are frequent, or otherwise, as they can. The
+great wealth and influence of the province of Holland enable her to
+effect both these purposes.
+
+It has more than once happened, that the deficiencies had to be
+ultimately collected at the point of the bayonet; a thing
+practicable, though dreadful, in a confedracy where one of the
+members exceeds in force all the rest, and where several of them are
+too small to meditate resistance; but utterly impracticable in one
+composed of members, several of which are equal to each other in
+strength and resources, and equal singly to a vigorous and
+persevering defense.
+
+Foreign ministers, says Sir William Temple, who was himself a
+foreign minister, elude matters taken ad referendum, by
+tampering with the provinces and cities. In 1726, the treaty of
+Hanover was delayed by these means a whole year. Instances of a
+like nature are numerous and notorious.
+
+In critical emergencies, the States-General are often compelled
+to overleap their constitutional bounds. In 1688, they concluded a
+treaty of themselves at the risk of their heads. The treaty of
+Westphalia, in 1648, by which their independence was formerly and
+finally recognized, was concluded without the consent of Zealand.
+Even as recently as the last treaty of peace with Great Britain,
+the constitutional principle of unanimity was departed from. A weak
+constitution must necessarily terminate in dissolution, for want of
+proper powers, or the usurpation of powers requisite for the public
+safety. Whether the usurpation, when once begun, will stop at the
+salutary point, or go forward to the dangerous extreme, must depend
+on the contingencies of the moment. Tyranny has perhaps oftener
+grown out of the assumptions of power, called for, on pressing
+exigencies, by a defective constitution, than out of the full
+exercise of the largest constitutional authorities.
+
+Notwithstanding the calamities produced by the stadtholdership,
+it has been supposed that without his influence in the individual
+provinces, the causes of anarchy manifest in the confederacy would
+long ago have dissolved it. "Under such a government," says the
+Abbe Mably, "the Union could never have subsisted, if the provinces
+had not a spring within themselves, capable of quickening their
+tardiness, and compelling them to the same way of thinking. This
+spring is the stadtholder." It is remarked by Sir William Temple,
+"that in the intermissions of the stadtholdership, Holland, by her
+riches and her authority, which drew the others into a sort of
+dependence, supplied the place."
+
+These are not the only circumstances which have controlled the
+tendency to anarchy and dissolution. The surrounding powers impose
+an absolute necessity of union to a certain degree, at the same time
+that they nourish by their intrigues the constitutional vices which
+keep the republic in some degree always at their mercy.
+
+The true patriots have long bewailed the fatal tendency of these
+vices, and have made no less than four regular experiments by
+EXTRAORDINARY ASSEMBLIES, convened for the special purpose, to apply
+a remedy. As many times has their laudable zeal found it impossible
+to UNITE THE PUBLIC COUNCILS in reforming the known, the
+acknowledged, the fatal evils of the existing constitution. Let us
+pause, my fellow-citizens, for one moment, over this melancholy and
+monitory lesson of history; and with the tear that drops for the
+calamities brought on mankind by their adverse opinions and selfish
+passions, let our gratitude mingle an ejaculation to Heaven, for the
+propitious concord which has distinguished the consultations for our
+political happiness.
+
+A design was also conceived of establishing a general tax to be
+administered by the federal authority. This also had its
+adversaries and failed.
+
+This unhappy people seem to be now suffering from popular
+convulsions, from dissensions among the states, and from the actual
+invasion of foreign arms, the crisis of their destiny. All nations
+have their eyes fixed on the awful spectacle. The first wish
+prompted by humanity is, that this severe trial may issue in such a
+revolution of their government as will establish their union, and
+render it the parent of tranquillity, freedom and happiness: The
+next, that the asylum under which, we trust, the enjoyment of these
+blessings will speedily be secured in this country, may receive and
+console them for the catastrophe of their own.
+
+I make no apology for having dwelt so long on the contemplation
+of these federal precedents. Experience is the oracle of truth;
+and where its responses are unequivocal, they ought to be
+conclusive and sacred. The important truth, which it unequivocally
+pronounces in the present case, is that a sovereignty over
+sovereigns, a government over governments, a legislation for
+communities, as contradistinguished from individuals, as it is a
+solecism in theory, so in practice it is subversive of the order and
+ends of civil polity, by substituting VIOLENCE in place of LAW, or
+the destructive COERCION of the SWORD in place of the mild and
+salutary COERCION of the MAGISTRACY.
+
+PUBLIUS.
+
+
+
+
+
+FEDERALIST No. 21
+
+
+
+Other Defects of the Present Confederation
+
+For the Independent Journal.
+
+
+
+HAMILTON
+
+
+
+To the People of the State of New York:
+
+HAVING in the three last numbers taken a summary review of the
+principal circumstances and events which have depicted the genius
+and fate of other confederate governments, I shall now proceed in
+the enumeration of the most important of those defects which have
+hitherto disappointed our hopes from the system established among
+ourselves. To form a safe and satisfactory judgment of the proper
+remedy, it is absolutely necessary that we should be well acquainted
+with the extent and malignity of the disease.
+
+The next most palpable defect of the subsisting Confederation,
+is the total want of a SANCTION to its laws. The United States, as
+now composed, have no powers to exact obedience, or punish
+disobedience to their resolutions, either by pecuniary mulcts, by a
+suspension or divestiture of privileges, or by any other
+constitutional mode. There is no express delegation of authority to
+them to use force against delinquent members; and if such a right
+should be ascribed to the federal head, as resulting from the nature
+of the social compact between the States, it must be by inference
+and construction, in the face of that part of the second article, by
+which it is declared, "that each State shall retain every power,
+jurisdiction, and right, not EXPRESSLY delegated to the United
+States in Congress assembled." There is, doubtless, a striking
+absurdity in supposing that a right of this kind does not exist, but
+we are reduced to the dilemma either of embracing that supposition,
+preposterous as it may seem, or of contravening or explaining away a
+provision, which has been of late a repeated theme of the eulogies
+of those who oppose the new Constitution; and the want of which, in
+that plan, has been the subject of much plausible animadversion, and
+severe criticism. If we are unwilling to impair the force of this
+applauded provision, we shall be obliged to conclude, that the
+United States afford the extraordinary spectacle of a government
+destitute even of the shadow of constitutional power to enforce the
+execution of its own laws. It will appear, from the specimens which
+have been cited, that the American Confederacy, in this particular,
+stands discriminated from every other institution of a similar kind,
+and exhibits a new and unexampled phenomenon in the political world.
+
+The want of a mutual guaranty of the State governments is
+another capital imperfection in the federal plan. There is nothing
+of this kind declared in the articles that compose it; and to imply
+a tacit guaranty from considerations of utility, would be a still
+more flagrant departure from the clause which has been mentioned,
+than to imply a tacit power of coercion from the like considerations.
+The want of a guaranty, though it might in its consequences
+endanger the Union, does not so immediately attack its existence as
+the want of a constitutional sanction to its laws.
+
+Without a guaranty the assistance to be derived from the Union
+in repelling those domestic dangers which may sometimes threaten the
+existence of the State constitutions, must be renounced. Usurpation
+may rear its crest in each State, and trample upon the liberties of
+the people, while the national government could legally do nothing
+more than behold its encroachments with indignation and regret. A
+successful faction may erect a tyranny on the ruins of order and
+law, while no succor could constitutionally be afforded by the Union
+to the friends and supporters of the government. The tempestuous
+situation from which Massachusetts has scarcely emerged, evinces
+that dangers of this kind are not merely speculative. Who can
+determine what might have been the issue of her late convulsions, if
+the malcontents had been headed by a Caesar or by a Cromwell? Who
+can predict what effect a despotism, established in Massachusetts,
+would have upon the liberties of New Hampshire or Rhode Island, of
+Connecticut or New York?
+
+The inordinate pride of State importance has suggested to some
+minds an objection to the principle of a guaranty in the federal
+government, as involving an officious interference in the domestic
+concerns of the members. A scruple of this kind would deprive us of
+one of the principal advantages to be expected from union, and can
+only flow from a misapprehension of the nature of the provision
+itself. It could be no impediment to reforms of the State
+constitution by a majority of the people in a legal and peaceable
+mode. This right would remain undiminished. The guaranty could
+only operate against changes to be effected by violence. Towards
+the preventions of calamities of this kind, too many checks cannot
+be provided. The peace of society and the stability of government
+depend absolutely on the efficacy of the precautions adopted on this
+head. Where the whole power of the government is in the hands of
+the people, there is the less pretense for the use of violent
+remedies in partial or occasional distempers of the State. The
+natural cure for an ill-administration, in a popular or
+representative constitution, is a change of men. A guaranty by the
+national authority would be as much levelled against the usurpations
+of rulers as against the ferments and outrages of faction and
+sedition in the community.
+
+The principle of regulating the contributions of the States to
+the common treasury by QUOTAS is another fundamental error in the
+Confederation. Its repugnancy to an adequate supply of the national
+exigencies has been already pointed out, and has sufficiently
+appeared from the trial which has been made of it. I speak of it
+now solely with a view to equality among the States. Those who have
+been accustomed to contemplate the circumstances which produce and
+constitute national wealth, must be satisfied that there is no
+common standard or barometer by which the degrees of it can be
+ascertained. Neither the value of lands, nor the numbers of the
+people, which have been successively proposed as the rule of State
+contributions, has any pretension to being a just representative.
+If we compare the wealth of the United Netherlands with that of
+Russia or Germany, or even of France, and if we at the same time
+compare the total value of the lands and the aggregate population of
+that contracted district with the total value of the lands and the
+aggregate population of the immense regions of either of the three
+last-mentioned countries, we shall at once discover that there is no
+comparison between the proportion of either of these two objects and
+that of the relative wealth of those nations. If the like parallel
+were to be run between several of the American States, it would
+furnish a like result. Let Virginia be contrasted with North
+Carolina, Pennsylvania with Connecticut, or Maryland with New
+Jersey, and we shall be convinced that the respective abilities of
+those States, in relation to revenue, bear little or no analogy to
+their comparative stock in lands or to their comparative population.
+The position may be equally illustrated by a similar process
+between the counties of the same State. No man who is acquainted
+with the State of New York will doubt that the active wealth of
+King's County bears a much greater proportion to that of Montgomery
+than it would appear to be if we should take either the total value
+of the lands or the total number of the people as a criterion!
+
+The wealth of nations depends upon an infinite variety of causes.
+Situation, soil, climate, the nature of the productions, the
+nature of the government, the genius of the citizens, the degree of
+information they possess, the state of commerce, of arts, of
+industry, these circumstances and many more, too complex, minute, or
+adventitious to admit of a particular specification, occasion
+differences hardly conceivable in the relative opulence and riches
+of different countries. The consequence clearly is that there can
+be no common measure of national wealth, and, of course, no general
+or stationary rule by which the ability of a state to pay taxes can
+be determined. The attempt, therefore, to regulate the
+contributions of the members of a confederacy by any such rule,
+cannot fail to be productive of glaring inequality and extreme
+oppression.
+
+This inequality would of itself be sufficient in America to work
+the eventual destruction of the Union, if any mode of enforcing a
+compliance with its requisitions could be devised. The suffering
+States would not long consent to remain associated upon a principle
+which distributes the public burdens with so unequal a hand, and
+which was calculated to impoverish and oppress the citizens of some
+States, while those of others would scarcely be conscious of the
+small proportion of the weight they were required to sustain. This,
+however, is an evil inseparable from the principle of quotas and
+requisitions.
+
+There is no method of steering clear of this inconvenience, but
+by authorizing the national government to raise its own revenues in
+its own way. Imposts, excises, and, in general, all duties upon
+articles of consumption, may be compared to a fluid, which will, in
+time, find its level with the means of paying them. The amount to
+be contributed by each citizen will in a degree be at his own
+option, and can be regulated by an attention to his resources. The
+rich may be extravagant, the poor can be frugal; and private
+oppression may always be avoided by a judicious selection of objects
+proper for such impositions. If inequalities should arise in some
+States from duties on particular objects, these will, in all
+probability, be counterbalanced by proportional inequalities in
+other States, from the duties on other objects. In the course of
+time and things, an equilibrium, as far as it is attainable in so
+complicated a subject, will be established everywhere. Or, if
+inequalities should still exist, they would neither be so great in
+their degree, so uniform in their operation, nor so odious in their
+appearance, as those which would necessarily spring from quotas,
+upon any scale that can possibly be devised.
+
+It is a signal advantage of taxes on articles of consumption,
+that they contain in their own nature a security against excess.
+They prescribe their own limit; which cannot be exceeded without
+defeating the end proposed, that is, an extension of the revenue.
+When applied to this object, the saying is as just as it is witty,
+that, "in political arithmetic, two and two do not always make four."
+
+If duties are too high, they lessen the consumption; the
+collection is eluded; and the product to the treasury is not so
+great as when they are confined within proper and moderate bounds.
+This forms a complete barrier against any material oppression of
+the citizens by taxes of this class, and is itself a natural
+limitation of the power of imposing them.
+
+Impositions of this kind usually fall under the denomination of
+indirect taxes, and must for a long time constitute the chief part
+of the revenue raised in this country. Those of the direct kind,
+which principally relate to land and buildings, may admit of a rule
+of apportionment. Either the value of land, or the number of the
+people, may serve as a standard. The state of agriculture and the
+populousness of a country have been considered as nearly connected
+with each other. And, as a rule, for the purpose intended, numbers,
+in the view of simplicity and certainty, are entitled to a
+preference. In every country it is a herculean task to obtain a
+valuation of the land; in a country imperfectly settled and
+progressive in improvement, the difficulties are increased almost to
+impracticability. The expense of an accurate valuation is, in all
+situations, a formidable objection. In a branch of taxation where
+no limits to the discretion of the government are to be found in the
+nature of things, the establishment of a fixed rule, not
+incompatible with the end, may be attended with fewer inconveniences
+than to leave that discretion altogether at large.
+
+PUBLIUS.
+
+
+
+
+
+FEDERALIST No. 22
+
+
+
+The Same Subject Continued
+
+(Other Defects of the Present Confederation)
+
+From the New York Packet.
+
+Friday, December 14, 1787.
+
+
+
+HAMILTON
+
+
+
+To the People of the State of New York:
+
+IN ADDITION to the defects already enumerated in the existing
+federal system, there are others of not less importance, which
+concur in rendering it altogether unfit for the administration of
+the affairs of the Union.
+
+The want of a power to regulate commerce is by all parties
+allowed to be of the number. The utility of such a power has been
+anticipated under the first head of our inquiries; and for this
+reason, as well as from the universal conviction entertained upon
+the subject, little need be added in this place. It is indeed
+evident, on the most superficial view, that there is no object,
+either as it respects the interests of trade or finance, that more
+strongly demands a federal superintendence. The want of it has
+already operated as a bar to the formation of beneficial treaties
+with foreign powers, and has given occasions of dissatisfaction
+between the States. No nation acquainted with the nature of our
+political association would be unwise enough to enter into
+stipulations with the United States, by which they conceded
+privileges of any importance to them, while they were apprised that
+the engagements on the part of the Union might at any moment be
+violated by its members, and while they found from experience that
+they might enjoy every advantage they desired in our markets,
+without granting us any return but such as their momentary
+convenience might suggest. It is not, therefore, to be wondered at
+that Mr. Jenkinson, in ushering into the House of Commons a bill for
+regulating the temporary intercourse between the two countries,
+should preface its introduction by a declaration that similar
+provisions in former bills had been found to answer every purpose to
+the commerce of Great Britain, and that it would be prudent to
+persist in the plan until it should appear whether the American
+government was likely or not to acquire greater consistency. [1]
+
+Several States have endeavored, by separate prohibitions,
+restrictions, and exclusions, to influence the conduct of that
+kingdom in this particular, but the want of concert, arising from
+the want of a general authority and from clashing and dissimilar
+views in the State, has hitherto frustrated every experiment of the
+kind, and will continue to do so as long as the same obstacles to a
+uniformity of measures continue to exist.
+
+The interfering and unneighborly regulations of some States,
+contrary to the true spirit of the Union, have, in different
+instances, given just cause of umbrage and complaint to others, and
+it is to be feared that examples of this nature, if not restrained
+by a national control, would be multiplied and extended till they
+became not less serious sources of animosity and discord than
+injurious impediments to the intercourse between the different parts
+of the Confederacy. "The commerce of the German empire [2] is in
+continual trammels from the multiplicity of the duties which the
+several princes and states exact upon the merchandises passing
+through their territories, by means of which the fine streams and
+navigable rivers with which Germany is so happily watered are
+rendered almost useless." Though the genius of the people of this
+country might never permit this description to be strictly
+applicable to us, yet we may reasonably expect, from the gradual
+conflicts of State regulations, that the citizens of each would at
+length come to be considered and treated by the others in no better
+light than that of foreigners and aliens.
+
+The power of raising armies, by the most obvious construction of
+the articles of the Confederation, is merely a power of making
+requisitions upon the States for quotas of men. This practice in
+the course of the late war, was found replete with obstructions to a
+vigorous and to an economical system of defense. It gave birth to a
+competition between the States which created a kind of auction for
+men. In order to furnish the quotas required of them, they outbid
+each other till bounties grew to an enormous and insupportable size.
+The hope of a still further increase afforded an inducement to
+those who were disposed to serve to procrastinate their enlistment,
+and disinclined them from engaging for any considerable periods.
+Hence, slow and scanty levies of men, in the most critical
+emergencies of our affairs; short enlistments at an unparalleled
+expense; continual fluctuations in the troops, ruinous to their
+discipline and subjecting the public safety frequently to the
+perilous crisis of a disbanded army. Hence, also, those oppressive
+expedients for raising men which were upon several occasions
+practiced, and which nothing but the enthusiasm of liberty would
+have induced the people to endure.
+
+This method of raising troops is not more unfriendly to economy
+and vigor than it is to an equal distribution of the burden. The
+States near the seat of war, influenced by motives of
+self-preservation, made efforts to furnish their quotas, which even
+exceeded their abilities; while those at a distance from danger
+were, for the most part, as remiss as the others were diligent, in
+their exertions. The immediate pressure of this inequality was not
+in this case, as in that of the contributions of money, alleviated
+by the hope of a final liquidation. The States which did not pay
+their proportions of money might at least be charged with their
+deficiencies; but no account could be formed of the deficiencies in
+the supplies of men. We shall not, however, see much reason to
+reget the want of this hope, when we consider how little prospect
+there is, that the most delinquent States will ever be able to make
+compensation for their pecuniary failures. The system of quotas and
+requisitions, whether it be applied to men or money, is, in every
+view, a system of imbecility in the Union, and of inequality and
+injustice among the members.
+
+The right of equal suffrage among the States is another
+exceptionable part of the Confederation. Every idea of proportion
+and every rule of fair representation conspire to condemn a
+principle, which gives to Rhode Island an equal weight in the scale
+of power with Massachusetts, or Connecticut, or New York; and to
+Deleware an equal voice in the national deliberations with
+Pennsylvania, or Virginia, or North Carolina. Its operation
+contradicts the fundamental maxim of republican government, which
+requires that the sense of the majority should prevail. Sophistry
+may reply, that sovereigns are equal, and that a majority of the
+votes of the States will be a majority of confederated America. But
+this kind of logical legerdemain will never counteract the plain
+suggestions of justice and common-sense. It may happen that this
+majority of States is a small minority of the people of
+America [3]; and two thirds of the people of America could not
+long be persuaded, upon the credit of artificial distinctions and
+syllogistic subtleties, to submit their interests to the management
+and disposal of one third. The larger States would after a while
+revolt from the idea of receiving the law from the smaller. To
+acquiesce in such a privation of their due importance in the
+political scale, would be not merely to be insensible to the love of
+power, but even to sacrifice the desire of equality. It is neither
+rational to expect the first, nor just to require the last. The
+smaller States, considering how peculiarly their safety and welfare
+depend on union, ought readily to renounce a pretension which, if
+not relinquished, would prove fatal to its duration.
+
+It may be objected to this, that not seven but nine States, or
+two thirds of the whole number, must consent to the most important
+resolutions; and it may be thence inferred that nine States would
+always comprehend a majority of the Union. But this does not
+obviate the impropriety of an equal vote between States of the most
+unequal dimensions and populousness; nor is the inference accurate
+in point of fact; for we can enumerate nine States which contain
+less than a majority of the people [4]; and it is constitutionally
+possible that these nine may give the vote. Besides, there are
+matters of considerable moment determinable by a bare majority; and
+there are others, concerning which doubts have been entertained,
+which, if interpreted in favor of the sufficiency of a vote of seven
+States, would extend its operation to interests of the first
+magnitude. In addition to this, it is to be observed that there is
+a probability of an increase in the number of States, and no
+provision for a proportional augmentation of the ratio of votes.
+
+But this is not all: what at first sight may seem a remedy, is,
+in reality, a poison. To give a minority a negative upon the
+majority (which is always the case where more than a majority is
+requisite to a decision), is, in its tendency, to subject the sense
+of the greater number to that of the lesser. Congress, from the
+nonattendance of a few States, have been frequently in the situation
+of a Polish diet, where a single VOTE has been sufficient to put a
+stop to all their movements. A sixtieth part of the Union, which is
+about the proportion of Delaware and Rhode Island, has several times
+been able to oppose an entire bar to its operations. This is one of
+those refinements which, in practice, has an effect the reverse of
+what is expected from it in theory. The necessity of unanimity in
+public bodies, or of something approaching towards it, has been
+founded upon a supposition that it would contribute to security.
+But its real operation is to embarrass the administration, to
+destroy the energy of the government, and to substitute the
+pleasure, caprice, or artifices of an insignificant, turbulent, or
+corrupt junto, to the regular deliberations and decisions of a
+respectable majority. In those emergencies of a nation, in which
+the goodness or badness, the weakness or strength of its government,
+is of the greatest importance, there is commonly a necessity for
+action. The public business must, in some way or other, go forward.
+If a pertinacious minority can control the opinion of a majority,
+respecting the best mode of conducting it, the majority, in order
+that something may be done, must conform to the views of the
+minority; and thus the sense of the smaller number will overrule
+that of the greater, and give a tone to the national proceedings.
+Hence, tedious delays; continual negotiation and intrigue;
+contemptible compromises of the public good. And yet, in such a
+system, it is even happy when such compromises can take place: for
+upon some occasions things will not admit of accommodation; and
+then the measures of government must be injuriously suspended, or
+fatally defeated. It is often, by the impracticability of obtaining
+the concurrence of the necessary number of votes, kept in a state of
+inaction. Its situation must always savor of weakness, sometimes
+border upon anarchy.
+
+It is not difficult to discover, that a principle of this kind
+gives greater scope to foreign corruption, as well as to domestic
+faction, than that which permits the sense of the majority to
+decide; though the contrary of this has been presumed. The mistake
+has proceeded from not attending with due care to the mischiefs that
+may be occasioned by obstructing the progress of government at
+certain critical seasons. When the concurrence of a large number is
+required by the Constitution to the doing of any national act, we
+are apt to rest satisfied that all is safe, because nothing improper
+will be likely TO BE DONE, but we forget how much good may be
+prevented, and how much ill may be produced, by the power of
+hindering the doing what may be necessary, and of keeping affairs in
+the same unfavorable posture in which they may happen to stand at
+particular periods.
+
+Suppose, for instance, we were engaged in a war, in conjunction
+with one foreign nation, against another. Suppose the necessity of
+our situation demanded peace, and the interest or ambition of our
+ally led him to seek the prosecution of the war, with views that
+might justify us in making separate terms. In such a state of
+things, this ally of ours would evidently find it much easier, by
+his bribes and intrigues, to tie up the hands of government from
+making peace, where two thirds of all the votes were requisite to
+that object, than where a simple majority would suffice. In the
+first case, he would have to corrupt a smaller number; in the last,
+a greater number. Upon the same principle, it would be much easier
+for a foreign power with which we were at war to perplex our
+councils and embarrass our exertions. And, in a commercial view, we
+may be subjected to similar inconveniences. A nation, with which we
+might have a treaty of commerce, could with much greater facility
+prevent our forming a connection with her competitor in trade,
+though such a connection should be ever so beneficial to ourselves.
+
+Evils of this description ought not to be regarded as imaginary.
+One of the weak sides of republics, among their numerous
+advantages, is that they afford too easy an inlet to foreign
+corruption. An hereditary monarch, though often disposed to
+sacrifice his subjects to his ambition, has so great a personal
+interest in the government and in the external glory of the nation,
+that it is not easy for a foreign power to give him an equivalent
+for what he would sacrifice by treachery to the state. The world
+has accordingly been witness to few examples of this species of
+royal prostitution, though there have been abundant specimens of
+every other kind.
+
+In republics, persons elevated from the mass of the community,
+by the suffrages of their fellow-citizens, to stations of great
+pre-eminence and power, may find compensations for betraying their
+trust, which, to any but minds animated and guided by superior
+virtue, may appear to exceed the proportion of interest they have in
+the common stock, and to overbalance the obligations of duty. Hence
+it is that history furnishes us with so many mortifying examples of
+the prevalency of foreign corruption in republican governments. How
+much this contributed to the ruin of the ancient commonwealths has
+been already delineated. It is well known that the deputies of the
+United Provinces have, in various instances, been purchased by the
+emissaries of the neighboring kingdoms. The Earl of Chesterfield
+(if my memory serves me right), in a letter to his court, intimates
+that his success in an important negotiation must depend on his
+obtaining a major's commission for one of those deputies. And in
+Sweden the parties were alternately bought by France and England in
+so barefaced and notorious a manner that it excited universal
+disgust in the nation, and was a principal cause that the most
+limited monarch in Europe, in a single day, without tumult,
+violence, or opposition, became one of the most absolute and
+uncontrolled.
+
+A circumstance which crowns the defects of the Confederation
+remains yet to be mentioned, the want of a judiciary power. Laws
+are a dead letter without courts to expound and define their true
+meaning and operation. The treaties of the United States, to have
+any force at all, must be considered as part of the law of the land.
+Their true import, as far as respects individuals, must, like all
+other laws, be ascertained by judicial determinations. To produce
+uniformity in these determinations, they ought to be submitted, in
+the last resort, to one SUPREME TRIBUNAL. And this tribunal ought
+to be instituted under the same authority which forms the treaties
+themselves. These ingredients are both indispensable. If there is
+in each State a court of final jurisdiction, there may be as many
+different final determinations on the same point as there are courts.
+There are endless diversities in the opinions of men. We often
+see not only different courts but the judges of the came court
+differing from each other. To avoid the confusion which would
+unavoidably result from the contradictory decisions of a number of
+independent judicatories, all nations have found it necessary to
+establish one court paramount to the rest, possessing a general
+superintendence, and authorized to settle and declare in the last
+resort a uniform rule of civil justice.
+
+This is the more necessary where the frame of the government is
+so compounded that the laws of the whole are in danger of being
+contravened by the laws of the parts. In this case, if the
+particular tribunals are invested with a right of ultimate
+jurisdiction, besides the contradictions to be expected from
+difference of opinion, there will be much to fear from the bias of
+local views and prejudices, and from the interference of local
+regulations. As often as such an interference was to happen, there
+would be reason to apprehend that the provisions of the particular
+laws might be preferred to those of the general laws; for nothing
+is more natural to men in office than to look with peculiar
+deference towards that authority to which they owe their official
+existence. The treaties of the United States, under the present
+Constitution, are liable to the infractions of thirteen different
+legislatures, and as many different courts of final jurisdiction,
+acting under the authority of those legislatures. The faith, the
+reputation, the peace of the whole Union, are thus continually at
+the mercy of the prejudices, the passions, and the interests of
+every member of which it is composed. Is it possible that foreign
+nations can either respect or confide in such a government? Is it
+possible that the people of America will longer consent to trust
+their honor, their happiness, their safety, on so precarious a
+foundation?
+
+In this review of the Confederation, I have confined myself to
+the exhibition of its most material defects; passing over those
+imperfections in its details by which even a great part of the power
+intended to be conferred upon it has been in a great measure
+rendered abortive. It must be by this time evident to all men of
+reflection, who can divest themselves of the prepossessions of
+preconceived opinions, that it is a system so radically vicious and
+unsound, as to admit not of amendment but by an entire change in its
+leading features and characters.
+
+The organization of Congress is itself utterly improper for the
+exercise of those powers which are necessary to be deposited in the
+Union. A single assembly may be a proper receptacle of those
+slender, or rather fettered, authorities, which have been heretofore
+delegated to the federal head; but it would be inconsistent with
+all the principles of good government, to intrust it with those
+additional powers which, even the moderate and more rational
+adversaries of the proposed Constitution admit, ought to reside in
+the United States. If that plan should not be adopted, and if the
+necessity of the Union should be able to withstand the ambitious
+aims of those men who may indulge magnificent schemes of personal
+aggrandizement from its dissolution, the probability would be, that
+we should run into the project of conferring supplementary powers
+upon Congress, as they are now constituted; and either the machine,
+from the intrinsic feebleness of its structure, will moulder into
+pieces, in spite of our ill-judged efforts to prop it; or, by
+successive augmentations of its force an energy, as necessity might
+prompt, we shall finally accumulate, in a single body, all the most
+important prerogatives of sovereignty, and thus entail upon our
+posterity one of the most execrable forms of government that human
+infatuation ever contrived. Thus, we should create in reality that
+very tyranny which the adversaries of the new Constitution either
+are, or affect to be, solicitous to avert.
+
+It has not a little contributed to the infirmities of the
+existing federal system, that it never had a ratification by the
+PEOPLE. Resting on no better foundation than the consent of the
+several legislatures, it has been exposed to frequent and intricate
+questions concerning the validity of its powers, and has, in some
+instances, given birth to the enormous doctrine of a right of
+legislative repeal. Owing its ratification to the law of a State,
+it has been contended that the same authority might repeal the law
+by which it was ratified. However gross a heresy it may be to
+maintain that a PARTY to a COMPACT has a right to revoke that
+COMPACT, the doctrine itself has had respectable advocates. The
+possibility of a question of this nature proves the necessity of
+laying the foundations of our national government deeper than in the
+mere sanction of delegated authority. The fabric of American empire
+ought to rest on the solid basis of THE CONSENT OF THE PEOPLE. The
+streams of national power ought to flow immediately from that pure,
+original fountain of all legitimate authority.
+
+PUBLIUS.
+
+FNA1-@1 This, as nearly as I can recollect, was the sense of his
+speech on introducing the last bill.
+
+FNA1-@2 Encyclopedia, article "Empire."
+
+FNA1-@3 New Hampshire, Rhode Island, New Jersey, Delaware, Georgia,
+South Carolina, and Maryland are a majority of the whole number of
+the States, but they do not contain one third of the people.
+
+FNA1-@4 Add New York and Connecticut to the foregoing seven, and they
+will be less than a majority.
+
+
+
+
+
+FEDERALIST No. 23
+
+
+
+The Necessity of a Government as Energetic as the One Proposed to
+the Preservation of the Union
+
+From the New York Packet.
+
+Tuesday, December 18, 1787.
+
+
+
+HAMILTON
+
+
+
+To the People of the State of New York:
+
+THE necessity of a Constitution, at least equally energetic with
+the one proposed, to the preservation of the Union, is the point at
+the examination of which we are now arrived.
+
+This inquiry will naturally divide itself into three
+branches the objects to be provided for by the federal government,
+the quantity of power necessary to the accomplishment of those
+objects, the persons upon whom that power ought to operate. Its
+distribution and organization will more properly claim our attention
+under the succeeding head.
+
+The principal purposes to be answered by union are these the
+common defense of the members; the preservation of the public peace
+as well against internal convulsions as external attacks; the
+regulation of commerce with other nations and between the States;
+the superintendence of our intercourse, political and commercial,
+with foreign countries.
+
+The authorities essential to the common defense are these: to
+raise armies; to build and equip fleets; to prescribe rules for
+the government of both; to direct their operations; to provide for
+their support. These powers ought to exist without limitation,
+BECAUSE IT IS IMPOSSIBLE TO FORESEE OR DEFINE THE EXTENT AND VARIETY
+OF NATIONAL EXIGENCIES, OR THE CORRESPONDENT EXTENT AND VARIETY OF
+THE MEANS WHICH MAY BE NECESSARY TO SATISFY THEM. The circumstances
+that endanger the safety of nations are infinite, and for this
+reason no constitutional shackles can wisely be imposed on the power
+to which the care of it is committed. This power ought to be
+coextensive with all the possible combinations of such
+circumstances; and ought to be under the direction of the same
+councils which are appointed to preside over the common defense.
+
+This is one of those truths which, to a correct and unprejudiced
+mind, carries its own evidence along with it; and may be obscured,
+but cannot be made plainer by argument or reasoning. It rests upon
+axioms as simple as they are universal; the MEANS ought to be
+proportioned to the END; the persons, from whose agency the
+attainment of any END is expected, ought to possess the MEANS by
+which it is to be attained.
+
+Whether there ought to be a federal government intrusted with
+the care of the common defense, is a question in the first instance,
+open for discussion; but the moment it is decided in the
+affirmative, it will follow, that that government ought to be
+clothed with all the powers requisite to complete execution of its
+trust. And unless it can be shown that the circumstances which may
+affect the public safety are reducible within certain determinate
+limits; unless the contrary of this position can be fairly and
+rationally disputed, it must be admitted, as a necessary
+consequence, that there can be no limitation of that authority which
+is to provide for the defense and protection of the community, in
+any matter essential to its efficacy that is, in any matter
+essential to the FORMATION, DIRECTION, or SUPPORT of the NATIONAL
+FORCES.
+
+Defective as the present Confederation has been proved to be,
+this principle appears to have been fully recognized by the framers
+of it; though they have not made proper or adequate provision for
+its exercise. Congress have an unlimited discretion to make
+requisitions of men and money; to govern the army and navy; to
+direct their operations. As their requisitions are made
+constitutionally binding upon the States, who are in fact under the
+most solemn obligations to furnish the supplies required of them,
+the intention evidently was that the United States should command
+whatever resources were by them judged requisite to the "common
+defense and general welfare." It was presumed that a sense of
+their true interests, and a regard to the dictates of good faith,
+would be found sufficient pledges for the punctual performance of
+the duty of the members to the federal head.
+
+The experiment has, however, demonstrated that this expectation
+was ill-founded and illusory; and the observations, made under the
+last head, will, I imagine, have sufficed to convince the impartial
+and discerning, that there is an absolute necessity for an entire
+change in the first principles of the system; that if we are in
+earnest about giving the Union energy and duration, we must abandon
+the vain project of legislating upon the States in their collective
+capacities; we must extend the laws of the federal government to
+the individual citizens of America; we must discard the fallacious
+scheme of quotas and requisitions, as equally impracticable and
+unjust. The result from all this is that the Union ought to be
+invested with full power to levy troops; to build and equip fleets;
+and to raise the revenues which will be required for the formation
+and support of an army and navy, in the customary and ordinary modes
+practiced in other governments.
+
+If the circumstances of our country are such as to demand a
+compound instead of a simple, a confederate instead of a sole,
+government, the essential point which will remain to be adjusted
+will be to discriminate the OBJECTS, as far as it can be done, which
+shall appertain to the different provinces or departments of power;
+allowing to each the most ample authority for fulfilling the
+objects committed to its charge. Shall the Union be constituted the
+guardian of the common safety? Are fleets and armies and revenues
+necessary to this purpose? The government of the Union must be
+empowered to pass all laws, and to make all regulations which have
+relation to them. The same must be the case in respect to commerce,
+and to every other matter to which its jurisdiction is permitted to
+extend. Is the administration of justice between the citizens of
+the same State the proper department of the local governments?
+These must possess all the authorities which are connected with
+this object, and with every other that may be allotted to their
+particular cognizance and direction. Not to confer in each case a
+degree of power commensurate to the end, would be to violate the
+most obvious rules of prudence and propriety, and improvidently to
+trust the great interests of the nation to hands which are disabled
+from managing them with vigor and success.
+
+Who is likely to make suitable provisions for the public
+defense, as that body to which the guardianship of the public safety
+is confided; which, as the centre of information, will best
+understand the extent and urgency of the dangers that threaten; as
+the representative of the WHOLE, will feel itself most deeply
+interested in the preservation of every part; which, from the
+responsibility implied in the duty assigned to it, will be most
+sensibly impressed with the necessity of proper exertions; and
+which, by the extension of its authority throughout the States, can
+alone establish uniformity and concert in the plans and measures by
+which the common safety is to be secured? Is there not a manifest
+inconsistency in devolving upon the federal government the care of
+the general defense, and leaving in the State governments the
+EFFECTIVE powers by which it is to be provided for? Is not a want
+of co-operation the infallible consequence of such a system? And
+will not weakness, disorder, an undue distribution of the burdens
+and calamities of war, an unnecessary and intolerable increase of
+expense, be its natural and inevitable concomitants? Have we not
+had unequivocal experience of its effects in the course of the
+revolution which we have just accomplished?
+
+Every view we may take of the subject, as candid inquirers after
+truth, will serve to convince us, that it is both unwise and
+dangerous to deny the federal government an unconfined authority, as
+to all those objects which are intrusted to its management. It will
+indeed deserve the most vigilant and careful attention of the
+people, to see that it be modeled in such a manner as to admit of
+its being safely vested with the requisite powers. If any plan
+which has been, or may be, offered to our consideration, should not,
+upon a dispassionate inspection, be found to answer this
+description, it ought to be rejected. A government, the
+constitution of which renders it unfit to be trusted with all the
+powers which a free people OUGHT TO DELEGATE TO ANY GOVERNMENT,
+would be an unsafe and improper depositary of the NATIONAL INTERESTS.
+Wherever THESE can with propriety be confided, the coincident
+powers may safely accompany them. This is the true result of all
+just reasoning upon the subject. And the adversaries of the plan
+promulgated by the convention ought to have confined themselves to
+showing, that the internal structure of the proposed government was
+such as to render it unworthy of the confidence of the people. They
+ought not to have wandered into inflammatory declamations and
+unmeaning cavils about the extent of the powers. The POWERS are not
+too extensive for the OBJECTS of federal administration, or, in
+other words, for the management of our NATIONAL INTERESTS; nor can
+any satisfactory argument be framed to show that they are chargeable
+with such an excess. If it be true, as has been insinuated by some
+of the writers on the other side, that the difficulty arises from
+the nature of the thing, and that the extent of the country will not
+permit us to form a government in which such ample powers can safely
+be reposed, it would prove that we ought to contract our views, and
+resort to the expedient of separate confederacies, which will move
+within more practicable spheres. For the absurdity must continually
+stare us in the face of confiding to a government the direction of
+the most essential national interests, without daring to trust it to
+the authorities which are indispensible to their proper and
+efficient management. Let us not attempt to reconcile
+contradictions, but firmly embrace a rational alternative.
+
+I trust, however, that the impracticability of one general
+system cannot be shown. I am greatly mistaken, if any thing of
+weight has yet been advanced of this tendency; and I flatter
+myself, that the observations which have been made in the course of
+these papers have served to place the reverse of that position in as
+clear a light as any matter still in the womb of time and experience
+can be susceptible of. This, at all events, must be evident, that
+the very difficulty itself, drawn from the extent of the country, is
+the strongest argument in favor of an energetic government; for any
+other can certainly never preserve the Union of so large an empire.
+If we embrace the tenets of those who oppose the adoption of the
+proposed Constitution, as the standard of our political creed, we
+cannot fail to verify the gloomy doctrines which predict the
+impracticability of a national system pervading entire limits of the
+present Confederacy.
+
+PUBLIUS.
+
+
+
+
+
+FEDERALIST No. 24
+
+
+
+The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered
+
+For the Independent Journal.
+
+
+
+HAMILTON
+
+
+
+To the People of the State of New York:
+
+To THE powers proposed to be conferred upon the federal
+government, in respect to the creation and direction of the national
+forces, I have met with but one specific objection, which, if I
+understand it right, is this, that proper provision has not been
+made against the existence of standing armies in time of peace; an
+objection which, I shall now endeavor to show, rests on weak and
+unsubstantial foundations.
+
+It has indeed been brought forward in the most vague and general
+form, supported only by bold assertions, without the appearance of
+argument; without even the sanction of theoretical opinions; in
+contradiction to the practice of other free nations, and to the
+general sense of America, as expressed in most of the existing
+constitutions. The proprietory of this remark will appear, the
+moment it is recollected that the objection under consideration
+turns upon a supposed necessity of restraining the LEGISLATIVE
+authority of the nation, in the article of military establishments;
+a principle unheard of, except in one or two of our State
+constitutions, and rejected in all the rest.
+
+A stranger to our politics, who was to read our newspapers at
+the present juncture, without having previously inspected the plan
+reported by the convention, would be naturally led to one of two
+conclusions: either that it contained a positive injunction, that
+standing armies should be kept up in time of peace; or that it
+vested in the EXECUTIVE the whole power of levying troops, without
+subjecting his discretion, in any shape, to the control of the
+legislature.
+
+If he came afterwards to peruse the plan itself, he would be
+surprised to discover, that neither the one nor the other was the
+case; that the whole power of raising armies was lodged in the
+LEGISLATURE, not in the EXECUTIVE; that this legislature was to be
+a popular body, consisting of the representatives of the people
+periodically elected; and that instead of the provision he had
+supposed in favor of standing armies, there was to be found, in
+respect to this object, an important qualification even of the
+legislative discretion, in that clause which forbids the
+appropriation of money for the support of an army for any longer
+period than two years a precaution which, upon a nearer view of it,
+will appear to be a great and real security against the keeping up
+of troops without evident necessity.
+
+Disappointed in his first surmise, the person I have supposed
+would be apt to pursue his conjectures a little further. He would
+naturally say to himself, it is impossible that all this vehement
+and pathetic declamation can be without some colorable pretext. It
+must needs be that this people, so jealous of their liberties, have,
+in all the preceding models of the constitutions which they have
+established, inserted the most precise and rigid precautions on this
+point, the omission of which, in the new plan, has given birth to
+all this apprehension and clamor.
+
+If, under this impression, he proceeded to pass in review the
+several State constitutions, how great would be his disappointment
+to find that TWO ONLY of them [1] contained an interdiction of
+standing armies in time of peace; that the other eleven had either
+observed a profound silence on the subject, or had in express terms
+admitted the right of the Legislature to authorize their existence.
+
+Still, however he would be persuaded that there must be some
+plausible foundation for the cry raised on this head. He would
+never be able to imagine, while any source of information remained
+unexplored, that it was nothing more than an experiment upon the
+public credulity, dictated either by a deliberate intention to
+deceive, or by the overflowings of a zeal too intemperate to be
+ingenuous. It would probably occur to him, that he would be likely
+to find the precautions he was in search of in the primitive compact
+between the States. Here, at length, he would expect to meet with a
+solution of the enigma. No doubt, he would observe to himself, the
+existing Confederation must contain the most explicit provisions
+against military establishments in time of peace; and a departure
+from this model, in a favorite point, has occasioned the discontent
+which appears to influence these political champions.
+
+If he should now apply himself to a careful and critical survey
+of the articles of Confederation, his astonishment would not only be
+increased, but would acquire a mixture of indignation, at the
+unexpected discovery, that these articles, instead of containing the
+prohibition he looked for, and though they had, with jealous
+circumspection, restricted the authority of the State legislatures
+in this particular, had not imposed a single restraint on that of
+the United States. If he happened to be a man of quick sensibility,
+or ardent temper, he could now no longer refrain from regarding
+these clamors as the dishonest artifices of a sinister and
+unprincipled opposition to a plan which ought at least to receive a
+fair and candid examination from all sincere lovers of their
+country! How else, he would say, could the authors of them have
+been tempted to vent such loud censures upon that plan, about a
+point in which it seems to have conformed itself to the general
+sense of America as declared in its different forms of government,
+and in which it has even superadded a new and powerful guard unknown
+to any of them? If, on the contrary, he happened to be a man of
+calm and dispassionate feelings, he would indulge a sigh for the
+frailty of human nature, and would lament, that in a matter so
+interesting to the happiness of millions, the true merits of the
+question should be perplexed and entangled by expedients so
+unfriendly to an impartial and right determination. Even such a man
+could hardly forbear remarking, that a conduct of this kind has too
+much the appearance of an intention to mislead the people by
+alarming their passions, rather than to convince them by arguments
+addressed to their understandings.
+
+But however little this objection may be countenanced, even by
+precedents among ourselves, it may be satisfactory to take a nearer
+view of its intrinsic merits. From a close examination it will
+appear that restraints upon the discretion of the legislature in
+respect to military establishments in time of peace, would be
+improper to be imposed, and if imposed, from the necessities of
+society, would be unlikely to be observed.
+
+Though a wide ocean separates the United States from Europe, yet
+there are various considerations that warn us against an excess of
+confidence or security. On one side of us, and stretching far into
+our rear, are growing settlements subject to the dominion of Britain.
+On the other side, and extending to meet the British settlements,
+are colonies and establishments subject to the dominion of Spain.
+This situation and the vicinity of the West India Islands,
+belonging to these two powers create between them, in respect to
+their American possessions and in relation to us, a common interest.
+The savage tribes on our Western frontier ought to be regarded as
+our natural enemies, their natural allies, because they have most to
+fear from us, and most to hope from them. The improvements in the
+art of navigation have, as to the facility of communication,
+rendered distant nations, in a great measure, neighbors. Britain
+and Spain are among the principal maritime powers of Europe. A
+future concert of views between these nations ought not to be
+regarded as improbable. The increasing remoteness of consanguinity
+is every day diminishing the force of the family compact between
+France and Spain. And politicians have ever with great reason
+considered the ties of blood as feeble and precarious links of
+political connection. These circumstances combined, admonish us not
+to be too sanguine in considering ourselves as entirely out of the
+reach of danger.
+
+Previous to the Revolution, and ever since the peace, there has
+been a constant necessity for keeping small garrisons on our Western
+frontier. No person can doubt that these will continue to be
+indispensable, if it should only be against the ravages and
+depredations of the Indians. These garrisons must either be
+furnished by occasional detachments from the militia, or by
+permanent corps in the pay of the government. The first is
+impracticable; and if practicable, would be pernicious. The
+militia would not long, if at all, submit to be dragged from their
+occupations and families to perform that most disagreeable duty in
+times of profound peace. And if they could be prevailed upon or
+compelled to do it, the increased expense of a frequent rotation of
+service, and the loss of labor and disconcertion of the industrious
+pursuits of individuals, would form conclusive objections to the
+scheme. It would be as burdensome and injurious to the public as
+ruinous to private citizens. The latter resource of permanent corps
+in the pay of the government amounts to a standing army in time of
+peace; a small one, indeed, but not the less real for being small.
+Here is a simple view of the subject, that shows us at once the
+impropriety of a constitutional interdiction of such establishments,
+and the necessity of leaving the matter to the discretion and
+prudence of the legislature.
+
+In proportion to our increase in strength, it is probable, nay,
+it may be said certain, that Britain and Spain would augment their
+military establishments in our neighborhood. If we should not be
+willing to be exposed, in a naked and defenseless condition, to
+their insults and encroachments, we should find it expedient to
+increase our frontier garrisons in some ratio to the force by which
+our Western settlements might be annoyed. There are, and will be,
+particular posts, the possession of which will include the command
+of large districts of territory, and facilitate future invasions of
+the remainder. It may be added that some of those posts will be
+keys to the trade with the Indian nations. Can any man think it
+would be wise to leave such posts in a situation to be at any
+instant seized by one or the other of two neighboring and formidable
+powers? To act this part would be to desert all the usual maxims of
+prudence and policy.
+
+If we mean to be a commercial people, or even to be secure on
+our Atlantic side, we must endeavor, as soon as possible, to have a
+navy. To this purpose there must be dock-yards and arsenals; and
+for the defense of these, fortifications, and probably garrisons.
+When a nation has become so powerful by sea that it can protect its
+dock-yards by its fleets, this supersedes the necessity of garrisons
+for that purpose; but where naval establishments are in their
+infancy, moderate garrisons will, in all likelihood, be found an
+indispensable security against descents for the destruction of the
+arsenals and dock-yards, and sometimes of the fleet itself.
+
+PUBLIUS.
+
+FNA1-@1 This statement of the matter is taken from the printed
+collection of State constitutions. Pennsylvania and North Carolina
+are the two which contain the interdiction in these words: "As
+standing armies in time of peace are dangerous to liberty, THEY
+OUGHT NOT to be kept up." This is, in truth, rather a CAUTION than
+a PROHIBITION. New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Delaware, and Maryland
+have, in each of their bils of rights, a clause to this effect:
+"Standing armies are dangerous to liberty, and ought not to be
+raised or kept up WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE LEGISLATURE"; which
+is a formal admission of the authority of the Legislature. New York
+has no bills of rights, and her constitution says not a word about
+the matter. No bills of rights appear annexed to the constitutions
+of the other States, except the foregoing, and their constitutions
+are equally silent. I am told, however that one or two States have
+bills of rights which do not appear in this collection; but that
+those also recognize the right of the legislative authority in this
+respect.
+
+
+
+
+
+FEDERALIST No. 25
+
+
+
+The Same Subject Continued
+
+(The Powers Necessary to the Common Defense Further Considered)
+
+From the New York Packet.
+
+Friday, December 21, 1787.
+
+
+
+HAMILTON
+
+
+
+To the People of the State of New York:
+
+IT MAY perhaps be urged that the objects enumerated in the
+preceding number ought to be provided for by the State governments,
+under the direction of the Union. But this would be, in reality, an
+inversion of the primary principle of our political association, as
+it would in practice transfer the care of the common defense from
+the federal head to the individual members: a project oppressive to
+some States, dangerous to all, and baneful to the Confederacy.
+
+The territories of Britain, Spain, and of the Indian nations in
+our neighborhood do not border on particular States, but encircle
+the Union from Maine to Georgia. The danger, though in different
+degrees, is therefore common. And the means of guarding against it
+ought, in like manner, to be the objects of common councils and of a
+common treasury. It happens that some States, from local situation,
+are more directly exposed. New York is of this class. Upon the
+plan of separate provisions, New York would have to sustain the
+whole weight of the establishments requisite to her immediate
+safety, and to the mediate or ultimate protection of her neighbors.
+This would neither be equitable as it respected New York nor safe
+as it respected the other States. Various inconveniences would
+attend such a system. The States, to whose lot it might fall to
+support the necessary establishments, would be as little able as
+willing, for a considerable time to come, to bear the burden of
+competent provisions. The security of all would thus be subjected
+to the parsimony, improvidence, or inability of a part. If the
+resources of such part becoming more abundant and extensive, its
+provisions should be proportionally enlarged, the other States would
+quickly take the alarm at seeing the whole military force of the
+Union in the hands of two or three of its members, and those
+probably amongst the most powerful. They would each choose to have
+some counterpoise, and pretenses could easily be contrived. In this
+situation, military establishments, nourished by mutual jealousy,
+would be apt to swell beyond their natural or proper size; and
+being at the separate disposal of the members, they would be engines
+for the abridgment or demolition of the national authority.
+
+Reasons have been already given to induce a supposition that the
+State governments will too naturally be prone to a rivalship with
+that of the Union, the foundation of which will be the love of
+power; and that in any contest between the federal head and one of
+its members the people will be most apt to unite with their local
+government. If, in addition to this immense advantage, the ambition
+of the members should be stimulated by the separate and independent
+possession of military forces, it would afford too strong a
+temptation and too great a facility to them to make enterprises
+upon, and finally to subvert, the constitutional authority of the
+Union. On the other hand, the liberty of the people would be less
+safe in this state of things than in that which left the national
+forces in the hands of the national government. As far as an army
+may be considered as a dangerous weapon of power, it had better be
+in those hands of which the people are most likely to be jealous
+than in those of which they are least likely to be jealous. For it
+is a truth, which the experience of ages has attested, that the
+people are always most in danger when the means of injuring their
+rights are in the possession of those of whom they entertain the
+least suspicion.
+
+The framers of the existing Confederation, fully aware of the
+danger to the Union from the separate possession of military forces
+by the States, have, in express terms, prohibited them from having
+either ships or troops, unless with the consent of Congress. The
+truth is, that the existence of a federal government and military
+establishments under State authority are not less at variance with
+each other than a due supply of the federal treasury and the system
+of quotas and requisitions.
+
+There are other lights besides those already taken notice of, in
+which the impropriety of restraints on the discretion of the
+national legislature will be equally manifest. The design of the
+objection, which has been mentioned, is to preclude standing armies
+in time of peace, though we have never been informed how far it is
+designed the prohibition should extend; whether to raising armies
+as well as to KEEPING THEM UP in a season of tranquillity or not.
+If it be confined to the latter it will have no precise
+signification, and it will be ineffectual for the purpose intended.
+When armies are once raised what shall be denominated "keeping
+them up," contrary to the sense of the Constitution? What time
+shall be requisite to ascertain the violation? Shall it be a week,
+a month, a year? Or shall we say they may be continued as long as
+the danger which occasioned their being raised continues? This
+would be to admit that they might be kept up IN TIME OF PEACE,
+against threatening or impending danger, which would be at once to
+deviate from the literal meaning of the prohibition, and to
+introduce an extensive latitude of construction. Who shall judge of
+the continuance of the danger? This must undoubtedly be submitted
+to the national government, and the matter would then be brought to
+this issue, that the national government, to provide against
+apprehended danger, might in the first instance raise troops, and
+might afterwards keep them on foot as long as they supposed the
+peace or safety of the community was in any degree of jeopardy. It
+is easy to perceive that a discretion so latitudinary as this would
+afford ample room for eluding the force of the provision.
+
+The supposed utility of a provision of this kind can only be
+founded on the supposed probability, or at least possibility, of a
+combination between the executive and the legislative, in some
+scheme of usurpation. Should this at any time happen, how easy
+would it be to fabricate pretenses of approaching danger! Indian
+hostilities, instigated by Spain or Britain, would always be at hand.
+Provocations to produce the desired appearances might even be
+given to some foreign power, and appeased again by timely
+concessions. If we can reasonably presume such a combination to
+have been formed, and that the enterprise is warranted by a
+sufficient prospect of success, the army, when once raised, from
+whatever cause, or on whatever pretext, may be applied to the
+execution of the project.
+
+If, to obviate this consequence, it should be resolved to extend
+the prohibition to the RAISING of armies in time of peace, the
+United States would then exhibit the most extraordinary spectacle
+which the world has yet seen, that of a nation incapacitated by its
+Constitution to prepare for defense, before it was actually invaded.
+As the ceremony of a formal denunciation of war has of late fallen
+into disuse, the presence of an enemy within our territories must be
+waited for, as the legal warrant to the government to begin its
+levies of men for the protection of the State. We must receive the
+blow, before we could even prepare to return it. All that kind of
+policy by which nations anticipate distant danger, and meet the
+gathering storm, must be abstained from, as contrary to the genuine
+maxims of a free government. We must expose our property and
+liberty to the mercy of foreign invaders, and invite them by our
+weakness to seize the naked and defenseless prey, because we are
+afraid that rulers, created by our choice, dependent on our will,
+might endanger that liberty, by an abuse of the means necessary to
+its preservation.
+
+Here I expect we shall be told that the militia of the country
+is its natural bulwark, and would be at all times equal to the
+national defense. This doctrine, in substance, had like to have
+lost us our independence. It cost millions to the United States
+that might have been saved. The facts which, from our own
+experience, forbid a reliance of this kind, are too recent to permit
+us to be the dupes of such a suggestion. The steady operations of
+war against a regular and disciplined army can only be successfully
+conducted by a force of the same kind. Considerations of economy,
+not less than of stability and vigor, confirm this position. The
+American militia, in the course of the late war, have, by their
+valor on numerous occasions, erected eternal monuments to their
+fame; but the bravest of them feel and know that the liberty of
+their country could not have been established by their efforts
+alone, however great and valuable they were. War, like most other
+things, is a science to be acquired and perfected by diligence, by
+perserverance, by time, and by practice.
+
+All violent policy, as it is contrary to the natural and
+experienced course of human affairs, defeats itself. Pennsylvania,
+at this instant, affords an example of the truth of this remark.
+The Bill of Rights of that State declares that standing armies are
+dangerous to liberty, and ought not to be kept up in time of peace.
+Pennsylvania, nevertheless, in a time of profound peace, from the
+existence of partial disorders in one or two of her counties, has
+resolved to raise a body of troops; and in all probability will
+keep them up as long as there is any appearance of danger to the
+public peace. The conduct of Massachusetts affords a lesson on the
+same subject, though on different ground. That State (without
+waiting for the sanction of Congress, as the articles of the
+Confederation require) was compelled to raise troops to quell a
+domestic insurrection, and still keeps a corps in pay to prevent a
+revival of the spirit of revolt. The particular constitution of
+Massachusetts opposed no obstacle to the measure; but the instance
+is still of use to instruct us that cases are likely to occur under
+our government, as well as under those of other nations, which will
+sometimes render a military force in time of peace essential to the
+security of the society, and that it is therefore improper in this
+respect to control the legislative discretion. It also teaches us,
+in its application to the United States, how little the rights of a
+feeble government are likely to be respected, even by its own
+constituents. And it teaches us, in addition to the rest, how
+unequal parchment provisions are to a struggle with public necessity.
+
+It was a fundamental maxim of the Lacedaemonian commonwealth,
+that the post of admiral should not be conferred twice on the same
+person. The Peloponnesian confederates, having suffered a severe
+defeat at sea from the Athenians, demanded Lysander, who had before
+served with success in that capacity, to command the combined fleets.
+The Lacedaemonians, to gratify their allies, and yet preserve the
+semblance of an adherence to their ancient institutions, had
+recourse to the flimsy subterfuge of investing Lysander with the
+real power of admiral, under the nominal title of vice-admiral.
+This instance is selected from among a multitude that might be
+cited to confirm the truth already advanced and illustrated by
+domestic examples; which is, that nations pay little regard to
+rules and maxims calculated in their very nature to run counter to
+the necessities of society. Wise politicians will be cautious about
+fettering the government with restrictions that cannot be observed,
+because they know that every breach of the fundamental laws, though
+dictated by necessity, impairs that sacred reverence which ought to
+be maintained in the breast of rulers towards the constitution of a
+country, and forms a precedent for other breaches where the same
+plea of necessity does not exist at all, or is less urgent and
+palpable.
+
+PUBLIUS.
+
+
+
+
+
+FEDERALIST No. 26
+
+
+
+The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to the
+Common Defense Considered
+
+For the Independent Journal.
+
+
+
+HAMILTON
+
+
+
+To the People of the State of New York:
+
+IT WAS a thing hardly to be expected that in a popular
+revolution the minds of men should stop at that happy mean which
+marks the salutary boundary between POWER and PRIVILEGE, and
+combines the energy of government with the security of private
+rights. A failure in this delicate and important point is the great
+source of the inconveniences we experience, and if we are not
+cautious to avoid a repetition of the error, in our future attempts
+to rectify and ameliorate our system, we may travel from one
+chimerical project to another; we may try change after change; but
+we shall never be likely to make any material change for the better.
+
+The idea of restraining the legislative authority, in the means
+of providing for the national defense, is one of those refinements
+which owe their origin to a zeal for liberty more ardent than
+enlightened. We have seen, however, that it has not had thus far an
+extensive prevalency; that even in this country, where it made its
+first appearance, Pennsylvania and North Carolina are the only two
+States by which it has been in any degree patronized; and that all
+the others have refused to give it the least countenance; wisely
+judging that confidence must be placed somewhere; that the
+necessity of doing it, is implied in the very act of delegating
+power; and that it is better to hazard the abuse of that confidence
+than to embarrass the government and endanger the public safety by
+impolitic restrictions on the legislative authority. The opponents
+of the proposed Constitution combat, in this respect, the general
+decision of America; and instead of being taught by experience the
+propriety of correcting any extremes into which we may have
+heretofore run, they appear disposed to conduct us into others still
+more dangerous, and more extravagant. As if the tone of government
+had been found too high, or too rigid, the doctrines they teach are
+calculated to induce us to depress or to relax it, by expedients
+which, upon other occasions, have been condemned or forborne. It
+may be affirmed without the imputation of invective, that if the
+principles they inculcate, on various points, could so far obtain as
+to become the popular creed, they would utterly unfit the people of
+this country for any species of government whatever. But a danger
+of this kind is not to be apprehended. The citizens of America have
+too much discernment to be argued into anarchy. And I am much
+mistaken, if experience has not wrought a deep and solemn conviction
+in the public mind, that greater energy of government is essential
+to the welfare and prosperity of the community.
+
+It may not be amiss in this place concisely to remark the origin
+and progress of the idea, which aims at the exclusion of military
+establishments in time of peace. Though in speculative minds it may
+arise from a contemplation of the nature and tendency of such
+institutions, fortified by the events that have happened in other
+ages and countries, yet as a national sentiment, it must be traced
+to those habits of thinking which we derive from the nation from
+whom the inhabitants of these States have in general sprung.
+
+In England, for a long time after the Norman Conquest, the
+authority of the monarch was almost unlimited. Inroads were
+gradually made upon the prerogative, in favor of liberty, first by
+the barons, and afterwards by the people, till the greatest part of
+its most formidable pretensions became extinct. But it was not till
+the revolution in 1688, which elevated the Prince of Orange to the
+throne of Great Britain, that English liberty was completely
+triumphant. As incident to the undefined power of making war, an
+acknowledged prerogative of the crown, Charles II. had, by his own
+authority, kept on foot in time of peace a body of 5,000 regular
+troops. And this number James II. increased to 30,000; who were
+paid out of his civil list. At the revolution, to abolish the
+exercise of so dangerous an authority, it became an article of the
+Bill of Rights then framed, that "the raising or keeping a standing
+army within the kingdom in time of peace, UNLESS WITH THE CONSENT OF
+PARLIAMENT, was against law."
+
+In that kingdom, when the pulse of liberty was at its highest
+pitch, no security against the danger of standing armies was thought
+requisite, beyond a prohibition of their being raised or kept up by
+the mere authority of the executive magistrate. The patriots, who
+effected that memorable revolution, were too temperate, too
+wellinformed, to think of any restraint on the legislative
+discretion. They were aware that a certain number of troops for
+guards and garrisons were indispensable; that no precise bounds
+could be set to the national exigencies; that a power equal to
+every possible contingency must exist somewhere in the government:
+and that when they referred the exercise of that power to the
+judgment of the legislature, they had arrived at the ultimate point
+of precaution which was reconcilable with the safety of the
+community.
+
+From the same source, the people of America may be said to have
+derived an hereditary impression of danger to liberty, from standing
+armies in time of peace. The circumstances of a revolution
+quickened the public sensibility on every point connected with the
+security of popular rights, and in some instances raise the warmth
+of our zeal beyond the degree which consisted with the due
+temperature of the body politic. The attempts of two of the States
+to restrict the authority of the legislature in the article of
+military establishments, are of the number of these instances. The
+principles which had taught us to be jealous of the power of an
+hereditary monarch were by an injudicious excess extended to the
+representatives of the people in their popular assemblies. Even in
+some of the States, where this error was not adopted, we find
+unnecessary declarations that standing armies ought not to be kept
+up, in time of peace, WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF THE LEGISLATURE. I
+call them unnecessary, because the reason which had introduced a
+similar provision into the English Bill of Rights is not applicable
+to any of the State constitutions. The power of raising armies at
+all, under those constitutions, can by no construction be deemed to
+reside anywhere else, than in the legislatures themselves; and it
+was superfluous, if not absurd, to declare that a matter should not
+be done without the consent of a body, which alone had the power of
+doing it. Accordingly, in some of these constitutions, and among
+others, in that of this State of New York, which has been justly
+celebrated, both in Europe and America, as one of the best of the
+forms of government established in this country, there is a total
+silence upon the subject.
+
+It is remarkable, that even in the two States which seem to have
+meditated an interdiction of military establishments in time of
+peace, the mode of expression made use of is rather cautionary than
+prohibitory. It is not said, that standing armies SHALL NOT BE kept
+up, but that they OUGHT NOT to be kept up, in time of peace. This
+ambiguity of terms appears to have been the result of a conflict
+between jealousy and conviction; between the desire of excluding
+such establishments at all events, and the persuasion that an
+absolute exclusion would be unwise and unsafe.
+
+Can it be doubted that such a provision, whenever the situation
+of public affairs was understood to require a departure from it,
+would be interpreted by the legislature into a mere admonition, and
+would be made to yield to the necessities or supposed necessities of
+the State? Let the fact already mentioned, with respect to
+Pennsylvania, decide. What then (it may be asked) is the use of
+such a provision, if it cease to operate the moment there is an
+inclination to disregard it?
+
+Let us examine whether there be any comparison, in point of
+efficacy, between the provision alluded to and that which is
+contained in the new Constitution, for restraining the
+appropriations of money for military purposes to the period of two
+years. The former, by aiming at too much, is calculated to effect
+nothing; the latter, by steering clear of an imprudent extreme, and
+by being perfectly compatible with a proper provision for the
+exigencies of the nation, will have a salutary and powerful
+operation.
+
+The legislature of the United States will be OBLIGED, by this
+provision, once at least in every two years, to deliberate upon the
+propriety of keeping a military force on foot; to come to a new
+resolution on the point; and to declare their sense of the matter,
+by a formal vote in the face of their constituents. They are not AT
+LIBERTY to vest in the executive department permanent funds for the
+support of an army, if they were even incautious enough to be
+willing to repose in it so improper a confidence. As the spirit of
+party, in different degrees, must be expected to infect all
+political bodies, there will be, no doubt, persons in the national
+legislature willing enough to arraign the measures and criminate the
+views of the majority. The provision for the support of a military
+force will always be a favorable topic for declamation. As often as
+the question comes forward, the public attention will be roused and
+attracted to the subject, by the party in opposition; and if the
+majority should be really disposed to exceed the proper limits, the
+community will be warned of the danger, and will have an opportunity
+of taking measures to guard against it. Independent of parties in
+the national legislature itself, as often as the period of
+discussion arrived, the State legislatures, who will always be not
+only vigilant but suspicious and jealous guardians of the rights of
+the citizens against encroachments from the federal government, will
+constantly have their attention awake to the conduct of the national
+rulers, and will be ready enough, if any thing improper appears, to
+sound the alarm to the people, and not only to be the VOICE, but, if
+necessary, the ARM of their discontent.
+
+Schemes to subvert the liberties of a great community REQUIRE
+TIME to mature them for execution. An army, so large as seriously
+to menace those liberties, could only be formed by progressive
+augmentations; which would suppose, not merely a temporary
+combination between the legislature and executive, but a continued
+conspiracy for a series of time. Is it probable that such a
+combination would exist at all? Is it probable that it would be
+persevered in, and transmitted along through all the successive
+variations in a representative body, which biennial elections would
+naturally produce in both houses? Is it presumable, that every man,
+the instant he took his seat in the national Senate or House of
+Representatives, would commence a traitor to his constituents and to
+his country? Can it be supposed that there would not be found one
+man, discerning enough to detect so atrocious a conspiracy, or bold
+or honest enough to apprise his constituents of their danger? If
+such presumptions can fairly be made, there ought at once to be an
+end of all delegated authority. The people should resolve to recall
+all the powers they have heretofore parted with out of their own
+hands, and to divide themselves into as many States as there are
+counties, in order that they may be able to manage their own
+concerns in person.
+
+If such suppositions could even be reasonably made, still the
+concealment of the design, for any duration, would be impracticable.
+It would be announced, by the very circumstance of augmenting the
+army to so great an extent in time of profound peace. What
+colorable reason could be assigned, in a country so situated, for
+such vast augmentations of the military force? It is impossible
+that the people could be long deceived; and the destruction of the
+project, and of the projectors, would quickly follow the discovery.
+
+It has been said that the provision which limits the
+appropriation of money for the support of an army to the period of
+two years would be unavailing, because the Executive, when once
+possessed of a force large enough to awe the people into submission,
+would find resources in that very force sufficient to enable him to
+dispense with supplies from the acts of the legislature. But the
+question again recurs, upon what pretense could he be put in
+possession of a force of that magnitude in time of peace? If we
+suppose it to have been created in consequence of some domestic
+insurrection or foreign war, then it becomes a case not within the
+principles of the objection; for this is levelled against the power
+of keeping up troops in time of peace. Few persons will be so
+visionary as seriously to contend that military forces ought not to
+be raised to quell a rebellion or resist an invasion; and if the
+defense of the community under such circumstances should make it
+necessary to have an army so numerous as to hazard its liberty, this
+is one of those calamaties for which there is neither preventative
+nor cure. It cannot be provided against by any possible form of
+government; it might even result from a simple league offensive and
+defensive, if it should ever be necessary for the confederates or
+allies to form an army for common defense.
+
+But it is an evil infinitely less likely to attend us in a
+united than in a disunited state; nay, it may be safely asserted
+that it is an evil altogether unlikely to attend us in the latter
+situation. It is not easy to conceive a possibility that dangers so
+formidable can assail the whole Union, as to demand a force
+considerable enough to place our liberties in the least jeopardy,
+especially if we take into our view the aid to be derived from the
+militia, which ought always to be counted upon as a valuable and
+powerful auxiliary. But in a state of disunion (as has been fully
+shown in another place), the contrary of this supposition would
+become not only probable, but almost unavoidable.
+
+PUBLIUS.
+
+
+
+
+
+FEDERALIST No. 27
+
+
+
+The Same Subject Continued
+
+(The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to
+the Common Defense Considered)
+
+From the New York Packet.
+
+Tuesday, December 25, 1787.
+
+
+
+HAMILTON
+
+
+
+To the People of the State of New York:
+
+IT HAS been urged, in different shapes, that a Constitution of
+the kind proposed by the convention cannot operate without the aid
+of a military force to execute its laws. This, however, like most
+other things that have been alleged on that side, rests on mere
+general assertion, unsupported by any precise or intelligible
+designation of the reasons upon which it is founded. As far as I
+have been able to divine the latent meaning of the objectors, it
+seems to originate in a presupposition that the people will be
+disinclined to the exercise of federal authority in any matter of an
+internal nature. Waiving any exception that might be taken to the
+inaccuracy or inexplicitness of the distinction between internal and
+external, let us inquire what ground there is to presuppose that
+disinclination in the people. Unless we presume at the same time
+that the powers of the general government will be worse administered
+than those of the State government, there seems to be no room for
+the presumption of ill-will, disaffection, or opposition in the
+people. I believe it may be laid down as a general rule that their
+confidence in and obedience to a government will commonly be
+proportioned to the goodness or badness of its administration. It
+must be admitted that there are exceptions to this rule; but these
+exceptions depend so entirely on accidental causes, that they cannot
+be considered as having any relation to the intrinsic merits or
+demerits of a constitution. These can only be judged of by general
+principles and maxims.
+
+Various reasons have been suggested, in the course of these
+papers, to induce a probability that the general government will be
+better administered than the particular governments; the principal
+of which reasons are that the extension of the spheres of election
+will present a greater option, or latitude of choice, to the people;
+that through the medium of the State legislatures which are select
+bodies of men, and which are to appoint the members of the national
+Senate there is reason to expect that this branch will generally be
+composed with peculiar care and judgment; that these circumstances
+promise greater knowledge and more extensive information in the
+national councils, and that they will be less apt to be tainted by
+the spirit of faction, and more out of the reach of those occasional
+ill-humors, or temporary prejudices and propensities, which, in
+smaller societies, frequently contaminate the public councils, beget
+injustice and oppression of a part of the community, and engender
+schemes which, though they gratify a momentary inclination or
+desire, terminate in general distress, dissatisfaction, and disgust.
+Several additional reasons of considerable force, to fortify that
+probability, will occur when we come to survey, with a more critical
+eye, the interior structure of the edifice which we are invited to
+erect. It will be sufficient here to remark, that until
+satisfactory reasons can be assigned to justify an opinion, that the
+federal government is likely to be administered in such a manner as
+to render it odious or contemptible to the people, there can be no
+reasonable foundation for the supposition that the laws of the Union
+will meet with any greater obstruction from them, or will stand in
+need of any other methods to enforce their execution, than the laws
+of the particular members.
+
+The hope of impunity is a strong incitement to sedition; the
+dread of punishment, a proportionably strong discouragement to it.
+Will not the government of the Union, which, if possessed of a due
+degree of power, can call to its aid the collective resources of the
+whole Confederacy, be more likely to repress the FORMER sentiment
+and to inspire the LATTER, than that of a single State, which can
+only command the resources within itself? A turbulent faction in a
+State may easily suppose itself able to contend with the friends to
+the government in that State; but it can hardly be so infatuated as
+to imagine itself a match for the combined efforts of the Union. If
+this reflection be just, there is less danger of resistance from
+irregular combinations of individuals to the authority of the
+Confederacy than to that of a single member.
+
+I will, in this place, hazard an observation, which will not be
+the less just because to some it may appear new; which is, that the
+more the operations of the national authority are intermingled in
+the ordinary exercise of government, the more the citizens are
+accustomed to meet with it in the common occurrences of their
+political life, the more it is familiarized to their sight and to
+their feelings, the further it enters into those objects which touch
+the most sensible chords and put in motion the most active springs
+of the human heart, the greater will be the probability that it will
+conciliate the respect and attachment of the community. Man is very
+much a creature of habit. A thing that rarely strikes his senses
+will generally have but little influence upon his mind. A
+government continually at a distance and out of sight can hardly be
+expected to interest the sensations of the people. The inference
+is, that the authority of the Union, and the affections of the
+citizens towards it, will be strengthened, rather than weakened, by
+its extension to what are called matters of internal concern; and
+will have less occasion to recur to force, in proportion to the
+familiarity and comprehensiveness of its agency. The more it
+circulates through those channels and currents in which the passions
+of mankind naturally flow, the less will it require the aid of the
+violent and perilous expedients of compulsion.
+
+One thing, at all events, must be evident, that a government
+like the one proposed would bid much fairer to avoid the necessity
+of using force, than that species of league contend for by most of
+its opponents; the authority of which should only operate upon the
+States in their political or collective capacities. It has been
+shown that in such a Confederacy there can be no sanction for the
+laws but force; that frequent delinquencies in the members are the
+natural offspring of the very frame of the government; and that as
+often as these happen, they can only be redressed, if at all, by war
+and violence.
+
+The plan reported by the convention, by extending the authority
+of the federal head to the individual citizens of the several
+States, will enable the government to employ the ordinary magistracy
+of each, in the execution of its laws. It is easy to perceive that
+this will tend to destroy, in the common apprehension, all
+distinction between the sources from which they might proceed; and
+will give the federal government the same advantage for securing a
+due obedience to its authority which is enjoyed by the government of
+each State, in addition to the influence on public opinion which
+will result from the important consideration of its having power to
+call to its assistance and support the resources of the whole Union.
+It merits particular attention in this place, that the laws of the
+Confederacy, as to the ENUMERATED and LEGITIMATE objects of its
+jurisdiction, will become the SUPREME LAW of the land; to the
+observance of which all officers, legislative, executive, and
+judicial, in each State, will be bound by the sanctity of an oath.
+Thus the legislatures, courts, and magistrates, of the respective
+members, will be incorporated into the operations of the national
+government AS FAR AS ITS JUST AND CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY EXTENDS;
+and will be rendered auxiliary to the enforcement of its laws. [1%]
+Any man who will pursue, by his own reflections, the consequences
+of this situation, will perceive that there is good ground to
+calculate upon a regular and peaceable execution of the laws of the
+Union, if its powers are administered with a common share of
+prudence. If we will arbitrarily suppose the contrary, we may
+deduce any inferences we please from the supposition; for it is
+certainly possible, by an injudicious exercise of the authorities of
+the best government that ever was, or ever can be instituted, to
+provoke and precipitate the people into the wildest excesses. But
+though the adversaries of the proposed Constitution should presume
+that the national rulers would be insensible to the motives of
+public good, or to the obligations of duty, I would still ask them
+how the interests of ambition, or the views of encroachment, can be
+promoted by such a conduct?
+
+PUBLIUS.
+
+FNA1-@1 The sophistry which has been employed to show that this will
+tend to the destruction of the State governments, will, in its will,
+in its proper place, be fully detected.
+
+
+
+
+
+FEDERALIST No. 28
+
+
+
+The Same Subject Continued
+
+(The Idea of Restraining the Legislative Authority in Regard to
+the Common Defense Considered)
+
+For the Independent Journal.
+
+
+
+HAMILTON
+
+
+
+To the People of the State of New York:
+
+THAT there may happen cases in which the national government may
+be necessitated to resort to force, cannot be denied. Our own
+experience has corroborated the lessons taught by the examples of
+other nations; that emergencies of this sort will sometimes arise
+in all societies, however constituted; that seditions and
+insurrections are, unhappily, maladies as inseparable from the body
+politic as tumors and eruptions from the natural body; that the
+idea of governing at all times by the simple force of law (which we
+have been told is the only admissible principle of republican
+government), has no place but in the reveries of those political
+doctors whose sagacity disdains the admonitions of experimental
+instruction.
+
+Should such emergencies at any time happen under the national
+government, there could be no remedy but force. The means to be
+employed must be proportioned to the extent of the mischief. If it
+should be a slight commotion in a small part of a State, the militia
+of the residue would be adequate to its suppression; and the
+national presumption is that they would be ready to do their duty.
+An insurrection, whatever may be its immediate cause, eventually
+endangers all government. Regard to the public peace, if not to the
+rights of the Union, would engage the citizens to whom the contagion
+had not communicated itself to oppose the insurgents; and if the
+general government should be found in practice conducive to the
+prosperity and felicity of the people, it were irrational to believe
+that they would be disinclined to its support.
+
+If, on the contrary, the insurrection should pervade a whole
+State, or a principal part of it, the employment of a different kind
+of force might become unavoidable. It appears that Massachusetts
+found it necessary to raise troops for repressing the disorders
+within that State; that Pennsylvania, from the mere apprehension of
+commotions among a part of her citizens, has thought proper to have
+recourse to the same measure. Suppose the State of New York had
+been inclined to re-establish her lost jurisdiction over the
+inhabitants of Vermont, could she have hoped for success in such an
+enterprise from the efforts of the militia alone? Would she not
+have been compelled to raise and to maintain a more regular force
+for the execution of her design? If it must then be admitted that
+the necessity of recurring to a force different from the militia, in
+cases of this extraordinary nature, is applicable to the State
+governments themselves, why should the possibility, that the
+national government might be under a like necessity, in similar
+extremities, be made an objection to its existence? Is it not
+surprising that men who declare an attachment to the Union in the
+abstract, should urge as an objection to the proposed Constitution
+what applies with tenfold weight to the plan for which they contend;
+and what, as far as it has any foundation in truth, is an
+inevitable consequence of civil society upon an enlarged scale? Who
+would not prefer that possibility to the unceasing agitations and
+frequent revolutions which are the continual scourges of petty
+republics?
+
+Let us pursue this examination in another light. Suppose, in
+lieu of one general system, two, or three, or even four
+Confederacies were to be formed, would not the same difficulty
+oppose itself to the operations of either of these Confederacies?
+Would not each of them be exposed to the same casualties; and when
+these happened, be obliged to have recourse to the same expedients
+for upholding its authority which are objected to in a government
+for all the States? Would the militia, in this supposition, be more
+ready or more able to support the federal authority than in the case
+of a general union? All candid and intelligent men must, upon due
+consideration, acknowledge that the principle of the objection is
+equally applicable to either of the two cases; and that whether we
+have one government for all the States, or different governments for
+different parcels of them, or even if there should be an entire
+separation of the States, there might sometimes be a necessity to
+make use of a force constituted differently from the militia, to
+preserve the peace of the community and to maintain the just
+authority of the laws against those violent invasions of them which
+amount to insurrections and rebellions.
+
+Independent of all other reasonings upon the subject, it is a
+full answer to those who require a more peremptory provision against
+military establishments in time of peace, to say that the whole
+power of the proposed government is to be in the hands of the
+representatives of the people. This is the essential, and, after
+all, only efficacious security for the rights and privileges of the
+people, which is attainable in civil society. [1]
+
+If the representatives of the people betray their constituents,
+there is then no resource left but in the exertion of that original
+right of self-defense which is paramount to all positive forms of
+government, and which against the usurpations of the national
+rulers, may be exerted with infinitely better prospect of success
+than against those of the rulers of an individual state. In a
+single state, if the persons intrusted with supreme power become
+usurpers, the different parcels, subdivisions, or districts of which
+it consists, having no distinct government in each, can take no
+regular measures for defense. The citizens must rush tumultuously
+to arms, without concert, without system, without resource; except
+in their courage and despair. The usurpers, clothed with the forms
+of legal authority, can too often crush the opposition in embryo.
+The smaller the extent of the territory, the more difficult will it
+be for the people to form a regular or systematic plan of
+opposition, and the more easy will it be to defeat their early
+efforts. Intelligence can be more speedily obtained of their
+preparations and movements, and the military force in the possession
+of the usurpers can be more rapidly directed against the part where
+the opposition has begun. In this situation there must be a
+peculiar coincidence of circumstances to insure success to the
+popular resistance.
+
+The obstacles to usurpation and the facilities of resistance
+increase with the increased extent of the state, provided the
+citizens understand their rights and are disposed to defend them.
+The natural strength of the people in a large community, in
+proportion to the artificial strength of the government, is greater
+than in a small, and of course more competent to a struggle with the
+attempts of the government to establish a tyranny. But in a
+confederacy the people, without exaggeration, may be said to be
+entirely the masters of their own fate. Power being almost always
+the rival of power, the general government will at all times stand
+ready to check the usurpations of the state governments, and these
+will have the same disposition towards the general government. The
+people, by throwing themselves into either scale, will infallibly
+make it preponderate. If their rights are invaded by either, they
+can make use of the other as the instrument of redress. How wise
+will it be in them by cherishing the union to preserve to themselves
+an advantage which can never be too highly prized!
+
+It may safely be received as an axiom in our political system,
+that the State governments will, in all possible contingencies,
+afford complete security against invasions of the public liberty by
+the national authority. Projects of usurpation cannot be masked
+under pretenses so likely to escape the penetration of select bodies
+of men, as of the people at large. The legislatures will have
+better means of information. They can discover the danger at a
+distance; and possessing all the organs of civil power, and the
+confidence of the people, they can at once adopt a regular plan of
+opposition, in which they can combine all the resources of the
+community. They can readily communicate with each other in the
+different States, and unite their common forces for the protection
+of their common liberty.
+
+The great extent of the country is a further security. We have
+already experienced its utility against the attacks of a foreign
+power. And it would have precisely the same effect against the
+enterprises of ambitious rulers in the national councils. If the
+federal army should be able to quell the resistance of one State,
+the distant States would have it in their power to make head with
+fresh forces. The advantages obtained in one place must be
+abandoned to subdue the opposition in others; and the moment the
+part which had been reduced to submission was left to itself, its
+efforts would be renewed, and its resistance revive.
+
+We should recollect that the extent of the military force must,
+at all events, be regulated by the resources of the country. For a
+long time to come, it will not be possible to maintain a large army;
+and as the means of doing this increase, the population and natural
+strength of the community will proportionably increase. When will
+the time arrive that the federal government can raise and maintain
+an army capable of erecting a despotism over the great body of the
+people of an immense empire, who are in a situation, through the
+medium of their State governments, to take measures for their own
+defense, with all the celerity, regularity, and system of
+independent nations? The apprehension may be considered as a
+disease, for which there can be found no cure in the resources of
+argument and reasoning.
+
+PUBLIUS.
+
+FNA1-@1 Its full efficacy will be examined hereafter.
+
+
+
+
+
+FEDERALIST No. 29
+
+
+
+Concerning the Militia
+
+From the Daily Advertiser.
+
+Thursday, January 10, 1788
+
+
+
+HAMILTON
+
+
+
+To the People of the State of New York:
+
+THE power of regulating the militia, and of commanding its
+services in times of insurrection and invasion are natural incidents
+to the duties of superintending the common defense, and of watching
+over the internal peace of the Confederacy.
+
+It requires no skill in the science of war to discern that
+uniformity in the organization and discipline of the militia would
+be attended with the most beneficial effects, whenever they were
+called into service for the public defense. It would enable them to
+discharge the duties of the camp and of the field with mutual
+intelligence and concert an advantage of peculiar moment in the
+operations of an army; and it would fit them much sooner to acquire
+the degree of proficiency in military functions which would be
+essential to their usefulness. This desirable uniformity can only
+be accomplished by confiding the regulation of the militia to the
+direction of the national authority. It is, therefore, with the
+most evident propriety, that the plan of the convention proposes to
+empower the Union "to provide for organizing, arming, and
+disciplining the militia, and for governing such part of them as may
+be employed in the service of the United States, RESERVING TO THE
+STATES RESPECTIVELY THE APPOINTMENT OF THE OFFICERS, AND THE
+AUTHORITY OF TRAINING THE MILITIA ACCORDING TO THE DISCIPLINE
+PRESCRIBED BY CONGRESS."
+
+Of the different grounds which have been taken in opposition to
+the plan of the convention, there is none that was so little to have
+been expected, or is so untenable in itself, as the one from which
+this particular provision has been attacked. If a well-regulated
+militia be the most natural defense of a free country, it ought
+certainly to be under the regulation and at the disposal of that
+body which is constituted the guardian of the national security. If
+standing armies are dangerous to liberty, an efficacious power over
+the militia, in the body to whose care the protection of the State
+is committed, ought, as far as possible, to take away the inducement
+and the pretext to such unfriendly institutions. If the federal
+government can command the aid of the militia in those emergencies
+which call for the military arm in support of the civil magistrate,
+it can the better dispense with the employment of a different kind
+of force. If it cannot avail itself of the former, it will be
+obliged to recur to the latter. To render an army unnecessary, will
+be a more certain method of preventing its existence than a thousand
+prohibitions upon paper.
+
+In order to cast an odium upon the power of calling forth the
+militia to execute the laws of the Union, it has been remarked that
+there is nowhere any provision in the proposed Constitution for
+calling out the POSSE COMITATUS, to assist the magistrate in the
+execution of his duty, whence it has been inferred, that military
+force was intended to be his only auxiliary. There is a striking
+incoherence in the objections which have appeared, and sometimes
+even from the same quarter, not much calculated to inspire a very
+favorable opinion of the sincerity or fair dealing of their authors.
+The same persons who tell us in one breath, that the powers of the
+federal government will be despotic and unlimited, inform us in the
+next, that it has not authority sufficient even to call out the
+POSSE COMITATUS. The latter, fortunately, is as much short of the
+truth as the former exceeds it. It would be as absurd to doubt,
+that a right to pass all laws NECESSARY AND PROPER to execute its
+declared powers, would include that of requiring the assistance of
+the citizens to the officers who may be intrusted with the execution
+of those laws, as it would be to believe, that a right to enact laws
+necessary and proper for the imposition and collection of taxes
+would involve that of varying the rules of descent and of the
+alienation of landed property, or of abolishing the trial by jury in
+cases relating to it. It being therefore evident that the
+supposition of a want of power to require the aid of the POSSE
+COMITATUS is entirely destitute of color, it will follow, that the
+conclusion which has been drawn from it, in its application to the
+authority of the federal government over the militia, is as uncandid
+as it is illogical. What reason could there be to infer, that force
+was intended to be the sole instrument of authority, merely because
+there is a power to make use of it when necessary? What shall we
+think of the motives which could induce men of sense to reason in
+this manner? How shall we prevent a conflict between charity and
+judgment?
+
+By a curious refinement upon the spirit of republican jealousy,
+we are even taught to apprehend danger from the militia itself, in
+the hands of the federal government. It is observed that select
+corps may be formed, composed of the young and ardent, who may be
+rendered subservient to the views of arbitrary power. What plan for
+the regulation of the militia may be pursued by the national
+government, is impossible to be foreseen. But so far from viewing
+the matter in the same light with those who object to select corps
+as dangerous, were the Constitution ratified, and were I to deliver
+my sentiments to a member of the federal legislature from this State
+on the subject of a militia establishment, I should hold to him, in
+substance, the following discourse:
+
+"The project of disciplining all the militia of the United
+States is as futile as it would be injurious, if it were capable of
+being carried into execution. A tolerable expertness in military
+movements is a business that requires time and practice. It is not
+a day, or even a week, that will suffice for the attainment of it.
+To oblige the great body of the yeomanry, and of the other classes
+of the citizens, to be under arms for the purpose of going through
+military exercises and evolutions, as often as might be necessary to
+acquire the degree of perfection which would entitle them to the
+character of a well-regulated militia, would be a real grievance to
+the people, and a serious public inconvenience and loss. It would
+form an annual deduction from the productive labor of the country,
+to an amount which, calculating upon the present numbers of the
+people, would not fall far short of the whole expense of the civil
+establishments of all the States. To attempt a thing which would
+abridge the mass of labor and industry to so considerable an extent,
+would be unwise: and the experiment, if made, could not succeed,
+because it would not long be endured. Little more can reasonably be
+aimed at, with respect to the people at large, than to have them
+properly armed and equipped; and in order to see that this be not
+neglected, it will be necessary to assemble them once or twice in
+the course of a year.
+
+"But though the scheme of disciplining the whole nation must be
+abandoned as mischievous or impracticable; yet it is a matter of
+the utmost importance that a well-digested plan should, as soon as
+possible, be adopted for the proper establishment of the militia.
+The attention of the government ought particularly to be directed
+to the formation of a select corps of moderate extent, upon such
+principles as will really fit them for service in case of need. By
+thus circumscribing the plan, it will be possible to have an
+excellent body of well-trained militia, ready to take the field
+whenever the defense of the State shall require it. This will not
+only lessen the call for military establishments, but if
+circumstances should at any time oblige the government to form an
+army of any magnitude that army can never be formidable to the
+liberties of the people while there is a large body of citizens,
+little, if at all, inferior to them in discipline and the use of
+arms, who stand ready to defend their own rights and those of their
+fellow-citizens. This appears to me the only substitute that can be
+devised for a standing army, and the best possible security against
+it, if it should exist."
+
+Thus differently from the adversaries of the proposed
+Constitution should I reason on the same subject, deducing arguments
+of safety from the very sources which they represent as fraught with
+danger and perdition. But how the national legislature may reason
+on the point, is a thing which neither they nor I can foresee.
+
+There is something so far-fetched and so extravagant in the idea
+of danger to liberty from the militia, that one is at a loss whether
+to treat it with gravity or with raillery; whether to consider it
+as a mere trial of skill, like the paradoxes of rhetoricians; as a
+disingenuous artifice to instil prejudices at any price; or as the
+serious offspring of political fanaticism. Where in the name of
+common-sense, are our fears to end if we may not trust our sons, our
+brothers, our neighbors, our fellow-citizens? What shadow of danger
+can there be from men who are daily mingling with the rest of their
+countrymen and who participate with them in the same feelings,
+sentiments, habits and interests? What reasonable cause of
+apprehension can be inferred from a power in the Union to prescribe
+regulations for the militia, and to command its services when
+necessary, while the particular States are to have the SOLE AND
+EXCLUSIVE APPOINTMENT OF THE OFFICERS? If it were possible
+seriously to indulge a jealousy of the militia upon any conceivable
+establishment under the federal government, the circumstance of the
+officers being in the appointment of the States ought at once to
+extinguish it. There can be no doubt that this circumstance will
+always secure to them a preponderating influence over the militia.
+
+In reading many of the publications against the Constitution, a
+man is apt to imagine that he is perusing some ill-written tale or
+romance, which instead of natural and agreeable images, exhibits to
+the mind nothing but frightful and distorted shapes "Gorgons, hydras,
+and chimeras dire"; discoloring and disfiguring whatever it represents,
+and transforming everything it touches into a monster.
+
+A sample of this is to be observed in the exaggerated and
+improbable suggestions which have taken place respecting the power
+of calling for the services of the militia. That of New Hampshire
+is to be marched to Georgia, of Georgia to New Hampshire, of New
+York to Kentucky, and of Kentucky to Lake Champlain. Nay, the debts
+due to the French and Dutch are to be paid in militiamen instead of
+louis d'ors and ducats. At one moment there is to be a large army
+to lay prostrate the liberties of the people; at another moment the
+militia of Virginia are to be dragged from their homes five or six
+hundred miles, to tame the republican contumacy of Massachusetts;
+and that of Massachusetts is to be transported an equal distance to
+subdue the refractory haughtiness of the aristocratic Virginians.
+Do the persons who rave at this rate imagine that their art or
+their eloquence can impose any conceits or absurdities upon the
+people of America for infallible truths?
+
+If there should be an army to be made use of as the engine of
+despotism, what need of the militia? If there should be no army,
+whither would the militia, irritated by being called upon to
+undertake a distant and hopeless expedition, for the purpose of
+riveting the chains of slavery upon a part of their countrymen,
+direct their course, but to the seat of the tyrants, who had
+meditated so foolish as well as so wicked a project, to crush them
+in their imagined intrenchments of power, and to make them an
+example of the just vengeance of an abused and incensed people? Is
+this the way in which usurpers stride to dominion over a numerous
+and enlightened nation? Do they begin by exciting the detestation
+of the very instruments of their intended usurpations? Do they
+usually commence their career by wanton and disgustful acts of
+power, calculated to answer no end, but to draw upon themselves
+universal hatred and execration? Are suppositions of this sort the
+sober admonitions of discerning patriots to a discerning people? Or
+are they the inflammatory ravings of incendiaries or distempered
+enthusiasts? If we were even to suppose the national rulers
+actuated by the most ungovernable ambition, it is impossible to
+believe that they would employ such preposterous means to accomplish
+their designs.
+
+In times of insurrection, or invasion, it would be natural and
+proper that the militia of a neighboring State should be marched
+into another, to resist a common enemy, or to guard the republic
+against the violence of faction or sedition. This was frequently
+the case, in respect to the first object, in the course of the late
+war; and this mutual succor is, indeed, a principal end of our
+political association. If the power of affording it be placed under
+the direction of the Union, there will be no danger of a supine and
+listless inattention to the dangers of a neighbor, till its near
+approach had superadded the incitements of selfpreservation to the
+too feeble impulses of duty and sympathy.
+
+PUBLIUS.
+
+
+
+
+
+FEDERALIST No. 30
+
+
+
+Concerning the General Power of Taxation
+
+From the New York Packet.
+
+Friday, December 28, 1787.
+
+
+
+HAMILTON
+
+
+
+To the People of the State of New York:
+
+IT HAS been already observed that the federal government ought
+to possess the power of providing for the support of the national
+forces; in which proposition was intended to be included the
+expense of raising troops, of building and equipping fleets, and all
+other expenses in any wise connected with military arrangements and
+operations. But these are not the only objects to which the
+jurisdiction of the Union, in respect to revenue, must necessarily
+be empowered to extend. It must embrace a provision for the support
+of the national civil list; for the payment of the national debts
+contracted, or that may be contracted; and, in general, for all
+those matters which will call for disbursements out of the national
+treasury. The conclusion is, that there must be interwoven, in the
+frame of the government, a general power of taxation, in one shape
+or another.
+
+Money is, with propriety, considered as the vital principle of
+the body politic; as that which sustains its life and motion, and
+enables it to perform its most essential functions. A complete
+power, therefore, to procure a regular and adequate supply of it, as
+far as the resources of the community will permit, may be regarded
+as an indispensable ingredient in every constitution. From a
+deficiency in this particular, one of two evils must ensue; either
+the people must be subjected to continual plunder, as a substitute
+for a more eligible mode of supplying the public wants, or the
+government must sink into a fatal atrophy, and, in a short course of
+time, perish.
+
+In the Ottoman or Turkish empire, the sovereign, though in other
+respects absolute master of the lives and fortunes of his subjects,
+has no right to impose a new tax. The consequence is that he
+permits the bashaws or governors of provinces to pillage the people
+without mercy; and, in turn, squeezes out of them the sums of which
+he stands in need, to satisfy his own exigencies and those of the
+state. In America, from a like cause, the government of the Union
+has gradually dwindled into a state of decay, approaching nearly to
+annihilation. Who can doubt, that the happiness of the people in
+both countries would be promoted by competent authorities in the
+proper hands, to provide the revenues which the necessities of the
+public might require?
+
+The present Confederation, feeble as it is intended to repose in
+the United States, an unlimited power of providing for the pecuniary
+wants of the Union. But proceeding upon an erroneous principle, it
+has been done in such a manner as entirely to have frustrated the
+intention. Congress, by the articles which compose that compact (as
+has already been stated), are authorized to ascertain and call for
+any sums of money necessary, in their judgment, to the service of
+the United States; and their requisitions, if conformable to the
+rule of apportionment, are in every constitutional sense obligatory
+upon the States. These have no right to question the propriety of
+the demand; no discretion beyond that of devising the ways and
+means of furnishing the sums demanded. But though this be strictly
+and truly the case; though the assumption of such a right would be
+an infringement of the articles of Union; though it may seldom or
+never have been avowedly claimed, yet in practice it has been
+constantly exercised, and would continue to be so, as long as the
+revenues of the Confederacy should remain dependent on the
+intermediate agency of its members. What the consequences of this
+system have been, is within the knowledge of every man the least
+conversant in our public affairs, and has been amply unfolded in
+different parts of these inquiries. It is this which has chiefly
+contributed to reduce us to a situation, which affords ample cause
+both of mortification to ourselves, and of triumph to our enemies.
+
+What remedy can there be for this situation, but in a change of
+the system which has produced it in a change of the fallacious and
+delusive system of quotas and requisitions? What substitute can
+there be imagined for this ignis fatuus in finance, but that of
+permitting the national government to raise its own revenues by the
+ordinary methods of taxation authorized in every well-ordered
+constitution of civil government? Ingenious men may declaim with
+plausibility on any subject; but no human ingenuity can point out
+any other expedient to rescue us from the inconveniences and
+embarrassments naturally resulting from defective supplies of the
+public treasury.
+
+The more intelligent adversaries of the new Constitution admit
+the force of this reasoning; but they qualify their admission by a
+distinction between what they call INTERNAL and EXTERNAL taxation.
+The former they would reserve to the State governments; the
+latter, which they explain into commercial imposts, or rather duties
+on imported articles, they declare themselves willing to concede to
+the federal head. This distinction, however, would violate the
+maxim of good sense and sound policy, which dictates that every
+POWER ought to be in proportion to its OBJECT; and would still
+leave the general government in a kind of tutelage to the State
+governments, inconsistent with every idea of vigor or efficiency.
+Who can pretend that commercial imposts are, or would be, alone
+equal to the present and future exigencies of the Union? Taking
+into the account the existing debt, foreign and domestic, upon any
+plan of extinguishment which a man moderately impressed with the
+importance of public justice and public credit could approve, in
+addition to the establishments which all parties will acknowledge to
+be necessary, we could not reasonably flatter ourselves, that this
+resource alone, upon the most improved scale, would even suffice for
+its present necessities. Its future necessities admit not of
+calculation or limitation; and upon the principle, more than once
+adverted to, the power of making provision for them as they arise
+ought to be equally unconfined. I believe it may be regarded as a
+position warranted by the history of mankind, that, IN THE USUAL
+PROGRESS OF THINGS, THE NECESSITIES OF A NATION, IN EVERY STAGE OF
+ITS EXISTENCE, WILL BE FOUND AT LEAST EQUAL TO ITS RESOURCES.
+
+To say that deficiencies may be provided for by requisitions
+upon the States, is on the one hand to acknowledge that this system
+cannot be depended upon, and on the other hand to depend upon it for
+every thing beyond a certain limit. Those who have carefully
+attended to its vices and deformities as they have been exhibited by
+experience or delineated in the course of these papers, must feel
+invincible repugnancy to trusting the national interests in any
+degree to its operation. Its inevitable tendency, whenever it is
+brought into activity, must be to enfeeble the Union, and sow the
+seeds of discord and contention between the federal head and its
+members, and between the members themselves. Can it be expected
+that the deficiencies would be better supplied in this mode than the
+total wants of the Union have heretofore been supplied in the same
+mode? It ought to be recollected that if less will be required from
+the States, they will have proportionably less means to answer the
+demand. If the opinions of those who contend for the distinction
+which has been mentioned were to be received as evidence of truth,
+one would be led to conclude that there was some known point in the
+economy of national affairs at which it would be safe to stop and to
+say: Thus far the ends of public happiness will be promoted by
+supplying the wants of government, and all beyond this is unworthy
+of our care or anxiety. How is it possible that a government half
+supplied and always necessitous, can fulfill the purposes of its
+institution, can provide for the security, advance the prosperity,
+or support the reputation of the commonwealth? How can it ever
+possess either energy or stability, dignity or credit, confidence at
+home or respectability abroad? How can its administration be any
+thing else than a succession of expedients temporizing, impotent,
+disgraceful? How will it be able to avoid a frequent sacrifice of
+its engagements to immediate necessity? How can it undertake or
+execute any liberal or enlarged plans of public good?
+
+Let us attend to what would be the effects of this situation in
+the very first war in which we should happen to be engaged. We will
+presume, for argument's sake, that the revenue arising from the
+impost duties answers the purposes of a provision for the public
+debt and of a peace establishment for the Union. Thus
+circumstanced, a war breaks out. What would be the probable conduct
+of the government in such an emergency? Taught by experience that
+proper dependence could not be placed on the success of
+requisitions, unable by its own authority to lay hold of fresh
+resources, and urged by considerations of national danger, would it
+not be driven to the expedient of diverting the funds already
+appropriated from their proper objects to the defense of the State?
+It is not easy to see how a step of this kind could be avoided;
+and if it should be taken, it is evident that it would prove the
+destruction of public credit at the very moment that it was becoming
+essential to the public safety. To imagine that at such a crisis
+credit might be dispensed with, would be the extreme of infatuation.
+In the modern system of war, nations the most wealthy are obliged
+to have recourse to large loans. A country so little opulent as
+ours must feel this necessity in a much stronger degree. But who
+would lend to a government that prefaced its overtures for borrowing
+by an act which demonstrated that no reliance could be placed on the
+steadiness of its measures for paying? The loans it might be able
+to procure would be as limited in their extent as burdensome in
+their conditions. They would be made upon the same principles that
+usurers commonly lend to bankrupt and fraudulent debtors, with a
+sparing hand and at enormous premiums.
+
+It may perhaps be imagined that, from the scantiness of the
+resources of the country, the necessity of diverting the established
+funds in the case supposed would exist, though the national
+government should possess an unrestrained power of taxation. But
+two considerations will serve to quiet all apprehension on this
+head: one is, that we are sure the resources of the community, in
+their full extent, will be brought into activity for the benefit of
+the Union; the other is, that whatever deficiences there may be,
+can without difficulty be supplied by loans.
+
+The power of creating new funds upon new objects of taxation, by
+its own authority, would enable the national government to borrow as
+far as its necessities might require. Foreigners, as well as the
+citizens of America, could then reasonably repose confidence in its
+engagements; but to depend upon a government that must itself
+depend upon thirteen other governments for the means of fulfilling
+its contracts, when once its situation is clearly understood, would
+require a degree of credulity not often to be met with in the
+pecuniary transactions of mankind, and little reconcilable with the
+usual sharp-sightedness of avarice.
+
+Reflections of this kind may have trifling weight with men who
+hope to see realized in America the halcyon scenes of the poetic or
+fabulous age; but to those who believe we are likely to experience
+a common portion of the vicissitudes and calamities which have
+fallen to the lot of other nations, they must appear entitled to
+serious attention. Such men must behold the actual situation of
+their country with painful solicitude, and deprecate the evils which
+ambition or revenge might, with too much facility, inflict upon it.
+
+PUBLIUS.
+
+
+
+
+
+FEDERALIST No. 31
+
+
+
+The Same Subject Continued
+
+(Concerning the General Power of Taxation)
+
+From the New York Packet.
+
+Tuesday, January 1, 1788.
+
+
+
+HAMILTON
+
+
+
+To the People of the State of New York:
+
+IN DISQUISITIONS of every kind, there are certain primary
+truths, or first principles, upon which all subsequent reasonings
+must depend. These contain an internal evidence which, antecedent
+to all reflection or combination, commands the assent of the mind.
+Where it produces not this effect, it must proceed either from some
+defect or disorder in the organs of perception, or from the
+influence of some strong interest, or passion, or prejudice. Of
+this nature are the maxims in geometry, that "the whole is greater
+than its part; things equal to the same are equal to one another;
+two straight lines cannot enclose a space; and all right angles
+are equal to each other." Of the same nature are these other
+maxims in ethics and politics, that there cannot be an effect
+without a cause; that the means ought to be proportioned to the
+end; that every power ought to be commensurate with its object;
+that there ought to be no limitation of a power destined to effect
+a purpose which is itself incapable of limitation. And there are
+other truths in the two latter sciences which, if they cannot
+pretend to rank in the class of axioms, are yet such direct
+inferences from them, and so obvious in themselves, and so agreeable
+to the natural and unsophisticated dictates of common-sense, that
+they challenge the assent of a sound and unbiased mind, with a
+degree of force and conviction almost equally irresistible.
+
+The objects of geometrical inquiry are so entirely abstracted
+from those pursuits which stir up and put in motion the unruly
+passions of the human heart, that mankind, without difficulty, adopt
+not only the more simple theorems of the science, but even those
+abstruse paradoxes which, however they may appear susceptible of
+demonstration, are at variance with the natural conceptions which
+the mind, without the aid of philosophy, would be led to entertain
+upon the subject. The INFINITE DIVISIBILITY of matter, or, in other
+words, the INFINITE divisibility of a FINITE thing, extending even
+to the minutest atom, is a point agreed among geometricians, though
+not less incomprehensible to common-sense than any of those
+mysteries in religion, against which the batteries of infidelity
+have been so industriously leveled.
+
+But in the sciences of morals and politics, men are found far
+less tractable. To a certain degree, it is right and useful that
+this should be the case. Caution and investigation are a necessary
+armor against error and imposition. But this untractableness may be
+carried too far, and may degenerate into obstinacy, perverseness, or
+disingenuity. Though it cannot be pretended that the principles of
+moral and political knowledge have, in general, the same degree of
+certainty with those of the mathematics, yet they have much better
+claims in this respect than, to judge from the conduct of men in
+particular situations, we should be disposed to allow them. The
+obscurity is much oftener in the passions and prejudices of the
+reasoner than in the subject. Men, upon too many occasions, do not
+give their own understandings fair play; but, yielding to some
+untoward bias, they entangle themselves in words and confound
+themselves in subtleties.
+
+How else could it happen (if we admit the objectors to be
+sincere in their opposition), that positions so clear as those which
+manifest the necessity of a general power of taxation in the
+government of the Union, should have to encounter any adversaries
+among men of discernment? Though these positions have been
+elsewhere fully stated, they will perhaps not be improperly
+recapitulated in this place, as introductory to an examination of
+what may have been offered by way of objection to them. They are in
+substance as follows:
+
+A government ought to contain in itself every power requisite to
+the full accomplishment of the objects committed to its care, and to
+the complete execution of the trusts for which it is responsible,
+free from every other control but a regard to the public good and to
+the sense of the people.
+
+As the duties of superintending the national defense and of
+securing the public peace against foreign or domestic violence
+involve a provision for casualties and dangers to which no possible
+limits can be assigned, the power of making that provision ought to
+know no other bounds than the exigencies of the nation and the
+resources of the community.
+
+As revenue is the essential engine by which the means of
+answering the national exigencies must be procured, the power of
+procuring that article in its full extent must necessarily be
+comprehended in that of providing for those exigencies.
+
+As theory and practice conspire to prove that the power of
+procuring revenue is unavailing when exercised over the States in
+their collective capacities, the federal government must of
+necessity be invested with an unqualified power of taxation in the
+ordinary modes.
+
+Did not experience evince the contrary, it would be natural to
+conclude that the propriety of a general power of taxation in the
+national government might safely be permitted to rest on the
+evidence of these propositions, unassisted by any additional
+arguments or illustrations. But we find, in fact, that the
+antagonists of the proposed Constitution, so far from acquiescing in
+their justness or truth, seem to make their principal and most
+zealous effort against this part of the plan. It may therefore be
+satisfactory to analyze the arguments with which they combat it.
+
+Those of them which have been most labored with that view, seem
+in substance to amount to this: "It is not true, because the
+exigencies of the Union may not be susceptible of limitation, that
+its power of laying taxes ought to be unconfined. Revenue is as
+requisite to the purposes of the local administrations as to those
+of the Union; and the former are at least of equal importance with
+the latter to the happiness of the people. It is, therefore, as
+necessary that the State governments should be able to command the
+means of supplying their wants, as that the national government
+should possess the like faculty in respect to the wants of the Union.
+But an indefinite power of taxation in the LATTER might, and
+probably would in time, deprive the FORMER of the means of providing
+for their own necessities; and would subject them entirely to the
+mercy of the national legislature. As the laws of the Union are to
+become the supreme law of the land, as it is to have power to pass
+all laws that may be NECESSARY for carrying into execution the
+authorities with which it is proposed to vest it, the national
+government might at any time abolish the taxes imposed for State
+objects upon the pretense of an interference with its own. It might
+allege a necessity of doing this in order to give efficacy to the
+national revenues. And thus all the resources of taxation might by
+degrees become the subjects of federal monopoly, to the entire
+exclusion and destruction of the State governments."
+
+This mode of reasoning appears sometimes to turn upon the
+supposition of usurpation in the national government; at other
+times it seems to be designed only as a deduction from the
+constitutional operation of its intended powers. It is only in the
+latter light that it can be admitted to have any pretensions to
+fairness. The moment we launch into conjectures about the
+usurpations of the federal government, we get into an unfathomable
+abyss, and fairly put ourselves out of the reach of all reasoning.
+Imagination may range at pleasure till it gets bewildered amidst
+the labyrinths of an enchanted castle, and knows not on which side
+to turn to extricate itself from the perplexities into which it has
+so rashly adventured. Whatever may be the limits or modifications
+of the powers of the Union, it is easy to imagine an endless train
+of possible dangers; and by indulging an excess of jealousy and
+timidity, we may bring ourselves to a state of absolute scepticism
+and irresolution. I repeat here what I have observed in substance
+in another place, that all observations founded upon the danger of
+usurpation ought to be referred to the composition and structure of
+the government, not to the nature or extent of its powers. The
+State governments, by their original constitutions, are invested
+with complete sovereignty. In what does our security consist
+against usurpation from that quarter? Doubtless in the manner of
+their formation, and in a due dependence of those who are to
+administer them upon the people. If the proposed construction of
+the federal government be found, upon an impartial examination of
+it, to be such as to afford, to a proper extent, the same species of
+security, all apprehensions on the score of usurpation ought to be
+discarded.
+
+It should not be forgotten that a disposition in the State
+governments to encroach upon the rights of the Union is quite as
+probable as a disposition in the Union to encroach upon the rights
+of the State governments. What side would be likely to prevail in
+such a conflict, must depend on the means which the contending
+parties could employ toward insuring success. As in republics
+strength is always on the side of the people, and as there are
+weighty reasons to induce a belief that the State governments will
+commonly possess most influence over them, the natural conclusion is
+that such contests will be most apt to end to the disadvantage of
+the Union; and that there is greater probability of encroachments
+by the members upon the federal head, than by the federal head upon
+the members. But it is evident that all conjectures of this kind
+must be extremely vague and fallible: and that it is by far the
+safest course to lay them altogether aside, and to confine our
+attention wholly to the nature and extent of the powers as they are
+delineated in the Constitution. Every thing beyond this must be
+left to the prudence and firmness of the people; who, as they will
+hold the scales in their own hands, it is to be hoped, will always
+take care to preserve the constitutional equilibrium between the
+general and the State governments. Upon this ground, which is
+evidently the true one, it will not be difficult to obviate the
+objections which have been made to an indefinite power of taxation
+in the United States.
+
+PUBLIUS.
+
+
+
+
+
+FEDERALIST No. 32
+
+
+
+The Same Subject Continued
+
+(Concerning the General Power of Taxation)
+
+From the Daily Advertiser.
+
+Thursday, January 3, 1788.
+
+
+
+HAMILTON
+
+
+
+To the People of the State of New York:
+
+ALTHOUGH I am of opinion that there would be no real danger of
+the consequences which seem to be apprehended to the State
+governments from a power in the Union to control them in the levies
+of money, because I am persuaded that the sense of the people, the
+extreme hazard of provoking the resentments of the State
+governments, and a conviction of the utility and necessity of local
+administrations for local purposes, would be a complete barrier
+against the oppressive use of such a power; yet I am willing here
+to allow, in its full extent, the justness of the reasoning which
+requires that the individual States should possess an independent
+and uncontrollable authority to raise their own revenues for the
+supply of their own wants. And making this concession, I affirm
+that (with the sole exception of duties on imports and exports) they
+would, under the plan of the convention, retain that authority in
+the most absolute and unqualified sense; and that an attempt on the
+part of the national government to abridge them in the exercise of
+it, would be a violent assumption of power, unwarranted by any
+article or clause of its Constitution.
+
+An entire consolidation of the States into one complete national
+sovereignty would imply an entire subordination of the parts; and
+whatever powers might remain in them, would be altogether dependent
+on the general will. But as the plan of the convention aims only at
+a partial union or consolidation, the State governments would
+clearly retain all the rights of sovereignty which they before had,
+and which were not, by that act, EXCLUSIVELY delegated to the United
+States. This exclusive delegation, or rather this alienation, of
+State sovereignty, would only exist in three cases: where the
+Constitution in express terms granted an exclusive authority to the
+Union; where it granted in one instance an authority to the Union,
+and in another prohibited the States from exercising the like
+authority; and where it granted an authority to the Union, to which
+a similar authority in the States would be absolutely and totally
+CONTRADICTORY and REPUGNANT. I use these terms to distinguish this
+last case from another which might appear to resemble it, but which
+would, in fact, be essentially different; I mean where the exercise
+of a concurrent jurisdiction might be productive of occasional
+interferences in the POLICY of any branch of administration, but
+would not imply any direct contradiction or repugnancy in point of
+constitutional authority. These three cases of exclusive
+jurisdiction in the federal government may be exemplified by the
+following instances: The last clause but one in the eighth section
+of the first article provides expressly that Congress shall exercise
+"EXCLUSIVE LEGISLATION" over the district to be appropriated as
+the seat of government. This answers to the first case. The first
+clause of the same section empowers Congress "TO LAY AND COLLECT
+TAXES, DUTIES, IMPOSTS AND EXCISES"; and the second clause of the
+tenth section of the same article declares that, "NO STATE SHALL,
+without the consent of Congress, LAY ANY IMPOSTS OR DUTIES ON
+IMPORTS OR EXPORTS, except for the purpose of executing its
+inspection laws." Hence would result an exclusive power in the
+Union to lay duties on imports and exports, with the particular
+exception mentioned; but this power is abridged by another clause,
+which declares that no tax or duty shall be laid on articles
+exported from any State; in consequence of which qualification, it
+now only extends to the DUTIES ON IMPORTS. This answers to the
+second case. The third will be found in that clause which declares
+that Congress shall have power "to establish an UNIFORM RULE of
+naturalization throughout the United States." This must
+necessarily be exclusive; because if each State had power to
+prescribe a DISTINCT RULE, there could not be a UNIFORM RULE.
+
+A case which may perhaps be thought to resemble the latter, but
+which is in fact widely different, affects the question immediately
+under consideration. I mean the power of imposing taxes on all
+articles other than exports and imports. This, I contend, is
+manifestly a concurrent and coequal authority in the United States
+and in the individual States. There is plainly no expression in the
+granting clause which makes that power EXCLUSIVE in the Union.
+There is no independent clause or sentence which prohibits the
+States from exercising it. So far is this from being the case, that
+a plain and conclusive argument to the contrary is to be deduced
+from the restraint laid upon the States in relation to duties on
+imports and exports. This restriction implies an admission that, if
+it were not inserted, the States would possess the power it
+excludes; and it implies a further admission, that as to all other
+taxes, the authority of the States remains undiminished. In any
+other view it would be both unnecessary and dangerous; it would be
+unnecessary, because if the grant to the Union of the power of
+laying such duties implied the exclusion of the States, or even
+their subordination in this particular, there could be no need of
+such a restriction; it would be dangerous, because the introduction
+of it leads directly to the conclusion which has been mentioned, and
+which, if the reasoning of the objectors be just, could not have
+been intended; I mean that the States, in all cases to which the
+restriction did not apply, would have a concurrent power of taxation
+with the Union. The restriction in question amounts to what lawyers
+call a NEGATIVE PREGNANT that is, a NEGATION of one thing, and an
+AFFIRMANCE of another; a negation of the authority of the States to
+impose taxes on imports and exports, and an affirmance of their
+authority to impose them on all other articles. It would be mere
+sophistry to argue that it was meant to exclude them ABSOLUTELY from
+the imposition of taxes of the former kind, and to leave them at
+liberty to lay others SUBJECT TO THE CONTROL of the national
+legislature. The restraining or prohibitory clause only says, that
+they shall not, WITHOUT THE CONSENT OF CONGRESS, lay such duties;
+and if we are to understand this in the sense last mentioned, the
+Constitution would then be made to introduce a formal provision for
+the sake of a very absurd conclusion; which is, that the States,
+WITH THE CONSENT of the national legislature, might tax imports and
+exports; and that they might tax every other article, UNLESS
+CONTROLLED by the same body. If this was the intention, why not
+leave it, in the first instance, to what is alleged to be the
+natural operation of the original clause, conferring a general power
+of taxation upon the Union? It is evident that this could not have
+been the intention, and that it will not bear a construction of the
+kind.
+
+As to a supposition of repugnancy between the power of taxation
+in the States and in the Union, it cannot be supported in that sense
+which would be requisite to work an exclusion of the States. It is,
+indeed, possible that a tax might be laid on a particular article by
+a State which might render it INEXPEDIENT that thus a further tax
+should be laid on the same article by the Union; but it would not
+imply a constitutional inability to impose a further tax. The
+quantity of the imposition, the expediency or inexpediency of an
+increase on either side, would be mutually questions of prudence;
+but there would be involved no direct contradiction of power. The
+particular policy of the national and of the State systems of
+finance might now and then not exactly coincide, and might require
+reciprocal forbearances. It is not, however a mere possibility of
+inconvenience in the exercise of powers, but an immediate
+constitutional repugnancy that can by implication alienate and
+extinguish a pre-existing right of sovereignty.
+
+The necessity of a concurrent jurisdiction in certain cases
+results from the division of the sovereign power; and the rule that
+all authorities, of which the States are not explicitly divested in
+favor of the Union, remain with them in full vigor, is not a
+theoretical consequence of that division, but is clearly admitted by
+the whole tenor of the instrument which contains the articles of the
+proposed Constitution. We there find that, notwithstanding the
+affirmative grants of general authorities, there has been the most
+pointed care in those cases where it was deemed improper that the
+like authorities should reside in the States, to insert negative
+clauses prohibiting the exercise of them by the States. The tenth
+section of the first article consists altogether of such provisions.
+This circumstance is a clear indication of the sense of the
+convention, and furnishes a rule of interpretation out of the body
+of the act, which justifies the position I have advanced and refutes
+every hypothesis to the contrary.
+
+PUBLIUS.
+
+
+
+
+
+FEDERALIST No. 33
+
+
+
+The Same Subject Continued
+
+(Concerning the General Power of Taxation)
+
+From the Daily Advertiser.
+
+January 3, 1788.
+
+
+
+HAMILTON
+
+
+
+To the People of the State of New York:
+
+THE residue of the argument against the provisions of the
+Constitution in respect to taxation is ingrafted upon the following
+clause. The last clause of the eighth section of the first article
+of the plan under consideration authorizes the national legislature
+"to make all laws which shall be NECESSARY and PROPER for carrying
+into execution THE POWERS by that Constitution vested in the
+government of the United States, or in any department or officer
+thereof"; and the second clause of the sixth article declares,
+"that the Constitution and the laws of the United States made IN
+PURSUANCE THEREOF, and the treaties made by their authority shall be
+the SUPREME LAW of the land, any thing in the constitution or laws
+of any State to the contrary notwithstanding."
+
+These two clauses have been the source of much virulent
+invective and petulant declamation against the proposed Constitution.
+They have been held up to the people in all the exaggerated colors
+of misrepresentation as the pernicious engines by which their local
+governments were to be destroyed and their liberties exterminated;
+as the hideous monster whose devouring jaws would spare neither sex
+nor age, nor high nor low, nor sacred nor profane; and yet, strange
+as it may appear, after all this clamor, to those who may not have
+happened to contemplate them in the same light, it may be affirmed
+with perfect confidence that the constitutional operation of the
+intended government would be precisely the same, if these clauses
+were entirely obliterated, as if they were repeated in every article.
+They are only declaratory of a truth which would have resulted by
+necessary and unavoidable implication from the very act of
+constituting a federal government, and vesting it with certain
+specified powers. This is so clear a proposition, that moderation
+itself can scarcely listen to the railings which have been so
+copiously vented against this part of the plan, without emotions
+that disturb its equanimity.
+
+What is a power, but the ability or faculty of doing a thing?
+What is the ability to do a thing, but the power of employing the
+MEANS necessary to its execution? What is a LEGISLATIVE power, but
+a power of making LAWS? What are the MEANS to execute a LEGISLATIVE
+power but LAWS? What is the power of laying and collecting taxes,
+but a LEGISLATIVE POWER, or a power of MAKING LAWS, to lay and
+collect taxes? What are the proper means of executing such a power,
+but NECESSARY and PROPER laws?
+
+This simple train of inquiry furnishes us at once with a test by
+which to judge of the true nature of the clause complained of. It
+conducts us to this palpable truth, that a power to lay and collect
+taxes must be a power to pass all laws NECESSARY and PROPER for the
+execution of that power; and what does the unfortunate and
+culumniated provision in question do more than declare the same
+truth, to wit, that the national legislature, to whom the power of
+laying and collecting taxes had been previously given, might, in the
+execution of that power, pass all laws NECESSARY and PROPER to carry
+it into effect? I have applied these observations thus particularly
+to the power of taxation, because it is the immediate subject under
+consideration, and because it is the most important of the
+authorities proposed to be conferred upon the Union. But the same
+process will lead to the same result, in relation to all other
+powers declared in the Constitution. And it is EXPRESSLY to execute
+these powers that the sweeping clause, as it has been affectedly
+called, authorizes the national legislature to pass all NECESSARY
+and PROPER laws. If there is any thing exceptionable, it must be
+sought for in the specific powers upon which this general
+declaration is predicated. The declaration itself, though it may be
+chargeable with tautology or redundancy, is at least perfectly
+harmless.
+
+But SUSPICION may ask, Why then was it introduced? The answer
+is, that it could only have been done for greater caution, and to
+guard against all cavilling refinements in those who might hereafter
+feel a disposition to curtail and evade the legitimate authorities
+of the Union. The Convention probably foresaw, what it has been a
+principal aim of these papers to inculcate, that the danger which
+most threatens our political welfare is that the State governments
+will finally sap the foundations of the Union; and might therefore
+think it necessary, in so cardinal a point, to leave nothing to
+construction. Whatever may have been the inducement to it, the
+wisdom of the precaution is evident from the cry which has been
+raised against it; as that very cry betrays a disposition to
+question the great and essential truth which it is manifestly the
+object of that provision to declare.
+
+But it may be again asked, Who is to judge of the NECESSITY and
+PROPRIETY of the laws to be passed for executing the powers of the
+Union? I answer, first, that this question arises as well and as
+fully upon the simple grant of those powers as upon the declaratory
+clause; and I answer, in the second place, that the national
+government, like every other, must judge, in the first instance, of
+the proper exercise of its powers, and its constituents in the last.
+If the federal government should overpass the just bounds of its
+authority and make a tyrannical use of its powers, the people, whose
+creature it is, must appeal to the standard they have formed, and
+take such measures to redress the injury done to the Constitution as
+the exigency may suggest and prudence justify. The propriety of a
+law, in a constitutional light, must always be determined by the
+nature of the powers upon which it is founded. Suppose, by some
+forced constructions of its authority (which, indeed, cannot easily
+be imagined), the Federal legislature should attempt to vary the law
+of descent in any State, would it not be evident that, in making
+such an attempt, it had exceeded its jurisdiction, and infringed
+upon that of the State? Suppose, again, that upon the pretense of
+an interference with its revenues, it should undertake to abrogate a
+landtax imposed by the authority of a State; would it not be
+equally evident that this was an invasion of that concurrent
+jurisdiction in respect to this species of tax, which its
+Constitution plainly supposes to exist in the State governments? If
+there ever should be a doubt on this head, the credit of it will be
+entirely due to those reasoners who, in the imprudent zeal of their
+animosity to the plan of the convention, have labored to envelop it
+in a cloud calculated to obscure the plainest and simplest truths.
+
+But it is said that the laws of the Union are to be the SUPREME
+LAW of the land. But what inference can be drawn from this, or what
+would they amount to, if they were not to be supreme? It is evident
+they would amount to nothing. A LAW, by the very meaning of the
+term, includes supremacy. It is a rule which those to whom it is
+prescribed are bound to observe. This results from every political
+association. If individuals enter into a state of society, the laws
+of that society must be the supreme regulator of their conduct. If
+a number of political societies enter into a larger political
+society, the laws which the latter may enact, pursuant to the powers
+intrusted to it by its constitution, must necessarily be supreme
+over those societies, and the individuals of whom they are composed.
+It would otherwise be a mere treaty, dependent on the good faith of
+the parties, and not a government, which is only another word for
+POLITICAL POWER AND SUPREMACY. But it will not follow from this
+doctrine that acts of the large society which are NOT PURSUANT to
+its constitutional powers, but which are invasions of the residuary
+authorities of the smaller societies, will become the supreme law of
+the land. These will be merely acts of usurpation, and will deserve
+to be treated as such. Hence we perceive that the clause which
+declares the supremacy of the laws of the Union, like the one we
+have just before considered, only declares a truth, which flows
+immediately and necessarily from the institution of a federal
+government. It will not, I presume, have escaped observation, that
+it EXPRESSLY confines this supremacy to laws made PURSUANT TO THE
+CONSTITUTION; which I mention merely as an instance of caution in
+the convention; since that limitation would have been to be
+understood, though it had not been expressed.
+
+Though a law, therefore, laying a tax for the use of the United
+States would be supreme in its nature, and could not legally be
+opposed or controlled, yet a law for abrogating or preventing the
+collection of a tax laid by the authority of the State, (unless upon
+imports and exports), would not be the supreme law of the land, but
+a usurpation of power not granted by the Constitution. As far as an
+improper accumulation of taxes on the same object might tend to
+render the collection difficult or precarious, this would be a
+mutual inconvenience, not arising from a superiority or defect of
+power on either side, but from an injudicious exercise of power by
+one or the other, in a manner equally disadvantageous to both. It
+is to be hoped and presumed, however, that mutual interest would
+dictate a concert in this respect which would avoid any material
+inconvenience. The inference from the whole is, that the individual
+States would, under the proposed Constitution, retain an independent
+and uncontrollable authority to raise revenue to any extent of which
+they may stand in need, by every kind of taxation, except duties on
+imports and exports. It will be shown in the next paper that this
+CONCURRENT JURISDICTION in the article of taxation was the only
+admissible substitute for an entire subordination, in respect to
+this branch of power, of the State authority to that of the Union.
+
+PUBLIUS.
+
+
+
+
+
+FEDERALIST No. 34
+
+
+
+The Same Subject Continued
+
+(Concerning the General Power of Taxation)
+
+From the New York Packet.
+
+Friday, January 4, 1788.
+
+
+
+HAMILTON
+
+
+
+To the People of the State of New York:
+
+I FLATTER myself it has been clearly shown in my last number
+that the particular States, under the proposed Constitution, would
+have COEQUAL authority with the Union in the article of revenue,
+except as to duties on imports. As this leaves open to the States
+far the greatest part of the resources of the community, there can
+be no color for the assertion that they would not possess means as
+abundant as could be desired for the supply of their own wants,
+independent of all external control. That the field is sufficiently
+wide will more fully appear when we come to advert to the
+inconsiderable share of the public expenses for which it will fall
+to the lot of the State governments to provide.
+
+To argue upon abstract principles that this co-ordinate
+authority cannot exist, is to set up supposition and theory against
+fact and reality. However proper such reasonings might be to show
+that a thing OUGHT NOT TO EXIST, they are wholly to be rejected when
+they are made use of to prove that it does not exist contrary to the
+evidence of the fact itself. It is well known that in the Roman
+republic the legislative authority, in the last resort, resided for
+ages in two different political bodies not as branches of the same
+legislature, but as distinct and independent legislatures, in each
+of which an opposite interest prevailed: in one the patrician; in
+the other, the plebian. Many arguments might have been adduced to
+prove the unfitness of two such seemingly contradictory authorities,
+each having power to ANNUL or REPEAL the acts of the other. But a
+man would have been regarded as frantic who should have attempted at
+Rome to disprove their existence. It will be readily understood
+that I allude to the COMITIA CENTURIATA and the COMITIA TRIBUTA.
+The former, in which the people voted by centuries, was so arranged
+as to give a superiority to the patrician interest; in the latter,
+in which numbers prevailed, the plebian interest had an entire
+predominancy. And yet these two legislatures coexisted for ages,
+and the Roman republic attained to the utmost height of human
+greatness.
+
+In the case particularly under consideration, there is no such
+contradiction as appears in the example cited; there is no power on
+either side to annul the acts of the other. And in practice there
+is little reason to apprehend any inconvenience; because, in a
+short course of time, the wants of the States will naturally reduce
+themselves within A VERY NARROW COMPASS; and in the interim, the
+United States will, in all probability, find it convenient to
+abstain wholly from those objects to which the particular States
+would be inclined to resort.
+
+To form a more precise judgment of the true merits of this
+question, it will be well to advert to the proportion between the
+objects that will require a federal provision in respect to revenue,
+and those which will require a State provision. We shall discover
+that the former are altogether unlimited, and that the latter are
+circumscribed within very moderate bounds. In pursuing this
+inquiry, we must bear in mind that we are not to confine our view to
+the present period, but to look forward to remote futurity.
+Constitutions of civil government are not to be framed upon a
+calculation of existing exigencies, but upon a combination of these
+with the probable exigencies of ages, according to the natural and
+tried course of human affairs. Nothing, therefore, can be more
+fallacious than to infer the extent of any power, proper to be
+lodged in the national government, from an estimate of its immediate
+necessities. There ought to be a CAPACITY to provide for future
+contingencies as they may happen; and as these are illimitable in
+their nature, it is impossible safely to limit that capacity. It is
+true, perhaps, that a computation might be made with sufficient
+accuracy to answer the purpose of the quantity of revenue requisite
+to discharge the subsisting engagements of the Union, and to
+maintain those establishments which, for some time to come, would
+suffice in time of peace. But would it be wise, or would it not
+rather be the extreme of folly, to stop at this point, and to leave
+the government intrusted with the care of the national defense in a
+state of absolute incapacity to provide for the protection of the
+community against future invasions of the public peace, by foreign
+war or domestic convulsions? If, on the contrary, we ought to
+exceed this point, where can we stop, short of an indefinite power
+of providing for emergencies as they may arise? Though it is easy
+to assert, in general terms, the possibility of forming a rational
+judgment of a due provision against probable dangers, yet we may
+safely challenge those who make the assertion to bring forward their
+data, and may affirm that they would be found as vague and uncertain
+as any that could be produced to establish the probable duration of
+the world. Observations confined to the mere prospects of internal
+attacks can deserve no weight; though even these will admit of no
+satisfactory calculation: but if we mean to be a commercial people,
+it must form a part of our policy to be able one day to defend that
+commerce. The support of a navy and of naval wars would involve
+contingencies that must baffle all the efforts of political
+arithmetic.
+
+Admitting that we ought to try the novel and absurd experiment
+in politics of tying up the hands of government from offensive war
+founded upon reasons of state, yet certainly we ought not to disable
+it from guarding the community against the ambition or enmity of
+other nations. A cloud has been for some time hanging over the
+European world. If it should break forth into a storm, who can
+insure us that in its progress a part of its fury would not be spent
+upon us? No reasonable man would hastily pronounce that we are
+entirely out of its reach. Or if the combustible materials that now
+seem to be collecting should be dissipated without coming to
+maturity, or if a flame should be kindled without extending to us,
+what security can we have that our tranquillity will long remain
+undisturbed from some other cause or from some other quarter? Let
+us recollect that peace or war will not always be left to our
+option; that however moderate or unambitious we may be, we cannot
+count upon the moderation, or hope to extinguish the ambition of
+others. Who could have imagined at the conclusion of the last war
+that France and Britain, wearied and exhausted as they both were,
+would so soon have looked with so hostile an aspect upon each other?
+To judge from the history of mankind, we shall be compelled to
+conclude that the fiery and destructive passions of war reign in the
+human breast with much more powerful sway than the mild and
+beneficent sentiments of peace; and that to model our political
+systems upon speculations of lasting tranquillity, is to calculate
+on the weaker springs of the human character.
+
+What are the chief sources of expense in every government? What
+has occasioned that enormous accumulation of debts with which
+several of the European nations are oppressed? The answers plainly
+is, wars and rebellions; the support of those institutions which
+are necessary to guard the body politic against these two most
+mortal diseases of society. The expenses arising from those
+institutions which are relative to the mere domestic police of a
+state, to the support of its legislative, executive, and judicial
+departments, with their different appendages, and to the
+encouragement of agriculture and manufactures (which will comprehend
+almost all the objects of state expenditure), are insignificant in
+comparison with those which relate to the national defense.
+
+In the kingdom of Great Britain, where all the ostentatious
+apparatus of monarchy is to be provided for, not above a fifteenth
+part of the annual income of the nation is appropriated to the class
+of expenses last mentioned; the other fourteen fifteenths are
+absorbed in the payment of the interest of debts contracted for
+carrying on the wars in which that country has been engaged, and in
+the maintenance of fleets and armies. If, on the one hand, it
+should be observed that the expenses incurred in the prosecution of
+the ambitious enterprises and vainglorious pursuits of a monarchy
+are not a proper standard by which to judge of those which might be
+necessary in a republic, it ought, on the other hand, to be remarked
+that there should be as great a disproportion between the profusion
+and extravagance of a wealthy kingdom in its domestic
+administration, and the frugality and economy which in that
+particular become the modest simplicity of republican government.
+If we balance a proper deduction from one side against that which
+it is supposed ought to be made from the other, the proportion may
+still be considered as holding good.
+
+But let us advert to the large debt which we have ourselves
+contracted in a single war, and let us only calculate on a common
+share of the events which disturb the peace of nations, and we shall
+instantly perceive, without the aid of any elaborate illustration,
+that there must always be an immense disproportion between the
+objects of federal and state expenditures. It is true that several
+of the States, separately, are encumbered with considerable debts,
+which are an excrescence of the late war. But this cannot happen
+again, if the proposed system be adopted; and when these debts are
+discharged, the only call for revenue of any consequence, which the
+State governments will continue to experience, will be for the mere
+support of their respective civil list; to which, if we add all
+contingencies, the total amount in every State ought to fall
+considerably short of two hundred thousand pounds.
+
+In framing a government for posterity as well as ourselves, we
+ought, in those provisions which are designed to be permanent, to
+calculate, not on temporary, but on permanent causes of expense. If
+this principle be a just one our attention would be directed to a
+provision in favor of the State governments for an annual sum of
+about two hundred thousand pounds; while the exigencies of the
+Union could be susceptible of no limits, even in imagination. In
+this view of the subject, by what logic can it be maintained that
+the local governments ought to command, in perpetuity, an EXCLUSIVE
+source of revenue for any sum beyond the extent of two hundred
+thousand pounds? To extend its power further, in EXCLUSION of the
+authority of the Union, would be to take the resources of the
+community out of those hands which stood in need of them for the
+public welfare, in order to put them into other hands which could
+have no just or proper occasion for them.
+
+Suppose, then, the convention had been inclined to proceed upon
+the principle of a repartition of the objects of revenue, between
+the Union and its members, in PROPORTION to their comparative
+necessities; what particular fund could have been selected for the
+use of the States, that would not either have been too much or too
+little too little for their present, too much for their future
+wants? As to the line of separation between external and internal
+taxes, this would leave to the States, at a rough computation, the
+command of two thirds of the resources of the community to defray
+from a tenth to a twentieth part of its expenses; and to the Union,
+one third of the resources of the community, to defray from nine
+tenths to nineteen twentieths of its expenses. If we desert this
+boundary and content ourselves with leaving to the States an
+exclusive power of taxing houses and lands, there would still be a
+great disproportion between the MEANS and the END; the possession
+of one third of the resources of the community to supply, at most,
+one tenth of its wants. If any fund could have been selected and
+appropriated, equal to and not greater than the object, it would
+have been inadequate to the discharge of the existing debts of the
+particular States, and would have left them dependent on the Union
+for a provision for this purpose.
+
+The preceding train of observation will justify the position
+which has been elsewhere laid down, that "A CONCURRENT JURISDICTION
+in the article of taxation was the only admissible substitute for an
+entire subordination, in respect to this branch of power, of State
+authority to that of the Union." Any separation of the objects of
+revenue that could have been fallen upon, would have amounted to a
+sacrifice of the great INTERESTS of the Union to the POWER of the
+individual States. The convention thought the concurrent
+jurisdiction preferable to that subordination; and it is evident
+that it has at least the merit of reconciling an indefinite
+constitutional power of taxation in the Federal government with an
+adequate and independent power in the States to provide for their
+own necessities. There remain a few other lights, in which this
+important subject of taxation will claim a further consideration.
+
+PUBLIUS.
+
+
+
+
+
+FEDERALIST No. 35
+
+
+
+The Same Subject Continued
+
+(Concerning the General Power of Taxation)
+
+For the Independent Journal.
+
+
+
+HAMILTON
+
+
+
+To the People of the State of New York:
+
+BEFORE we proceed to examine any other objections to an
+indefinite power of taxation in the Union, I shall make one general
+remark; which is, that if the jurisdiction of the national
+government, in the article of revenue, should be restricted to
+particular objects, it would naturally occasion an undue proportion
+of the public burdens to fall upon those objects. Two evils would
+spring from this source: the oppression of particular branches of
+industry; and an unequal distribution of the taxes, as well among
+the several States as among the citizens of the same State.
+
+Suppose, as has been contended for, the federal power of
+taxation were to be confined to duties on imports, it is evident
+that the government, for want of being able to command other
+resources, would frequently be tempted to extend these duties to an
+injurious excess. There are persons who imagine that they can never
+be carried to too great a length; since the higher they are, the
+more it is alleged they will tend to discourage an extravagant
+consumption, to produce a favorable balance of trade, and to promote
+domestic manufactures. But all extremes are pernicious in various
+ways. Exorbitant duties on imported articles would beget a general
+spirit of smuggling; which is always prejudicial to the fair
+trader, and eventually to the revenue itself: they tend to render
+other classes of the community tributary, in an improper degree, to
+the manufacturing classes, to whom they give a premature monopoly of
+the markets; they sometimes force industry out of its more natural
+channels into others in which it flows with less advantage; and in
+the last place, they oppress the merchant, who is often obliged to
+pay them himself without any retribution from the consumer. When
+the demand is equal to the quantity of goods at market, the consumer
+generally pays the duty; but when the markets happen to be
+overstocked, a great proportion falls upon the merchant, and
+sometimes not only exhausts his profits, but breaks in upon his
+capital. I am apt to think that a division of the duty, between the
+seller and the buyer, more often happens than is commonly imagined.
+It is not always possible to raise the price of a commodity in
+exact proportion to every additional imposition laid upon it. The
+merchant, especially in a country of small commercial capital, is
+often under a necessity of keeping prices down in order to a more
+expeditious sale.
+
+The maxim that the consumer is the payer, is so much oftener
+true than the reverse of the proposition, that it is far more
+equitable that the duties on imports should go into a common stock,
+than that they should redound to the exclusive benefit of the
+importing States. But it is not so generally true as to render it
+equitable, that those duties should form the only national fund.
+When they are paid by the merchant they operate as an additional
+tax upon the importing State, whose citizens pay their proportion of
+them in the character of consumers. In this view they are
+productive of inequality among the States; which inequality would
+be increased with the increased extent of the duties. The
+confinement of the national revenues to this species of imposts
+would be attended with inequality, from a different cause, between
+the manufacturing and the non-manufacturing States. The States
+which can go farthest towards the supply of their own wants, by
+their own manufactures, will not, according to their numbers or
+wealth, consume so great a proportion of imported articles as those
+States which are not in the same favorable situation. They would
+not, therefore, in this mode alone contribute to the public treasury
+in a ratio to their abilities. To make them do this it is necessary
+that recourse be had to excises, the proper objects of which are
+particular kinds of manufactures. New York is more deeply
+interested in these considerations than such of her citizens as
+contend for limiting the power of the Union to external taxation may
+be aware of. New York is an importing State, and is not likely
+speedily to be, to any great extent, a manufacturing State. She
+would, of course, suffer in a double light from restraining the
+jurisdiction of the Union to commercial imposts.
+
+So far as these observations tend to inculcate a danger of the
+import duties being extended to an injurious extreme it may be
+observed, conformably to a remark made in another part of these
+papers, that the interest of the revenue itself would be a
+sufficient guard against such an extreme. I readily admit that this
+would be the case, as long as other resources were open; but if the
+avenues to them were closed, HOPE, stimulated by necessity, would
+beget experiments, fortified by rigorous precautions and additional
+penalties, which, for a time, would have the intended effect, till
+there had been leisure to contrive expedients to elude these new
+precautions. The first success would be apt to inspire false
+opinions, which it might require a long course of subsequent
+experience to correct. Necessity, especially in politics, often
+occasions false hopes, false reasonings, and a system of measures
+correspondingly erroneous. But even if this supposed excess should
+not be a consequence of the limitation of the federal power of
+taxation, the inequalities spoken of would still ensue, though not
+in the same degree, from the other causes that have been noticed.
+Let us now return to the examination of objections.
+
+One which, if we may judge from the frequency of its repetition,
+seems most to be relied on, is, that the House of Representatives is
+not sufficiently numerous for the reception of all the different
+classes of citizens, in order to combine the interests and feelings
+of every part of the community, and to produce a due sympathy
+between the representative body and its constituents. This argument
+presents itself under a very specious and seducing form; and is
+well calculated to lay hold of the prejudices of those to whom it is
+addressed. But when we come to dissect it with attention, it will
+appear to be made up of nothing but fair-sounding words. The object
+it seems to aim at is, in the first place, impracticable, and in the
+sense in which it is contended for, is unnecessary. I reserve for
+another place the discussion of the question which relates to the
+sufficiency of the representative body in respect to numbers, and
+shall content myself with examining here the particular use which
+has been made of a contrary supposition, in reference to the
+immediate subject of our inquiries.
+
+The idea of an actual representation of all classes of the
+people, by persons of each class, is altogether visionary. Unless
+it were expressly provided in the Constitution, that each different
+occupation should send one or more members, the thing would never
+take place in practice. Mechanics and manufacturers will always be
+inclined, with few exceptions, to give their votes to merchants, in
+preference to persons of their own professions or trades. Those
+discerning citizens are well aware that the mechanic and
+manufacturing arts furnish the materials of mercantile enterprise
+and industry. Many of them, indeed, are immediately connected with
+the operations of commerce. They know that the merchant is their
+natural patron and friend; and they are aware, that however great
+the confidence they may justly feel in their own good sense, their
+interests can be more effectually promoted by the merchant than by
+themselves. They are sensible that their habits in life have not
+been such as to give them those acquired endowments, without which,
+in a deliberative assembly, the greatest natural abilities are for
+the most part useless; and that the influence and weight, and
+superior acquirements of the merchants render them more equal to a
+contest with any spirit which might happen to infuse itself into the
+public councils, unfriendly to the manufacturing and trading
+interests. These considerations, and many others that might be
+mentioned prove, and experience confirms it, that artisans and
+manufacturers will commonly be disposed to bestow their votes upon
+merchants and those whom they recommend. We must therefore consider
+merchants as the natural representatives of all these classes of the
+community.
+
+With regard to the learned professions, little need be observed;
+they truly form no distinct interest in society, and according to
+their situation and talents, will be indiscriminately the objects of
+the confidence and choice of each other, and of other parts of the
+community.
+
+Nothing remains but the landed interest; and this, in a
+political view, and particularly in relation to taxes, I take to be
+perfectly united, from the wealthiest landlord down to the poorest
+tenant. No tax can be laid on land which will not affect the
+proprietor of millions of acres as well as the proprietor of a
+single acre. Every landholder will therefore have a common interest
+to keep the taxes on land as low as possible; and common interest
+may always be reckoned upon as the surest bond of sympathy. But if
+we even could suppose a distinction of interest between the opulent
+landholder and the middling farmer, what reason is there to
+conclude, that the first would stand a better chance of being
+deputed to the national legislature than the last? If we take fact
+as our guide, and look into our own senate and assembly, we shall
+find that moderate proprietors of land prevail in both; nor is this
+less the case in the senate, which consists of a smaller number,
+than in the assembly, which is composed of a greater number. Where
+the qualifications of the electors are the same, whether they have
+to choose a small or a large number, their votes will fall upon
+those in whom they have most confidence; whether these happen to be
+men of large fortunes, or of moderate property, or of no property at
+all.
+
+It is said to be necessary, that all classes of citizens should
+have some of their own number in the representative body, in order
+that their feelings and interests may be the better understood and
+attended to. But we have seen that this will never happen under any
+arrangement that leaves the votes of the people free. Where this is
+the case, the representative body, with too few exceptions to have
+any influence on the spirit of the government, will be composed of
+landholders, merchants, and men of the learned professions. But
+where is the danger that the interests and feelings of the different
+classes of citizens will not be understood or attended to by these
+three descriptions of men? Will not the landholder know and feel
+whatever will promote or insure the interest of landed property?
+And will he not, from his own interest in that species of property,
+be sufficiently prone to resist every attempt to prejudice or
+encumber it? Will not the merchant understand and be disposed to
+cultivate, as far as may be proper, the interests of the mechanic
+and manufacturing arts, to which his commerce is so nearly allied?
+Will not the man of the learned profession, who will feel a
+neutrality to the rivalships between the different branches of
+industry, be likely to prove an impartial arbiter between them,
+ready to promote either, so far as it shall appear to him conducive
+to the general interests of the society?
+
+If we take into the account the momentary humors or dispositions
+which may happen to prevail in particular parts of the society, and
+to which a wise administration will never be inattentive, is the man
+whose situation leads to extensive inquiry and information less
+likely to be a competent judge of their nature, extent, and
+foundation than one whose observation does not travel beyond the
+circle of his neighbors and acquaintances? Is it not natural that a
+man who is a candidate for the favor of the people, and who is
+dependent on the suffrages of his fellow-citizens for the
+continuance of his public honors, should take care to inform himself
+of their dispositions and inclinations, and should be willing to
+allow them their proper degree of influence upon his conduct? This
+dependence, and the necessity of being bound himself, and his
+posterity, by the laws to which he gives his assent, are the true,
+and they are the strong chords of sympathy between the
+representative and the constituent.
+
+There is no part of the administration of government that
+requires extensive information and a thorough knowledge of the
+principles of political economy, so much as the business of taxation.
+The man who understands those principles best will be least likely
+to resort to oppressive expedients, or sacrifice any particular
+class of citizens to the procurement of revenue. It might be
+demonstrated that the most productive system of finance will always
+be the least burdensome. There can be no doubt that in order to a
+judicious exercise of the power of taxation, it is necessary that
+the person in whose hands it should be acquainted with the general
+genius, habits, and modes of thinking of the people at large, and
+with the resources of the country. And this is all that can be
+reasonably meant by a knowledge of the interests and feelings of the
+people. In any other sense the proposition has either no meaning,
+or an absurd one. And in that sense let every considerate citizen
+judge for himself where the requisite qualification is most likely
+to be found.
+
+PUBLIUS.
+
+
+
+
+
+FEDERALIST No. 36
+
+
+
+The Same Subject Continued
+
+(Concerning the General Power of Taxation)
+
+From the New York Packet.
+
+Tuesday January 8, 1788.
+
+
+
+HAMILTON
+
+
+
+To the People of the State of New York:
+
+WE HAVE seen that the result of the observations, to which the
+foregoing number has been principally devoted, is, that from the
+natural operation of the different interests and views of the
+various classes of the community, whether the representation of the
+people be more or less numerous, it will consist almost entirely of
+proprietors of land, of merchants, and of members of the learned
+professions, who will truly represent all those different interests
+and views. If it should be objected that we have seen other
+descriptions of men in the local legislatures, I answer that it is
+admitted there are exceptions to the rule, but not in sufficient
+number to influence the general complexion or character of the
+government. There are strong minds in every walk of life that will
+rise superior to the disadvantages of situation, and will command
+the tribute due to their merit, not only from the classes to which
+they particularly belong, but from the society in general. The door
+ought to be equally open to all; and I trust, for the credit of
+human nature, that we shall see examples of such vigorous plants
+flourishing in the soil of federal as well as of State legislation;
+but occasional instances of this sort will not render the reasoning
+founded upon the general course of things, less conclusive.
+
+The subject might be placed in several other lights that would
+all lead to the same result; and in particular it might be asked,
+What greater affinity or relation of interest can be conceived
+between the carpenter and blacksmith, and the linen manufacturer or
+stocking weaver, than between the merchant and either of them? It
+is notorious that there are often as great rivalships between
+different branches of the mechanic or manufacturing arts as there
+are between any of the departments of labor and industry; so that,
+unless the representative body were to be far more numerous than
+would be consistent with any idea of regularity or wisdom in its
+deliberations, it is impossible that what seems to be the spirit of
+the objection we have been considering should ever be realized in
+practice. But I forbear to dwell any longer on a matter which has
+hitherto worn too loose a garb to admit even of an accurate
+inspection of its real shape or tendency.
+
+There is another objection of a somewhat more precise nature
+that claims our attention. It has been asserted that a power of
+internal taxation in the national legislature could never be
+exercised with advantage, as well from the want of a sufficient
+knowledge of local circumstances, as from an interference between
+the revenue laws of the Union and of the particular States. The
+supposition of a want of proper knowledge seems to be entirely
+destitute of foundation. If any question is depending in a State
+legislature respecting one of the counties, which demands a
+knowledge of local details, how is it acquired? No doubt from the
+information of the members of the county. Cannot the like knowledge
+be obtained in the national legislature from the representatives of
+each State? And is it not to be presumed that the men who will
+generally be sent there will be possessed of the necessary degree of
+intelligence to be able to communicate that information? Is the
+knowledge of local circumstances, as applied to taxation, a minute
+topographical acquaintance with all the mountains, rivers, streams,
+highways, and bypaths in each State; or is it a general
+acquaintance with its situation and resources, with the state of its
+agriculture, commerce, manufactures, with the nature of its products
+and consumptions, with the different degrees and kinds of its
+wealth, property, and industry?
+
+Nations in general, even under governments of the more popular
+kind, usually commit the administration of their finances to single
+men or to boards composed of a few individuals, who digest and
+prepare, in the first instance, the plans of taxation, which are
+afterwards passed into laws by the authority of the sovereign or
+legislature.
+
+Inquisitive and enlightened statesmen are deemed everywhere best
+qualified to make a judicious selection of the objects proper for
+revenue; which is a clear indication, as far as the sense of
+mankind can have weight in the question, of the species of knowledge
+of local circumstances requisite to the purposes of taxation.
+
+The taxes intended to be comprised under the general
+denomination of internal taxes may be subdivided into those of the
+DIRECT and those of the INDIRECT kind. Though the objection be made
+to both, yet the reasoning upon it seems to be confined to the
+former branch. And indeed, as to the latter, by which must be
+understood duties and excises on articles of consumption, one is at
+a loss to conceive what can be the nature of the difficulties
+apprehended. The knowledge relating to them must evidently be of a
+kind that will either be suggested by the nature of the article
+itself, or can easily be procured from any well-informed man,
+especially of the mercantile class. The circumstances that may
+distinguish its situation in one State from its situation in another
+must be few, simple, and easy to be comprehended. The principal
+thing to be attended to, would be to avoid those articles which had
+been previously appropriated to the use of a particular State; and
+there could be no difficulty in ascertaining the revenue system of
+each. This could always be known from the respective codes of laws,
+as well as from the information of the members from the several
+States.
+
+The objection, when applied to real property or to houses and
+lands, appears to have, at first sight, more foundation, but even in
+this view it will not bear a close examination. Land taxes are co
+monly laid in one of two modes, either by ACTUAL valuations,
+permanent or periodical, or by OCCASIONAL assessments, at the
+discretion, or according to the best judgment, of certain officers
+whose duty it is to make them. In either case, the EXECUTION of the
+business, which alone requires the knowledge of local details, must
+be devolved upon discreet persons in the character of commissioners
+or assessors, elected by the people or appointed by the government
+for the purpose. All that the law can do must be to name the
+persons or to prescribe the manner of their election or appointment,
+to fix their numbers and qualifications and to draw the general
+outlines of their powers and duties. And what is there in all this
+that cannot as well be performed by the national legislature as by a
+State legislature? The attention of either can only reach to
+general principles; local details, as already observed, must be
+referred to those who are to execute the plan.
+
+But there is a simple point of view in which this matter may be
+placed that must be altogether satisfactory. The national
+legislature can make use of the SYSTEM OF EACH STATE WITHIN THAT
+STATE. The method of laying and collecting this species of taxes in
+each State can, in all its parts, be adopted and employed by the
+federal government.
+
+Let it be recollected that the proportion of these taxes is not
+to be left to the discretion of the national legislature, but is to
+be determined by the numbers of each State, as described in the
+second section of the first article. An actual census or
+enumeration of the people must furnish the rule, a circumstance
+which effectually shuts the door to partiality or oppression. The
+abuse of this power of taxation seems to have been provided against
+with guarded circumspection. In addition to the precaution just
+mentioned, there is a provision that "all duties, imposts, and
+excises shall be UNIFORM throughout the United States."
+
+It has been very properly observed by different speakers and
+writers on the side of the Constitution, that if the exercise of the
+power of internal taxation by the Union should be discovered on
+experiment to be really inconvenient, the federal government may
+then forbear the use of it, and have recourse to requisitions in its
+stead. By way of answer to this, it has been triumphantly asked,
+Why not in the first instance omit that ambiguous power, and rely
+upon the latter resource? Two solid answers may be given. The
+first is, that the exercise of that power, if convenient, will be
+preferable, because it will be more effectual; and it is impossible
+to prove in theory, or otherwise than by the experiment, that it
+cannot be advantageously exercised. The contrary, indeed, appears
+most probable. The second answer is, that the existence of such a
+power in the Constitution will have a strong influence in giving
+efficacy to requisitions. When the States know that the Union can
+apply itself without their agency, it will be a powerful motive for
+exertion on their part.
+
+As to the interference of the revenue laws of the Union, and of
+its members, we have already seen that there can be no clashing or
+repugnancy of authority. The laws cannot, therefore, in a legal
+sense, interfere with each other; and it is far from impossible to
+avoid an interference even in the policy of their different systems.
+An effectual expedient for this purpose will be, mutually, to
+abstain from those objects which either side may have first had
+recourse to. As neither can CONTROL the other, each will have an
+obvious and sensible interest in this reciprocal forbearance. And
+where there is an IMMEDIATE common interest, we may safely count
+upon its operation. When the particular debts of the States are
+done away, and their expenses come to be limited within their
+natural compass, the possibility almost of interference will vanish.
+A small land tax will answer the purpose of the States, and will be
+their most simple and most fit resource.
+
+Many spectres have been raised out of this power of internal
+taxation, to excite the apprehensions of the people: double sets of
+revenue officers, a duplication of their burdens by double
+taxations, and the frightful forms of odious and oppressive
+poll-taxes, have been played off with all the ingenious dexterity of
+political legerdemain.
+
+As to the first point, there are two cases in which there can be
+no room for double sets of officers: one, where the right of
+imposing the tax is exclusively vested in the Union, which applies
+to the duties on imports; the other, where the object has not
+fallen under any State regulation or provision, which may be
+applicable to a variety of objects. In other cases, the probability
+is that the United States will either wholly abstain from the
+objects preoccupied for local purposes, or will make use of the
+State officers and State regulations for collecting the additional
+imposition. This will best answer the views of revenue, because it
+will save expense in the collection, and will best avoid any
+occasion of disgust to the State governments and to the people. At
+all events, here is a practicable expedient for avoiding such an
+inconvenience; and nothing more can be required than to show that
+evils predicted to not necessarily result from the plan.
+
+As to any argument derived from a supposed system of influence,
+it is a sufficient answer to say that it ought not to be presumed;
+but the supposition is susceptible of a more precise answer. If
+such a spirit should infest the councils of the Union, the most
+certain road to the accomplishment of its aim would be to employ the
+State officers as much as possible, and to attach them to the Union
+by an accumulation of their emoluments. This would serve to turn
+the tide of State influence into the channels of the national
+government, instead of making federal influence flow in an opposite
+and adverse current. But all suppositions of this kind are
+invidious, and ought to be banished from the consideration of the
+great question before the people. They can answer no other end than
+to cast a mist over the truth.
+
+As to the suggestion of double taxation, the answer is plain.
+The wants of the Union are to be supplied in one way or another;
+if to be done by the authority of the federal government, it will
+not be to be done by that of the State government. The quantity of
+taxes to be paid by the community must be the same in either case;
+with this advantage, if the provision is to be made by the
+Union that the capital resource of commercial imposts, which is the
+most convenient branch of revenue, can be prudently improved to a
+much greater extent under federal than under State regulation, and
+of course will render it less necessary to recur to more
+inconvenient methods; and with this further advantage, that as far
+as there may be any real difficulty in the exercise of the power of
+internal taxation, it will impose a disposition to greater care in
+the choice and arrangement of the means; and must naturally tend to
+make it a fixed point of policy in the national administration to go
+as far as may be practicable in making the luxury of the rich
+tributary to the public treasury, in order to diminish the necessity
+of those impositions which might create dissatisfaction in the
+poorer and most numerous classes of the society. Happy it is when
+the interest which the government has in the preservation of its own
+power, coincides with a proper distribution of the public burdens,
+and tends to guard the least wealthy part of the community from
+oppression!
+
+As to poll taxes, I, without scruple, confess my disapprobation
+of them; and though they have prevailed from an early period in
+those States [1] which have uniformly been the most tenacious of
+their rights, I should lament to see them introduced into practice
+under the national government. But does it follow because there is
+a power to lay them that they will actually be laid? Every State in
+the Union has power to impose taxes of this kind; and yet in
+several of them they are unknown in practice. Are the State
+governments to be stigmatized as tyrannies, because they possess
+this power? If they are not, with what propriety can the like power
+justify such a charge against the national government, or even be
+urged as an obstacle to its adoption? As little friendly as I am to
+the species of imposition, I still feel a thorough conviction that
+the power of having recourse to it ought to exist in the federal
+government. There are certain emergencies of nations, in which
+expedients, that in the ordinary state of things ought to be
+forborne, become essential to the public weal. And the government,
+from the possibility of such emergencies, ought ever to have the
+option of making use of them. The real scarcity of objects in this
+country, which may be considered as productive sources of revenue,
+is a reason peculiar to itself, for not abridging the discretion of
+the national councils in this respect. There may exist certain
+critical and tempestuous conjunctures of the State, in which a poll
+tax may become an inestimable resource. And as I know nothing to
+exempt this portion of the globe from the common calamities that
+have befallen other parts of it, I acknowledge my aversion to every
+project that is calculated to disarm the government of a single
+weapon, which in any possible contingency might be usefully employed
+for the general defense and security.
+
+I have now gone through the examination of such of the powers
+proposed to be vested in the United States, which may be considered
+as having an immediate relation to the energy of the government;
+and have endeavored to answer the principal objections which have
+been made to them. I have passed over in silence those minor
+authorities, which are either too inconsiderable to have been
+thought worthy of the hostilities of the opponents of the
+Constitution, or of too manifest propriety to admit of controversy.
+The mass of judiciary power, however, might have claimed an
+investigation under this head, had it not been for the consideration
+that its organization and its extent may be more advantageously
+considered in connection. This has determined me to refer it to the
+branch of our inquiries upon which we shall next enter.
+
+PUBLIUS.
+
+FNA1-@1 The New England States.
+
+
+
+
+
+FEDERALIST No. 37
+
+
+
+Concerning the Difficulties of the Convention in Devising a Proper
+Form of Government
+
+From the Daily Advertiser.
+
+Friday, January 11, 1788.
+
+
+
+MADISON
+
+
+
+To the People of the State of New York:
+
+IN REVIEWING the defects of the existing Confederation, and
+showing that they cannot be supplied by a government of less energy
+than that before the public, several of the most important
+principles of the latter fell of course under consideration. But as
+the ultimate object of these papers is to determine clearly and
+fully the merits of this Constitution, and the expediency of
+adopting it, our plan cannot be complete without taking a more
+critical and thorough survey of the work of the convention, without
+examining it on all its sides, comparing it in all its parts, and
+calculating its probable effects.
+
+That this remaining task may be executed under impressions
+conducive to a just and fair result, some reflections must in this
+place be indulged, which candor previously suggests.
+
+It is a misfortune, inseparable from human affairs, that public
+measures are rarely investigated with that spirit of moderation
+which is essential to a just estimate of their real tendency to
+advance or obstruct the public good; and that this spirit is more
+apt to be diminished than promoted, by those occasions which require
+an unusual exercise of it. To those who have been led by experience
+to attend to this consideration, it could not appear surprising,
+that the act of the convention, which recommends so many important
+changes and innovations, which may be viewed in so many lights and
+relations, and which touches the springs of so many passions and
+interests, should find or excite dispositions unfriendly, both on
+one side and on the other, to a fair discussion and accurate
+judgment of its merits. In some, it has been too evident from their
+own publications, that they have scanned the proposed Constitution,
+not only with a predisposition to censure, but with a
+predetermination to condemn; as the language held by others betrays
+an opposite predetermination or bias, which must render their
+opinions also of little moment in the question. In placing,
+however, these different characters on a level, with respect to the
+weight of their opinions, I wish not to insinuate that there may not
+be a material difference in the purity of their intentions. It is
+but just to remark in favor of the latter description, that as our
+situation is universally admitted to be peculiarly critical, and to
+require indispensably that something should be done for our relief,
+the predetermined patron of what has been actually done may have
+taken his bias from the weight of these considerations, as well as
+from considerations of a sinister nature. The predetermined
+adversary, on the other hand, can have been governed by no venial
+motive whatever. The intentions of the first may be upright, as
+they may on the contrary be culpable. The views of the last cannot
+be upright, and must be culpable. But the truth is, that these
+papers are not addressed to persons falling under either of these
+characters. They solicit the attention of those only, who add to a
+sincere zeal for the happiness of their country, a temper favorable
+to a just estimate of the means of promoting it.
+
+Persons of this character will proceed to an examination of the
+plan submitted by the convention, not only without a disposition to
+find or to magnify faults; but will see the propriety of
+reflecting, that a faultless plan was not to be expected. Nor will
+they barely make allowances for the errors which may be chargeable
+on the fallibility to which the convention, as a body of men, were
+liable; but will keep in mind, that they themselves also are but
+men, and ought not to assume an infallibility in rejudging the
+fallible opinions of others.
+
+With equal readiness will it be perceived, that besides these
+inducements to candor, many allowances ought to be made for the
+difficulties inherent in the very nature of the undertaking referred
+to the convention.
+
+The novelty of the undertaking immediately strikes us. It has
+been shown in the course of these papers, that the existing
+Confederation is founded on principles which are fallacious; that
+we must consequently change this first foundation, and with it the
+superstructure resting upon it. It has been shown, that the other
+confederacies which could be consulted as precedents have been
+vitiated by the same erroneous principles, and can therefore furnish
+no other light than that of beacons, which give warning of the
+course to be shunned, without pointing out that which ought to be
+pursued. The most that the convention could do in such a situation,
+was to avoid the errors suggested by the past experience of other
+countries, as well as of our own; and to provide a convenient mode
+of rectifying their own errors, as future experiences may unfold
+them.
+
+Among the difficulties encountered by the convention, a very
+important one must have lain in combining the requisite stability
+and energy in government, with the inviolable attention due to
+liberty and to the republican form. Without substantially
+accomplishing this part of their undertaking, they would have very
+imperfectly fulfilled the object of their appointment, or the
+expectation of the public; yet that it could not be easily
+accomplished, will be denied by no one who is unwilling to betray
+his ignorance of the subject. Energy in government is essential to
+that security against external and internal danger, and to that
+prompt and salutary execution of the laws which enter into the very
+definition of good government. Stability in government is essential
+to national character and to the advantages annexed to it, as well
+as to that repose and confidence in the minds of the people, which
+are among the chief blessings of civil society. An irregular and
+mutable legislation is not more an evil in itself than it is odious
+to the people; and it may be pronounced with assurance that the
+people of this country, enlightened as they are with regard to the
+nature, and interested, as the great body of them are, in the
+effects of good government, will never be satisfied till some remedy
+be applied to the vicissitudes and uncertainties which characterize
+the State administrations. On comparing, however, these valuable
+ingredients with the vital principles of liberty, we must perceive
+at once the difficulty of mingling them together in their due
+proportions. The genius of republican liberty seems to demand on
+one side, not only that all power should be derived from the people,
+but that those intrusted with it should be kept in independence on
+the people, by a short duration of their appointments; and that
+even during this short period the trust should be placed not in a
+few, but a number of hands. Stability, on the contrary, requires
+that the hands in which power is lodged should continue for a length
+of time the same. A frequent change of men will result from a
+frequent return of elections; and a frequent change of measures
+from a frequent change of men: whilst energy in government requires
+not only a certain duration of power, but the execution of it by a
+single hand.
+
+How far the convention may have succeeded in this part of their
+work, will better appear on a more accurate view of it. From the
+cursory view here taken, it must clearly appear to have been an
+arduous part.
+
+Not less arduous must have been the task of marking the proper
+line of partition between the authority of the general and that of
+the State governments. Every man will be sensible of this
+difficulty, in proportion as he has been accustomed to contemplate
+and discriminate objects extensive and complicated in their nature.
+The faculties of the mind itself have never yet been distinguished
+and defined, with satisfactory precision, by all the efforts of the
+most acute and metaphysical philosophers. Sense, perception,
+judgment, desire, volition, memory, imagination, are found to be
+separated by such delicate shades and minute gradations that their
+boundaries have eluded the most subtle investigations, and remain a
+pregnant source of ingenious disquisition and controversy. The
+boundaries between the great kingdom of nature, and, still more,
+between the various provinces, and lesser portions, into which they
+are subdivided, afford another illustration of the same important
+truth. The most sagacious and laborious naturalists have never yet
+succeeded in tracing with certainty the line which separates the
+district of vegetable life from the neighboring region of
+unorganized matter, or which marks the termination of the former and
+the commencement of the animal empire. A still greater obscurity
+lies in the distinctive characters by which the objects in each of
+these great departments of nature have been arranged and assorted.
+
+When we pass from the works of nature, in which all the
+delineations are perfectly accurate, and appear to be otherwise only
+from the imperfection of the eye which surveys them, to the
+institutions of man, in which the obscurity arises as well from the
+object itself as from the organ by which it is contemplated, we must
+perceive the necessity of moderating still further our expectations
+and hopes from the efforts of human sagacity. Experience has
+instructed us that no skill in the science of government has yet
+been able to discriminate and define, with sufficient certainty, its
+three great provinces the legislative, executive, and judiciary; or
+even the privileges and powers of the different legislative branches.
+Questions daily occur in the course of practice, which prove the
+obscurity which reins in these subjects, and which puzzle the
+greatest adepts in political science.
+
+The experience of ages, with the continued and combined labors
+of the most enlightened legislatures and jurists, has been equally
+unsuccessful in delineating the several objects and limits of
+different codes of laws and different tribunals of justice. The
+precise extent of the common law, and the statute law, the maritime
+law, the ecclesiastical law, the law of corporations, and other
+local laws and customs, remains still to be clearly and finally
+established in Great Britain, where accuracy in such subjects has
+been more industriously pursued than in any other part of the world.
+The jurisdiction of her several courts, general and local, of law,
+of equity, of admiralty, etc., is not less a source of frequent and
+intricate discussions, sufficiently denoting the indeterminate
+limits by which they are respectively circumscribed. All new laws,
+though penned with the greatest technical skill, and passed on the
+fullest and most mature deliberation, are considered as more or less
+obscure and equivocal, until their meaning be liquidated and
+ascertained by a series of particular discussions and adjudications.
+Besides the obscurity arising from the complexity of objects, and
+the imperfection of the human faculties, the medium through which
+the conceptions of men are conveyed to each other adds a fresh
+embarrassment. The use of words is to express ideas. Perspicuity,
+therefore, requires not only that the ideas should be distinctly
+formed, but that they should be expressed by words distinctly and
+exclusively appropriate to them. But no language is so copious as
+to supply words and phrases for every complex idea, or so correct as
+not to include many equivocally denoting different ideas. Hence it
+must happen that however accurately objects may be discriminated in
+themselves, and however accurately the discrimination may be
+considered, the definition of them may be rendered inaccurate by the
+inaccuracy of the terms in which it is delivered. And this
+unavoidable inaccuracy must be greater or less, according to the
+complexity and novelty of the objects defined. When the Almighty
+himself condescends to address mankind in their own language, his
+meaning, luminous as it must be, is rendered dim and doubtful by the
+cloudy medium through which it is communicated.
+
+Here, then, are three sources of vague and incorrect
+definitions: indistinctness of the object, imperfection of the
+organ of conception, inadequateness of the vehicle of ideas. Any
+one of these must produce a certain degree of obscurity. The
+convention, in delineating the boundary between the federal and
+State jurisdictions, must have experienced the full effect of them
+all.
+
+To the difficulties already mentioned may be added the
+interfering pretensions of the larger and smaller States. We cannot
+err in supposing that the former would contend for a participation
+in the government, fully proportioned to their superior wealth and
+importance; and that the latter would not be less tenacious of the
+equality at present enjoyed by them. We may well suppose that
+neither side would entirely yield to the other, and consequently
+that the struggle could be terminated only by compromise. It is
+extremely probable, also, that after the ratio of representation had
+been adjusted, this very compromise must have produced a fresh
+struggle between the same parties, to give such a turn to the
+organization of the government, and to the distribution of its
+powers, as would increase the importance of the branches, in forming
+which they had respectively obtained the greatest share of influence.
+There are features in the Constitution which warrant each of these
+suppositions; and as far as either of them is well founded, it
+shows that the convention must have been compelled to sacrifice
+theoretical propriety to the force of extraneous considerations.
+
+Nor could it have been the large and small States only, which
+would marshal themselves in opposition to each other on various
+points. Other combinations, resulting from a difference of local
+position and policy, must have created additional difficulties. As
+every State may be divided into different districts, and its
+citizens into different classes, which give birth to contending
+interests and local jealousies, so the different parts of the United
+States are distinguished from each other by a variety of
+circumstances, which produce a like effect on a larger scale. And
+although this variety of interests, for reasons sufficiently
+explained in a former paper, may have a salutary influence on the
+administration of the government when formed, yet every one must be
+sensible of the contrary influence, which must have been experienced
+in the task of forming it.
+
+Would it be wonderful if, under the pressure of all these
+difficulties, the convention should have been forced into some
+deviations from that artificial structure and regular symmetry which
+an abstract view of the subject might lead an ingenious theorist to
+bestow on a Constitution planned in his closet or in his
+imagination? The real wonder is that so many difficulties should
+have been surmounted, and surmounted with a unanimity almost as
+unprecedented as it must have been unexpected. It is impossible for
+any man of candor to reflect on this circumstance without partaking
+of the astonishment. It is impossible for the man of pious
+reflection not to perceive in it a finger of that Almighty hand
+which has been so frequently and signally extended to our relief in
+the critical stages of the revolution.
+
+We had occasion, in a former paper, to take notice of the
+repeated trials which have been unsuccessfully made in the United
+Netherlands for reforming the baneful and notorious vices of their
+constitution. The history of almost all the great councils and
+consultations held among mankind for reconciling their discordant
+opinions, assuaging their mutual jealousies, and adjusting their
+respective interests, is a history of factions, contentions, and
+disappointments, and may be classed among the most dark and degraded
+pictures which display the infirmities and depravities of the human
+character. If, in a few scattered instances, a brighter aspect is
+presented, they serve only as exceptions to admonish us of the
+general truth; and by their lustre to darken the gloom of the
+adverse prospect to which they are contrasted. In revolving the
+causes from which these exceptions result, and applying them to the
+particular instances before us, we are necessarily led to two
+important conclusions. The first is, that the convention must have
+enjoyed, in a very singular degree, an exemption from the
+pestilential influence of party animosities the disease most
+incident to deliberative bodies, and most apt to contaminate their
+proceedings. The second conclusion is that all the deputations
+composing the convention were satisfactorily accommodated by the
+final act, or were induced to accede to it by a deep conviction of
+the necessity of sacrificing private opinions and partial interests
+to the public good, and by a despair of seeing this necessity
+diminished by delays or by new experiments.
+
+
+
+
+
+FEDERALIST No. 38
+
+
+
+The Same Subject Continued, and the Incoherence of the Objections
+to the New Plan Exposed
+
+From the New York Packet.
+
+Tuesday, January 15, 1788.
+
+
+
+MADISON
+
+
+
+To the People of the State of New York:
+
+IT IS not a little remarkable that in every case reported by
+ancient history, in which government has been established with
+deliberation and consent, the task of framing it has not been
+committed to an assembly of men, but has been performed by some
+individual citizen of preeminent wisdom and approved integrity.
+
+Minos, we learn, was the primitive founder of the government of
+Crete, as Zaleucus was of that of the Locrians. Theseus first, and
+after him Draco and Solon, instituted the government of Athens.
+Lycurgus was the lawgiver of Sparta. The foundation of the
+original government of Rome was laid by Romulus, and the work
+completed by two of his elective successors, Numa and Tullius
+Hostilius. On the abolition of royalty the consular administration
+was substituted by Brutus, who stepped forward with a project for
+such a reform, which, he alleged, had been prepared by Tullius
+Hostilius, and to which his address obtained the assent and
+ratification of the senate and people. This remark is applicable to
+confederate governments also. Amphictyon, we are told, was the
+author of that which bore his name. The Achaean league received its
+first birth from Achaeus, and its second from Aratus.
+
+What degree of agency these reputed lawgivers might have in
+their respective establishments, or how far they might be clothed
+with the legitimate authority of the people, cannot in every
+instance be ascertained. In some, however, the proceeding was
+strictly regular. Draco appears to have been intrusted by the
+people of Athens with indefinite powers to reform its government and
+laws. And Solon, according to Plutarch, was in a manner compelled,
+by the universal suffrage of his fellow-citizens, to take upon him
+the sole and absolute power of new-modeling the constitution. The
+proceedings under Lycurgus were less regular; but as far as the
+advocates for a regular reform could prevail, they all turned their
+eyes towards the single efforts of that celebrated patriot and sage,
+instead of seeking to bring about a revolution by the intervention
+of a deliberative body of citizens.
+
+Whence could it have proceeded, that a people, jealous as the
+Greeks were of their liberty, should so far abandon the rules of
+caution as to place their destiny in the hands of a single citizen?
+Whence could it have proceeded, that the Athenians, a people who
+would not suffer an army to be commanded by fewer than ten generals,
+and who required no other proof of danger to their liberties than
+the illustrious merit of a fellow-citizen, should consider one
+illustrious citizen as a more eligible depositary of the fortunes of
+themselves and their posterity, than a select body of citizens, from
+whose common deliberations more wisdom, as well as more safety,
+might have been expected? These questions cannot be fully answered,
+without supposing that the fears of discord and disunion among a
+number of counsellors exceeded the apprehension of treachery or
+incapacity in a single individual. History informs us, likewise, of
+the difficulties with which these celebrated reformers had to
+contend, as well as the expedients which they were obliged to employ
+in order to carry their reforms into effect. Solon, who seems to
+have indulged a more temporizing policy, confessed that he had not
+given to his countrymen the government best suited to their
+happiness, but most tolerable to their prejudices. And Lycurgus,
+more true to his object, was under the necessity of mixing a portion
+of violence with the authority of superstition, and of securing his
+final success by a voluntary renunciation, first of his country, and
+then of his life. If these lessons teach us, on one hand, to admire
+the improvement made by America on the ancient mode of preparing and
+establishing regular plans of government, they serve not less, on
+the other, to admonish us of the hazards and difficulties incident
+to such experiments, and of the great imprudence of unnecessarily
+multiplying them.
+
+Is it an unreasonable conjecture, that the errors which may be
+contained in the plan of the convention are such as have resulted
+rather from the defect of antecedent experience on this complicated
+and difficult subject, than from a want of accuracy or care in the
+investigation of it; and, consequently such as will not be
+ascertained until an actual trial shall have pointed them out? This
+conjecture is rendered probable, not only by many considerations of
+a general nature, but by the particular case of the Articles of
+Confederation. It is observable that among the numerous objections
+and amendments suggested by the several States, when these articles
+were submitted for their ratification, not one is found which
+alludes to the great and radical error which on actual trial has
+discovered itself. And if we except the observations which New
+Jersey was led to make, rather by her local situation, than by her
+peculiar foresight, it may be questioned whether a single suggestion
+was of sufficient moment to justify a revision of the system. There
+is abundant reason, nevertheless, to suppose that immaterial as
+these objections were, they would have been adhered to with a very
+dangerous inflexibility, in some States, had not a zeal for their
+opinions and supposed interests been stifled by the more powerful
+sentiment of selfpreservation. One State, we may remember,
+persisted for several years in refusing her concurrence, although
+the enemy remained the whole period at our gates, or rather in the
+very bowels of our country. Nor was her pliancy in the end effected
+by a less motive, than the fear of being chargeable with protracting
+the public calamities, and endangering the event of the contest.
+Every candid reader will make the proper reflections on these
+important facts.
+
+A patient who finds his disorder daily growing worse, and that
+an efficacious remedy can no longer be delayed without extreme
+danger, after coolly revolving his situation, and the characters of
+different physicians, selects and calls in such of them as he judges
+most capable of administering relief, and best entitled to his
+confidence. The physicians attend; the case of the patient is
+carefully examined; a consultation is held; they are unanimously
+agreed that the symptoms are critical, but that the case, with
+proper and timely relief, is so far from being desperate, that it
+may be made to issue in an improvement of his constitution. They
+are equally unanimous in prescribing the remedy, by which this happy
+effect is to be produced. The prescription is no sooner made known,
+however, than a number of persons interpose, and, without denying
+the reality or danger of the disorder, assure the patient that the
+prescription will be poison to his constitution, and forbid him,
+under pain of certain death, to make use of it. Might not the
+patient reasonably demand, before he ventured to follow this advice,
+that the authors of it should at least agree among themselves on
+some other remedy to be substituted? And if he found them differing
+as much from one another as from his first counsellors, would he not
+act prudently in trying the experiment unanimously recommended by
+the latter, rather than be hearkening to those who could neither
+deny the necessity of a speedy remedy, nor agree in proposing one?
+
+Such a patient and in such a situation is America at this moment.
+She has been sensible of her malady. She has obtained a regular
+and unanimous advice from men of her own deliberate choice. And she
+is warned by others against following this advice under pain of the
+most fatal consequences. Do the monitors deny the reality of her
+danger? No. Do they deny the necessity of some speedy and powerful
+remedy? No. Are they agreed, are any two of them agreed, in their
+objections to the remedy proposed, or in the proper one to be
+substituted? Let them speak for themselves. This one tells us that
+the proposed Constitution ought to be rejected, because it is not a
+confederation of the States, but a government over individuals.
+Another admits that it ought to be a government over individuals to
+a certain extent, but by no means to the extent proposed. A third
+does not object to the government over individuals, or to the extent
+proposed, but to the want of a bill of rights. A fourth concurs in
+the absolute necessity of a bill of rights, but contends that it
+ought to be declaratory, not of the personal rights of individuals,
+but of the rights reserved to the States in their political capacity.
+A fifth is of opinion that a bill of rights of any sort would be
+superfluous and misplaced, and that the plan would be
+unexceptionable but for the fatal power of regulating the times and
+places of election. An objector in a large State exclaims loudly
+against the unreasonable equality of representation in the Senate.
+An objector in a small State is equally loud against the dangerous
+inequality in the House of Representatives. From this quarter, we
+are alarmed with the amazing expense, from the number of persons who
+are to administer the new government. From another quarter, and
+sometimes from the same quarter, on another occasion, the cry is
+that the Congress will be but a shadow of a representation, and that
+the government would be far less objectionable if the number and the
+expense were doubled. A patriot in a State that does not import or
+export, discerns insuperable objections against the power of direct
+taxation. The patriotic adversary in a State of great exports and
+imports, is not less dissatisfied that the whole burden of taxes may
+be thrown on consumption. This politician discovers in the
+Constitution a direct and irresistible tendency to monarchy; that
+is equally sure it will end in aristocracy. Another is puzzled to
+say which of these shapes it will ultimately assume, but sees
+clearly it must be one or other of them; whilst a fourth is not
+wanting, who with no less confidence affirms that the Constitution
+is so far from having a bias towards either of these dangers, that
+the weight on that side will not be sufficient to keep it upright
+and firm against its opposite propensities. With another class of
+adversaries to the Constitution the language is that the
+legislative, executive, and judiciary departments are intermixed in
+such a manner as to contradict all the ideas of regular government
+and all the requisite precautions in favor of liberty. Whilst this
+objection circulates in vague and general expressions, there are but
+a few who lend their sanction to it. Let each one come forward with
+his particular explanation, and scarce any two are exactly agreed
+upon the subject. In the eyes of one the junction of the Senate
+with the President in the responsible function of appointing to
+offices, instead of vesting this executive power in the Executive
+alone, is the vicious part of the organization. To another, the
+exclusion of the House of Representatives, whose numbers alone could
+be a due security against corruption and partiality in the exercise
+of such a power, is equally obnoxious. With another, the admission
+of the President into any share of a power which ever must be a
+dangerous engine in the hands of the executive magistrate, is an
+unpardonable violation of the maxims of republican jealousy. No
+part of the arrangement, according to some, is more inadmissible
+than the trial of impeachments by the Senate, which is alternately a
+member both of the legislative and executive departments, when this
+power so evidently belonged to the judiciary department. "We
+concur fully," reply others, "in the objection to this part of the
+plan, but we can never agree that a reference of impeachments to the
+judiciary authority would be an amendment of the error. Our
+principal dislike to the organization arises from the extensive
+powers already lodged in that department." Even among the zealous
+patrons of a council of state the most irreconcilable variance is
+discovered concerning the mode in which it ought to be constituted.
+The demand of one gentleman is, that the council should consist of
+a small number to be appointed by the most numerous branch of the
+legislature. Another would prefer a larger number, and considers it
+as a fundamental condition that the appointment should be made by
+the President himself.
+
+As it can give no umbrage to the writers against the plan of the
+federal Constitution, let us suppose, that as they are the most
+zealous, so they are also the most sagacious, of those who think the
+late convention were unequal to the task assigned them, and that a
+wiser and better plan might and ought to be substituted. Let us
+further suppose that their country should concur, both in this
+favorable opinion of their merits, and in their unfavorable opinion
+of the convention; and should accordingly proceed to form them into
+a second convention, with full powers, and for the express purpose
+of revising and remoulding the work of the first. Were the
+experiment to be seriously made, though it required some effort to
+view it seriously even in fiction, I leave it to be decided by the
+sample of opinions just exhibited, whether, with all their enmity to
+their predecessors, they would, in any one point, depart so widely
+from their example, as in the discord and ferment that would mark
+their own deliberations; and whether the Constitution, now before
+the public, would not stand as fair a chance for immortality, as
+Lycurgus gave to that of Sparta, by making its change to depend on
+his own return from exile and death, if it were to be immediately
+adopted, and were to continue in force, not until a BETTER, but
+until ANOTHER should be agreed upon by this new assembly of
+lawgivers.
+
+It is a matter both of wonder and regret, that those who raise
+so many objections against the new Constitution should never call to
+mind the defects of that which is to be exchanged for it. It is not
+necessary that the former should be perfect; it is sufficient that
+the latter is more imperfect. No man would refuse to give brass for
+silver or gold, because the latter had some alloy in it. No man
+would refuse to quit a shattered and tottering habitation for a firm
+and commodious building, because the latter had not a porch to it,
+or because some of the rooms might be a little larger or smaller, or
+the ceilings a little higher or lower than his fancy would have
+planned them. But waiving illustrations of this sort, is it not
+manifest that most of the capital objections urged against the new
+system lie with tenfold weight against the existing Confederation?
+Is an indefinite power to raise money dangerous in the hands of the
+federal government? The present Congress can make requisitions to
+any amount they please, and the States are constitutionally bound to
+furnish them; they can emit bills of credit as long as they will
+pay for the paper; they can borrow, both abroad and at home, as
+long as a shilling will be lent. Is an indefinite power to raise
+troops dangerous? The Confederation gives to Congress that power
+also; and they have already begun to make use of it. Is it
+improper and unsafe to intermix the different powers of government
+in the same body of men? Congress, a single body of men, are the
+sole depositary of all the federal powers. Is it particularly
+dangerous to give the keys of the treasury, and the command of the
+army, into the same hands? The Confederation places them both in
+the hands of Congress. Is a bill of rights essential to liberty?
+The Confederation has no bill of rights. Is it an objection
+against the new Constitution, that it empowers the Senate, with the
+concurrence of the Executive, to make treaties which are to be the
+laws of the land? The existing Congress, without any such control,
+can make treaties which they themselves have declared, and most of
+the States have recognized, to be the supreme law of the land. Is
+the importation of slaves permitted by the new Constitution for
+twenty years? By the old it is permitted forever.
+
+I shall be told, that however dangerous this mixture of powers
+may be in theory, it is rendered harmless by the dependence of
+Congress on the State for the means of carrying them into practice;
+that however large the mass of powers may be, it is in fact a
+lifeless mass. Then, say I, in the first place, that the
+Confederation is chargeable with the still greater folly of
+declaring certain powers in the federal government to be absolutely
+necessary, and at the same time rendering them absolutely nugatory;
+and, in the next place, that if the Union is to continue, and no
+better government be substituted, effective powers must either be
+granted to, or assumed by, the existing Congress; in either of
+which events, the contrast just stated will hold good. But this is
+not all. Out of this lifeless mass has already grown an excrescent
+power, which tends to realize all the dangers that can be
+apprehended from a defective construction of the supreme government
+of the Union. It is now no longer a point of speculation and hope,
+that the Western territory is a mine of vast wealth to the United
+States; and although it is not of such a nature as to extricate
+them from their present distresses, or for some time to come, to
+yield any regular supplies for the public expenses, yet must it
+hereafter be able, under proper management, both to effect a gradual
+discharge of the domestic debt, and to furnish, for a certain
+period, liberal tributes to the federal treasury. A very large
+proportion of this fund has been already surrendered by individual
+States; and it may with reason be expected that the remaining
+States will not persist in withholding similar proofs of their
+equity and generosity. We may calculate, therefore, that a rich and
+fertile country, of an area equal to the inhabited extent of the
+United States, will soon become a national stock. Congress have
+assumed the administration of this stock. They have begun to render
+it productive. Congress have undertaken to do more: they have
+proceeded to form new States, to erect temporary governments, to
+appoint officers for them, and to prescribe the conditions on which
+such States shall be admitted into the Confederacy. All this has
+been done; and done without the least color of constitutional
+authority. Yet no blame has been whispered; no alarm has been
+sounded. A GREAT and INDEPENDENT fund of revenue is passing into
+the hands of a SINGLE BODY of men, who can RAISE TROOPS to an
+INDEFINITE NUMBER, and appropriate money to their support for an
+INDEFINITE PERIOD OF TIME. And yet there are men, who have not only
+been silent spectators of this prospect, but who are advocates for
+the system which exhibits it; and, at the same time, urge against
+the new system the objections which we have heard. Would they not
+act with more consistency, in urging the establishment of the
+latter, as no less necessary to guard the Union against the future
+powers and resources of a body constructed like the existing
+Congress, than to save it from the dangers threatened by the present
+impotency of that Assembly?
+
+I mean not, by any thing here said, to throw censure on the
+measures which have been pursued by Congress. I am sensible they
+could not have done otherwise. The public interest, the necessity
+of the case, imposed upon them the task of overleaping their
+constitutional limits. But is not the fact an alarming proof of the
+danger resulting from a government which does not possess regular
+powers commensurate to its objects? A dissolution or usurpation is
+the dreadful dilemma to which it is continually exposed.
+
+PUBLIUS.
+
+
+
+
+
+FEDERALIST No. 39
+
+
+
+The Conformity of the Plan to Republican Principles
+
+For the Independent Journal.
+
+
+
+MADISON
+
+
+
+To the People of the State of New York:
+
+THE last paper having concluded the observations which were
+meant to introduce a candid survey of the plan of government
+reported by the convention, we now proceed to the execution of that
+part of our undertaking.
+
+The first question that offers itself is, whether the general
+form and aspect of the government be strictly republican. It is
+evident that no other form would be reconcilable with the genius of
+the people of America; with the fundamental principles of the
+Revolution; or with that honorable determination which animates
+every votary of freedom, to rest all our political experiments on
+the capacity of mankind for self-government. If the plan of the
+convention, therefore, be found to depart from the republican
+character, its advocates must abandon it as no longer defensible.
+
+What, then, are the distinctive characters of the republican
+form? Were an answer to this question to be sought, not by
+recurring to principles, but in the application of the term by
+political writers, to the constitution of different States, no
+satisfactory one would ever be found. Holland, in which no particle
+of the supreme authority is derived from the people, has passed
+almost universally under the denomination of a republic. The same
+title has been bestowed on Venice, where absolute power over the
+great body of the people is exercised, in the most absolute manner,
+by a small body of hereditary nobles. Poland, which is a mixture of
+aristocracy and of monarchy in their worst forms, has been dignified
+with the same appellation. The government of England, which has one
+republican branch only, combined with an hereditary aristocracy and
+monarchy, has, with equal impropriety, been frequently placed on the
+list of republics. These examples, which are nearly as dissimilar
+to each other as to a genuine republic, show the extreme inaccuracy
+with which the term has been used in political disquisitions.
+
+If we resort for a criterion to the different principles on
+which different forms of government are established, we may define a
+republic to be, or at least may bestow that name on, a government
+which derives all its powers directly or indirectly from the great
+body of the people, and is administered by persons holding their
+offices during pleasure, for a limited period, or during good
+behavior. It is ESSENTIAL to such a government that it be derived
+from the great body of the society, not from an inconsiderable
+proportion, or a favored class of it; otherwise a handful of
+tyrannical nobles, exercising their oppressions by a delegation of
+their powers, might aspire to the rank of republicans, and claim for
+their government the honorable title of republic. It is SUFFICIENT
+for such a government that the persons administering it be
+appointed, either directly or indirectly, by the people; and that
+they hold their appointments by either of the tenures just
+specified; otherwise every government in the United States, as well
+as every other popular government that has been or can be well
+organized or well executed, would be degraded from the republican
+character. According to the constitution of every State in the
+Union, some or other of the officers of government are appointed
+indirectly only by the people. According to most of them, the chief
+magistrate himself is so appointed. And according to one, this mode
+of appointment is extended to one of the co-ordinate branches of the
+legislature. According to all the constitutions, also, the tenure
+of the highest offices is extended to a definite period, and in many
+instances, both within the legislative and executive departments, to
+a period of years. According to the provisions of most of the
+constitutions, again, as well as according to the most respectable
+and received opinions on the subject, the members of the judiciary
+department are to retain their offices by the firm tenure of good
+behavior.
+
+On comparing the Constitution planned by the convention with the
+standard here fixed, we perceive at once that it is, in the most
+rigid sense, conformable to it. The House of Representatives, like
+that of one branch at least of all the State legislatures, is
+elected immediately by the great body of the people. The Senate,
+like the present Congress, and the Senate of Maryland, derives its
+appointment indirectly from the people. The President is indirectly
+derived from the choice of the people, according to the example in
+most of the States. Even the judges, with all other officers of the
+Union, will, as in the several States, be the choice, though a
+remote choice, of the people themselves, the duration of the
+appointments is equally conformable to the republican standard, and
+to the model of State constitutions The House of Representatives is
+periodically elective, as in all the States; and for the period of
+two years, as in the State of South Carolina. The Senate is
+elective, for the period of six years; which is but one year more
+than the period of the Senate of Maryland, and but two more than
+that of the Senates of New York and Virginia. The President is to
+continue in office for the period of four years; as in New York and
+Delaware, the chief magistrate is elected for three years, and in
+South Carolina for two years. In the other States the election is
+annual. In several of the States, however, no constitutional
+provision is made for the impeachment of the chief magistrate. And
+in Delaware and Virginia he is not impeachable till out of office.
+The President of the United States is impeachable at any time
+during his continuance in office. The tenure by which the judges
+are to hold their places, is, as it unquestionably ought to be, that
+of good behavior. The tenure of the ministerial offices generally,
+will be a subject of legal regulation, conformably to the reason of
+the case and the example of the State constitutions.
+
+Could any further proof be required of the republican complexion
+of this system, the most decisive one might be found in its absolute
+prohibition of titles of nobility, both under the federal and the
+State governments; and in its express guaranty of the republican
+form to each of the latter.
+
+"But it was not sufficient," say the adversaries of the
+proposed Constitution, "for the convention to adhere to the
+republican form. They ought, with equal care, to have preserved the
+FEDERAL form, which regards the Union as a CONFEDERACY of sovereign
+states; instead of which, they have framed a NATIONAL government,
+which regards the Union as a CONSOLIDATION of the States." And it
+is asked by what authority this bold and radical innovation was
+undertaken? The handle which has been made of this objection
+requires that it should be examined with some precision.
+
+Without inquiring into the accuracy of the distinction on which
+the objection is founded, it will be necessary to a just estimate of
+its force, first, to ascertain the real character of the government
+in question; secondly, to inquire how far the convention were
+authorized to propose such a government; and thirdly, how far the
+duty they owed to their country could supply any defect of regular
+authority.
+
+First. In order to ascertain the real character of the
+government, it may be considered in relation to the foundation on
+which it is to be established; to the sources from which its
+ordinary powers are to be drawn; to the operation of those powers;
+to the extent of them; and to the authority by which future
+changes in the government are to be introduced.
+
+On examining the first relation, it appears, on one hand, that
+the Constitution is to be founded on the assent and ratification of
+the people of America, given by deputies elected for the special
+purpose; but, on the other, that this assent and ratification is to
+be given by the people, not as individuals composing one entire
+nation, but as composing the distinct and independent States to
+which they respectively belong. It is to be the assent and
+ratification of the several States, derived from the supreme
+authority in each State, the authority of the people themselves.
+The act, therefore, establishing the Constitution, will not be a
+NATIONAL, but a FEDERAL act.
+
+That it will be a federal and not a national act, as these terms
+are understood by the objectors; the act of the people, as forming
+so many independent States, not as forming one aggregate nation, is
+obvious from this single consideration, that it is to result neither
+from the decision of a MAJORITY of the people of the Union, nor from
+that of a MAJORITY of the States. It must result from the UNANIMOUS
+assent of the several States that are parties to it, differing no
+otherwise from their ordinary assent than in its being expressed,
+not by the legislative authority, but by that of the people
+themselves. Were the people regarded in this transaction as forming
+one nation, the will of the majority of the whole people of the
+United States would bind the minority, in the same manner as the
+majority in each State must bind the minority; and the will of the
+majority must be determined either by a comparison of the individual
+votes, or by considering the will of the majority of the States as
+evidence of the will of a majority of the people of the United
+States. Neither of these rules have been adopted. Each State, in
+ratifying the Constitution, is considered as a sovereign body,
+independent of all others, and only to be bound by its own voluntary
+act. In this relation, then, the new Constitution will, if
+established, be a FEDERAL, and not a NATIONAL constitution.
+
+The next relation is, to the sources from which the ordinary
+powers of government are to be derived. The House of
+Representatives will derive its powers from the people of America;
+and the people will be represented in the same proportion, and on
+the same principle, as they are in the legislature of a particular
+State. So far the government is NATIONAL, not FEDERAL. The Senate,
+on the other hand, will derive its powers from the States, as
+political and coequal societies; and these will be represented on
+the principle of equality in the Senate, as they now are in the
+existing Congress. So far the government is FEDERAL, not NATIONAL.
+The executive power will be derived from a very compound source.
+The immediate election of the President is to be made by the States
+in their political characters. The votes allotted to them are in a
+compound ratio, which considers them partly as distinct and coequal
+societies, partly as unequal members of the same society. The
+eventual election, again, is to be made by that branch of the
+legislature which consists of the national representatives; but in
+this particular act they are to be thrown into the form of
+individual delegations, from so many distinct and coequal bodies
+politic. From this aspect of the government it appears to be of a
+mixed character, presenting at least as many FEDERAL as NATIONAL
+features.
+
+The difference between a federal and national government, as it
+relates to the OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT, is supposed to consist
+in this, that in the former the powers operate on the political
+bodies composing the Confederacy, in their political capacities; in
+the latter, on the individual citizens composing the nation, in
+their individual capacities. On trying the Constitution by this
+criterion, it falls under the NATIONAL, not the FEDERAL character;
+though perhaps not so completely as has been understood. In
+several cases, and particularly in the trial of controversies to
+which States may be parties, they must be viewed and proceeded
+against in their collective and political capacities only. So far
+the national countenance of the government on this side seems to be
+disfigured by a few federal features. But this blemish is perhaps
+unavoidable in any plan; and the operation of the government on the
+people, in their individual capacities, in its ordinary and most
+essential proceedings, may, on the whole, designate it, in this
+relation, a NATIONAL government.
+
+But if the government be national with regard to the OPERATION
+of its powers, it changes its aspect again when we contemplate it in
+relation to the EXTENT of its powers. The idea of a national
+government involves in it, not only an authority over the individual
+citizens, but an indefinite supremacy over all persons and things,
+so far as they are objects of lawful government. Among a people
+consolidated into one nation, this supremacy is completely vested in
+the national legislature. Among communities united for particular
+purposes, it is vested partly in the general and partly in the
+municipal legislatures. In the former case, all local authorities
+are subordinate to the supreme; and may be controlled, directed, or
+abolished by it at pleasure. In the latter, the local or municipal
+authorities form distinct and independent portions of the supremacy,
+no more subject, within their respective spheres, to the general
+authority, than the general authority is subject to them, within its
+own sphere. In this relation, then, the proposed government cannot
+be deemed a NATIONAL one; since its jurisdiction extends to certain
+enumerated objects only, and leaves to the several States a
+residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all other objects. It is
+true that in controversies relating to the boundary between the two
+jurisdictions, the tribunal which is ultimately to decide, is to be
+established under the general government. But this does not change
+the principle of the case. The decision is to be impartially made,
+according to the rules of the Constitution; and all the usual and
+most effectual precautions are taken to secure this impartiality.
+Some such tribunal is clearly essential to prevent an appeal to the
+sword and a dissolution of the compact; and that it ought to be
+established under the general rather than under the local
+governments, or, to speak more properly, that it could be safely
+established under the first alone, is a position not likely to be
+combated.
+
+If we try the Constitution by its last relation to the authority
+by which amendments are to be made, we find it neither wholly
+NATIONAL nor wholly FEDERAL. Were it wholly national, the supreme
+and ultimate authority would reside in the MAJORITY of the people of
+the Union; and this authority would be competent at all times, like
+that of a majority of every national society, to alter or abolish
+its established government. Were it wholly federal, on the other
+hand, the concurrence of each State in the Union would be essential
+to every alteration that would be binding on all. The mode provided
+by the plan of the convention is not founded on either of these
+principles. In requiring more than a majority, and principles. In
+requiring more than a majority, and particularly in computing the
+proportion by STATES, not by CITIZENS, it departs from the NATIONAL
+and advances towards the FEDERAL character; in rendering the
+concurrence of less than the whole number of States sufficient, it
+loses again the FEDERAL and partakes of the NATIONAL character.
+
+The proposed Constitution, therefore, is, in strictness, neither
+a national nor a federal Constitution, but a composition of both.
+In its foundation it is federal, not national; in the sources from
+which the ordinary powers of the government are drawn, it is partly
+federal and partly national; in the operation of these powers, it
+is national, not federal; in the extent of them, again, it is
+federal, not national; and, finally, in the authoritative mode of
+introducing amendments, it is neither wholly federal nor wholly
+national.
+
+PUBLIUS.
+
+
+
+
+
+FEDERALIST No. 40
+
+The Powers of the Convention to Form a Mixed Government Examined
+
+and Sustained
+
+From the New York Packet.
+
+Friday, January 18, 1788.
+
+
+
+MADISON
+
+
+
+To the People of the State of New York:
+
+THE SECOND point to be examined is, whether the convention were
+
+authorized to frame and propose this mixed Constitution. The
+
+powers of the convention ought, in strictness, to be determined
+
+by an inspection of the commissions given to the members by their
+
+respective constituents. As all of these, however, had reference,
+
+either to the recommendation from the meeting at Annapolis, in
+
+September, 1786, or to that from Congress, in February, 1787, it
+
+will be sufficient to recur to these particular acts. The act
+
+from Annapolis recommends the "appointment of commissioners to
+
+take into consideration the situation of the United States; to
+
+devise SUCH FURTHER PROVISIONS as shall appear to them necessary
+
+to render the Constitution of the federal government ADEQUATE TO
+
+THE EXIGENCIES OF THE UNION; and to report such an act for that
+
+purpose, to the United States in Congress assembled, as when
+
+agreed to by them, and afterwards confirmed by the legislature of
+
+every State, will effectually provide for the same. "The
+
+recommendatory act of Congress is in the words
+
+following:"WHEREAS, There is provision in the articles of
+
+Confederation and perpetual Union, for making alterations
+
+therein, by the assent of a Congress of the United States, and of
+
+the legislatures of the several States; and whereas experience
+
+hath evinced, that there are defects in the present
+
+Confederation; as a mean to remedy which, several of the States,
+
+and PARTICULARLY THE STATE OF NEW YORK, by express instructions
+
+to their delegates in Congress, have suggested a convention for
+
+the purposes expressed in the following resolution; and such
+
+convention appearing to be the most probable mean of establishing
+
+in these States A FIRM NATIONAL GOVERNMENT:"Resolved, That in
+
+the opinion of Congress it is expedient, that on the second
+
+Monday of May next a convention of delegates, who shall have been
+
+appointed by the several States, be held at Philadelphia, for the
+
+sole and express purpose OF REVISING THE ARTICLES OF
+
+CONFEDERATION, and reporting to Congress and the several
+
+legislatures such ALTERATIONS AND PROVISIONS THEREIN, as shall,
+
+when agreed to in Congress, and confirmed by the States, render
+
+the federal Constitution ADEQUATE TO THE EXIGENCIES OF GOVERNMENT
+
+AND THE PRESERVATION OF THE UNION. "From these two acts, it
+
+appears, 1st, that the object of the convention was to establish,
+
+in these States, A FIRM NATIONAL GOVERNMENT; 2d, that this
+
+government was to be such as would be ADEQUATE TO THE EXIGENCIES
+
+OF GOVERNMENT and THE PRESERVATION OF THE UNION; 3d, that these
+
+purposes were to be effected by ALTERATIONS AND PROVISIONS IN THE
+
+ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, as it is expressed in the act of
+
+Congress, or by SUCH FURTHER PROVISIONS AS SHOULD APPEAR
+
+NECESSARY, as it stands in the recommendatory act from Annapolis;
+
+4th, that the alterations and provisions were to be reported to
+
+Congress, and to the States, in order to be agreed to by the
+
+former and confirmed by the latter. From a comparison and fair
+
+construction of these several modes of expression, is to be
+
+deduced the authority under which the convention acted. They were
+
+to frame a NATIONAL GOVERNMENT, adequate to the EXIGENCIES OF
+
+GOVERNMENT, and OF THE UNION; and to reduce the articles of
+
+Confederation into such form as to accomplish these purposes.
+
+There are two rules of construction, dictated by plain reason, as
+
+well as founded on legal axioms. The one is, that every part of
+
+the expression ought, if possible, to be allowed some meaning,
+
+and be made to conspire to some common end. The other is, that
+
+where the several parts cannot be made to coincide, the less
+
+important should give way to the more important part; the means
+
+should be sacrificed to the end, rather than the end to the
+
+means. Suppose, then, that the expressions defining the
+
+authority of the convention were irreconcilably at variance with
+
+each other; that a NATIONAL and ADEQUATE GOVERNMENT could not
+
+possibly, in the judgment of the convention, be affected by
+
+ALTERATIONS and PROVISIONS in the ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION;
+
+which part of the definition ought to have been embraced, and
+
+which rejected? Which was the more important, which the less
+
+important part? Which the end; which the means? Let the most
+
+scrupulous expositors of delegated powers; let the most
+
+inveterate objectors against those exercised by the convention,
+
+answer these questions. Let them declare, whether it was of most
+
+importance to the happiness of the people of America, that the
+
+articles of Confederation should be disregarded, and an adequate
+
+government be provided, and the Union preserved; or that an
+
+adequate government should be omitted, and the articles of
+
+Confederation preserved. Let them declare, whether the
+
+preservation of these articles was the end, for securing which a
+
+reform of the government was to be introduced as the means; or
+
+whether the establishment of a government, adequate to the
+
+national happiness, was the end at which these articles
+
+themselves originally aimed, and to which they ought, as
+
+insufficient means, to have been sacrificed. But is it necessary
+
+to suppose that these expressions are absolutely irreconcilable
+
+to each other; that no ALTERATIONS or PROVISIONS in THE ARTICLES
+
+OF THE CONFEDERATION could possibly mould them into a national
+
+and adequate government; into such a government as has been
+
+proposed by the convention? No stress, it is presumed, will, in
+
+this case, be laid on the TITLE; a change of that could never be
+
+deemed an exercise of ungranted power. ALTERATIONS in the body of
+
+the instrument are expressly authorized. NEW PROVISIONS therein
+
+are also expressly authorized. Here then is a power to change the
+
+title; to insert new articles; to alter old ones. Must it of
+
+necessity be admitted that this power is infringed, so long as a
+
+part of the old articles remain? Those who maintain the
+
+affirmative ought at least to mark the boundary between
+
+authorized and usurped innovations; between that degree of change
+
+which lies within the compass of ALTERATIONS AND FURTHER
+
+PROVISIONS, and that which amounts to a TRANSMUTATION of the
+
+government. Will it be said that the alterations ought not to
+
+have touched the substance of the Confederation? The States
+
+would never have appointed a convention with so much solemnity,
+
+nor described its objects with so much latitude, if some
+
+SUBSTANTIAL reform had not been in contemplation. Will it be said
+
+that the FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES of the Confederation were not
+
+within the purview of the convention, and ought not to have been
+
+varied? I ask, What are these principles? Do they require that,
+
+in the establishment of the Constitution, the States should be
+
+regarded as distinct and independent sovereigns? They are so
+
+regarded by the Constitution proposed. Do they require that the
+
+members of the government should derive their appointment from
+
+the legislatures, not from the people of the States? One branch
+
+of the new government is to be appointed by these legislatures;
+
+and under the Confederation, the delegates to Congress MAY ALL
+
+be appointed immediately by the people, and in two States1 are
+
+actually so appointed. Do they require that the powers of the
+
+government should act on the States, and not immediately on
+
+individuals? In some instances, as has been shown, the powers of
+
+the new government will act on the States in their collective
+
+characters. In some instances, also, those of the existing
+
+government act immediately on individuals. In cases of capture;
+
+of piracy; of the post office; of coins, weights, and measures;
+
+of trade with the Indians; of claims under grants of land by
+
+different States; and, above all, in the case of trials by
+
+courts-marshal in the army and navy, by which death may be
+
+inflicted without the intervention of a jury, or even of a civil
+
+magistrate; in all these cases the powers of the Confederation
+
+operate immediately on the persons and interests of individual
+
+citizens. Do these fundamental principles require, particularly,
+
+that no tax should be levied without the intermediate agency of
+
+the States? The Confederation itself authorizes a direct tax, to
+
+a certain extent, on the post office. The power of coinage has
+
+been so construed by Congress as to levy a tribute immediately
+
+from that source also. But pretermitting these instances, was it
+
+not an acknowledged object of the convention and the universal
+
+expectation of the people, that the regulation of trade should be
+
+submitted to the general government in such a form as would
+
+render it an immediate source of general revenue? Had not
+
+Congress repeatedly recommended this measure as not inconsistent
+
+with the fundamental principles of the Confederation? Had not
+
+every State but one; had not New York herself, so far complied
+
+with the plan of Congress as to recognize the PRINCIPLE of the
+
+innovation? Do these principles, in fine, require that the
+
+powers of the general government should be limited, and that,
+
+beyond this limit, the States should be left in possession of
+
+their sovereignty and independence? We have seen that in the new
+
+government, as in the old, the general powers are limited; and
+
+that the States, in all unenumerated cases, are left in the
+
+enjoyment of their sovereign and independent jurisdiction. The
+
+truth is, that the great principles of the Constitution proposed
+
+by the convention may be considered less as absolutely new, than
+
+as the expansion of principles which are found in the articles of
+
+Confederation. The misfortune under the latter system has been,
+
+that these principles are so feeble and confined as to justify
+
+all the charges of inefficiency which have been urged against it,
+
+and to require a degree of enlargement which gives to the new
+
+system the aspect of an entire transformation of the old. In one
+
+particular it is admitted that the convention have departed from
+
+the tenor of their commission. Instead of reporting a plan
+
+requiring the confirmation OF THE LEGISLATURES OF ALL THE STATES,
+
+they have reported a plan which is to be confirmed by the PEOPLE,
+
+and may be carried into effect by NINE STATES ONLY. It is worthy
+
+of remark that this objection, though the most plausible, has
+
+been the least urged in the publications which have swarmed
+
+against the convention. The forbearance can only have proceeded
+
+from an irresistible conviction of the absurdity of subjecting
+
+the fate of twelve States to the perverseness or corruption of a
+
+thirteenth; from the example of inflexible opposition given by a
+
+MAJORITY of one sixtieth of the people of America to a measure
+
+approved and called for by the voice of twelve States, comprising
+
+fifty-nine sixtieths of the people an example still fresh in the
+
+memory and indignation of every citizen who has felt for the
+
+wounded honor and prosperity of his country. As this objection,
+
+therefore, has been in a manner waived by those who have
+
+criticised the powers of the convention, I dismiss it without
+
+further observation. The THIRD point to be inquired into is, how
+
+far considerations of duty arising out of the case itself could
+
+have supplied any defect of regular authority. In the preceding
+
+inquiries the powers of the convention have been analyzed and
+
+tried with the same rigor, and by the same rules, as if they had
+
+been real and final powers for the establishment of a
+
+Constitution for the United States. We have seen in what manner
+
+they have borne the trial even on that supposition. It is time
+
+now to recollect that the powers were merely advisory and
+
+recommendatory; that they were so meant by the States, and so
+
+understood by the convention; and that the latter have
+
+accordingly planned and proposed a Constitution which is to be of
+
+no more consequence than the paper on which it is written, unless
+
+it be stamped with the approbation of those to whom it is
+
+addressed. This reflection places the subject in a point of view
+
+altogether different, and will enable us to judge with propriety
+
+of the course taken by the convention. Let us view the ground on
+
+which the convention stood. It may be collected from their
+
+proceedings, that they were deeply and unanimously impressed with
+
+the crisis, which had led their country almost with one voice to
+
+make so singular and solemn an experiment for correcting the
+
+errors of a system by which this crisis had been produced; that
+
+they were no less deeply and unanimously convinced that such a
+
+reform as they have proposed was absolutely necessary to effect
+
+the purposes of their appointment. It could not be unknown to
+
+them that the hopes and expectations of the great body of
+
+citizens, throughout this great empire, were turned with the
+
+keenest anxiety to the event of their deliberations. They had
+
+every reason to believe that the contrary sentiments agitated the
+
+minds and bosoms of every external and internal foe to the
+
+liberty and prosperity of the United States. They had seen in the
+
+origin and progress of the experiment, the alacrity with which
+
+the PROPOSITION, made by a single State (Virginia), towards a
+
+partial amendment of the Confederation, had been attended to and
+
+promoted. They had seen the LIBERTY ASSUMED by a VERY FEW
+
+deputies from a VERY FEW States, convened at Annapolis, of
+
+recommending a great and critical object, wholly foreign to their
+
+commission, not only justified by the public opinion, but
+
+actually carried into effect by twelve out of the thirteen
+
+States. They had seen, in a variety of instances, assumptions by
+
+Congress, not only of recommendatory, but of operative, powers,
+
+warranted, in the public estimation, by occasions and objects
+
+infinitely less urgent than those by which their conduct was to
+
+be governed. They must have reflected, that in all great changes
+
+of established governments, forms ought to give way to substance;
+
+that a rigid adherence in such cases to the former, would render
+
+nominal and nugatory the transcendent and precious right of the
+
+people to "abolish or alter their governments as to them shall
+
+seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness,"2 since
+
+it is impossible for the people spontaneously and universally to
+
+move in concert towards their object; and it is therefore
+
+essential that such changes be instituted by some INFORMAL AND
+
+UNAUTHORIZED PROPOSITIONS, made by some patriotic and respectable
+
+citizen or number of citizens. They must have recollected that it
+
+was by this irregular and assumed privilege of proposing to the
+
+people plans for their safety and happiness, that the States
+
+were first united against the danger with which they were
+
+threatened by their ancient government; that committees and
+
+congresses were formed for concentrating their efforts and
+
+defending their rights; and that CONVENTIONS were ELECTED in THE
+
+SEVERAL STATES for establishing the constitutions under which
+
+they are now governed; nor could it have been forgotten that no
+
+little ill-timed scruples, no zeal for adhering to ordinary
+
+forms, were anywhere seen, except in those who wished to indulge,
+
+under these masks, their secret enmity to the substance contended
+
+for. They must have borne in mind, that as the plan to be framed
+
+and proposed was to be submitted TO THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES, the
+
+disapprobation of this supreme authority would destroy it
+
+forever; its approbation blot out antecedent errors and
+
+irregularities. It might even have occurred to them, that where a
+
+disposition to cavil prevailed, their neglect to execute the
+
+degree of power vested in them, and still more their
+
+recommendation of any measure whatever, not warranted by their
+
+commission, would not less excite animadversion, than a
+
+recommendation at once of a measure fully commensurate to the
+
+national exigencies. Had the convention, under all these
+
+impressions, and in the midst of all these considerations,
+
+instead of exercising a manly confidence in their country, by
+
+whose confidence they had been so peculiarly distinguished, and
+
+of pointing out a system capable, in their judgment, of securing
+
+its happiness, taken the cold and sullen resolution of
+
+disappointing its ardent hopes, of sacrificing substance to
+
+forms, of committing the dearest interests of their country to
+
+the uncertainties of delay and the hazard of events, let me ask
+
+the man who can raise his mind to one elevated conception, who
+
+can awaken in his bosom one patriotic emotion, what judgment
+
+ought to have been pronounced by the impartial world, by the
+
+friends of mankind, by every virtuous citizen, on the conduct and
+
+character of this assembly? Or if there be a man whose
+
+propensity to condemn is susceptible of no control, let me then
+
+ask what sentence he has in reserve for the twelve States who
+
+USURPED THE POWER of sending deputies to the convention, a body
+
+utterly unknown to their constitutions; for Congress, who
+
+recommended the appointment of this body, equally unknown to the
+
+Confederation; and for the State of New York, in particular,
+
+which first urged and then complied with this unauthorized
+
+interposition? But that the objectors may be disarmed of every
+
+pretext, it shall be granted for a moment that the convention
+
+were neither authorized by their commission, nor justified by
+
+circumstances in proposing a Constitution for their country: does
+
+it follow that the Constitution ought, for that reason alone, to
+
+be rejected? If, according to the noble precept, it be lawful to
+
+accept good advice even from an enemy, shall we set the ignoble
+
+example of refusing such advice even when it is offered by our
+
+friends? The prudent inquiry, in all cases, ought surely to be,
+
+not so much FROM WHOM the advice comes, as whether the advice be
+
+GOOD. The sum of what has been here advanced and proved is, that
+
+the charge against the convention of exceeding their powers,
+
+except in one instance little urged by the objectors, has no
+
+foundation to support it; that if they had exceeded their powers,
+
+they were not only warranted, but required, as the confidential
+
+servants of their country, by the circumstances in which they
+
+were placed, to exercise the liberty which they assume; and that
+
+finally, if they had violated both their powers and their
+
+obligations, in proposing a Constitution, this ought nevertheless
+
+to be embraced, if it be calculated to accomplish the views and
+
+happiness of the people of America. How far this character is due
+
+to the Constitution, is the subject under investigation. PUBLIUS.
+
+
+
+Connecticut and Rhode Island. Declaration of Independence.
+
+
+
+
+
+FEDERALIST No. 41
+
+General View of the Powers Conferred by The Constitution
+
+For the Independent Journal.
+
+
+
+MADISON
+
+
+
+To the People of the State of New York:
+
+THE Constitution proposed by the convention may be considered
+
+under two general points of view. The FIRST relates to the sum or
+
+quantity of power which it vests in the government, including
+
+the restraints imposed on the States. The SECOND, to the
+
+particular structure of the government, and the distribution of
+
+this power among its several branches. Under the FIRST view of
+
+the subject, two important questions arise: 1. Whether any part
+
+of the powers transferred to the general government be
+
+unnecessary or improper? 2. Whether the entire mass of them be
+
+dangerous to the portion of jurisdiction left in the several
+
+States? Is the aggregate power of the general government greater
+
+than ought to have been vested in it? This is the FIRST
+
+question. It cannot have escaped those who have attended with
+
+candor to the arguments employed against the extensive powers of
+
+the government, that the authors of them have very little
+
+considered how far these powers were necessary means of attaining
+
+a necessary end. They have chosen rather to dwell on the
+
+inconveniences which must be unavoidably blended with all
+
+political advantages; and on the possible abuses which must be
+
+incident to every power or trust, of which a beneficial use can
+
+be made. This method of handling the subject cannot impose on the
+
+good sense of the people of America. It may display the subtlety
+
+of the writer; it may open a boundless field for rhetoric and
+
+declamation; it may inflame the passions of the unthinking, and
+
+may confirm the prejudices of the misthinking: but cool and
+
+candid people will at once reflect, that the purest of human
+
+blessings must have a portion of alloy in them; that the choice
+
+must always be made, if not of the lesser evil, at least of the
+
+GREATER, not the PERFECT, good; and that in every political
+
+institution, a power to advance the public happiness involves a
+
+discretion which may be misapplied and abused. They will see,
+
+therefore, that in all cases where power is to be conferred, the
+
+point first to be decided is, whether such a power be necessary
+
+to the public good; as the next will be, in case of an
+
+affirmative decision, to guard as effectually as possible
+
+against a perversion of the power to the public detriment. That
+
+we may form a correct judgment on this subject, it will be proper
+
+to review the several powers conferred on the government of the
+
+Union; and that this may be the more conveniently done they may
+
+be reduced into different classes as they relate to the following
+
+different objects: 1. Security against foreign danger; 2.
+
+Regulation of the intercourse with foreign nations; 3.
+
+Maintenance of harmony and proper intercourse among the States;
+
+4. Certain miscellaneous objects of general utility; 5.
+
+Restraint of the States from certain injurious acts; 6.
+
+Provisions for giving due efficacy to all these powers. The
+
+powers falling within the FIRST class are those of declaring war
+
+and granting letters of marque; of providing armies and fleets;
+
+of regulating and calling forth the militia; of levying and
+
+borrowing money. Security against foreign danger is one of the
+
+primitive objects of civil society. It is an avowed and essential
+
+object of the American Union. The powers requisite for attaining
+
+it must be effectually confided to the federal councils. Is the
+
+power of declaring war necessary? No man will answer this
+
+question in the negative. It would be superfluous, therefore, to
+
+enter into a proof of the affirmative. The existing Confederation
+
+establishes this power in the most ample form. Is the power of
+
+raising armies and equipping fleets necessary? This is involved
+
+in the foregoing power. It is involved in the power of
+
+self-defense. But was it necessary to give an INDEFINITE POWER
+
+of raising TROOPS, as well as providing fleets; and of
+
+maintaining both in PEACE, as well as in war? The answer to these
+
+questions has been too far anticipated in another place to admit
+
+an extensive discussion of them in this place. The answer indeed
+
+seems to be so obvious and conclusive as scarcely to justify such
+
+a discussion in any place. With what color of propriety could the
+
+force necessary for defense be limited by those who cannot limit
+
+the force of offense? If a federal Constitution could chain the
+
+ambition or set bounds to the exertions of all other nations,
+
+then indeed might it prudently chain the discretion of its own
+
+government, and set bounds to the exertions for its own safety.
+
+How could a readiness for war in time of peace be safely
+
+prohibited, unless we could prohibit, in like manner, the
+
+preparations and establishments of every hostile nation? The
+
+means of security can only be regulated by the means and the
+
+danger of attack. They will, in fact, be ever determined by these
+
+rules, and by no others. It is in vain to oppose constitutional
+
+barriers to the impulse of self-preservation. It is worse than in
+
+vain; because it plants in the Constitution itself necessary
+
+usurpations of power, every precedent of which is a germ of
+
+unnecessary and multiplied repetitions. If one nation maintains
+
+constantly a disciplined army, ready for the service of ambition
+
+or revenge, it obliges the most pacific nations who may be within
+
+the reach of its enterprises to take corresponding precautions.
+
+The fifteenth century was the unhappy epoch of military
+
+establishments in the time of peace. They were introduced by
+
+Charles VII. of France. All Europe has followed, or been forced
+
+into, the example. Had the example not been followed by other
+
+nations, all Europe must long ago have worn the chains of a
+
+universal monarch. Were every nation except France now to disband
+
+its peace establishments, the same event might follow. The
+
+veteran legions of Rome were an overmatch for the undisciplined
+
+valor of all other nations and rendered her the mistress of the
+
+world. Not the less true is it, that the liberties of Rome
+
+proved the final victim to her military triumphs; and that the
+
+liberties of Europe, as far as they ever existed, have, with few
+
+exceptions, been the price of her military establishments. A
+
+standing force, therefore, is a dangerous, at the same time that
+
+it may be a necessary, provision. On the smallest scale it has
+
+its inconveniences. On an extensive scale its consequences may be
+
+fatal. On any scale it is an object of laudable circumspection
+
+and precaution. A wise nation will combine all these
+
+considerations; and, whilst it does not rashly preclude itself
+
+from any resource which may become essential to its safety, will
+
+exert all its prudence in diminishing both the necessity and the
+
+danger of resorting to one which may be inauspicious to its
+
+liberties. The clearest marks of this prudence are stamped on
+
+the proposed Constitution. The Union itself, which it cements and
+
+secures, destroys every pretext for a military establishment
+
+which could be dangerous. America united, with a handful of
+
+troops, or without a single soldier, exhibits a more forbidding
+
+posture to foreign ambition than America disunited, with a
+
+hundred thousand veterans ready for combat. It was remarked, on a
+
+former occasion, that the want of this pretext had saved the
+
+liberties of one nation in Europe. Being rendered by her insular
+
+situation and her maritime resources impregnable to the armies of
+
+her neighbors, the rulers of Great Britain have never been able,
+
+by real or artificial dangers, to cheat the public into an
+
+extensive peace establishment. The distance of the United States
+
+from the powerful nations of the world gives them the same happy
+
+security. A dangerous establishment can never be necessary or
+
+plausible, so long as they continue a united people. But let it
+
+never, for a moment, be forgotten that they are indebted for this
+
+advantage to the Union alone. The moment of its dissolution will
+
+be the date of a new order of things. The fears of the weaker, or
+
+the ambition of the stronger States, or Confederacies, will set
+
+the same example in the New, as Charles VII. did in the Old
+
+World. The example will be followed here from the same motives
+
+which produced universal imitation there. Instead of deriving
+
+from our situation the precious advantage which Great Britain has
+
+derived from hers, the face of America will be but a copy of that
+
+of the continent of Europe. It will present liberty everywhere
+
+crushed between standing armies and perpetual taxes. The fortunes
+
+of disunited America will be even more disastrous than those of
+
+Europe. The sources of evil in the latter are confined to her own
+
+limits. No superior powers of another quarter of the globe
+
+intrigue among her rival nations, inflame their mutual
+
+animosities, and render them the instruments of foreign ambition,
+
+jealousy, and revenge. In America the miseries springing from her
+
+internal jealousies, contentions, and wars, would form a part
+
+only of her lot. A plentiful addition of evils would have their
+
+source in that relation in which Europe stands to this quarter of
+
+the earth, and which no other quarter of the earth bears to
+
+Europe. This picture of the consequences of disunion cannot be
+
+too highly colored, or too often exhibited. Every man who loves
+
+peace, every man who loves his country, every man who loves
+
+liberty, ought to have it ever before his eyes, that he may
+
+cherish in his heart a due attachment to the Union of America,
+
+and be able to set a due value on the means of preserving it.
+
+Next to the effectual establishment of the Union, the best
+
+possible precaution against danger from standing armies is a
+
+limitation of the term for which revenue may be appropriated to
+
+their support. This precaution the Constitution has prudently
+
+added. I will not repeat here the observations which I flatter
+
+myself have placed this subject in a just and satisfactory
+
+light. But it may not be improper to take notice of an argument
+
+against this part of the Constitution, which has been drawn from
+
+the policy and practice of Great Britain. It is said that the
+
+continuance of an army in that kingdom requires an annual vote of
+
+the legislature; whereas the American Constitution has lengthened
+
+this critical period to two years. This is the form in which the
+
+comparison is usually stated to the public: but is it a just
+
+form? Is it a fair comparison? Does the British Constitution
+
+restrain the parliamentary discretion to one year? Does the
+
+American impose on the Congress appropriations for two years? On
+
+the contrary, it cannot be unknown to the authors of the fallacy
+
+themselves, that the British Constitution fixes no limit whatever
+
+to the discretion of the legislature, and that the American ties
+
+down the legislature to two years, as the longest admissible
+
+term. Had the argument from the British example been truly
+
+stated, it would have stood thus: The term for which supplies
+
+may be appropriated to the army establishment, though unlimited
+
+by the British Constitution, has nevertheless, in practice, been
+
+limited by parliamentary discretion to a single year. Now, if in
+
+Great Britain, where the House of Commons is elected for seven
+
+years; where so great a proportion of the members are elected by
+
+so small a proportion of the people; where the electors are so
+
+corrupted by the representatives, and the representatives so
+
+corrupted by the Crown, the representative body can possess a
+
+power to make appropriations to the army for an indefinite term,
+
+without desiring, or without daring, to extend the term beyond a
+
+single year, ought not suspicion herself to blush, in pretending
+
+that the representatives of the United States, elected FREELY by
+
+the WHOLE BODY of the people, every SECOND YEAR, cannot be safely
+
+intrusted with the discretion over such appropriations, expressly
+
+limited to the short period of TWO YEARS? A bad cause seldom
+
+fails to betray itself. Of this truth, the management of the
+
+opposition to the federal government is an unvaried
+
+exemplification. But among all the blunders which have been
+
+committed, none is more striking than the attempt to enlist on
+
+that side the prudent jealousy entertained by the people, of
+
+standing armies. The attempt has awakened fully the public
+
+attention to that important subject; and has led to
+
+investigations which must terminate in a thorough and universal
+
+conviction, not only that the constitution has provided the most
+
+effectual guards against danger from that quarter, but that
+
+nothing short of a Constitution fully adequate to the national
+
+defense and the preservation of the Union, can save America from
+
+as many standing armies as it may be split into States or
+
+Confederacies, and from such a progressive augmentation, of these
+
+establishments in each, as will render them as burdensome to the
+
+properties and ominous to the liberties of the people, as any
+
+establishment that can become necessary, under a united and
+
+efficient government, must be tolerable to the former and safe to
+
+the latter. The palpable necessity of the power to provide and
+
+maintain a navy has protected that part of the Constitution
+
+against a spirit of censure, which has spared few other parts. It
+
+must, indeed, be numbered among the greatest blessings of
+
+America, that as her Union will be the only source of her
+
+maritime strength, so this will be a principal source of her
+
+security against danger from abroad. In this respect our
+
+situation bears another likeness to the insular advantage of
+
+Great Britain. The batteries most capable of repelling foreign
+
+enterprises on our safety, are happily such as can never be
+
+turned by a perfidious government against our liberties. The
+
+inhabitants of the Atlantic frontier are all of them deeply
+
+interested in this provision for naval protection, and if they
+
+have hitherto been suffered to sleep quietly in their beds; if
+
+their property has remained safe against the predatory spirit of
+
+licentious adventurers; if their maritime towns have not yet
+
+been compelled to ransom themselves from the terrors of a
+
+conflagration, by yielding to the exactions of daring and sudden
+
+invaders, these instances of good fortune are not to be ascribed
+
+to the capacity of the existing government for the protection of
+
+those from whom it claims allegiance, but to causes that are
+
+fugitive and fallacious. If we except perhaps Virginia and
+
+Maryland, which are peculiarly vulnerable on their eastern
+
+frontiers, no part of the Union ought to feel more anxiety on
+
+this subject than New York. Her seacoast is extensive. A very
+
+important district of the State is an island. The State itself is
+
+penetrated by a large navigable river for more than fifty
+
+leagues. The great emporium of its commerce, the great reservoir
+
+of its wealth, lies every moment at the mercy of events, and may
+
+almost be regarded as a hostage for ignominious compliances with
+
+the dictates of a foreign enemy, or even with the rapacious
+
+demands of pirates and barbarians. Should a war be the result of
+
+the precarious situation of European affairs, and all the unruly
+
+passions attending it be let loose on the ocean, our escape from
+
+insults and depredations, not only on that element, but every
+
+part of the other bordering on it, will be truly miraculous. In
+
+the present condition of America, the States more immediately
+
+exposed to these calamities have nothing to hope from the phantom
+
+of a general government which now exists; and if their single
+
+resources were equal to the task of fortifying themselves against
+
+the danger, the object to be protected would be almost consumed
+
+by the means of protecting them. The power of regulating and
+
+calling forth the militia has been already sufficiently
+
+vindicated and explained. The power of levying and borrowing
+
+money, being the sinew of that which is to be exerted in the
+
+national defense, is properly thrown into the same class with
+
+it. This power, also, has been examined already with much
+
+attention, and has, I trust, been clearly shown to be necessary,
+
+both in the extent and form given to it by the Constitution. I
+
+will address one additional reflection only to those who contend
+
+that the power ought to have been restrained to external
+
+taxation by which they mean, taxes on articles imported from
+
+other countries. It cannot be doubted that this will always be a
+
+valuable source of revenue; that for a considerable time it must
+
+be a principal source; that at this moment it is an essential
+
+one. But we may form very mistaken ideas on this subject, if we
+
+do not call to mind in our calculations, that the extent of
+
+revenue drawn from foreign commerce must vary with the
+
+variations, both in the extent and the kind of imports; and that
+
+these variations do not correspond with the progress of
+
+population, which must be the general measure of the public
+
+wants. As long as agriculture continues the sole field of labor,
+
+the importation of manufactures must increase as the consumers
+
+multiply. As soon as domestic manufactures are begun by the hands
+
+not called for by agriculture, the imported manufactures will
+
+decrease as the numbers of people increase. In a more remote
+
+stage, the imports may consist in a considerable part of raw
+
+materials, which will be wrought into articles for exportation,
+
+and will, therefore, require rather the encouragement of
+
+bounties, than to be loaded with discouraging duties. A system of
+
+government, meant for duration, ought to contemplate these
+
+revolutions, and be able to accommodate itself to them. Some,
+
+who have not denied the necessity of the power of taxation, have
+
+grounded a very fierce attack against the Constitution, on the
+
+language in which it is defined. It has been urged and echoed,
+
+that the power "to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts, and
+
+excises, to pay the debts, and provide for the common defense and
+
+general welfare of the United States," amounts to an unlimited
+
+commission to exercise every power which may be alleged to be
+
+necessary for the common defense or general welfare. No stronger
+
+proof could be given of the distress under which these writers
+
+labor for objections, than their stooping to such a
+
+misconstruction. Had no other enumeration or definition of the
+
+powers of the Congress been found in the Constitution, than the
+
+general expressions just cited, the authors of the objection
+
+might have had some color for it; though it would have been
+
+difficult to find a reason for so awkward a form of describing an
+
+authority to legislate in all possible cases. A power to destroy
+
+the freedom of the press, the trial by jury, or even to regulate
+
+the course of descents, or the forms of conveyances, must be very
+
+singularly expressed by the terms "to raise money for the
+
+general welfare. "But what color can the objection have, when a
+
+specification of the objects alluded to by these general terms
+
+immediately follows, and is not even separated by a longer pause
+
+than a semicolon? If the different parts of the same instrument
+
+ought to be so expounded, as to give meaning to every part which
+
+will bear it, shall one part of the same sentence be excluded
+
+altogether from a share in the meaning; and shall the more
+
+doubtful and indefinite terms be retained in their full extent,
+
+and the clear and precise expressions be denied any signification
+
+whatsoever? For what purpose could the enumeration of particular
+
+powers be inserted, if these and all others were meant to be
+
+included in the preceding general power? Nothing is more natural
+
+nor common than first to use a general phrase, and then to
+
+explain and qualify it by a recital of particulars. But the idea
+
+of an enumeration of particulars which neither explain nor
+
+qualify the general meaning, and can have no other effect than to
+
+confound and mislead, is an absurdity, which, as we are reduced
+
+to the dilemma of charging either on the authors of the objection
+
+or on the authors of the Constitution, we must take the liberty
+
+of supposing, had not its origin with the latter. The objection
+
+here is the more extraordinary, as it appears that the language
+
+used by the convention is a copy from the articles of
+
+Confederation. The objects of the Union among the States, as
+
+described in article third, are "their common defense, security
+
+of their liberties, and mutual and general welfare. " The terms
+
+of article eighth are still more identical: "All charges of war
+
+and all other expenses that shall be incurred for the common
+
+defense or general welfare, and allowed by the United States in
+
+Congress, shall be defrayed out of a common treasury," etc. A
+
+similar language again occurs in article ninth. Construe either
+
+of these articles by the rules which would justify the
+
+construction put on the new Constitution, and they vest in the
+
+existing Congress a power to legislate in all cases whatsoever.
+
+But what would have been thought of that assembly, if, attaching
+
+themselves to these general expressions, and disregarding the
+
+specifications which ascertain and limit their import, they had
+
+exercised an unlimited power of providing for the common defense
+
+and general welfare? I appeal to the objectors themselves,
+
+whether they would in that case have employed the same reasoning
+
+in justification of Congress as they now make use of against the
+
+convention. How difficult it is for error to escape its own
+
+condemnation! PUBLIUS.
+
+
+
+
+
+FEDERALIST No. 42
+
+The Powers Conferred by the Constitution Further Considered
+
+From the New York Packet. Tuesday, January 22, 1788.
+
+
+
+MADISON
+
+
+
+To the People of the State of New York:
+
+THE SECOND class of powers, lodged in the general government,
+
+consists of those which regulate the intercourse with foreign
+
+nations, to wit: to make treaties; to send and receive
+
+ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls; to define and
+
+punish piracies and felonies committed on the high seas, and
+
+offenses against the law of nations; to regulate foreign
+
+commerce, including a power to prohibit, after the year 1808, the
+
+importation of slaves, and to lay an intermediate duty of ten
+
+dollars per head, as a discouragement to such importations. This
+
+class of powers forms an obvious and essential branch of the
+
+federal administration. If we are to be one nation in any
+
+respect, it clearly ought to be in respect to other nations. The
+
+powers to make treaties and to send and receive ambassadors,
+
+speak their own propriety. Both of them are comprised in the
+
+articles of Confederation, with this difference only, that the
+
+former is disembarrassed, by the plan of the convention, of an
+
+exception, under which treaties might be substantially frustrated
+
+by regulations of the States; and that a power of appointing and
+
+receiving "other public ministers and consuls," is expressly
+
+and very properly added to the former provision concerning
+
+ambassadors. The term ambassador, if taken strictly, as seems to
+
+be required by the second of the articles of Confederation,
+
+comprehends the highest grade only of public ministers, and
+
+excludes the grades which the United States will be most likely
+
+to prefer, where foreign embassies may be necessary. And under no
+
+latitude of construction will the term comprehend consuls. Yet it
+
+has been found expedient, and has been the practice of Congress,
+
+to employ the inferior grades of public ministers, and to send
+
+and receive consuls. It is true, that where treaties of commerce
+
+stipulate for the mutual appointment of consuls, whose functions
+
+are connected with commerce, the admission of foreign consuls may
+
+fall within the power of making commercial treaties; and that
+
+where no such treaties exist, the mission of American consuls
+
+into foreign countries may PERHAPS be covered under the
+
+authority, given by the ninth article of the Confederation, to
+
+appoint all such civil officers as may be necessary for managing
+
+the general affairs of the United States. But the admission of
+
+consuls into the United States, where no previous treaty has
+
+stipulated it, seems to have been nowhere provided for. A supply
+
+of the omission is one of the lesser instances in which the
+
+convention have improved on the model before them. But the most
+
+minute provisions become important when they tend to obviate the
+
+necessity or the pretext for gradual and unobserved usurpations
+
+of power. A list of the cases in which Congress have been
+
+betrayed, or forced by the defects of the Confederation, into
+
+violations of their chartered authorities, would not a little
+
+surprise those who have paid no attention to the subject; and
+
+would be no inconsiderable argument in favor of the new
+
+Constitution, which seems to have provided no less studiously for
+
+the lesser, than the more obvious and striking defects of the
+
+old. The power to define and punish piracies and felonies
+
+committed on the high seas, and offenses against the law of
+
+nations, belongs with equal propriety to the general government,
+
+and is a still greater improvement on the articles of
+
+Confederation. These articles contain no provision for the case
+
+of offenses against the law of nations; and consequently leave
+
+it in the power of any indiscreet member to embroil the
+
+Confederacy with foreign nations. The provision of the federal
+
+articles on the subject of piracies and felonies extends no
+
+further than to the establishment of courts for the trial of
+
+these offenses. The definition of piracies might, perhaps,
+
+without inconveniency, be left to the law of nations; though a
+
+legislative definition of them is found in most municipal codes.
+
+A definition of felonies on the high seas is evidently
+
+requisite. Felony is a term of loose signification, even in the
+
+common law of England; and of various import in the statute law
+
+of that kingdom. But neither the common nor the statute law of
+
+that, or of any other nation, ought to be a standard for the
+
+proceedings of this, unless previously made its own by
+
+legislative adoption. The meaning of the term, as defined in the
+
+codes of the several States, would be as impracticable as the
+
+former would be a dishonorable and illegitimate guide. It is not
+
+precisely the same in any two of the States; and varies in each
+
+with every revision of its criminal laws. For the sake of
+
+certainty and uniformity, therefore, the power of defining
+
+felonies in this case was in every respect necessary and proper.
+
+The regulation of foreign commerce, having fallen within several
+
+views which have been taken of this subject, has been too fully
+
+discussed to need additional proofs here of its being properly
+
+submitted to the federal administration. It were doubtless to be
+
+wished, that the power of prohibiting the importation of slaves
+
+had not been postponed until the year 1808, or rather that it had
+
+been suffered to have immediate operation. But it is not
+
+difficult to account, either for this restriction on the general
+
+government, or for the manner in which the whole clause is
+
+expressed. It ought to be considered as a great point gained in
+
+favor of humanity, that a period of twenty years may terminate
+
+forever, within these States, a traffic which has so long and so
+
+loudly upbraided the barbarism of modern policy; that within that
+
+period, it will receive a considerable discouragement from the
+
+federal government, and may be totally abolished, by a
+
+concurrence of the few States which continue the unnatural
+
+traffic, in the prohibitory example which has been given by so
+
+great a majority of the Union. Happy would it be for the
+
+unfortunate Africans, if an equal prospect lay before them of
+
+being redeemed from the oppressions of their European brethren!
+
+Attempts have been made to pervert this clause into an objection
+
+against the Constitution, by representing it on one side as a
+
+criminal toleration of an illicit practice, and on another as
+
+calculated to prevent voluntary and beneficial emigrations from
+
+Europe to America. I mention these misconstructions, not with a
+
+view to give them an answer, for they deserve none, but as
+
+specimens of the manner and spirit in which some have thought fit
+
+to conduct their opposition to the proposed government. The
+
+powers included in the THIRD class are those which provide for
+
+the harmony and proper intercourse among the States. Under this
+
+head might be included the particular restraints imposed on the
+
+authority of the States, and certain powers of the judicial
+
+department; but the former are reserved for a distinct class, and
+
+the latter will be particularly examined when we arrive at the
+
+structure and organization of the government. I shall confine
+
+myself to a cursory review of the remaining powers comprehended
+
+under this third description, to wit: to regulate commerce among
+
+the several States and the Indian tribes; to coin money, regulate
+
+the value thereof, and of foreign coin; to provide for the
+
+punishment of counterfeiting the current coin and secureties of
+
+the United States; to fix the standard of weights and measures;
+
+to establish a uniform rule of naturalization, and uniform laws
+
+of bankruptcy, to prescribe the manner in which the public acts,
+
+records, and judicial proceedings of each State shall be proved,
+
+and the effect they shall have in other States; and to establish
+
+post offices and post roads. The defect of power in the existing
+
+Confederacy to regulate the commerce between its several members,
+
+is in the number of those which have been clearly pointed out by
+
+experience. To the proofs and remarks which former papers have
+
+brought into view on this subject, it may be added that without
+
+this supplemental provision, the great and essential power of
+
+regulating foreign commerce would have been incomplete and
+
+ineffectual. A very material object of this power was the relief
+
+of the States which import and export through other States, from
+
+the improper contributions levied on them by the latter. Were
+
+these at liberty to regulate the trade between State and State,
+
+it must be foreseen that ways would be found out to load the
+
+articles of import and export, during the passage through their
+
+jurisdiction, with duties which would fall on the makers of the
+
+latter and the consumers of the former. We may be assured by past
+
+experience, that such a practice would be introduced by future
+
+contrivances; and both by that and a common knowledge of human
+
+affairs, that it would nourish unceasing animosities, and not
+
+improbably terminate in serious interruptions of the public
+
+tranquillity. To those who do not view the question through the
+
+medium of passion or of interest, the desire of the commercial
+
+States to collect, in any form, an indirect revenue from their
+
+uncommercial neighbors, must appear not less impolitic than it is
+
+unfair; since it would stimulate the injured party, by resentment
+
+as well as interest, to resort to less convenient channels for
+
+their foreign trade. But the mild voice of reason, pleading the
+
+cause of an enlarged and permanent interest, is but too often
+
+drowned, before public bodies as well as individuals, by the
+
+clamors of an impatient avidity for immediate and immoderate
+
+gain. The necessity of a superintending authority over the
+
+reciprocal trade of confederated States, has been illustrated by
+
+other examples as well as our own. In Switzerland, where the
+
+Union is so very slight, each canton is obliged to allow to
+
+merchandises a passage through its jurisdiction into other
+
+cantons, without an augmentation of the tolls. In Germany it is a
+
+law of the empire, that the princes and states shall not lay
+
+tolls or customs on bridges, rivers, or passages, without the
+
+consent of the emperor and the diet; though it appears from a
+
+quotation in an antecedent paper, that the practice in this, as
+
+in many other instances in that confederacy, has not followed the
+
+law, and has produced there the mischiefs which have been
+
+foreseen here. Among the restraints imposed by the Union of the
+
+Netherlands on its members, one is, that they shall not establish
+
+imposts disadvantageous to their neighbors, without the general
+
+permission. The regulation of commerce with the Indian tribes is
+
+very properly unfettered from two limitations in the articles of
+
+Confederation, which render the provision obscure and
+
+contradictory. The power is there restrained to Indians, not
+
+members of any of the States, and is not to violate or infringe
+
+the legislative right of any State within its own limits. What
+
+description of Indians are to be deemed members of a State, is
+
+not yet settled, and has been a question of frequent perplexity
+
+and contention in the federal councils. And how the trade with
+
+Indians, though not members of a State, yet residing within its
+
+legislative jurisdiction, can be regulated by an external
+
+authority, without so far intruding on the internal rights of
+
+legislation, is absolutely incomprehensible. This is not the only
+
+case in which the articles of Confederation have inconsiderately
+
+endeavored to accomplish impossibilities; to reconcile a partial
+
+sovereignty in the Union, with complete sovereignty in the
+
+States; to subvert a mathematical axiom, by taking away a part,
+
+and letting the whole remain. All that need be remarked on the
+
+power to coin money, regulate the value thereof, and of foreign
+
+coin, is, that by providing for this last case, the Constitution
+
+has supplied a material omission in the articles of
+
+Confederation. The authority of the existing Congress is
+
+restrained to the regulation of coin STRUCK by their own
+
+authority, or that of the respective States. It must be seen at
+
+once that the proposed uniformity in the VALUE of the current
+
+coin might be destroyed by subjecting that of foreign coin to the
+
+different regulations of the different States. The punishment of
+
+counterfeiting the public securities, as well as the current
+
+coin, is submitted of course to that authority which is to secure
+
+the value of both. The regulation of weights and measures is
+
+transferred from the articles of Confederation, and is founded on
+
+like considerations with the preceding power of regulating coin.
+
+The dissimilarity in the rules of naturalization has long been
+
+remarked as a fault in our system, and as laying a foundation for
+
+intricate and delicate questions. In the fourth article of the
+
+Confederation, it is declared "that the FREE INHABITANTS of each
+
+of these States, paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives from justice,
+
+excepted, shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of
+
+FREE CITIZENS in the several States; and THE PEOPLE of each State
+
+shall, in every other, enjoy all the privileges of trade and
+
+commerce," etc. There is a confusion of language here, which is
+
+remarkable. Why the terms FREE INHABITANTS are used in one part
+
+of the article, FREE CITIZENS in another, and PEOPLE in another;
+
+or what was meant by superadding to "all privileges and
+
+immunities of free citizens," "all the privileges of trade and
+
+commerce,"
+
+cannot easily be determined. It seems to be a construction
+
+scarcely avoidable, however, that those who come under the
+
+denomination of FREE INHABITANTS of a State, although not
+
+citizens of such State, are entitled, in every other State, to
+
+all the privileges of FREE CITIZENS of the latter; that is, to
+
+greater privileges than they may be entitled to in their own
+
+State: so that it may be in the power of a particular State, or
+
+rather every State is laid under a necessity, not only to confer
+
+the rights of citizenship in other States upon any whom it may
+
+admit to such rights within itself, but upon any whom it may
+
+allow to become inhabitants within its jurisdiction. But were an
+
+exposition of the term "inhabitants" to be admitted which
+
+would confine the stipulated privileges to citizens alone, the
+
+difficulty is diminished only, not removed. The very improper
+
+power would still be retained by each State, of naturalizing
+
+aliens in every other State. In one State, residence for a short
+
+term confirms all the rights of citizenship: in another,
+
+qualifications of greater importance are required. An alien,
+
+therefore, legally incapacitated for certain rights in the
+
+latter, may, by previous residence only in the former, elude his
+
+incapacity; and thus the law of one State be preposterously
+
+rendered paramount to the law of another, within the jurisdiction
+
+of the other. We owe it to mere casualty, that very serious
+
+embarrassments on this subject have been hitherto escaped. By the
+
+laws of several States, certain descriptions of aliens, who had
+
+rendered themselves obnoxious, were laid under interdicts
+
+inconsistent not only with the rights of citizenship but with the
+
+privilege of residence. What would have been the consequence, if
+
+such persons, by residence or otherwise, had acquired the
+
+character of citizens under the laws of another State, and then
+
+asserted their rights as such, both to residence and citizenship,
+
+within the State proscribing them? Whatever the legal
+
+consequences might have been, other consequences would probably
+
+have resulted, of too serious a nature not to be provided
+
+against. The new Constitution has accordingly, with great
+
+propriety, made provision against them, and all others proceeding
+
+from the defect of the Confederation on this head, by authorizing
+
+the general government to establish a uniform rule of
+
+naturalization throughout the United States. The power of
+
+establishing uniform laws of bankruptcy is so intimately
+
+connected with the regulation of commerce, and will prevent so
+
+many frauds where the parties or their property may lie or be
+
+removed into different States, that the expediency of it seems
+
+not likely to be drawn into question. The power of prescribing
+
+by general laws, the manner in which the public acts, records and
+
+judicial proceedings of each State shall be proved, and the
+
+effect they shall have in other States, is an evident and
+
+valuable improvement on the clause relating to this subject in
+
+the articles of Confederation. The meaning of the latter is
+
+extremely indeterminate, and can be of little importance under
+
+any interpretation which it will bear. The power here established
+
+may be rendered a very convenient instrument of justice, and be
+
+particularly beneficial on the borders of contiguous States,
+
+where the effects liable to justice may be suddenly and secretly
+
+translated, in any stage of the process, within a foreign
+
+jurisdiction. The power of establishing post roads must, in
+
+every view, be a harmless power, and may, perhaps, by judicious
+
+management, become productive of great public conveniency.
+
+Nothing which tends to facilitate the intercourse between the
+
+States can be deemed unworthy of the public care. PUBLIUS.
+
+
+
+FEDERALIST No. 43
+
+The Same Subject Continued (The Powers Conferred by the
+
+Constitution Further Considered)
+
+For the Independent Journal.
+
+
+
+MADISON
+
+
+
+To the People of the State of New York:
+
+THE FOURTH class comprises the following miscellaneous powers:1.
+
+A power "to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by
+
+securing, for a limited time, to authors and inventors, the
+
+exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.
+
+"The utility of this power will scarcely be questioned. The
+
+copyright of authors has been solemnly adjudged, in Great
+
+Britain, to be a right of common law. The right to useful
+
+inventions seems with equal reason to belong to the inventors.
+
+The public good fully coincides in both cases with the claims of
+
+individuals. The States cannot separately make effectual
+
+provisions for either of the cases, and most of them have
+
+anticipated the decision of this point, by laws passed at the
+
+instance of Congress. 2. "To exercise exclusive legislation, in
+
+all cases whatsoever, over such district (not exceeding ten miles
+
+square) as may, by cession of particular States and the
+
+acceptance of Congress, become the seat of the government of the
+
+United States; and to exercise like authority over all places
+
+purchased by the consent of the legislatures of the States in
+
+which the same shall be, for the erection of forts, magazines,
+
+arsenals, dockyards, and other needful buildings. "The
+
+indispensable necessity of complete authority at the seat of
+
+government, carries its own evidence with it. It is a power
+
+exercised by every legislature of the Union, I might say of the
+
+world, by virtue of its general supremacy. Without it, not only
+
+the public authority might be insulted and its proceedings
+
+interrupted with impunity; but a dependence of the members of the
+
+general government on the State comprehending the seat of the
+
+government, for protection in the exercise of their duty, might
+
+bring on the national councils an imputation of awe or influence,
+
+equally dishonorable to the government and dissatisfactory to the
+
+other members of the Confederacy. This consideration has the more
+
+weight, as the gradual accumulation of public improvements at the
+
+stationary residence of the government would be both too great a
+
+public pledge to be left in the hands of a single State, and
+
+would create so many obstacles to a removal of the government, as
+
+still further to abridge its necessary independence. The extent
+
+of this federal district is sufficiently circumscribed to satisfy
+
+every jealousy of an opposite nature. And as it is to be
+
+appropriated to this use with the consent of the State ceding it;
+
+as the State will no doubt provide in the compact for the rights
+
+and the consent of the citizens inhabiting it; as the inhabitants
+
+will find sufficient inducements of interest to become willing
+
+parties to the cession; as they will have had their voice in the
+
+election of the government which is to exercise authority over
+
+them; as a municipal legislature for local purposes, derived from
+
+their own suffrages, will of course be allowed them; and as the
+
+authority of the legislature of the State, and of the inhabitants
+
+of the ceded part of it, to concur in the cession, will be
+
+derived from the whole people of the State in their adoption of
+
+the Constitution, every imaginable objection seems to be
+
+obviated. The necessity of a like authority over forts,
+
+magazines, etc., established by the general government, is not
+
+less evident. The public money expended on such places, and the
+
+public property deposited in them, requires that they should be
+
+exempt from the authority of the particular State. Nor would it
+
+be proper for the places on which the security of the entire
+
+Union may depend, to be in any degree dependent on a particular
+
+member of it. All objections and scruples are here also obviated,
+
+by requiring the concurrence of the States concerned, in every
+
+such establishment. 3. "To declare the punishment of treason,
+
+but no attainder of treason shall work corruption of blood, or
+
+forfeiture, except during the life of the person attained. "As
+
+treason may be committed against the United States, the authority
+
+of the United States ought to be enabled to punish it. But as
+
+new-fangled and artificial treasons have been the great engines
+
+by which violent factions, the natural offspring of free
+
+government, have usually wreaked their alternate malignity on
+
+each other, the convention have, with great judgment, opposed a
+
+barrier to this peculiar danger, by inserting a constitutional
+
+definition of the crime, fixing the proof necessary for
+
+conviction of it, and restraining the Congress, even in punishing
+
+it, from extending the consequences of guilt beyond the person of
+
+its author. 4. "To admit new States into the Union; but no new
+
+State shall be formed or erected within the jurisdiction of any
+
+other State; nor any State be formed by the junction of two or
+
+more States, or parts of States, without the consent of the
+
+legislatures of the States concerned, as well as of the Congress.
+
+"In the articles of Confederation, no provision is found on this
+
+important subject. Canada was to be admitted of right, on her
+
+joining in the measures of the United States; and the other
+
+COLONIES, by which were evidently meant the other British
+
+colonies, at the discretion of nine States. The eventual
+
+establishment of NEW STATES seems to have been overlooked by the
+
+compilers of that instrument. We have seen the inconvenience of
+
+this omission, and the assumption of power into which Congress
+
+have been led by it. With great propriety, therefore, has the new
+
+system supplied the defect. The general precaution, that no new
+
+States shall be formed, without the concurrence of the federal
+
+authority, and that of the States concerned, is consonant to the
+
+principles which ought to govern such transactions. The
+
+particular precaution against the erection of new States, by the
+
+partition of a State without its consent, quiets the jealousy of
+
+the larger States; as that of the smaller is quieted by a like
+
+precaution, against a junction of States without their consent.
+
+5. "To dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations
+
+respecting the territory or other property belonging to the
+
+United States, with a proviso, that nothing in the Constitution
+
+shall be so construed as to prejudice any claims of the United
+
+States, or of any particular State. "This is a power of very
+
+great importance, and required by considerations similar to those
+
+which show the propriety of the former. The proviso annexed is
+
+proper in itself, and was probably rendered absolutely necessary
+
+by jealousies and questions concerning the Western territory
+
+sufficiently known to the public. 6. "To guarantee to every
+
+State in the Union a republican form of government; to protect
+
+each of them against invasion; and on application of the
+
+legislature, or of the executive (when the legislature cannot be
+
+convened), against domestic violence. "In a confederacy founded
+
+on republican principles, and composed of republican members, the
+
+superintending government ought clearly to possess authority to
+
+defend the system against aristocratic or monarchial
+
+innovations. The more intimate the nature of such a union may be,
+
+the greater interest have the members in the political
+
+institutions of each other; and the greater right to insist that
+
+the forms of government under which the compact was entered into
+
+should be SUBSTANTIALLY maintained. But a right implies a remedy;
+
+and where else could the remedy be deposited, than where it is
+
+deposited by the Constitution? Governments of dissimilar
+
+principles and forms have been found less adapted to a federal
+
+coalition of any sort, than those of a kindred nature. "As the
+
+confederate republic of Germany," says Montesquieu, "consists
+
+of free cities and petty states, subject to different princes,
+
+experience shows us that it is more imperfect than that of
+
+Holland and Switzerland. " "Greece was undone," he adds, "as
+
+soon as the king of Macedon obtained a seat among the
+
+Amphictyons. " In the latter case, no doubt, the
+
+disproportionate force, as well as the monarchical form, of the
+
+new confederate, had its share of influence on the events. It may
+
+possibly be asked, what need there could be of such a
+
+precaution, and whether it may not become a pretext for
+
+alterations in the State governments, without the concurrence of
+
+the States themselves. These questions admit of ready answers. If
+
+the interposition of the general government should not be
+
+needed, the provision for such an event will be a harmless
+
+superfluity only in the Constitution. But who can say what
+
+experiments may be produced by the caprice of particular States,
+
+by the ambition of enterprising leaders, or by the intrigues and
+
+influence of foreign powers? To the second question it may be
+
+answered, that if the general government should interpose by
+
+virtue of this constitutional authority, it will be, of course,
+
+bound to pursue the authority. But the authority extends no
+
+further than to a GUARANTY of a republican form of government,
+
+which supposes a pre-existing government of the form which is to
+
+be guaranteed. As long, therefore, as the existing republican
+
+forms are continued by the States, they are guaranteed by the
+
+federal Constitution. Whenever the States may choose to
+
+substitute other republican forms, they have a right to do so,
+
+and to claim the federal guaranty for the latter. The only
+
+restriction imposed on them is, that they shall not exchange
+
+republican for antirepublican Constitutions; a restriction
+
+which, it is presumed, will hardly be considered as a grievance.
+
+A protection against invasion is due from every society to the
+
+parts composing it. The latitude of the expression here used
+
+seems to secure each State, not only against foreign hostility,
+
+but against ambitious or vindictive enterprises of its more
+
+powerful neighbors. The history, both of ancient and modern
+
+confederacies, proves that the weaker members of the union ought
+
+not to be insensible to the policy of this article. Protection
+
+against domestic violence is added with equal propriety. It has
+
+been remarked, that even among the Swiss cantons, which, properly
+
+speaking, are not under one government, provision is made for
+
+this object; and the history of that league informs us that
+
+mutual aid is frequently claimed and afforded; and as well by
+
+the most democratic, as the other cantons. A recent and
+
+well-known event among ourselves has warned us to be prepared for
+
+emergencies of a like nature. At first view, it might seem not
+
+to square with the republican theory, to suppose, either that a
+
+majority have not the right, or that a minority will have the
+
+force, to subvert a government; and consequently, that the
+
+federal interposition can never be required, but when it would be
+
+improper. But theoretic reasoning, in this as in most other
+
+cases, must be qualified by the lessons of practice. Why may not
+
+illicit combinations, for purposes of violence, be formed as
+
+well by a majority of a State, especially a small State as by a
+
+majority of a county, or a district of the same State; and if
+
+the authority of the State ought, in the latter case, to protect
+
+the local magistracy, ought not the federal authority, in the
+
+former, to support the State authority? Besides, there are
+
+certain parts of the State constitutions which are so interwoven
+
+with the federal Constitution, that a violent blow cannot be
+
+given to the one without communicating the wound to the other.
+
+Insurrections in a State will rarely induce a federal
+
+interposition, unless the number concerned in them bear some
+
+proportion to the friends of government. It will be much better
+
+that the violence in such cases should be repressed by the
+
+superintending power, than that the majority should be left to
+
+maintain their cause by a bloody and obstinate contest. The
+
+existence of a right to interpose, will generally prevent the
+
+necessity of exerting it. Is it true that force and right are
+
+necessarily on the same side in republican governments? May not
+
+the minor party possess such a superiority of pecuniary
+
+resources, of military talents and experience, or of secret
+
+succors from foreign powers, as will render it superior also in
+
+an appeal to the sword? May not a more compact and advantageous
+
+position turn the scale on the same side, against a superior
+
+number so situated as to be less capable of a prompt and
+
+collected exertion of its strength? Nothing can be more
+
+chimerical than to imagine that in a trial of actual force,
+
+victory may be calculated by the rules which prevail in a census
+
+of the inhabitants, or which determine the event of an election!
+
+May it not happen, in fine, that the minority of CITIZENS may
+
+become a majority of PERSONS, by the accession of alien
+
+residents, of a casual concourse of adventurers, or of those whom
+
+the constitution of the State has not admitted to the rights of
+
+suffrage? I take no notice of an unhappy species of population
+
+abounding in some of the States, who, during the calm of regular
+
+government, are sunk below the level of men; but who, in the
+
+tempestuous scenes of civil violence, may emerge into the human
+
+character, and give a superiority of strength to any party with
+
+which they may associate themselves. In cases where it may be
+
+doubtful on which side justice lies, what better umpires could
+
+be desired by two violent factions, flying to arms, and tearing a
+
+State to pieces, than the representatives of confederate States,
+
+not heated by the local flame? To the impartiality of judges,
+
+they would unite the affection of friends. Happy would it be if
+
+such a remedy for its infirmities could be enjoyed by all free
+
+governments; if a project equally effectual could be established
+
+for the universal peace of mankind! Should it be asked, what is
+
+to be the redress for an insurrection pervading all the States,
+
+and comprising a superiority of the entire force, though not a
+
+constitutional right? the answer must be, that such a case, as
+
+it would be without the compass of human remedies, so it is
+
+fortunately not within the compass of human probability; and
+
+that it is a sufficient recommendation of the federal
+
+Constitution, that it diminishes the risk of a calamity for which
+
+no possible constitution can provide a cure. Among the
+
+advantages of a confederate republic enumerated by Montesquieu,
+
+an important one is, "that should a popular insurrection happen
+
+in one of the States, the others are able to quell it. Should
+
+abuses creep into one part, they are reformed by those that
+
+remain sound. "7. "To consider all debts contracted, and
+
+engagements entered into, before the adoption of this
+
+Constitution, as being no less valid against the United States,
+
+under this Constitution, than under the Confederation. "This
+
+can only be considered as a declaratory proposition; and may have
+
+been inserted, among other reasons, for the satisfaction of the
+
+foreign creditors of the United States, who cannot be strangers
+
+to the pretended doctrine, that a change in the political form of
+
+civil society has the magical effect of dissolving its moral
+
+obligations. Among the lesser criticisms which have been
+
+exercised on the Constitution, it has been remarked that the
+
+validity of engagements ought to have been asserted in favor of
+
+the United States, as well as against them; and in the spirit
+
+which usually characterizes little critics, the omission has been
+
+transformed and magnified into a plot against the national
+
+rights. The authors of this discovery may be told, what few
+
+others need to be informed of, that as engagements are in their
+
+nature reciprocal, an assertion of their validity on one side,
+
+necessarily involves a validity on the other side; and that as
+
+the article is merely declaratory, the establishment of the
+
+principle in one case is sufficient for every case. They may be
+
+further told, that every constitution must limit its precautions
+
+to dangers that are not altogether imaginary; and that no real
+
+danger can exist that the government would DARE, with, or even
+
+without, this constitutional declaration before it, to remit the
+
+debts justly due to the public, on the pretext here condemned. 8.
+
+"To provide for amendments to be ratified by three fourths of
+
+the States under two exceptions only. "That useful alterations
+
+will be suggested by experience, could not but be foreseen. It
+
+was requisite, therefore, that a mode for introducing them should
+
+be provided. The mode preferred by the convention seems to be
+
+stamped with every mark of propriety. It guards equally against
+
+that extreme facility, which would render the Constitution too
+
+mutable; and that extreme difficulty, which might perpetuate its
+
+discovered faults. It, moreover, equally enables the general and
+
+the State governments to originate the amendment of errors, as
+
+they may be pointed out by the experience on one side, or on the
+
+other. The exception in favor of the equality of suffrage in the
+
+Senate, was probably meant as a palladium to the residuary
+
+sovereignty of the States, implied and secured by that principle
+
+of representation in one branch of the legislature; and was
+
+probably insisted on by the States particularly attached to that
+
+equality. The other exception must have been admitted on the same
+
+considerations which produced the privilege defended by it. 9.
+
+"The ratification of the conventions of nine States shall be
+
+sufficient for the establishment of this Constitution between the
+
+States, ratifying the same. "This article speaks for itself.
+
+The express authority of the people alone could give due validity
+
+to the Constitution. To have required the unanimous ratification
+
+of the thirteen States, would have subjected the essential
+
+interests of the whole to the caprice or corruption of a single
+
+member. It would have marked a want of foresight in the
+
+convention, which our own experience would have rendered
+
+inexcusable. Two questions of a very delicate nature present
+
+themselves on this occasion: 1. On what principle the
+
+Confederation, which stands in the solemn form of a compact among
+
+the States, can be superseded without the unanimous consent of
+
+the parties to it? 2. What relation is to subsist between the
+
+nine or more States ratifying the Constitution, and the remaining
+
+few who do not become parties to it? The first question is
+
+answered at once by recurring to the absolute necessity of the
+
+case; to the great principle of self-preservation; to the
+
+transcendent law of nature and of nature's God, which declares
+
+that the safety and happiness of society are the objects at which
+
+all political institutions aim, and to which all such
+
+institutions must be sacrificed. PERHAPS, also, an answer may be
+
+found without searching beyond the principles of the compact
+
+itself. It has been heretofore noted among the defects of the
+
+Confederation, that in many of the States it had received no
+
+higher sanction than a mere legislative ratification. The
+
+principle of reciprocality seems to require that its obligation
+
+on the other States should be reduced to the same standard. A
+
+compact between independent sovereigns, founded on ordinary acts
+
+of legislative authority, can pretend to no higher validity than
+
+a league or treaty between the parties. It is an established
+
+doctrine on the subject of treaties, that all the articles are
+
+mutually conditions of each other; that a breach of any one
+
+article is a breach of the whole treaty; and that a breach,
+
+committed by either of the parties, absolves the others, and
+
+authorizes them, if they please, to pronounce the compact
+
+violated and void. Should it unhappily be necessary to appeal to
+
+these delicate truths for a justification for dispensing with
+
+the consent of particular States to a dissolution of the federal
+
+pact, will not the complaining parties find it a difficult task
+
+to answer the MULTIPLIED and IMPORTANT infractions with which
+
+they may be confronted? The time has been when it was incumbent
+
+on us all to veil the ideas which this paragraph exhibits. The
+
+scene is now changed, and with it the part which the same motives
+
+dictate. The second question is not less delicate; and the
+
+flattering prospect of its being merely hypothetical forbids an
+
+overcurious discussion of it. It is one of those cases which must
+
+be left to provide for itself. In general, it may be observed,
+
+that although no political relation can subsist between the
+
+assenting and dissenting States, yet the moral relations will
+
+remain uncancelled. The claims of justice, both on one side and
+
+on the other, will be in force, and must be fulfilled; the
+
+rights of humanity must in all cases be duly and mutually
+
+respected; whilst considerations of a common interest, and,
+
+above all, the remembrance of the endearing scenes which are
+
+past, and the anticipation of a speedy triumph over the obstacles
+
+to reunion, will, it is hoped, not urge in vain MODERATION on one
+
+side, and PRUDENCE on the other. PUBLIUS.
+
+
+
+
+
+FEDERALIST No. 44
+
+
+
+Restrictions on the Authority of the Several States
+
+From the New York Packet. Friday, January 25, 1788.
+
+
+
+MADISON
+
+
+
+To the People of the State of New York:
+
+A FIFTH class of provisions in favor of the federal authority
+
+consists of the following restrictions on the authority of the
+
+several States:1. "No State shall enter into any treaty,
+
+alliance, or confederation; grant letters of marque and reprisal;
+
+coin money; emit bills of credit; make any thing but gold and
+
+silver a legal tender in payment of debts; pass any bill of
+
+attainder, ex-post-facto law, or law impairing the obligation of
+
+contracts; or grant any title of nobility. "The prohibition
+
+against treaties, alliances, and confederations makes a part of
+
+the existing articles of Union; and for reasons which need no
+
+explanation, is copied into the new Constitution. The prohibition
+
+of letters of marque is another part of the old system, but is
+
+somewhat extended in the new. According to the former, letters of
+
+marque could be granted by the States after a declaration of war;
+
+according to the latter, these licenses must be obtained, as well
+
+during war as previous to its declaration, from the government of
+
+the United States. This alteration is fully justified by the
+
+advantage of uniformity in all points which relate to foreign
+
+powers; and of immediate responsibility to the nation in all
+
+those for whose conduct the nation itself is to be responsible.
+
+The right of coining money, which is here taken from the States,
+
+was left in their hands by the Confederation, as a concurrent
+
+right with that of Congress, under an exception in favor of the
+
+exclusive right of Congress to regulate the alloy and value. In
+
+this instance, also, the new provision is an improvement on the
+
+old. Whilst the alloy and value depended on the general
+
+authority, a right of coinage in the particular States could have
+
+no other effect than to multiply expensive mints and diversify
+
+the forms and weights of the circulating pieces. The latter
+
+inconveniency defeats one purpose for which the power was
+
+originally submitted to the federal head; and as far as the
+
+former might prevent an inconvenient remittance of gold and
+
+silver to the central mint for recoinage, the end can be as well
+
+attained by local mints established under the general authority.
+
+The extension of the prohibition to bills of credit must give
+
+pleasure to every citizen, in proportion to his love of justice
+
+and his knowledge of the true springs of public prosperity. The
+
+loss which America has sustained since the peace, from the
+
+pestilent effects of paper money on the necessary confidence
+
+between man and man, on the necessary confidence in the public
+
+councils, on the industry and morals of the people, and on the
+
+character of republican government, constitutes an enormous debt
+
+against the States chargeable with this unadvised measure, which
+
+must long remain unsatisfied; or rather an accumulation of guilt,
+
+which can be expiated no otherwise than by a voluntary sacrifice
+
+on the altar of justice, of the power which has been the
+
+instrument of it. In addition to these persuasive
+
+considerations, it may be observed, that the same reasons which
+
+show the necessity of denying to the States the power of
+
+regulating coin, prove with equal force that they ought not to be
+
+at liberty to substitute a paper medium in the place of coin. Had
+
+every State a right to regulate the value of its coin, there
+
+might be as many different currencies as States, and thus the
+
+intercourse among them would be impeded; retrospective
+
+alterations in its value might be made, and thus the citizens of
+
+other States be injured, and animosities be kindled among the
+
+States themselves. The subjects of foreign powers might suffer
+
+from the same cause, and hence the Union be discredited and
+
+embroiled by the indiscretion of a single member. No one of these
+
+mischiefs is less incident to a power in the States to emit paper
+
+money, than to coin gold or silver. The power to make any thing
+
+but gold and silver a tender in payment of debts, is withdrawn
+
+from the States, on the same principle with that of issuing a
+
+paper currency. Bills of attainder, ex-post-facto laws, and laws
+
+impairing the obligation of contracts, are contrary to the first
+
+principles of the social compact, and to every principle of sound
+
+legislation. The two former are expressly prohibited by the
+
+declarations prefixed to some of the State constitutions, and all
+
+of them are prohibited by the spirit and scope of these
+
+fundamental charters. Our own experience has taught us,
+
+nevertheless, that additional fences against these dangers ought
+
+not to be omitted. Very properly, therefore, have the convention
+
+added this constitutional bulwark in favor of personal security
+
+and private rights; and I am much deceived if they have not, in
+
+so doing, as faithfully consulted the genuine sentiments as the
+
+undoubted interests of their constituents. The sober people of
+
+America are weary of the fluctuating policy which has directed
+
+the public councils. They have seen with regret and indignation
+
+that sudden changes and legislative interferences, in cases
+
+affecting personal rights, become jobs in the hands of
+
+enterprising and influential speculators, and snares to the
+
+more-industrious and less-informed part of the community. They
+
+have seen, too, that one legislative interference is but the
+
+first link of a long chain of repetitions, every subsequent
+
+interference being naturally produced by the effects of the
+
+preceding. They very rightly infer, therefore, that some thorough
+
+reform is wanting, which will banish speculations on public
+
+measures, inspire a general prudence and industry, and give a
+
+regular course to the business of society. The prohibition with
+
+respect to titles of nobility is copied from the articles of
+
+Confederation and needs no comment. 2. "No State shall, without
+
+the consent of the Congress, lay any imposts or duties on imports
+
+or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing
+
+its inspection laws, and the net produce of all duties and
+
+imposts laid by any State on imports or exports, shall be for the
+
+use of the treasury of the United States; and all such laws shall
+
+be subject to the revision and control of the Congress. No State
+
+shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any duty on tonnage,
+
+keep troops or ships of war in time of peace, enter into any
+
+agreement or compact with another State, or with a foreign power,
+
+or engage in war unless actually invaded, or in such imminent
+
+danger as will not admit of delay. "The restraint on the power
+
+of the States over imports and exports is enforced by all the
+
+arguments which prove the necessity of submitting the regulation
+
+of trade to the federal councils. It is needless, therefore, to
+
+remark further on this head, than that the manner in which the
+
+restraint is qualified seems well calculated at once to secure to
+
+the States a reasonable discretion in providing for the
+
+conveniency of their imports and exports, and to the United
+
+States a reasonable check against the abuse of this discretion.
+
+The remaining particulars of this clause fall within reasonings
+
+which are either so obvious, or have been so fully developed,
+
+that they may be passed over without remark. The SIXTH and last
+
+class consists of the several powers and provisions by which
+
+efficacy is given to all the rest. 1. Of these the first is, the
+
+"power to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for
+
+carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other
+
+powers vested by this Constitution in the government of the
+
+United States, or in any department or officer thereof. "Few
+
+parts of the Constitution have been assailed with more
+
+intemperance than this; yet on a fair investigation of it, no
+
+part can appear more completely invulnerable. Without the
+
+SUBSTANCE of this power, the whole Constitution would be a dead
+
+letter. Those who object to the article, therefore, as a part of
+
+the Constitution, can only mean that the FORM of the provision is
+
+improper. But have they considered whether a better form could
+
+have been substituted? There are four other possible methods
+
+which the Constitution might have taken on this subject. They
+
+might have copied the second article of the existing
+
+Confederation, which would have prohibited the exercise of any
+
+power not EXPRESSLY delegated; they might have attempted a
+
+positive enumeration of the powers comprehended under the general
+
+terms "necessary and proper"; they might have attempted a
+
+negative enumeration of them, by specifying the powers excepted
+
+from the general definition; they might have been altogether
+
+silent on the subject, leaving these necessary and proper powers
+
+to construction and inference. Had the convention taken the
+
+first method of adopting the second article of Confederation, it
+
+is evident that the new Congress would be continually exposed, as
+
+their predecessors have been, to the alternative of construing
+
+the term "EXPRESSLY" with so much rigor, as to disarm the
+
+government of all real authority whatever, or with so much
+
+latitude as to destroy altogether the force of the restriction.
+
+It would be easy to show, if it were necessary, that no important
+
+power, delegated by the articles of Confederation, has been or
+
+can be executed by Congress, without recurring more or less to
+
+the doctrine of CONSTRUCTION or IMPLICATION. As the powers
+
+delegated under the new system are more extensive, the government
+
+which is to administer it would find itself still more distressed
+
+with the alternative of betraying the public interests by doing
+
+nothing, or of violating the Constitution by exercising powers
+
+indispensably necessary and proper, but, at the same time, not
+
+EXPRESSLY granted. Had the convention attempted a positive
+
+enumeration of the powers necessary and proper for carrying their
+
+other powers into effect, the attempt would have involved a
+
+complete digest of laws on every subject to which the
+
+Constitution relates; accommodated too, not only to the existing
+
+state of things, but to all the possible changes which futurity
+
+may produce; for in every new application of a general power, the
+
+PARTICULAR POWERS, which are the means of attaining the OBJECT of
+
+the general power, must always necessarily vary with that object,
+
+and be often properly varied whilst the object remains the same.
+
+Had they attempted to enumerate the particular powers or means
+
+not necessary or proper for carrying the general powers into
+
+execution, the task would have been no less chimerical; and would
+
+have been liable to this further objection, that every defect in
+
+the enumeration would have been equivalent to a positive grant of
+
+authority. If, to avoid this consequence, they had attempted a
+
+partial enumeration of the exceptions, and described the residue
+
+by the general terms, NOT NECESSARY OR PROPER, it must have
+
+happened that the enumeration would comprehend a few of the
+
+excepted powers only; that these would be such as would be least
+
+likely to be assumed or tolerated, because the enumeration would
+
+of course select such as would be least necessary or proper; and
+
+that the unnecessary and improper powers included in the
+
+residuum, would be less forcibly excepted, than if no partial
+
+enumeration had been made. Had the Constitution been silent on
+
+this head, there can be no doubt that all the particular powers
+
+requisite as means of executing the general powers would have
+
+resulted to the government, by unavoidable implication. No axiom
+
+is more clearly established in law, or in reason, than that
+
+wherever the end is required, the means are authorized; wherever
+
+a general power to do a thing is given, every particular power
+
+necessary for doing it is included. Had this last method,
+
+therefore, been pursued by the convention, every objection now
+
+urged against their plan would remain in all its plausibility;
+
+and the real inconveniency would be incurred of not removing a
+
+pretext which may be seized on critical occasions for drawing
+
+into question the essential powers of the Union. If it be asked
+
+what is to be the consequence, in case the Congress shall
+
+misconstrue this part of the Constitution, and exercise powers
+
+not warranted by its true meaning, I answer, the same as if they
+
+should misconstrue or enlarge any other power vested in them; as
+
+if the general power had been reduced to particulars, and any one
+
+of these were to be violated; the same, in short, as if the State
+
+legislatures should violate the irrespective constitutional
+
+authorities. In the first instance, the success of the usurpation
+
+will depend on the executive and judiciary departments, which are
+
+to expound and give effect to the legislative acts; and in the
+
+last resort a remedy must be obtained from the people who can, by
+
+the election of more faithful representatives, annul the acts of
+
+the usurpers. The truth is, that this ultimate redress may be
+
+more confided in against unconstitutional acts of the federal
+
+than of the State legislatures, for this plain reason, that as
+
+every such act of the former will be an invasion of the rights of
+
+the latter, these will be ever ready to mark the innovation, to
+
+sound the alarm to the people, and to exert their local influence
+
+in effecting a change of federal representatives. There being no
+
+such intermediate body between the State legislatures and the
+
+people interested in watching the conduct of the former,
+
+violations of the State constitutions are more likely to remain
+
+unnoticed and unredressed. 2. "This Constitution and the laws
+
+of the United States which shall be made in pursuance thereof,
+
+and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
+
+authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the
+
+land, and the judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any
+
+thing in the constitution or laws of any State to the contrary
+
+notwithstanding. "The indiscreet zeal of the adversaries to the
+
+Constitution has betrayed them into an attack on this part of it
+
+also, without which it would have been evidently and radically
+
+defective. To be fully sensible of this, we need only suppose for
+
+a moment that the supremacy of the State constitutions had been
+
+left complete by a saving clause in their favor. In the first
+
+place, as these constitutions invest the State legislatures with
+
+absolute sovereignty, in all cases not excepted by the existing
+
+articles of Confederation, all the authorities contained in the
+
+proposed Constitution, so far as they exceed those enumerated in
+
+the Confederation, would have been annulled, and the new Congress
+
+would have been reduced to the same impotent condition with their
+
+predecessors. In the next place, as the constitutions of some of
+
+the States do not even expressly and fully recognize the existing
+
+powers of the Confederacy, an express saving of the supremacy of
+
+the former would, in such States, have brought into question
+
+every power contained in the proposed Constitution. In the third
+
+place, as the constitutions of the States differ much from each
+
+other, it might happen that a treaty or national law, of great
+
+and equal importance to the States, would interfere with some and
+
+not with other constitutions, and would consequently be valid in
+
+some of the States, at the same time that it would have no effect
+
+in others. In fine, the world would have seen, for the first
+
+time, a system of government founded on an inversion of the
+
+fundamental principles of all government; it would have seen the
+
+authority of the whole society every where subordinate to the
+
+authority of the parts; it would have seen a monster, in which
+
+the head was under the direction of the members. 3. "The
+
+Senators and Representatives, and the members of the several
+
+State legislatures, and all executive and judicial officers, both
+
+of the United States and the several States, shall be bound by
+
+oath or affirmation to support this Constitution. "It has been
+
+asked why it was thought necessary, that the State magistracy
+
+should be bound to support the federal Constitution, and
+
+unnecessary that a like oath should be imposed on the officers of
+
+the United States, in favor of the State constitutions. Several
+
+reasons might be assigned for the distinction. I content myself
+
+with one, which is obvious and conclusive. The members of the
+
+federal government will have no agency in carrying the State
+
+constitutions into effect. The members and officers of the State
+
+governments, on the contrary, will have an essential agency in
+
+giving effect to the federal Constitution. The election of the
+
+President and Senate will depend, in all cases, on the
+
+legislatures of the several States. And the election of the House
+
+of Representatives will equally depend on the same authority in
+
+the first instance; and will, probably, forever be conducted by
+
+the officers, and according to the laws, of the States. 4. Among
+
+the provisions for giving efficacy to the federal powers might be
+
+added those which belong to the executive and judiciary
+
+departments: but as these are reserved for particular examination
+
+in another place, I pass them over in this. We have now
+
+reviewed, in detail, all the articles composing the sum or
+
+quantity of power delegated by the proposed Constitution to the
+
+federal government, and are brought to this undeniable
+
+conclusion, that no part of the power is unnecessary or improper
+
+for accomplishing the necessary objects of the Union. The
+
+question, therefore, whether this amount of power shall be
+
+granted or not, resolves itself into another question, whether or
+
+not a government commensurate to the exigencies of the Union
+
+shall be established; or, in other words, whether the Union
+
+itself shall be preserved. PUBLIUS.
+
+
+
+
+
+FEDERALIST No. 45
+
+
+
+The Alleged Danger From the Powers of the Union to the State
+
+Governments Considered
+
+For the Independent Fournal.
+
+
+
+MADISON
+
+
+
+To the People of the State of New York:
+
+HAVING shown that no one of the powers transferred to the federal
+
+government is unnecessary or improper, the next question to be
+
+considered is, whether the whole mass of them will be dangerous
+
+to the portion of authority left in the several States. The
+
+adversaries to the plan of the convention, instead of considering
+
+in the first place what degree of power was absolutely necessary
+
+for the purposes of the federal government, have exhausted
+
+themselves in a secondary inquiry into the possible consequences
+
+of the proposed degree of power to the governments of the
+
+particular States. But if the Union, as has been shown, be
+
+essential to the security of the people of America against
+
+foreign danger; if it be essential to their security against
+
+contentions and wars among the different States; if it be
+
+essential to guard them against those violent and oppressive
+
+factions which embitter the blessings of liberty, and against
+
+those military establishments which must gradually poison its
+
+very fountain; if, in a word, the Union be essential to the
+
+happiness of the people of America, is it not preposterous, to
+
+urge as an objection to a government, without which the objects
+
+of the Union cannot be attained, that such a government may
+
+derogate from the importance of the governments of the individual
+
+States? Was, then, the American Revolution effected, was the
+
+American Confederacy formed, was the precious blood of thousands
+
+spilt, and the hard-earned substance of millions lavished, not
+
+that the people of America should enjoy peace, liberty, and
+
+safety, but that the government of the individual States, that
+
+particular municipal establishments, might enjoy a certain extent
+
+of power, and be arrayed with certain dignities and attributes of
+
+sovereignty? We have heard of the impious doctrine in the Old
+
+World, that the people were made for kings, not kings for the
+
+people. Is the same doctrine to be revived in the New, in another
+
+shape that the solid happiness of the people is to be sacrificed
+
+to the views of political institutions of a different form? It is
+
+too early for politicians to presume on our forgetting that the
+
+public good, the real welfare of the great body of the people, is
+
+the supreme object to be pursued; and that no form of government
+
+whatever has any other value than as it may be fitted for the
+
+attainment of this object. Were the plan of the convention
+
+adverse to the public happiness, my voice would be, Reject the
+
+plan. Were the Union itself inconsistent with the public
+
+happiness, it would be, Abolish the Union. In like manner, as far
+
+as the sovereignty of the States cannot be reconciled to the
+
+happiness of the people, the voice of every good citizen must be,
+
+Let the former be sacrificed to the latter. How far the sacrifice
+
+is necessary, has been shown. How far the unsacrificed residue
+
+will be endangered, is the question before us. Several important
+
+considerations have been touched in the course of these papers,
+
+which discountenance the supposition that the operation of the
+
+federal government will by degrees prove fatal to the State
+
+governments. The more I revolve the subject, the more fully I am
+
+persuaded that the balance is much more likely to be disturbed by
+
+the preponderancy of the last than of the first scale. We have
+
+seen, in all the examples of ancient and modern confederacies,
+
+the strongest tendency continually betraying itself in the
+
+members, to despoil the general government of its authorities,
+
+with a very ineffectual capacity in the latter to defend itself
+
+against the encroachments. Although, in most of these examples,
+
+the system has been so dissimilar from that under consideration
+
+as greatly to weaken any inference concerning the latter from the
+
+fate of the former, yet, as the States will retain, under the
+
+proposed Constitution, a very extensive portion of active
+
+sovereignty, the inference ought not to be wholly disregarded. In
+
+the Achaean league it is probable that the federal head had a
+
+degree and species of power, which gave it a considerable
+
+likeness to the government framed by the convention. The Lycian
+
+Confederacy, as far as its principles and form are transmitted,
+
+must have borne a still greater analogy to it. Yet history does
+
+not inform us that either of them ever degenerated, or tended to
+
+degenerate, into one consolidated government. On the contrary, we
+
+know that the ruin of one of them proceeded from the incapacity
+
+of the federal authority to prevent the dissensions, and finally
+
+the disunion, of the subordinate authorities. These cases are the
+
+more worthy of our attention, as the external causes by which the
+
+component parts were pressed together were much more numerous and
+
+powerful than in our case; and consequently less powerful
+
+ligaments within would be sufficient to bind the members to the
+
+head, and to each other. In the feudal system, we have seen a
+
+similar propensity exemplified. Notwithstanding the want of
+
+proper sympathy in every instance between the local sovereigns
+
+and the people, and the sympathy in some instances between the
+
+general sovereign and the latter, it usually happened that the
+
+local sovereigns prevailed in the rivalship for encroachments.
+
+Had no external dangers enforced internal harmony and
+
+subordination, and particularly, had the local sovereigns
+
+possessed the affections of the people, the great kingdoms in
+
+Europe would at this time consist of as many independent princes
+
+as there were formerly feudatory barons. The State government
+
+will have the advantage of the Federal government, whether we
+
+compare them in respect to the immediate dependence of the one on
+
+the other; to the weight of personal influence which each side
+
+will possess; to the powers respectively vested in them; to the
+
+predilection and probable support of the people; to the
+
+disposition and faculty of resisting and frustrating the measures
+
+of each other. The State governments may be regarded as
+
+constituent and essential parts of the federal government; whilst
+
+the latter is nowise essential to the operation or organization
+
+of the former. Without the intervention of the State
+
+legislatures, the President of the United States cannot be
+
+elected at all. They must in all cases have a great share in his
+
+appointment, and will, perhaps, in most cases, of themselves
+
+determine it. The Senate will be elected absolutely and
+
+exclusively by the State legislatures. Even the House of
+
+Representatives, though drawn immediately from the people, will
+
+be chosen very much under the influence of that class of men,
+
+whose influence over the people obtains for themselves an
+
+election into the State legislatures. Thus, each of the principal
+
+branches of the federal government will owe its existence more or
+
+less to the favor of the State governments, and must consequently
+
+feel a dependence, which is much more likely to beget a
+
+disposition too obsequious than too overbearing towards them. On
+
+the other side, the component parts of the State governments will
+
+in no instance be indebted for their appointment to the direct
+
+agency of the federal government, and very little, if at all, to
+
+the local influence of its members. The number of individuals
+
+employed under the Constitution of the United States will be much
+
+smaller than the number employed under the particular States.
+
+There will consequently be less of personal influence on the side
+
+of the former than of the latter. The members of the legislative,
+
+executive, and judiciary departments of thirteen and more States,
+
+the justices of peace, officers of militia, ministerial officers
+
+of justice, with all the county, corporation, and town officers,
+
+for three millions and more of people, intermixed, and having
+
+particular acquaintance with every class and circle of people,
+
+must exceed, beyond all proportion, both in number and influence,
+
+those of every description who will be employed in the
+
+administration of the federal system. Compare the members of the
+
+three great departments of the thirteen States, excluding from
+
+the judiciary department the justices of peace, with the members
+
+of the corresponding departments of the single government of the
+
+Union; compare the militia officers of three millions of people
+
+with the military and marine officers of any establishment which
+
+is within the compass of probability, or, I may add, of
+
+possibility, and in this view alone, we may pronounce the
+
+advantage of the States to be decisive. If the federal government
+
+is to have collectors of revenue, the State governments will have
+
+theirs also. And as those of the former will be principally on
+
+the seacoast, and not very numerous, whilst those of the latter
+
+will be spread over the face of the country, and will be very
+
+numerous, the advantage in this view also lies on the same side.
+
+It is true, that the Confederacy is to possess, and may exercise,
+
+the power of collecting internal as well as external taxes
+
+throughout the States; but it is probable that this power will
+
+not be resorted to, except for supplemental purposes of revenue;
+
+that an option will then be given to the States to supply their
+
+quotas by previous collections of their own; and that the
+
+eventual collection, under the immediate authority of the Union,
+
+will generally be made by the officers, and according to the
+
+rules, appointed by the several States. Indeed it is extremely
+
+probable, that in other instances, particularly in the
+
+organization of the judicial power, the officers of the States
+
+will be clothed with the correspondent authority of the Union.
+
+Should it happen, however, that separate collectors of internal
+
+revenue should be appointed under the federal government, the
+
+influence of the whole number would not bear a comparison with
+
+that of the multitude of State officers in the opposite scale.
+
+Within every district to which a federal collector would be
+
+allotted, there would not be less than thirty or forty, or even
+
+more, officers of different descriptions, and many of them
+
+persons of character and weight, whose influence would lie on the
+
+side of the State. The powers delegated by the proposed
+
+Constitution to the federal government are few and defined. Those
+
+which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and
+
+indefinite. The former will be exercised principally on external
+
+objects, as war, peace, negotiation, and foreign commerce; with
+
+which last the power of taxation will, for the most part, be
+
+connected. The powers reserved to the several States will extend
+
+to all the objects which, in the ordinary course of affairs,
+
+concern the lives, liberties, and properties of the people, and
+
+the internal order, improvement, and prosperity of the State. The
+
+operations of the federal government will be most extensive and
+
+important in times of war and danger; those of the State
+
+governments, in times of peace and security. As the former
+
+periods will probably bear a small proportion to the latter, the
+
+State governments will here enjoy another advantage over the
+
+federal government. The more adequate, indeed, the federal powers
+
+may be rendered to the national defense, the less frequent will
+
+be those scenes of danger which might favor their ascendancy over
+
+the governments of the particular States. If the new Constitution
+
+be examined with accuracy and candor, it will be found that the
+
+change which it proposes consists much less in the addition of
+
+NEW POWERS to the Union, than in the invigoration of its ORIGINAL
+
+POWERS. The regulation of commerce, it is true, is a new power;
+
+but that seems to be an addition which few oppose, and from which
+
+no apprehensions are entertained. The powers relating to war and
+
+peace, armies and fleets, treaties and finance, with the other
+
+more considerable powers, are all vested in the existing Congress
+
+by the articles of Confederation. The proposed change does not
+
+enlarge these powers; it only substitutes a more effectual mode
+
+of administering them. The change relating to taxation may be
+
+regarded as the most important; and yet the present Congress have
+
+as complete authority to REQUIRE of the States indefinite
+
+supplies of money for the common defense and general welfare, as
+
+the future Congress will have to require them of individual
+
+citizens; and the latter will be no more bound than the States
+
+themselves have been, to pay the quotas respectively taxed on
+
+them. Had the States complied punctually with the articles of
+
+Confederation, or could their compliance have been enforced by as
+
+peaceable means as may be used with success towards single
+
+persons, our past experience is very far from countenancing an
+
+opinion, that the State governments would have lost their
+
+constitutional powers, and have gradually undergone an entire
+
+consolidation. To maintain that such an event would have ensued,
+
+would be to say at once, that the existence of the State
+
+governments is incompatible with any system whatever that
+
+accomplishes the essential purposes of the Union. PUBLIUS.
+
+
+
+
+
+FEDERALIST No. 46
+
+
+
+The Influence of the State and Federal Governments Compared
+
+From the New York Packet. Tuesday, January 29, 1788.
+
+
+
+MADISON
+
+
+
+To the People of the State of New York:
+
+RESUMING the subject of the last paper, I proceed to inquire
+
+whether the federal government or the State governments will have
+
+the advantage with regard to the predilection and support of the
+
+people. Notwithstanding the different modes in which they are
+
+appointed, we must consider both of them as substantially
+
+dependent on the great body of the citizens of the United States.
+
+I assume this position here as it respects the first, reserving
+
+the proofs for another place. The federal and State governments
+
+are in fact but different agents and trustees of the people,
+
+constituted with different powers, and designed for different
+
+purposes. The adversaries of the Constitution seem to have lost
+
+sight of the people altogether in their reasonings on this
+
+subject; and to have viewed these different establishments, not
+
+only as mutual rivals and enemies, but as uncontrolled by any
+
+common superior in their efforts to usurp the authorities of each
+
+other. These gentlemen must here be reminded of their error. They
+
+must be told that the ultimate authority, wherever the derivative
+
+may be found, resides in the people alone, and that it will not
+
+depend merely on the comparative ambition or address of the
+
+different governments, whether either, or which of them, will be
+
+able to enlarge its sphere of jurisdiction at the expense of the
+
+other. Truth, no less than decency, requires that the event in
+
+every case should be supposed to depend on the sentiments and
+
+sanction of their common constituents. Many considerations,
+
+besides those suggested on a former occasion, seem to place it
+
+beyond doubt that the first and most natural attachment of the
+
+people will be to the governments of their respective States.
+
+Into the administration of these a greater number of individuals
+
+will expect to rise. From the gift of these a greater number of
+
+offices and emoluments will flow. By the superintending care of
+
+these, all the more domestic and personal interests of the people
+
+will be regulated and provided for. With the affairs of these,
+
+the people will be more familiarly and minutely conversant. And
+
+with the members of these, will a greater proportion of the
+
+people have the ties of personal acquaintance and friendship, and
+
+of family and party attachments; on the side of these,
+
+therefore, the popular bias may well be expected most strongly to
+
+incline. Experience speaks the same language in this case. The
+
+federal administration, though hitherto very defective in
+
+comparison with what may be hoped under a better system, had,
+
+during the war, and particularly whilst the independent fund of
+
+paper emissions was in credit, an activity and importance as
+
+great as it can well have in any future circumstances whatever.
+
+It was engaged, too, in a course of measures which had for their
+
+object the protection of everything that was dear, and the
+
+acquisition of everything that could be desirable to the people
+
+at large. It was, nevertheless, invariably found, after the
+
+transient enthusiasm for the early Congresses was over, that the
+
+attention and attachment of the people were turned anew to their
+
+own particular governments; that the federal council was at no
+
+time the idol of popular favor; and that opposition to proposed
+
+enlargements of its powers and importance was the side usually
+
+taken by the men who wished to build their political consequence
+
+on the prepossessions of their fellow-citizens. If, therefore,
+
+as has been elsewhere remarked, the people should in future
+
+become more partial to the federal than to the State governments,
+
+the change can only result from such manifest and irresistible
+
+proofs of a better administration, as will overcome all their
+
+antecedent propensities. And in that case, the people ought not
+
+surely to be precluded from giving most of their confidence where
+
+they may discover it to be most due; but even in that case the
+
+State governments could have little to apprehend, because it is
+
+only within a certain sphere that the federal power can, in the
+
+nature of things, be advantageously administered. The remaining
+
+points on which I propose to compare the federal and State
+
+governments, are the disposition and the faculty they may
+
+respectively possess, to resist and frustrate the measures of
+
+each other. It has been already proved that the members of the
+
+federal will be more dependent on the members of the State
+
+governments, than the latter will be on the former. It has
+
+appeared also, that the prepossessions of the people, on whom
+
+both will depend, will be more on the side of the State
+
+governments, than of the federal government. So far as the
+
+disposition of each towards the other may be influenced by these
+
+causes, the State governments must clearly have the advantage.
+
+But in a distinct and very important point of view, the advantage
+
+will lie on the same side. The prepossessions, which the members
+
+themselves will carry into the federal government, will generally
+
+be favorable to the States; whilst it will rarely happen, that
+
+the members of the State governments will carry into the public
+
+councils a bias in favor of the general government. A local
+
+spirit will infallibly prevail much more in the members of
+
+Congress, than a national spirit will prevail in the legislatures
+
+of the particular States. Every one knows that a great proportion
+
+of the errors committed by the State legislatures proceeds from
+
+the disposition of the members to sacrifice the comprehensive and
+
+permanent interest of the State, to the particular and separate
+
+views of the counties or districts in which they reside. And if
+
+they do not sufficiently enlarge their policy to embrace the
+
+collective welfare of their particular State, how can it be
+
+imagined that they will make the aggregate prosperity of the
+
+Union, and the dignity and respectability of its government, the
+
+objects of their affections and consultations? For the same
+
+reason that the members of the State legislatures will be
+
+unlikely to attach themselves sufficiently to national objects,
+
+the members of the federal legislature will be likely to attach
+
+themselves too much to local objects. The States will be to the
+
+latter what counties and towns are to the former. Measures will
+
+too often be decided according to their probable effect, not on
+
+the national prosperity and happiness, but on the prejudices,
+
+interests, and pursuits of the governments and people of the
+
+individual States. What is the spirit that has in general
+
+characterized the proceedings of Congress? A perusal of their
+
+journals, as well as the candid acknowledgments of such as have
+
+had a seat in that assembly, will inform us, that the members
+
+have but too frequently displayed the character, rather of
+
+partisans of their respective States, than of impartial guardians
+
+of a common interest; that where on one occasion improper
+
+sacrifices have been made of local considerations, to the
+
+aggrandizement of the federal government, the great interests of
+
+the nation have suffered on a hundred, from an undue attention to
+
+the local prejudices, interests, and views of the particular
+
+States. I mean not by these reflections to insinuate, that the
+
+new federal government will not embrace a more enlarged plan of
+
+policy than the existing government may have pursued; much less,
+
+that its views will be as confined as those of the State
+
+legislatures; but only that it will partake sufficiently of the
+
+spirit of both, to be disinclined to invade the rights of the
+
+individual States, or the preorgatives of their governments. The
+
+motives on the part of the State governments, to augment their
+
+prerogatives by defalcations from the federal government, will be
+
+overruled by no reciprocal predispositions in the members. Were
+
+it admitted, however, that the Federal government may feel an
+
+equal disposition with the State governments to extend its power
+
+beyond the due limits, the latter would still have the advantage
+
+in the means of defeating such encroachments. If an act of a
+
+particular State, though unfriendly to the national government,
+
+be generally popular in that State and should not too grossly
+
+violate the oaths of the State officers, it is executed
+
+immediately and, of course, by means on the spot and depending on
+
+the State alone. The opposition of the federal government, or the
+
+interposition of federal officers, would but inflame the zeal of
+
+all parties on the side of the State, and the evil could not be
+
+prevented or repaired, if at all, without the employment of means
+
+which must always be resorted to with reluctance and difficulty.
+
+On the other hand, should an unwarrantable measure of the federal
+
+government be unpopular in particular States, which would seldom
+
+fail to be the case, or even a warrantable measure be so, which
+
+may sometimes be the case, the means of opposition to it are
+
+powerful and at hand. The disquietude of the people; their
+
+repugnance and, perhaps, refusal to co-operate with the officers
+
+of the Union; the frowns of the executive magistracy of the
+
+State; the embarrassments created by legislative devices, which
+
+would often be added on such occasions, would oppose, in any
+
+State, difficulties not to be despised; would form, in a large
+
+State, very serious impediments; and where the sentiments of
+
+several adjoining States happened to be in unison, would present
+
+obstructions which the federal government would hardly be willing
+
+to encounter. But ambitious encroachments of the federal
+
+government, on the authority of the State governments, would not
+
+excite the opposition of a single State, or of a few States
+
+only. They would be signals of general alarm. Every government
+
+would espouse the common cause. A correspondence would be
+
+opened. Plans of resistance would be concerted. One spirit would
+
+animate and conduct the whole. The same combinations, in short,
+
+would result from an apprehension of the federal, as was produced
+
+by the dread of a foreign, yoke; and unless the projected
+
+innovations should be voluntarily renounced, the same appeal to
+
+a trial of force would be made in the one case as was made in the
+
+other. But what degree of madness could ever drive the federal
+
+government to such an extremity. In the contest with Great
+
+Britain, one part of the empire was employed against the other.
+
+The more numerous part invaded the rights of the less numerous
+
+part. The attempt was unjust and unwise; but it was not in
+
+speculation absolutely chimerical. But what would be the contest
+
+in the case we are supposing? Who would be the parties? A few
+
+representatives of the people would be opposed to the people
+
+themselves; or rather one set of representatives would be
+
+contending against thirteen sets of representatives, with the
+
+whole body of their common constituents on the side of the
+
+latter. The only refuge left for those who prophesy the downfall
+
+of the State governments is the visionary supposition that the
+
+federal government may previously accumulate a military force for
+
+the projects of ambition. The reasonings contained in these
+
+papers must have been employed to little purpose indeed, if it
+
+could be necessary now to disprove the reality of this danger.
+
+That the people and the States should, for a sufficient period of
+
+time, elect an uninterrupted succession of men ready to betray
+
+both; that the traitors should, throughout this period,
+
+uniformly and systematically pursue some fixed plan for the
+
+extension of the military establishment; that the governments
+
+and the people of the States should silently and patiently behold
+
+the gathering storm, and continue to supply the materials, until
+
+it should be prepared to burst on their own heads, must appear to
+
+every one more like the incoherent dreams of a delirious
+
+jealousy, or the misjudged exaggerations of a counterfeit zeal,
+
+than like the sober apprehensions of genuine patriotism.
+
+Extravagant as the supposition is, let it however be made. Let a
+
+regular army, fully equal to the resources of the country, be
+
+formed; and let it be entirely at the devotion of the federal
+
+government; still it would not be going too far to say, that the
+
+State governments, with the people on their side, would be able
+
+to repel the danger. The highest number to which, according to
+
+the best computation, a standing army can be carried in any
+
+country, does not exceed one hundredth part of the whole number
+
+of souls; or one twenty-fifth part of the number able to bear
+
+arms. This proportion would not yield, in the United States, an
+
+army of more than twenty-five or thirty thousand men. To these
+
+would be opposed a militia amounting to near half a million of
+
+citizens with arms in their hands, officered by men chosen from
+
+among themselves, fighting for their common liberties, and united
+
+and conducted by governments possessing their affections and
+
+confidence. It may well be doubted, whether a militia thus
+
+circumstanced could ever be conquered by such a proportion of
+
+regular troops. Those who are best acquainted with the last
+
+successful resistance of this country against the British arms,
+
+will be most inclined to deny the possibility of it. Besides the
+
+advantage of being armed, which the Americans possess over the
+
+people of almost every other nation, the existence of
+
+subordinate governments, to which the people are attached, and by
+
+which the militia officers are appointed, forms a barrier against
+
+the enterprises of ambition, more insurmountable than any which a
+
+simple government of any form can admit of. Notwithstanding the
+
+military establishments in the several kingdoms of Europe, which
+
+are carried as far as the public resources will bear, the
+
+governments are afraid to trust the people with arms. And it is
+
+not certain, that with this aid alone they would not be able to
+
+shake off their yokes. But were the people to possess the
+
+additional advantages of local governments chosen by themselves,
+
+who could collect the national will and direct the national
+
+force, and of officers appointed out of the militia, by these
+
+governments, and attached both to them and to the militia, it may
+
+be affirmed with the greatest assurance, that the throne of every
+
+tyranny in Europe would be speedily overturned in spite of the
+
+legions which surround it. Let us not insult the free and gallant
+
+citizens of America with the suspicion, that they would be less
+
+able to defend the rights of which they would be in actual
+
+possession, than the debased subjects of arbitrary power would be
+
+to rescue theirs from the hands of their oppressors. Let us
+
+rather no longer insult them with the supposition that they can
+
+ever reduce themselves to the necessity of making the experiment,
+
+by a blind and tame submission to the long train of insidious
+
+measures which must precede and produce it. The argument under
+
+the present head may be put into a very concise form, which
+
+appears altogether conclusive. Either the mode in which the
+
+federal government is to be constructed will render it
+
+sufficiently dependent on the people, or it will not. On the
+
+first supposition, it will be restrained by that dependence from
+
+forming schemes obnoxious to their constituents. On the other
+
+supposition, it will not possess the confidence of the people,
+
+and its schemes of usurpation will be easily defeated by the
+
+State governments, who will be supported by the people. On
+
+summing up the considerations stated in this and the last paper,
+
+they seem to amount to the most convincing evidence, that the
+
+powers proposed to be lodged in the federal government are as
+
+little formidable to those reserved to the individual States, as
+
+they are indispensably necessary to accomplish the purposes of
+
+the Union; and that all those alarms which have been sounded, of
+
+a meditated and consequential annihilation of the State
+
+governments, must, on the most favorable interpretation, be
+
+ascribed to the chimerical fears of the authors of them. PUBLIUS.
+
+
+
+
+
+FEDERALIST No. 47
+
+
+
+The Particular Structure of the New Government and the
+
+Distribution of Power Among Its Different Parts
+
+From the New York Packet. Friday, February 1, 1788.
+
+
+
+MADISON
+
+
+
+To the People of the State of New York:
+
+HAVING reviewed the general form of the proposed government and
+
+the general mass of power allotted to it, I proceed to examine
+
+the particular structure of this government, and the distribution
+
+of this mass of power among its constituent parts. One of the
+
+principal objections inculcated by the more respectable
+
+adversaries to the Constitution, is its supposed violation of the
+
+political maxim, that the legislative, executive, and judiciary
+
+departments ought to be separate and distinct. In the structure
+
+of the federal government, no regard, it is said, seems to have
+
+been paid to this essential precaution in favor of liberty. The
+
+several departments of power are distributed and blended in such
+
+a manner as at once to destroy all symmetry and beauty of form,
+
+and to expose some of the essential parts of the edifice to the
+
+danger of being crushed by the disproportionate weight of other
+
+parts. No political truth is certainly of greater intrinsic
+
+value, or is stamped with the authority of more enlightened
+
+patrons of liberty, than that on which the objection is founded.
+
+The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and
+
+judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and
+
+whether hereditary, selfappointed, or elective, may justly be
+
+pronounced the very definition of tyranny. Were the federal
+
+Constitution, therefore, really chargeable with the accumulation
+
+of power, or with a mixture of powers, having a dangerous
+
+tendency to such an accumulation, no further arguments would be
+
+necessary to inspire a universal reprobation of the system. I
+
+persuade myself, however, that it will be made apparent to every
+
+one, that the charge cannot be supported, and that the maxim on
+
+which it relies has been totally misconceived and misapplied. In
+
+order to form correct ideas on this important subject, it will be
+
+proper to investigate the sense in which the preservation of
+
+liberty requires that the three great departments of power should
+
+be separate and distinct. The oracle who is always consulted and
+
+cited on this subject is the celebrated Montesquieu. If he be not
+
+the author of this invaluable precept in the science of politics,
+
+he has the merit at least of displaying and recommending it most
+
+effectually to the attention of mankind. Let us endeavor, in the
+
+first place, to ascertain his meaning on this point. The British
+
+Constitution was to Montesquieu what Homer has been to the
+
+didactic writers on epic poetry. As the latter have considered
+
+the work of the immortal bard as the perfect model from which the
+
+principles and rules of the epic art were to be drawn, and by
+
+which all similar works were to be judged, so this great
+
+political critic appears to have viewed the Constitution of
+
+England as the standard, or to use his own expression, as the
+
+mirror of political liberty; and to have delivered, in the form
+
+of elementary truths, the several characteristic principles of
+
+that particular system. That we may be sure, then, not to mistake
+
+his meaning in this case, let us recur to the source from which
+
+the maxim was drawn.
+                        On the slightest view of the British
+
+Constitution, we must perceive that the legislative, executive,
+
+and judiciary departments are by no means totally separate and
+
+distinct from each other. The executive magistrate forms an
+
+integral part of the legislative authority. He alone has the
+
+prerogative of making treaties with foreign sovereigns, which,
+
+when made, have, under certain limitations, the force of
+
+legislative acts. All the members of the judiciary department are
+
+appointed by him, can be removed by him on the address of the two
+
+Houses of Parliament, and form, when he pleases to consult them,
+
+one of his constitutional councils. One branch of the legislative
+
+department forms also a great constitutional council to the
+
+executive chief, as, on another hand, it is the sole depositary
+
+of judicial power in cases of impeachment, and is invested with
+
+the supreme appellate jurisdiction in all other cases. The
+
+judges, again, are so far connected with the legislative
+
+department as often to attend and participate in its
+
+deliberations, though not admitted to a legislative vote. From
+
+these facts, by which Montesquieu was guided, it may clearly be
+
+inferred that, in saying "There can be no liberty where the
+
+legislative and executive powers are united in the same person,
+
+or body of magistrates," or, "if the power of judging be not
+
+separated from the legislative and executive powers," he did not
+
+mean that these departments ought to have no PARTIAL AGENCY in,
+
+or no CONTROL over, the acts of each other. His meaning, as his
+
+own words import, and still more conclusively as illustrated by
+
+the example in his eye, can amount to no more than this, that
+
+where the WHOLE power of one department is exercised by the same
+
+hands which possess the WHOLE power of another department, the
+
+fundamental principles of a free constitution are subverted. This
+
+would have been the case in the constitution examined by him, if
+
+the king, who is the sole executive magistrate, had possessed
+
+also the complete legislative power, or the supreme
+
+administration of justice; or if the entire legislative body had
+
+possessed the supreme judiciary, or the supreme executive
+
+authority. This, however, is not among the vices of that
+
+constitution. The magistrate in whom the whole executive power
+
+resides cannot of himself make a law, though he can put a
+
+negative on every law; nor administer justice in person, though
+
+he has the appointment of those who do administer it. The judges
+
+can exercise no executive prerogative, though they are shoots
+
+from the executive stock; nor any legislative function, though
+
+they may be advised with by the legislative councils. The entire
+
+legislature can perform no judiciary act, though by the joint act
+
+of two of its branches the judges may be removed from their
+
+offices, and though one of its branches is possessed of the
+
+judicial power in the last resort. The entire legislature, again,
+
+can exercise no executive prerogative, though one of its branches
+
+constitutes the supreme executive magistracy, and another, on the
+
+impeachment of a third, can try and condemn all the subordinate
+
+officers in the executive department. The reasons on which
+
+Montesquieu grounds his maxim are a further demonstration of his
+
+meaning. "When the legislative and executive powers are united
+
+in the same person or body," says he, "there can be no liberty,
+
+because apprehensions may arise lest THE SAME monarch or senate
+
+should ENACT tyrannical laws to EXECUTE them in a tyrannical
+
+manner. " Again: "Were the power of judging joined with the
+
+legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be exposed
+
+to arbitrary control, for THE JUDGE would then be THE LEGISLATOR.
+
+Were it joined to the executive power, THE JUDGE might behave
+
+with all the violence of AN OPPRESSOR. " Some of these reasons
+
+are more fully explained in other passages; but briefly stated as
+
+they are here, they sufficiently establish the meaning which we
+
+have put on this celebrated maxim of this celebrated author.
+
+
+If we look into the constitutions of the several States, we find
+
+that, notwithstanding the emphatical and, in some instances, the
+
+unqualified terms in which this axiom has been laid down, there
+
+is not a single instance in which the several departments of
+
+power have been kept absolutely separate and distinct. New
+
+Hampshire, whose constitution was the last formed, seems to have
+
+been fully aware of the impossibility and inexpediency of
+
+avoiding any mixture whatever of these departments, and has
+
+qualified the doctrine by declaring "that the legislative,
+
+executive, and judiciary powers ought to be kept as separate
+
+from, and independent of, each other AS THE NATURE OF A FREE
+
+GOVERNMENT WILL ADMIT; OR AS IS CONSISTENT WITH THAT CHAIN OF
+
+CONNECTION THAT BINDS THE WHOLE FABRIC OF THE CONSTITUTION IN ONE
+
+INDISSOLUBLE BOND OF UNITY AND AMITY. " Her constitution
+
+accordingly mixes these departments in several respects. The
+
+Senate, which is a branch of the legislative department, is also
+
+a judicial tribunal for the trial of impeachments. The
+
+President, who is the head of the executive department, is the
+
+presiding member also of the Senate; and, besides an equal vote
+
+in all cases, has a casting vote in case of a tie. The executive
+
+head is himself eventually elective every year by the
+
+legislative department, and his council is every year chosen by
+
+and from the members of the same department. Several of the
+
+officers of state are also appointed by the legislature. And the
+
+members of the judiciary department are appointed by the
+
+executive department. The constitution of Massachusetts has
+
+observed a sufficient though less pointed caution, in expressing
+
+this fundamental article of liberty. It declares "that the
+
+legislative department shall never exercise the executive and
+
+judicial powers, or either of them; the executive shall never
+
+exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them;
+
+the judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive
+
+powers, or either of them. " This declaration corresponds
+
+precisely with the doctrine of Montesquieu, as it has been
+
+explained, and is not in a single point violated by the plan of
+
+the convention. It goes no farther than to prohibit any one of
+
+the entire departments from exercising the powers of another
+
+department. In the very Constitution to which it is prefixed, a
+
+partial mixture of powers has been admitted. The executive
+
+magistrate has a qualified negative on the legislative body, and
+
+the Senate, which is a part of the legislature, is a court of
+
+impeachment for members both of the executive and judiciary
+
+departments. The members of the judiciary department, again, are
+
+appointable by the executive department, and removable by the
+
+same authority on the address of the two legislative branches.
+
+Lastly, a number of the officers of government are annually
+
+appointed by the legislative department. As the appointment to
+
+offices, particularly executive offices, is in its nature an
+
+executive function, the compilers of the Constitution have, in
+
+this last point at least, violated the rule established by
+
+themselves. I pass over the constitutions of Rhode Island and
+
+Connecticut, because they were formed prior to the Revolution,
+
+and even before the principle under examination had become an
+
+object of political attention. The constitution of New York
+
+contains no declaration on this subject; but appears very
+
+clearly to have been framed with an eye to the danger of
+
+improperly blending the different departments. It gives,
+
+nevertheless, to the executive magistrate, a partial control over
+
+the legislative department; and, what is more, gives a like
+
+control to the judiciary department; and even blends the
+
+executive and judiciary departments in the exercise of this
+
+control. In its council of appointment members of the
+
+legislative are associated with the executive authority, in the
+
+appointment of officers, both executive and judiciary. And its
+
+court for the trial of impeachments and correction of errors is
+
+to consist of one branch of the legislature and the principal
+
+members of the judiciary department. The constitution of New
+
+Jersey has blended the different powers of government more than
+
+any of the preceding. The governor, who is the executive
+
+magistrate, is appointed by the legislature; is chancellor and
+
+ordinary, or surrogate of the State; is a member of the Supreme
+
+Court of Appeals, and president, with a casting vote, of one of
+
+the legislative branches. The same legislative branch acts again
+
+as executive council of the governor, and with him constitutes
+
+the Court of Appeals. The members of the judiciary department are
+
+appointed by the legislative department and removable by one
+
+branch of it, on the impeachment of the other. According to the
+
+constitution of Pennsylvania, the president, who is the head of
+
+the executive department, is annually elected by a vote in which
+
+the legislative department predominates. In conjunction with an
+
+executive council, he appoints the members of the judiciary
+
+department, and forms a court of impeachment for trial of all
+
+officers, judiciary as well as executive. The judges of the
+
+Supreme Court and justices of the peace seem also to be removable
+
+by the legislature; and the executive power of pardoning in
+
+certain cases, to be referred to the same department. The members
+
+of the executive council are made EX-OFFICIO justices of peace
+
+throughout the State. In Delaware, the chief executive magistrate
+
+is annually elected by the legislative department. The speakers
+
+of the two legislative branches are vice-presidents in the
+
+executive department. The executive chief, with six others,
+
+appointed, three by each of the legislative branches constitutes
+
+the Supreme Court of Appeals; he is joined with the legislative
+
+department in the appointment of the other judges. Throughout the
+
+States, it appears that the members of the legislature may at the
+
+same time be justices of the peace; in this State, the members of
+
+one branch of it are EX-OFFICIO justices of the peace; as are
+
+also the members of the executive council. The principal officers
+
+of the executive department are appointed by the legislative; and
+
+one branch of the latter forms a court of impeachments. All
+
+officers may be removed on address of the legislature. Maryland
+
+has adopted the maxim in the most unqualified terms; declaring
+
+that the legislative, executive, and judicial powers of
+
+government ought to be forever separate and distinct from each
+
+other. Her constitution, notwithstanding, makes the executive
+
+magistrate appointable by the legislative department; and the
+
+members of the judiciary by the executive department. The
+
+language of Virginia is still more pointed on this subject. Her
+
+constitution declares, "that the legislative, executive, and
+
+judiciary departments shall be separate and distinct; so that
+
+neither exercise the powers properly belonging to the other; nor
+
+shall any person exercise the powers of more than one of them at
+
+the same time, except that the justices of county courts shall be
+
+eligible to either House of Assembly. " Yet we find not only
+
+this express exception, with respect to the members of the
+
+inferior courts, but that the chief magistrate, with his
+
+executive council, are appointable by the legislature; that two
+
+members of the latter are triennially displaced at the pleasure
+
+of the legislature; and that all the principal offices, both
+
+executive and judiciary, are filled by the same department. The
+
+executive prerogative of pardon, also, is in one case vested in
+
+the legislative department. The constitution of North Carolina,
+
+which declares "that the legislative, executive, and supreme
+
+judicial powers of government ought to be forever separate and
+
+distinct from each other," refers, at the same time, to the
+
+legislative department, the appointment not only of the executive
+
+chief, but all the principal officers within both that and the
+
+judiciary department. In South Carolina, the constitution makes
+
+the executive magistracy eligible by the legislative department.
+
+It gives to the latter, also, the appointment of the members of
+
+the judiciary department, including even justices of the peace
+
+and sheriffs; and the appointment of officers in the executive
+
+department, down to captains in the army and navy of the State.
+
+In the constitution of Georgia, where it is declared "that the
+
+legislative, executive, and judiciary departments shall be
+
+separate and distinct, so that neither exercise the powers
+
+properly belonging to the other," we find that the executive
+
+department is to be filled by appointments of the legislature;
+
+and the executive prerogative of pardon to be finally exercised
+
+by the same authority. Even justices of the peace are to be
+
+appointed by the legislature. In citing these cases, in which
+
+the legislative, executive, and judiciary departments have not
+
+been kept totally separate and distinct, I wish not to be
+
+regarded as an advocate for the particular organizations of the
+
+several State governments. I am fully aware that among the many
+
+excellent principles which they exemplify, they carry strong
+
+marks of the haste, and still stronger of the inexperience, under
+
+which they were framed. It is but too obvious that in some
+
+instances the fundamental principle under consideration has been
+
+violated by too great a mixture, and even an actual
+
+consolidation, of the different powers; and that in no instance
+
+has a competent provision been made for maintaining in practice
+
+the separation delineated on paper. What I have wished to evince
+
+is, that the charge brought against the proposed Constitution, of
+
+violating the sacred maxim of free government, is warranted
+
+neither by the real meaning annexed to that maxim by its author,
+
+nor by the sense in which it has hitherto been understood in
+
+America. This interesting subject will be resumed in the ensuing
+
+paper. PUBLIUS.
+
+
+
+
+
+FEDERALIST No. 48
+
+
+
+These Departments Should Not Be So Far Separated as to Have No
+
+Constitutional Control Over Each Other
+
+From the New York Packet. Friday, February 1, 1788.
+
+
+
+MADISON
+
+
+
+To the People of the State of New York:
+
+IT WAS shown in the last paper that the political apothegm there
+
+examined does not require that the legislative, executive, and
+
+judiciary departments should be wholly unconnected with each
+
+other. I shall undertake, in the next place, to show that unless
+
+these departments be so far connected and blended as to give to
+
+each a constitutional control over the others, the degree of
+
+separation which the maxim requires, as essential to a free
+
+government, can never in practice be duly maintained. It is
+
+agreed on all sides, that the powers properly belonging to one of
+
+the departments ought not to be directly and completely
+
+administered by either of the other departments. It is equally
+
+evident, that none of them ought to possess, directly or
+
+indirectly, an overruling influence over the others, in the
+
+administration of their respective powers. It will not be denied,
+
+that power is of an encroaching nature, and that it ought to be
+
+effectually restrained from passing the limits assigned to it.
+
+After discriminating, therefore, in theory, the several classes
+
+of power, as they may in their nature be legislative, executive,
+
+or judiciary, the next and most difficult task is to provide some
+
+practical security for each, against the invasion of the others.
+
+What this security ought to be, is the great problem to be
+
+solved. Will it be sufficient to mark, with precision, the
+
+boundaries of these departments, in the constitution of the
+
+government, and to trust to these parchment barriers against the
+
+encroaching spirit of power? This is the security which appears
+
+to have been principally relied on by the compilers of most of
+
+the American constitutions. But experience assures us, that the
+
+efficacy of the provision has been greatly overrated; and that
+
+some more adequate defense is indispensably necessary for the
+
+more feeble, against the more powerful, members of the
+
+government. The legislative department is everywhere extending
+
+the sphere of its activity, and drawing all power into its
+
+impetuous vortex. The founders of our republics have so much
+
+merit for the wisdom which they have displayed, that no task can
+
+be less pleasing than that of pointing out the errors into which
+
+they have fallen. A respect for truth, however, obliges us to
+
+remark, that they seem never for a moment to have turned their
+
+eyes from the danger to liberty from the overgrown and
+
+all-grasping prerogative of an hereditary magistrate, supported
+
+and fortified by an hereditary branch of the legislative
+
+authority. They seem never to have recollected the danger from
+
+legislative usurpations, which, by assembling all power in the
+
+same hands, must lead to the same tyranny as is threatened by
+
+executive usurpations. In a government where numerous and
+
+extensive prerogatives are placed in the hands of an hereditary
+
+monarch, the executive department is very justly regarded as the
+
+source of danger, and watched with all the jealousy which a zeal
+
+for liberty ought to inspire. In a democracy, where a multitude
+
+of people exercise in person the legislative functions, and are
+
+continually exposed, by their incapacity for regular deliberation
+
+and concerted measures, to the ambitious intrigues of their
+
+executive magistrates, tyranny may well be apprehended, on some
+
+favorable emergency, to start up in the same quarter. But in a
+
+representative republic, where the executive magistracy is
+
+carefully limited; both in the extent and the duration of its
+
+power; and where the legislative power is exercised by an
+
+assembly, which is inspired, by a supposed influence over the
+
+people, with an intrepid confidence in its own strength; which is
+
+sufficiently numerous to feel all the passions which actuate a
+
+multitude, yet not so numerous as to be incapable of pursuing the
+
+objects of its passions, by means which reason prescribes; it is
+
+against the enterprising ambition of this department that the
+
+people ought to indulge all their jealousy and exhaust all their
+
+precautions. The legislative department derives a superiority in
+
+our governments from other circumstances. Its constitutional
+
+powers being at once more extensive, and less susceptible of
+
+precise limits, it can, with the greater facility, mask, under
+
+complicated and indirect measures, the encroachments which it
+
+makes on the co-ordinate departments. It is not unfrequently a
+
+question of real nicety in legislative bodies, whether the
+
+operation of a particular measure will, or will not, extend
+
+beyond the legislative sphere. On the other side, the executive
+
+power being restrained within a narrower compass, and being more
+
+simple in its nature, and the judiciary being described by
+
+landmarks still less uncertain, projects of usurpation by either
+
+of these departments would immediately betray and defeat
+
+themselves. Nor is this all: as the legislative department alone
+
+has access to the pockets of the people, and has in some
+
+constitutions full discretion, and in all a prevailing influence,
+
+over the pecuniary rewards of those who fill the other
+
+departments, a dependence is thus created in the latter, which
+
+gives still greater facility to encroachments of the former. I
+
+have appealed to our own experience for the truth of what I
+
+advance on this subject. Were it necessary to verify this
+
+experience by particular proofs, they might be multiplied
+
+without end. I might find a witness in every citizen who has
+
+shared in, or been attentive to, the course of public
+
+administrations. I might collect vouchers in abundance from the
+
+records and archives of every State in the Union. But as a more
+
+concise, and at the same time equally satisfactory, evidence, I
+
+will refer to the example of two States, attested by two
+
+unexceptionable authorities. The first example is that of
+
+Virginia, a State which, as we have seen, has expressly declared
+
+in its constitution, that the three great departments ought not
+
+to be intermixed. The authority in support of it is Mr.
+
+Jefferson, who, besides his other advantages for remarking the
+
+operation of the government, was himself the chief magistrate of
+
+it. In order to convey fully the ideas with which his experience
+
+had impressed him on this subject, it will be necessary to quote
+
+a passage of some length from his very interesting "Notes on the
+
+State of Virginia," p. 195. "All the powers of government,
+
+legislative, executive, and judiciary, result to the legislative
+
+body. The concentrating these in the same hands, is precisely the
+
+definition of despotic government. It will be no alleviation,
+
+that these powers will be exercised by a plurality of hands, and
+
+not by a single one. One hundred and seventy-three despots would
+
+surely be as oppressive as one. Let those who doubt it, turn
+
+their eyes on the republic of Venice. As little will it avail us,
+
+that they are chosen by ourselves. An ELECTIVE DESPOTISM was not
+
+the government we fought for; but one which should not only be
+
+founded on free principles, but in which the powers of government
+
+should be so divided and balanced among several bodies of
+
+magistracy, as that no one could transcend their legal limits,
+
+without being effectually checked and restrained by the others.
+
+For this reason, that convention which passed the ordinance of
+
+government, laid its foundation on this basis, that the
+
+legislative, executive, and judiciary departments should be
+
+separate and distinct, so that no person should exercise the
+
+powers of more than one of them at the same time. BUT NO BARRIER
+
+WAS PROVIDED BETWEEN THESE SEVERAL POWERS. The judiciary and the
+
+executive members were left dependent on the legislative for
+
+their subsistence in office, and some of them for their
+
+continuance in it. If, therefore, the legislature assumes
+
+executive and judiciary powers, no opposition is likely to be
+
+made; nor, if made, can be effectual; because in that case they
+
+may put their proceedings into the form of acts of Assembly,
+
+which will render them obligatory on the other branches. They
+
+have accordingly, IN MANY instances, DECIDED RIGHTS which should
+
+have been left to JUDICIARY CONTROVERSY, and THE DIRECTION OF THE
+
+EXECUTIVE, DURING THE WHOLE TIME OF THEIR SESSION, IS BECOMING
+
+HABITUAL AND FAMILIAR. "The other State which I shall take for
+
+an example is Pennsylvania; and the other authority, the Council
+
+of Censors, which assembled in the years 1783 and 1784. A part of
+
+the duty of this body, as marked out by the constitution, was
+
+"to inquire whether the constitution had been preserved
+
+inviolate in every part; and whether the legislative and
+
+executive branches of government had performed their duty as
+
+guardians of the people, or assumed to themselves, or exercised,
+
+other or greater powers than they are entitled to by the
+
+constitution. " In the execution of this trust, the council were
+
+necessarily led to a comparison of both the legislative and
+
+executive proceedings, with the constitutional powers of these
+
+departments; and from the facts enumerated, and to the truth of
+
+most of which both sides in the council subscribed, it appears
+
+that the constitution had been flagrantly violated by the
+
+legislature in a variety of important instances. A great number
+
+of laws had been passed, violating, without any apparent
+
+necessity, the rule requiring that all bills of a public nature
+
+shall be previously printed for the consideration of the people;
+
+although this is one of the precautions chiefly relied on by the
+
+constitution against improper acts of legislature. The
+
+constitutional trial by jury had been violated, and powers
+
+assumed which had not been delegated by the constitution.
+
+Executive powers had been usurped. The salaries of the judges,
+
+which the constitution expressly requires to be fixed, had been
+
+occasionally varied; and cases belonging to the judiciary
+
+department frequently drawn within legislative cognizance and
+
+determination. Those who wish to see the several particulars
+
+falling under each of these heads, may consult the journals of
+
+the council, which are in print. Some of them, it will be found,
+
+may be imputable to peculiar circumstances connected with the
+
+war; but the greater part of them may be considered as the
+
+spontaneous shoots of an ill-constituted government. It appears,
+
+also, that the executive department had not been innocent of
+
+frequent breaches of the constitution. There are three
+
+observations, however, which ought to be made on this head:
+
+FIRST, a great proportion of the instances were either
+
+immediately produced by the necessities of the war, or
+
+recommended by Congress or the commander-in-chief; SECONDLY, in
+
+most of the other instances, they conformed either to the
+
+declared or the known sentiments of the legislative department;
+
+THIRDLY, the executive department of Pennsylvania is
+
+distinguished from that of the other States by the number of
+
+members composing it. In this respect, it has as much affinity
+
+to a legislative assembly as to an executive council. And being
+
+at once exempt from the restraint of an individual responsibility
+
+for the acts of the body, and deriving confidence from mutual
+
+example and joint influence, unauthorized measures would, of
+
+course, be more freely hazarded, than where the executive
+
+department is administered by a single hand, or by a few hands.
+
+The conclusion which I am warranted in drawing from these
+
+observations is, that a mere demarcation on parchment of the
+
+constitutional limits of the several departments, is not a
+
+sufficient guard against those encroachments which lead to a
+
+tyrannical concentration of all the powers of government in the
+
+same hands. PUBLIUS.
+
+
+
+
+
+FEDERALIST No. 49
+
+
+
+Method of Guarding Against the Encroachments of Any One
+
+Department of Government by Appealing to the People Through a
+
+Convention
+
+From the New York Packet. Tuesday, February 5, 1788.
+
+
+
+HAMILTON OR MADISON
+
+
+
+To the People of the State of New York:
+
+THE author of the "Notes on the State of Virginia," quoted in
+
+the last paper, has subjoined to that valuable work the draught
+
+of a constitution, which had been prepared in order to be laid
+
+before a convention, expected to be called in 1783, by the
+
+legislature, for the establishment of a constitution for that
+
+commonwealth. The plan, like every thing from the same pen, marks
+
+a turn of thinking, original, comprehensive, and accurate; and is
+
+the more worthy of attention as it equally displays a fervent
+
+attachment to republican government and an enlightened view of
+
+the dangerous propensities against which it ought to be guarded.
+
+One of the precautions which he proposes, and on which he appears
+
+ultimately to rely as a palladium to the weaker departments of
+
+power against the invasions of the stronger, is perhaps
+
+altogether his own, and as it immediately relates to the subject
+
+of our present inquiry, ought not to be overlooked. His
+
+proposition is, "that whenever any two of the three branches of
+
+government shall concur in opinion, each by the voices of two
+
+thirds of their whole number, that a convention is necessary for
+
+altering the constitution, or CORRECTING BREACHES OF IT, a
+
+convention shall be called for the purpose. "As the people are
+
+the only legitimate fountain of power, and it is from them that
+
+the constitutional charter, under which the several branches of
+
+government hold their power, is derived, it seems strictly
+
+consonant to the republican theory, to recur to the same original
+
+authority, not only whenever it may be necessary to enlarge,
+
+diminish, or new-model the powers of the government, but also
+
+whenever any one of the departments may commit encroachments on
+
+the chartered authorities of the others. The several departments
+
+being perfectly co-ordinate by the terms of their common
+
+commission, none of them, it is evident, can pretend to an
+
+exclusive or superior right of settling the boundaries between
+
+their respective powers; and how are the encroachments of the
+
+stronger to be prevented, or the wrongs of the weaker to be
+
+redressed, without an appeal to the people themselves, who, as
+
+the grantors of the commissions, can alone declare its true
+
+meaning, and enforce its observance? There is certainly great
+
+force in this reasoning, and it must be allowed to prove that a
+
+constitutional road to the decision of the people ought to be
+
+marked out and kept open, for certain great and extraordinary
+
+occasions. But there appear to be insuperable objections against
+
+the proposed recurrence to the people, as a provision in all
+
+cases for keeping the several departments of power within their
+
+constitutional limits. In the first place, the provision does not
+
+reach the case of a combination of two of the departments against
+
+the third. If the legislative authority, which possesses so many
+
+means of operating on the motives of the other departments,
+
+should be able to gain to its interest either of the others, or
+
+even one third of its members, the remaining department could
+
+derive no advantage from its remedial provision. I do not dwell,
+
+however, on this objection, because it may be thought to be
+
+rather against the modification of the principle, than against
+
+the principle itself. In the next place, it may be considered as
+
+an objection inherent in the principle, that as every appeal to
+
+the people would carry an implication of some defect in the
+
+government, frequent appeals would, in a great measure, deprive
+
+the government of that veneration which time bestows on every
+
+thing, and without which perhaps the wisest and freest
+
+governments would not possess the requisite stability. If it be
+
+true that all governments rest on opinion, it is no less true
+
+that the strength of opinion in each individual, and its
+
+practical influence on his conduct, depend much on the number
+
+which he supposes to have entertained the same opinion. The
+
+reason of man, like man himself, is timid and cautious when left
+
+alone, and acquires firmness and confidence in proportion to the
+
+number with which it is associated. When the examples which
+
+fortify opinion are ANCIENT as well as NUMEROUS, they are known
+
+to have a double effect. In a nation of philosophers, this
+
+consideration ought to be disregarded. A reverence for the laws
+
+would be sufficiently inculcated by the voice of an enlightened
+
+reason. But a nation of philosophers is as little to be expected
+
+as the philosophical race of kings wished for by Plato. And in
+
+every other nation, the most rational government will not find it
+
+a superfluous advantage to have the prejudices of the community
+
+on its side. The danger of disturbing the public tranquillity by
+
+interesting too strongly the public passions, is a still more
+
+serious objection against a frequent reference of constitutional
+
+questions to the decision of the whole society. Notwithstanding
+
+the success which has attended the revisions of our established
+
+forms of government, and which does so much honor to the virtue
+
+and intelligence of the people of America, it must be confessed
+
+that the experiments are of too ticklish a nature to be
+
+unnecessarily multiplied. We are to recollect that all the
+
+existing constitutions were formed in the midst of a danger which
+
+repressed the passions most unfriendly to order and concord; of
+
+an enthusiastic confidence of the people in their patriotic
+
+leaders, which stifled the ordinary diversity of opinions on
+
+great national questions; of a universal ardor for new and
+
+opposite forms, produced by a universal resentment and
+
+indignation against the ancient government; and whilst no spirit
+
+of party connected with the changes to be made, or the abuses to
+
+be reformed, could mingle its leaven in the operation. The future
+
+situations in which we must expect to be usually placed, do not
+
+present any equivalent security against the danger which is
+
+apprehended. But the greatest objection of all is, that the
+
+decisions which would probably result from such appeals would not
+
+answer the purpose of maintaining the constitutional equilibrium
+
+of the government. We have seen that the tendency of republican
+
+governments is to an aggrandizement of the legislative at the
+
+expense of the other departments. The appeals to the people,
+
+therefore, would usually be made by the executive and judiciary
+
+departments. But whether made by one side or the other, would
+
+each side enjoy equal advantages on the trial? Let us view their
+
+different situations. The members of the executive and judiciary
+
+departments are few in number, and can be personally known to a
+
+small part only of the people. The latter, by the mode of their
+
+appointment, as well as by the nature and permanency of it, are
+
+too far removed from the people to share much in their
+
+prepossessions. The former are generally the objects of jealousy,
+
+and their administration is always liable to be discolored and
+
+rendered unpopular. The members of the legislative department, on
+
+the other hand, are numberous. They are distributed and dwell
+
+among the people at large. Their connections of blood, of
+
+friendship, and of acquaintance embrace a great proportion of the
+
+most influential part of the society. The nature of their public
+
+trust implies a personal influence among the people, and that
+
+they are more immediately the confidential guardians of the
+
+rights and liberties of the people. With these advantages, it can
+
+hardly be supposed that the adverse party would have an equal
+
+chance for a favorable issue. But the legislative party would not
+
+only be able to plead their cause most successfully with the
+
+people. They would probably be constituted themselves the judges.
+
+The same influence which had gained them an election into the
+
+legislature, would gain them a seat in the convention. If this
+
+should not be the case with all, it would probably be the case
+
+with many, and pretty certainly with those leading characters, on
+
+whom every thing depends in such bodies. The convention, in
+
+short, would be composed chiefly of men who had been, who
+
+actually were, or who expected to be, members of the department
+
+whose conduct was arraigned. They would consequently be parties
+
+to the very question to be decided by them. It might, however,
+
+sometimes happen, that appeals would be made under circumstances
+
+less adverse to the executive and judiciary departments. The
+
+usurpations of the legislature might be so flagrant and so
+
+sudden, as to admit of no specious coloring. A strong party
+
+among themselves might take side with the other branches. The
+
+executive power might be in the hands of a peculiar favorite of
+
+the people. In such a posture of things, the public decision
+
+might be less swayed by prepossessions in favor of the
+
+legislative party. But still it could never be expected to turn
+
+on the true merits of the question. It would inevitably be
+
+connected with the spirit of pre-existing parties, or of parties
+
+springing out of the question itself. It would be connected with
+
+persons of distinguished character and extensive influence in the
+
+community. It would be pronounced by the very men who had been
+
+agents in, or opponents of, the measures to which the decision
+
+would relate. The PASSIONS, therefore, not the REASON, of the
+
+public would sit in judgment. But it is the reason, alone, of the
+
+public, that ought to control and regulate the government. The
+
+passions ought to be controlled and regulated by the government.
+
+We found in the last paper, that mere declarations in the written
+
+constitution are not sufficient to restrain the several
+
+departments within their legal rights. It appears in this, that
+
+occasional appeals to the people would be neither a proper nor an
+
+effectual provision for that purpose. How far the provisions of a
+
+different nature contained in the plan above quoted might be
+
+adequate, I do not examine. Some of them are unquestionably
+
+founded on sound political principles, and all of them are framed
+
+with singular ingenuity and precision. PUBLIUS.
+
+
+
+
+
+FEDERALIST No. 50
+
+
+
+Periodical Appeals to the People Considered
+
+From the New York Packet. Tuesday, February 5, 1788.
+
+
+
+HAMILTON OR MADISON
+
+
+
+To the People of the State of New York:
+
+IT MAY be contended, perhaps, that instead of OCCASIONAL appeals
+
+to the people, which are liable to the objections urged against
+
+them, PERIODICAL appeals are the proper and adequate means of
+
+PREVENTING AND CORRECTING INFRACTIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION. It
+
+will be attended to, that in the examination of these expedients,
+
+I confine myself to their aptitude for ENFORCING the
+
+Constitution, by keeping the several departments of power within
+
+their due bounds, without particularly considering them as
+
+provisions for ALTERING the Constitution itself. In the first
+
+view, appeals to the people at fixed periods appear to be nearly
+
+as ineligible as appeals on particular occasions as they emerge.
+
+If the periods be separated by short intervals, the measures to
+
+be reviewed and rectified will have been of recent date, and will
+
+be connected with all the circumstances which tend to vitiate and
+
+pervert the result of occasional revisions. If the periods be
+
+distant from each other, the same remark will be applicable to
+
+all recent measures; and in proportion as the remoteness of the
+
+others may favor a dispassionate review of them, this advantage
+
+is inseparable from inconveniences which seem to counterbalance
+
+it. In the first place, a distant prospect of public censure
+
+would be a very feeble restraint on power from those excesses to
+
+which it might be urged by the force of present motives. Is it to
+
+be imagined that a legislative assembly, consisting of a hundred
+
+or two hundred members, eagerly bent on some favorite object, and
+
+breaking through the restraints of the Constitution in pursuit of
+
+it, would be arrested in their career, by considerations drawn
+
+from a censorial revision of their conduct at the future distance
+
+of ten, fifteen, or twenty years? In the next place, the abuses
+
+would often have completed their mischievous effects before the
+
+remedial provision would be applied. And in the last place, where
+
+this might not be the case, they would be of long standing, would
+
+have taken deep root, and would not easily be extirpated. The
+
+scheme of revising the constitution, in order to correct recent
+
+breaches of it, as well as for other purposes, has been actually
+
+tried in one of the States. One of the objects of the Council of
+
+Censors which met in Pennsylvania in 1783 and 1784, was, as we
+
+have seen, to inquire, "whether the constitution had been
+
+violated, and whether the legislative and executive departments
+
+had encroached upon each other. " This important and novel
+
+experiment in politics merits, in several points of view, very
+
+particular attention. In some of them it may, perhaps, as a
+
+single experiment, made under circumstances somewhat peculiar, be
+
+thought to be not absolutely conclusive. But as applied to the
+
+case under consideration, it involves some facts, which I venture
+
+to remark, as a complete and satisfactory illustration of the
+
+reasoning which I have employed. First. It appears, from the
+
+names of the gentlemen who composed the council, that some, at
+
+least, of its most active members had also been active and
+
+leading characters in the parties which pre-existed in the State.
+
+Secondly. It appears that the same active and leading members of
+
+the council had been active and influential members of the
+
+legislative and executive branches, within the period to be
+
+reviewed; and even patrons or opponents of the very measures to
+
+be thus brought to the test of the constitution. Two of the
+
+members had been vice-presidents of the State, and several other
+
+members of the executive council, within the seven preceding
+
+years. One of them had been speaker, and a number of others
+
+distinguished members, of the legislative assembly within the
+
+same period. Thirdly. Every page of their proceedings witnesses
+
+the effect of all these circumstances on the temper of their
+
+deliberations. Throughout the continuance of the council, it was
+
+split into two fixed and violent parties. The fact is
+
+acknowledged and lamented by themselves. Had this not been the
+
+case, the face of their proceedings exhibits a proof equally
+
+satisfactory. In all questions, however unimportant in
+
+themselves, or unconnected with each other, the same names stand
+
+invariably contrasted on the opposite columns. Every unbiased
+
+observer may infer, without danger of mistake, and at the same
+
+time without meaning to reflect on either party, or any
+
+individuals of either party, that, unfortunately, PASSION, not
+
+REASON, must have presided over their decisions. When men
+
+exercise their reason coolly and freely on a variety of distinct
+
+questions, they inevitably fall into different opinions on some
+
+of them. When they are governed by a common passion, their
+
+opinions, if they are so to be called, will be the same.
+
+Fourthly. It is at least problematical, whether the decisions of
+
+this body do not, in several instances, misconstrue the limits
+
+prescribed for the legislative and executive departments, instead
+
+of reducing and limiting them within their constitutional places.
+
+Fifthly. I have never understood that the decisions of the
+
+council on constitutional questions, whether rightly or
+
+erroneously formed, have had any effect in varying the practice
+
+founded on legislative constructions. It even appears, if I
+
+mistake not, that in one instance the contemporary legislature
+
+denied the constructions of the council, and actually prevailed
+
+in the contest. This censorial body, therefore, proves at the
+
+same time, by its researches, the existence of the disease, and
+
+by its example, the inefficacy of the remedy. This conclusion
+
+cannot be invalidated by alleging that the State in which the
+
+experiment was made was at that crisis, and had been for a long
+
+time before, violently heated and distracted by the rage of
+
+party. Is it to be presumed, that at any future septennial epoch
+
+the same State will be free from parties? Is it to be presumed
+
+that any other State, at the same or any other given period, will
+
+be exempt from them? Such an event ought to be neither presumed
+
+nor desired; because an extinction of parties necessarily implies
+
+either a universal alarm for the public safety, or an absolute
+
+extinction of liberty. Were the precaution taken of excluding
+
+from the assemblies elected by the people, to revise the
+
+preceding administration of the government, all persons who
+
+should have been concerned with the government within the given
+
+period, the difficulties would not be obviated. The important
+
+task would probably devolve on men, who, with inferior
+
+capacities, would in other respects be little better qualified.
+
+Although they might not have been personally concerned in the
+
+administration, and therefore not immediately agents in the
+
+measures to be examined, they would probably have been involved
+
+in the parties connected with these measures, and have been
+
+elected under their auspices. PUBLIUS.
+
+
+
+
+
+FEDERALIST No. 51
+
+
+
+The Structure of the Government Must Furnish the Proper Checks
+
+and Balances Between the Different Departments
+
+From the New York Packet. Friday, February 8, 1788.
+
+
+
+HAMILTON OR MADISON
+
+
+
+To the People of the State of New York:
+
+TO WHAT expedient, then, shall we finally resort, for maintaining
+
+in practice the necessary partition of power among the several
+
+departments, as laid down in the Constitution? The only answer
+
+that can be given is, that as all these exterior provisions are
+
+found to be inadequate, the defect must be supplied, by so
+
+contriving the interior structure of the government as that its
+
+several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the
+
+means of keeping each other in their proper places. Without
+
+presuming to undertake a full development of this important idea,
+
+I will hazard a few general observations, which may perhaps place
+
+it in a clearer light, and enable us to form a more correct
+
+judgment of the principles and structure of the government
+
+planned by the convention. In order to lay a due foundation for
+
+that separate and distinct exercise of the different powers of
+
+government, which to a certain extent is admitted on all hands to
+
+be essential to the preservation of liberty, it is evident that
+
+each department should have a will of its own; and consequently
+
+should be so constituted that the members of each should have as
+
+little agency as possible in the appointment of the members of
+
+the others. Were this principle rigorously adhered to, it would
+
+require that all the appointments for the supreme executive,
+
+legislative, and judiciary magistracies should be drawn from the
+
+same fountain of authority, the people, through channels having
+
+no communication whatever with one another. Perhaps such a plan
+
+of constructing the several departments would be less difficult
+
+in practice than it may in contemplation appear. Some
+
+difficulties, however, and some additional expense would attend
+
+the execution of it. Some deviations, therefore, from the
+
+principle must be admitted. In the constitution of the judiciary
+
+department in particular, it might be inexpedient to insist
+
+rigorously on the principle: first, because peculiar
+
+qualifications being essential in the members, the primary
+
+consideration ought to be to select that mode of choice which
+
+best secures these qualifications; secondly, because the
+
+permanent tenure by which the appointments are held in that
+
+department, must soon destroy all sense of dependence on the
+
+authority conferring them. It is equally evident, that the
+
+members of each department should be as little dependent as
+
+possible on those of the others, for the emoluments annexed to
+
+their offices. Were the executive magistrate, or the judges, not
+
+independent of the legislature in this particular, their
+
+independence in every other would be merely nominal. But the
+
+great security against a gradual concentration of the several
+
+powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who
+
+administer each department the necessary constitutional means and
+
+personal motives to resist encroachments of the others. The
+
+provision for defense must in this, as in all other cases, be
+
+made commensurate to the danger of attack. Ambition must be made
+
+to counteract ambition. The interest of the man must be
+
+connected with the constitutional rights of the place. It may be
+
+a reflection on human nature, that such devices should be
+
+necessary to control the abuses of government. But what is
+
+government itself, but the greatest of all reflections on human
+
+nature? If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If
+
+angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal
+
+controls on government would be necessary. In framing a
+
+government which is to be administered by men over men, the great
+
+difficulty lies in this: you must first enable the government to
+
+control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control
+
+itself. A dependence on the people is, no doubt, the primary
+
+control on the government; but experience has taught mankind the
+
+necessity of auxiliary precautions. This policy of supplying, by
+
+opposite and rival interests, the defect of better motives, might
+
+be traced through the whole system of human affairs, private as
+
+well as public. We see it particularly displayed in all the
+
+subordinate distributions of power, where the constant aim is to
+
+divide and arrange the several offices in such a manner as that
+
+each may be a check on the other that the private interest of
+
+every individual may be a sentinel over the public rights. These
+
+inventions of prudence cannot be less requisite in the
+
+distribution of the supreme powers of the State. But it is not
+
+possible to give to each department an equal power of
+
+self-defense. In republican government, the legislative
+
+authority necessarily predominates. The remedy for this
+
+inconveniency is to divide the legislature into different
+
+branches; and to render them, by different modes of election and
+
+different principles of action, as little connected with each
+
+other as the nature of their common functions and their common
+
+dependence on the society will admit. It may even be necessary
+
+to guard against dangerous encroachments by still further
+
+precautions. As the weight of the legislative authority requires
+
+that it should be thus divided, the weakness of the executive may
+
+require, on the other hand, that it should be fortified. An
+
+absolute negative on the legislature appears, at first view, to
+
+be the natural defense with which the executive magistrate should
+
+be armed. But perhaps it would be neither altogether safe nor
+
+alone sufficient. On ordinary occasions it might not be exerted
+
+with the requisite firmness, and on extraordinary occasions it
+
+might be perfidiously abused. May not this defect of an absolute
+
+negative be supplied by some qualified connection between this
+
+weaker department and the weaker branch of the stronger
+
+department, by which the latter may be led to support the
+
+constitutional rights of the former, without being too much
+
+detached from the rights of its own department? If the principles
+
+on which these observations are founded be just, as I persuade
+
+myself they are, and they be applied as a criterion to the
+
+several State constitutions, and to the federal Constitution it
+
+will be found that if the latter does not perfectly correspond
+
+with them, the former are infinitely less able to bear such a
+
+test. There are, moreover, two considerations particularly
+
+applicable to the federal system of America, which place that
+
+system in a very interesting point of view. First. In a single
+
+republic, all the power surrendered by the people is submitted to
+
+the administration of a single government; and the usurpations
+
+are guarded against by a division of the government into distinct
+
+and separate departments. In the compound republic of America,
+
+the power surrendered by the people is first divided between two
+
+distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each
+
+subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a
+
+double security arises to the rights of the people. The different
+
+governments will control each other, at the same time that each
+
+will be controlled by itself. Second. It is of great importance
+
+in a republic not only to guard the society against the
+
+oppression of its rulers, but to guard one part of the society
+
+against the injustice of the other part. Different interests
+
+necessarily exist in different classes of citizens. If a
+
+majority be united by a common interest, the rights of the
+
+minority will be insecure. There are but two methods of
+
+providing against this evil: the one by creating a will in the
+
+community independent of the majority that is, of the society
+
+itself; the other, by comprehending in the society so many
+
+separate descriptions of citizens as will render an unjust
+
+combination of a majority of the whole very improbable, if not
+
+impracticable. The first method prevails in all governments
+
+possessing an hereditary or self-appointed authority. This, at
+
+best, is but a precarious security; because a power independent
+
+of the society may as well espouse the unjust views of the major,
+
+as the rightful interests of the minor party, and may possibly be
+
+turned against both parties. The second method will be
+
+exemplified in the federal republic of the United States. Whilst
+
+all authority in it will be derived from and dependent on the
+
+society, the society itself will be broken into so many parts,
+
+interests, and classes of citizens, that the rights of
+
+individuals, or of the minority, will be in little danger from
+
+interested combinations of the majority. In a free government
+
+the security for civil rights must be the same as that for
+
+religious rights. It consists in the one case in the
+
+multiplicity of interests, and in the other in the multiplicity
+
+of sects. The degree of security in both cases will depend on
+
+the number of interests and sects; and this may be presumed to
+
+depend on the extent of country and number of people comprehended
+
+under the same government. This view of the subject must
+
+particularly recommend a proper federal system to all the sincere
+
+and considerate friends of republican government, since it shows
+
+that in exact proportion as the territory of the Union may be
+
+formed into more circumscribed Confederacies, or States
+
+oppressive combinations of a majority will be facilitated: the
+
+best security, under the republican forms, for the rights of
+
+every class of citizens, will be diminished: and consequently the
+
+stability and independence of some member of the government, the
+
+only other security, must be proportionately increased. Justice
+
+is the end of government. It is the end of civil society. It
+
+ever has been and ever will be pursued until it be obtained, or
+
+until liberty be lost in the pursuit. In a society under the
+
+forms of which the stronger faction can readily unite and oppress
+
+the weaker, anarchy may as truly be said to reign as in a state
+
+of nature, where the weaker individual is not secured against the
+
+violence of the stronger; and as, in the latter state, even the
+
+stronger individuals are prompted, by the uncertainty of their
+
+condition, to submit to a government which may protect the weak
+
+as well as themselves; so, in the former state, will the more
+
+powerful factions or parties be gradually induced, by a like
+
+motive, to wish for a government which will protect all parties,
+
+the weaker as well as the more powerful. It can be little
+
+doubted that if the State of Rhode Island was separated from the
+
+Confederacy and left to itself, the insecurity of rights under
+
+the popular form of government within such narrow limits would be
+
+displayed by such reiterated oppressions of factious majorities
+
+that some power altogether independent of the people would soon
+
+be called for by the voice of the very factions whose misrule had
+
+proved the necessity of it. In the extended republic of the
+
+United States, and among the great variety of interests, parties,
+
+and sects which it embraces, a coalition of a majority of the
+
+whole society could seldom take place on any other principles
+
+than those of justice and the general good; whilst there being
+
+thus less danger to a minor from the will of a major party, there
+
+must be less pretext, also, to provide for the security of the
+
+former, by introducing into the government a will not dependent
+
+on the latter, or, in other words, a will independent of the
+
+society itself. It is no less certain than it is important,
+
+notwithstanding the contrary opinions which have been
+
+entertained, that the larger the society, provided it lie within
+
+a practical sphere, the more duly capable it will be of
+
+self-government. And happily for the REPUBLICAN CAUSE, the
+
+practicable sphere may be carried to a very great extent, by a
+
+judicious modification and mixture of the FEDERAL PRINCIPLE.
+
+PUBLIUS.
+
+
+
+
+
+FEDERALIST No. 52
+
+
+
+The House of Representatives
+
+From the New York Packet. Friday, February 8, 1788.
+
+
+
+HAMILTON OR MADISON
+
+
+
+To the People of the State of New York:
+
+FROM the more general inquiries pursued in the four last papers,
+
+I pass on to a more particular examination of the several parts
+
+of the government. I shall begin with the House of
+
+Representatives. The first view to be taken of this part of the
+
+government relates to the qualifications of the electors and the
+
+elected. Those of the former are to be the same with those of the
+
+electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures.
+
+The definition of the right of suffrage is very justly regarded
+
+as a fundamental article of republican government. It was
+
+incumbent on the convention, therefore, to define and establish
+
+this right in the Constitution. To have left it open for the
+
+occasional regulation of the Congress, would have been improper
+
+for the reason just mentioned. To have submitted it to the
+
+legislative discretion of the States, would have been improper
+
+for the same reason; and for the additional reason that it would
+
+have rendered too dependent on the State governments that branch
+
+of the federal government which ought to be dependent on the
+
+people alone. To have reduced the different qualifications in the
+
+different States to one uniform rule, would probably have been as
+
+dissatisfactory to some of the States as it would have been
+
+difficult to the convention. The provision made by the convention
+
+appears, therefore, to be the best that lay within their option.
+
+It must be satisfactory to every State, because it is conformable
+
+to the standard already established, or which may be established,
+
+by the State itself. It will be safe to the United States,
+
+because, being fixed by the State constitutions, it is not
+
+alterable by the State governments, and it cannot be feared that
+
+the people of the States will alter this part of their
+
+constitutions in such a manner as to abridge the rights secured
+
+to them by the federal Constitution. The qualifications of the
+
+elected, being less carefully and properly defined by the State
+
+constitutions, and being at the same time more susceptible of
+
+uniformity, have been very properly considered and regulated by
+
+the convention. A representative of the United States must be of
+
+the age of twenty-five years; must have been seven years a
+
+citizen of the United States; must, at the time of his election,
+
+be an inhabitant of the State he is to represent; and, during the
+
+time of his service, must be in no office under the United
+
+States. Under these reasonable limitations, the door of this part
+
+of the federal government is open to merit of every description,
+
+whether native or adoptive, whether young or old, and without
+
+regard to poverty or wealth, or to any particular profession of
+
+religious faith. The term for which the representatives are to be
+
+elected falls under a second view which may be taken of this
+
+branch. In order to decide on the propriety of this article, two
+
+questions must be considered: first, whether biennial elections
+
+will, in this case, be safe; secondly, whether they be necessary
+
+or useful. First. As it is essential to liberty that the
+
+government in general should have a common interest with the
+
+people, so it is particularly essential that the branch of it
+
+under consideration should have an immediate dependence on, and
+
+an intimate sympathy with, the people. Frequent elections are
+
+unquestionably the only policy by which this dependence and
+
+sympathy can be effectually secured. But what particular degree
+
+of frequency may be absolutely necessary for the purpose, does
+
+not appear to be susceptible of any precise calculation, and must
+
+depend on a variety of circumstances with which it may be
+
+connected. Let us consult experience, the guide that ought always
+
+to be followed whenever it can be found. The scheme of
+
+representation, as a substitute for a meeting of the citizens in
+
+person, being at most but very imperfectly known to ancient
+
+polity, it is in more modern times only that we are to expect
+
+instructive examples. And even here, in order to avoid a research
+
+too vague and diffusive, it will be proper to confine ourselves
+
+to the few examples which are best known, and which bear the
+
+greatest analogy to our particular case. The first to which this
+
+character ought to be applied, is the House of Commons in Great
+
+Britain. The history of this branch of the English Constitution,
+
+anterior to the date of Magna Charta, is too obscure to yield
+
+instruction. The very existence of it has been made a question
+
+among political antiquaries. The earliest records of subsequent
+
+date prove that parliaments were to SIT only every year; not that
+
+they were to be ELECTED every year. And even these annual
+
+sessions were left so much at the discretion of the monarch,
+
+that, under various pretexts, very long and dangerous
+
+intermissions were often contrived by royal ambition. To remedy
+
+this grievance, it was provided by a statute in the reign of
+
+Charles II. , that the intermissions should not be protracted
+
+beyond a period of three years. On the accession of William III.,
+
+when a revolution took place in the government, the subject was
+
+still more seriously resumed, and it was declared to be among the
+
+fundamental rights of the people that parliaments ought to be
+
+held FREQUENTLY. By another statute, which passed a few years
+
+later in the same reign, the term "frequently," which had
+
+alluded to the triennial period settled in the time of Charles
+
+II., is reduced to a precise meaning, it being expressly enacted
+
+that a new parliament shall be called within three years after
+
+the termination of the former. The last change, from three to
+
+seven years, is well known to have been introduced pretty early
+
+in the present century, under on alarm for the Hanoverian
+
+succession. From these facts it appears that the greatest
+
+frequency of elections which has been deemed necessary in that
+
+kingdom, for binding the representatives to their constituents,
+
+does not exceed a triennial return of them. And if we may argue
+
+from the degree of liberty retained even under septennial
+
+elections, and all the other vicious ingredients in the
+
+parliamentary constitution, we cannot doubt that a reduction of
+
+the period from seven to three years, with the other necessary
+
+reforms, would so far extend the influence of the people over
+
+their representatives as to satisfy us that biennial elections,
+
+under the federal system, cannot possibly be dangerous to the
+
+requisite dependence of the House of Representatives on their
+
+constituents. Elections in Ireland, till of late, were regulated
+
+entirely by the discretion of the crown, and were seldom
+
+repeated, except on the accession of a new prince, or some other
+
+contingent event. The parliament which commenced with George II.
+
+was continued throughout his whole reign, a period of about
+
+thirty-five years. The only dependence of the representatives on
+
+the people consisted in the right of the latter to supply
+
+occasional vacancies by the election of new members, and in the
+
+chance of some event which might produce a general new election.
+
+The ability also of the Irish parliament to maintain the rights
+
+of their constituents, so far as the disposition might exist, was
+
+extremely shackled by the control of the crown over the subjects
+
+of their deliberation. Of late these shackles, if I mistake not,
+
+have been broken; and octennial parliaments have besides been
+
+established. What effect may be produced by this partial reform,
+
+must be left to further experience. The example of Ireland, from
+
+this view of it, can throw but little light on the subject. As
+
+far as we can draw any conclusion from it, it must be that if the
+
+people of that country have been able under all these
+
+disadvantages to retain any liberty whatever, the advantage of
+
+biennial elections would secure to them every degree of liberty,
+
+which might depend on a due connection between their
+
+representatives and themselves. Let us bring our inquiries nearer
+
+home. The example of these States, when British colonies, claims
+
+particular attention, at the same time that it is so well known
+
+as to require little to be said on it. The principle of
+
+representation, in one branch of the legislature at least, was
+
+established in all of them. But the periods of election were
+
+different. They varied from one to seven years. Have we any
+
+reason to infer, from the spirit and conduct of the
+
+representatives of the people, prior to the Revolution, that
+
+biennial elections would have been dangerous to the public
+
+liberties? The spirit which everywhere displayed itself at the
+
+commencement of the struggle, and which vanquished the obstacles
+
+to independence, is the best of proofs that a sufficient portion
+
+of liberty had been everywhere enjoyed to inspire both a sense of
+
+its worth and a zeal for its proper enlargement This remark holds
+
+good, as well with regard to the then colonies whose elections
+
+were least frequent, as to those whose elections were most
+
+frequent Virginia was the colony which stood first in resisting
+
+the parliamentary usurpations of Great Britain; it was the first
+
+also in espousing, by public act, the resolution of independence.
+
+In Virginia, nevertheless, if I have not been misinformed,
+
+elections under the former government were septennial. This
+
+particular example is brought into view, not as a proof of any
+
+peculiar merit, for the priority in those instances was probably
+
+accidental; and still less of any advantage in SEPTENNIAL
+
+elections, for when compared with a greater frequency they are
+
+inadmissible; but merely as a proof, and I conceive it to be a
+
+very substantial proof, that the liberties of the people can be
+
+in no danger from BIENNIAL elections. The conclusion resulting
+
+from these examples will be not a little strengthened by
+
+recollecting three circumstances. The first is, that the federal
+
+legislature will possess a part only of that supreme legislative
+
+authority which is vested completely in the British Parliament;
+
+and which, with a few exceptions, was exercised by the colonial
+
+assemblies and the Irish legislature. It is a received and
+
+well-founded maxim, that where no other circumstances affect the
+
+case, the greater the power is, the shorter ought to be its
+
+duration; and, conversely, the smaller the power, the more safely
+
+may its duration be protracted. In the second place, it has, on
+
+another occasion, been shown that the federal legislature will
+
+not only be restrained by its dependence on its people, as other
+
+legislative bodies are, but that it will be, moreover, watched
+
+and controlled by the several collateral legislatures, which
+
+other legislative bodies are not. And in the third place, no
+
+comparison can be made between the means that will be possessed
+
+by the more permanent branches of the federal government for
+
+seducing, if they should be disposed to seduce, the House of
+
+Representatives from their duty to the people, and the means of
+
+influence over the popular branch possessed by the other branches
+
+of the government above cited. With less power, therefore, to
+
+abuse, the federal representatives can be less tempted on one
+
+side, and will be doubly watched on the other. PUBLIUS.
+
+
+
+FEDERALIST No. 53
+
+
+
+The Same Subject Continued (The House of Representatives)
+
+From the New York Packet. Tuesday, February 12, 1788.
+
+
+
+HAMILTON OR MADISON
+
+
+
+To the People of the State of New York:
+
+I SHALL here, perhaps, be reminded of a current observation,
+
+"that where annual elections end, tyranny begins. " If it be
+
+true, as has often been remarked, that sayings which become
+
+proverbial are generally founded in reason, it is not less true,
+
+that when once established, they are often applied to cases to
+
+which the reason of them does not extend. I need not look for a
+
+proof beyond the case before us. What is the reason on which this
+
+proverbial observation is founded? No man will subject himself to
+
+the ridicule of pretending that any natural connection subsists
+
+between the sun or the seasons, and the period within which human
+
+virtue can bear the temptations of power. Happily for mankind,
+
+liberty is not, in this respect, confined to any single point of
+
+time; but lies within extremes, which afford sufficient latitude
+
+for all the variations which may be required by the various
+
+situations and circumstances of civil society. The election of
+
+magistrates might be, if it were found expedient, as in some
+
+instances it actually has been, daily, weekly, or monthly, as
+
+well as annual; and if circumstances may require a deviation from
+
+the rule on one side, why not also on the other side? Turning our
+
+attention to the periods established among ourselves, for the
+
+election of the most numerous branches of the State legislatures,
+
+we find them by no means coinciding any more in this instance,
+
+than in the elections of other civil magistrates. In Connecticut
+
+and Rhode Island, the periods are half-yearly. In the other
+
+States, South Carolina excepted, they are annual. In South
+
+Carolina they are biennial as is proposed in the federal
+
+government. Here is a difference, as four to one, between the
+
+longest and shortest periods; and yet it would be not easy to
+
+show, that Connecticut or Rhode Island is better governed, or
+
+enjoys a greater share of rational liberty, than South Carolina;
+
+or that either the one or the other of these States is
+
+distinguished in these respects, and by these causes, from the
+
+States whose elections are different from both. In searching for
+
+the grounds of this doctrine, I can discover but one, and that is
+
+wholly inapplicable to our case. The important distinction so
+
+well understood in America, between a Constitution established by
+
+the people and unalterable by the government, and a law
+
+established by the government and alterable by the government,
+
+seems to have been little understood and less observed in any
+
+other country. Wherever the supreme power of legislation has
+
+resided, has been supposed to reside also a full power to change
+
+the form of the government. Even in Great Britain, where the
+
+principles of political and civil liberty have been most
+
+discussed, and where we hear most of the rights of the
+
+Constitution, it is maintained that the authority of the
+
+Parliament is transcendent and uncontrollable, as well with
+
+regard to the Constitution, as the ordinary objects of
+
+legislative provision. They have accordingly, in several
+
+instances, actually changed, by legislative acts, some of the
+
+most fundamental articles of the government. They have in
+
+particular, on several occasions, changed the period of election;
+
+and, on the last occasion, not only introduced septennial in
+
+place of triennial elections, but by the same act, continued
+
+themselves in place four years beyond the term for which they
+
+were elected by the people. An attention to these dangerous
+
+practices has produced a very natural alarm in the votaries of
+
+free government, of which frequency of elections is the
+
+corner-stone; and has led them to seek for some security to
+
+liberty, against the danger to which it is exposed. Where no
+
+Constitution, paramount to the government, either existed or
+
+could be obtained, no constitutional security, similar to that
+
+established in the United States, was to be attempted. Some
+
+other security, therefore, was to be sought for; and what better
+
+security would the case admit, than that of selecting and
+
+appealing to some simple and familiar portion of time, as a
+
+standard for measuring the danger of innovations, for fixing the
+
+national sentiment, and for uniting the patriotic exertions? The
+
+most simple and familiar portion of time, applicable to the
+
+subject was that of a year; and hence the doctrine has been
+
+inculcated by a laudable zeal, to erect some barrier against the
+
+gradual innovations of an unlimited government, that the advance
+
+towards tyranny was to be calculated by the distance of departure
+
+from the fixed point of annual elections. But what necessity can
+
+there be of applying this expedient to a government limited, as
+
+the federal government will be, by the authority of a paramount
+
+Constitution? Or who will pretend that the liberties of the
+
+people of America will not be more secure under biennial
+
+elections, unalterably fixed by such a Constitution, than those
+
+of any other nation would be, where elections were annual, or
+
+even more frequent, but subject to alterations by the ordinary
+
+power of the government? The second question stated is, whether
+
+biennial elections be necessary or useful. The propriety of
+
+answering this question in the affirmative will appear from
+
+several very obvious considerations.
+                                        No man can be a
+
+competent legislator who does not add to an upright intention and
+
+a sound judgment a certain degree of knowledge of the subjects on
+
+which he is to legislate. A part of this knowledge may be
+
+acquired by means of information which lie within the compass of
+
+men in private as well as public stations. Another part can only
+
+be attained, or at least thoroughly attained, by actual
+
+experience in the station which requires the use of it. The
+
+period of service, ought, therefore, in all such cases, to bear
+
+some proportion to the extent of practical knowledge requisite to
+
+the due performance of the service. The period of legislative
+
+service established in most of the States for the more numerous
+
+branch is, as we have seen, one year. The question then may be
+
+put into this simple form: does the period of two years bear no
+
+greater proportion to the knowledge requisite for federal
+
+legislation than one year does to the knowledge requisite for
+
+State legislation? The very statement of the question, in this
+
+form, suggests the answer that ought to be given to it. In a
+
+single State, the requisite knowledge relates to the existing
+
+laws which are uniform throughout the State, and with which all
+
+the citizens are more or less conversant; and to the general
+
+affairs of the State, which lie within a small compass, are not
+
+very diversified, and occupy much of the attention and
+
+conversation of every class of people. The great theatre of the
+
+United States presents a very different scene. The laws are so
+
+far from being uniform, that they vary in every State; whilst the
+
+public affairs of the Union are spread throughout a very
+
+extensive region, and are extremely diversified by t e local
+
+affairs connected with them, and can with difficulty be correctly
+
+learnt in any other place than in the central councils to which a
+
+knowledge of them will be brought by the representatives of every
+
+part of the empire. Yet some knowledge of the affairs, and even
+
+of the laws, of all the States, ought to be possessed by the
+
+members from each of the States. How can foreign trade be
+
+properly regulated by uniform laws, without some acquaintance
+
+with the commerce, the ports, the usages, and the regulatious of
+
+the different States? How can the trade between the different
+
+States be duly regulated, without some knowledge of their
+
+relative situations in these and other respects? How can taxes
+
+be judiciously imposed and effectually collected, if they be not
+
+accommodated to the different laws and local circumstances
+
+relating to these objects in the different States? How can
+
+uniform regulations for the militia be duly provided, without a
+
+similar knowledge of many internal circumstances by which the
+
+States are distinguished from each other? These are the
+
+principal objects of federal legislation, and suggest most
+
+forcibly the extensive information which the representatives
+
+ought to acquire. The other interior objects will require a
+
+proportional degree of information with regard to them. It is
+
+true that all these difficulties will, by degrees, be very much
+
+diminished. The most laborious task will be the proper
+
+inauguration of the government and the primeval formation of a
+
+federal code. Improvements on the first draughts will every year
+
+become both easier and fewer. Past transactions of the
+
+government will be a ready and accurate source of information to
+
+new members. The affairs of the Union will become more and more
+
+objects of curiosity and conversation among the citizens at
+
+large. And the increased intercourse among those of different
+
+States will contribute not a little to diffuse a mutual knowledge
+
+of their affairs, as this again will contribute to a general
+
+assimilation of their manners and laws. But with all these
+
+abatements, the business of federal legislation must continue so
+
+far to exceed, both in novelty and difficulty, the legislative
+
+business of a single State, as to justify the longer period of
+
+service assigned to those who are to transact it. A branch of
+
+knowledge which belongs to the acquirements of a federal
+
+representative, and which has not been mentioned is that of
+
+foreign affairs. In regulating our own commerce he ought to be
+
+not only acquainted with the treaties between the United States
+
+and other nations, but also with the commercial policy and laws
+
+of other nations. He ought not to be altogether ignorant of the
+
+law of nations; for that, as far as it is a proper object of
+
+municipal legislation, is submitted to the federal government.
+
+And although the House of Representatives is not immediately to
+
+participate in foreign negotiations and arrangements, yet from
+
+the necessary connection between the several branches of public
+
+affairs, those particular branches will frequently deserve
+
+attention in the ordinary course of legislation, and will
+
+sometimes demand particular legislative sanction and
+
+co-operation. Some portion of this knowledge may, no doubt, be
+
+acquired in a man's closet; but some of it also can only be
+
+derived from the public sources of information; and all of it
+
+will be acquired to best effect by a practical attention to the
+
+subject during the period of actual service in the legislature.
+
+There are other considerations, of less importance, perhaps, but
+
+which are not unworthy of notice. The distance which many of the
+
+representatives will be obliged to travel, and the arrangements
+
+rendered necessary by that circumstance, might be much more
+
+serious objections with fit men to this service, if limited to a
+
+single year, than if extended to two years. No argument can be
+
+drawn on this subject, from the case of the delegates to the
+
+existing Congress. They are elected annually, it is true; but
+
+their re-election is considered by the legislative assemblies
+
+almost as a matter of course. The election of the representatives
+
+by the people would not be governed by the same principle. A few
+
+of the members, as happens in all such assemblies, will possess
+
+superior talents; will, by frequent reelections, become members
+
+of long standing; will be thoroughly masters of the public
+
+business, and perhaps not unwilling to avail themselves of those
+
+advantages. The greater the proportion of new members, and the
+
+less the information of the bulk of the members the more apt will
+
+they be to fall into the snares that may be laid for them. This
+
+remark is no less applicable to the relation which will subsist
+
+between the House of Representatives and the Senate. It is an
+
+inconvenience mingled with the advantages of our frequent
+
+elections even in single States, where they are large, and hold
+
+but one legislative session in a year, that spurious elections
+
+cannot be investigated and annulled in time for the decision to
+
+have its due effect. If a return can be obtained, no matter by
+
+what unlawful means, the irregular member, who takes his seat of
+
+course, is sure of holding it a sufficient time to answer his
+
+purposes. Hence, a very pernicious encouragement is given to the
+
+use of unlawful means, for obtaining irregular returns. Were
+
+elections for the federal legislature to be annual, this practice
+
+might become a very serious abuse, particularly in the more
+
+distant States. Each house is, as it necessarily must be, the
+
+judge of the elections, qualifications, and returns of its
+
+members; and whatever improvements may be suggested by
+
+experience, for simplifying and accelerating the process in
+
+disputed cases, so great a portion of a year would unavoidably
+
+elapse, before an illegitimate member could be dispossessed of
+
+his seat, that the prospect of such an event would be little
+
+check to unfair and illicit means of obtaining a seat. All these
+
+considerations taken together warrant us in affirming, that
+
+biennial elections will be as useful to the affairs of the public
+
+as we have seen that they will be safe to the liberty of the
+
+people. PUBLIUS.
+
+
+
+
+
+FEDERALIST No. 54
+
+
+
+The Apportionment of Members Among the States
+
+
+
+From the New York Packet. Tuesday, February 12, 1788.
+
+
+
+HAMILTON OR MADISON
+
+
+
+To the People of the State of New York:
+
+THE next view which I shall take of the House of Representatives
+
+relates to the appointment of its members to the several States
+
+which is to be determined by the same rule with that of direct
+
+taxes.
+          It is not contended that the number of people in each
+
+State ought not to be the standard for regulating the proportion
+
+of those who are to represent the people of each State. The
+
+establishment of the same rule for the appointment of taxes, will
+
+probably be as little contested; though the rule itself in this
+
+case, is by no means founded on the same principle. In the former
+
+case, the rule is understood to refer to the personal rights of
+
+the people, with which it has a natural and universal connection.
+
+In the latter, it has reference to the proportion of wealth, of
+
+which it is in no case a precise measure, and in ordinary cases a
+
+very unfit one. But notwithstanding the imperfection of the rule
+
+as applied to the relative wealth and contributions of the
+
+States, it is evidently the least objectionable among the
+
+practicable rules, and had too recently obtained the general
+
+sanction of America, not to have found a ready preference with
+
+the convention. All this is admitted, it will perhaps be said;
+
+but does it follow, from an admission of numbers for the measure
+
+of representation, or of slaves combined with free citizens as a
+
+ratio of taxation, that slaves ought to be included in the
+
+numerical rule of representation? Slaves are considered as
+
+property, not as persons. They ought therefore to be comprehended
+
+in estimates of taxation which are founded on property, and to be
+
+excluded from representation which is regulated by a census of
+
+persons. This is the objection, as I understand it, stated in its
+
+full force. I shall be equally candid in stating the reasoning
+
+which may be offered on the opposite side. "We subscribe to the
+
+doctrine," might one of our Southern brethren observe, "that
+
+representation relates more immediately to persons, and taxation
+
+more immediately to property, and we join in the application of
+
+this distinction to the case of our slaves. But we must deny the
+
+fact, that slaves are considered merely as property, and in no
+
+respect whatever as persons. The true state of the case is, that
+
+they partake of both these qualities: being considered by our
+
+laws, in some respects, as persons, and in other respects as
+
+property. In being compelled to labor, not for himself, but for
+
+a master; in being vendible by one master to another master; and
+
+in being subject at all times to be restrained in his liberty and
+
+chastised in his body, by the capricious will of another, the
+
+slave may appear to be degraded from the human rank, and classed
+
+with those irrational animals which fall under the legal
+
+denomination of property. In being protected, on the other hand,
+
+in his life and in his limbs, against the violence of all
+
+others, even the master of his labor and his liberty; and in
+
+being punishable himself for all violence committed against
+
+others, the slave is no less evidently regarded by the law as a
+
+member of the society, not as a part of the irrational creation;
+
+as a moral person, not as a mere article of property. The
+
+federal Constitution, therefore, decides with great propriety on
+
+the case of our slaves, when it views them in the mixed character
+
+of persons and of property. This is in fact their true
+
+character. It is the character bestowed on them by the laws
+
+under which they live; and it will not be denied, that these are
+
+the proper criterion; because it is only under the pretext that
+
+the laws have transformed the negroes into subjects of property,
+
+that a place is disputed them in the computation of numbers; and
+
+it is admitted, that if the laws were to restore the rights which
+
+have been taken away, the negroes could no longer be refused an
+
+equal share of representation with the other inhabitants. "This
+
+question may be placed in another light. It is agreed on all
+
+sides, that numbers are the best scale of wealth and taxation, as
+
+they are the only proper scale of representation. Would the
+
+convention have been impartial or consistent, if they had
+
+rejected the slaves from the list of inhabitants, when the shares
+
+of representation were to be calculated, and inserted them on the
+
+lists when the tariff of contributions was to be adjusted? Could
+
+it be reasonably expected, that the Southern States would concur
+
+in a system, which considered their slaves in some degree as men,
+
+when burdens were to be imposed, but refused to consider them in
+
+the same light, when advantages were to be conferred? Might not
+
+some surprise also be expressed, that those who reproach the
+
+Southern States with the barbarous policy of considering as
+
+property a part of their human brethren, should themselves
+
+contend, that the government to which all the States are to be
+
+parties, ought to consider this unfortunate race more completely
+
+in the unnatural light of property, than the very laws of which
+
+they complain? "It may be replied, perhaps, that slaves are not
+
+included in the estimate of representatives in any of the States
+
+possessing them. They neither vote themselves nor increase the
+
+votes of their masters. Upon what principle, then, ought they to
+
+be taken into the federal estimate of representation? In
+
+rejecting them altogether, the Constitution would, in this
+
+respect, have followed the very laws which have been appealed to
+
+as the proper guide. "This objection is repelled by a single
+
+observation. It is a fundamental principle of the proposed
+
+Constitution, that as the aggregate number of representatives
+
+allotted to the several States is to be determined by a federal
+
+rule, founded on the aggregate number of inhabitants, so the
+
+right of choosing this allotted number in each State is to be
+
+exercised by such part of the inhabitants as the State itself may
+
+designate. The qualifications on which the right of suffrage
+
+depend are not, perhaps, the same in any two States. In some of
+
+the States the difference is very material. In every State, a
+
+certain proportion of inhabitants are deprived of this right by
+
+the constitution of the State, who will be included in the census
+
+by which the federal Constitution apportions the representatives.
+
+In this point of view the Southern States might retort the
+
+complaint, by insisting that the principle laid down by the
+
+convention required that no regard should be had to the policy of
+
+particular States towards their own inhabitants; and
+
+consequently, that the slaves, as inhabitants, should have been
+
+admitted into the census according to their full number, in like
+
+manner with other inhabitants, who, by the policy of other
+
+States, are not admitted to all the rights of citizens. A
+
+rigorous adherence, however, to this principle, is waived by
+
+those who would be gainers by it. All that they ask is that
+
+equal moderation be shown on the other side. Let the case of the
+
+slaves be considered, as it is in truth, a peculiar one. Let the
+
+compromising expedient of the Constitution be mutually adopted,
+
+which regards them as inhabitants, but as debased by servitude
+
+below the equal level of free inhabitants, which regards the
+
+SLAVE as divested of two fifths of the MAN. "After all, may not
+
+another ground be taken on which this article of the
+
+Constitution will admit of a still more ready defense? We have
+
+hitherto proceeded on the idea that representation related to
+
+persons only, and not at all to property. But is it a just idea?
+
+Government is instituted no less for protection of the property,
+
+than of the persons, of individuals. The one as well as the
+
+other, therefore, may be considered as represented by those who
+
+are charged with the government. Upon this principle it is, that
+
+in several of the States, and particularly in the State of New
+
+York, one branch of the government is intended more especially to
+
+be the guardian of property, and is accordingly elected by that
+
+part of the society which is most interested in this object of
+
+government. In the federal Constitution, this policy does not
+
+prevail. The rights of property are committed into the same hands
+
+with the personal rights. Some attention ought, therefore, to be
+
+paid to property in the choice of those hands. "For another
+
+reason, the votes allowed in the federal legislature to the
+
+people of each State, ought to bear some proportion to the
+
+comparative wealth of the States. States have not, like
+
+individuals, an influence over each other, arising from superior
+
+advantages of fortune. If the law allows an opulent citizen but a
+
+single vote in the choice of his representative, the respect and
+
+consequence which he derives from his fortunate situation very
+
+frequently guide the votes of others to the objects of his
+
+choice; and through this imperceptible channel the rights of
+
+property are conveyed into the public representation. A State
+
+possesses no such influence over other States. It is not probable
+
+that the richest State in the Confederacy will ever influence the
+
+choice of a single representative in any other State. Nor will
+
+the representatives of the larger and richer States possess any
+
+other advantage in the federal legislature, over the
+
+representatives of other States, than what may result from their
+
+superior number alone. As far, therefore, as their superior
+
+wealth and weight may justly entitle them to any advantage, it
+
+ought to be secured to them by a superior share of
+
+representation. The new Constitution is, in this respect,
+
+materially different from the existing Confederation, as well as
+
+from that of the United Netherlands, and other similar
+
+confederacies. In each of the latter, the efficacy of the
+
+federal resolutions depends on the subsequent and voluntary
+
+resolutions of the states composing the union. Hence the states,
+
+though possessing an equal vote in the public councils, have an
+
+unequal influence, corresponding with the unequal importance of
+
+these subsequent and voluntary resolutions. Under the proposed
+
+Constitution, the federal acts will take effect without the
+
+necessary intervention of the individual States. They will depend
+
+merely on the majority of votes in the federal legislature, and
+
+consequently each vote, whether proceeding from a larger or
+
+smaller State, or a State more or less wealthy or powerful, will
+
+have an equal weight and efficacy: in the same manner as the
+
+votes individually given in a State legislature, by the
+
+representatives of unequal counties or other districts, have
+
+each a precise equality of value and effect; or if there be any
+
+difference in the case, it proceeds from the difference in the
+
+personal character of the individual representative, rather than
+
+from any regard to the extent of the district from which he
+
+comes. "Such is the reasoning which an advocate for the
+
+Southern interests might employ on this subject; and although it
+
+may appear to be a little strained in some points, yet, on the
+
+whole, I must confess that it fully reconciles me to the scale of
+
+representation which the convention have established. In one
+
+respect, the establishment of a common measure for representation
+
+and taxation will have a very salutary effect. As the accuracy
+
+of the census to be obtained by the Congress will necessarily
+
+depend, in a considerable degree on the disposition, if not on
+
+the co-operation, of the States, it is of great importance that
+
+the States should feel as little bias as possible, to swell or to
+
+reduce the amount of their numbers. Were their share of
+
+representation alone to be governed by this rule, they would have
+
+an interest in exaggerating their inhabitants. Were the rule to
+
+decide their share of taxation alone, a contrary temptation would
+
+prevail. By extending the rule to both objects, the States will
+
+have opposite interests, which will control and balance each
+
+other, and produce the requisite impartiality. PUBLIUS.
+
+
+
+
+
+FEDERALIST No. 55
+
+
+
+The Total Number of the House of Representatives
+
+From the New York Packet. Friday, February 15, 1788.
+
+
+
+HAMILTON OR MADISON
+
+
+
+To the People of the State of New York:
+
+THE number of which the House of Representatives is to consist,
+
+forms another and a very interesting point of view, under which
+
+this branch of the federal legislature may be contemplated.
+
+Scarce any article, indeed, in the whole Constitution seems to be
+
+rendered more worthy of attention, by the weight of character and
+
+the apparent force of argument with which it has been assailed.
+
+The charges exhibited against it are, first, that so small a
+
+number of representatives will be an unsafe depositary of the
+
+public interests; secondly, that they will not possess a proper
+
+knowledge of the local circumstances of their numerous
+
+constituents; thirdly, that they will be taken from that class of
+
+citizens which will sympathize least with the feelings of the
+
+mass of the people, and be most likely to aim at a permanent
+
+elevation of the few on the depression of the many; fourthly,
+
+that defective as the number will be in the first instance, it
+
+will be more and more disproportionate, by the increase of the
+
+people, and the obstacles which will prevent a correspondent
+
+increase of the representatives. In general it may be remarked on
+
+this subject, that no political problem is less susceptible of a
+
+precise solution than that which relates to the number most
+
+convenient for a representative legislature; nor is there any
+
+point on which the policy of the several States is more at
+
+variance, whether we compare their legislative assemblies
+
+directly with each other, or consider the proportions which they
+
+respectively bear to the number of their constituents. Passing
+
+over the difference between the smallest and largest States, as
+
+Delaware, whose most numerous branch consists of twenty-one
+
+representatives, and Massachusetts, where it amounts to between
+
+three and four hundred, a very considerable difference is
+
+observable among States nearly equal in population. The number of
+
+representatives in Pennsylvania is not more than one fifth of
+
+that in the State last mentioned. New York, whose population is
+
+to that of South Carolina as six to five, has little more than
+
+one third of the number of representatives. As great a disparity
+
+prevails between the States of Georgia and Delaware or Rhode
+
+Island. In Pennsylvania, the representatives do not bear a
+
+greater proportion to their constituents than of one for every
+
+four or five thousand. In Rhode Island, they bear a proportion of
+
+at least one for every thousand. And according to the
+
+constitution of Georgia, the proportion may be carried to one to
+
+every ten electors; and must unavoidably far exceed the
+
+proportion in any of the other States. Another general remark to
+
+be made is, that the ratio between the representatives and the
+
+people ought not to be the same where the latter are very
+
+numerous as where they are very few. Were the representatives in
+
+Virginia to be regulated by the standard in Rhode Island, they
+
+would, at this time, amount to between four and five hundred; and
+
+twenty or thirty years hence, to a thousand. On the other hand,
+
+the ratio of Pennsylvania, if applied to the State of Delaware,
+
+would reduce the representative assembly of the latter to seven
+
+or eight members. Nothing can be more fallacious than to found
+
+our political calculations on arithmetical principles. Sixty or
+
+seventy men may be more properly trusted with a given degree of
+
+power than six or seven. But it does not follow that six or seven
+
+hundred would be proportionably a better depositary. And if we
+
+carry on the supposition to six or seven thousand, the whole
+
+reasoning ought to be reversed. The truth is, that in all cases a
+
+certain number at least seems to be necessary to secure the
+
+benefits of free consultation and discussion, and to guard
+
+against too easy a combination for improper purposes; as, on the
+
+other hand, the number ought at most to be kept within a certain
+
+limit, in order to avoid the confusion and intemperance of a
+
+multitude. In all very numerous assemblies, of whatever character
+
+composed, passion never fails to wrest the sceptre from reason.
+
+Had every Athenian citizen been a Socrates, every Athenian
+
+assembly would still have been a mob.
+                                         It is necessary also to
+
+recollect here the observations which were applied to the case of
+
+biennial elections. For the same reason that the limited powers
+
+of the Congress, and the control of the State legislatures,
+
+justify less frequent elections than the public safely might
+
+otherwise require, the members of the Congress need be less
+
+numerous than if they possessed the whole power of legislation,
+
+and were under no other than the ordinary restraints of other
+
+legislative bodies. With these general ideas in our mind, let us
+
+weigh the objections which have been stated against the number of
+
+members proposed for the House of Representatives. It is said, in
+
+the first place, that so small a number cannot be safely trusted
+
+with so much power. The number of which this branch of the
+
+legislature is to consist, at the outset of the government, will
+
+be sixtyfive. Within three years a census is to be taken, when
+
+the number may be augmented to one for every thirty thousand
+
+inhabitants; and within every successive period of ten years the
+
+census is to be renewed, and augmentations may continue to be
+
+made under the above limitation. It will not be thought an
+
+extravagant conjecture that the first census will, at the rate of
+
+one for every thirty thousand, raise the number of
+
+representatives to at least one hundred. Estimating the negroes
+
+in the proportion of three fifths, it can scarcely be doubted
+
+that the population of the United States will by that time, if it
+
+does not already, amount to three millions. At the expiration of
+
+twenty-five years, according to the computed rate of increase,
+
+the number of representatives will amount to two hundred, and of
+
+fifty years, to four hundred. This is a number which, I presume,
+
+will put an end to all fears arising from the smallness of the
+
+body. I take for granted here what I shall, in answering the
+
+fourth objection, hereafter show, that the number of
+
+representatives will be augmented from time to time in the
+
+manner provided by the Constitution. On a contrary supposition, I
+
+should admit the objection to have very great weight indeed. The
+
+true question to be decided then is, whether the smallness of the
+
+number, as a temporary regulation, be dangerous to the public
+
+liberty? Whether sixty-five members for a few years, and a
+
+hundred or two hundred for a few more, be a safe depositary for a
+
+limited and well-guarded power of legislating for the United
+
+States? I must own that I could not give a negative answer to
+
+this question, without first obliterating every impression which
+
+I have received with regard to the present genius of the people
+
+of America, the spirit which actuates the State legislatures, and
+
+the principles which are incorporated with the political
+
+character of every class of citizens I am unable to conceive that
+
+the people of America, in their present temper, or under any
+
+circumstances which can speedily happen, will choose, and every
+
+second year repeat the choice of, sixty-five or a hundred men who
+
+would be disposed to form and pursue a scheme of tyranny or
+
+treachery. I am unable to conceive that the State legislatures,
+
+which must feel so many motives to watch, and which possess so
+
+many means of counteracting, the federal legislature, would fail
+
+either to detect or to defeat a conspiracy of the latter against
+
+the liberties of their common constituents. I am equally unable
+
+to conceive that there are at this time, or can be in any short
+
+time, in the United States, any sixty-five or a hundred men
+
+capable of recommending themselves to the choice of the people at
+
+large, who would either desire or dare, within the short space of
+
+two years, to betray the solemn trust committed to them. What
+
+change of circumstances, time, and a fuller population of our
+
+country may produce, requires a prophetic spirit to declare,
+
+which makes no part of my pretensions. But judging from the
+
+circumstances now before us, and from the probable state of them
+
+within a moderate period of time, I must pronounce that the
+
+liberties of America cannot be unsafe in the number of hands
+
+proposed by the federal Constitution. From what quarter can the
+
+danger proceed? Are we afraid of foreign gold? If foreign gold
+
+could so easily corrupt our federal rulers and enable them to
+
+ensnare and betray their constituents, how has it happened that
+
+we are at this time a free and independent nation? The Congress
+
+which conducted us through the Revolution was a less numerous
+
+body than their successors will be; they were not chosen by, nor
+
+responsible to, their fellowcitizens at large; though appointed
+
+from year to year, and recallable at pleasure, they were
+
+generally continued for three years, and prior to the
+
+ratification of the federal articles, for a still longer term.
+
+They held their consultations always under the veil of secrecy;
+
+they had the sole transaction of our affairs with foreign
+
+nations; through the whole course of the war they had the fate of
+
+their country more in their hands than it is to be hoped will
+
+ever be the case with our future representatives; and from the
+
+greatness of the prize at stake, and the eagerness of the party
+
+which lost it, it may well be supposed that the use of other
+
+means than force would not have been scrupled. Yet we know by
+
+happy experience that the public trust was not betrayed; nor has
+
+the purity of our public councils in this particular ever
+
+suffered, even from the whispers of calumny. Is the danger
+
+apprehended from the other branches of the federal government?
+
+But where are the means to be found by the President, or the
+
+Senate, or both? Their emoluments of office, it is to be
+
+presumed, will not, and without a previous corruption of the
+
+House of Representatives cannot, more than suffice for very
+
+different purposes; their private fortunes, as they must allbe
+
+American citizens, cannot possibly be sources of danger. The
+
+only means, then, which they can possess, will be in the
+
+dispensation of appointments. Is it here that suspicion rests
+
+her charge? Sometimes we are told that this fund of corruption
+
+is to be exhausted by the President in subduing the virtue of the
+
+Senate. Now, the fidelity of the other House is to be the
+
+victim. The improbability of such a mercenary and perfidious
+
+combination of the several members of government, standing on as
+
+different foundations as republican principles will well admit,
+
+and at the same time accountable to the society over which they
+
+are placed, ought alone to quiet this apprehension. But,
+
+fortunately, the Constitution has provided a still further
+
+safeguard. The members of the Congress are rendered ineligible
+
+to any civil offices that may be created, or of which the
+
+emoluments may be increased, during the term of their election.
+
+No offices therefore can be dealt out to the existing members but
+
+such as may become vacant by ordinary casualties: and to suppose
+
+that these would be sufficient to purchase the guardians of the
+
+people, selected by the people themselves, is to renounce every
+
+rule by which events ought to be calculated, and to substitute an
+
+indiscriminate and unbounded jealousy, with which all reasoning
+
+must be vain. The sincere friends of liberty, who give
+
+themselves up to the extravagancies of this passion, are not
+
+aware of the injury they do their own cause. As there is a
+
+degree of depravity in mankind which requires a certain degree of
+
+circumspection and distrust, so there are other qualities in
+
+human nature which justify a certain portion of esteem and
+
+confidence. Republican government presupposes the existence of
+
+these qualities in a higher degree than any other form. Were the
+
+pictures which have been drawn by the political jealousy of some
+
+among us faithful likenesses of the human character, the
+
+inference would be, that there is not sufficient virtue among men
+
+for self-government; and that nothing less than the chains of
+
+despotism can restrain them from destroying and devouring one
+
+another. PUBLIUS.
+
+
+
+
+
+FEDERALIST No. 56
+
+
+
+The Same Subject Continued (The Total Number of the House of
+
+Representatives)
+
+From the New York Packet. Tuesday, February 19, 1788.
+
+
+
+HAMILTON OR MADISON
+
+
+
+To the People of the State of New York:
+
+THE SECOND charge against the House of Representatives is, that
+
+it will be too small to possess a due knowledge of the interests
+
+of its constituents. As this objection evidently proceeds from a
+
+comparison of the proposed number of representatives with the
+
+great extent of the United States, the number of their
+
+inhabitants, and the diversity of their interests, without taking
+
+into view at the same time the circumstances which will
+
+distinguish the Congress from other legislative bodies, the best
+
+answer that can be given to it will be a brief explanation of
+
+these peculiarities. It is a sound and important principle that
+
+the representative ought to be acquainted with the interests and
+
+circumstances of his constituents. But this principle can extend
+
+no further than to those circumstances and interests to which the
+
+authority and care of the representative relate. An ignorance of
+
+a variety of minute and particular objects, which do not lie
+
+within the compass of legislation, is consistent with every
+
+attribute necessary to a due performance of the legislative
+
+trust. In determining the extent of information required in the
+
+exercise of a particular authority, recourse then must be had to
+
+the objects within the purview of that authority. What are to be
+
+the objects of federal legislation? Those which are of most
+
+importance, and which seem most to require local knowledge, are
+
+commerce, taxation, and the militia. A proper regulation of
+
+commerce requires much information, as has been elsewhere
+
+remarked; but as far as this information relates to the laws and
+
+local situation of each individual State, a very few
+
+representatives would be very sufficient vehicles of it to the
+
+federal councils. Taxation will consist, in a great measure, of
+
+duties which will be involved in the regulation of commerce. So
+
+far the preceding remark is applicable to this object. As far as
+
+it may consist of internal collections, a more diffusive
+
+knowledge of the circumstances of the State may be necessary. But
+
+will not this also be possessed in sufficient degree by a very
+
+few intelligent men, diffusively elected within the State? Divide
+
+the largest State into ten or twelve districts, and it will be
+
+found that there will be no peculiar local interests in either,
+
+which will not be within the knowledge of the representative of
+
+the district. Besides this source of information, the laws of the
+
+State, framed by representatives from every part of it, will be
+
+almost of themselves a sufficient guide. In every State there
+
+have been made, and must continue to be made, regulations on this
+
+subject which will, in many cases, leave little more to be done
+
+by the federal legislature, than to review the different laws,
+
+and reduce them in one general act. A skillful individual in his
+
+closet with all the local codes before him, might compile a law
+
+on some subjects of taxation for the whole union, without any aid
+
+from oral information, and it may be expected that whenever
+
+internal taxes may be necessary, and particularly in cases
+
+requiring uniformity throughout the States, the more simple
+
+objects will be preferred. To be fully sensible of the facility
+
+which will be given to this branch of federal legislation by the
+
+assistance of the State codes, we need only suppose for a moment
+
+that this or any other State were divided into a number of parts,
+
+each having and exercising within itself a power of local
+
+legislation. Is it not evident that a degree of local information
+
+and preparatory labor would be found in the several volumes of
+
+their proceedings, which would very much shorten the labors of
+
+the general legislature, and render a much smaller number of
+
+members sufficient for it? The federal councils will derive great
+
+advantage from another circumstance. The representatives of each
+
+State will not only bring with them a considerable knowledge of
+
+its laws, and a local knowledge of their respective districts,
+
+but will probably in all cases have been members, and may even at
+
+the very time be members, of the State legislature, where all the
+
+local information and interests of the State are assembled, and
+
+from whence they may easily be conveyed by a very few hands into
+
+the legislature of the United States. The observations made on
+
+the subject of taxation apply with greater force to the case of
+
+the militia. For however different the rules of discipline may be
+
+in different States, they are the same throughout each particular
+
+State; and depend on circumstances which can differ but little in
+
+different parts of the same State. The attentive reader will
+
+discern that the reasoning here used, to prove the sufficiency of
+
+a moderate number of representatives, does not in any respect
+
+contradict what was urged on another occasion with regard to the
+
+extensive information which the representatives ought to possess,
+
+and the time that might be necessary for acquiring it. This
+
+information, so far as it may relate to local objects, is
+
+rendered necessary and difficult, not by a difference of laws and
+
+local circumstances within a single State, but of those among
+
+different States. Taking each State by itself, its laws are the
+
+same, and its interests but little diversified. A few men,
+
+therefore, will possess all the knowledge requisite for a proper
+
+representation of them. Were the interests and affairs of each
+
+individual State perfectly simple and uniform, a knowledge of
+
+them in one part would involve a knowledge of them in every
+
+other, and the whole State might be competently represented by a
+
+single member taken from any part of it. On a comparison of the
+
+different States together, we find a great dissimilarity in their
+
+laws, and in many other circumstances connected with the objects
+
+of federal legislation, with all of which the federal
+
+representatives ought to have some acquaintance. Whilst a few
+
+representatives, therefore, from each State, may bring with them
+
+a due knowledge of their own State, every representative will
+
+have much information to acquire concerning all the other States.
+
+The changes of time, as was formerly remarked, on the comparative
+
+situation of the different States, will have an assimilating
+
+effect. The effect of time on the internal affairs of the States,
+
+taken singly, will be just the contrary. At present some of the
+
+States are little more than a society of husbandmen. Few of them
+
+have made much progress in those branches of industry which give
+
+a variety and complexity to the affairs of a nation. These,
+
+however, will in all of them be the fruits of a more advanced
+
+population, and will require, on the part of each State, a fuller
+
+representation. The foresight of the convention has accordingly
+
+taken care that the progress of population may be accompanied
+
+with a proper increase of the representative branch of the
+
+government. The experience of Great Britain, which presents to
+
+mankind so many political lessons, both of the monitory and
+
+exemplary kind, and which has been frequently consulted in the
+
+course of these inquiries, corroborates the result of the
+
+reflections which we have just made. The number of inhabitants in
+
+the two kingdoms of England and Scotland cannot be stated at less
+
+than eight millions. The representatives of these eight millions
+
+in the House of Commons amount to five hundred and fifty-eight.
+
+Of this number, one ninth are elected by three hundred and
+
+sixty-four persons, and one half, by five thousand seven hundred
+
+and twenty-three persons. 1 It cannot be supposed that the half
+
+thus elected, and who do not even reside among the people at
+
+large, can add any thing either to the security of the people
+
+against the government, or to the knowledge of their
+
+circumstances and interests in the legislative councils. On the
+
+contrary, it is notorious, that they are more frequently the
+
+representatives and instruments of the executive magistrate, than
+
+the guardians and advocates of the popular rights. They might
+
+therefore, with great propriety, be considered as something more
+
+than a mere deduction from the real representatives of the
+
+nation. We will, however, consider them in this light alone, and
+
+will not extend the deduction to a considerable number of
+
+others, who do not reside among their constitutents, are very
+
+faintly connected with them, and have very little particular
+
+knowledge of their affairs. With all these concessions, two
+
+hundred and seventy-nine persons only will be the depository of
+
+the safety, interest, and happiness of eight millions that is to
+
+say, there will be one representative only to maintain the rights
+
+and explain the situation OF TWENTY-EIGHT THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED
+
+AND SEVENTY constitutents, in an assembly exposed to the whole
+
+force of executive influence, and extending its authority to
+
+every object of legislation within a nation whose affairs are in
+
+the highest degree diversified and complicated. Yet it is very
+
+certain, not only that a valuable portion of freedom has been
+
+preserved under all these circumstances, but that the defects in
+
+the British code are chargeable, in a very small proportion, on
+
+the ignorance of the legislature concerning the circumstances of
+
+the people. Allowing to this case the weight which is due to it,
+
+and comparing it with that of the House of Representatives as
+
+above explained it seems to give the fullest assurance, that a
+
+representative for every THIRTY THOUSAND INHABITANTS will render
+
+the latter both a safe and competent guardian of the interests
+
+which will be confided to it. PUBLIUS. Burgh's "Political
+
+Disquisitions. "
+
+
+
+
+
+FEDERALIST No. 57
+
+
+
+The Alleged Tendency of the New Plan to Elevate the Few at the
+
+Expense of the Many Considered in Connection with Representation
+
+From the New York Packet. Tuesday, February 19, 1788.
+
+
+
+HAMILTON OR MADISON
+
+
+
+To the People of the State of New York:
+
+THE THIRD charge against the House of Representatives is, that it
+
+will be taken from that class of citizens which will have least
+
+sympathy with the mass of the people, and be most likely to aim
+
+at an ambitious sacrifice of the many to the aggrandizement of
+
+the few. Of all the objections which have been framed against the
+
+federal Constitution, this is perhaps the most extraordinary.
+
+Whilst the objection itself is levelled against a pretended
+
+oligarchy, the principle of it strikes at the very root of
+
+republican government. The aim of every political constitution
+
+is, or ought to be, first to obtain for rulers men who possess
+
+most wisdom to discern, and most virtue to pursue, the common
+
+good of the society; and in the next place, to take the most
+
+effectual precautions for keeping them virtuous whilst they
+
+continue to hold their public trust. The elective mode of
+
+obtaining rulers is the characteristic policy of republican
+
+government. The means relied on in this form of government for
+
+preventing their degeneracy are numerous and various. The most
+
+effectual one, is such a limitation of the term of appointments
+
+as will maintain a proper responsibility to the people. Let me
+
+now ask what circumstance there is in the constitution of the
+
+House of Representatives that violates the principles of
+
+republican government, or favors the elevation of the few on the
+
+ruins of the many? Let me ask whether every circumstance is not,
+
+on the contrary, strictly conformable to these principles, and
+
+scrupulously impartial to the rights and pretensions of every
+
+class and description of citizens? Who are to be the electors of
+
+the federal representatives? Not the rich, more than the poor;
+
+not the learned, more than the ignorant; not the haughty heirs of
+
+distinguished names, more than the humble sons of obscurity and
+
+unpropitious fortune. The electors are to be the great body of
+
+the people of the United States. They are to be the same who
+
+exercise the right in every State of electing the corresponding
+
+branch of the legislature of the State. Who are to be the objects
+
+of popular choice? Every citizen whose merit may recommend him to
+
+the esteem and confidence of his country. No qualification of
+
+wealth, of birth, of religious faith, or of civil profession is
+
+permitted to fetter the judgement or disappoint the inclination
+
+of the people. If we consider the situation of the men on whom
+
+the free suffrages of their fellow-citizens may confer the
+
+representative trust, we shall find it involving every security
+
+which can be devised or desired for their fidelity to their
+
+constituents. In the first place, as they will have been
+
+distinguished by the preference of their fellow-citizens, we are
+
+to presume that in general they will be somewhat distinguished
+
+also by those qualities which entitle them to it, and which
+
+promise a sincere and scrupulous regard to the nature of their
+
+engagements. In the second place, they will enter into the public
+
+service under circumstances which cannot fail to produce a
+
+temporary affection at least to their constituents. There is in
+
+every breast a sensibility to marks of honor, of favor, of
+
+esteem, and of confidence, which, apart from all considerations
+
+of interest, is some pledge for grateful and benevolent returns.
+
+Ingratitude is a common topic of declamation against human
+
+nature; and it must be confessed that instances of it are but too
+
+frequent and flagrant, both in public and in private life. But
+
+the universal and extreme indignation which it inspires is itself
+
+a proof of the energy and prevalence of the contrary sentiment.
+
+In the third place, those ties which bind the representative to
+
+his constituents are strengthened by motives of a more selfish
+
+nature. His pride and vanity attach him to a form of government
+
+which favors his pretensions and gives him a share in its honors
+
+and distinctions. Whatever hopes or projects might be entertained
+
+by a few aspiring characters, it must generally happen that a
+
+great proportion of the men deriving their advancement from their
+
+influence with the people, would have more to hope from a
+
+preservation of the favor, than from innovations in the
+
+government subversive of the authority of the people. All these
+
+securities, however, would be found very insufficient without the
+
+restraint of frequent elections. Hence, in the fourth place, the
+
+House of Representatives is so constituted as to support in the
+
+members an habitual recollection of their dependence on the
+
+people. Before the sentiments impressed on their minds by the
+
+mode of their elevation can be effaced by the exercise of power,
+
+they will be compelled to anticipate the moment when their power
+
+is to cease, when their exercise of it is to be reviewed, and
+
+when they must descend to the level from which they were raised;
+
+there forever to remain unless a faithful discharge of their
+
+trust shall have established their title to a renewal of it. I
+
+will add, as a fifth circumstance in the situation of the House
+
+of Representatives, restraining them from oppressive measures,
+
+that they can make no law which will not have its full operation
+
+on themselves and their friends, as well as on the great mass of
+
+the society. This has always been deemed one of the strongest
+
+bonds by which human policy can connect the rulers and the people
+
+together. It creates between them that communion of interests and
+
+sympathy of sentiments, of which few governments have furnished
+
+examples; but without which every government degenerates into
+
+tyranny. If it be asked, what is to restrain the House of
+
+Representatives from making legal discriminations in favor of
+
+themselves and a particular class of the society? I answer: the
+
+genius of the whole system; the nature of just and constitutional
+
+laws; and above all, the vigilant and manly spirit which actuates
+
+the people of America, a spirit which nourishes freedom, and in
+
+return is nourished by it. If this spirit shall ever be so far
+
+debased as to tolerate a law not obligatory on the legislature,
+
+as well as on the people, the people will be prepared to tolerate
+
+any thing but liberty. Such will be the relation between the
+
+House of Representatives and their constituents. Duty, gratitude,
+
+interest, ambition itself, are the chords by which they will be
+
+bound to fidelity and sympathy with the great mass of the people.
+
+It is possible that these may all be insufficient to control the
+
+caprice and wickedness of man. But are they not all that
+
+government will admit, and that human prudence can devise? Are
+
+they not the genuine and the characteristic means by which
+
+republican government provides for the liberty and happiness of
+
+the people? Are they not the identical means on which every State
+
+government in the Union relies for the attainment of these
+
+important ends? What then are we to understand by the objection
+
+which this paper has combated? What are we to say to the men who
+
+profess the most flaming zeal for republican government, yet
+
+boldly impeach the fundamental principle of it; who pretend to be
+
+champions for the right and the capacity of the people to choose
+
+their own rulers, yet maintain that they will prefer those only
+
+who will immediately and infallibly betray the trust committed to
+
+them? Were the objection to be read by one who had not seen the
+
+mode prescribed by the Constitution for the choice of
+
+representatives, he could suppose nothing less than that some
+
+unreasonable qualification of property was annexed to the right
+
+of suffrage; or that the right of eligibility was limited to
+
+persons of particular families or fortunes; or at least that the
+
+mode prescribed by the State constitutions was in some respect or
+
+other, very grossly departed from. We have seen how far such a
+
+supposition would err, as to the two first points. Nor would it,
+
+in fact, be less erroneous as to the last. The only difference
+
+discoverable between the two cases is, that each representative
+
+of the United States will be elected by five or six thousand
+
+citizens; whilst in the individual States, the election of a
+
+representative is left to about as many hundreds. Will it be
+
+pretended that this difference is sufficient to justify an
+
+attachment to the State governments, and an abhorrence to the
+
+federal government? If this be the point on which the objection
+
+turns, it deserves to be examined. Is it supported by REASON?
+
+This cannot be said, without maintaining that five or six
+
+thousand citizens are less capable of choosing a fit
+
+representative, or more liable to be corrupted by an unfit one,
+
+than five or six hundred. Reason, on the contrary, assures us,
+
+that as in so great a number a fit representative would be most
+
+likely to be found, so the choice would be less likely to be
+
+diverted from him by the intrigues of the ambitious or the
+
+ambitious or the bribes of the rich. Is the CONSEQUENCE from
+
+this doctrine admissible? If we say that five or six hundred
+
+citizens are as many as can jointly exercise their right of
+
+suffrage, must we not deprive the people of the immediate choice
+
+of their public servants, in every instance where the
+
+administration of the government does not require as many of them
+
+as will amount to one for that number of citizens? Is the
+
+doctrine warranted by FACTS? It was shown in the last paper, that
+
+the real representation in the British House of Commons very
+
+little exceeds the proportion of one for every thirty thousand
+
+inhabitants. Besides a variety of powerful causes not existing
+
+here, and which favor in that country the pretensions of rank and
+
+wealth, no person is eligible as a representative of a county,
+
+unless he possess real estate of the clear value of six hundred
+
+pounds sterling per year; nor of a city or borough, unless he
+
+possess a like estate of half that annual value. To this
+
+qualification on the part of the county representatives is added
+
+another on the part of the county electors, which restrains the
+
+right of suffrage to persons having a freehold estate of the
+
+annual value of more than twenty pounds sterling, according to
+
+the present rate of money. Notwithstanding these unfavorable
+
+circumstances, and notwithstanding some very unequal laws in the
+
+British code, it cannot be said that the representatives of the
+
+nation have elevated the few on the ruins of the many. But we
+
+need not resort to foreign experience on this subject. Our own
+
+is explicit and decisive. The districts in New Hampshire in
+
+which the senators are chosen immediately by the people, are
+
+nearly as large as will be necessary for her representatives in
+
+the Congress. Those of Massachusetts are larger than will be
+
+necessary for that purpose; and those of New York still more so.
+
+In the last State the members of Assembly for the cities and
+
+counties of New York and Albany are elected by very nearly as
+
+many voters as will be entitled to a representative in the
+
+Congress, calculating on the number of sixty-five representatives
+
+only. It makes no difference that in these senatorial districts
+
+and counties a number of representatives are voted for by each
+
+elector at the same time. If the same electors at the same time
+
+are capable of choosing four or five representatives, they cannot
+
+be incapable of choosing one. Pennsylvania is an additional
+
+example. Some of her counties, which elect her State
+
+representatives, are almost as large as her districts will be by
+
+which her federal representatives will be elected. The city of
+
+Philadelphia is supposed to contain between fifty and sixty
+
+thousand souls. It will therefore form nearly two districts for
+
+the choice of federal representatives. It forms, however, but
+
+one county, in which every elector votes for each of its
+
+representatives in the State legislature. And what may appear to
+
+be still more directly to our purpose, the whole city actually
+
+elects a SINGLE MEMBER for the executive council. This is the
+
+case in all the other counties of the State. Are not these facts
+
+the most satisfactory proofs of the fallacy which has been
+
+employed against the branch of the federal government under
+
+consideration? Has it appeared on trial that the senators of New
+
+Hampshire, Massachusetts, and New York, or the executive council
+
+of Pennsylvania, or the members of the Assembly in the two last
+
+States, have betrayed any peculiar disposition to sacrifice the
+
+many to the few, or are in any respect less worthy of their
+
+places than the representatives and magistrates appointed in
+
+other States by very small divisions of the people? But there are
+
+cases of a stronger complexion than any which I have yet quoted.
+
+One branch of the legislature of Connecticut is so constituted
+
+that each member of it is elected by the whole State. So is the
+
+governor of that State, of Massachusetts, and of this State, and
+
+the president of New Hampshire. I leave every man to decide
+
+whether the result of any one of these experiments can be said to
+
+countenance a suspicion, that a diffusive mode of choosing
+
+representatives of the people tends to elevate traitors and to
+
+undermine the public liberty. PUBLIUS.
+
+
+
+
+
+FEDERALIST No. 58
+
+Objection That The Number of Members Will Not Be Augmented as the
+
+Progress of Population Demands Considered
+
+
+
+MADISON
+
+
+
+To the People of the State of New York:
+
+THE remaining charge against the House of Representatives, which
+
+I am to examine, is grounded on a supposition that the number of
+
+members will not be augmented from time to time, as the progress
+
+of population may demand. It has been admitted, that this
+
+objection, if well supported, would have great weight. The
+
+following observations will show that, like most other objections
+
+against the Constitution, it can only proceed from a partial view
+
+of the subject, or from a jealousy which discolors and disfigures
+
+every object which is beheld. 1. Those who urge the objection
+
+seem not to have recollected that the federal Constitution will
+
+not suffer by a comparison with the State constitutions, in the
+
+security provided for a gradual augmentation of the number of
+
+representatives. The number which is to prevail in the first
+
+instance is declared to be temporary. Its duration is limited to
+
+the short term of three years. Within every successive term of
+
+ten years a census of inhabitants is to be repeated. The
+
+unequivocal objects of these regulations are, first, to readjust,
+
+from time to time, the apportionment of representatives to the
+
+number of inhabitants, under the single exception that each State
+
+shall have one representative at least; secondly, to augment the
+
+number of representatives at the same periods, under the sole
+
+limitation that the whole number shall not exceed one for every
+
+thirty thousand inhabitants. If we review the constitutions of
+
+the several States, we shall find that some of them contain no
+
+determinate regulations on this subject, that others correspond
+
+pretty much on this point with the federal Constitution, and that
+
+the most effectual security in any of them is resolvable into a
+
+mere directory provision. 2. As far as experience has taken place
+
+on this subject, a gradual increase of representatives under the
+
+State constitutions has at least kept pace with that of the
+
+constituents, and it appears that the former have been as ready
+
+to concur in such measures as the latter have been to call for
+
+them. 3. There is a peculiarity in the federal Constitution which
+
+insures a watchful attention in a majority both of the people and
+
+of their representatives to a constitutional augmentation of the
+
+latter. The peculiarity lies in this, that one branch of the
+
+legislature is a representation of citizens, the other of the
+
+States: in the former, consequently, the larger States will have
+
+most weight; in the latter, the advantage will be in favor of the
+
+smaller States. From this circumstance it may with certainty be
+
+inferred that the larger States will be strenuous advocates for
+
+increasing the number and weight of that part of the legislature
+
+in which their influence predominates. And it so happens that
+
+four only of the largest will have a majority of the whole votes
+
+in the House of Representatives. Should the representatives or
+
+people, therefore, of the smaller States oppose at any time a
+
+reasonable addition of members, a coalition of a very few States
+
+will be sufficient to overrule the opposition; a coalition which,
+
+notwithstanding the rivalship and local prejudices which might
+
+prevent it on ordinary occasions, would not fail to take place,
+
+when not merely prompted by common interest, but justified by
+
+equity and the principles of the Constitution. It may be
+
+alleged, perhaps, that the Senate would be prompted by like
+
+motives to an adverse coalition; and as their concurrence would
+
+be indispensable, the just and constitutional views of the other
+
+branch might be defeated. This is the difficulty which has
+
+probably created the most serious apprehensions in the jealous
+
+friends of a numerous representation. Fortunately it is among
+
+the difficulties which, existing only in appearance, vanish on a
+
+close and accurate inspection. The following reflections will,
+
+if I mistake not, be admitted to be conclusive and satisfactory
+
+on this point. Notwithstanding the equal authority which will
+
+subsist between the two houses on all legislative subjects,
+
+except the originating of money bills, it cannot be doubted that
+
+the House, composed of the greater number of members, when
+
+supported by the more powerful States, and speaking the known and
+
+determined sense of a majority of the people, will have no small
+
+advantage in a question depending on the comparative firmness of
+
+the two houses. This advantage must be increased by the
+
+consciousness, felt by the same side of being supported in its
+
+demands by right, by reason, and by the Constitution; and the
+
+consciousness, on the opposite side, of contending against the
+
+force of all these solemn considerations. It is farther to be
+
+considered, that in the gradation between the smallest and
+
+largest States, there are several, which, though most likely in
+
+general to arrange themselves among the former are too little
+
+removed in extent and population from the latter, to second an
+
+opposition to their just and legitimate pretensions. Hence it is
+
+by no means certain that a majority of votes, even in the
+
+Senate, would be unfriendly to proper augmentations in the number
+
+of representatives. It will not be looking too far to add, that
+
+the senators from all the new States may be gained over to the
+
+just views of the House of Representatives, by an expedient too
+
+obvious to be overlooked. As these States will, for a great
+
+length of time, advance in population with peculiar rapidity,
+
+they will be interested in frequent reapportionments of the
+
+representatives to the number of inhabitants. The large States,
+
+therefore, who will prevail in the House of Representatives, will
+
+have nothing to do but to make reapportionments and augmentations
+
+mutually conditions of each other; and the senators from all the
+
+most growing States will be bound to contend for the latter, by
+
+the interest which their States will feel in the former. These
+
+considerations seem to afford ample security on this subject, and
+
+ought alone to satisfy all the doubts and fears which have been
+
+indulged with regard to it. Admitting, however, that they should
+
+all be insufficient to subdue the unjust policy of the smaller
+
+States, or their predominant influence in the councils of the
+
+Senate, a constitutional and infallible resource still remains
+
+with the larger States, by which they will be able at all times
+
+to accomplish their just purposes. The House of Representatives
+
+cannot only refuse, but they alone can propose, the supplies
+
+requisite for the support of government. They, in a word, hold
+
+the purse that powerful instrument by which we behold, in the
+
+history of the British Constitution, an infant and humble
+
+representation of the people gradually enlarging the sphere of
+
+its activity and importance, and finally reducing, as far as it
+
+seems to have wished, all the overgrown prerogatives of the other
+
+branches of the government. This power over the purse may, in
+
+fact, be regarded as the most complete and effectual weapon with
+
+which any constitution can arm the immediate representatives of
+
+the people, for obtaining a redress of every grievance, and for
+
+carrying into effect every just and salutary measure. But will
+
+not the House of Representatives be as much interested as the
+
+Senate in maintaining the government in its proper functions, and
+
+will they not therefore be unwilling to stake its existence or
+
+its reputation on the pliancy of the Senate? Or, if such a trial
+
+of firmness between the two branches were hazarded, would not the
+
+one be as likely first to yield as the other? These questions
+
+will create no difficulty with those who reflect that in all
+
+cases the smaller the number, and the more permanent and
+
+conspicuous the station, of men in power, the stronger must be
+
+the interest which they will individually feel in whatever
+
+concerns the government. Those who represent the dignity of their
+
+country in the eyes of other nations, will be particularly
+
+sensible to every prospect of public danger, or of dishonorable
+
+stagnation in public affairs. To those causes we are to ascribe
+
+the continual triumph of the British House of Commons over the
+
+other branches of the government, whenever the engine of a money
+
+bill has been employed. An absolute inflexibility on the side of
+
+the latter, although it could not have failed to involve every
+
+department of the state in the general confusion, has neither
+
+been apprehended nor experienced. The utmost degree of firmness
+
+that can be displayed by the federal Senate or President, will
+
+not be more than equal to a resistance in which they will be
+
+supported by constitutional and patriotic principles. In this
+
+review of the Constitution of the House of Representatives, I
+
+have passed over the circumstances of economy, which, in the
+
+present state of affairs, might have had some effect in lessening
+
+the temporary number of representatives, and a disregard of which
+
+would probably have been as rich a theme of declamation against
+
+the Constitution as has been shown by the smallness of the number
+
+proposed. I omit also any remarks on the difficulty which might
+
+be found, under present circumstances, in engaging in the federal
+
+service a large number of such characters as the people will
+
+probably elect. One observation, however, I must be permitted to
+
+add on this subject as claiming, in my judgment, a very serious
+
+attention. It is, that in all legislative assemblies the greater
+
+the number composing them may be, the fewer will be the men who
+
+will in fact direct their proceedings. In the first place, the
+
+more numerous an assembly may be, of whatever characters
+
+composed, the greater is known to be the ascendency of passion
+
+over reason. In the next place, the larger the number, the
+
+greater will be the proportion of members of limited information
+
+and of weak capacities. Now, it is precisely on characters of
+
+this description that the eloquence and address of the few are
+
+known to act with all their force. In the ancient republics,
+
+where the whole body of the people assembled in person, a single
+
+orator, or an artful statesman, was generally seen to rule with
+
+as complete a sway as if a sceptre had been placed in his single
+
+hand. On the same principle, the more multitudinous a
+
+representative assembly may be rendered, the more it will partake
+
+of the infirmities incident to collective meetings of the people.
+
+Ignorance will be the dupe of cunning, and passion the slave of
+
+sophistry and declamation. The people can never err more than in
+
+supposing that by multiplying their representatives beyond a
+
+certain limit, they strengthen the barrier against the government
+
+of a few. Experience will forever admonish them that, on the
+
+contrary, AFTER SECURING A SUFFICIENT NUMBER FOR THE PURPOSES OF
+
+SAFETY, OF LOCAL INFORMATION, AND OF DIFFUSIVE SYMPATHY WITH THE
+
+WHOLE SOCIETY, they will counteract their own views by every
+
+addition to their representatives. The countenance of the
+
+government may become more democratic, but the soul that animates
+
+it will be more oligarchic. The machine will be enlarged, but the
+
+fewer, and often the more secret, will be the springs by which
+
+its motions are directed. As connected with the objection against
+
+the number of representatives, may properly be here noticed, that
+
+which has been suggested against the number made competent for
+
+legislative business. It has been said that more than a majority
+
+ought to have been required for a quorum; and in particular
+
+cases, if not in all, more than a majority of a quorum for a
+
+decision. That some advantages might have resulted from such a
+
+precaution, cannot be denied. It might have been an additional
+
+shield to some particular interests, and another obstacle
+
+generally to hasty and partial measures. But these considerations
+
+are outweighed by the inconveniences in the opposite scale. In
+
+all cases where justice or the general good might require new
+
+laws to be passed, or active measures to be pursued, the
+
+fundamental principle of free government would be reversed. It
+
+would be no longer the majority that would rule: the power would
+
+be transferred to the minority. Were the defensive privilege
+
+limited to particular cases, an interested minority might take
+
+advantage of it to screen themselves from equitable sacrifices to
+
+the general weal, or, in particular emergencies, to extort
+
+unreasonable indulgences. Lastly, it would facilitate and foster
+
+the baneful practice of secessions; a practice which has shown
+
+itself even in States where a majority only is required; a
+
+practice subversive of all the principles of order and regular
+
+government; a practice which leads more directly to public
+
+convulsions, and the ruin of popular governments, than any other
+
+which has yet been displayed among us. PUBLIUS.
+
+
+
+
+
+FEDERALIST No. 59
+
+
+
+Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of
+
+Members
+
+From the New York Packet. Friday, February 22, 1788.
+
+
+
+HAMILTON
+
+
+
+To the People of the State of New York:
+
+THE natural order of the subject leads us to consider, in this
+
+place, that provision of the Constitution which authorizes the
+
+national legislature to regulate, in the last resort, the
+
+election of its own members. It is in these words: "The TIMES,
+
+PLACES, and MANNER of holding elections for senators and
+
+representatives shall be prescribed in each State by the
+
+legislature thereof; but the Congress may, at any time, by law,
+
+make or alter SUCH REGULATIONS, except as to the PLACES of
+
+choosing senators. "1 This provision has not only been declaimed
+
+against by those who condemn the Constitution in the gross, but
+
+it has been censured by those who have objected with less
+
+latitude and greater moderation; and, in one instance it has been
+
+thought exceptionable by a gentleman who has declared himself the
+
+advocate of every other part of the system. I am greatly
+
+mistaken, notwithstanding, if there be any article in the whole
+
+plan more completely defensible than this. Its propriety rests
+
+upon the evidence of this plain proposition, that EVERY
+
+GOVERNMENT OUGHT TO CONTAIN IN ITSELF THE MEANS OF ITS OWN
+
+PRESERVATION. Every just reasoner will, at first sight, approve
+
+an adherence to this rule, in the work of the convention; and
+
+will disapprove every deviation from it which may not appear to
+
+have been dictated by the necessity of incorporating into the
+
+work some particular ingredient, with which a rigid conformity to
+
+the rule was incompatible. Even in this case, though he may
+
+acquiesce in the necessity, yet he will not cease to regard and
+
+to regret a departure from so fundamental a principle, as a
+
+portion of imperfection in the system which may prove the seed of
+
+future weakness, and perhaps anarchy. It will not be alleged,
+
+that an election law could have been framed and inserted in the
+
+Constitution, which would have been always applicable to every
+
+probable change in the situation of the country; and it will
+
+therefore not be denied, that a discretionary power over
+
+elections ought to exist somewhere. It will, I presume, be as
+
+readily conceded, that there were only three ways in which this
+
+power could have been reasonably modified and disposed: that it
+
+must either have been lodged wholly in the national legislature,
+
+or wholly in the State legislatures, or primarily in the latter
+
+and ultimately in the former. The last mode has, with reason,
+
+been preferred by the convention. They have submitted the
+
+regulation of elections for the federal government, in the first
+
+instance, to the local administrations; which, in ordinary
+
+cases, and when no improper views prevail, may be both more
+
+convenient and more satisfactory; but they have reserved to the
+
+national authority a right to interpose, whenever extraordinary
+
+circumstances might render that interposition necessary to its
+
+safety. Nothing can be more evident, than that an exclusive
+
+power of regulating elections for the national government, in the
+
+hands of the State legislatures, would leave the existence of the
+
+Union entirely at their mercy. They could at any moment
+
+annihilate it, by neglecting to provide for the choice of persons
+
+to administer its affairs. It is to little purpose to say, that
+
+a neglect or omission of this kind would not be likely to take
+
+place. The constitutional possibility of the thing, without an
+
+equivalent for the risk, is an unanswerable objection. Nor has
+
+any satisfactory reason been yet assigned for incurring that
+
+risk. The extravagant surmises of a distempered jealousy can
+
+never be dignified with that character. If we are in a humor to
+
+presume abuses of power, it is as fair to presume them on the
+
+part of the State governments as on the part of the general
+
+government. And as it is more consonant to the rules of a just
+
+theory, to trust the Union with the care of its own existence,
+
+than to transfer that care to any other hands, if abuses of power
+
+are to be hazarded on the one side or on the other, it is more
+
+rational to hazard them where the power would naturally be
+
+placed, than where it would unnaturally be placed. Suppose an
+
+article had been introduced into the Constitution, empowering the
+
+United States to regulate the elections for the particular
+
+States, would any man have hesitated to condemn it, both as an
+
+unwarrantable transposition of power, and as a premeditated
+
+engine for the destruction of the State governments? The
+
+violation of principle, in this case, would have required no
+
+comment; and, to an unbiased observer, it will not be less
+
+apparent in the project of subjecting the existence of the
+
+national government, in a similar respect, to the pleasure of the
+
+State governments. An impartial view of the matter cannot fail
+
+to result in a conviction, that each, as far as possible, ought
+
+to depend on itself for its own preservation. As an objection to
+
+this position, it may be remarked that the constitution of the
+
+national Senate would involve, in its full extent, the danger
+
+which it is suggested might flow from an exclusive power in the
+
+State legislatures to regulate the federal elections. It may be
+
+alleged, that by declining the appointment of Senators, they
+
+might at any time give a fatal blow to the Union; and from this
+
+it may be inferred, that as its existence would be thus rendered
+
+dependent upon them in so essential a point, there can be no
+
+objection to intrusting them with it in the particular case under
+
+consideration. The interest of each State, it may be added, to
+
+maintain its representation in the national councils, would be a
+
+complete security against an abuse of the trust. This argument,
+
+though specious, will not, upon examination, be found solid. It
+
+is certainly true that the State legislatures, by forbearing the
+
+appointment of senators, may destroy the national government. But
+
+it will not follow that, because they have a power to do this in
+
+one instance, they ought to have it in every other. There are
+
+cases in which the pernicious tendency of such a power may be far
+
+more decisive, without any motive equally cogent with that which
+
+must have regulated the conduct of the convention in respect to
+
+the formation of the Senate, to recommend their admission into
+
+the system. So far as that construction may expose the Union to
+
+the possibility of injury from the State legislatures, it is an
+
+evil; but it is an evil which could not have been avoided without
+
+excluding the States, in their political capacities, wholly from
+
+a place in the organization of the national government. If this
+
+had been done, it would doubtless have been interpreted into an
+
+entire dereliction of the federal principle; and would certainly
+
+have deprived the State governments of that absolute safeguard
+
+which they will enjoy under this provision. But however wise it
+
+may have been to have submitted in this instance to an
+
+inconvenience, for the attainment of a necessary advantage or a
+
+greater good, no inference can be drawn from thence to favor an
+
+accumulation of the evil, where no necessity urges, nor any
+
+greater good invites. It may be easily discerned also that the
+
+national government would run a much greater risk from a power in
+
+the State legislatures over the elections of its House of
+
+Representatives, than from their power of appointing the members
+
+of its Senate. The senators are to be chosen for the period of
+
+six years; there is to be a rotation, by which the seats of a
+
+third part of them are to be vacated and replenished every two
+
+years; and no State is to be entitled to more than two senators;
+
+a quorum of the body is to consist of sixteen members. The joint
+
+result of these circumstances would be, that a temporary
+
+combination of a few States to intermit the appointment of
+
+senators, could neither annul the existence nor impair the
+
+activity of the body; and it is not from a general and permanent
+
+combination of the States that we can have any thing to fear. The
+
+first might proceed from sinister designs in the leading members
+
+of a few of the State legislatures; the last would suppose a
+
+fixed and rooted disaffection in the great body of the people,
+
+which will either never exist at all, or will, in all
+
+probability, proceed from an experience of the inaptitude of the
+
+general government to the advancement of their happiness in which
+
+event no good citizen could desire its continuance. But with
+
+regard to the federal House of Representatives, there is intended
+
+to be a general election of members once in two years. If the
+
+State legislatures were to be invested with an exclusive power of
+
+regulating these elections, every period of making them would be
+
+a delicate crisis in the national situation, which might issue in
+
+a dissolution of the Union, if the leaders of a few of the most
+
+important States should have entered into a previous conspiracy
+
+to prevent an election. I shall not deny, that there is a degree
+
+of weight in the observation, that the interests of each State,
+
+to be represented in the federal councils, will be a security
+
+against the abuse of a power over its elections in the hands of
+
+the State legislatures. But the security will not be considered
+
+as complete, by those who attend to the force of an obvious
+
+distinction between the interest of the people in the public
+
+felicity, and the interest of their local rulers in the power and
+
+consequence of their offices. The people of America may be
+
+warmly attached to the government of the Union, at times when the
+
+particular rulers of particular States, stimulated by the natural
+
+rivalship of power, and by the hopes of personal aggrandizement,
+
+and supported by a strong faction in each of those States, may be
+
+in a very opposite temper. This diversity of sentiment between a
+
+majority of the people, and the individuals who have the
+
+greatest credit in their councils, is exemplified in some of the
+
+States at the present moment, on the present question. The
+
+scheme of separate confederacies, which will always multiply the
+
+chances of ambition, will be a never failing bait to all such
+
+influential characters in the State administrations as are
+
+capable of preferring their own emolument and advancement to the
+
+public weal. With so effectual a weapon in their hands as the
+
+exclusive power of regulating elections for the national
+
+government, a combination of a few such men, in a few of the most
+
+considerable States, where the temptation will always be the
+
+strongest, might accomplish the destruction of the Union, by
+
+seizing the opportunity of some casual dissatisfaction among the
+
+people (and which perhaps they may themselves have excited), to
+
+discontinue the choice of members for the federal House of
+
+Representatives. It ought never to be forgotten, that a firm
+
+union of this country, under an efficient government, will
+
+probably be an increasing object of jealousy to more than one
+
+nation of Europe; and that enterprises to subvert it will
+
+sometimes originate in the intrigues of foreign powers, and will
+
+seldom fail to be patronized and abetted by some of them. Its
+
+preservation, therefore ought in no case that can be avoided, to
+
+be committed to the guardianship of any but those whose situation
+
+will uniformly beget an immediate interest in the faithful and
+
+vigilant performance of the trust. PUBLIUS. Ist clause, 4th
+
+section, of the Ist article.
+
+
+
+
+
+FEDERALIST No. 60
+
+
+
+The Same Subject Continued
+
+(Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of
+Members)
+
+From the New York Packet.
+
+Tuesday, February 26, 1788.
+
+
+
+HAMILTON
+
+
+
+To the People of the State of New York:
+
+WE HAVE seen, that an uncontrollable power over the elections to
+the federal government could not, without hazard, be committed to
+the State legislatures. Let us now see, what would be the danger on
+the other side; that is, from confiding the ultimate right of
+regulating its own elections to the Union itself. It is not
+pretended, that this right would ever be used for the exclusion of
+any State from its share in the representation. The interest of all
+would, in this respect at least, be the security of all. But it is
+alleged, that it might be employed in such a manner as to promote
+the election of some favorite class of men in exclusion of others,
+by confining the places of election to particular districts, and
+rendering it impracticable to the citizens at large to partake in
+the choice. Of all chimerical suppositions, this seems to be the
+most chimerical. On the one hand, no rational calculation of
+probabilities would lead us to imagine that the disposition which a
+conduct so violent and extraordinary would imply, could ever find
+its way into the national councils; and on the other, it may be
+concluded with certainty, that if so improper a spirit should ever
+gain admittance into them, it would display itself in a form
+altogether different and far more decisive.
+
+The improbability of the attempt may be satisfactorily inferred
+from this single reflection, that it could never be made without
+causing an immediate revolt of the great body of the people, headed
+and directed by the State governments. It is not difficult to
+conceive that this characteristic right of freedom may, in certain
+turbulent and factious seasons, be violated, in respect to a
+particular class of citizens, by a victorious and overbearing
+majority; but that so fundamental a privilege, in a country so
+situated and enlightened, should be invaded to the prejudice of the
+great mass of the people, by the deliberate policy of the
+government, without occasioning a popular revolution, is altogether
+inconceivable and incredible.
+
+In addition to this general reflection, there are considerations
+of a more precise nature, which forbid all apprehension on the
+subject. The dissimilarity in the ingredients which will compose
+the national government, and still more in the manner in which they
+will be brought into action in its various branches, must form a
+powerful obstacle to a concert of views in any partial scheme of
+elections. There is sufficient diversity in the state of property,
+in the genius, manners, and habits of the people of the different
+parts of the Union, to occasion a material diversity of disposition
+in their representatives towards the different ranks and conditions
+in society. And though an intimate intercourse under the same
+government will promote a gradual assimilation in some of these
+respects, yet there are causes, as well physical as moral, which
+may, in a greater or less degree, permanently nourish different
+propensities and inclinations in this respect. But the circumstance
+which will be likely to have the greatest influence in the matter,
+will be the dissimilar modes of constituting the several component
+parts of the government. The House of Representatives being to be
+elected immediately by the people, the Senate by the State
+legislatures, the President by electors chosen for that purpose by
+the people, there would be little probability of a common interest
+to cement these different branches in a predilection for any
+particular class of electors.
+
+As to the Senate, it is impossible that any regulation of "time
+and manner," which is all that is proposed to be submitted to the
+national government in respect to that body, can affect the spirit
+which will direct the choice of its members. The collective sense
+of the State legislatures can never be influenced by extraneous
+circumstances of that sort; a consideration which alone ought to
+satisfy us that the discrimination apprehended would never be
+attempted. For what inducement could the Senate have to concur in a
+preference in which itself would not be included? Or to what
+purpose would it be established, in reference to one branch of the
+legislature, if it could not be extended to the other? The
+composition of the one would in this case counteract that of the
+other. And we can never suppose that it would embrace the
+appointments to the Senate, unless we can at the same time suppose
+the voluntary co-operation of the State legislatures. If we make
+the latter supposition, it then becomes immaterial where the power
+in question is placed whether in their hands or in those of the
+Union.
+
+But what is to be the object of this capricious partiality in
+the national councils? Is it to be exercised in a discrimination
+between the different departments of industry, or between the
+different kinds of property, or between the different degrees of
+property? Will it lean in favor of the landed interest, or the
+moneyed interest, or the mercantile interest, or the manufacturing
+interest? Or, to speak in the fashionable language of the
+adversaries to the Constitution, will it court the elevation of
+"the wealthy and the well-born," to the exclusion and debasement
+of all the rest of the society?
+
+If this partiality is to be exerted in favor of those who are
+concerned in any particular description of industry or property, I
+presume it will readily be admitted, that the competition for it
+will lie between landed men and merchants. And I scruple not to
+affirm, that it is infinitely less likely that either of them should
+gain an ascendant in the national councils, than that the one or the
+other of them should predominate in all the local councils. The
+inference will be, that a conduct tending to give an undue
+preference to either is much less to be dreaded from the former than
+from the latter.
+
+The several States are in various degrees addicted to
+agriculture and commerce. In most, if not all of them, agriculture
+is predominant. In a few of them, however, commerce nearly divides
+its empire, and in most of them has a considerable share of
+influence. In proportion as either prevails, it will be conveyed
+into the national representation; and for the very reason, that
+this will be an emanation from a greater variety of interests, and
+in much more various proportions, than are to be found in any single
+State, it will be much less apt to espouse either of them with a
+decided partiality, than the representation of any single State.
+
+In a country consisting chiefly of the cultivators of land,
+where the rules of an equal representation obtain, the landed
+interest must, upon the whole, preponderate in the government. As
+long as this interest prevails in most of the State legislatures, so
+long it must maintain a correspondent superiority in the national
+Senate, which will generally be a faithful copy of the majorities of
+those assemblies. It cannot therefore be presumed, that a sacrifice
+of the landed to the mercantile class will ever be a favorite object
+of this branch of the federal legislature. In applying thus
+particularly to the Senate a general observation suggested by the
+situation of the country, I am governed by the consideration, that
+the credulous votaries of State power cannot, upon their own
+principles, suspect, that the State legislatures would be warped
+from their duty by any external influence. But in reality the same
+situation must have the same effect, in the primative composition at
+least of the federal House of Representatives: an improper bias
+towards the mercantile class is as little to be expected from this
+quarter as from the other.
+
+In order, perhaps, to give countenance to the objection at any
+rate, it may be asked, is there not danger of an opposite bias in
+the national government, which may dispose it to endeavor to secure
+a monopoly of the federal administration to the landed class? As
+there is little likelihood that the supposition of such a bias will
+have any terrors for those who would be immediately injured by it, a
+labored answer to this question will be dispensed with. It will be
+sufficient to remark, first, that for the reasons elsewhere
+assigned, it is less likely that any decided partiality should
+prevail in the councils of the Union than in those of any of its
+members. Secondly, that there would be no temptation to violate the
+Constitution in favor of the landed class, because that class would,
+in the natural course of things, enjoy as great a preponderancy as
+itself could desire. And thirdly, that men accustomed to
+investigate the sources of public prosperity upon a large scale,
+must be too well convinced of the utility of commerce, to be
+inclined to inflict upon it so deep a wound as would result from the
+entire exclusion of those who would best understand its interest
+from a share in the management of them. The importance of commerce,
+in the view of revenue alone, must effectually guard it against the
+enmity of a body which would be continually importuned in its favor,
+by the urgent calls of public necessity.
+
+I the rather consult brevity in discussing the probability of a
+preference founded upon a discrimination between the different kinds
+of industry and property, because, as far as I understand the
+meaning of the objectors, they contemplate a discrimination of
+another kind. They appear to have in view, as the objects of the
+preference with which they endeavor to alarm us, those whom they
+designate by the description of "the wealthy and the well-born."
+These, it seems, are to be exalted to an odious pre-eminence over
+the rest of their fellow-citizens. At one time, however, their
+elevation is to be a necessary consequence of the smallness of the
+representative body; at another time it is to be effected by
+depriving the people at large of the opportunity of exercising their
+right of suffrage in the choice of that body.
+
+But upon what principle is the discrimination of the places of
+election to be made, in order to answer the purpose of the meditated
+preference? Are "the wealthy and the well-born," as they are
+called, confined to particular spots in the several States? Have
+they, by some miraculous instinct or foresight, set apart in each of
+them a common place of residence? Are they only to be met with in
+the towns or cities? Or are they, on the contrary, scattered over
+the face of the country as avarice or chance may have happened to
+cast their own lot or that of their predecessors? If the latter is
+the case, (as every intelligent man knows it to be,1) is it not
+evident that the policy of confining the places of election to
+particular districts would be as subversive of its own aim as it
+would be exceptionable on every other account? The truth is, that
+there is no method of securing to the rich the preference
+apprehended, but by prescribing qualifications of property either
+for those who may elect or be elected. But this forms no part of
+the power to be conferred upon the national government. Its
+authority would be expressly restricted to the regulation of the
+TIMES, the PLACES, the MANNER of elections. The qualifications of
+the persons who may choose or be chosen, as has been remarked upon
+other occasions, are defined and fixed in the Constitution, and are
+unalterable by the legislature.
+
+Let it, however, be admitted, for argument sake, that the
+expedient suggested might be successful; and let it at the same
+time be equally taken for granted that all the scruples which a
+sense of duty or an apprehension of the danger of the experiment
+might inspire, were overcome in the breasts of the national rulers,
+still I imagine it will hardly be pretended that they could ever
+hope to carry such an enterprise into execution without the aid of a
+military force sufficient to subdue the resistance of the great body
+of the people. The improbability of the existence of a force equal
+to that object has been discussed and demonstrated in different
+parts of these papers; but that the futility of the objection under
+consideration may appear in the strongest light, it shall be
+conceded for a moment that such a force might exist, and the
+national government shall be supposed to be in the actual possession
+of it. What will be the conclusion? With a disposition to invade
+the essential rights of the community, and with the means of
+gratifying that disposition, is it presumable that the persons who
+were actuated by it would amuse themselves in the ridiculous task of
+fabricating election laws for securing a preference to a favorite
+class of men? Would they not be likely to prefer a conduct better
+adapted to their own immediate aggrandizement? Would they not
+rather boldly resolve to perpetuate themselves in office by one
+decisive act of usurpation, than to trust to precarious expedients
+which, in spite of all the precautions that might accompany them,
+might terminate in the dismission, disgrace, and ruin of their
+authors? Would they not fear that citizens, not less tenacious than
+conscious of their rights, would flock from the remote extremes of
+their respective States to the places of election, to overthrow
+their tyrants, and to substitute men who would be disposed to avenge
+the violated majesty of the people?
+
+PUBLIUS.
+
+1 Particularly in the Southern States and in this State.
+
+
+
+
+
+FEDERALIST No. 61
+
+
+
+The Same Subject Continued
+
+(Concerning the Power of Congress to Regulate the Election of
+Members)
+
+From the New York Packet.
+
+Tuesday, February 26, 1788.
+
+
+
+HAMILTON
+
+
+
+To the People of the State of New York:
+
+THE more candid opposers of the provision respecting elections,
+contained in the plan of the convention, when pressed in argument,
+will sometimes concede the propriety of that provision; with this
+qualification, however, that it ought to have been accompanied with
+a declaration, that all elections should be had in the counties
+where the electors resided. This, say they, was a necessary
+precaution against an abuse of the power. A declaration of this
+nature would certainly have been harmless; so far as it would have
+had the effect of quieting apprehensions, it might not have been
+undesirable. But it would, in fact, have afforded little or no
+additional security against the danger apprehended; and the want of
+it will never be considered, by an impartial and judicious examiner,
+as a serious, still less as an insuperable, objection to the plan.
+The different views taken of the subject in the two preceding
+papers must be sufficient to satisfy all dispassionate and
+discerning men, that if the public liberty should ever be the victim
+of the ambition of the national rulers, the power under examination,
+at least, will be guiltless of the sacrifice.
+
+If those who are inclined to consult their jealousy only, would
+exercise it in a careful inspection of the several State
+constitutions, they would find little less room for disquietude and
+alarm, from the latitude which most of them allow in respect to
+elections, than from the latitude which is proposed to be allowed to
+the national government in the same respect. A review of their
+situation, in this particular, would tend greatly to remove any ill
+impressions which may remain in regard to this matter. But as that
+view would lead into long and tedious details, I shall content
+myself with the single example of the State in which I write. The
+constitution of New York makes no other provision for LOCALITY of
+elections, than that the members of the Assembly shall be elected in
+the COUNTIES; those of the Senate, in the great districts into
+which the State is or may be divided: these at present are four in
+number, and comprehend each from two to six counties. It may
+readily be perceived that it would not be more difficult to the
+legislature of New York to defeat the suffrages of the citizens of
+New York, by confining elections to particular places, than for the
+legislature of the United States to defeat the suffrages of the
+citizens of the Union, by the like expedient. Suppose, for
+instance, the city of Albany was to be appointed the sole place of
+election for the county and district of which it is a part, would
+not the inhabitants of that city speedily become the only electors
+of the members both of the Senate and Assembly for that county and
+district? Can we imagine that the electors who reside in the remote
+subdivisions of the counties of Albany, Saratoga, Cambridge, etc.,
+or in any part of the county of Montgomery, would take the trouble
+to come to the city of Albany, to give their votes for members of
+the Assembly or Senate, sooner than they would repair to the city of
+New York, to participate in the choice of the members of the federal
+House of Representatives? The alarming indifference discoverable in
+the exercise of so invaluable a privilege under the existing laws,
+which afford every facility to it, furnishes a ready answer to this
+question. And, abstracted from any experience on the subject, we
+can be at no loss to determine, that when the place of election is
+at an INCONVENIENT DISTANCE from the elector, the effect upon his
+conduct will be the same whether that distance be twenty miles or
+twenty thousand miles. Hence it must appear, that objections to the
+particular modification of the federal power of regulating elections
+will, in substance, apply with equal force to the modification of
+the like power in the constitution of this State; and for this
+reason it will be impossible to acquit the one, and to condemn the
+other. A similar comparison would lead to the same conclusion in
+respect to the constitutions of most of the other States.
+
+If it should be said that defects in the State constitutions
+furnish no apology for those which are to be found in the plan
+proposed, I answer, that as the former have never been thought
+chargeable with inattention to the security of liberty, where the
+imputations thrown on the latter can be shown to be applicable to
+them also, the presumption is that they are rather the cavilling
+refinements of a predetermined opposition, than the well-founded
+inferences of a candid research after truth. To those who are
+disposed to consider, as innocent omissions in the State
+constitutions, what they regard as unpardonable blemishes in the
+plan of the convention, nothing can be said; or at most, they can
+only be asked to assign some substantial reason why the
+representatives of the people in a single State should be more
+impregnable to the lust of power, or other sinister motives, than
+the representatives of the people of the United States? If they
+cannot do this, they ought at least to prove to us that it is easier
+to subvert the liberties of three millions of people, with the
+advantage of local governments to head their opposition, than of two
+hundred thousand people who are destitute of that advantage. And in
+relation to the point immediately under consideration, they ought to
+convince us that it is less probable that a predominant faction in a
+single State should, in order to maintain its superiority, incline
+to a preference of a particular class of electors, than that a
+similar spirit should take possession of the representatives of
+thirteen States, spread over a vast region, and in several respects
+distinguishable from each other by a diversity of local
+circumstances, prejudices, and interests.
+
+Hitherto my observations have only aimed at a vindication of the
+provision in question, on the ground of theoretic propriety, on that
+of the danger of placing the power elsewhere, and on that of the
+safety of placing it in the manner proposed. But there remains to
+be mentioned a positive advantage which will result from this
+disposition, and which could not as well have been obtained from any
+other: I allude to the circumstance of uniformity in the time of
+elections for the federal House of Representatives. It is more than
+possible that this uniformity may be found by experience to be of
+great importance to the public welfare, both as a security against
+the perpetuation of the same spirit in the body, and as a cure for
+the diseases of faction. If each State may choose its own time of
+election, it is possible there may be at least as many different
+periods as there are months in the year. The times of election in
+the several States, as they are now established for local purposes,
+vary between extremes as wide as March and November. The
+consequence of this diversity would be that there could never happen
+a total dissolution or renovation of the body at one time. If an
+improper spirit of any kind should happen to prevail in it, that
+spirit would be apt to infuse itself into the new members, as they
+come forward in succession. The mass would be likely to remain
+nearly the same, assimilating constantly to itself its gradual
+accretions. There is a contagion in example which few men have
+sufficient force of mind to resist. I am inclined to think that
+treble the duration in office, with the condition of a total
+dissolution of the body at the same time, might be less formidable
+to liberty than one third of that duration subject to gradual and
+successive alterations.
+
+Uniformity in the time of elections seems not less requisite for
+executing the idea of a regular rotation in the Senate, and for
+conveniently assembling the legislature at a stated period in each
+year.
+
+It may be asked, Why, then, could not a time have been fixed in
+the Constitution? As the most zealous adversaries of the plan of
+the convention in this State are, in general, not less zealous
+admirers of the constitution of the State, the question may be
+retorted, and it may be asked, Why was not a time for the like
+purpose fixed in the constitution of this State? No better answer
+can be given than that it was a matter which might safely be
+entrusted to legislative discretion; and that if a time had been
+appointed, it might, upon experiment, have been found less
+convenient than some other time. The same answer may be given to
+the question put on the other side. And it may be added that the
+supposed danger of a gradual change being merely speculative, it
+would have been hardly advisable upon that speculation to establish,
+as a fundamental point, what would deprive several States of the
+convenience of having the elections for their own governments and
+for the national government at the same epochs.
+
+PUBLIUS.
+
+
+
+
+
+FEDERALIST No. 62
+
+
+
+The Senate
+
+For the Independent Journal.
+
+
+
+HAMILTON OR MADISON
+
+
+
+To the People of the State of New York:
+
+HAVING examined the constitution of the House of
+Representatives, and answered such of the objections against it as
+seemed to merit notice, I enter next on the examination of the
+Senate.
+
+The heads into which this member of the government may be
+considered are: I. The qualification of senators; II. The
+appointment of them by the State legislatures; III. The equality of
+representation in the Senate; IV. The number of senators, and the
+term for which they are to be elected; V. The powers vested in the
+Senate.
+
+I. The qualifications proposed for senators, as distinguished
+from those of representatives, consist in a more advanced age and a
+longer period of citizenship. A senator must be thirty years of age
+at least; as a representative must be twenty-five. And the former
+must have been a citizen nine years; as seven years are required
+for the latter. The propriety of these distinctions is explained by
+the nature of the senatorial trust, which, requiring greater extent
+of information and stability of character, requires at the same time
+that the senator should have reached a period of life most likely to
+supply these advantages; and which, participating immediately in
+transactions with foreign nations, ought to be exercised by none who
+are not thoroughly weaned from the prepossessions and habits
+incident to foreign birth and education. The term of nine years
+appears to be a prudent mediocrity between a total exclusion of
+adopted citizens, whose merits and talents may claim a share in the
+public confidence, and an indiscriminate and hasty admission of
+them, which might create a channel for foreign influence on the
+national councils.
+
+II. It is equally unnecessary to dilate on the appointment of
+senators by the State legislatures. Among the various modes which
+might have been devised for constituting this branch of the
+government, that which has been proposed by the convention is
+probably the most congenial with the public opinion. It is
+recommended by the double advantage of favoring a select
+appointment, and of giving to the State governments such an agency
+in the formation of the federal government as must secure the
+authority of the former, and may form a convenient link between the
+two systems.
+
+III. The equality of representation in the Senate is another
+point, which, being evidently the result of compromise between the
+opposite pretensions of the large and the small States, does not
+call for much discussion. If indeed it be right, that among a
+people thoroughly incorporated into one nation, every district ought
+to have a PROPORTIONAL share in the government, and that among
+independent and sovereign States, bound together by a simple league,
+the parties, however unequal in size, ought to have an EQUAL share
+in the common councils, it does not appear to be without some reason
+that in a compound republic, partaking both of the national and
+federal character, the government ought to be founded on a mixture
+of the principles of proportional and equal representation. But it
+is superfluous to try, by the standard of theory, a part of the
+Constitution which is allowed on all hands to be the result, not of
+theory, but "of a spirit of amity, and that mutual deference and
+concession which the peculiarity of our political situation rendered
+indispensable." A common government, with powers equal to its
+objects, is called for by the voice, and still more loudly by the
+political situation, of America. A government founded on principles
+more consonant to the wishes of the larger States, is not likely to
+be obtained from the smaller States. The only option, then, for the
+former, lies between the proposed government and a government still
+more objectionable. Under this alternative, the advice of prudence
+must be to embrace the lesser evil; and, instead of indulging a
+fruitless anticipation of the possible mischiefs which may ensue, to
+contemplate rather the advantageous consequences which may qualify
+the sacrifice.
+
+In this spirit it may be remarked, that the equal vote allowed
+to each State is at once a constitutional recognition of the portion
+of sovereignty remaining in the individual States, and an instrument
+for preserving that residuary sovereignty. So far the equality
+ought to be no less acceptable to the large than to the small
+States; since they are not less solicitous to guard, by every
+possible expedient, against an improper consolidation of the States
+into one simple republic.
+
+Another advantage accruing from this ingredient in the
+constitution of the Senate is, the additional impediment it must
+prove against improper acts of legislation. No law or resolution
+can now be passed without the concurrence, first, of a majority of
+the people, and then, of a majority of the States. It must be
+acknowledged that this complicated check on legislation may in some
+instances be injurious as well as beneficial; and that the peculiar
+defense which it involves in favor of the smaller States, would be
+more rational, if any interests common to them, and distinct from
+those of the other States, would otherwise be exposed to peculiar
+danger. But as the larger States will always be able, by their
+power over the supplies, to defeat unreasonable exertions of this
+prerogative of the lesser States, and as the faculty and excess of
+law-making seem to be the diseases to which our governments are most
+liable, it is not impossible that this part of the Constitution may
+be more convenient in practice than it appears to many in
+contemplation.
+
+IV. The number of senators, and the duration of their
+appointment, come next to be considered. In order to form an
+accurate judgment on both of these points, it will be proper to
+inquire into the purposes which are to be answered by a senate; and
+in order to ascertain these, it will be necessary to review the
+inconveniences which a republic must suffer from the want of such an
+institution.
+
+First. It is a misfortune incident to republican
+government, though in a less degree than to other governments, that
+those who administer it may forget their obligations to their
+constituents, and prove unfaithful to their important trust. In
+this point of view, a senate, as a second branch of the legislative
+assembly, distinct from, and dividing the power with, a first, must
+be in all cases a salutary check on the government. It doubles the
+security to the people, by requiring the concurrence of two distinct
+bodies in schemes of usurpation or perfidy, where the ambition or
+corruption of one would otherwise be sufficient. This is a
+precaution founded on such clear principles, and now so well
+understood in the United States, that it would be more than
+superfluous to enlarge on it. I will barely remark, that as the
+improbability of sinister combinations will be in proportion to the
+dissimilarity in the genius of the two bodies, it must be politic to
+distinguish them from each other by every circumstance which will
+consist with a due harmony in all proper measures, and with the
+genuine principles of republican government.
+
+Secondly. The necessity of a senate is not less indicated
+by the propensity of all single and numerous assemblies to yield to
+the impulse of sudden and violent passions, and to be seduced by
+factious leaders into intemperate and pernicious resolutions.
+Examples on this subject might be cited without number; and from
+proceedings within the United States, as well as from the history of
+other nations. But a position that will not be contradicted, need
+not be proved. All that need be remarked is, that a body which is
+to correct this infirmity ought itself to be free from it, and
+consequently ought to be less numerous. It ought, moreover, to
+possess great firmness, and consequently ought to hold its authority
+by a tenure of considerable duration.
+
+Thirdly. Another defect to be supplied by a senate lies in
+a want of due acquaintance with the objects and principles of
+legislation. It is not possible that an assembly of men called for
+the most part from pursuits of a private nature, continued in
+appointment for a short time, and led by no permanent motive to
+devote the intervals of public occupation to a study of the laws,
+the affairs, and the comprehensive interests of their country,
+should, if left wholly to themselves, escape a variety of important
+errors in the exercise of their legislative trust. It may be
+affirmed, on the best grounds, that no small share of the present
+embarrassments of America is to be charged on the blunders of our
+governments; and that these have proceeded from the heads rather
+than the hearts of most of the authors of them. What indeed are all
+the repealing, explaining, and amending laws, which fill and
+disgrace our voluminous codes, but so many monuments of deficient
+wisdom; so many impeachments exhibited by each succeeding against
+each preceding session; so many admonitions to the people, of the
+value of those aids which may be expected from a well-constituted
+senate?
+
+A good government implies two things: first, fidelity to the
+object of government, which is the happiness of the people;
+secondly, a knowledge of the means by which that object can be best
+attained. Some governments are deficient in both these qualities;
+most governments are deficient in the first. I scruple not to
+assert, that in American governments too little attention has been
+paid to the last. The federal Constitution avoids this error; and
+what merits particular notice, it provides for the last in a mode
+which increases the security for the first.
+
+Fourthly. The mutability in the public councils arising
+from a rapid succession of new members, however qualified they may
+be, points out, in the strongest manner, the necessity of some
+stable institution in the government. Every new election in the
+States is found to change one half of the representatives. From
+this change of men must proceed a change of opinions; and from a
+change of opinions, a change of measures. But a continual change
+even of good measures is inconsistent with every rule of prudence
+and every prospect of success. The remark is verified in private
+life, and becomes more just, as well as more important, in national
+transactions.
+
+To trace the mischievous effects of a mutable government would
+fill a volume. I will hint a few only, each of which will be
+perceived to be a source of innumerable others.
+
+In the first place, it forfeits the respect and confidence of
+other nations, and all the advantages connected with national
+character. An individual who is observed to be inconstant to his
+plans, or perhaps to carry on his affairs without any plan at all,
+is marked at once, by all prudent people, as a speedy victim to his
+own unsteadiness and folly. His more friendly neighbors may pity
+him, but all will decline to connect their fortunes with his; and
+not a few will seize the opportunity of making their fortunes out of
+his. One nation is to another what one individual is to another;
+with this melancholy distinction perhaps, that the former, with
+fewer of the benevolent emotions than the latter, are under fewer
+restraints also from taking undue advantage from the indiscretions
+of each other. Every nation, consequently, whose affairs betray a
+want of wisdom and stability, may calculate on every loss which can
+be sustained from the more systematic policy of their wiser
+neighbors. But the best instruction on this subject is unhappily
+conveyed to America by the example of her own situation. She finds
+that she is held in no respect by her friends; that she is the
+derision of her enemies; and that she is a prey to every nation
+which has an interest in speculating on her fluctuating councils and
+embarrassed affairs.
+
+The internal effects of a mutable policy are still more
+calamitous. It poisons the blessing of liberty itself. It will be
+of little avail to the people, that the laws are made by men of
+their own choice, if the laws be so voluminous that they cannot be
+read, or so incoherent that they cannot be understood; if they be
+repealed or revised before they are promulgated, or undergo such
+incessant changes that no man, who knows what the law is to-day, can
+guess what it will be to-morrow. Law is defined to be a rule of
+action; but how can that be a rule, which is little known, and less
+fixed?
+
+Another effect of public instability is the unreasonable
+advantage it gives to the sagacious, the enterprising, and the
+moneyed few over the industrious and uniformed mass of the people.
+Every new regulation concerning commerce or revenue, or in any way
+affecting the value of the different species of property, presents a
+new harvest to those who watch the change, and can trace its
+consequences; a harvest, reared not by themselves, but by the toils
+and cares of the great body of their fellow-citizens. This is a
+state of things in which it may be said with some truth that laws
+are made for the FEW, not for the MANY.
+
+In another point of view, great injury results from an unstable
+government. The want of confidence in the public councils damps
+every useful undertaking, the success and profit of which may depend
+on a continuance of existing arrangements. What prudent merchant
+will hazard his fortunes in any new branch of commerce when he knows
+not but that his plans may be rendered unlawful before they can be
+executed? What farmer or manufacturer will lay himself out for the
+encouragement given to any particular cultivation or establishment,
+when he can have no assurance that his preparatory labors and
+advances will not render him a victim to an inconstant government?
+In a word, no great improvement or laudable enterprise can go
+forward which requires the auspices of a steady system of national
+policy.
+
+But the most deplorable effect of all is that diminution of
+attachment and reverence which steals into the hearts of the people,
+towards a political system which betrays so many marks of infirmity,
+and disappoints so many of their flattering hopes. No government,
+any more than an individual, will long be respected without being
+truly respectable; nor be truly respectable, without possessing a
+certain portion of order and stability.
+
+PUBLIUS.
+
+
+
+
+
+FEDERALIST. No. 63
+
+
+
+The Senate Continued
+
+For the Independent Journal.
+
+
+
+HAMILTON OR MADISON
+
+
+
+To the People of the State of New York:
+
+A FIFTH desideratum, illustrating the utility of a senate, is
+the want of a due sense of national character. Without a select and
+stable member of the government, the esteem of foreign powers will
+not only be forfeited by an unenlightened and variable policy,
+proceeding from the causes already mentioned, but the national
+councils will not possess that sensibility to the opinion of the
+world, which is perhaps not less necessary in order to merit, than
+it is to obtain, its respect and confidence.
+
+An attention to the judgment of other nations is important to
+every government for two reasons: the one is, that, independently
+of the merits of any particular plan or measure, it is desirable, on
+various accounts, that it should appear to other nations as the
+offspring of a wise and honorable policy; the second is, that in
+doubtful cases, particularly where the national councils may be
+warped by some strong passion or momentary interest, the presumed or
+known opinion of the impartial world may be the best guide that can
+be followed. What has not America lost by her want of character
+with foreign nations; and how many errors and follies would she not
+have avoided, if the justice and propriety of her measures had, in
+every instance, been previously tried by the light in which they
+would probably appear to the unbiased part of mankind?
+
+Yet however requisite a sense of national character may be, it
+is evident that it can never be sufficiently possessed by a numerous
+and changeable body. It can only be found in a number so small that
+a sensible degree of the praise and blame of public measures may be
+the portion of each individual; or in an assembly so durably
+invested with public trust, that the pride and consequence of its
+members may be sensibly incorporated with the reputation and
+prosperity of the community. The half-yearly representatives of
+Rhode Island would probably have been little affected in their
+deliberations on the iniquitous measures of that State, by arguments
+drawn from the light in which such measures would be viewed by
+foreign nations, or even by the sister States; whilst it can
+scarcely be doubted that if the concurrence of a select and stable
+body had been necessary, a regard to national character alone would
+have prevented the calamities under which that misguided people is
+now laboring.
+
+I add, as a SIXTH defect the want, in some important cases, of a
+due responsibility in the government to the people, arising from
+that frequency of elections which in other cases produces this
+responsibility. This remark will, perhaps, appear not only new, but
+paradoxical. It must nevertheless be acknowledged, when explained,
+to be as undeniable as it is important.
+
+Responsibility, in order to be reasonable, must be limited to
+objects within the power of the responsible party, and in order to
+be effectual, must relate to operations of that power, of which a
+ready and proper judgment can be formed by the constituents. The
+objects of government may be divided into two general classes: the
+one depending on measures which have singly an immediate and
+sensible operation; the other depending on a succession of
+well-chosen and well-connected measures, which have a gradual and
+perhaps unobserved operation. The importance of the latter
+description to the collective and permanent welfare of every
+country, needs no explanation. And yet it is evident that an
+assembly elected for so short a term as to be unable to provide more
+than one or two links in a chain of measures, on which the general
+welfare may essentially depend, ought not to be answerable for the
+final result, any more than a steward or tenant, engaged for one
+year, could be justly made to answer for places or improvements
+which could not be accomplished in less than half a dozen years.
+Nor is it possible for the people to estimate the SHARE of
+influence which their annual assemblies may respectively have on
+events resulting from the mixed transactions of several years. It
+is sufficiently difficult to preserve a personal responsibility in
+the members of a NUMEROUS body, for such acts of the body as have an
+immediate, detached, and palpable operation on its constituents.
+
+The proper remedy for this defect must be an additional body in
+the legislative department, which, having sufficient permanency to
+provide for such objects as require a continued attention, and a
+train of measures, may be justly and effectually answerable for the
+attainment of those objects.
+
+Thus far I have considered the circumstances which point out the
+necessity of a well-constructed Senate only as they relate to the
+representatives of the people. To a people as little blinded by
+prejudice or corrupted by flattery as those whom I address, I shall
+not scruple to add, that such an institution may be sometimes
+necessary as a defense to the people against their own temporary
+errors and delusions. As the cool and deliberate sense of the
+community ought, in all governments, and actually will, in all free
+governments, ultimately prevail over the views of its rulers; so
+there are particular moments in public affairs when the people,
+stimulated by some irregular passion, or some illicit advantage, or
+misled by the artful misrepresentations of interested men, may call
+for measures which they themselves will afterwards be the most ready
+to lament and condemn. In these critical moments, how salutary will
+be the interference of some temperate and respectable body of
+citizens, in order to check the misguided career, and to suspend the
+blow meditated by the people against themselves, until reason,
+justice, and truth can regain their authority over the public mind?
+What bitter anguish would not the people of Athens have often
+escaped if their government had contained so provident a safeguard
+against the tyranny of their own passions? Popular liberty might
+then have escaped the indelible reproach of decreeing to the same
+citizens the hemlock on one day and statues on the next.
+
+It may be suggested, that a people spread over an extensive
+region cannot, like the crowded inhabitants of a small district, be
+subject to the infection of violent passions, or to the danger of
+combining in pursuit of unjust measures. I am far from denying that
+this is a distinction of peculiar importance. I have, on the
+contrary, endeavored in a former paper to show, that it is one of
+the principal recommendations of a confederated republic. At the
+same time, this advantage ought not to be considered as superseding
+the use of auxiliary precautions. It may even be remarked, that the
+same extended situation, which will exempt the people of America
+from some of the dangers incident to lesser republics, will expose
+them to the inconveniency of remaining for a longer time under the
+influence of those misrepresentations which the combined industry of
+interested men may succeed in distributing among them.
+
+It adds no small weight to all these considerations, to
+recollect that history informs us of no long-lived republic which
+had not a senate. Sparta, Rome, and Carthage are, in fact, the only
+states to whom that character can be applied. In each of the two
+first there was a senate for life. The constitution of the senate
+in the last is less known. Circumstantial evidence makes it
+probable that it was not different in this particular from the two
+others. It is at least certain, that it had some quality or other
+which rendered it an anchor against popular fluctuations; and that
+a smaller council, drawn out of the senate, was appointed not only
+for life, but filled up vacancies itself. These examples, though as
+unfit for the imitation, as they are repugnant to the genius, of
+America, are, notwithstanding, when compared with the fugitive and
+turbulent existence of other ancient republics, very instructive
+proofs of the necessity of some institution that will blend
+stability with liberty. I am not unaware of the circumstances which
+distinguish the American from other popular governments, as well
+ancient as modern; and which render extreme circumspection
+necessary, in reasoning from the one case to the other. But after
+allowing due weight to this consideration, it may still be
+maintained, that there are many points of similitude which render
+these examples not unworthy of our attention. Many of the defects,
+as we have seen, which can only be supplied by a senatorial
+institution, are common to a numerous assembly frequently elected by
+the people, and to the people themselves. There are others peculiar
+to the former, which require the control of such an institution.
+The people can never wilfully betray their own interests; but they
+may possibly be betrayed by the representatives of the people; and
+the danger will be evidently greater where the whole legislative
+trust is lodged in the hands of one body of men, than where the
+concurrence of separate and dissimilar bodies is required in every
+public act.
+
+The difference most relied on, between the American and other
+republics, consists in the principle of representation; which is
+the pivot on which the former move, and which is supposed to have
+been unknown to the latter, or at least to the ancient part of them.
+The use which has been made of this difference, in reasonings
+contained in former papers, will have shown that I am disposed
+neither to deny its existence nor to undervalue its importance. I
+feel the less restraint, therefore, in observing, that the position
+concerning the ignorance of the ancient governments on the subject
+of representation, is by no means precisely true in the latitude
+commonly given to it. Without entering into a disquisition which
+here would be misplaced, I will refer to a few known facts, in
+support of what I advance.
+
+In the most pure democracies of Greece, many of the executive
+functions were performed, not by the people themselves, but by
+officers elected by the people, and REPRESENTING the people in their
+EXECUTIVE capacity.
+
+Prior to the reform of Solon, Athens was governed by nine
+Archons, annually ELECTED BY THE PEOPLE AT LARGE. The degree of
+power delegated to them seems to be left in great obscurity.
+Subsequent to that period, we find an assembly, first of four, and
+afterwards of six hundred members, annually ELECTED BY THE PEOPLE;
+and PARTIALLY representing them in their LEGISLATIVE capacity,
+since they were not only associated with the people in the function
+of making laws, but had the exclusive right of originating
+legislative propositions to the people. The senate of Carthage,
+also, whatever might be its power, or the duration of its
+appointment, appears to have been ELECTIVE by the suffrages of the
+people. Similar instances might be traced in most, if not all the
+popular governments of antiquity.
+
+Lastly, in Sparta we meet with the Ephori, and in Rome with the
+Tribunes; two bodies, small indeed in numbers, but annually ELECTED
+BY THE WHOLE BODY OF THE PEOPLE, and considered as the
+REPRESENTATIVES of the people, almost in their PLENIPOTENTIARY
+capacity. The Cosmi of Crete were also annually ELECTED BY THE
+PEOPLE, and have been considered by some authors as an institution
+analogous to those of Sparta and Rome, with this difference only,
+that in the election of that representative body the right of
+suffrage was communicated to a part only of the people.
+
+From these facts, to which many others might be added, it is
+clear that the principle of representation was neither unknown to
+the ancients nor wholly overlooked in their political constitutions.
+The true distinction between these and the American governments,
+lies IN THE TOTAL EXCLUSION OF THE PEOPLE, IN THEIR COLLECTIVE
+CAPACITY, from any share in the LATTER, and not in the TOTAL
+EXCLUSION OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PEOPLE from the
+administration of the FORMER. The distinction, however, thus
+qualified, must be admitted to leave a most advantageous superiority
+in favor of the United States. But to insure to this advantage its
+full effect, we must be careful not to separate it from the other
+advantage, of an extensive territory. For it cannot be believed,
+that any form of representative government could have succeeded
+within the narrow limits occupied by the democracies of Greece.
+
+In answer to all these arguments, suggested by reason,
+illustrated by examples, and enforced by our own experience, the
+jealous adversary of the Constitution will probably content himself
+with repeating, that a senate appointed not immediately by the
+people, and for the term of six years, must gradually acquire a
+dangerous pre-eminence in the government, and finally transform it
+into a tyrannical aristocracy.
+
+To this general answer, the general reply ought to be
+sufficient, that liberty may be endangered by the abuses of liberty
+as well as by the abuses of power; that there are numerous
+instances of the former as well as of the latter; and that the
+former, rather than the latter, are apparently most to be
+apprehended by the United States. But a more particular reply may
+be given.
+
+Before such a revolution can be effected, the Senate, it is to
+be observed, must in the first place corrupt itself; must next
+corrupt the State legislatures; must then corrupt the House of
+Representatives; and must finally corrupt the people at large. It
+is evident that the Senate must be first corrupted before it can
+attempt an establishment of tyranny. Without corrupting the State
+legislatures, it cannot prosecute the attempt, because the
+periodical change of members would otherwise regenerate the whole
+body. Without exerting the means of corruption with equal success
+on the House of Representatives, the opposition of that coequal
+branch of the government would inevitably defeat the attempt; and
+without corrupting the people themselves, a succession of new
+representatives would speedily restore all things to their pristine
+order. Is there any man who can seriously persuade himself that the
+proposed Senate can, by any possible means within the compass of
+human address, arrive at the object of a lawless ambition, through
+all these obstructions?
+
+If reason condemns the suspicion, the same sentence is
+pronounced by experience. The constitution of Maryland furnishes
+the most apposite example. The Senate of that State is elected, as
+the federal Senate will be, indirectly by the people, and for a term
+less by one year only than the federal Senate. It is distinguished,
+also, by the remarkable prerogative of filling up its own vacancies
+within the term of its appointment, and, at the same time, is not
+under the control of any such rotation as is provided for the
+federal Senate. There are some other lesser distinctions, which
+would expose the former to colorable objections, that do not lie
+against the latter. If the federal Senate, therefore, really
+contained the danger which has been so loudly proclaimed, some
+symptoms at least of a like danger ought by this time to have been
+betrayed by the Senate of Maryland, but no such symptoms have
+appeared. On the contrary, the jealousies at first entertained by
+men of the same description with those who view with terror the
+correspondent part of the federal Constitution, have been gradually
+extinguished by the progress of the experiment; and the Maryland
+constitution is daily deriving, from the salutary operation of this
+part of it, a reputation in which it will probably not be rivalled
+by that of any State in the Union.
+
+But if any thing could silence the jealousies on this subject,
+it ought to be the British example. The Senate there instead of
+being elected for a term of six years, and of being unconfined to
+particular families or fortunes, is an hereditary assembly of
+opulent nobles. The House of Representatives, instead of being
+elected for two years, and by the whole body of the people, is
+elected for seven years, and, in very great proportion, by a very
+small proportion of the people. Here, unquestionably, ought to be
+seen in full display the aristocratic usurpations and tyranny which
+are at some future period to be exemplified in the United States.
+Unfortunately, however, for the anti-federal argument, the British
+history informs us that this hereditary assembly has not been able
+to defend itself against the continual encroachments of the House of
+Representatives; and that it no sooner lost the support of the
+monarch, than it was actually crushed by the weight of the popular
+branch.
+
+As far as antiquity can instruct us on this subject, its
+examples support the reasoning which we have employed. In Sparta,
+the Ephori, the annual representatives of the people, were found an
+overmatch for the senate for life, continually gained on its
+authority and finally drew all power into their own hands. The
+Tribunes of Rome, who were the representatives of the people,
+prevailed, it is well known, in almost every contest with the senate
+for life, and in the end gained the most complete triumph over it.
+The fact is the more remarkable, as unanimity was required in every
+act of the Tribunes, even after their number was augmented to ten.
+It proves the irresistible force possessed by that branch of a free
+government, which has the people on its side. To these examples
+might be added that of Carthage, whose senate, according to the
+testimony of Polybius, instead of drawing all power into its vortex,
+had, at the commencement of the second Punic War, lost almost the
+whole of its original portion.
+
+Besides the conclusive evidence resulting from this assemblage
+of facts, that the federal Senate will never be able to transform
+itself, by gradual usurpations, into an independent and aristocratic
+body, we are warranted in believing, that if such a revolution
+should ever happen from causes which the foresight of man cannot
+guard against, the House of Representatives, with the people on
+their side, will at all times be able to bring back the Constitution
+to its primitive form and principles. Against the force of the
+immediate representatives of the people, nothing will be able to
+maintain even the constitutional authority of the Senate, but such a
+display of enlightened policy, and attachment to the public good, as
+will divide with that branch of the legislature the affections and
+support of the entire body of the people themselves.
+
+PUBLIUS.
+
+
+
+
+
+FEDERALIST No. 64
+
+
+
+The Powers of the Senate
+
+From the New York Packet.
+
+Friday, March 7, 1788.
+
+
+
+JAY
+
+
+
+To the People of the State of New York:
+
+IT IS a just and not a new observation, that enemies to
+particular persons, and opponents to particular measures, seldom
+confine their censures to such things only in either as are worthy
+of blame. Unless on this principle, it is difficult to explain the
+motives of their conduct, who condemn the proposed Constitution in
+the aggregate, and treat with severity some of the most
+unexceptionable articles in it.
+
+The second section gives power to the President, "BY AND WITH
+THE ADVICE AND CONSENT OF THE SENATE, TO MAKE TREATIES, PROVIDED TWO
+THIRDS OF THE SENATORS PRESENT CONCUR."
+
+The power of making treaties is an important one, especially as
+it relates to war, peace, and commerce; and it should not be
+delegated but in such a mode, and with such precautions, as will
+afford the highest security that it will be exercised by men the
+best qualified for the purpose, and in the manner most conducive to
+the public good. The convention appears to have been attentive to
+both these points: they have directed the President to be chosen by
+select bodies of electors, to be deputed by the people for that
+express purpose; and they have committed the appointment of
+senators to the State legislatures. This mode has, in such cases,
+vastly the advantage of elections by the people in their collective
+capacity, where the activity of party zeal, taking the advantage of
+the supineness, the ignorance, and the hopes and fears of the unwary
+and interested, often places men in office by the votes of a small
+proportion of the electors.
+
+As the select assemblies for choosing the President, as well as
+the State legislatures who appoint the senators, will in general be
+composed of the most enlightened and respectable citizens, there is
+reason to presume that their attention and their votes will be
+directed to those men only who have become the most distinguished by
+their abilities and virtue, and in whom the people perceive just
+grounds for confidence. The Constitution manifests very particular
+attention to this object. By excluding men under thirty-five from
+the first office, and those under thirty from the second, it
+confines the electors to men of whom the people have had time to
+form a judgment, and with respect to whom they will not be liable to
+be deceived by those brilliant appearances of genius and patriotism,
+which, like transient meteors, sometimes mislead as well as dazzle.
+If the observation be well founded, that wise kings will always be
+served by able ministers, it is fair to argue, that as an assembly
+of select electors possess, in a greater degree than kings, the
+means of extensive and accurate information relative to men and
+characters, so will their appointments bear at least equal marks of
+discretion and discernment. The inference which naturally results
+from these considerations is this, that the President and senators
+so chosen will always be of the number of those who best understand
+our national interests, whether considered in relation to the
+several States or to foreign nations, who are best able to promote
+those interests, and whose reputation for integrity inspires and
+merits confidence. With such men the power of making treaties may
+be safely lodged.
+
+Although the absolute necessity of system, in the conduct of any
+business, is universally known and acknowledged, yet the high
+importance of it in national affairs has not yet become sufficiently
+impressed on the public mind. They who wish to commit the power
+under consideration to a popular assembly, composed of members
+constantly coming and going in quick succession, seem not to
+recollect that such a body must necessarily be inadequate to the
+attainment of those great objects, which require to be steadily
+contemplated in all their relations and circumstances, and which can
+only be approached and achieved by measures which not only talents,
+but also exact information, and often much time, are necessary to
+concert and to execute. It was wise, therefore, in the convention
+to provide, not only that the power of making treaties should be
+committed to able and honest men, but also that they should continue
+in place a sufficient time to become perfectly acquainted with our
+national concerns, and to form and introduce a a system for the
+management of them. The duration prescribed is such as will give
+them an opportunity of greatly extending their political
+information, and of rendering their accumulating experience more and
+more beneficial to their country. Nor has the convention discovered
+less prudence in providing for the frequent elections of senators in
+such a way as to obviate the inconvenience of periodically
+transferring those great affairs entirely to new men; for by
+leaving a considerable residue of the old ones in place, uniformity
+and order, as well as a constant succession of official information
+will be preserved.
+
+There are a few who will not admit that the affairs of trade and
+navigation should be regulated by a system cautiously formed and
+steadily pursued; and that both our treaties and our laws should
+correspond with and be made to promote it. It is of much
+consequence that this correspondence and conformity be carefully
+maintained; and they who assent to the truth of this position will
+see and confess that it is well provided for by making concurrence
+of the Senate necessary both to treaties and to laws.
+
+It seldom happens in the negotiation of treaties, of whatever
+nature, but that perfect SECRECY and immediate DESPATCH are
+sometimes requisite. These are cases where the most useful
+intelligence may be obtained, if the persons possessing it can be
+relieved from apprehensions of discovery. Those apprehensions will
+operate on those persons whether they are actuated by mercenary or
+friendly motives; and there doubtless are many of both
+descriptions, who would rely on the secrecy of the President, but
+who would not confide in that of the Senate, and still less in that
+of a large popular Assembly. The convention have done well,
+therefore, in so disposing of the power of making treaties, that
+although the President must, in forming them, act by the advice and
+consent of the Senate, yet he will be able to manage the business of
+intelligence in such a manner as prudence may suggest.
+
+They who have turned their attention to the affairs of men, must
+have perceived that there are tides in them; tides very irregular
+in their duration, strength, and direction, and seldom found to run
+twice exactly in the same manner or measure. To discern and to
+profit by these tides in national affairs is the business of those
+who preside over them; and they who have had much experience on
+this head inform us, that there frequently are occasions when days,
+nay, even when hours, are precious. The loss of a battle, the death
+of a prince, the removal of a minister, or other circumstances
+intervening to change the present posture and aspect of affairs, may
+turn the most favorable tide into a course opposite to our wishes.
+As in the field, so in the cabinet, there are moments to be seized
+as they pass, and they who preside in either should be left in
+capacity to improve them. So often and so essentially have we
+heretofore suffered from the want of secrecy and despatch, that the
+Constitution would have been inexcusably defective, if no attention
+had been paid to those objects. Those matters which in negotiations
+usually require the most secrecy and the most despatch, are those
+preparatory and auxiliary measures which are not otherwise important
+in a national view, than as they tend to facilitate the attainment
+of the objects of the negotiation. For these, the President will
+find no difficulty to provide; and should any circumstance occur
+which requires the advice and consent of the Senate, he may at any
+time convene them. Thus we see that the Constitution provides that
+our negotiations for treaties shall have every advantage which can
+be derived from talents, information, integrity, and deliberate
+investigations, on the one hand, and from secrecy and despatch on
+the other.
+
+But to this plan, as to most others that have ever appeared,
+objections are contrived and urged.
+
+Some are displeased with it, not on account of any errors or
+defects in it, but because, as the treaties, when made, are to have
+the force of laws, they should be made only by men invested with
+legislative authority. These gentlemen seem not to consider that
+the judgments of our courts, and the commissions constitutionally
+given by our governor, are as valid and as binding on all persons
+whom they concern, as the laws passed by our legislature. All
+constitutional acts of power, whether in the executive or in the
+judicial department, have as much legal validity and obligation as
+if they proceeded from the legislature; and therefore, whatever
+name be given to the power of making treaties, or however obligatory
+they may be when made, certain it is, that the people may, with much
+propriety, commit the power to a distinct body from the legislature,
+the executive, or the judicial. It surely does not follow, that
+because they have given the power of making laws to the legislature,
+that therefore they should likewise give them the power to do every
+other act of sovereignty by which the citizens are to be bound and
+affected.
+
+Others, though content that treaties should be made in the mode
+proposed, are averse to their being the SUPREME laws of the land.
+They insist, and profess to believe, that treaties like acts of
+assembly, should be repealable at pleasure. This idea seems to be
+new and peculiar to this country, but new errors, as well as new
+truths, often appear. These gentlemen would do well to reflect that
+a treaty is only another name for a bargain, and that it would be
+impossible to find a nation who would make any bargain with us,
+which should be binding on them ABSOLUTELY, but on us only so long
+and so far as we may think proper to be bound by it. They who make
+laws may, without doubt, amend or repeal them; and it will not be
+disputed that they who make treaties may alter or cancel them; but
+still let us not forget that treaties are made, not by only one of
+the contracting parties, but by both; and consequently, that as the
+consent of both was essential to their formation at first, so must
+it ever afterwards be to alter or cancel them. The proposed
+Constitution, therefore, has not in the least extended the
+obligation of treaties. They are just as binding, and just as far
+beyond the lawful reach of legislative acts now, as they will be at
+any future period, or under any form of government.
+
+However useful jealousy may be in republics, yet when like bile
+in the natural, it abounds too much in the body politic, the eyes of
+both become very liable to be deceived by the delusive appearances
+which that malady casts on surrounding objects. From this cause,
+probably, proceed the fears and apprehensions of some, that the
+President and Senate may make treaties without an equal eye to the
+interests of all the States. Others suspect that two thirds will
+oppress the remaining third, and ask whether those gentlemen are
+made sufficiently responsible for their conduct; whether, if they
+act corruptly, they can be punished; and if they make
+disadvantageous treaties, how are we to get rid of those treaties?
+
+As all the States are equally represented in the Senate, and by
+men the most able and the most willing to promote the interests of
+their constituents, they will all have an equal degree of influence
+in that body, especially while they continue to be careful in
+appointing proper persons, and to insist on their punctual
+attendance. In proportion as the United States assume a national
+form and a national character, so will the good of the whole be more
+and more an object of attention, and the government must be a weak
+one indeed, if it should forget that the good of the whole can only
+be promoted by advancing the good of each of the parts or members
+which compose the whole. It will not be in the power of the
+President and Senate to make any treaties by which they and their
+families and estates will not be equally bound and affected with the
+rest of the community; and, having no private interests distinct
+from that of the nation, they will be under no temptations to
+neglect the latter.
+
+As to corruption, the case is not supposable. He must either
+have been very unfortunate in his intercourse with the world, or
+possess a heart very susceptible of such impressions, who can think
+it probable that the President and two thirds of the Senate will
+ever be capable of such unworthy conduct. The idea is too gross and
+too invidious to be entertained. But in such a case, if it should
+ever happen, the treaty so obtained from us would, like all other
+fraudulent contracts, be null and void by the law of nations.
+
+With respect to their responsibility, it is difficult to
+conceive how it could be increased. Every consideration that can
+influence the human mind, such as honor, oaths, reputations,
+conscience, the love of country, and family affections and
+attachments, afford security for their fidelity. In short, as the
+Constitution has taken the utmost care that they shall be men of
+talents and integrity, we have reason to be persuaded that the
+treaties they make will be as advantageous as, all circumstances
+considered, could be made; and so far as the fear of punishment and
+disgrace can operate, that motive to good behavior is amply afforded
+by the article on the subject of impeachments.
+
+PUBLIUS.
+
+
+
+
+
+FEDERALIST No. 65
+
+
+
+The Powers of the Senate Continued
+
+From the New York Packet.
+
+Friday, March 7, 1788.
+
+
+
+HAMILTON
+
+
+
+To the People of the State of New York:
+
+THE remaining powers which the plan of the convention allots to
+the Senate, in a distinct capacity, are comprised in their
+participation with the executive in the appointment to offices, and
+in their judicial character as a court for the trial of impeachments.
+As in the business of appointments the executive will be the
+principal agent, the provisions relating to it will most properly be
+discussed in the examination of that department. We will,
+therefore, conclude this head with a view of the judicial character
+of the Senate.
+
+A well-constituted court for the trial of impeachments is an
+object not more to be desired than difficult to be obtained in a
+government wholly elective. The subjects of its jurisdiction are
+those offenses which proceed from the misconduct of public men, or,
+in other words, from the abuse or violation of some public trust.
+They are of a nature which may with peculiar propriety be
+denominated POLITICAL, as they relate chiefly to injuries done
+immediately to the society itself. The prosecution of them, for
+this reason, will seldom fail to agitate the passions of the whole
+community, and to divide it into parties more or less friendly or
+inimical to the accused. In many cases it will connect itself with
+the pre-existing factions, and will enlist all their animosities,
+partialities, influence, and interest on one side or on the other;
+and in such cases there will always be the greatest danger that the
+decision will be regulated more by the comparative strength of
+parties, than by the real demonstrations of innocence or guilt.
+
+The delicacy and magnitude of a trust which so deeply concerns
+the political reputation and existence of every man engaged in the
+administration of public affairs, speak for themselves. The
+difficulty of placing it rightly, in a government resting entirely
+on the basis of periodical elections, will as readily be perceived,
+when it is considered that the most conspicuous characters in it
+will, from that circumstance, be too often the leaders or the tools
+of the most cunning or the most numerous faction, and on this
+account, can hardly be expected to possess the requisite neutrality
+towards those whose conduct may be the subject of scrutiny.
+
+The convention, it appears, thought the Senate the most fit
+depositary of this important trust. Those who can best discern the
+intrinsic difficulty of the thing, will be least hasty in condemning
+that opinion, and will be most inclined to allow due weight to the
+arguments which may be supposed to have produced it.
+
+What, it may be asked, is the true spirit of the institution
+itself? Is it not designed as a method of NATIONAL INQUEST into the
+conduct of public men? If this be the design of it, who can so
+properly be the inquisitors for the nation as the representatives of
+the nation themselves? It is not disputed that the power of
+originating the inquiry, or, in other words, of preferring the
+impeachment, ought to be lodged in the hands of one branch of the
+legislative body. Will not the reasons which indicate the propriety
+of this arrangement strongly plead for an admission of the other
+branch of that body to a share of the inquiry? The model from which
+the idea of this institution has been borrowed, pointed out that
+course to the convention. In Great Britain it is the province of
+the House of Commons to prefer the impeachment, and of the House of
+Lords to decide upon it. Several of the State constitutions have
+followed the example. As well the latter, as the former, seem to
+have regarded the practice of impeachments as a bridle in the hands
+of the legislative body upon the executive servants of the
+government. Is not this the true light in which it ought to be
+regarded?
+
+Where else than in the Senate could have been found a tribunal
+sufficiently dignified, or sufficiently independent? What other
+body would be likely to feel CONFIDENCE ENOUGH IN ITS OWN SITUATION,
+to preserve, unawed and uninfluenced, the necessary impartiality
+between an INDIVIDUAL accused, and the REPRESENTATIVES OF THE
+PEOPLE, HIS ACCUSERS?
+
+Could the Supreme Court have been relied upon as answering this
+description? It is much to be doubted, whether the members of that
+tribunal would at all times be endowed with so eminent a portion of
+fortitude, as would be called for in the execution of so difficult a
+task; and it is still more to be doubted, whether they would
+possess the degree of credit and authority, which might, on certain
+occasions, be indispensable towards reconciling the people to a
+decision that should happen to clash with an accusation brought by
+their immediate representatives. A deficiency in the first, would
+be fatal to the accused; in the last, dangerous to the public
+tranquillity. The hazard in both these respects, could only be
+avoided, if at all, by rendering that tribunal more numerous than
+would consist with a reasonable attention to economy. The necessity
+of a numerous court for the trial of impeachments, is equally
+dictated by the nature of the proceeding. This can never be tied
+down by such strict rules, either in the delineation of the offense
+by the prosecutors, or in the construction of it by the judges, as
+in common cases serve to limit the discretion of courts in favor of
+personal security. There will be no jury to stand between the
+judges who are to pronounce the sentence of the law, and the party
+who is to receive or suffer it. The awful discretion which a court
+of impeachments must necessarily have, to doom to honor or to infamy
+the most confidential and the most distinguished characters of the
+community, forbids the commitment of the trust to a small number of
+persons.
+
+These considerations seem alone sufficient to authorize a
+conclusion, that the Supreme Court would have been an improper
+substitute for the Senate, as a court of impeachments. There
+remains a further consideration, which will not a little strengthen
+this conclusion. It is this: The punishment which may be the
+consequence of conviction upon impeachment, is not to terminate the
+chastisement of the offender. After having been sentenced to a
+perpetual ostracism from the esteem and confidence, and honors and
+emoluments of his country, he will still be liable to prosecution
+and punishment in the ordinary course of law. Would it be proper
+that the persons who had disposed of his fame, and his most valuable
+rights as a citizen in one trial, should, in another trial, for the
+same offense, be also the disposers of his life and his fortune?
+Would there not be the greatest reason to apprehend, that error, in
+the first sentence, would be the parent of error in the second
+sentence? That the strong bias of one decision would be apt to
+overrule the influence of any new lights which might be brought to
+vary the complexion of another decision? Those who know anything of
+human nature, will not hesitate to answer these questions in the
+affirmative; and will be at no loss to perceive, that by making the
+same persons judges in both cases, those who might happen to be the
+objects of prosecution would, in a great measure, be deprived of the
+double security intended them by a double trial. The loss of life
+and estate would often be virtually included in a sentence which, in
+its terms, imported nothing more than dismission from a present, and
+disqualification for a future, office. It may be said, that the
+intervention of a jury, in the second instance, would obviate the
+danger. But juries are frequently influenced by the opinions of
+judges. They are sometimes induced to find special verdicts, which
+refer the main question to the decision of the court. Who would be
+willing to stake his life and his estate upon the verdict of a jury
+acting under the auspices of judges who had predetermined his guilt?
+
+Would it have been an improvement of the plan, to have united
+the Supreme Court with the Senate, in the formation of the court of
+impeachments? This union would certainly have been attended with
+several advantages; but would they not have been overbalanced by
+the signal disadvantage, already stated, arising from the agency of
+the same judges in the double prosecution to which the offender
+would be liable? To a certain extent, the benefits of that union
+will be obtained from making the chief justice of the Supreme Court
+the president of the court of impeachments, as is proposed to be
+done in the plan of the convention; while the inconveniences of an
+entire incorporation of the former into the latter will be
+substantially avoided. This was perhaps the prudent mean. I
+forbear to remark upon the additional pretext for clamor against the
+judiciary, which so considerable an augmentation of its authority
+would have afforded.
+
+Would it have been desirable to have composed the court for the
+trial of impeachments, of persons wholly distinct from the other
+departments of the government? There are weighty arguments, as well
+against, as in favor of, such a plan. To some minds it will not
+appear a trivial objection, that it could tend to increase the
+complexity of the political machine, and to add a new spring to the
+government, the utility of which would at best be questionable. But
+an objection which will not be thought by any unworthy of attention,
+is this: a court formed upon such a plan, would either be attended
+with a heavy expense, or might in practice be subject to a variety
+of casualties and inconveniences. It must either consist of
+permanent officers, stationary at the seat of government, and of
+course entitled to fixed and regular stipends, or of certain
+officers of the State governments to be called upon whenever an
+impeachment was actually depending. It will not be easy to imagine
+any third mode materially different, which could rationally be
+proposed. As the court, for reasons already given, ought to be
+numerous, the first scheme will be reprobated by every man who can
+compare the extent of the public wants with the means of supplying
+them. The second will be espoused with caution by those who will
+seriously consider the difficulty of collecting men dispersed over
+the whole Union; the injury to the innocent, from the
+procrastinated determination of the charges which might be brought
+against them; the advantage to the guilty, from the opportunities
+which delay would afford to intrigue and corruption; and in some
+cases the detriment to the State, from the prolonged inaction of men
+whose firm and faithful execution of their duty might have exposed
+them to the persecution of an intemperate or designing majority in
+the House of Representatives. Though this latter supposition may
+seem harsh, and might not be likely often to be verified, yet it
+ought not to be forgotten that the demon of faction will, at certain
+seasons, extend his sceptre over all numerous bodies of men.
+
+But though one or the other of the substitutes which have been
+examined, or some other that might be devised, should be thought
+preferable to the plan in this respect, reported by the convention,
+it will not follow that the Constitution ought for this reason to be
+rejected. If mankind were to resolve to agree in no institution of
+government, until every part of it had been adjusted to the most
+exact standard of perfection, society would soon become a general
+scene of anarchy, and the world a desert. Where is the standard of
+perfection to be found? Who will undertake to unite the discordant
+opinions of a whole community, in the same judgment of it; and to
+prevail upon one conceited projector to renounce his INFALLIBLE
+criterion for the FALLIBLE criterion of his more CONCEITED NEIGHBOR?
+To answer the purpose of the adversaries of the Constitution, they
+ought to prove, not merely that particular provisions in it are not
+the best which might have been imagined, but that the plan upon the
+whole is bad and pernicious.
+
+PUBLIUS.
+
+
+
+
+
+FEDERALIST No. 66
+
+
+
+Objections to the Power of the Senate To Set as a Court for
+Impeachments Further Considered
+
+From the New York Packet.
+
+Tuesday, March 11, 1788.
+
+
+
+HAMILTON
+
+
+
+To the People of the State of New York:
+
+A REVIEW of the principal objections that have appeared against
+the proposed court for the trial of impeachments, will not
+improbably eradicate the remains of any unfavorable impressions
+which may still exist in regard to this matter.
+
+The FIRST of these objections is, that the provision in question
+confounds legislative and judiciary authorities in the same body, in
+violation of that important and wellestablished maxim which requires
+a separation between the different departments of power. The true
+meaning of this maxim has been discussed and ascertained in another
+place, and has been shown to be entirely compatible with a partial
+intermixture of those departments for special purposes, preserving
+them, in the main, distinct and unconnected. This partial
+intermixture is even, in some cases, not only proper but necessary
+to the mutual defense of the several members of the government
+against each other. An absolute or qualified negative in the
+executive upon the acts of the legislative body, is admitted, by the
+ablest adepts in political science, to be an indispensable barrier
+against the encroachments of the latter upon the former. And it
+may, perhaps, with no less reason be contended, that the powers
+relating to impeachments are, as before intimated, an essential
+check in the hands of that body upon the encroachments of the
+executive. The division of them between the two branches of the
+legislature, assigning to one the right of accusing, to the other
+the right of judging, avoids the inconvenience of making the same
+persons both accusers and judges; and guards against the danger of
+persecution, from the prevalency of a factious spirit in either of
+those branches. As the concurrence of two thirds of the Senate will
+be requisite to a condemnation, the security to innocence, from this
+additional circumstance, will be as complete as itself can desire.
+
+It is curious to observe, with what vehemence this part of the
+plan is assailed, on the principle here taken notice of, by men who
+profess to admire, without exception, the constitution of this
+State; while that constitution makes the Senate, together with the
+chancellor and judges of the Supreme Court, not only a court of
+impeachments, but the highest judicatory in the State, in all
+causes, civil and criminal. The proportion, in point of numbers, of
+the chancellor and judges to the senators, is so inconsiderable,
+that the judiciary authority of New York, in the last resort, may,
+with truth, be said to reside in its Senate. If the plan of the
+convention be, in this respect, chargeable with a departure from the
+celebrated maxim which has been so often mentioned, and seems to be
+so little understood, how much more culpable must be the
+constitution of New York?1
+
+A SECOND objection to the Senate, as a court of impeachments,
+is, that it contributes to an undue accumulation of power in that
+body, tending to give to the government a countenance too
+aristocratic. The Senate, it is observed, is to have concurrent
+authority with the Executive in the formation of treaties and in the
+appointment to offices: if, say the objectors, to these
+prerogatives is added that of deciding in all cases of impeachment,
+it will give a decided predominancy to senatorial influence. To an
+objection so little precise in itself, it is not easy to find a very
+precise answer. Where is the measure or criterion to which we can
+appeal, for determining what will give the Senate too much, too
+little, or barely the proper degree of influence? Will it not be
+more safe, as well as more simple, to dismiss such vague and
+uncertain calculations, to examine each power by itself, and to
+decide, on general principles, where it may be deposited with most
+advantage and least inconvenience?
+
+If we take this course, it will lead to a more intelligible, if
+not to a more certain result. The disposition of the power of
+making treaties, which has obtained in the plan of the convention,
+will, then, if I mistake not, appear to be fully justified by the
+considerations stated in a former number, and by others which will
+occur under the next head of our inquiries. The expediency of the
+junction of the Senate with the Executive, in the power of
+appointing to offices, will, I trust, be placed in a light not less
+satisfactory, in the disquisitions under the same head. And I
+flatter myself the observations in my last paper must have gone no
+inconsiderable way towards proving that it was not easy, if
+practicable, to find a more fit receptacle for the power of
+determining impeachments, than that which has been chosen. If this
+be truly the case, the hypothetical dread of the too great weight of
+the Senate ought to be discarded from our reasonings.
+
+But this hypothesis, such as it is, has already been refuted in
+the remarks applied to the duration in office prescribed for the
+senators. It was by them shown, as well on the credit of historical
+examples, as from the reason of the thing, that the most POPULAR
+branch of every government, partaking of the republican genius, by
+being generally the favorite of the people, will be as generally a
+full match, if not an overmatch, for every other member of the
+Government.
+
+But independent of this most active and operative principle, to
+secure the equilibrium of the national House of Representatives, the
+plan of the convention has provided in its favor several important
+counterpoises to the additional authorities to be conferred upon the
+Senate. The exclusive privilege of originating money bills will
+belong to the House of Representatives. The same house will possess
+the sole right of instituting impeachments: is not this a complete
+counterbalance to that of determining them? The same house will be
+the umpire in all elections of the President, which do not unite the
+suffrages of a majority of the whole number of electors; a case
+which it cannot be doubted will sometimes, if not frequently, happen.
+The constant possibility of the thing must be a fruitful source of
+influence to that body. The more it is contemplated, the more
+important will appear this ultimate though contingent power, of
+deciding the competitions of the most illustrious citizens of the
+Union, for the first office in it. It would not perhaps be rash to
+predict, that as a mean of influence it will be found to outweigh
+all the peculiar attributes of the Senate.
+
+A THIRD objection to the Senate as a court of impeachments, is
+drawn from the agency they are to have in the appointments to office.
+It is imagined that they would be too indulgent judges of the
+conduct of men, in whose official creation they had participated.
+The principle of this objection would condemn a practice, which is
+to be seen in all the State governments, if not in all the
+governments with which we are acquainted: I mean that of rendering
+those who hold offices during pleasure, dependent on the pleasure of
+those who appoint them. With equal plausibility might it be alleged
+in this case, that the favoritism of the latter would always be an
+asylum for the misbehavior of the former. But that practice, in
+contradiction to this principle, proceeds upon the presumption, that
+the responsibility of those who appoint, for the fitness and
+competency of the persons on whom they bestow their choice, and the
+interest they will have in the respectable and prosperous
+administration of affairs, will inspire a sufficient disposition to
+dismiss from a share in it all such who, by their conduct, shall
+have proved themselves unworthy of the confidence reposed in them.
+Though facts may not always correspond with this presumption, yet
+if it be, in the main, just, it must destroy the supposition that
+the Senate, who will merely sanction the choice of the Executive,
+should feel a bias, towards the objects of that choice, strong
+enough to blind them to the evidences of guilt so extraordinary, as
+to have induced the representatives of the nation to become its
+accusers.
+
+If any further arguments were necessary to evince the
+improbability of such a bias, it might be found in the nature of the
+agency of the Senate in the business of appointments.
+
+It will be the office of the President to NOMINATE, and, with
+the advice and consent of the Senate, to APPOINT. There will, of
+course, be no exertion of CHOICE on the part of the Senate. They
+may defeat one choice of the Executive, and oblige him to make
+another; but they cannot themselves CHOOSE, they can only ratify or
+reject the choice of the President. They might even entertain a
+preference to some other person, at the very moment they were
+assenting to the one proposed, because there might be no positive
+ground of opposition to him; and they could not be sure, if they
+withheld their assent, that the subsequent nomination would fall
+upon their own favorite, or upon any other person in their
+estimation more meritorious than the one rejected. Thus it could
+hardly happen, that the majority of the Senate would feel any other
+complacency towards the object of an appointment than such as the
+appearances of merit might inspire, and the proofs of the want of it
+destroy.
+
+A FOURTH objection to the Senate in the capacity of a court of
+impeachments, is derived from its union with the Executive in the
+power of making treaties. This, it has been said, would constitute
+the senators their own judges, in every case of a corrupt or
+perfidious execution of that trust. After having combined with the
+Executive in betraying the interests of the nation in a ruinous
+treaty, what prospect, it is asked, would there be of their being
+made to suffer the punishment they would deserve, when they were
+themselves to decide upon the accusation brought against them for
+the treachery of which they have been guilty?
+
+This objection has been circulated with more earnestness and
+with greater show of reason than any other which has appeared
+against this part of the plan; and yet I am deceived if it does not
+rest upon an erroneous foundation.
+
+The security essentially intended by the Constitution against
+corruption and treachery in the formation of treaties, is to be
+sought for in the numbers and characters of those who are to make
+them. The JOINT AGENCY of the Chief Magistrate of the Union, and of
+two thirds of the members of a body selected by the collective
+wisdom of the legislatures of the several States, is designed to be
+the pledge for the fidelity of the national councils in this
+particular. The convention might with propriety have meditated the
+punishment of the Executive, for a deviation from the instructions
+of the Senate, or a want of integrity in the conduct of the
+negotiations committed to him; they might also have had in view the
+punishment of a few leading individuals in the Senate, who should
+have prostituted their influence in that body as the mercenary
+instruments of foreign corruption: but they could not, with more or
+with equal propriety, have contemplated the impeachment and
+punishment of two thirds of the Senate, consenting to an improper
+treaty, than of a majority of that or of the other branch of the
+national legislature, consenting to a pernicious or unconstitutional
+law, a principle which, I believe, has never been admitted into any
+government. How, in fact, could a majority in the House of
+Representatives impeach themselves? Not better, it is evident, than
+two thirds of the Senate might try themselves. And yet what reason
+is there, that a majority of the House of Representatives,
+sacrificing the interests of the society by an unjust and tyrannical
+act of legislation, should escape with impunity, more than two
+thirds of the Senate, sacrificing the same interests in an injurious
+treaty with a foreign power? The truth is, that in all such cases
+it is essential to the freedom and to the necessary independence of
+the deliberations of the body, that the members of it should be
+exempt from punishment for acts done in a collective capacity; and
+the security to the society must depend on the care which is taken
+to confide the trust to proper hands, to make it their interest to
+execute it with fidelity, and to make it as difficult as possible
+for them to combine in any interest opposite to that of the public
+good.
+
+So far as might concern the misbehavior of the Executive in
+perverting the instructions or contravening the views of the Senate,
+we need not be apprehensive of the want of a disposition in that
+body to punish the abuse of their confidence or to vindicate their
+own authority. We may thus far count upon their pride, if not upon
+their virtue. And so far even as might concern the corruption of
+leading members, by whose arts and influence the majority may have
+been inveigled into measures odious to the community, if the proofs
+of that corruption should be satisfactory, the usual propensity of
+human nature will warrant us in concluding that there would be
+commonly no defect of inclination in the body to divert the public
+resentment from themselves by a ready sacrifice of the authors of
+their mismanagement and disgrace.
+
+PUBLIUS.
+
+In that of New Jersey, also, the final judiciary authority is in
+a branch of the legislature. In New Hampshire, Massachusetts,
+Pennsylvanis, and South Carolina, one branch of the legislature is
+the court for the trial of impeachments.
+
+
+
+
+
+FEDERALIST No. 67
+
+
+
+The Executive Department
+
+From the New York Packet.
+
+Tuesday, March 11, 1788.
+
+
+
+HAMILTON
+
+
+
+To the People of the State of New York:
+
+THE constitution of the executive department of the proposed
+government, claims next our attention.
+
+There is hardly any part of the system which could have been
+attended with greater difficulty in the arrangement of it than this;
+and there is, perhaps, none which has been inveighed against with
+less candor or criticised with less judgment.
+
+Here the writers against the Constitution seem to have taken
+pains to signalize their talent of misrepresentation. Calculating
+upon the aversion of the people to monarchy, they have endeavored to
+enlist all their jealousies and apprehensions in opposition to the
+intended President of the United States; not merely as the embryo,
+but as the full-grown progeny, of that detested parent. To
+establish the pretended affinity, they have not scrupled to draw
+resources even from the regions of fiction. The authorities of a
+magistrate, in few instances greater, in some instances less, than
+those of a governor of New York, have been magnified into more than
+royal prerogatives. He has been decorated with attributes superior
+in dignity and splendor to those of a king of Great Britain. He has
+been shown to us with the diadem sparkling on his brow and the
+imperial purple flowing in his train. He has been seated on a
+throne surrounded with minions and mistresses, giving audience to
+the envoys of foreign potentates, in all the supercilious pomp of
+majesty. The images of Asiatic despotism and voluptuousness have
+scarcely been wanting to crown the exaggerated scene. We have been
+taught to tremble at the terrific visages of murdering janizaries,
+and to blush at the unveiled mysteries of a future seraglio.
+
+Attempts so extravagant as these to disfigure or, it might
+rather be said, to metamorphose the object, render it necessary to
+take an accurate view of its real nature and form: in order as well
+to ascertain its true aspect and genuine appearance, as to unmask
+the disingenuity and expose the fallacy of the counterfeit
+resemblances which have been so insidiously, as well as
+industriously, propagated.
+
+In the execution of this task, there is no man who would not
+find it an arduous effort either to behold with moderation, or to
+treat with seriousness, the devices, not less weak than wicked,
+which have been contrived to pervert the public opinion in relation
+to the subject. They so far exceed the usual though unjustifiable
+licenses of party artifice, that even in a disposition the most
+candid and tolerant, they must force the sentiments which favor an
+indulgent construction of the conduct of political adversaries to
+give place to a voluntary and unreserved indignation. It is
+impossible not to bestow the imputation of deliberate imposture and
+deception upon the gross pretense of a similitude between a king of
+Great Britain and a magistrate of the character marked out for that
+of the President of the United States. It is still more impossible
+to withhold that imputation from the rash and barefaced expedients
+which have been employed to give success to the attempted imposition.
+
+In one instance, which I cite as a sample of the general spirit,
+the temerity has proceeded so far as to ascribe to the President of
+the United States a power which by the instrument reported is
+EXPRESSLY allotted to the Executives of the individual States. I
+mean the power of filling casual vacancies in the Senate.
+
+This bold experiment upon the discernment of his countrymen has
+been hazarded by a writer who (whatever may be his real merit) has
+had no inconsiderable share in the applauses of his party1; and
+who, upon this false and unfounded suggestion, has built a series of
+observations equally false and unfounded. Let him now be confronted
+with the evidence of the fact, and let him, if he be able, justify
+or extenuate the shameful outrage he has offered to the dictates of
+truth and to the rules of fair dealing.
+
+The second clause of the second section of the second article
+empowers the President of the United States "to nominate, and by
+and with the advice and consent of the Senate, to appoint
+ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, judges of the
+Supreme Court, and all other OFFICERS of United States whose
+appointments are NOT in the Constitution OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR, and
+WHICH SHALL BE ESTABLISHED BY LAW." Immediately after this clause
+follows another in these words: "The President shall have power to
+fill up ?? VACANCIES that may happen DURING THE RECESS OF THE
+SENATE, by granting commissions which shall EXPIRE AT THE END OF
+THEIR NEXT SESSION." It is from this last provision that the
+pretended power of the President to fill vacancies in the Senate has
+been deduced. A slight attention to the connection of the clauses,
+and to the obvious meaning of the terms, will satisfy us that the
+deduction is not even colorable.
+
+The first of these two clauses, it is clear, only provides a
+mode for appointing such officers, "whose appointments are NOT
+OTHERWISE PROVIDED FOR in the Constitution, and which SHALL BE
+ESTABLISHED BY LAW"; of course it cannot extend to the
+appointments of senators, whose appointments are OTHERWISE PROVIDED
+FOR in the Constitution2, and who are ESTABLISHED BY THE
+CONSTITUTION, and will not require a future establishment by law.
+This position will hardly be contested.
+
+The last of these two clauses, it is equally clear, cannot be
+understood to comprehend the power of filling vacancies in the
+Senate, for the following reasons:  First. The relation in
+which that clause stands to the other, which declares the general
+mode of appointing officers of the United States, denotes it to be
+nothing more than a supplement to the other, for the purpose of
+establishing an auxiliary method of appointment, in cases to which
+the general method was inadequate. The ordinary power of
+appointment is confined to the President and Senate JOINTLY, and can
+therefore only be exercised during the session of the Senate; but
+as it would have been improper to oblige this body to be continually
+in session for the appointment of officers and as vacancies might
+happen IN THEIR RECESS, which it might be necessary for the public
+service to fill without delay, the succeeding clause is evidently
+intended to authorize the President, SINGLY, to make temporary
+appointments "during the recess of the Senate, by granting
+commissions which shall expire at the end of their next session."
+Secondly. If this clause is to be considered as supplementary
+to the one which precedes, the VACANCIES of which it speaks must be
+construed to relate to the "officers" described in the preceding
+one; and this, we have seen, excludes from its description the
+members of the Senate. Thirdly. The time within which the
+power is to operate, "during the recess of the Senate," and the
+duration of the appointments, "to the end of the next session" of
+that body, conspire to elucidate the sense of the provision, which,
+if it had been intended to comprehend senators, would naturally have
+referred the temporary power of filling vacancies to the recess of
+the State legislatures, who are to make the permanent appointments,
+and not to the recess of the national Senate, who are to have no
+concern in those appointments; and would have extended the duration
+in office of the temporary senators to the next session of the
+legislature of the State, in whose representation the vacancies had
+happened, instead of making it to expire at the end of the ensuing
+session of the national Senate. The circumstances of the body
+authorized to make the permanent appointments would, of course, have
+governed the modification of a power which related to the temporary
+appointments; and as the national Senate is the body, whose
+situation is alone contemplated in the clause upon which the
+suggestion under examination has been founded, the vacancies to
+which it alludes can only be deemed to respect those officers in
+whose appointment that body has a concurrent agency with the
+President. But lastly, the first and second clauses of the
+third section of the first article, not only obviate all possibility
+of doubt, but destroy the pretext of misconception. The former
+provides, that "the Senate of the United States shall be composed
+of two Senators from each State, chosen BY THE LEGISLATURE THEREOF
+for six years"; and the latter directs, that, "if vacancies in
+that body should happen by resignation or otherwise, DURING THE
+RECESS OF THE LEGISLATURE OF ANY STATE, the Executive THEREOF may
+make temporary appointments until the NEXT MEETING OF THE
+LEGISLATURE, which shall then fill such vacancies." Here is an
+express power given, in clear and unambiguous terms, to the State
+Executives, to fill casual vacancies in the Senate, by temporary
+appointments; which not only invalidates the supposition, that the
+clause before considered could have been intended to confer that
+power upon the President of the United States, but proves that this
+supposition, destitute as it is even of the merit of plausibility,
+must have originated in an intention to deceive the people, too
+palpable to be obscured by sophistry, too atrocious to be palliated
+by hypocrisy.
+
+I have taken the pains to select this instance of
+misrepresentation, and to place it in a clear and strong light, as
+an unequivocal proof of the unwarrantable arts which are practiced
+to prevent a fair and impartial judgment of the real merits of the
+Constitution submitted to the consideration of the people. Nor have
+I scrupled, in so flagrant a case, to allow myself a severity of
+animadversion little congenial with the general spirit of these
+papers. I hesitate not to submit it to the decision of any candid
+and honest adversary of the proposed government, whether language
+can furnish epithets of too much asperity, for so shameless and so
+prostitute an attempt to impose on the citizens of America.
+
+PUBLIUS.
+
+1 See CATO, No. V.
+
+2 Article I, section 3, clause I.
+
+
+
+
+
+FEDERALIST No. 68
+
+
+
+The Mode of Electing the President
+
+From the New York Packet.
+
+Friday, March 14, 1788.
+
+
+
+HAMILTON
+
+
+
+To the People of the State of New York:
+
+THE mode of appointment of the Chief Magistrate of the United
+States is almost the only part of the system, of any consequence,
+which has escaped without severe censure, or which has received the
+slightest mark of approbation from its opponents. The most
+plausible of these, who has appeared in print, has even deigned to
+admit that the election of the President is pretty well
+guarded.1 I venture somewhat further, and hesitate not to
+affirm, that if the manner of it be not perfect, it is at least
+excellent. It unites in an eminent degree all the advantages, the
+union of which was to be wished for.
+
+It was desirable that the sense of the people should operate in
+the choice of the person to whom so important a trust was to be
+confided. This end will be answered by committing the right of
+making it, not to any preestablished body, but to men chosen by the
+people for the special purpose, and at the particular conjuncture.
+
+It was equally desirable, that the immediate election should be
+made by men most capable of analyzing the qualities adapted to the
+station, and acting under circumstances favorable to deliberation,
+and to a judicious combination of all the reasons and inducements
+which were proper to govern their choice. A small number of
+persons, selected by their fellow-citizens from the general mass,
+will be most likely to possess the information and discernment
+requisite to such complicated investigations.
+
+It was also peculiarly desirable to afford as little opportunity
+as possible to tumult and disorder. This evil was not least to be
+dreaded in the election of a magistrate, who was to have so
+important an agency in the administration of the government as the
+President of the United States. But the precautions which have been
+so happily concerted in the system under consideration, promise an
+effectual security against this mischief. The choice of SEVERAL, to
+form an intermediate body of electors, will be much less apt to
+convulse the community with any extraordinary or violent movements,
+than the choice of ONE who was himself to be the final object of the
+public wishes. And as the electors, chosen in each State, are to
+assemble and vote in the State in which they are chosen, this
+detached and divided situation will expose them much less to heats
+and ferments, which might be communicated from them to the people,
+than if they were all to be convened at one time, in one place.
+
+Nothing was more to be desired than that every practicable
+obstacle should be opposed to cabal, intrigue, and corruption.
+These most deadly adversaries of republican government might
+naturally have been expected to make their approaches from more than
+one quarter, but chiefly from the desire in foreign powers to gain
+an improper ascendant in our councils. How could they better
+gratify this, than by raising a creature of their own to the chief
+magistracy of the Union? But the convention have guarded against
+all danger of this sort, with the most provident and judicious
+attention. They have not made the appointment of the President to
+depend on any preexisting bodies of men, who might be tampered with
+beforehand to prostitute their votes; but they have referred it in
+the first instance to an immediate act of the people of America, to
+be exerted in the choice of persons for the temporary and sole
+purpose of making the appointment. And they have excluded from
+eligibility to this trust, all those who from situation might be
+suspected of too great devotion to the President in office. No
+senator, representative, or other person holding a place of trust or
+profit under the United States, can be of the numbers of the
+electors. Thus without corrupting the body of the people, the
+immediate agents in the election will at least enter upon the task
+free from any sinister bias. Their transient existence, and their
+detached situation, already taken notice of, afford a satisfactory
+prospect of their continuing so, to the conclusion of it. The
+business of corruption, when it is to embrace so considerable a
+number of men, requires time as well as means. Nor would it be
+found easy suddenly to embark them, dispersed as they would be over
+thirteen States, in any combinations founded upon motives, which
+though they could not properly be denominated corrupt, might yet be
+of a nature to mislead them from their duty.
+
+Another and no less important desideratum was, that the
+Executive should be independent for his continuance in office on all
+but the people themselves. He might otherwise be tempted to
+sacrifice his duty to his complaisance for those whose favor was
+necessary to the duration of his official consequence. This
+advantage will also be secured, by making his re-election to depend
+on a special body of representatives, deputed by the society for the
+single purpose of making the important choice.
+
+All these advantages will happily combine in the plan devised by
+the convention; which is, that the people of each State shall
+choose a number of persons as electors, equal to the number of
+senators and representatives of such State in the national
+government, who shall assemble within the State, and vote for some
+fit person as President. Their votes, thus given, are to be
+transmitted to the seat of the national government, and the person
+who may happen to have a majority of the whole number of votes will
+be the President. But as a majority of the votes might not always
+happen to centre in one man, and as it might be unsafe to permit
+less than a majority to be conclusive, it is provided that, in such
+a contingency, the House of Representatives shall select out of the
+candidates who shall have the five highest number of votes, the man
+who in their opinion may be best qualified for the office.
+
+The process of election affords a moral certainty, that the
+office of President will never fall to the lot of any man who is not
+in an eminent degree endowed with the requisite qualifications.
+Talents for low intrigue, and the little arts of popularity, may
+alone suffice to elevate a man to the first honors in a single
+State; but it will require other talents, and a different kind of
+merit, to establish him in the esteem and confidence of the whole
+Union, or of so considerable a portion of it as would be necessary
+to make him a successful candidate for the distinguished office of
+President of the United States. It will not be too strong to say,
+that there will be a constant probability of seeing the station
+filled by characters pre-eminent for ability and virtue. And this
+will be thought no inconsiderable recommendation of the
+Constitution, by those who are able to estimate the share which the
+executive in every government must necessarily have in its good or
+ill administration. Though we cannot acquiesce in the political
+heresy of the poet who says:  "For forms of government let fools
+contest That which is best  administered is best,"
+yet we may safely pronounce, that the true test of a good
+government is its aptitude and tendency to produce a good
+administration.
+
+The Vice-President is to be chosen in the same manner with the
+President; with this difference, that the Senate is to do, in
+respect to the former, what is to be done by the House of
+Representatives, in respect to the latter.
+
+The appointment of an extraordinary person, as Vice-President,
+has been objected to as superfluous, if not mischievous. It has
+been alleged, that it would have been preferable to have authorized
+the Senate to elect out of their own body an officer answering that
+description. But two considerations seem to justify the ideas of
+the convention in this respect. One is, that to secure at all times
+the possibility of a definite resolution of the body, it is
+necessary that the President should have only a casting vote. And
+to take the senator of any State from his seat as senator, to place
+him in that of President of the Senate, would be to exchange, in
+regard to the State from which he came, a constant for a contingent
+vote. The other consideration is, that as the Vice-President may
+occasionally become a substitute for the President, in the supreme
+executive magistracy, all the reasons which recommend the mode of
+election prescribed for the one, apply with great if not with equal
+force to the manner of appointing the other. It is remarkable that
+in this, as in most other instances, the objection which is made
+would lie against the constitution of this State. We have a
+Lieutenant-Governor, chosen by the people at large, who presides in
+the Senate, and is the constitutional substitute for the Governor,
+in casualties similar to those which would authorize the
+Vice-President to exercise the authorities and discharge the duties
+of the President.
+
+PUBLIUS.
+
+1 Vide FEDERAL FARMER.
+
+
+
+
+
+FEDERALIST No. 69
+
+
+
+The Real Character of the Executive
+
+From the New York Packet.
+
+Friday, March 14, 1788.
+
+
+
+HAMILTON
+
+
+
+To the People of the State of New York:
+
+I PROCEED now to trace the real characters of the proposed
+Executive, as they are marked out in the plan of the convention.
+This will serve to place in a strong light the unfairness of the
+representations which have been made in regard to it.
+
+The first thing which strikes our attention is, that the
+executive authority, with few exceptions, is to be vested in a
+single magistrate. This will scarcely, however, be considered as a
+point upon which any comparison can be grounded; for if, in this
+particular, there be a resemblance to the king of Great Britain,
+there is not less a resemblance to the Grand Seignior, to the khan
+of Tartary, to the Man of the Seven Mountains, or to the governor of
+New York.
+
+That magistrate is to be elected for FOUR years; and is to be
+re-eligible as often as the people of the United States shall think
+him worthy of their confidence. In these circumstances there is a
+total dissimilitude between HIM and a king of Great Britain, who is
+an HEREDITARY monarch, possessing the crown as a patrimony
+descendible to his heirs forever; but there is a close analogy
+between HIM and a governor of New York, who is elected for THREE
+years, and is re-eligible without limitation or intermission. If we
+consider how much less time would be requisite for establishing a
+dangerous influence in a single State, than for establishing a like
+influence throughout the United States, we must conclude that a
+duration of FOUR years for the Chief Magistrate of the Union is a
+degree of permanency far less to be dreaded in that office, than a
+duration of THREE years for a corresponding office in a single State.
+
+The President of the United States would be liable to be
+impeached, tried, and, upon conviction of treason, bribery, or other
+high crimes or misdemeanors, removed from office; and would
+afterwards be liable to prosecution and punishment in the ordinary
+course of law. The person of the king of Great Britain is sacred
+and inviolable; there is no constitutional tribunal to which he is
+amenable; no punishment to which he can be subjected without
+involving the crisis of a national revolution. In this delicate and
+important circumstance of personal responsibility, the President of
+Confederated America would stand upon no better ground than a
+governor of New York, and upon worse ground than the governors of
+Maryland and Delaware.
+
+The President of the United States is to have power to return a
+bill, which shall have passed the two branches of the legislature,
+for reconsideration; and the bill so returned is to become a law,
+if, upon that reconsideration, it be approved by two thirds of both
+houses. The king of Great Britain, on his part, has an absolute
+negative upon the acts of the two houses of Parliament. The disuse
+of that power for a considerable time past does not affect the
+reality of its existence; and is to be ascribed wholly to the
+crown's having found the means of substituting influence to
+authority, or the art of gaining a majority in one or the other of
+the two houses, to the necessity of exerting a prerogative which
+could seldom be exerted without hazarding some degree of national
+agitation. The qualified negative of the President differs widely
+from this absolute negative of the British sovereign; and tallies
+exactly with the revisionary authority of the council of revision of
+this State, of which the governor is a constituent part. In this
+respect the power of the President would exceed that of the governor
+of New York, because the former would possess, singly, what the
+latter shares with the chancellor and judges; but it would be
+precisely the same with that of the governor of Massachusetts, whose
+constitution, as to this article, seems to have been the original
+from which the convention have copied.
+
+The President is to be the "commander-in-chief of the army and
+navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several States,
+when called into the actual service of the United States. He is to
+have power to grant reprieves and pardons for offenses against the
+United States, EXCEPT IN CASES OF IMPEACHMENT; to recommend to the
+consideration of Congress such measures as he shall judge necessary
+and expedient; to convene, on extraordinary occasions, both houses
+of the legislature, or either of them, and, in case of disagreement
+between them WITH RESPECT TO THE TIME OF ADJOURNMENT, to adjourn
+them to such time as he shall think proper; to take care that the
+laws be faithfully executed; and to commission all officers of the
+United States." In most of these particulars, the power of the
+President will resemble equally that of the king of Great Britain
+and of the governor of New York. The most material points of
+difference are these:  First. The President will have only the
+occasional command of such part of the militia of the nation as by
+legislative provision may be called into the actual service of the
+Union. The king of Great Britain and the governor of New York have
+at all times the entire command of all the militia within their
+several jurisdictions. In this article, therefore, the power of the
+President would be inferior to that of either the monarch or the
+governor. Secondly. The President is to be commander-in-chief
+of the army and navy of the United States. In this respect his
+authority would be nominally the same with that of the king of Great
+Britain, but in substance much inferior to it. It would amount to
+nothing more than the supreme command and direction of the military
+and naval forces, as first General and admiral of the Confederacy;
+while that of the British king extends to the DECLARING of war and
+to the RAISING and REGULATING of fleets and armies, all which, by
+the Constitution under consideration, would appertain to the
+legislature.1 The governor of New York, on the other hand, is
+by the constitution of the State vested only with the command of its
+militia and navy. But the constitutions of several of the States
+expressly declare their governors to be commanders-in-chief, as well
+of the army as navy; and it may well be a question, whether those
+of New Hampshire and Massachusetts, in particular, do not, in this
+instance, confer larger powers upon their respective governors, than
+could be claimed by a President of the United States. Thirdly.
+The power of the President, in respect to pardons, would extend to
+all cases, EXCEPT THOSE OF IMPEACHMENT. The governor of New York
+may pardon in all cases, even in those of impeachment, except for
+treason and murder. Is not the power of the governor, in this
+article, on a calculation of political consequences, greater than
+that of the President? All conspiracies and plots against the
+government, which have not been matured into actual treason, may be
+screened from punishment of every kind, by the interposition of the
+prerogative of pardoning. If a governor of New York, therefore,
+should be at the head of any such conspiracy, until the design had
+been ripened into actual hostility he could insure his accomplices
+and adherents an entire impunity. A President of the Union, on the
+other hand, though he may even pardon treason, when prosecuted in
+the ordinary course of law, could shelter no offender, in any
+degree, from the effects of impeachment and conviction. Would not
+the prospect of a total indemnity for all the preliminary steps be a
+greater temptation to undertake and persevere in an enterprise
+against the public liberty, than the mere prospect of an exemption
+from death and confiscation, if the final execution of the design,
+upon an actual appeal to arms, should miscarry? Would this last
+expectation have any influence at all, when the probability was
+computed, that the person who was to afford that exemption might
+himself be involved in the consequences of the measure, and might be
+incapacitated by his agency in it from affording the desired
+impunity? The better to judge of this matter, it will be necessary
+to recollect, that, by the proposed Constitution, the offense of
+treason is limited "to levying war upon the United States, and
+adhering to their enemies, giving them aid and comfort"; and that
+by the laws of New York it is confined within similar bounds.
+Fourthly. The President can only adjourn the national legislature
+in the single case of disagreement about the time of adjournment.
+The British monarch may prorogue or even dissolve the Parliament.
+The governor of New York may also prorogue the legislature of this
+State for a limited time; a power which, in certain situations, may
+be employed to very important purposes.
+
+The President is to have power, with the advice and consent of
+the Senate, to make treaties, provided two thirds of the senators
+present concur. The king of Great Britain is the sole and absolute
+representative of the nation in all foreign transactions. He can of
+his own accord make treaties of peace, commerce, alliance, and of
+every other description. It has been insinuated, that his authority
+in this respect is not conclusive, and that his conventions with
+foreign powers are subject to the revision, and stand in need of the
+ratification, of Parliament. But I believe this doctrine was never
+heard of, until it was broached upon the present occasion. Every
+jurist2 of that kingdom, and every other man acquainted with its
+Constitution, knows, as an established fact, that the prerogative of
+making treaties exists in the crown in its utmost plentitude; and
+that the compacts entered into by the royal authority have the most
+complete legal validity and perfection, independent of any other
+sanction. The Parliament, it is true, is sometimes seen employing
+itself in altering the existing laws to conform them to the
+stipulations in a new treaty; and this may have possibly given
+birth to the imagination, that its co-operation was necessary to the
+obligatory efficacy of the treaty. But this parliamentary
+interposition proceeds from a different cause: from the necessity
+of adjusting a most artificial and intricate system of revenue and
+commercial laws, to the changes made in them by the operation of the
+treaty; and of adapting new provisions and precautions to the new
+state of things, to keep the machine from running into disorder. In
+this respect, therefore, there is no comparison between the intended
+power of the President and the actual power of the British sovereign.
+The one can perform alone what the other can do only with the
+concurrence of a branch of the legislature. It must be admitted,
+that, in this instance, the power of the federal Executive would
+exceed that of any State Executive. But this arises naturally from
+the sovereign power which relates to treaties. If the Confederacy
+were to be dissolved, it would become a question, whether the
+Executives of the several States were not solely invested with that
+delicate and important prerogative.
+
+The President is also to be authorized to receive ambassadors
+and other public ministers. This, though it has been a rich theme
+of declamation, is more a matter of dignity than of authority. It
+is a circumstance which will be without consequence in the
+administration of the government; and it was far more convenient
+that it should be arranged in this manner, than that there should be
+a necessity of convening the legislature, or one of its branches,
+upon every arrival of a foreign minister, though it were merely to
+take the place of a departed predecessor.
+
+The President is to nominate, and, WITH THE ADVICE AND CONSENT
+OF THE SENATE, to appoint ambassadors and other public ministers,
+judges of the Supreme Court, and in general all officers of the
+United States established by law, and whose appointments are not
+otherwise provided for by the Constitution. The king of Great
+Britain is emphatically and truly styled the fountain of honor. He
+not only appoints to all offices, but can create offices. He can
+confer titles of nobility at pleasure; and has the disposal of an
+immense number of church preferments. There is evidently a great
+inferiority in the power of the President, in this particular, to
+that of the British king; nor is it equal to that of the governor
+of New York, if we are to interpret the meaning of the constitution
+of the State by the practice which has obtained under it. The power
+of appointment is with us lodged in a council, composed of the
+governor and four members of the Senate, chosen by the Assembly.
+The governor CLAIMS, and has frequently EXERCISED, the right of
+nomination, and is ENTITLED to a casting vote in the appointment.
+If he really has the right of nominating, his authority is in this
+respect equal to that of the President, and exceeds it in the
+article of the casting vote. In the national government, if the
+Senate should be divided, no appointment could be made; in the
+government of New York, if the council should be divided, the
+governor can turn the scale, and confirm his own nomination.3
+If we compare the publicity which must necessarily attend the mode
+of appointment by the President and an entire branch of the national
+legislature, with the privacy in the mode of appointment by the
+governor of New York, closeted in a secret apartment with at most
+four, and frequently with only two persons; and if we at the same
+time consider how much more easy it must be to influence the small
+number of which a council of appointment consists, than the
+considerable number of which the national Senate would consist, we
+cannot hesitate to pronounce that the power of the chief magistrate
+of this State, in the disposition of offices, must, in practice, be
+greatly superior to that of the Chief Magistrate of the Union.
+
+Hence it appears that, except as to the concurrent authority of
+the President in the article of treaties, it would be difficult to
+determine whether that magistrate would, in the aggregate, possess
+more or less power than the Governor of New York. And it appears
+yet more unequivocally, that there is no pretense for the parallel
+which has been attempted between him and the king of Great Britain.
+But to render the contrast in this respect still more striking, it
+may be of use to throw the principal circumstances of dissimilitude
+into a closer group.
+
+The President of the United States would be an officer elected
+by the people for FOUR years; the king of Great Britain is a
+perpetual and HEREDITARY prince. The one would be amenable to
+personal punishment and disgrace; the person of the other is sacred
+and inviolable. The one would have a QUALIFIED negative upon the
+acts of the legislative body; the other has an ABSOLUTE negative.
+The one would have a right to command the military and naval forces
+of the nation; the other, in addition to this right, possesses that
+of DECLARING war, and of RAISING and REGULATING fleets and armies by
+his own authority. The one would have a concurrent power with a
+branch of the legislature in the formation of treaties; the other
+is the SOLE POSSESSOR of the power of making treaties. The one
+would have a like concurrent authority in appointing to offices;
+the other is the sole author of all appointments. The one can
+confer no privileges whatever; the other can make denizens of
+aliens, noblemen of commoners; can erect corporations with all the
+rights incident to corporate bodies. The one can prescribe no rules
+concerning the commerce or currency of the nation; the other is in
+several respects the arbiter of commerce, and in this capacity can
+establish markets and fairs, can regulate weights and measures, can
+lay embargoes for a limited time, can coin money, can authorize or
+prohibit the circulation of foreign coin. The one has no particle
+of spiritual jurisdiction; the other is the supreme head and
+governor of the national church! What answer shall we give to those
+who would persuade us that things so unlike resemble each other?
+The same that ought to be given to those who tell us that a
+government, the whole power of which would be in the hands of the
+elective and periodical servants of the people, is an aristocracy, a
+monarchy, and a despotism.
+
+PUBLIUS.
+
+1 A writer in a Pennsylvania paper, under the signature of
+TAMONY, has asserted that the king of Great Britain owes his
+prerogative as commander-in-chief to an annual mutiny bill. The
+truth is, on the contrary, that his prerogative, in this respect, is
+immemorial, and was only disputed, "contrary to all reason and
+precedent," as Blackstone vol. i., page 262, expresses it, by the
+Long Parliament of Charles I. but by the statute the 13th of Charles
+II., chap. 6, it was declared to be in the king alone, for that the
+sole supreme government and command of the militia within his
+Majesty's realms and dominions, and of all forces by sea and land,
+and of all forts and places of strength, EVER WAS AND IS the
+undoubted right of his Majesty and his royal predecessors, kings and
+queens of England, and that both or either house of Parliament
+cannot nor ought to pretend to the same.
+
+2 Vide Blackstone's "Commentaries," vol i., p. 257.
+
+3 Candor, however, demands an acknowledgment that I do not think
+the claim of the governor to a right of nomination well founded.
+Yet it is always justifiable to reason from the practice of a
+government, till its propriety has been constitutionally questioned.
+And independent of this claim, when we take into view the other
+considerations, and pursue them through all their consequences, we
+shall be inclined to draw much the same conclusion.
+
+
+
+*There are two slightly different versions of No. 70 included here.
+
+
+
+FEDERALIST No. 70
+
+
+
+The Executive Department Further Considered
+
+From the New York Packet.
+
+Tuesday, March 18, 1788.
+
+
+
+HAMILTON
+
+
+
+To the People of the State of New York:
+
+THERE is an idea, which is not without its advocates, that a
+vigorous Executive is inconsistent with the genius of republican
+government. The enlightened well-wishers to this species of
+government must at least hope that the supposition is destitute of
+foundation; since they can never admit its truth, without at the
+same time admitting the condemnation of their own principles.
+Energy in the Executive is a leading character in the definition of
+good government. It is essential to the protection of the community
+against foreign attacks; it is not less essential to the steady
+administration of the laws; to the protection of property against
+those irregular and high-handed combinations which sometimes
+interrupt the ordinary course of justice; to the security of
+liberty against the enterprises and assaults of ambition, of
+faction, and of anarchy. Every man the least conversant in Roman
+story, knows how often that republic was obliged to take refuge in
+the absolute power of a single man, under the formidable title of
+Dictator, as well against the intrigues of ambitious individuals who
+aspired to the tyranny, and the seditions of whole classes of the
+community whose conduct threatened the existence of all government,
+as against the invasions of external enemies who menaced the
+conquest and destruction of Rome.
+
+There can be no need, however, to multiply arguments or examples
+on this head. A feeble Executive implies a feeble execution of the
+government. A feeble execution is but another phrase for a bad
+execution; and a government ill executed, whatever it may be in
+theory, must be, in practice, a bad government.
+
+Taking it for granted, therefore, that all men of sense will
+agree in the necessity of an energetic Executive, it will only
+remain to inquire, what are the ingredients which constitute this
+energy? How far can they be combined with those other ingredients
+which constitute safety in the republican sense? And how far does
+this combination characterize the plan which has been reported by
+the convention?
+
+The ingredients which constitute energy in the Executive are,
+first, unity; secondly, duration; thirdly, an adequate provision
+for its support; fourthly, competent powers.
+
+The ingredients which constitute safety in the repub lican sense
+are, first, a due dependence on the people, secondly, a due
+responsibility.
+
+Those politicians and statesmen who have been the most
+celebrated for the soundness of their principles and for the justice
+of their views, have declared in favor of a single Executive and a
+numerous legislature. They have with great propriety, considered
+energy as the most necessary qualification of the former, and have
+regarded this as most applicable to power in a single hand, while
+they have, with equal propriety, considered the latter as best
+adapted to deliberation and wisdom, and best calculated to
+conciliate the confidence of the people and to secure their
+privileges and interests.
+
+That unity is conducive to energy will not be disputed.
+Decision, activity, secrecy, and despatch will generally
+characterize the proceedings of one man in a much more eminent
+degree than the proceedings of any greater number; and in
+proportion as the number is increased, these qualities will be
+diminished.
+
+This unity may be destroyed in two ways: either by vesting the
+power in two or more magistrates of equal dignity and authority; or
+by vesting it ostensibly in one man, subject, in whole or in part,
+to the control and co-operation of others, in the capacity of
+counsellors to him. Of the first, the two Consuls of Rome may serve
+as an example; of the last, we shall find examples in the
+constitutions of several of the States. New York and New Jersey, if
+I recollect right, are the only States which have intrusted the
+executive authority wholly to single men.1 Both these methods
+of destroying the unity of the Executive have their partisans; but
+the votaries of an executive council are the most numerous. They
+are both liable, if not to equal, to similar objections, and may in
+most lights be examined in conjunction.
+
+The experience of other nations will afford little instruction
+on this head. As far, however, as it teaches any thing, it teaches
+us not to be enamoured of plurality in the Executive. We have seen
+that the Achaeans, on an experiment of two Praetors, were induced to
+abolish one. The Roman history records many instances of mischiefs
+to the republic from the dissensions between the Consuls, and
+between the military Tribunes, who were at times substituted for the
+Consuls. But it gives us no specimens of any peculiar advantages
+derived to the state from the circumstance of the plurality of those
+magistrates. That the dissensions between them were not more
+frequent or more fatal, is a matter of astonishment, until we advert
+to the singular position in which the republic was almost
+continually placed, and to the prudent policy pointed out by the
+circumstances of the state, and pursued by the Consuls, of making a
+division of the government between them. The patricians engaged in
+a perpetual struggle with the plebeians for the preservation of
+their ancient authorities and dignities; the Consuls, who were
+generally chosen out of the former body, were commonly united by the
+personal interest they had in the defense of the privileges of their
+order. In addition to this motive of union, after the arms of the
+republic had considerably expanded the bounds of its empire, it
+became an established custom with the Consuls to divide the
+administration between themselves by lot one of them remaining at
+Rome to govern the city and its environs, the other taking the
+command in the more distant provinces. This expedient must, no
+doubt, have had great influence in preventing those collisions and
+rivalships which might otherwise have embroiled the peace of the
+republic.
+
+But quitting the dim light of historical research, attaching
+ourselves purely to the dictates of reason and good sense, we shall
+discover much greater cause to reject than to approve the idea of
+plurality in the Executive, under any modification whatever.
+
+Wherever two or more persons are engaged in any common
+enterprise or pursuit, there is always danger of difference of
+opinion. If it be a public trust or office, in which they are
+clothed with equal dignity and authority, there is peculiar danger
+of personal emulation and even animosity. From either, and
+especially from all these causes, the most bitter dissensions are
+apt to spring. Whenever these happen, they lessen the
+respectability, weaken the authority, and distract the plans and
+operation of those whom they divide. If they should unfortunately
+assail the supreme executive magistracy of a country, consisting of
+a plurality of persons, they might impede or frustrate the most
+important measures of the government, in the most critical
+emergencies of the state. And what is still worse, they might split
+the community into the most violent and irreconcilable factions,
+adhering differently to the different individuals who composed the
+magistracy.
+
+Men often oppose a thing, merely because they have had no agency
+in planning it, or because it may have been planned by those whom
+they dislike. But if they have been consulted, and have happened to
+disapprove, opposition then becomes, in their estimation, an
+indispensable duty of self-love. They seem to think themselves
+bound in honor, and by all the motives of personal infallibility, to
+defeat the success of what has been resolved upon contrary to their
+sentiments. Men of upright, benevolent tempers have too many
+opportunities of remarking, with horror, to what desperate lengths
+this disposition is sometimes carried, and how often the great
+interests of society are sacrificed to the vanity, to the conceit,
+and to the obstinacy of individuals, who have credit enough to make
+their passions and their caprices interesting to mankind. Perhaps
+the question now before the public may, in its consequences, afford
+melancholy proofs of the effects of this despicable frailty, or
+rather detestable vice, in the human character.
+
+Upon the principles of a free government, inconveniences from
+the source just mentioned must necessarily be submitted to in the
+formation of the legislature; but it is unnecessary, and therefore
+unwise, to introduce them into the constitution of the Executive.
+It is here too that they may be most pernicious. In the
+legislature, promptitude of decision is oftener an evil than a
+benefit. The differences of opinion, and the jarrings of parties in
+that department of the government, though they may sometimes
+obstruct salutary plans, yet often promote deliberation and
+circumspection, and serve to check excesses in the majority. When a
+resolution too is once taken, the opposition must be at an end.
+That resolution is a law, and resistance to it punishable. But no
+favorable circumstances palliate or atone for the disadvantages of
+dissension in the executive department. Here, they are pure and
+unmixed. There is no point at which they cease to operate. They
+serve to embarrass and weaken the execution of the plan or measure
+to which they relate, from the first step to the final conclusion of
+it. They constantly counteract those qualities in the Executive
+which are the most necessary ingredients in its composition, vigor
+and expedition, and this without anycounterbalancing good. In the
+conduct of war, in which the energy of the Executive is the bulwark
+of the national security, every thing would be to be apprehended
+from its plurality.
+
+It must be confessed that these observations apply with
+principal weight to the first case supposed that is, to a plurality
+of magistrates of equal dignity and authority a scheme, the
+advocates for which are not likely to form a numerous sect; but
+they apply, though not with equal, yet with considerable weight to
+the project of a council, whose concurrence is made constitutionally
+necessary to the operations of the ostensible Executive. An artful
+cabal in that council would be able to distract and to enervate the
+whole system of administration. If no such cabal should exist, the
+mere diversity of views and opinions would alone be sufficient to
+tincture the exercise of the executive authority with a spirit of
+habitual feebleness and dilatoriness.
+
+But one of the weightiest objections to a plurality in the
+Executive, and which lies as much against the last as the first
+plan, is, that it tends to conceal faults and destroy responsibility.
+Responsibility is of two kinds to censure and to punishment. The
+first is the more important of the two, especially in an elective
+office. Man, in public trust, will much oftener act in such a
+manner as to render him unworthy of being any longer trusted, than
+in such a manner as to make him obnoxious to legal punishment. But
+the multiplication of the Executive adds to the difficulty of
+detection in either case. It often becomes impossible, amidst
+mutual accusations, to determine on whom the blame or the punishment
+of a pernicious measure, or series of pernicious measures, ought
+really to fall. It is shifted from one to another with so much
+dexterity, and under such plausible appearances, that the public
+opinion is left in suspense about the real author. The
+circumstances which may have led to any national miscarriage or
+misfortune are sometimes so complicated that, where there are a
+number of actors who may have had different degrees and kinds of
+agency, though we may clearly see upon the whole that there has been
+mismanagement, yet it may be impracticable to pronounce to whose
+account the evil which may have been incurred is truly chargeable.
+
+"I was overruled by my council. The council were so divided in
+their opinions that it was impossible to obtain any better
+resolution on the point." These and similar pretexts are
+constantly at hand, whether true or false. And who is there that
+will either take the trouble or incur the odium, of a strict
+scrunity into the secret springs of the transaction? Should there
+be found a citizen zealous enough to undertake the unpromising task,
+if there happen to be collusion between the parties concerned, how
+easy it is to clothe the circumstances with so much ambiguity, as to
+render it uncertain what was the precise conduct of any of those
+parties?
+
+In the single instance in which the governor of this State is
+coupled with a council that is, in the appointment to offices, we
+have seen the mischiefs of it in the view now under consideration.
+Scandalous appointments to important offices have been made. Some
+cases, indeed, have been so flagrant that ALL PARTIES have agreed in
+the impropriety of the thing. When inquiry has been made, the blame
+has been laid by the governor on the members of the council, who, on
+their part, have charged it upon his nomination; while the people
+remain altogether at a loss to determine, by whose influence their
+interests have been committed to hands so unqualified and so
+manifestly improper. In tenderness to individuals, I forbear to
+descend to particulars.
+
+It is evident from these considerations, that the plurality of
+the Executive tends to deprive the people of the two greatest
+securities they can have for the faithful exercise of any delegated
+power, first, the restraints of public opinion, which lose their
+efficacy, as well on account of the division of the censure
+attendant on bad measures among a number, as on account of the
+uncertainty on whom it ought to fall; and, secondly, the
+opportunity of discovering with facility and clearness the
+misconduct of the persons they trust, in order either to their
+removal from office or to their actual punishment in cases which
+admit of it.
+
+In England, the king is a perpetual magistrate; and it is a
+maxim which has obtained for the sake of the pub lic peace, that he
+is unaccountable for his administration, and his person sacred.
+Nothing, therefore, can be wiser in that kingdom, than to annex to
+the king a constitutional council, who may be responsible to the
+nation for the advice they give. Without this, there would be no
+responsibility whatever in the executive department an idea
+inadmissible in a free government. But even there the king is not
+bound by the resolutions of his council, though they are answerable
+for the advice they give. He is the absolute master of his own
+conduct in the exercise of his office, and may observe or disregard
+the counsel given to him at his sole discretion.
+
+But in a republic, where every magistrate ought to be personally
+responsible for his behavior in office the reason which in the
+British Constitution dictates the propriety of a council, not only
+ceases to apply, but turns against the institution. In the monarchy
+of Great Britain, it furnishes a substitute for the prohibited
+responsibility of the chief magistrate, which serves in some degree
+as a hostage to the national justice for his good behavior. In the
+American republic, it would serve to destroy, or would greatly
+diminish, the intended and necessary responsibility of the Chief
+Magistrate himself.
+
+The idea of a council to the Executive, which has so generally
+obtained in the State constitutions, has been derived from that
+maxim of republican jealousy which considers power as safer in the
+hands of a number of men than of a single man. If the maxim should
+be admitted to be applicable to the case, I should contend that the
+advantage on that side would not counterbalance the numerous
+disadvantages on the opposite side. But I do not think the rule at
+all applicable to the executive power. I clearly concur in opinion,
+in this particular, with a writer whom the celebrated Junius
+pronounces to be "deep, solid, and ingenious," that "the
+executive power is more easily confined when it is ONE";2 that
+it is far more safe there should be a single object for the jealousy
+and watchfulness of the people; and, in a word, that all
+multiplication of the Executive is rather dangerous than friendly to
+liberty.
+
+A little consideration will satisfy us, that the species of
+security sought for in the multiplication of the Executive, is
+nattainable. Numbers must be so great as to render combination
+difficult, or they are rather a source of danger than of security.
+The united credit and influence of several individuals must be more
+formidable to liberty, than the credit and influence of either of
+them separately. When power, therefore, is placed in the hands of
+so small a number of men, as to admit of their interests and views
+being easily combined in a common enterprise, by an artful leader,
+it becomes more liable to abuse, and more dangerous when abused,
+than if it be lodged in the hands of one man; who, from the very
+circumstance of his being alone, will be more narrowly watched and
+more readily suspected, and who cannot unite so great a mass of
+influence as when he is associated with others. The Decemvirs of
+Rome, whose name denotes their number,3 were more to be dreaded
+in their usurpation than any ONE of them would have been. No person
+would think of proposing an Executive much more numerous than that
+body; from six to a dozen have been suggested for the number of the
+council. The extreme of these numbers, is not too great for an easy
+combination; and from such a combination America would have more to
+fear, than from the ambition of any single individual. A council to
+a magistrate, who is himself responsible for what he does, are
+generally nothing better than a clog upon his good intentions, are
+often the instruments and accomplices of his bad and are almost
+always a cloak to his faults.
+
+I forbear to dwell upon the subject of expense; though it be
+evident that if the council should be numerous enough to answer the
+principal end aimed at by the institution, the salaries of the
+members, who must be drawn from their homes to reside at the seat of
+government, would form an item in the catalogue of public
+expenditures too serious to be incurred for an object of equivocal
+utility. I will only add that, prior to the appearance of the
+Constitution, I rarely met with an intelligent man from any of the
+States, who did not admit, as the result of experience, that the
+UNITY of the executive of this State was one of the best of the
+distinguishing features of our constitution.
+
+PUBLIUS.
+
+1 New York has no council except for the single purpose of
+appointing to offices; New Jersey has a council whom the governor
+may consult. But I think, from the terms of the constitution, their
+resolutions do not bind him.
+
+2 De Lolme.
+
+3 Ten.
+
+
+
+*There are two slightly different versions of No. 70 included here.
+
+
+
+FEDERALIST No. 70
+
+
+
+The Executive Department Further Considered
+
+From the New York Packet.
+
+Tuesday, March 18, 1788.
+
+
+
+HAMILTON
+
+
+
+To the People of the State of New York:
+
+THERE is an idea, which is not without its advocates, that a
+vigorous Executive is inconsistent with the genius of republican
+government. The enlightened well-wishers to this species of
+government must at least hope that the supposition is destitute of
+foundation; since they can never admit its truth, without at the
+same time admitting the condemnation of their own principles.
+Energy in the Executive is a leading character in the definition of
+good government. It is essential to the protection of the community
+against foreign attacks; it is not less essential to the steady
+administration of the laws; to the protection of property against
+those irregular and high-handed combinations which sometimes
+interrupt the ordinary course of justice; to the security of
+liberty against the enterprises and assaults of ambition, of
+faction, and of anarchy. Every man the least conversant in Roman
+story, knows how often that republic was obliged to take refuge in
+the absolute power of a single man, under the formidable title of
+Dictator, as well against the intrigues of ambitious individuals who
+aspired to the tyranny, and the seditions of whole classes of the
+community whose conduct threatened the existence of all government,
+as against the invasions of external enemies who menaced the
+conquest and destruction of Rome.
+
+There can be no need, however, to multiply arguments or examples
+on this head. A feeble Executive implies a feeble execution of the
+government. A feeble execution is but another phrase for a bad
+execution; and a government ill executed, whatever it may be in
+theory, must be, in practice, a bad government.
+
+Taking it for granted, therefore, that all men of sense will
+agree in the necessity of an energetic Executive, it will only
+remain to inquire, what are the ingredients which constitute this
+energy? How far can they be combined with those other ingredients
+which constitute safety in the republican sense? And how far does
+this combination characterize the plan which has been reported by
+the convention?
+
+The ingredients which constitute energy in the Executive are,
+first, unity; secondly, duration; thirdly, an adequate provision
+for its support; fourthly, competent powers.
+
+The ingredients which constitute safety in the repub lican sense
+are, first, a due dependence on the people, secondly, a due
+responsibility.
+
+Those politicians and statesmen who have been the most
+celebrated for the soundness of their principles and for the justice
+of their views, have declared in favor of a single Executive and a
+numerous legislature. They have with great propriety, considered
+energy as the most necessary qualification of the former, and have
+regarded this as most applicable to power in a single hand, while
+they have, with equal propriety, considered the latter as best
+adapted to deliberation and wisdom, and best calculated to
+conciliate the confidence of the people and to secure their
+privileges and interests.
+
+That unity is conducive to energy will not be disputed.
+Decision, activity, secrecy, and despatch will generally
+characterize the proceedings of one man in a much more eminent
+degree than the proceedings of any greater number; and in
+proportion as the number is increased, these qualities will be
+diminished.
+
+This unity may be destroyed in two ways: either by vesting the
+power in two or more magistrates of equal dignity and authority; or
+by vesting it ostensibly in one man, subject, in whole or in part,
+to the control and co-operation of others, in the capacity of
+counsellors to him. Of the first, the two Consuls of Rome may serve
+as an example; of the last, we shall find examples in the
+constitutions of several of the States. New York and New Jersey, if
+I recollect right, are the only States which have intrusted the
+executive authority wholly to single men.1 Both these methods
+of destroying the unity of the Executive have their partisans; but
+the votaries of an executive council are the most numerous. They
+are both liable, if not to equal, to similar objections, and may in
+most lights be examined in conjunction.
+
+The experience of other nations will afford little instruction
+on this head. As far, however, as it teaches any thing, it teaches
+us not to be enamoured of plurality in the Executive. We have seen
+that the Achaeans, on an experiment of two Praetors, were induced to
+abolish one. The Roman history records many instances of mischiefs
+to the republic from the dissensions between the Consuls, and
+between the military Tribunes, who were at times substituted for the
+Consuls. But it gives us no specimens of any peculiar advantages
+derived to the state from the circumstance of the plurality of those
+magistrates. That the dissensions between them were not more
+frequent or more fatal, is a matter of astonishment, until we advert
+to the singular position in which the republic was almost
+continually placed, and to the prudent policy pointed out by the
+circumstances of the state, and pursued by the Consuls, of making a
+division of the government between them. The patricians engaged in
+a perpetual struggle with the plebeians for the preservation of
+their ancient authorities and dignities; the Consuls, who were
+generally chosen out of the former body, were commonly united by the
+personal interest they had in the defense of the privileges of their
+order. In addition to this motive of union, after the arms of the
+republic had considerably expanded the bounds of its empire, it
+became an established custom with the Consuls to divide the
+administration between themselves by lot one of them remaining at
+Rome to govern the city and its environs, the other taking the
+command in the more distant provinces. This expedient must, no
+doubt, have had great influence in preventing those collisions and
+rivalships which might otherwise have embroiled the peace of the
+republic.
+
+But quitting the dim light of historical research, attaching
+ourselves purely to the dictates of reason and good se se, we shall
+discover much greater cause to reject than to approve the idea of
+plurality in the Executive, under any modification whatever.
+
+Wherever two or more persons are engaged in any common
+enterprise or pursuit, there is always danger of difference of
+opinion. If it be a public trust or office, in which they are
+clothed with equal dignity and authority, there is peculiar danger
+of personal emulation and even animosity. From either, and
+especially from all these causes, the most bitter dissensions are
+apt to spring. Whenever these happen, they lessen the
+respectability, weaken the authority, and distract the plans and
+operation of those whom they divide. If they should unfortunately
+assail the supreme executive magistracy of a country, consisting of
+a plurality of persons, they might impede or frustrate the most
+important measures of the government, in the most critical
+emergencies of the state. And what is still worse, they might split
+the community into the most violent and irreconcilable factions,
+adhering differently to the different individuals who composed the
+magistracy.
+
+Men often oppose a thing, merely because they have had no agency
+in planning it, or because it may have been planned by those whom
+they dislike. But if they have been consulted, and have happened to
+disapprove, opposition then becomes, in their estimation, an
+indispensable duty of self-love. They seem to think themselves
+bound in honor, and by all the motives of personal infallibility, to
+defeat the success of what has been resolved upon contrary to their
+sentiments. Men of upright, benevolent tempers have too many
+opportunities of remarking, with horror, to what desperate lengths
+this disposition is sometimes carried, and how often the great
+interests of society are sacrificed to the vanity, to the conceit,
+and to the obstinacy of individuals, who have credit enough to make
+their passions and their caprices interesting to mankind. Perhaps
+the question now before the public may, in its consequences, afford
+melancholy proofs of the effects of this despicable frailty, or
+rather detestable vice, in the human character.
+
+Upon the principles of a free government, inconveniences from
+the source just mentioned must necessarily be submitted to in the
+formation of the legislature; but it is unnecessary, and therefore
+unwise, to introduce them into the constitution of the Executive.
+It is here too that they may be most pernicious. In the
+legislature, promptitude of decision is oftener an evil than a
+benefit. The differences of opinion, and the jarrings of parties in
+that department of the government, though they may sometimes
+obstruct salutary plans, yet often promote deliberation and
+circumspection, and serve to check excesses in the majority. When a
+resolution too is once taken, the opposition must be at an end.
+That resolution is a law, and resistance to it punishable. But no
+favorable circumstances palliate or atone for the disadvantages of
+dissension in the executive department. Here, they are pure and
+unmixed. There is no point at which they cease to operate. They
+serve to embarrass and weaken the execution of the plan or measure
+to which they relate, from the first step to the final conclusion of
+it. They constantly counteract those qualities in the Executive
+which are the most necessary ingredients in its composition, vigor
+and expedition, and this without anycounterbalancing good. In the
+conduct of war, in which the energy of the Executive is the bulwark
+of the national security, every thing would be to be apprehended
+from its plurality.
+
+It must be confessed that these observations apply with
+principal weight to the first case supposed that is, to a plurality
+of magistrates of equal dignity and authority a scheme, the
+advocates for which are not likely to form a numerous sect; but
+they apply, though not with equal, yet with considerable weight to
+the project of a council, whose concurrence is made constitutionally
+necessary to the operations of the ostensible Executive. An artful
+cabal in that council would be able to distract and to enervate the
+whole system of administration. If no such cabal should exist, the
+mere diversity of views and opinions would alone be sufficient to
+tincture the exercise of the executive authority with a spirit of
+habitual feebleness and dilatoriness.
+
+But one of the weightiest objections to a plurality in the
+Executive, and which lies as much against the last as the first
+plan, is, that it tends to conceal faults and destroy responsibility.
+
+Responsibility is of two kinds to censure and to punishment. The
+first is the more important of the two, especially in an elective
+office. Man, in public trust, will much oftener act in such a
+manner as to render him unworthy of being any longer trusted, than
+in such a manner as to make him obnoxious to legal punishment. But
+the multiplication of the Executive adds to the difficulty of
+detection in either case. It often becomes impossible, amidst
+mutual accusations, to determine on whom the blame or the punishment
+of a pernicious measure, or series of pernicious measures, ought
+really to fall. It is shifted from one to another with so much
+dexterity, and under such plausible appearances, that the public
+opinion is left in suspense about the real author. The
+circumstances which may have led to any national miscarriage or
+misfortune are sometimes so complicated that, where there are a
+number of actors who may have had different degrees and kinds of
+agency, though we may clearly see upon the whole that there has been
+mismanagement, yet it may be impracticable to pronounce to whose
+account the evil which may have been incurred is truly chargeable.
+
+"I was overruled by my council. The council were so divided in
+their opinions that it was impossible to obtain any better
+resolution on the point." These and similar pretexts are
+constantly at hand, whether true or false. And who is there that
+will either take the trouble or incur the odium, of a strict
+scrunity into the secret springs of the transaction? Should there
+be found a citizen zealous enough to undertake the unpromising task,
+if there happen to be collusion between the parties concerned, how
+easy it is to clothe the circumstances with so much ambiguity, as to
+render it uncertain what was the precise conduct of any of those
+parties?
+
+In the single instance in which the governor of this State is
+coupled with a council that is, in the appointment to offices, we
+have seen the mischiefs of it in the view now under consideration.
+Scandalous appointments to important offices have been made. Some
+cases, indeed, have been so flagrant that ALL PARTIES have agreed in
+the impropriety of the thing. When inquiry has been made, the blame
+has been laid by the governor on the members of the council, who, on
+their part, have charged it upon his nomination; while the people
+remain altogether at a loss to determine, by whose influence their
+interests have been committed to hands so unqualified and so
+manifestly improper. In tenderness to individuals, I forbear to
+descend to particulars.
+
+It is evident from these considerations, that the plurality of
+the Executive tends to deprive the people of the two greatest
+securities they can have for the faithful exercise of any delegated
+power, first, the restraints of public opinion, which lose their
+efficacy, as well on account of the division of the censure
+attendant on bad measures among a number, as on account of the
+uncertainty on whom it ought to fall; and, secondly, the
+opportunity of discovering with facility and clearness the
+misconduct of the persons they trust, in order either to their
+removal from office or to their actual punishment in cases which
+admit of it.
+
+In England, the king is a perpetual magistrate; and it is a
+maxim which has obtained for the sake of the pub lic peace, that he
+is unaccountable for his administration, and his person sacred.
+Nothing, therefore, can be wiser in that kingdom, than to annex to
+the king a constitutional council, who may be responsible to the
+nation for the advice they give. Without this, there would be no
+responsibility whatever in the executive department an idea
+inadmissible in a free government. But even there the king is not
+bound by the resolutions of his council, though they are answerable
+for the advice they give. He is the absolute master of his own
+conduct in the exercise of his office, and may observe or disregard
+the counsel given to him at his sole discretion.
+
+But in a republic, where every magistrate ought to be personally
+responsible for his behavior in office the reason which in the
+British Constitution dictates the propriety of a council, not only
+ceases to apply, but turns against the institution. In the monarchy
+of Great Britain, it furnishes a substitute for the prohibited
+responsibility of the chief magistrate, which serves in some degree
+as a hostage to the national justice for his good behavior. In the
+American republic, it would serve to destroy, or would greatly
+diminish, the intended and necessary responsibility of the Chief
+Magistrate himself.
+
+The idea of a council to the Executive, which has so generally
+obtained in the State constitutions, has been derived from that
+maxim of republican jealousy which considers power as safer in the
+hands of a number of men than of a single man. If the maxim should
+be admitted to be applicable to the case, I should contend that the
+advantage on that side would not counterbalance the numerous
+disadvantages on the opposite side. But I do not think the rule at
+all applicable to the executive power. I clearly concur in opinion,
+in this particular, with a writer whom the celebrated Junius
+pronounces to be "deep, solid, and ingenious," that "the
+executive power is more easily confined when it is ONE";2 that
+it is far more safe there should be a single object for the jealousy
+and watchfulness of the people; and, in a word, that all
+multiplication of the Executive is rather dangerous than friendly to
+liberty.
+
+A little consideration will satisfy us, that the species of
+security sought for in the multiplication of the Executive, is
+nattainable. Numbers must be so great as to render combination
+difficult, or they are rather a source of danger than of security.
+The united credit and influence of several individuals must be more
+formidable to liberty, than the credit and influence of either of
+them separately. When power, therefore, is placed in the hands of
+so small a number of men, as to admit of their interests and views
+being easily combined in a common enterprise, by an artful leader,
+it becomes more liable to abuse, and more dangerous when abused,
+than if it be lodged in the hands of one man; who, from the very
+circumstance of his being alone, will be more narrowly watched and
+more readily suspected, and who cannot unite so great a mass of
+influence as when he is associated with others. The Decemvirs of
+Rome, whose name denotes their number,3 were more to be dreaded
+in their usurpation than any ONE of them would have been. No person
+would think of proposing an Executive much more numerous than that
+body; from six to a dozen have been suggested for the number of the
+council. The extreme of these numbers, is not too great for an easy
+combination; and from such a combination America would have more to
+fear, than from the ambition of any single individual. A council to
+a magistrate, who is himself responsible for what he does, are
+generally nothing better than a clog upon his good intentions, are
+often the instruments and accomplices of his bad and are almost
+always a cloak to his faults.
+
+I forbear to dwell upon the subject of expense; though it be
+evident that if the council should be numerous enough to answer the
+principal end aimed at by the institution, the salaries of the
+members, who must be drawn from their homes to reside at the seat of
+government, would form an item in the catalogue of public
+expenditures too serious to be incurred for an object of equivocal
+utility. I will only add that, prior to the appearance of the
+Constitution, I rarely met with an intelligent man from any of the
+States, who did not admit, as the result of experience, that the
+UNITY of the executive of this State was one of the best of the
+distinguishing features of our constitution.
+
+PUBLIUS.
+
+1 New York has no council except for the single purpose of
+appointing to offices; New Jersey has a council whom the governor
+may consult. But I think, from the terms of the constitution, their
+resolutions do not bind him.
+
+2 De Lolme.
+
+3 Ten.
+
+
+
+
+
+FEDERALIST No. 71
+
+
+
+The Duration in Office of the Executive
+
+From the New York Packet.
+
+Tuesday, March 18, 1788.
+
+
+
+HAMILTON
+
+
+
+To the People of the State of New York:
+
+DURATION in office has been mentioned as the second requisite to
+the energy of the Executive authority. This has relation to two
+objects: to the personal firmness of the executive magistrate, in
+the employment of his constitutional powers; and to the stability
+of the system of administration which may have been adopted under
+his auspices. With regard to the first, it must be evident, that
+the longer the duration in office, the greater will be the
+probability of obtaining so important an advantage. It is a general
+principle of human nature, that a man will be interested in whatever
+he possesses, in proportion to the firmness or precariousness of the
+tenure by which he holds it; will be less attached to what he holds
+by a momentary or uncertain title, than to what he enjoys by a
+durable or certain title; and, of course, will be willing to risk
+more for the sake of the one, than for the sake of the other. This
+remark is not less applicable to a political privilege, or honor, or
+trust, than to any article of ordinary property. The inference from
+it is, that a man acting in the capacity of chief magistrate, under
+a consciousness that in a very short time he MUST lay down his
+office, will be apt to feel himself too little interested in it to
+hazard any material censure or perplexity, from the independent
+exertion of his powers, or from encountering the ill-humors, however
+transient, which may happen to prevail, either in a considerable
+part of the society itself, or even in a predominant faction in the
+legislative body. If the case should only be, that he MIGHT lay it
+down, unless continued by a new choice, and if he should be desirous
+of being continued, his wishes, conspiring with his fears, would
+tend still more powerfully to corrupt his integrity, or debase his
+fortitude. In either case, feebleness and irresolution must be the
+characteristics of the station.
+
+There are some who would be inclined to regard the servile
+pliancy of the Executive to a prevailing current, either in the
+community or in the legislature, as its best recommendation. But
+such men entertain very crude notions, as well of the purposes for
+which government was instituted, as of the true means by which the
+public happiness may be promoted. The republican principle demands
+that the deliberate sense of the community should govern the conduct
+of those to whom they intrust the management of their affairs; but
+it does not require an unqualified complaisance to every sudden
+breeze of passion, or to every transient impulse which the people
+may receive from the arts of men, who flatter their prejudices to
+betray their interests. It is a just observation, that the people
+commonly INTEND the PUBLIC GOOD. This often applies to their very
+errors. But their good sense would despise the adulator who should
+pretend that they always REASON RIGHT about the MEANS of promoting
+it. They know from experience that they sometimes err; and the
+wonder is that they so seldom err as they do, beset, as they
+continually are, by the wiles of parasites and sycophants, by the
+snares of the ambitious, the avaricious, the desperate, by the
+artifices of men who possess their confidence more than they deserve
+it, and of those who seek to possess rather than to deserve it.
+When occasions present themselves, in which the interests of the
+people are at variance with their inclinations, it is the duty of
+the persons whom they have appointed to be the guardians of those
+interests, to withstand the temporary delusion, in order to give
+them time and opportunity for more cool and sedate reflection.
+Instances might be cited in which a conduct of this kind has saved
+the people from very fatal consequences of their own mistakes, and
+has procured lasting monuments of their gratitude to the men who had
+courage and magnanimity enough to serve them at the peril of their
+displeasure.
+
+But however inclined we might be to insist upon an unbounded
+complaisance in the Executive to the inclinations of the people, we
+can with no propriety contend for a like complaisance to the humors
+of the legislature. The latter may sometimes stand in opposition to
+the former, and at other times the people may be entirely neutral.
+In either supposition, it is certainly desirable that the Executive
+should be in a situation to dare to act his own opinion with vigor
+and decision.
+
+The same rule which teaches the propriety of a partition between
+the various branches of power, teaches us likewise that this
+partition ought to be so contrived as to render the one independent
+of the other. To what purpose separate the executive or the
+judiciary from the legislative, if both the executive and the
+judiciary are so constituted as to be at the absolute devotion of
+the legislative? Such a separation must be merely nominal, and
+incapable of producing the ends for which it was established. It is
+one thing to be subordinate to the laws, and another to be dependent
+on the legislative body. The first comports with, the last
+violates, the fundamental principles of good government; and,
+whatever may be the forms of the Constitution, unites all power in
+the same hands. The tendency of the legislative authority to absorb
+every other, has been fully displayed and illustrated by examples in
+some preceding numbers. In governments purely republican, this
+tendency is almost irresistible. The representatives of the people,
+in a popular assembly, seem sometimes to fancy that they are the
+people themselves, and betray strong symptoms of impatience and
+disgust at the least sign of opposition from any other quarter; as
+if the exercise of its rights, by either the executive or judiciary,
+were a breach of their privilege and an outrage to their dignity.
+They often appear disposed to exert an imperious control over the
+other departments; and as they commonly have the people on their
+side, they always act with such momentum as to make it very
+difficult for the other members of the government to maintain the
+balance of the Constitution.
+
+It may perhaps be asked, how the shortness of the duration in
+office can affect the independence of the Executive on the
+legislature, unless the one were possessed of the power of
+appointing or displacing the other. One answer to this inquiry may
+be drawn from the principle already remarked that is, from the
+slender interest a man is apt to take in a short-lived advantage,
+and the little inducement it affords him to expose himself, on
+account of it, to any considerable inconvenience or hazard. Another
+answer, perhaps more obvious, though not more conclusive, will
+result from the consideration of the influence of the legislative
+body over the people; which might be employed to prevent the
+re-election of a man who, by an upright resistance to any sinister
+project of that body, should have made himself obnoxious to its
+resentment.
+
+It may be asked also, whether a duration of four years would
+answer the end proposed; and if it would not, whether a less
+period, which would at least be recommended by greater security
+against ambitious designs, would not, for that reason, be preferable
+to a longer period, which was, at the same time, too short for the
+purpose of inspiring the desired firmness and independence of the
+magistrate.
+
+It cannot be affirmed, that a duration of four years, or any
+other limited duration, would completely answer the end proposed;
+but it would contribute towards it in a degree which would have a
+material influence upon the spirit and character of the government.
+Between the commencement and termination of such a period, there
+would always be a considerable interval, in which the prospect of
+annihilation would be sufficiently remote, not to have an improper
+effect upon the conduct of a man indued with a tolerable portion of
+fortitude; and in which he might reasonably promise himself, that
+there would be time enough before it arrived, to make the community
+sensible of the propriety of the measures he might incline to pursue.
+Though it be probable that, as he approached the moment when the
+public were, by a new election, to signify their sense of his
+conduct, his confidence, and with it his firmness, would decline;
+yet both the one and the other would derive support from the
+opportunities which his previous continuance in the station had
+afforded him, of establishing himself in the esteem and good-will of
+his constituents. He might, then, hazard with safety, in proportion
+to the proofs he had given of his wisdom and integrity, and to the
+title he had acquired to the respect and attachment of his
+fellow-citizens. As, on the one hand, a duration of four years will
+contribute to the firmness of the Executive in a sufficient degree
+to render it a very valuable ingredient in the composition; so, on
+the other, it is not enough to justify any alarm for the public
+liberty. If a British House of Commons, from the most feeble
+beginnings, FROM THE MERE POWER OF ASSENTING OR DISAGREEING TO THE
+IMPOSITION OF A NEW TAX, have, by rapid strides, reduced the
+prerogatives of the crown and the privileges of the nobility within
+the limits they conceived to be compatible with the principles of a
+free government, while they raised themselves to the rank and
+consequence of a coequal branch of the legislature; if they have
+been able, in one instance, to abolish both the royalty and the
+aristocracy, and to overturn all the ancient establishments, as well
+in the Church as State; if they have been able, on a recent
+occasion, to make the monarch tremble at the prospect of an
+innovation1 attempted by them, what would be to be feared from
+an elective magistrate of four years' duration, with the confined
+authorities of a President of the United States? What, but that he
+might be unequal to the task which the Constitution assigns him? I
+shall only add, that if his duration be such as to leave a doubt of
+his firmness, that doubt is inconsistent with a jealousy of his
+encroachments.
+
+PUBLIUS.
+
+1 This was the case with respect to Mr. Fox's India bill, which
+was carried in the House of Commons, and rejected in the House of
+Lords, to the entire satisfaction, as it is said, of the people.
+
+
+
+
+
+FEDERALIST No. 72
+
+
+
+The Same Subject Continued, and Re-Eligibility of the Executive
+Considered
+
+From the New York Packet.
+
+Friday, March 21, 1788.
+
+
+
+HAMILTON
+
+
+
+To the People of the State of New York:
+
+THE administration of government, in its largest sense,
+comprehends all the operations of the body politic, whether
+legislative, executive, or judiciary; but in its most usual, and
+perhaps its most precise signification. It is limited to executive
+details, and falls peculiarly within the province of the executive
+department. The actual conduct of foreign negotiations, the
+preparatory plans of finance, the application and disbursement of
+the public moneys in conformity to the general appropriations of the
+legislature, the arrangement of the army and navy, the directions of
+the operations of war, these, and other matters of a like nature,
+constitute what seems to be most properly understood by the
+administration of government. The persons, therefore, to whose
+immediate management these different matters are committed, ought to
+be considered as the assistants or deputies of the chief magistrate,
+and on this account, they ought to derive their offices from his
+appointment, at least from his nomination, and ought to be subject
+to his superintendence. This view of the subject will at once
+suggest to us the intimate connection between the duration of the
+executive magistrate in office and the stability of the system of
+administration. To reverse and undo what has been done by a
+predecessor, is very often considered by a successor as the best
+proof he can give of his own capacity and desert; and in addition
+to this propensity, where the alteration has been the result of
+public choice, the person substituted is warranted in supposing that
+the dismission of his predecessor has proceeded from a dislike to
+his measures; and that the less he resembles him, the more he will
+recommend himself to the favor of his constituents. These
+considerations, and the influence of personal confidences and
+attachments, would be likely to induce every new President to
+promote a change of men to fill the subordinate stations; and these
+causes together could not fail to occasion a disgraceful and ruinous
+mutability in the administration of the government.
+
+With a positive duration of considerable extent, I connect the
+circumstance of re-eligibility. The first is necessary to give to
+the officer himself the inclination and the resolution to act his
+part well, and to the community time and leisure to observe the
+tendency of his measures, and thence to form an experimental
+estimate of their merits. The last is necessary to enable the
+people, when they see reason to approve of his conduct, to continue
+him in his station, in order to prolong the utility of his talents
+and virtues, and to secure to the government the advantage of
+permanency in a wise system of administration.
+
+Nothing appears more plausible at first sight, nor more
+ill-founded upon close inspection, than a scheme which in relation
+to the present point has had some respectable advocates, I mean that
+of continuing the chief magistrate in office for a certain time, and
+then excluding him from it, either for a limited period or forever
+after. This exclusion, whether temporary or perpetual, would have
+nearly the same effects, and these effects would be for the most
+part rather pernicious than salutary.
+
+One ill effect of the exclusion would be a diminution of the
+inducements to good behavior. There are few men who would not feel
+much less zeal in the discharge of a duty when they were conscious
+that the advantages of the station with which it was connected must
+be relinquished at a determinate period, than when they were
+permitted to entertain a hope of OBTAINING, by MERITING, a
+continuance of them. This position will not be disputed so long as
+it is admitted that the desire of reward is one of the strongest
+incentives of human conduct; or that the best security for the
+fidelity of mankind is to make their interests coincide with their
+duty. Even the love of fame, the ruling passion of the noblest
+minds, which would prompt a man to plan and undertake extensive and
+arduous enterprises for the public benefit, requiring considerable
+time to mature and perfect them, if he could flatter himself with
+the prospect of being allowed to finish what he had begun, would, on
+the contrary, deter him from the undertaking, when he foresaw that
+he must quit the scene before he could accomplish the work, and must
+commit that, together with his own reputation, to hands which might
+be unequal or unfriendly to the task. The most to be expected from
+the generality of men, in such a situation, is the negative merit of
+not doing harm, instead of the positive merit of doing good.
+
+Another ill effect of the exclusion would be the temptation to
+sordid views, to peculation, and, in some instances, to usurpation.
+An avaricious man, who might happen to fill the office, looking
+forward to a time when he must at all events yield up the emoluments
+he enjoyed, would feel a propensity, not easy to be resisted by such
+a man, to make the best use of the opportunity he enjoyed while it
+lasted, and might not scruple to have recourse to the most corrupt
+expedients to make the harvest as abundant as it was transitory;
+though the same man, probably, with a different prospect before
+him, might content himself with the regular perquisites of his
+situation, and might even be unwilling to risk the consequences of
+an abuse of his opportunities. His avarice might be a guard upon
+his avarice. Add to this that the same man might be vain or
+ambitious, as well as avaricious. And if he could expect to prolong
+his honors by his good conduct, he might hesitate to sacrifice his
+appetite for them to his appetite for gain. But with the prospect
+before him of approaching an inevitable annihilation, his avarice
+would be likely to get the victory over his caution, his vanity, or
+his ambition.
+
+An ambitious man, too, when he found himself seated on the
+summit of his country's honors, when he looked forward to the time
+at which he must descend from the exalted eminence for ever, and
+reflected that no exertion of merit on his part could save him from
+the unwelcome reverse; such a man, in such a situation, would be
+much more violently tempted to embrace a favorable conjuncture for
+attempting the prolongation of his power, at every personal hazard,
+than if he had the probability of answering the same end by doing
+his duty.
+
+Would it promote the peace of the community, or the stability of
+the government to have half a dozen men who had had credit enough to
+be raised to the seat of the supreme magistracy, wandering among the
+people like discontented ghosts, and sighing for a place which they
+were destined never more to possess?
+
+A third ill effect of the exclusion would be, the depriving the
+community of the advantage of the experience gained by the chief
+magistrate in the exercise of his office. That experience is the
+parent of wisdom, is an adage the truth of which is recognized by
+the wisest as well as the simplest of mankind. What more desirable
+or more essential than this quality in the governors of nations?
+Where more desirable or more essential than in the first magistrate
+of a nation? Can it be wise to put this desirable and essential
+quality under the ban of the Constitution, and to declare that the
+moment it is acquired, its possessor shall be compelled to abandon
+the station in which it was acquired, and to which it is adapted?
+This, nevertheless, is the precise import of all those regulations
+which exclude men from serving their country, by the choice of their
+fellowcitizens, after they have by a course of service fitted
+themselves for doing it with a greater degree of utility.
+
+A fourth ill effect of the exclusion would be the banishing men
+from stations in which, in certain emergencies of the state, their
+presence might be of the greatest moment to the public interest or
+safety. There is no nation which has not, at one period or another,
+experienced an absolute necessity of the services of particular men
+in particular situations; perhaps it would not be too strong to
+say, to the preservation of its political existence. How unwise,
+therefore, must be every such self-denying ordinance as serves to
+prohibit a nation from making use of its own citizens in the manner
+best suited to its exigencies and circumstances! Without supposing
+the personal essentiality of the man, it is evident that a change of
+the chief magistrate, at the breaking out of a war, or at any
+similar crisis, for another, even of equal merit, would at all times
+be detrimental to the community, inasmuch as it would substitute
+inexperience to experience, and would tend to unhinge and set afloat
+the already settled train of the administration.
+
+A fifth ill effect of the exclusion would be, that it would
+operate as a constitutional interdiction of stability in the
+administration. By NECESSITATING a change of men, in the first
+office of the nation, it would necessitate a mutability of measures.
+It is not generally to be expected, that men will vary and measures
+remain uniform. The contrary is the usual course of things. And we
+need not be apprehensive that there will be too much stability,
+while there is even the option of changing; nor need we desire to
+prohibit the people from continuing their confidence where they
+think it may be safely placed, and where, by constancy on their
+part, they may obviate the fatal inconveniences of fluctuating
+councils and a variable policy.
+
+These are some of the disadvantages which would flow from the
+principle of exclusion. They apply most forcibly to the scheme of a
+perpetual exclusion; but when we consider that even a partial
+exclusion would always render the readmission of the person a remote
+and precarious object, the observations which have been made will
+apply nearly as fully to one case as to the other.
+
+What are the advantages promised to counterbalance these
+disadvantages? They are represented to be: 1st, greater
+independence in the magistrate; 2d, greater security to the people.
+Unless the exclusion be perpetual, there will be no pretense to
+infer the first advantage. But even in that case, may he have no
+object beyond his present station, to which he may sacrifice his
+independence? May he have no connections, no friends, for whom he
+may sacrifice it? May he not be less willing by a firm conduct, to
+make personal enemies, when he acts under the impression that a time
+is fast approaching, on the arrival of which he not only MAY, but
+MUST, be exposed to their resentments, upon an equal, perhaps upon
+an inferior, footing? It is not an easy point to determine whether
+his independence would be most promoted or impaired by such an
+arrangement.
+
+As to the second supposed advantage, there is still greater
+reason to entertain doubts concerning it. If the exclusion were to
+be perpetual, a man of irregular ambition, of whom alone there could
+be reason in any case to entertain apprehension, would, with
+infinite reluctance, yield to the necessity of taking his leave
+forever of a post in which his passion for power and pre-eminence
+had acquired the force of habit. And if he had been fortunate or
+adroit enough to conciliate the good-will of the people, he might
+induce them to consider as a very odious and unjustifiable restraint
+upon themselves, a provision which was calculated to debar them of
+the right of giving a fresh proof of their attachment to a favorite.
+There may be conceived circumstances in which this disgust of the
+people, seconding the thwarted ambition of such a favorite, might
+occasion greater danger to liberty, than could ever reasonably be
+dreaded from the possibility of a perpetuation in office, by the
+voluntary suffrages of the community, exercising a constitutional
+privilege.
+
+There is an excess of refinement in the idea of disabling the
+people to continue in office men who had entitled themselves, in
+their opinion, to approbation and confidence; the advantages of
+which are at best speculative and equivocal, and are overbalanced by
+disadvantages far more certain and decisive.
+
+PUBLIUS.
+
+
+
+
+
+FEDERALIST No. 73
+
+The Provision For The Support of the Executive, and the Veto Power
+
+From the New York Packet.
+
+Friday, March 21, 1788.
+
+
+
+HAMILTON
+
+
+
+To the People of the State of New York:
+
+THE third ingredient towards constituting the vigor of the
+executive authority, is an adequate provision for its support. It
+is evident that, without proper attention to this article, the
+separation of the executive from the legislative department would be
+merely nominal and nugatory. The legislature, with a discretionary
+power over the salary and emoluments of the Chief Magistrate, could
+render him as obsequious to their will as they might think proper to
+make him. They might, in most cases, either reduce him by famine,
+or tempt him by largesses, to surrender at discretion his judgment
+to their inclinations. These expressions, taken in all the latitude
+of the terms, would no doubt convey more than is intended. There
+are men who could neither be distressed nor won into a sacrifice of
+their duty; but this stern virtue is the growth of few soils; and
+in the main it will be found that a power over a man's support is a
+power over his will. If it were necessary to confirm so plain a
+truth by facts, examples would not be wanting, even in this country,
+of the intimidation or seduction of the Executive by the terrors or
+allurements of the pecuniary arrangements of the legislative body.
+
+It is not easy, therefore, to commend too highly the judicious
+attention which has been paid to this subject in the proposed
+Constitution. It is there provided that "The President of the
+United States shall, at stated times, receive for his services a
+compensation WHICH SHALL NEITHER BE INCREASED NOR DIMINISHED DURING
+THE PERIOD FOR WHICH HE SHALL HAVE BEEN ELECTED; and he SHALL NOT
+RECEIVE WITHIN THAT PERIOD ANY OTHER EMOLUMENT from the United
+States, or any of them." It is impossible to imagine any provision
+which would have been more eligible than this. The legislature, on
+the appointment of a President, is once for all to declare what
+shall be the compensation for his services during the time for which
+he shall have been elected. This done, they will have no power to
+alter it, either by increase or diminution, till a new period of
+service by a new election commences. They can neither weaken his
+fortitude by operating on his necessities, nor corrupt his integrity
+by appealing to his avarice. Neither the Union, nor any of its
+members, will be at liberty to give, nor will he be at liberty to
+receive, any other emolument than that which may have been
+determined by the first act. He can, of course, have no pecuniary
+inducement to renounce or desert the independence intended for him
+by the Constitution.
+
+The last of the requisites to energy, which have been
+enumerated, are competent powers. Let us proceed to consider those
+which are proposed to be vested in the President of the United
+States.
+
+The first thing that offers itself to our observation, is the
+qualified negative of the President upon the acts or resolutions of
+the two houses of the legislature; or, in other words, his power of
+returning all bills with objections, to have the effect of
+preventing their becoming laws, unless they should afterwards be
+ratified by two thirds of each of the component members of the
+legislative body.
+
+The propensity of the legislative department to intrude upon the
+rights, and to absorb the powers, of the other departments, has been
+already suggested and repeated; the insufficiency of a mere
+parchment delineation of the boundaries of each, has also been
+remarked upon; and the necessity of furnishing each with
+constitutional arms for its own defense, has been inferred and
+proved. From these clear and indubitable principles results the
+propriety of a negative, either absolute or qualified, in the
+Executive, upon the acts of the legislative branches. Without the
+one or the other, the former would be absolutely unable to defend
+himself against the depredations of the latter. He might gradually
+be stripped of his authorities by successive resolutions, or
+annihilated by a single vote. And in the one mode or the other, the
+legislative and executive powers might speedily come to be blended
+in the same hands. If even no propensity had ever discovered itself
+in the legislative body to invade the rights of the Executive, the
+rules of just reasoning and theoretic propriety would of themselves
+teach us, that the one ought not to be left to the mercy of the
+other, but ought to possess a constitutional and effectual power of
+selfdefense.
+
+But the power in question has a further use. It not only serves
+as a shield to the Executive, but it furnishes an additional
+security against the enaction of improper laws. It establishes a
+salutary check upon the legislative body, calculated to guard the
+community against the effects of faction, precipitancy, or of any
+impulse unfriendly to the public good, which may happen to influence
+a majority of that body.
+
+The propriety of a negative has, upon some occasions, been
+combated by an observation, that it was not to be presumed a single
+man would possess more virtue and wisdom than a number of men; and
+that unless this presumption should be entertained, it would be
+improper to give the executive magistrate any species of control
+over the legislative body.
+
+But this observation, when examined, will appear rather specious
+than solid. The propriety of the thing does not turn upon the
+supposition of superior wisdom or virtue in the Executive, but upon
+the supposition that the legislature will not be infallible; that
+the love of power may sometimes betray it into a disposition to
+encroach upon the rights of other members of the government; that a
+spirit of faction may sometimes pervert its deliberations; that
+impressions of the moment may sometimes hurry it into measures which
+itself, on maturer reflexion, would condemn. The primary inducement
+to conferring the power in question upon the Executive is, to enable
+him to defend himself; the secondary one is to increase the chances
+in favor of the community against the passing of bad laws, through
+haste, inadvertence, or design. The oftener the measure is brought
+under examination, the greater the diversity in the situations of
+those who are to examine it, the less must be the danger of those
+errors which flow from want of due deliberation, or of those
+missteps which proceed from the contagion of some common passion or
+interest. It is far less probable, that culpable views of any kind
+should infect all the parts of the government at the same moment and
+in relation to the same object, than that they should by turns
+govern and mislead every one of them.
+
+It may perhaps be said that the power of preventing bad laws
+includes that of preventing good ones; and may be used to the one
+purpose as well as to the other. But this objection will have
+little weight with those who can properly estimate the mischiefs of
+that inconstancy and mutability in the laws, which form the greatest
+blemish in the character and genius of our governments. They will
+consider every institution calculated to restrain the excess of
+law-making, and to keep things in the same state in which they
+happen to be at any given period, as much more likely to do good
+than harm; because it is favorable to greater stability in the
+system of legislation. The injury which may possibly be done by
+defeating a few good laws, will be amply compensated by the
+advantage of preventing a number of bad ones.
+
+Nor is this all. The superior weight and influence of the
+legislative body in a free government, and the hazard to the
+Executive in a trial of strength with that body, afford a
+satisfactory security that the negative would generally be employed
+with great caution; and there would oftener be room for a charge of
+timidity than of rashness in the exercise of it. A king of Great
+Britain, with all his train of sovereign attributes, and with all
+the influence he draws from a thousand sources, would, at this day,
+hesitate to put a negative upon the joint resolutions of the two
+houses of Parliament. He would not fail to exert the utmost
+resources of that influence to strangle a measure disagreeable to
+him, in its progress to the throne, to avoid being reduced to the
+dilemma of permitting it to take effect, or of risking the
+displeasure of the nation by an opposition to the sense of the
+legislative body. Nor is it probable, that he would ultimately
+venture to exert his prerogatives, but in a case of manifest
+propriety, or extreme necessity. All well-informed men in that
+kingdom will accede to the justness of this remark. A very
+considerable period has elapsed since the negative of the crown has
+been exercised.
+
+If a magistrate so powerful and so well fortified as a British
+monarch, would have scruples about the exercise of the power under
+consideration, how much greater caution may be reasonably expected
+in a President of the United States, clothed for the short period of
+four years with the executive authority of a government wholly and
+purely republican?
+
+It is evident that there would be greater danger of his not
+using his power when necessary, than of his using it too often, or
+too much. An argument, indeed, against its expediency, has been
+drawn from this very source. It has been represented, on this
+account, as a power odious in appearance, useless in practice. But
+it will not follow, that because it might be rarely exercised, it
+would never be exercised. In the case for which it is chiefly
+designed, that of an immediate attack upon the constitutional rights
+of the Executive, or in a case in which the public good was
+evidently and palpably sacrificed, a man of tolerable firmness would
+avail himself of his constitutional means of defense, and would
+listen to the admonitions of duty and responsibility. In the former
+supposition, his fortitude would be stimulated by his immediate
+interest in the power of his office; in the latter, by the
+probability of the sanction of his constituents, who, though they
+would naturally incline to the legislative body in a doubtful case,
+would hardly suffer their partiality to delude them in a very plain
+case. I speak now with an eye to a magistrate possessing only a
+common share of firmness. There are men who, under any
+circumstances, will have the courage to do their duty at every
+hazard.
+
+But the convention have pursued a mean in this business, which
+will both facilitate the exercise of the power vested in this
+respect in the executive magistrate, and make its efficacy to depend
+on the sense of a considerable part of the legislative body.
+Instead of an absolute negative, it is proposed to give the
+Executive the qualified negative already described. This is a power
+which would be much more readily exercised than the other. A man
+who might be afraid to defeat a law by his single VETO, might not
+scruple to return it for reconsideration; subject to being finally
+rejected only in the event of more than one third of each house
+concurring in the sufficiency of his objections. He would be
+encouraged by the reflection, that if his opposition should prevail,
+it would embark in it a very respectable proportion of the
+legislative body, whose influence would be united with his in
+supporting the propriety of his conduct in the public opinion. A
+direct and categorical negative has something in the appearance of
+it more harsh, and more apt to irritate, than the mere suggestion of
+argumentative objections to be approved or disapproved by those to
+whom they are addressed. In proportion as it would be less apt to
+offend, it would be more apt to be exercised; and for this very
+reason, it may in practice be found more effectual. It is to be
+hoped that it will not often happen that improper views will govern
+so large a proportion as two thirds of both branches of the
+legislature at the same time; and this, too, in spite of the
+counterposing weight of the Executive. It is at any rate far less
+probable that this should be the case, than that such views should
+taint the resolutions and conduct of a bare majority. A power of
+this nature in the Executive, will often have a silent and
+unperceived, though forcible, operation. When men, engaged in
+unjustifiable pursuits, are aware that obstructions may come from a
+quarter which they cannot control, they will often be restrained by
+the bare apprehension of opposition, from doing what they would with
+eagerness rush into, if no such external impediments were to be
+feared.
+
+This qualified negative, as has been elsewhere remarked, is in
+this State vested in a council, consisting of the governor, with the
+chancellor and judges of the Supreme Court, or any two of them. It
+has been freely employed upon a variety of occasions, and frequently
+with success. And its utility has become so apparent, that persons
+who, in compiling the Constitution, were violent opposers of it,
+have from experience become its declared admirers.1
+
+I have in another place remarked, that the convention, in the
+formation of this part of their plan, had departed from the model of
+the constitution of this State, in favor of that of Massachusetts.
+Two strong reasons may be imagined for this preference. One is
+that the judges, who are to be the interpreters of the law, might
+receive an improper bias, from having given a previous opinion in
+their revisionary capacities; the other is that by being often
+associated with the Executive, they might be induced to embark too
+far in the political views of that magistrate, and thus a dangerous
+combination might by degrees be cemented between the executive and
+judiciary departments. It is impossible to keep the judges too
+distinct from every other avocation than that of expounding the laws.
+It is peculiarly dangerous to place them in a situation to be
+either corrupted or influenced by the Executive.
+
+PUBLIUS.
+
+1 Mr. Abraham Yates, a warm opponent of the plan of the
+convention is of this number.
+
+
+
+
+
+FEDERALIST No. 74
+
+
+
+The Command of the Military and Naval Forces, and the Pardoning
+Power of the Executive
+
+From the New York Packet.
+
+Tuesday, March 25, 1788.
+
+
+
+HAMILTON
+
+
+
+To the People of the State of New York:
+
+THE President of the United States is to be "commander-in-chief
+of the army and navy of the United States, and of the militia of the
+several States WHEN CALLED INTO THE ACTUAL SERVICE of the United
+States." The propriety of this provision is so evident in itself,
+and it is, at the same time, so consonant to the precedents of the
+State constitutions in general, that little need be said to explain
+or enforce it. Even those of them which have, in other respects,
+coupled the chief magistrate with a council, have for the most part
+concentrated the military authority in him alone. Of all the cares
+or concerns of government, the direction of war most peculiarly
+demands those qualities which distinguish the exercise of power by a
+single hand. The direction of war implies the direction of the
+common strength; and the power of directing and employing the
+common strength, forms a usual and essential part in the definition
+of the executive authority.
+
+"The President may require the opinion, in writing, of the
+principal officer in each of the executive departments, upon any
+subject relating to the duties of their respective officers." This
+I consider as a mere redundancy in the plan, as the right for which
+it provides would result of itself from the office.
+
+He is also to be authorized to grant "reprieves and pardons for
+offenses against the United States, EXCEPT IN CASES OF
+IMPEACHMENT." Humanity and good policy conspire to dictate, that
+the benign prerogative of pardoning should be as little as possible
+fettered or embarrassed. The criminal code of every country
+partakes so much of necessary severity, that without an easy access
+to exceptions in favor of unfortunate guilt, justice would wear a
+countenance too sanguinary and cruel. As the sense of
+responsibility is always strongest, in proportion as it is
+undivided, it may be inferred that a single man would be most ready
+to attend to the force of those motives which might plead for a
+mitigation of the rigor of the law, and least apt to yield to
+considerations which were calculated to shelter a fit object of its
+vengeance. The reflection that the fate of a fellow-creature
+depended on his sole fiat, would naturally inspire
+scrupulousness and caution; the dread of being accused of weakness
+or connivance, would beget equal circumspection, though of a
+different kind. On the other hand, as men generally derive
+confidence from their numbers, they might often encourage each other
+in an act of obduracy, and might be less sensible to the
+apprehension of suspicion or censure for an injudicious or affected
+clemency. On these accounts, one man appears to be a more eligible
+dispenser of the mercy of government, than a body of men.
+
+The expediency of vesting the power of pardoning in the
+President has, if I mistake not, been only contested in relation to
+the crime of treason. This, it has been urged, ought to have
+depended upon the assent of one, or both, of the branches of the
+legislative body. I shall not deny that there are strong reasons to
+be assigned for requiring in this particular the concurrence of that
+body, or of a part of it. As treason is a crime levelled at the
+immediate being of the society, when the laws have once ascertained
+the guilt of the offender, there seems a fitness in referring the
+expediency of an act of mercy towards him to the judgment of the
+legislature. And this ought the rather to be the case, as the
+supposition of the connivance of the Chief Magistrate ought not to
+be entirely excluded. But there are also strong objections to such
+a plan. It is not to be doubted, that a single man of prudence and
+good sense is better fitted, in delicate conjunctures, to balance
+the motives which may plead for and against the remission of the
+punishment, than any numerous body whatever. It deserves particular
+attention, that treason will often be connected with seditions which
+embrace a large proportion of the community; as lately happened in
+Massachusetts. In every such case, we might expect to see the
+representation of the people tainted with the same spirit which had
+given birth to the offense. And when parties were pretty equally
+matched, the secret sympathy of the friends and favorers of the
+condemned person, availing itself of the good-nature and weakness of
+others, might frequently bestow impunity where the terror of an
+example was necessary. On the other hand, when the sedition had
+proceeded from causes which had inflamed the resentments of the
+major party, they might often be found obstinate and inexorable,
+when policy demanded a conduct of forbearance and clemency. But the
+principal argument for reposing the power of pardoning in this case
+to the Chief Magistrate is this: in seasons of insurrection or
+rebellion, there are often critical moments, when a welltimed offer
+of pardon to the insurgents or rebels may restore the tranquillity
+of the commonwealth; and which, if suffered to pass unimproved, it
+may never be possible afterwards to recall. The dilatory process of
+convening the legislature, or one of its branches, for the purpose
+of obtaining its sanction to the measure, would frequently be the
+occasion of letting slip the golden opportunity. The loss of a
+week, a day, an hour, may sometimes be fatal. If it should be
+observed, that a discretionary power, with a view to such
+contingencies, might be occasionally conferred upon the President,
+it may be answered in the first place, that it is questionable,
+whether, in a limited Constitution, that power could be delegated by
+law; and in the second place, that it would generally be impolitic
+beforehand to take any step which might hold out the prospect of
+impunity. A proceeding of this kind, out of the usual course, would
+be likely to be construed into an argument of timidity or of
+weakness, and would have a tendency to embolden guilt.
+
+PUBLIUS.
+
+
+
+
+
+FEDERALIST No. 75
+
+The Treaty-Making Power of the Executive
+
+For the Independent Journal.
+
+
+
+HAMILTON
+
+
+
+To the People of the State of New York:
+
+THE President is to have power, "by and with the advice and
+consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two thirds of the
+senators present concur."
+
+Though this provision has been assailed, on different grounds,
+with no small degree of vehemence, I scruple not to declare my firm
+persuasion, that it is one of the best digested and most
+unexceptionable parts of the plan. One ground of objection is the
+trite topic of the intermixture of powers; some contending that the
+President ought alone to possess the power of making treaties;
+others, that it ought to have been exclusively deposited in the
+Senate. Another source of objection is derived from the small
+number of persons by whom a treaty may be made. Of those who
+espouse this objection, a part are of opinion that the House of
+Representatives ought to have been associated in the business, while
+another part seem to think that nothing more was necessary than to
+have substituted two thirds of ALL the members of the Senate, to two
+thirds of the members PRESENT. As I flatter myself the observations
+made in a preceding number upon this part of the plan must have
+sufficed to place it, to a discerning eye, in a very favorable
+light, I shall here content myself with offering only some
+supplementary remarks, principally with a view to the objections
+which have been just stated.
+
+With regard to the intermixture of powers, I shall rely upon the
+explanations already given in other places, of the true sense of the
+rule upon which that objection is founded; and shall take it for
+granted, as an inference from them, that the union of the Executive
+with the Senate, in the article of treaties, is no infringement of
+that rule. I venture to add, that the particular nature of the
+power of making treaties indicates a peculiar propriety in that
+union. Though several writers on the subject of government place
+that power in the class of executive authorities, yet this is
+evidently an arbitrary disposition; for if we attend carefully to
+its operation, it will be found to partake more of the legislative
+than of the executive character, though it does not seem strictly to
+fall within the definition of either of them. The essence of the
+legislative authority is to enact laws, or, in other words, to
+prescribe rules for the regulation of the society; while the
+execution of the laws, and the employment of the common strength,
+either for this purpose or for the common defense, seem to comprise
+all the functions of the executive magistrate. The power of making
+treaties is, plainly, neither the one nor the other. It relates
+neither to the execution of the subsisting laws, nor to the enaction
+of new ones; and still less to an exertion of the common strength.
+Its objects are CONTRACTS with foreign nations, which have the
+force of law, but derive it from the obligations of good faith.
+They are not rules prescribed by the sovereign to the subject, but
+agreements between sovereign and sovereign. The power in question
+seems therefore to form a distinct department, and to belong,
+properly, neither to the legislative nor to the executive. The
+qualities elsewhere detailed as indispensable in the management of
+foreign negotiations, point out the Executive as the most fit agent
+in those transactions; while the vast importance of the trust, and
+the operation of treaties as laws, plead strongly for the
+participation of the whole or a portion of the legislative body in
+the office of making them.
+
+However proper or safe it may be in governments where the
+executive magistrate is an hereditary monarch, to commit to him the
+entire power of making treaties, it would be utterly unsafe and
+improper to intrust that power to an elective magistrate of four
+years' duration. It has been remarked, upon another occasion, and
+the remark is unquestionably just, that an hereditary monarch,
+though often the oppressor of his people, has personally too much
+stake in the government to be in any material danger of being
+corrupted by foreign powers. But a man raised from the station of a
+private citizen to the rank of chief magistrate, possessed of a
+moderate or slender fortune, and looking forward to a period not
+very remote when he may probably be obliged to return to the station
+from which he was taken, might sometimes be under temptations to
+sacrifice his duty to his interest, which it would require
+superlative virtue to withstand. An avaricious man might be tempted
+to betray the interests of the state to the acquisition of wealth.
+An ambitious man might make his own aggrandizement, by the aid of a
+foreign power, the price of his treachery to his constituents. The
+history of human conduct does not warrant that exalted opinion of
+human virtue which would make it wise in a nation to commit
+interests of so delicate and momentous a kind, as those which
+concern its intercourse with the rest of the world, to the sole
+disposal of a magistrate created and circumstanced as would be a
+President of the United States.
+
+To have intrusted the power of making treaties to the Senate
+alone, would have been to relinquish the benefits of the
+constitutional agency of the President in the conduct of foreign
+negotiations. It is true that the Senate would, in that case, have
+the option of employing him in this capacity, but they would also
+have the option of letting it alone, and pique or cabal might induce
+the latter rather than the former. Besides this, the ministerial
+servant of the Senate could not be expected to enjoy the confidence
+and respect of foreign powers in the same degree with the
+constitutional representatives of the nation, and, of course, would
+not be able to act with an equal degree of weight or efficacy.
+While the Union would, from this cause, lose a considerable
+advantage in the management of its external concerns, the people
+would lose the additional security which would result from the
+co-operation of the Executive. Though it would be imprudent to
+confide in him solely so important a trust, yet it cannot be doubted
+that his participation would materially add to the safety of the
+society. It must indeed be clear to a demonstration that the joint
+possession of the power in question, by the President and Senate,
+would afford a greater prospect of security, than the separate
+possession of it by either of them. And whoever has maturely
+weighed the circumstances which must concur in the appointment of a
+President, will be satisfied that the office will always bid fair to
+be filled by men of such characters as to render their concurrence
+in the formation of treaties peculiarly desirable, as well on the
+score of wisdom, as on that of integrity.
+
+The remarks made in a former number, which have been alluded to
+in another part of this paper, will apply with conclusive force
+against the admission of the House of Representatives to a share in
+the formation of treaties. The fluctuating and, taking its future
+increase into the account, the multitudinous composition of that
+body, forbid us to expect in it those qualities which are essential
+to the proper execution of such a trust. Accurate and comprehensive
+knowledge of foreign politics; a steady and systematic adherence to
+the same views; a nice and uniform sensibility to national
+character; decision, SECRECY, and despatch, are incompatible with
+the genius of a body so variable and so numerous. The very
+complication of the business, by introducing a necessity of the
+concurrence of so many different bodies, would of itself afford a
+solid objection. The greater frequency of the calls upon the House
+of Representatives, and the greater length of time which it would
+often be necessary to keep them together when convened, to obtain
+their sanction in the progressive stages of a treaty, would be a
+source of so great inconvenience and expense as alone ought to
+condemn the project.
+
+The only objection which remains to be canvassed, is that which
+would substitute the proportion of two thirds of all the members
+composing the senatorial body, to that of two thirds of the members
+PRESENT. It has been shown, under the second head of our inquiries,
+that all provisions which require more than the majority of any body
+to its resolutions, have a direct tendency to embarrass the
+operations of the government, and an indirect one to subject the
+sense of the majority to that of the minority. This consideration
+seems sufficient to determine our opinion, that the convention have
+gone as far in the endeavor to secure the advantage of numbers in
+the formation of treaties as could have been reconciled either with
+the activity of the public councils or with a reasonable regard to
+the major sense of the community. If two thirds of the whole number
+of members had been required, it would, in many cases, from the
+non-attendance of a part, amount in practice to a necessity of
+unanimity. And the history of every political establishment in
+which this principle has prevailed, is a history of impotence,
+perplexity, and disorder. Proofs of this position might be adduced
+from the examples of the Roman Tribuneship, the Polish Diet, and the
+States-General of the Netherlands, did not an example at home render
+foreign precedents unnecessary.
+
+To require a fixed proportion of the whole body would not, in
+all probability, contribute to the advantages of a numerous agency,
+better then merely to require a proportion of the attending members.
+The former, by making a determinate number at all times requisite
+to a resolution, diminishes the motives to punctual attendance. The
+latter, by making the capacity of the body to depend on a PROPORTION
+which may be varied by the absence or presence of a single member,
+has the contrary effect. And as, by promoting punctuality, it tends
+to keep the body complete, there is great likelihood that its
+resolutions would generally be dictated by as great a number in this
+case as in the other; while there would be much fewer occasions of
+delay. It ought not to be forgotten that, under the existing
+Confederation, two members MAY, and usually DO, represent a State;
+whence it happens that Congress, who now are solely invested with
+ALL THE POWERS of the Union, rarely consist of a greater number of
+persons than would compose the intended Senate. If we add to this,
+that as the members vote by States, and that where there is only a
+single member present from a State, his vote is lost, it will
+justify a supposition that the active voices in the Senate, where
+the members are to vote individually, would rarely fall short in
+number of the active voices in the existing Congress. When, in
+addition to these considerations, we take into view the co-operation
+of the President, we shall not hesitate to infer that the people of
+America would have greater security against an improper use of the
+power of making treaties, under the new Constitution, than they now
+enjoy under the Confederation. And when we proceed still one step
+further, and look forward to the probable augmentation of the
+Senate, by the erection of new States, we shall not only perceive
+ample ground of confidence in the sufficiency of the members to
+whose agency that power will be intrusted, but we shall probably be
+led to conclude that a body more numerous than the Senate would be
+likely to become, would be very little fit for the proper discharge
+of the trust.
+
+PUBLIUS.
+
+
+
+
+
+FEDERALIST No. 76
+
+The Appointing Power of the Executive
+
+From the New York Packet.
+
+Tuesday, April 1, 1788.
+
+
+
+HAMILTON
+
+
+
+To the People of the State of New York:
+
+THE President is "to NOMINATE, and, by and with the advice and
+consent of the Senate, to appoint ambassadors, other public
+ministers and consuls, judges of the Supreme Court, and all other
+officers of the United States whose appointments are not otherwise
+provided for in the Constitution. But the Congress may by law vest
+the appointment of such inferior officers as they think proper, in
+the President alone, or in the courts of law, or in the heads of
+departments. The President shall have power to fill up ALL
+VACANCIES which may happen DURING THE RECESS OF THE SENATE, by
+granting commissions which shall EXPIRE at the end of their next
+session."
+
+It has been observed in a former paper, that "the true test of
+a good government is its aptitude and tendency to produce a good
+administration." If the justness of this observation be admitted,
+the mode of appointing the officers of the United States contained
+in the foregoing clauses, must, when examined, be allowed to be
+entitled to particular commendation. It is not easy to conceive a
+plan better calculated than this to promote a judicious choice of
+men for filling the offices of the Union; and it will not need
+proof, that on this point must essentially depend the character of
+its administration.
+
+It will be agreed on all hands, that the power of appointment,
+in ordinary cases, ought to be modified in one of three ways. It
+ought either to be vested in a single man, or in a SELECT assembly
+of a moderate number; or in a single man, with the concurrence of
+such an assembly. The exercise of it by the people at large will be
+readily admitted to be impracticable; as waiving every other
+consideration, it would leave them little time to do anything else.
+When, therefore, mention is made in the subsequent reasonings of an
+assembly or body of men, what is said must be understood to relate
+to a select body or assembly, of the description already given. The
+people collectively, from their number and from their dispersed
+situation, cannot be regulated in their movements by that systematic
+spirit of cabal and intrigue, which will be urged as the chief
+objections to reposing the power in question in a body of men.
+
+Those who have themselves reflected upon the subject, or who
+have attended to the observations made in other parts of these
+papers, in relation to the appointment of the President, will, I
+presume, agree to the position, that there would always be great
+probability of having the place supplied by a man of abilities, at
+least respectable. Premising this, I proceed to lay it down as a
+rule, that one man of discernment is better fitted to analyze and
+estimate the peculiar qualities adapted to particular offices, than
+a body of men of equal or perhaps even of superior discernment.
+
+The sole and undivided responsibility of one man will naturally
+beget a livelier sense of duty and a more exact regard to reputation.
+He will, on this account, feel himself under stronger obligations,
+and more interested to investigate with care the qualities requisite
+to the stations to be filled, and to prefer with impartiality the
+persons who may have the fairest pretensions to them. He will have
+FEWER personal attachments to gratify, than a body of men who may
+each be supposed to have an equal number; and will be so much the
+less liable to be misled by the sentiments of friendship and of
+affection. A single well-directed man, by a single understanding,
+cannot be distracted and warped by that diversity of views,
+feelings, and interests, which frequently distract and warp the
+resolutions of a collective body. There is nothing so apt to
+agitate the passions of mankind as personal considerations whether
+they relate to ourselves or to others, who are to be the objects of
+our choice or preference. Hence, in every exercise of the power of
+appointing to offices, by an assembly of men, we must expect to see
+a full display of all the private and party likings and dislikes,
+partialities and antipathies, attachments and animosities, which are
+felt by those who compose the assembly. The choice which may at any
+time happen to be made under such circumstances, will of course be
+the result either of a victory gained by one party over the other,
+or of a compromise between the parties. In either case, the
+intrinsic merit of the candidate will be too often out of sight. In
+the first, the qualifications best adapted to uniting the suffrages
+of the party, will be more considered than those which fit the
+person for the station. In the last, the coalition will commonly
+turn upon some interested equivalent: "Give us the man we wish for
+this office, and you shall have the one you wish for that." This
+will be the usual condition of the bargain. And it will rarely
+happen that the advancement of the public service will be the
+primary object either of party victories or of party negotiations.
+
+The truth of the principles here advanced seems to have been
+felt by the most intelligent of those who have found fault with the
+provision made, in this respect, by the convention. They contend
+that the President ought solely to have been authorized to make the
+appointments under the federal government. But it is easy to show,
+that every advantage to be expected from such an arrangement would,
+in substance, be derived from the power of NOMINATION, which is
+proposed to be conferred upon him; while several disadvantages
+which might attend the absolute power of appointment in the hands of
+that officer would be avoided. In the act of nomination, his
+judgment alone would be exercised; and as it would be his sole duty
+to point out the man who, with the approbation of the Senate, should
+fill an office, his responsibility would be as complete as if he
+were to make the final appointment. There can, in this view, be no
+difference others, who are to be the objects of our choice or
+preference. Hence, in every exercise of the power of appointing to
+offices, by an assembly of men, we must expect to see a full display
+of all the private and party likings and dislikes, partialities and
+antipathies, attachments and animosities, which are felt by those
+who compose the assembly. The choice which may at any time happen
+to be made under such circumstances, will of course be the result
+either of a victory gained by one party over the other, or of a
+compromise between the parties. In either case, the intrinsic merit
+of the candidate will be too often out of sight. In the first, the
+qualifications best adapted to uniting the suffrages of the party,
+will be more considered than those which fit the person for the
+station. In the last, the coalition will commonly turn upon some
+interested equivalent: "Give us the man we wish for this office,
+and you shall have the one you wish for that." This will be the
+usual condition of the bargain. And it will rarely happen that the
+advancement of the public service will be the primary object either
+of party victories or of party negotiations.
+
+The truth of the principles here advanced seems to have been
+felt by the most intelligent of those who have found fault with the
+provision made, in this respect, by the convention. They contend
+that the President ought solely to have been authorized to make the
+appointments under the federal government. But it is easy to show,
+that every advantage to be expected from such an arrangement would,
+in substance, be derived from the power of NOMINATION, which is
+proposed to be conferred upon him; while several disadvantages
+which might attend the absolute power of appointment in the hands of
+that officer would be avoided. In the act of nomination, his
+judgment alone would be exercised; and as it would be his sole duty
+to point out the man who, with the approbation of the Senate, should
+fill an office, his responsibility would be as complete as if he
+were to make the final appointment. There can, in this view, be no
+difference between nominating and appointing. The same motives
+which would influence a proper discharge of his duty in one case,
+would exist in the other. And as no man could be appointed but on
+his previous nomination, every man who might be appointed would be,
+in fact, his choice.
+
+But might not his nomination be overruled? I grant it might,
+yet this could only be to make place for another nomination by
+himself. The person ultimately appointed must be the object of his
+preference, though perhaps not in the first degree. It is also not
+very probable that his nomination would often be overruled. The
+Senate could not be tempted, by the preference they might feel to
+another, to reject the one proposed; because they could not assure
+themselves, that the person they might wish would be brought forward
+by a second or by any subsequent nomination. They could not even be
+certain, that a future nomination would present a candidate in any
+degree more acceptable to them; and as their dissent might cast a
+kind of stigma upon the individual rejected, and might have the
+appearance of a reflection upon the judgment of the chief
+magistrate, it is not likely that their sanction would often be
+refused, where there were not special and strong reasons for the
+refusal.
+
+To what purpose then require the co-operation of the Senate? I
+answer, that the necessity of their concurrence would have a
+powerful, though, in general, a silent operation. It would be an
+excellent check upon a spirit of favoritism in the President, and
+would tend greatly to prevent the appointment of unfit characters
+from State prejudice, from family connection, from personal
+attachment, or from a view to popularity. In addition to this, it
+would be an efficacious source of stability in the administration.
+
+It will readily be comprehended, that a man who had himself the
+sole disposition of offices, would be governed much more by his
+private inclinations and interests, than when he was bound to submit
+the propriety of his choice to the discussion and determination of a
+different and independent body, and that body an entire branch of
+the legislature. The possibility of rejection would be a strong
+motive to care in proposing. The danger to his own reputation, and,
+in the case of an elective magistrate, to his political existence,
+from betraying a spirit of favoritism, or an unbecoming pursuit of
+popularity, to the observation of a body whose opinion would have
+great weight in forming that of the public, could not fail to
+operate as a barrier to the one and to the other. He would be both
+ashamed and afraid to bring forward, for the most distinguished or
+lucrative stations, candidates who had no other merit than that of
+coming from the same State to which he particularly belonged, or of
+being in some way or other personally allied to him, or of
+possessing the necessary insignificance and pliancy to render them
+the obsequious instruments of his pleasure.
+
+To this reasoning it has been objected that the President, by
+the influence of the power of nomination, may secure the
+complaisance of the Senate to his views. This supposition of
+universal venalty in human nature is little less an error in
+political reasoning, than the supposition of universal rectitude.
+The institution of delegated power implies, that there is a portion
+of virtue and honor among mankind, which may be a reasonable
+foundation of confidence; and experience justifies the theory. It
+has been found to exist in the most corrupt periods of the most
+corrupt governments. The venalty of the British House of Commons
+has been long a topic of accusation against that body, in the
+country to which they belong as well as in this; and it cannot be
+doubted that the charge is, to a considerable extent, well founded.
+But it is as little to be doubted, that there is always a large
+proportion of the body, which consists of independent and
+public-spirited men, who have an influential weight in the councils
+of the nation. Hence it is (the present reign not excepted) that
+the sense of that body is often seen to control the inclinations of
+the monarch, both with regard to men and to measures. Though it
+might therefore be allowable to suppose that the Executive might
+occasionally influence some individuals in the Senate, yet the
+supposition, that he could in general purchase the integrity of the
+whole body, would be forced and improbable. A man disposed to view
+human nature as it is, without either flattering its virtues or
+exaggerating its vices, will see sufficient ground of confidence in
+the probity of the Senate, to rest satisfied, not only that it will
+be impracticable to the Executive to corrupt or seduce a majority of
+its members, but that the necessity of its co-operation, in the
+business of appointments, will be a considerable and salutary
+restraint upon the conduct of that magistrate. Nor is the integrity
+of the Senate the only reliance. The Constitution has provided some
+important guards against the danger of executive influence upon the
+legislative body: it declares that "No senator or representative
+shall during the time FOR WHICH HE WAS ELECTED, be appointed to any
+civil office under the United States, which shall have been created,
+or the emoluments whereof shall have been increased, during such
+time; and no person, holding any office under the United States,
+shall be a member of either house during his continuance in
+office."
+
+PUBLIUS.
+
+
+
+
+
+FEDERALIST No. 77
+
+
+
+The Appointing Power Continued and Other Powers of the Executive
+Considered
+
+From the New York Packet.
+
+Friday, April 4, 1788.
+
+
+
+HAMILTON
+
+
+
+To the People of the State of New York:
+
+IT HAS been mentioned as one of the advantages to be expected
+from the co-operation of the Senate, in the business of
+appointments, that it would contribute to the stability of the
+administration. The consent of that body would be necessary to
+displace as well as to appoint. A change of the Chief Magistrate,
+therefore, would not occasion so violent or so general a revolution
+in the officers of the government as might be expected, if he were
+the sole disposer of offices. Where a man in any station had given
+satisfactory evidence of his fitness for it, a new President would
+be restrained from attempting a change in favor of a person more
+agreeable to him, by the apprehension that a discountenance of the
+Senate might frustrate the attempt, and bring some degree of
+discredit upon himself. Those who can best estimate the value of a
+steady administration, will be most disposed to prize a provision
+which connects the official existence of public men with the
+approbation or disapprobation of that body which, from the greater
+permanency of its own composition, will in all probability be less
+subject to inconstancy than any other member of the government.
+
+To this union of the Senate with the President, in the article
+of appointments, it has in some cases been suggested that it would
+serve to give the President an undue influence over the Senate, and
+in others that it would have an opposite tendency, a strong proof
+that neither suggestion is true.
+
+To state the first in its proper form, is to refute it. It
+amounts to this: the President would have an improper INFLUENCE
+OVER the Senate, because the Senate would have the power of
+RESTRAINING him. This is an absurdity in terms. It cannot admit of
+a doubt that the entire power of appointment would enable him much
+more effectually to establish a dangerous empire over that body,
+than a mere power of nomination subject to their control.
+
+Let us take a view of the converse of the proposition: "the
+Senate would influence the Executive." As I have had occasion to
+remark in several other instances, the indistinctness of the
+objection forbids a precise answer. In what manner is this
+influence to be exerted? In relation to what objects? The power of
+influencing a person, in the sense in which it is here used, must
+imply a power of conferring a benefit upon him. How could the
+Senate confer a benefit upon the President by the manner of
+employing their right of negative upon his nominations? If it be
+said they might sometimes gratify him by an acquiescence in a
+favorite choice, when public motives might dictate a different
+conduct, I answer, that the instances in which the President could
+be personally interested in the result, would be too few to admit of
+his being materially affected by the compliances of the Senate. The
+POWER which can ORIGINATE the disposition of honors and emoluments,
+is more likely to attract than to be attracted by the POWER which
+can merely obstruct their course. If by influencing the President
+be meant RESTRAINING him, this is precisely what must have been
+intended. And it has been shown that the restraint would be
+salutary, at the same time that it would not be such as to destroy a
+single advantage to be looked for from the uncontrolled agency of
+that Magistrate. The right of nomination would produce all the good
+of that of appointment, and would in a great measure avoid its evils.
+Upon a comparison of the plan for the appointment of the
+officers of the proposed government with that which is established
+by the constitution of this State, a decided preference must be
+given to the former. In that plan the power of nomination is
+unequivocally vested in the Executive. And as there would be a
+necessity for submitting each nomination to the judgment of an
+entire branch of the legislature, the circumstances attending an
+appointment, from the mode of conducting it, would naturally become
+matters of notoriety; and the public would be at no loss to
+determine what part had been performed by the different actors. The
+blame of a bad nomination would fall upon the President singly and
+absolutely. The censure of rejecting a good one would lie entirely
+at the door of the Senate; aggravated by the consideration of their
+having counteracted the good intentions of the Executive. If an ill
+appointment should be made, the Executive for nominating, and the
+Senate for approving, would participate, though in different
+degrees, in the opprobrium and disgrace.
+
+The reverse of all this characterizes the manner of appointment
+in this State. The council of appointment consists of from three to
+five persons, of whom the governor is always one. This small body,
+shut up in a private apartment, impenetrable to the public eye,
+proceed to the execution of the trust committed to them. It is
+known that the governor claims the right of nomination, upon the
+strength of some ambiguous expressions in the constitution; but it
+is not known to what extent, or in what manner he exercises it; nor
+upon what occasions he is contradicted or opposed. The censure of a
+bad appointment, on account of the uncertainty of its author, and
+for want of a determinate object, has neither poignancy nor duration.
+And while an unbounded field for cabal and intrigue lies open, all
+idea of responsibility is lost. The most that the public can know,
+is that the governor claims the right of nomination; that TWO out
+of the inconsiderable number of FOUR men can too often be managed
+without much difficulty; that if some of the members of a
+particular council should happen to be of an uncomplying character,
+it is frequently not impossible to get rid of their opposition by
+regulating the times of meeting in such a manner as to render their
+attendance inconvenient; and that from whatever cause it may
+proceed, a great number of very improper appointments are from time
+to time made. Whether a governor of this State avails himself of
+the ascendant he must necessarily have, in this delicate and
+important part of the administration, to prefer to offices men who
+are best qualified for them, or whether he prostitutes that
+advantage to the advancement of persons whose chief merit is their
+implicit devotion to his will, and to the support of a despicable
+and dangerous system of personal influence, are questions which,
+unfortunately for the community, can only be the subjects of
+speculation and conjecture.
+
+Every mere council of appointment, however constituted, will be
+a conclave, in which cabal and intrigue will have their full scope.
+Their number, without an unwarrantable increase of expense, cannot
+be large enough to preclude a facility of combination. And as each
+member will have his friends and connections to provide for, the
+desire of mutual gratification will beget a scandalous bartering of
+votes and bargaining for places. The private attachments of one man
+might easily be satisfied; but to satisfy the private attachments
+of a dozen, or of twenty men, would occasion a monopoly of all the
+principal employments of the government in a few families, and would
+lead more directly to an aristocracy or an oligarchy than any
+measure that could be contrived. If, to avoid an accumulation of
+offices, there was to be a frequent change in the persons who were
+to compose the council, this would involve the mischiefs of a
+mutable administration in their full extent. Such a council would
+also be more liable to executive influence than the Senate, because
+they would be fewer in number, and would act less immediately under
+the public inspection. Such a council, in fine, as a substitute for
+the plan of the convention, would be productive of an increase of
+expense, a multiplication of the evils which spring from favoritism
+and intrigue in the distribution of public honors, a decrease of
+stability in the administration of the government, and a diminution
+of the security against an undue influence of the Executive. And
+yet such a council has been warmly contended for as an essential
+amendment in the proposed Constitution.
+
+I could not with propriety conclude my observations on the
+subject of appointments without taking notice of a scheme for which
+there have appeared some, though but few advocates; I mean that of
+uniting the House of Representatives in the power of making them. I
+shall, however, do little more than mention it, as I cannot imagine
+that it is likely to gain the countenance of any considerable part
+of the community. A body so fluctuating and at the same time so
+numerous, can never be deemed proper for the exercise of that power.
+Its unfitness will appear manifest to all, when it is recollected
+that in half a century it may consist of three or four hundred
+persons. All the advantages of the stability, both of the Executive
+and of the Senate, would be defeated by this union, and infinite
+delays and embarrassments would be occasioned. The example of most
+of the States in their local constitutions encourages us to
+reprobate the idea.
+
+The only remaining powers of the Executive are comprehended in
+giving information to Congress of the state of the Union; in
+recommending to their consideration such measures as he shall judge
+expedient; in convening them, or either branch, upon extraordinary
+occasions; in adjourning them when they cannot themselves agree
+upon the time of adjournment; in receiving ambassadors and other
+public ministers; in faithfully executing the laws; and in
+commissioning all the officers of the United States.
+
+Except some cavils about the power of convening EITHER house of
+the legislature, and that of receiving ambassadors, no objection has
+been made to this class of authorities; nor could they possibly
+admit of any. It required, indeed, an insatiable avidity for
+censure to invent exceptions to the parts which have been excepted
+to. In regard to the power of convening either house of the
+legislature, I shall barely remark, that in respect to the Senate at
+least, we can readily discover a good reason for it. AS this body
+has a concurrent power with the Executive in the article of
+treaties, it might often be necessary to call it together with a
+view to this object, when it would be unnecessary and improper to
+convene the House of Representatives. As to the reception of
+ambassadors, what I have said in a former paper will furnish a
+sufficient answer.
+
+We have now completed a survey of the structure and powers of
+the executive department, which, I have endeavored to show,
+combines, as far as republican principles will admit, all the
+requisites to energy. The remaining inquiry is: Does it also
+combine the requisites to safety, in a republican sense, a due
+dependence on the people, a due responsibility? The answer to this
+question has been anticipated in the investigation of its other
+characteristics, and is satisfactorily deducible from these
+circumstances; from the election of the President once in four
+years by persons immediately chosen by the people for that purpose;
+and from his being at all times liable to impeachment, trial,
+dismission from office, incapacity to serve in any other, and to
+forfeiture of life and estate by subsequent prosecution in the
+common course of law. But these precautions, great as they are, are
+not the only ones which the plan of the convention has provided in
+favor of the public security. In the only instances in which the
+abuse of the executive authority was materially to be feared, the
+Chief Magistrate of the United States would, by that plan, be
+subjected to the control of a branch of the legislative body. What
+more could be desired by an enlightened and reasonable people?
+
+
+PUBLIUS.
+
+
+
+
+
+FEDERALIST No. 78
+
+
+
+The Judiciary Department
+
+From McLEAN'S Edition, New York.
+
+
+
+HAMILTON
+
+
+
+To the People of the State of New York:
+
+WE PROCEED now to an examination of the judiciary department of
+the proposed government.
+
+In unfolding the defects of the existing Confederation, the
+utility and necessity of a federal judicature have been clearly
+pointed out. It is the less necessary to recapitulate the
+considerations there urged, as the propriety of the institution in
+the abstract is not disputed; the only questions which have been
+raised being relative to the manner of constituting it, and to its
+extent. To these points, therefore, our observations shall be
+confined.
+
+The manner of constituting it seems to embrace these several
+objects: 1st. The mode of appointing the judges. 2d. The tenure by
+which they are to hold their places. 3d. The partition of the
+judiciary authority between different courts, and their relations to
+each other.
+
+First. As to the mode of appointing the judges; this is
+the same with that of appointing the officers of the Union in
+general, and has been so fully discussed in the two last numbers,
+that nothing can be said here which would not be useless repetition.
+
+Second. As to the tenure by which the judges are to hold
+their places; this chiefly concerns their duration in office; the
+provisions for their support; the precautions for their
+responsibility.
+
+According to the plan of the convention, all judges who may be
+appointed by the United States are to hold their offices DURING GOOD
+BEHAVIOR; which is conformable to the most approved of the State
+constitutions and among the rest, to that of this State. Its
+propriety having been drawn into question by the adversaries of that
+plan, is no light symptom of the rage for objection, which disorders
+their imaginations and judgments. The standard of good behavior for
+the continuance in office of the judicial magistracy, is certainly
+one of the most valuable of the modern improvements in the practice
+of government. In a monarchy it is an excellent barrier to the
+despotism of the prince; in a republic it is a no less excellent
+barrier to the encroachments and oppressions of the representative
+body. And it is the best expedient which can be devised in any
+government, to secure a steady, upright, and impartial
+administration of the laws.
+
+Whoever attentively considers the different departments of power
+must perceive, that, in a government in which they are separated
+from each other, the judiciary, from the nature of its functions,
+will always be the least dangerous to the political rights of the
+Constitution; because it will be least in a capacity to annoy or
+injure them. The Executive not only dispenses the honors, but holds
+the sword of the community. The legislature not only commands the
+purse, but prescribes the rules by which the duties and rights of
+every citizen are to be regulated. The judiciary, on the contrary,
+has no influence over either the sword or the purse; no direction
+either of the strength or of the wealth of the society; and can
+take no active resolution whatever. It may truly be said to have
+neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment; and must ultimately
+depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of
+its judgments.
+
+This simple view of the matter suggests several important
+consequences. It proves incontestably, that the judiciary is beyond
+comparison the weakest of the three departments of power1; that
+it can never attack with success either of the other two; and that
+all possible care is requisite to enable it to defend itself against
+their attacks. It equally proves, that though individual oppression
+may now and then proceed from the courts of justice, the general
+liberty of the people can never be endangered from that quarter; I
+mean so long as the judiciary remains truly distinct from both the
+legislature and the Executive. For I agree, that "there is no
+liberty, if the power of judging be not separated from the
+legislative and executive powers."2 And it proves, in the last
+place, that as liberty can have nothing to fear from the judiciary
+alone, but would have every thing to fear from its union with either
+of the other departments; that as all the effects of such a union
+must ensue from a dependence of the former on the latter,
+notwithstanding a nominal and apparent separation; that as, from
+the natural feebleness of the judiciary, it is in continual jeopardy
+of being overpowered, awed, or influenced by its co-ordinate
+branches; and that as nothing can contribute so much to its
+firmness and independence as permanency in office, this quality may
+therefore be justly regarded as an indispensable ingredient in its
+constitution, and, in a great measure, as the citadel of the public
+justice and the public security.
+
+The complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly
+essential in a limited Constitution. By a limited Constitution, I
+understand one which contains certain specified exceptions to the
+legislative authority; such, for instance, as that it shall pass no
+bills of attainder, no ex-post-facto laws, and the like.
+Limitations of this kind can be preserved in practice no other way
+than through the medium of courts of justice, whose duty it must be
+to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of the
+Constitution void. Without this, all the reservations of particular
+rights or privileges would amount to nothing.
+
+Some perplexity respecting the rights of the courts to pronounce
+legislative acts void, because contrary to the Constitution, has
+arisen from an imagination that the doctrine would imply a
+superiority of the judiciary to the legislative power. It is urged
+that the authority which can declare the acts of another void, must
+necessarily be superior to the one whose acts may be declared void.
+As this doctrine is of great importance in all the American
+constitutions, a brief discussion of the ground on which it rests
+cannot be unacceptable.
+
+There is no position which depends on clearer principles, than
+that every act of a delegated authority, contrary to the tenor of
+the commission under which it is exercised, is void. No legislative
+act, therefore, contrary to the Constitution, can be valid. To deny
+this, would be to affirm, that the deputy is greater than his
+principal; that the servant is above his master; that the
+representatives of the people are superior to the people themselves;
+that men acting by virtue of powers, may do not only what their
+powers do not authorize, but what they forbid.
+
+If it be said that the legislative body are themselves the
+constitutional judges of their own powers, and that the construction
+they put upon them is conclusive upon the other departments, it may
+be answered, that this cannot be the natural presumption, where it
+is not to be collected from any particular provisions in the
+Constitution. It is not otherwise to be supposed, that the
+Constitution could intend to enable the representatives of the
+people to substitute their WILL to that of their constituents. It
+is far more rational to suppose, that the courts were designed to be
+an intermediate body between the people and the legislature, in
+order, among other things, to keep the latter within the limits
+assigned to their authority. The interpretation of the laws is the
+proper and peculiar province of the courts. A constitution is, in
+fact, and must be regarded by the judges, as a fundamental law. It
+therefore belongs to them to ascertain its meaning, as well as the
+meaning of any particular act proceeding from the legislative body.
+If there should happen to be an irreconcilable variance between the
+two, that which has the superior obligation and validity ought, of
+course, to be preferred; or, in other words, the Constitution ought
+to be preferred to the statute, the intention of the people to the
+intention of their agents.
+
+Nor does this conclusion by any means suppose a superiority of
+the judicial to the legislative power. It only supposes that the
+power of the people is superior to both; and that where the will of
+the legislature, declared in its statutes, stands in opposition to
+that of the people, declared in the Constitution, the judges ought
+to be governed by the latter rather than the former. They ought to
+regulate their decisions by the fundamental laws, rather than by
+those which are not fundamental.
+
+This exercise of judicial discretion, in determining between two
+contradictory laws, is exemplified in a familiar instance. It not
+uncommonly happens, that there are two statutes existing at one
+time, clashing in whole or in part with each other, and neither of
+them containing any repealing clause or expression. In such a case,
+it is the province of the courts to liquidate and fix their meaning
+and operation. So far as they can, by any fair construction, be
+reconciled to each other, reason and law conspire to dictate that
+this should be done; where this is impracticable, it becomes a
+matter of necessity to give effect to one, in exclusion of the other.
+The rule which has obtained in the courts for determining their
+relative validity is, that the last in order of time shall be
+preferred to the first. But this is a mere rule of construction,
+not derived from any positive law, but from the nature and reason of
+the thing. It is a rule not enjoined upon the courts by legislative
+provision, but adopted by themselves, as consonant to truth and
+propriety, for the direction of their conduct as interpreters of the
+law. They thought it reasonable, that between the interfering acts
+of an EQUAL authority, that which was the last indication of its
+will should have the preference.
+
+But in regard to the interfering acts of a superior and
+subordinate authority, of an original and derivative power, the
+nature and reason of the thing indicate the converse of that rule as
+proper to be followed. They teach us that the prior act of a
+superior ought to be preferred to the subsequent act of an inferior
+and subordinate authority; and that accordingly, whenever a
+particular statute contravenes the Constitution, it will be the duty
+of the judicial tribunals to adhere to the latter and disregard the
+former.
+
+It can be of no weight to say that the courts, on the pretense
+of a repugnancy, may substitute their own pleasure to the
+constitutional intentions of the legislature. This might as well
+happen in the case of two contradictory statutes; or it might as
+well happen in every adjudication upon any single statute. The
+courts must declare the sense of the law; and if they should be
+disposed to exercise WILL instead of JUDGMENT, the consequence would
+equally be the substitution of their pleasure to that of the
+legislative body. The observation, if it prove any thing, would
+prove that there ought to be no judges distinct from that body.
+
+If, then, the courts of justice are to be considered as the
+bulwarks of a limited Constitution against legislative
+encroachments, this consideration will afford a strong argument for
+the permanent tenure of judicial offices, since nothing will
+contribute so much as this to that independent spirit in the judges
+which must be essential to the faithful performance of so arduous a
+duty.
+
+This independence of the judges is equally requisite to guard
+the Constitution and the rights of individuals from the effects of
+those ill humors, which the arts of designing men, or the influence
+of particular conjunctures, sometimes disseminate among the people
+themselves, and which, though they speedily give place to better
+information, and more deliberate reflection, have a tendency, in the
+meantime, to occasion dangerous innovations in the government, and
+serious oppressions of the minor party in the community. Though I
+trust the friends of the proposed Constitution will never concur
+with its enemies,3 in questioning that fundamental principle of
+republican government, which admits the right of the people to alter
+or abolish the established Constitution, whenever they find it
+inconsistent with their happiness, yet it is not to be inferred from
+this principle, that the representatives of the people, whenever a
+momentary inclination happens to lay hold of a majority of their
+constituents, incompatible with the provisions in the existing
+Constitution, would, on that account, be justifiable in a violation
+of those provisions; or that the courts would be under a greater
+obligation to connive at infractions in this shape, than when they
+had proceeded wholly from the cabals of the representative body.
+Until the people have, by some solemn and authoritative act,
+annulled or changed the established form, it is binding upon
+themselves collectively, as well as individually; and no
+presumption, or even knowledge, of their sentiments, can warrant
+their representatives in a departure from it, prior to such an act.
+But it is easy to see, that it would require an uncommon portion of
+fortitude in the judges to do their duty as faithful guardians of
+the Constitution, where legislative invasions of it had been
+instigated by the major voice of the community.
+
+But it is not with a view to infractions of the Constitution
+only, that the independence of the judges may be an essential
+safeguard against the effects of occasional ill humors in the
+society. These sometimes extend no farther than to the injury of
+the private rights of particular classes of citizens, by unjust and
+partial laws. Here also the firmness of the judicial magistracy is
+of vast importance in mitigating the severity and confining the
+operation of such laws. It not only serves to moderate the
+immediate mischiefs of those which may have been passed, but it
+operates as a check upon the legislative body in passing them; who,
+perceiving that obstacles to the success of iniquitous intention are
+to be expected from the scruples of the courts, are in a manner
+compelled, by the very motives of the injustice they meditate, to
+qualify their attempts. This is a circumstance calculated to have
+more influence upon the character of our governments, than but few
+may be aware of. The benefits of the integrity and moderation of
+the judiciary have already been felt in more States than one; and
+though they may have displeased those whose sinister expectations
+they may have disappointed, they must have commanded the esteem and
+applause of all the virtuous and disinterested. Considerate men, of
+every description, ought to prize whatever will tend to beget or
+fortify that temper in the courts: as no man can be sure that he
+may not be to-morrow the victim of a spirit of injustice, by which
+he may be a gainer to-day. And every man must now feel, that the
+inevitable tendency of such a spirit is to sap the foundations of
+public and private confidence, and to introduce in its stead
+universal distrust and distress.
+
+That inflexible and uniform adherence to the rights of the
+Constitution, and of individuals, which we perceive to be
+indispensable in the courts of justice, can certainly not be
+expected from judges who hold their offices by a temporary
+commission. Periodical appointments, however regulated, or by
+whomsoever made, would, in some way or other, be fatal to their
+necessary independence. If the power of making them was committed
+either to the Executive or legislature, there would be danger of an
+improper complaisance to the branch which possessed it; if to both,
+there would be an unwillingness to hazard the displeasure of either;
+if to the people, or to persons chosen by them for the special
+purpose, there would be too great a disposition to consult
+popularity, to justify a reliance that nothing would be consulted
+but the Constitution and the laws.
+
+There is yet a further and a weightier reason for the permanency
+of the judicial offices, which is deducible from the nature of the
+qualifications they require. It has been frequently remarked, with
+great propriety, that a voluminous code of laws is one of the
+inconveniences necessarily connected with the advantages of a free
+government. To avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is
+indispensable that they should be bound down by strict rules and
+precedents, which serve to define and point out their duty in every
+particular case that comes before them; and it will readily be
+conceived from the variety of controversies which grow out of the
+folly and wickedness of mankind, that the records of those
+precedents must unavoidably swell to a very considerable bulk, and
+must demand long and laborious study to acquire a competent
+knowledge of them. Hence it is, that there can be but few men in
+the society who will have sufficient skill in the laws to qualify
+them for the stations of judges. And making the proper deductions
+for the ordinary depravity of human nature, the number must be still
+smaller of those who unite the requisite integrity with the
+requisite knowledge. These considerations apprise us, that the
+government can have no great option between fit character; and that
+a temporary duration in office, which would naturally discourage
+such characters from quitting a lucrative line of practice to accept
+a seat on the bench, would have a tendency to throw the
+administration of justice into hands less able, and less well
+qualified, to conduct it with utility and dignity. In the present
+circumstances of this country, and in those in which it is likely to
+be for a long time to come, the disadvantages on this score would be
+greater than they may at first sight appear; but it must be
+confessed, that they are far inferior to those which present
+themselves under the other aspects of the subject.
+
+Upon the whole, there can be no room to doubt that the
+convention acted wisely in copying from the models of those
+constitutions which have established GOOD BEHAVIOR as the tenure of
+their judicial offices, in point of duration; and that so far from
+being blamable on this account, their plan would have been
+inexcusably defective, if it had wanted this important feature of
+good government. The experience of Great Britain affords an
+illustrious comment on the excellence of the institution.
+
+
+PUBLIUS.
+
+1 The celebrated Montesquieu, speaking of them, says: "Of the
+three powers above mentioned, the judiciary is next to
+nothing." "Spirit of Laws." vol. i., page 186.
+
+2 Idem, page 181.
+
+3 Vide "Protest of the Minority of the Convention of
+Pennsylvania," Martin's Speech, etc.
+
+
+
+
+
+FEDERALIST No. 79
+
+
+
+The Judiciary Continued
+
+From MCLEAN's Edition, New York.
+
+
+
+HAMILTON
+
+
+
+To the People of the State of New York:
+
+NEXT to permanency in office, nothing can contribute more to the
+independence of the judges than a fixed provision for their support.
+The remark made in relation to the President is equally applicable
+here. In the general course of human nature, A POWER OVER A MAN's
+SUBSISTENCE AMOUNTS TO A POWER OVER HIS WILL. And we can never hope
+to see realized in practice, the complete separation of the judicial
+from the legislative power, in any system which leaves the former
+dependent for pecuniary resources on the occasional grants of the
+latter. The enlightened friends to good government in every State,
+have seen cause to lament the want of precise and explicit
+precautions in the State constitutions on this head. Some of these
+indeed have declared that PERMANENT1 salaries should be
+established for the judges; but the experiment has in some
+instances shown that such expressions are not sufficiently definite
+to preclude legislative evasions. Something still more positive and
+unequivocal has been evinced to be requisite. The plan of the
+convention accordingly has provided that the judges of the United
+States "shall at STATED TIMES receive for their services a
+compensation which shall not be DIMINISHED during their continuance
+in office."
+
+This, all circumstances considered, is the most eligible
+provision that could have been devised. It will readily be
+understood that the fluctuations in the value of money and in the
+state of society rendered a fixed rate of compensation in the
+Constitution inadmissible. What might be extravagant to-day, might
+in half a century become penurious and inadequate. It was therefore
+necessary to leave it to the discretion of the legislature to vary
+its provisions in conformity to the variations in circumstances, yet
+under such restrictions as to put it out of the power of that body
+to change the condition of the individual for the worse. A man may
+then be sure of the ground upon which he stands, and can never be
+deterred from his duty by the apprehension of being placed in a less
+eligible situation. The clause which has been quoted combines both
+advantages. The salaries of judicial officers may from time to time
+be altered, as occasion shall require, yet so as never to lessen the
+allowance with which any particular judge comes into office, in
+respect to him. It will be observed that a difference has been made
+by the convention between the compensation of the President and of
+the judges, That of the former can neither be increased nor
+diminished; that of the latter can only not be diminished. This
+probably arose from the difference in the duration of the respective
+offices. As the President is to be elected for no more than four
+years, it can rarely happen that an adequate salary, fixed at the
+commencement of that period, will not continue to be such to its end.
+But with regard to the judges, who, if they behave properly, will
+be secured in their places for life, it may well happen, especially
+in the early stages of the government, that a stipend, which would
+be very sufficient at their first appointment, would become too
+small in the progress of their service.
+
+This provision for the support of the judges bears every mark of
+prudence and efficacy; and it may be safely affirmed that, together
+with the permanent tenure of their offices, it affords a better
+prospect of their independence than is discoverable in the
+constitutions of any of the States in regard to their own judges.
+
+The precautions for their responsibility are comprised in the
+article respecting impeachments. They are liable to be impeached
+for malconduct by the House of Representatives, and tried by the
+Senate; and, if convicted, may be dismissed from office, and
+disqualified for holding any other. This is the only provision on
+the point which is consistent with the necessary independence of the
+judicial character, and is the only one which we find in our own
+Constitution in respect to our own judges.
+
+The want of a provision for removing the judges on account of
+inability has been a subject of complaint. But all considerate men
+will be sensible that such a provision would either not be practiced
+upon or would be more liable to abuse than calculated to answer any
+good purpose. The mensuration of the faculties of the mind has, I
+believe, no place in the catalogue of known arts. An attempt to fix
+the boundary between the regions of ability and inability, would
+much oftener give scope to personal and party attachments and
+enmities than advance the interests of justice or the public good.
+The result, except in the case of insanity, must for the most part
+be arbitrary; and insanity, without any formal or express
+provision, may be safely pronounced to be a virtual disqualification.
+
+The constitution of New York, to avoid investigations that must
+forever be vague and dangerous, has taken a particular age as the
+criterion of inability. No man can be a judge beyond sixty. I
+believe there are few at present who do not disapprove of this
+provision. There is no station, in relation to which it is less
+proper than to that of a judge. The deliberating and comparing
+faculties generally preserve their strength much beyond that period
+in men who survive it; and when, in addition to this circumstance,
+we consider how few there are who outlive the season of intellectual
+vigor, and how improbable it is that any considerable portion of the
+bench, whether more or less numerous, should be in such a situation
+at the same time, we shall be ready to conclude that limitations of
+this sort have little to recommend them. In a republic, where
+fortunes are not affluent, and pensions not expedient, the
+dismission of men from stations in which they have served their
+country long and usefully, on which they depend for subsistence, and
+from which it will be too late to resort to any other occupation for
+a livelihood, ought to have some better apology to humanity than is
+to be found in the imaginary danger of a superannuated bench.
+
+
+PUBLIUS.
+
+1 Vide "Constitution of Massachusetts," chapter 2, section
+I, article 13.
+
+
+
+
+
+FEDERALIST No. 80
+
+The Powers of the Judiciary
+
+From McLEAN's Edition, New York.
+
+
+
+HAMILTON
+
+
+
+To the People of the State of New York:
+
+To JUDGE with accuracy of the proper extent of the federal
+judicature, it will be necessary to consider, in the first place,
+what are its proper objects.
+
+It seems scarcely to admit of controversy, that the judicary
+authority of the Union ought to extend to these several descriptions
+of cases: 1st, to all those which arise out of the laws of the
+United States, passed in pursuance of their just and constitutional
+powers of legislation; 2d, to all those which concern the execution
+of the provisions expressly contained in the articles of Union; 3d,
+to all those in which the United States are a party; 4th, to all
+those which involve the PEACE of the CONFEDERACY, whether they
+relate to the intercourse between the United States and foreign
+nations, or to that between the States themselves; 5th, to all
+those which originate on the high seas, and are of admiralty or
+maritime jurisdiction; and, lastly, to all those in which the State
+tribunals cannot be supposed to be impartial and unbiased.
+
+The first point depends upon this obvious consideration, that
+there ought always to be a constitutional method of giving efficacy
+to constitutional provisions. What, for instance, would avail
+restrictions on the authority of the State legislatures, without
+some constitutional mode of enforcing the observance of them? The
+States, by the plan of the convention, are prohibited from doing a
+variety of things, some of which are incompatible with the interests
+of the Union, and others with the principles of good government.
+The imposition of duties on imported articles, and the emission of
+paper money, are specimens of each kind. No man of sense will
+believe, that such prohibitions would be scrupulously regarded,
+without some effectual power in the government to restrain or
+correct the infractions of them. This power must either be a direct
+negative on the State laws, or an authority in the federal courts to
+overrule such as might be in manifest contravention of the articles
+of Union. There is no third course that I can imagine. The latter
+appears to have been thought by the convention preferable to the
+former, and, I presume, will be most agreeable to the States.
+
+As to the second point, it is impossible, by any argument or
+comment, to make it clearer than it is in itself. If there are such
+things as political axioms, the propriety of the judicial power of a
+government being coextensive with its legislative, may be ranked
+among the number. The mere necessity of uniformity in the
+interpretation of the national laws, decides the question. Thirteen
+independent courts of final jurisdiction over the same causes,
+arising upon the same laws, is a hydra in government, from which
+nothing but contradiction and confusion can proceed.
+
+Still less need be said in regard to the third point.
+Controversies between the nation and its members or citizens, can
+only be properly referred to the national tribunals. Any other plan
+would be contrary to reason, to precedent, and to decorum.
+
+The fourth point rests on this plain proposition, that the peace
+of the WHOLE ought not to be left at the disposal of a PART. The
+Union will undoubtedly be answerable to foreign powers for the
+conduct of its members. And the responsibility for an injury ought
+ever to be accompanied with the faculty of preventing it. As the
+denial or perversion of justice by the sentences of courts, as well
+as in any other manner, is with reason classed among the just causes
+of war, it will follow that the federal judiciary ought to have
+cognizance of all causes in which the citizens of other countries
+are concerned. This is not less essential to the preservation of
+the public faith, than to the security of the public tranquillity.
+A distinction may perhaps be imagined between cases arising upon
+treaties and the laws of nations and those which may stand merely on
+the footing of the municipal law. The former kind may be supposed
+proper for the federal jurisdiction, the latter for that of the
+States. But it is at least problematical, whether an unjust
+sentence against a foreigner, where the subject of controversy was
+wholly relative to the lex loci, would not, if unredressed, be
+an aggression upon his sovereign, as well as one which violated the
+stipulations of a treaty or the general law of nations. And a still
+greater objection to the distinction would result from the immense
+difficulty, if not impossibility, of a practical discrimination
+between the cases of one complexion and those of the other. So
+great a proportion of the cases in which foreigners are parties,
+involve national questions, that it is by far most safe and most
+expedient to refer all those in which they are concerned to the
+national tribunals.
+
+The power of determining causes between two States, between one
+State and the citizens of another, and between the citizens of
+different States, is perhaps not less essential to the peace of the
+Union than that which has been just examined. History gives us a
+horrid picture of the dissensions and private wars which distracted
+and desolated Germany prior to the institution of the Imperial
+Chamber by Maximilian, towards the close of the fifteenth century;
+and informs us, at the same time, of the vast influence of that
+institution in appeasing the disorders and establishing the
+tranquillity of the empire. This was a court invested with
+authority to decide finally all differences among the members of the
+Germanic body.
+
+A method of terminating territorial disputes between the States,
+under the authority of the federal head, was not unattended to, even
+in the imperfect system by which they have been hitherto held
+together. But there are many other sources, besides interfering
+claims of boundary, from which bickerings and animosities may spring
+up among the members of the Union. To some of these we have been
+witnesses in the course of our past experience. It will readily be
+conjectured that I allude to the fraudulent laws which have been
+passed in too many of the States. And though the proposed
+Constitution establishes particular guards against the repetition of
+those instances which have heretofore made their appearance, yet it
+is warrantable to apprehend that the spirit which produced them will
+assume new shapes, that could not be foreseen nor specifically
+provided against. Whatever practices may have a tendency to disturb
+the harmony between the States, are proper objects of federal
+superintendence and control.
+
+It may be esteemed the basis of the Union, that "the citizens
+of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities
+of citizens of the several States." And if it be a just principle
+that every government OUGHT TO POSSESS THE MEANS OF EXECUTING ITS
+OWN PROVISIONS BY ITS OWN AUTHORITY, it will follow, that in order
+to the inviolable maintenance of that equality of privileges and
+immunities to which the citizens of the Union will be entitled, the
+national judiciary ought to preside in all cases in which one State
+or its citizens are opposed to another State or its citizens. To
+secure the full effect of so fundamental a provision against all
+evasion and subterfuge, it is necessary that its construction should
+be committed to that tribunal which, having no local attachments,
+will be likely to be impartial between the different States and
+their citizens, and which, owing its official existence to the
+Union, will never be likely to feel any bias inauspicious to the
+principles on which it is founded.
+
+The fifth point will demand little animadversion. The most
+bigoted idolizers of State authority have not thus far shown a
+disposition to deny the national judiciary the cognizances of
+maritime causes. These so generally depend on the laws of nations,
+and so commonly affect the rights of foreigners, that they fall
+within the considerations which are relative to the public peace.
+The most important part of them are, by the present Confederation,
+submitted to federal jurisdiction.
+
+The reasonableness of the agency of the national courts in cases
+in which the State tribunals cannot be supposed to be impartial,
+speaks for itself. No man ought certainly to be a judge in his own
+cause, or in any cause in respect to which he has the least interest
+or bias. This principle has no inconsiderable weight in designating
+the federal courts as the proper tribunals for the determination of
+controversies between different States and their citizens. And it
+ought to have the same operation in regard to some cases between
+citizens of the same State. Claims to land under grants of
+different States, founded upon adverse pretensions of boundary, are
+of this description. The courts of neither of the granting States
+could be expected to be unbiased. The laws may have even prejudged
+the question, and tied the courts down to decisions in favor of the
+grants of the State to which they belonged. And even where this had
+not been done, it would be natural that the judges, as men, should
+feel a strong predilection to the claims of their own government.
+
+Having thus laid down and discussed the principles which ought
+to regulate the constitution of the federal judiciary, we will
+proceed to test, by these principles, the particular powers of
+which, according to the plan of the convention, it is to be composed.
+It is to comprehend "all cases in law and equity arising under
+the Constitution, the laws of the United States, and treaties made,
+or which shall be made, under their authority; to all cases
+affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls; to all
+cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction; to controversies to
+which the United States shall be a party; to controversies between
+two or more States; between a State and citizens of another State;
+between citizens of different States; between citizens of the same
+State claiming lands and grants of different States; and between a
+State or the citizens thereof and foreign states, citizens, and
+subjects." This constitutes the entire mass of the judicial
+authority of the Union. Let us now review it in detail. It is,
+then, to extend:
+
+First. To all cases in law and equity, ARISING UNDER THE
+CONSTITUTION and THE LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES. This corresponds
+with the two first classes of causes, which have been enumerated, as
+proper for the jurisdiction of the United States. It has been
+asked, what is meant by "cases arising under the Constitution," in
+contradiction from those "arising under the laws of the United
+States"? The difference has been already explained. All the
+restrictions upon the authority of the State legislatures furnish
+examples of it. They are not, for instance, to emit paper money;
+but the interdiction results from the Constitution, and will have
+no connection with any law of the United States. Should paper
+money, notwithstanding, be emited, the controversies concerning it
+would be cases arising under the Constitution and not the laws of
+the United States, in the ordinary signification of the terms. This
+may serve as a sample of the whole.
+
+It has also been asked, what need of the word "equity What
+equitable causes can grow out of the Constitution and laws of the
+United States? There is hardly a subject of litigation between
+individuals, which may not involve those ingredients of FRAUD,
+ACCIDENT, TRUST, or HARDSHIP, which would render the matter an
+object of equitable rather than of legal jurisdiction, as the
+distinction is known and established in several of the States. It
+is the peculiar province, for instance, of a court of equity to
+relieve against what are called hard bargains: these are contracts
+in which, though there may have been no direct fraud or deceit,
+sufficient to invalidate them in a court of law, yet there may have
+been some undue and unconscionable advantage taken of the
+necessities or misfortunes of one of the parties, which a court of
+equity would not tolerate. In such cases, where foreigners were
+concerned on either side, it would be impossible for the federal
+judicatories to do justice without an equitable as well as a legal
+jurisdiction. Agreements to convey lands claimed under the grants
+of different States, may afford another example of the necessity of
+an equitable jurisdiction in the federal courts. This reasoning may
+not be so palpable in those States where the formal and technical
+distinction between LAW and EQUITY is not maintained, as in this
+State, where it is exemplified by every day's practice.
+
+The judiciary authority of the Union is to extend:
+
+Second. To treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
+authority of the United States, and to all cases affecting
+ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls. These belong to
+the fourth class of the enumerated cases, as they have an evident
+connection with the preservation of the national peace.
+
+Third. To cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction.
+These form, altogether, the fifth of the enumerated classes of
+causes proper for the cognizance of the national courts.
+
+Fourth. To controversies to which the United States shall be
+a party. These constitute the third of those classes.
+
+Fifth. To controversies between two or more States; between
+a State and citizens of another State; between citizens of
+different States. These belong to the fourth of those classes, and
+partake, in some measure, of the nature of the last.
+
+Sixth. To cases between the citizens of the same State,
+CLAIMING LANDS UNDER GRANTS OF DIFFERENT STATES. These fall within
+the last class, and ARE THE ONLY INSTANCES IN WHICH THE PROPOSED
+CONSTITUTION DIRECTLY CONTEMPLATES THE COGNIZANCE OF DISPUTES
+BETWEEN THE CITIZENS OF THE SAME STATE.
+
+Seventh. To cases between a State and the citizens thereof,
+and foreign States, citizens, or subjects. These have been already
+explained to belong to the fourth of the enumerated classes, and
+have been shown to be, in a peculiar manner, the proper subjects of
+the national judicature.
+
+From this review of the particular powers of the federal
+judiciary, as marked out in the Constitution, it appears that they
+are all conformable to the principles which ought to have governed
+the structure of that department, and which were necessary to the
+perfection of the system. If some partial inconviences should
+appear to be connected with the incorporation of any of them into
+the plan, it ought to be recollected that the national legislature
+will have ample authority to make such EXCEPTIONS, and to prescribe
+such regulations as will be calculated to obviate or remove these
+inconveniences. The possibility of particular mischiefs can never
+be viewed, by a wellinformed mind, as a solid objection to a general
+principle, which is calculated to avoid general mischiefs and to
+obtain general advantages.
+
+PUBLIUS.
+
+
+
+
+
+FEDERALIST. No. 81
+
+
+
+The Judiciary Continued, and the Distribution of the Judicial
+Authority
+
+From McLEAN's Edition, New York.
+
+
+
+HAMILTON
+
+
+
+To the People of the State of New York:
+
+LET US now return to the partition of the judiciary authority
+between different courts, and their relations to each other,
+"The judicial power of the United States is" (by the plan of
+the convention) "to be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such
+inferior courts as the Congress may, from time to time, ordain and
+establish."1
+
+That there ought to be one court of supreme and final
+jurisdiction, is a proposition which is not likely to be contested.
+The reasons for it have been assigned in another place, and are too
+obvious to need repetition. The only question that seems to have
+been raised concerning it, is, whether it ought to be a distinct
+body or a branch of the legislature. The same contradiction is
+observable in regard to this matter which has been remarked in
+several other cases. The very men who object to the Senate as a
+court of impeachments, on the ground of an improper intermixture of
+powers, advocate, by implication at least, the propriety of vesting
+the ultimate decision of all causes, in the whole or in a part of
+the legislative body.
+
+The arguments, or rather suggestions, upon which this charge is
+founded, are to this effect: "The authority of the proposed
+Supreme Court of the United States, which is to be a separate and
+independent body, will be superior to that of the legislature. The
+power of construing the laws according to the SPIRIT of the
+Constitution, will enable that court to mould them into whatever
+shape it may think proper; especially as its decisions will not be
+in any manner subject to the revision or correction of the
+legislative body. This is as unprecedented as it is dangerous. In
+Britain, the judical power, in the last resort, resides in the House
+of Lords, which is a branch of the legislature; and this part of
+the British government has been imitated in the State constitutions
+in general. The Parliament of Great Britain, and the legislatures
+of the several States, can at any time rectify, by law, the
+exceptionable decisions of their respective courts. But the errors
+and usurpations of the Supreme Court of the United States will be
+uncontrollable and remediless." This, upon examination, will be
+found to be made up altogether of false reasoning upon misconceived
+fact.
+
+In the first place, there is not a syllable in the plan under
+consideration which DIRECTLY empowers the national courts to
+construe the laws according to the spirit of the Constitution, or
+which gives them any greater latitude in this respect than may be
+claimed by the courts of every State. I admit, however, that the
+Constitution ought to be the standard of construction for the laws,
+and that wherever there is an evident opposition, the laws ought to
+give place to the Constitution. But this doctrine is not deducible
+from any circumstance peculiar to the plan of the convention, but
+from the general theory of a limited Constitution; and as far as it
+is true, is equally applicable to most, if not to all the State
+governments. There can be no objection, therefore, on this account,
+to the federal judicature which will not lie against the local
+judicatures in general, and which will not serve to condemn every
+constitution that attempts to set bounds to legislative discretion.
+
+But perhaps the force of the objection may be thought to consist
+in the particular organization of the Supreme Court; in its being
+composed of a distinct body of magistrates, instead of being one of
+the branches of the legislature, as in the government of Great
+Britain and that of the State. To insist upon this point, the
+authors of the objection must renounce the meaning they have labored
+to annex to the celebrated maxim, requiring a separation of the
+departments of power. It shall, nevertheless, be conceded to them,
+agreeably to the interpretation given to that maxim in the course of
+these papers, that it is not violated by vesting the ultimate power
+of judging in a PART of the legislative body. But though this be
+not an absolute violation of that excellent rule, yet it verges so
+nearly upon it, as on this account alone to be less eligible than
+the mode preferred by the convention. From a body which had even a
+partial agency in passing bad laws, we could rarely expect a
+disposition to temper and moderate them in the application. The
+same spirit which had operated in making them, would be too apt in
+interpreting them; still less could it be expected that men who had
+infringed the Constitution in the character of legislators, would be
+disposed to repair the breach in the character of judges. Nor is
+this all. Every reason which recommends the tenure of good behavior
+for judicial offices, militates against placing the judiciary power,
+in the last resort, in a body composed of men chosen for a limited
+period. There is an absurdity in referring the determination of
+causes, in the first instance, to judges of permanent standing; in
+the last, to those of a temporary and mutable constitution. And
+there is a still greater absurdity in subjecting the decisions of
+men, selected for their knowledge of the laws, acquired by long and
+laborious study, to the revision and control of men who, for want of
+the same advantage, cannot but be deficient in that knowledge. The
+members of the legislature will rarely be chosen with a view to
+those qualifications which fit men for the stations of judges; and
+as, on this account, there will be great reason to apprehend all the
+ill consequences of defective information, so, on account of the
+natural propensity of such bodies to party divisions, there will be
+no less reason to fear that the pestilential breath of faction may
+poison the fountains of justice. The habit of being continually
+marshalled on opposite sides will be too apt to stifle the voice
+both of law and of equity.
+
+These considerations teach us to applaud the wisdom of those
+States who have committed the judicial power, in the last resort,
+not to a part of the legislature, but to distinct and independent
+bodies of men. Contrary to the supposition of those who have
+represented the plan of the convention, in this respect, as novel
+and unprecedented, it is but a copy of the constitutions of New
+Hampshire, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland,
+Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia; and the
+preference which has been given to those models is highly to be
+commended.
+
+It is not true, in the second place, that the Parliament of
+Great Britain, or the legislatures of the particular States, can
+rectify the exceptionable decisions of their respective courts, in
+any other sense than might be done by a future legislature of the
+United States. The theory, neither of the British, nor the State
+constitutions, authorizes the revisal of a judicial sentence by a
+legislative act. Nor is there any thing in the proposed
+Constitution, more than in either of them, by which it is forbidden.
+In the former, as well as in the latter, the impropriety of the
+thing, on the general principles of law and reason, is the sole
+obstacle. A legislature, without exceeding its province, cannot
+reverse a determination once made in a particular case; though it
+may prescribe a new rule for future cases. This is the principle,
+and it applies in all its consequences, exactly in the same manner
+and extent, to the State governments, as to the national government
+now under consideration. Not the least difference can be pointed
+out in any view of the subject.
+
+It may in the last place be observed that the supposed danger of
+judiciary encroachments on the legislative authority, which has been
+upon many occasions reiterated, is in reality a phantom. Particular
+misconstructions and contraventions of the will of the legislature
+may now and then happen; but they can never be so extensive as to
+amount to an inconvenience, or in any sensible degree to affect the
+order of the political system. This may be inferred with certainty,
+from the general nature of the judicial power, from the objects to
+which it relates, from the manner in which it is exercised, from its
+comparative weakness, and from its total incapacity to support its
+usurpations by force. And the inference is greatly fortified by the
+consideration of the important constitutional check which the power
+of instituting impeachments in one part of the legislative body, and
+of determining upon them in the other, would give to that body upon
+the members of the judicial department. This is alone a complete
+security. There never can be danger that the judges, by a series of
+deliberate usurpations on the authority of the legislature, would
+hazard the united resentment of the body intrusted with it, while
+this body was possessed of the means of punishing their presumption,
+by degrading them from their stations. While this ought to remove
+all apprehensions on the subject, it affords, at the same time, a
+cogent argument for constituting the Senate a court for the trial of
+impeachments.
+
+Having now examined, and, I trust, removed the objections to the
+distinct and independent organization of the Supreme Court, I
+proceed to consider the propriety of the power of constituting
+inferior courts,2 and the relations which will subsist between
+these and the former.
+
+The power of constituting inferior courts is evidently
+calculated to obviate the necessity of having recourse to the
+Supreme Court in every case of federal cognizance. It is intended
+to enable the national government to institute or AUTHORUZE, in each
+State or district of the United States, a tribunal competent to the
+determination of matters of national jurisdiction within its limits.
+
+But why, it is asked, might not the same purpose have been
+accomplished by the instrumentality of the State courts? This
+admits of different answers. Though the fitness and competency of
+those courts should be allowed in the utmost latitude, yet the
+substance of the power in question may still be regarded as a
+necessary part of the plan, if it were only to empower the national
+legislature to commit to them the cognizance of causes arising out
+of the national Constitution. To confer the power of determining
+such causes upon the existing courts of the several States, would
+perhaps be as much "to constitute tribunals," as to create new
+courts with the like power. But ought not a more direct and
+explicit provision to have been made in favor of the State courts?
+There are, in my opinion, substantial reasons against such a
+provision: the most discerning cannot foresee how far the
+prevalency of a local spirit may be found to disqualify the local
+tribunals for the jurisdiction of national causes; whilst every man
+may discover, that courts constituted like those of some of the
+States would be improper channels of the judicial authority of the
+Union. State judges, holding their offices during pleasure, or from
+year to year, will be too little independent to be relied upon for
+an inflexible execution of the national laws. And if there was a
+necessity for confiding the original cognizance of causes arising
+under those laws to them there would be a correspondent necessity
+for leaving the door of appeal as wide as possible. In proportion
+to the grounds of confidence in, or distrust of, the subordinate
+tribunals, ought to be the facility or difficulty of appeals. And
+well satisfied as I am of the propriety of the appellate
+jurisdiction, in the several classes of causes to which it is
+extended by the plan of the convention. I should consider every
+thing calculated to give, in practice, an UNRESTRAINED COURSE to
+appeals, as a source of public and private inconvenience.
+
+I am not sure, but that it will be found highly expedient and
+useful, to divide the United States into four or five or half a
+dozen districts; and to institute a federal court in each district,
+in lieu of one in every State. The judges of these courts, with the
+aid of the State judges, may hold circuits for the trial of causes
+in the several parts of the respective districts. Justice through
+them may be administered with ease and despatch; and appeals may be
+safely circumscribed within a narrow compass. This plan appears to
+me at present the most eligible of any that could be adopted; and
+in order to it, it is necessary that the power of constituting
+inferior courts should exist in the full extent in which it is to be
+found in the proposed Constitution.
+
+These reasons seem sufficient to satisfy a candid mind, that the
+want of such a power would have been a great defect in the plan.
+Let us now examine in what manner the judicial authority is to be
+distributed between the supreme and the inferior courts of the Union.
+The Supreme Court is to be invested with original jurisdiction,
+only "in cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and
+consuls, and those in which A STATE shall be a party." Public
+ministers of every class are the immediate representatives of their
+sovereigns. All questions in which they are concerned are so
+directly connected with the public peace, that, as well for the
+preservation of this, as out of respect to the sovereignties they
+represent, it is both expedient and proper that such questions
+should be submitted in the first instance to the highest judicatory
+of the nation. Though consuls have not in strictness a diplomatic
+character, yet as they are the public agents of the nations to which
+they belong, the same observation is in a great measure applicable
+to them. In cases in which a State might happen to be a party, it
+would ill suit its dignity to be turned over to an inferior tribunal.
+Though it may rather be a digression from the immediate subject
+of this paper, I shall take occasion to mention here a supposition
+which has excited some alarm upon very mistaken grounds. It has
+been suggested that an assignment of the public securities of one
+State to the citizens of another, would enable them to prosecute
+that State in the federal courts for the amount of those securities;
+a suggestion which the following considerations prove to be without
+foundation.
+
+It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable
+to the suit of an individual WITHOUT ITS CONSENT. This is the
+general sense, and the general practice of mankind; and the
+exemption, as one of the attributes of sovereignty, is now enjoyed
+by the government of every State in the Union. Unless, therefore,
+there is a surrender of this immunity in the plan of the convention,
+it will remain with the States, and the danger intimated must be
+merely ideal. The circumstances which are necessary to produce an
+alienation of State sovereignty were discussed in considering the
+article of taxation, and need not be repeated here. A recurrence to
+the principles there established will satisfy us, that there is no
+color to pretend that the State governments would, by the adoption
+of that plan, be divested of the privilege of paying their own debts
+in their own way, free from every constraint but that which flows
+from the obligations of good faith. The contracts between a nation
+and individuals are only binding on the conscience of the sovereign,
+and have no pretensions to a compulsive force. They confer no right
+of action, independent of the sovereign will. To what purpose would
+it be to authorize suits against States for the debts they owe? How
+could recoveries be enforced? It is evident, it could not be done
+without waging war against the contracting State; and to ascribe to
+the federal courts, by mere implication, and in destruction of a
+pre-existing right of the State governments, a power which would
+involve such a consequence, would be altogether forced and
+unwarrantable.
+
+Let us resume the train of our observations. We have seen that
+the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court would be confined to
+two classes of causes, and those of a nature rarely to occur. In
+all other cases of federal cognizance, the original jurisdiction
+would appertain to the inferior tribunals; and the Supreme Court
+would have nothing more than an appellate jurisdiction, "with such
+EXCEPTIONS and under such REGULATIONS as the Congress shall make."
+
+The propriety of this appellate jurisdiction has been scarcely
+called in question in regard to matters of law; but the clamors
+have been loud against it as applied to matters of fact. Some
+well-intentioned men in this State, deriving their notions from the
+language and forms which obtain in our courts, have been induced to
+consider it as an implied supersedure of the trial by jury, in favor
+of the civil-law mode of trial, which prevails in our courts of
+admiralty, probate, and chancery. A technical sense has been
+affixed to the term "appellate," which, in our law parlance, is
+commonly used in reference to appeals in the course of the civil law.
+But if I am not misinformed, the same meaning would not be given
+to it in any part of New England. There an appeal from one jury to
+another, is familiar both in language and practice, and is even a
+matter of course, until there have been two verdicts on one side.
+The word "appellate," therefore, will not be understood in the
+same sense in New England as in New York, which shows the
+impropriety of a technical interpretation derived from the
+jurisprudence of any particular State. The expression, taken in the
+abstract, denotes nothing more than the power of one tribunal to
+review the proceedings of another, either as to the law or fact, or
+both. The mode of doing it may depend on ancient custom or
+legislative provision (in a new government it must depend on the
+latter), and may be with or without the aid of a jury, as may be
+judged advisable. If, therefore, the re-examination of a fact once
+determined by a jury, should in any case be admitted under the
+proposed Constitution, it may be so regulated as to be done by a
+second jury, either by remanding the cause to the court below for a
+second trial of the fact, or by directing an issue immediately out
+of the Supreme Court.
+
+But it does not follow that the re-examination of a fact once
+ascertained by a jury, will be permitted in the Supreme Court. Why
+may not it be said, with the strictest propriety, when a writ of
+error is brought from an inferior to a superior court of law in this
+State, that the latter has jurisdiction of the fact as well as the
+law? It is true it cannot institute a new inquiry concerning the
+fact, but it takes cognizance of it as it appears upon the record,
+and pronounces the law arising upon it.3 This is jurisdiction
+of both fact and law; nor is it even possible to separate them.
+Though the common-law courts of this State ascertain disputed facts
+by a jury, yet they unquestionably have jurisdiction of both fact
+and law; and accordingly when the former is agreed in the
+pleadings, they have no recourse to a jury, but proceed at once to
+judgment. I contend, therefore, on this ground, that the
+expressions, "appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact," do
+not necessarily imply a re-examination in the Supreme Court of facts
+decided by juries in the inferior courts.
+
+The following train of ideas may well be imagined to have
+influenced the convention, in relation to this particular provision.
+The appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court (it may have been
+argued) will extend to causes determinable in different modes, some
+in the course of the COMMON LAW, others in the course of the CIVIL
+LAW. In the former, the revision of the law only will be, generally
+speaking, the proper province of the Supreme Court; in the latter,
+the re-examination of the fact is agreeable to usage, and in some
+cases, of which prize causes are an example, might be essential to
+the preservation of the public peace. It is therefore necessary
+that the appellate jurisdiction should, in certain cases, extend in
+the broadest sense to matters of fact. It will not answer to make
+an express exception of cases which shall have been originally tried
+by a jury, because in the courts of some of the States ALL CAUSES
+are tried in this mode4; and such an exception would preclude
+the revision of matters of fact, as well where it might be proper,
+as where it might be improper. To avoid all inconveniencies, it
+will be safest to declare generally, that the Supreme Court shall
+possess appellate jurisdiction both as to law and FACT, and that
+this jurisdiction shall be subject to such EXCEPTIONS and
+regulations as the national legislature may prescribe. This will
+enable the government to modify it in such a manner as will best
+answer the ends of public justice and security.
+
+This view of the matter, at any rate, puts it out of all doubt
+that the supposed ABOLITION of the trial by jury, by the operation
+of this provision, is fallacious and untrue. The legislature of the
+United States would certainly have full power to provide, that in
+appeals to the Supreme Court there should be no re-examination of
+facts where they had been tried in the original causes by juries.
+This would certainly be an authorized exception; but if, for the
+reason already intimated, it should be thought too extensive, it
+might be qualified with a limitation to such causes only as are
+determinable at common law in that mode of trial.
+
+The amount of the observations hitherto made on the authority of
+the judicial department is this: that it has been carefully
+restricted to those causes which are manifestly proper for the
+cognizance of the national judicature; that in the partition of
+this authority a very small portion of original jurisdiction has
+been preserved to the Supreme Court, and the rest consigned to the
+subordinate tribunals; that the Supreme Court will possess an
+appellate jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, in all the cases
+referred to them, both subject to any EXCEPTIONS and REGULATIONS
+which may be thought advisable; that this appellate jurisdiction
+does, in no case, ABOLISH the trial by jury; and that an ordinary
+degree of prudence and integrity in the national councils will
+insure us solid advantages from the establishment of the proposed
+judiciary, without exposing us to any of the inconveniences which
+have been predicted from that source.
+
+
+PUBLIUS.
+
+1 Article 3, sec. I.
+
+2 This power has been absurdly represented as intended to
+abolish all the county courts in the several States, which are
+commonly called inferior courts. But the expressions of the
+Constitution are, to constitute "tribunals INFERIOR TO THE SUPREME
+COURT"; and the evident design of the provision is to enable the
+institution of local courts, subordinate to the Supreme, either in
+States or larger districts. It is ridiculous to imagine that county
+courts were in contemplation.
+
+3 This word is composed of JUS and DICTIO, juris dictio or a
+speaking and pronouncing of the law.
+
+4 I hold that the States will have concurrent jurisdiction with
+the subordinate federal judicatories, in many cases of federal
+cognizance, as will be explained in my next paper.
+
+
+
+
+
+FEDERALIST No. 82
+
+
+
+The Judiciary Continued
+
+From McLEAN's Edition, New York.
+
+
+
+HAMILTON
+
+
+
+To the People of the State of New York:
+
+THE erection of a new government, whatever care or wisdom may
+distinguish the work, cannot fail to originate questions of
+intricacy and nicety; and these may, in a particular manner, be
+expected to flow from the establishment of a constitution founded
+upon the total or partial incorporation of a number of distinct
+sovereignties. 'T is time only that can mature and perfect so
+compound a system, can liquidate the meaning of all the parts, and
+can adjust them to each other in a harmonious and consistent WHOLE.
+
+Such questions, accordingly, have arisen upon the plan proposed
+by the convention, and particularly concerning the judiciary
+department. The principal of these respect the situation of the
+State courts in regard to those causes which are to be submitted to
+federal jurisdiction. Is this to be exclusive, or are those courts
+to possess a concurrent jurisdiction? If the latter, in what
+relation will they stand to the national tribunals? These are
+inquiries which we meet with in the mouths of men of sense, and
+which are certainly entitled to attention.
+
+The principles established in a former paper1 teach us that
+the States will retain all PRE-EXISTING authorities which may not be
+exclusively delegated to the federal head; and that this exclusive
+delegation can only exist in one of three cases: where an exclusive
+authority is, in express terms, granted to the Union; or where a
+particular authority is granted to the Union, and the exercise of a
+like authority is prohibited to the States; or where an authority
+is granted to the Union, with which a similar authority in the
+States would be utterly incompatible. Though these principles may
+not apply with the same force to the judiciary as to the legislative
+power, yet I am inclined to think that they are, in the main, just
+with respect to the former, as well as the latter. And under this
+impression, I shall lay it down as a rule, that the State courts
+will RETAIN the jurisdiction they now have, unless it appears to be
+taken away in one of the enumerated modes.
+
+The only thing in the proposed Constitution, which wears the
+appearance of confining the causes of federal cognizance to the
+federal courts, is contained in this passage:  "The JUDICIAL POWER
+of the United States SHALL BE VESTED in one Supreme Court, and in
+SUCH inferior courts as the Congress shall from time to time ordain
+and establish." This might either be construed to signify, that
+the supreme and subordinate courts of the Union should alone have
+the power of deciding those causes to which their authority is to
+extend; or simply to denote, that the organs of the national
+judiciary should be one Supreme Court, and as many subordinate
+courts as Congress should think proper to appoint; or in other
+words, that the United States should exercise the judicial power
+with which they are to be invested, through one supreme tribunal,
+and a certain number of inferior ones, to be instituted by them.
+The first excludes, the last admits, the concurrent jurisdiction of
+the State tribunals; and as the first would amount to an alienation
+of State power by implication, the last appears to me the most
+natural and the most defensible construction.
+
+But this doctrine of concurrent jurisdiction is only clearly
+applicable to those descriptions of causes of which the State courts
+have previous cognizance. It is not equally evident in relation to
+cases which may grow out of, and be PECULIAR to, the Constitution to
+be established; for not to allow the State courts a right of
+jurisdiction in such cases, can hardly be considered as the
+abridgment of a pre-existing authority. I mean not therefore to
+contend that the United States, in the course of legislation upon
+the objects intrusted to their direction, may not commit the
+decision of causes arising upon a particular regulation to the
+federal courts solely, if such a measure should be deemed expedient;
+but I hold that the State courts will be divested of no part of
+their primitive jurisdiction, further than may relate to an appeal;
+and I am even of opinion that in every case in which they were not
+expressly excluded by the future acts of the national legislature,
+they will of course take cognizance of the causes to which those
+acts may give birth. This I infer from the nature of judiciary
+power, and from the general genius of the system. The judiciary
+power of every government looks beyond its own local or municipal
+laws, and in civil cases lays hold of all subjects of litigation
+between parties within its jurisdiction, though the causes of
+dispute are relative to the laws of the most distant part of the
+globe. Those of Japan, not less than of New York, may furnish the
+objects of legal discussion to our courts. When in addition to this
+we consider the State governments and the national governments, as
+they truly are, in the light of kindred systems, and as parts of ONE
+WHOLE, the inference seems to be conclusive, that the State courts
+would have a concurrent jurisdiction in all cases arising under the
+laws of the Union, where it was not expressly prohibited.
+
+Here another question occurs: What relation would subsist
+between the national and State courts in these instances of
+concurrent jurisdiction? I answer, that an appeal would certainly
+lie from the latter, to the Supreme Court of the United States. The
+Constitution in direct terms gives an appellate jurisdiction to the
+Supreme Court in all the enumerated cases of federal cognizance in
+which it is not to have an original one, without a single expression
+to confine its operation to the inferior federal courts. The
+objects of appeal, not the tribunals from which it is to be made,
+are alone contemplated. From this circumstance, and from the reason
+of the thing, it ought to be construed to extend to the State
+tribunals. Either this must be the case, or the local courts must
+be excluded from a concurrent jurisdiction in matters of national
+concern, else the judiciary authority of the Union may be eluded at
+the pleasure of every plaintiff or prosecutor. Neither of these
+consequences ought, without evident necessity, to be involved; the
+latter would be entirely inadmissible, as it would defeat some of
+the most important and avowed purposes of the proposed government,
+and would essentially embarrass its measures. Nor do I perceive any
+foundation for such a supposition. Agreeably to the remark already
+made, the national and State systems are to be regarded as ONE WHOLE.
+The courts of the latter will of course be natural auxiliaries to
+the execution of the laws of the Union, and an appeal from them will
+as naturally lie to that tribunal which is destined to unite and
+assimilate the principles of national justice and the rules of
+national decisions. The evident aim of the plan of the convention
+is, that all the causes of the specified classes shall, for weighty
+public reasons, receive their original or final determination in the
+courts of the Union. To confine, therefore, the general expressions
+giving appellate jurisdiction to the Supreme Court, to appeals from
+the subordinate federal courts, instead of allowing their extension
+to the State courts, would be to abridge the latitude of the terms,
+in subversion of the intent, contrary to every sound rule of
+interpretation.
+
+But could an appeal be made to lie from the State courts to the
+subordinate federal judicatories? This is another of the questions
+which have been raised, and of greater difficulty than the former.
+The following considerations countenance the affirmative. The plan
+of the convention, in the first place, authorizes the national
+legislature "to constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme
+Court."2 It declares, in the next place, that "the JUDICIAL
+POWER of the United States SHALL BE VESTED in one Supreme Court, and
+in such inferior courts as Congress shall ordain and establish";
+and it then proceeds to enumerate the cases to which this judicial
+power shall extend. It afterwards divides the jurisdiction of the
+Supreme Court into original and appellate, but gives no definition
+of that of the subordinate courts. The only outlines described for
+them, are that they shall be "inferior to the Supreme Court," and
+that they shall not exceed the specified limits of the federal
+judiciary. Whether their authority shall be original or appellate,
+or both, is not declared. All this seems to be left to the
+discretion of the legislature. And this being the case, I perceive
+at present no impediment to the establishment of an appeal from the
+State courts to the subordinate national tribunals; and many
+advantages attending the power of doing it may be imagined. It
+would diminish the motives to the multiplication of federal courts,
+and would admit of arrangements calculated to contract the appellate
+jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. The State tribunals may then be
+left with a more entire charge of federal causes; and appeals, in
+most cases in which they may be deemed proper, instead of being
+carried to the Supreme Court, may be made to lie from the State
+courts to district courts of the Union.
+
+
+PUBLIUS.
+
+1 No. 31.
+
+2 Sec. 8th art. 1st.
+
+
+
+
+
+FEDERALIST No. 83
+
+
+
+The Judiciary Continued in Relation to Trial by Jury
+
+From MCLEAN's Edition, New York.
+
+
+
+HAMILTON
+
+
+
+To the People of the State of New York:
+
+THE objection to the plan of the convention, which has met with
+most success in this State, and perhaps in several of the other
+States, is THAT RELATIVE TO THE WANT OF A CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION
+for the trial by jury in civil cases. The disingenuous form in
+which this objection is usually stated has been repeatedly adverted
+to and exposed, but continues to be pursued in all the conversations
+and writings of the opponents of the plan. The mere silence of the
+Constitution in regard to CIVIL CAUSES, is represented as an
+abolition of the trial by jury, and the declamations to which it has
+afforded a pretext are artfully calculated to induce a persuasion
+that this pretended abolition is complete and universal, extending
+not only to every species of civil, but even to CRIMINAL CAUSES. To
+argue with respect to the latter would, however, be as vain and
+fruitless as to attempt the serious proof of the EXISTENCE of
+MATTER, or to demonstrate any of those propositions which, by their
+own internal evidence, force conviction, when expressed in language
+adapted to convey their meaning.
+
+With regard to civil causes, subtleties almost too contemptible
+for refutation have been employed to countenance the surmise that a
+thing which is only NOT PROVIDED FOR, is entirely ABOLISHED. Every
+man of discernment must at once perceive the wide difference between
+SILENCE and ABOLITION. But as the inventors of this fallacy have
+attempted to support it by certain LEGAL MAXIMS of interpretation,
+which they have perverted from their true meaning, it may not be
+wholly useless to explore the ground they have taken.
+
+The maxims on which they rely are of this nature: "A
+specification of particulars is an exclusion of generals"; or,
+"The expression of one thing is the exclusion of another." Hence,
+say they, as the Constitution has established the trial by jury in
+criminal cases, and is silent in respect to civil, this silence is
+an implied prohibition of trial by jury in regard to the latter.
+
+The rules of legal interpretation are rules of COMMONSENSE,
+adopted by the courts in the construction of the laws. The true
+test, therefore, of a just application of them is its conformity to
+the source from which they are derived. This being the case, let me
+ask if it is consistent with common-sense to suppose that a
+provision obliging the legislative power to commit the trial of
+criminal causes to juries, is a privation of its right to authorize
+or permit that mode of trial in other cases? Is it natural to
+suppose, that a command to do one thing is a prohibition to the
+doing of another, which there was a previous power to do, and which
+is not incompatible with the thing commanded to be done? If such a
+supposition would be unnatural and unreasonable, it cannot be
+rational to maintain that an injunction of the trial by jury in
+certain cases is an interdiction of it in others.
+
+A power to constitute courts is a power to prescribe the mode of
+trial; and consequently, if nothing was said in the Constitution on
+the subject of juries, the legislature would be at liberty either to
+adopt that institution or to let it alone. This discretion, in
+regard to criminal causes, is abridged by the express injunction of
+trial by jury in all such cases; but it is, of course, left at
+large in relation to civil causes, there being a total silence on
+this head. The specification of an obligation to try all criminal
+causes in a particular mode, excludes indeed the obligation or
+necessity of employing the same mode in civil causes, but does not
+abridge THE POWER of the legislature to exercise that mode if it
+should be thought proper. The pretense, therefore, that the
+national legislature would not be at full liberty to submit all the
+civil causes of federal cognizance to the determination of juries,
+is a pretense destitute of all just foundation.
+
+From these observations this conclusion results: that the trial
+by jury in civil cases would not be abolished; and that the use
+attempted to be made of the maxims which have been quoted, is
+contrary to reason and common-sense, and therefore not admissible.
+Even if these maxims had a precise technical sense, corresponding
+with the idea of those who employ them upon the present occasion,
+which, however, is not the case, they would still be inapplicable to
+a constitution of government. In relation to such a subject, the
+natural and obvious sense of its provisions, apart from any
+technical rules, is the true criterion of construction.
+
+Having now seen that the maxims relied upon will not bear the
+use made of them, let us endeavor to ascertain their proper use and
+true meaning. This will be best done by examples. The plan of the
+convention declares that the power of Congress, or, in other words,
+of the NATIONAL LEGISLATURE, shall extend to certain enumerated
+cases. This specification of particulars evidently excludes all
+pretension to a general legislative authority, because an
+affirmative grant of special powers would be absurd, as well as
+useless, if a general authority was intended.
+
+In like manner the judicial authority of the federal judicatures
+is declared by the Constitution to comprehend certain cases
+particularly specified. The expression of those cases marks the
+precise limits, beyond which the federal courts cannot extend their
+jurisdiction, because the objects of their cognizance being
+enumerated, the specification would be nugatory if it did not
+exclude all ideas of more extensive authority.
+
+These examples are sufficient to elucidate the maxims which have
+been mentioned, and to designate the manner in which they should be
+used. But that there may be no misapprehensions upon this subject,
+I shall add one case more, to demonstrate the proper use of these
+maxims, and the abuse which has been made of them.
+
+Let us suppose that by the laws of this State a married woman
+was incapable of conveying her estate, and that the legislature,
+considering this as an evil, should enact that she might dispose of
+her property by deed executed in the presence of a magistrate. In
+such a case there can be no doubt but the specification would amount
+to an exclusion of any other mode of conveyance, because the woman
+having no previous power to alienate her property, the specification
+determines the particular mode which she is, for that purpose, to
+avail herself of. But let us further suppose that in a subsequent
+part of the same act it should be declared that no woman should
+dispose of any estate of a determinate value without the consent of
+three of her nearest relations, signified by their signing the deed;
+could it be inferred from this regulation that a married woman
+might not procure the approbation of her relations to a deed for
+conveying property of inferior value? The position is too absurd to
+merit a refutation, and yet this is precisely the position which
+those must establish who contend that the trial by juries in civil
+cases is abolished, because it is expressly provided for in cases of
+a criminal nature.
+
+From these observations it must appear unquestionably true, that
+trial by jury is in no case abolished by the proposed Constitution,
+and it is equally true, that in those controversies between
+individuals in which the great body of the people are likely to be
+interested, that institution will remain precisely in the same
+situation in which it is placed by the State constitutions, and will
+be in no degree altered or influenced by the adoption of the plan
+under consideration. The foundation of this assertion is, that the
+national judiciary will have no cognizance of them, and of course
+they will remain determinable as heretofore by the State courts
+only, and in the manner which the State constitutions and laws
+prescribe. All land causes, except where claims under the grants of
+different States come into question, and all other controversies
+between the citizens of the same State, unless where they depend
+upon positive violations of the articles of union, by acts of the
+State legislatures, will belong exclusively to the jurisdiction of
+the State tribunals. Add to this, that admiralty causes, and almost
+all those which are of equity jurisdiction, are determinable under
+our own government without the intervention of a jury, and the
+inference from the whole will be, that this institution, as it
+exists with us at present, cannot possibly be affected to any great
+extent by the proposed alteration in our system of government.
+
+The friends and adversaries of the plan of the convention, if
+they agree in nothing else, concur at least in the value they set
+upon the trial by jury; or if there is any difference between them
+it consists in this: the former regard it as a valuable safeguard
+to liberty; the latter represent it as the very palladium of free
+government. For my own part, the more the operation of the
+institution has fallen under my observation, the more reason I have
+discovered for holding it in high estimation; and it would be
+altogether superfluous to examine to what extent it deserves to be
+esteemed useful or essential in a representative republic, or how
+much more merit it may be entitled to, as a defense against the
+oppressions of an hereditary monarch, than as a barrier to the
+tyranny of popular magistrates in a popular government. Discussions
+of this kind would be more curious than beneficial, as all are
+satisfied of the utility of the institution, and of its friendly
+aspect to liberty. But I must acknowledge that I cannot readily
+discern the inseparable connection between the existence of liberty,
+and the trial by jury in civil cases. Arbitrary impeachments,
+arbitrary methods of prosecuting pretended offenses, and arbitrary
+punishments upon arbitrary convictions, have ever appeared to me to
+be the great engines of judicial despotism; and these have all
+relation to criminal proceedings. The trial by jury in criminal
+cases, aided by the habeas-corpus act, seems therefore to be
+alone concerned in the question. And both of these are provided
+for, in the most ample manner, in the plan of the convention.
+
+It has been observed, that trial by jury is a safeguard against
+an oppressive exercise of the power of taxation. This observation
+deserves to be canvassed.
+
+It is evident that it can have no influence upon the
+legislature, in regard to the AMOUNT of taxes to be laid, to the
+OBJECTS upon which they are to be imposed, or to the RULE by which
+they are to be apportioned. If it can have any influence,
+therefore, it must be upon the mode of collection, and the conduct
+of the officers intrusted with the execution of the revenue laws.
+
+As to the mode of collection in this State, under our own
+Constitution, the trial by jury is in most cases out of use. The
+taxes are usually levied by the more summary proceeding of distress
+and sale, as in cases of rent. And it is acknowledged on all hands,
+that this is essential to the efficacy of the revenue laws. The
+dilatory course of a trial at law to recover the taxes imposed on
+individuals, would neither suit the exigencies of the public nor
+promote the convenience of the citizens. It would often occasion an
+accumulation of costs, more burdensome than the original sum of the
+tax to be levied.
+
+And as to the conduct of the officers of the revenue, the
+provision in favor of trial by jury in criminal cases, will afford
+the security aimed at. Wilful abuses of a public authority, to the
+oppression of the subject, and every species of official extortion,
+are offenses against the government, for which the persons who
+commit them may be indicted and punished according to the
+circumstances of the case.
+
+The excellence of the trial by jury in civil cases appears to
+depend on circumstances foreign to the preservation of liberty. The
+strongest argument in its favor is, that it is a security against
+corruption. As there is always more time and better opportunity to
+tamper with a standing body of magistrates than with a jury summoned
+for the occasion, there is room to suppose that a corrupt influence
+would more easily find its way to the former than to the latter.
+The force of this consideration is, however, diminished by others.
+The sheriff, who is the summoner of ordinary juries, and the clerks
+of courts, who have the nomination of special juries, are themselves
+standing officers, and, acting individually, may be supposed more
+accessible to the touch of corruption than the judges, who are a
+collective body. It is not difficult to see, that it would be in
+the power of those officers to select jurors who would serve the
+purpose of the party as well as a corrupted bench. In the next
+place, it may fairly be supposed, that there would be less
+difficulty in gaining some of the jurors promiscuously taken from
+the public mass, than in gaining men who had been chosen by the
+government for their probity and good character. But making every
+deduction for these considerations, the trial by jury must still be
+a valuable check upon corruption. It greatly multiplies the
+impediments to its success. As matters now stand, it would be
+necessary to corrupt both court and jury; for where the jury have
+gone evidently wrong, the court will generally grant a new trial,
+and it would be in most cases of little use to practice upon the
+jury, unless the court could be likewise gained. Here then is a
+double security; and it will readily be perceived that this
+complicated agency tends to preserve the purity of both institutions.
+By increasing the obstacles to success, it discourages attempts to
+seduce the integrity of either. The temptations to prostitution
+which the judges might have to surmount, must certainly be much
+fewer, while the co-operation of a jury is necessary, than they
+might be, if they had themselves the exclusive determination of all
+causes.
+
+Notwithstanding, therefore, the doubts I have expressed, as to
+the essentiality of trial by jury in civil cases to liberty, I admit
+that it is in most cases, under proper regulations, an excellent
+method of determining questions of property; and that on this
+account alone it would be entitled to a constitutional provision in
+its favor if it were possible to fix the limits within which it
+ought to be comprehended. There is, however, in all cases, great
+difficulty in this; and men not blinded by enthusiasm must be
+sensible that in a federal government, which is a composition of
+societies whose ideas and institutions in relation to the matter
+materially vary from each other, that difficulty must be not a
+little augmented. For my own part, at every new view I take of the
+subject, I become more convinced of the reality of the obstacles
+which, we are authoritatively informed, prevented the insertion of a
+provision on this head in the plan of the convention.
+
+The great difference between the limits of the jury trial in
+different States is not generally understood; and as it must have
+considerable influence on the sentence we ought to pass upon the
+omission complained of in regard to this point, an explanation of it
+is necessary. In this State, our judicial establishments resemble,
+more nearly than in any other, those of Great Britain. We have
+courts of common law, courts of probates (analogous in certain
+matters to the spiritual courts in England), a court of admiralty
+and a court of chancery. In the courts of common law only, the
+trial by jury prevails, and this with some exceptions. In all the
+others a single judge presides, and proceeds in general either
+according to the course of the canon or civil law, without the aid
+of a jury.1 In New Jersey, there is a court of chancery which
+proceeds like ours, but neither courts of admiralty nor of probates,
+in the sense in which these last are established with us. In that
+State the courts of common law have the cognizance of those causes
+which with us are determinable in the courts of admiralty and of
+probates, and of course the jury trial is more extensive in New
+Jersey than in New York. In Pennsylvania, this is perhaps still
+more the case, for there is no court of chancery in that State, and
+its common-law courts have equity jurisdiction. It has a court of
+admiralty, but none of probates, at least on the plan of ours.
+Delaware has in these respects imitated Pennsylvania. Maryland
+approaches more nearly to New York, as does also Virginia, except
+that the latter has a plurality of chancellors. North Carolina
+bears most affinity to Pennsylvania; South Carolina to Virginia. I
+believe, however, that in some of those States which have distinct
+courts of admiralty, the causes depending in them are triable by
+juries. In Georgia there are none but common-law courts, and an
+appeal of course lies from the verdict of one jury to another, which
+is called a special jury, and for which a particular mode of
+appointment is marked out. In Connecticut, they have no distinct
+courts either of chancery or of admiralty, and their courts of
+probates have no jurisdiction of causes. Their common-law courts
+have admiralty and, to a certain extent, equity jurisdiction. In
+cases of importance, their General Assembly is the only court of
+chancery. In Connecticut, therefore, the trial by jury extends in
+PRACTICE further than in any other State yet mentioned. Rhode
+Island is, I believe, in this particular, pretty much in the
+situation of Connecticut. Massachusetts and New Hampshire, in
+regard to the blending of law, equity, and admiralty jurisdictions,
+are in a similar predicament. In the four Eastern States, the trial
+by jury not only stands upon a broader foundation than in the other
+States, but it is attended with a peculiarity unknown, in its full
+extent, to any of them. There is an appeal OF COURSE from one jury
+to another, till there have been two verdicts out of three on one
+side.
+
+From this sketch it appears that there is a material diversity,
+as well in the modification as in the extent of the institution of
+trial by jury in civil cases, in the several States; and from this
+fact these obvious reflections flow: first, that no general rule
+could have been fixed upon by the convention which would have
+corresponded with the circumstances of all the States; and
+secondly, that more or at least as much might have been hazarded by
+taking the system of any one State for a standard, as by omitting a
+provision altogether and leaving the matter, as has been done, to
+legislative regulation.
+
+The propositions which have been made for supplying the omission
+have rather served to illustrate than to obviate the difficulty of
+the thing. The minority of Pennsylvania have proposed this mode of
+expression for the purpose "Trial by jury shall be as
+heretofore" and this I maintain would be senseless and nugatory.
+The United States, in their united or collective capacity, are the
+OBJECT to which all general provisions in the Constitution must
+necessarily be construed to refer. Now it is evident that though
+trial by jury, with various limitations, is known in each State
+individually, yet in the United States, AS SUCH, it is at this time
+altogether unknown, because the present federal government has no
+judiciary power whatever; and consequently there is no proper
+antecedent or previous establishment to which the term HERETOFORE
+could relate. It would therefore be destitute of a precise meaning,
+and inoperative from its uncertainty.
+
+As, on the one hand, the form of the provision would not fulfil
+the intent of its proposers, so, on the other, if I apprehend that
+intent rightly, it would be in itself inexpedient. I presume it to
+be, that causes in the federal courts should be tried by jury, if,
+in the State where the courts sat, that mode of trial would obtain
+in a similar case in the State courts; that is to say, admiralty
+causes should be tried in Connecticut by a jury, in New York without
+one. The capricious operation of so dissimilar a method of trial in
+the same cases, under the same government, is of itself sufficient
+to indispose every wellregulated judgment towards it. Whether the
+cause should be tried with or without a jury, would depend, in a
+great number of cases, on the accidental situation of the court and
+parties.
+
+But this is not, in my estimation, the greatest objection. I
+feel a deep and deliberate conviction that there are many cases in
+which the trial by jury is an ineligible one. I think it so
+particularly in cases which concern the public peace with foreign
+nations that is, in most cases where the question turns wholly on
+the laws of nations. Of this nature, among others, are all prize
+causes. Juries cannot be supposed competent to investigations that
+require a thorough knowledge of the laws and usages of nations; and
+they will sometimes be under the influence of impressions which will
+not suffer them to pay sufficient regard to those considerations of
+public policy which ought to guide their inquiries. There would of
+course be always danger that the rights of other nations might be
+infringed by their decisions, so as to afford occasions of reprisal
+and war. Though the proper province of juries be to determine
+matters of fact, yet in most cases legal consequences are
+complicated with fact in such a manner as to render a separation
+impracticable.
+
+It will add great weight to this remark, in relation to prize
+causes, to mention that the method of determining them has been
+thought worthy of particular regulation in various treaties between
+different powers of Europe, and that, pursuant to such treaties,
+they are determinable in Great Britain, in the last resort, before
+the king himself, in his privy council, where the fact, as well as
+the law, undergoes a re-examination. This alone demonstrates the
+impolicy of inserting a fundamental provision in the Constitution
+which would make the State systems a standard for the national
+government in the article under consideration, and the danger of
+encumbering the government with any constitutional provisions the
+propriety of which is not indisputable.
+
+My convictions are equally strong that great advantages result
+from the separation of the equity from the law jurisdiction, and
+that the causes which belong to the former would be improperly
+committed to juries. The great and primary use of a court of equity
+is to give relief IN EXTRAORDINARY CASES, which are EXCEPTIONS2
+to general rules. To unite the jurisdiction of such cases with the
+ordinary jurisdiction, must have a tendency to unsettle the general
+rules, and to subject every case that arises to a SPECIAL
+determination; while a separation of the one from the other has the
+contrary effect of rendering one a sentinel over the other, and of
+keeping each within the expedient limits. Besides this, the
+circumstances that constitute cases proper for courts of equity are
+in many instances so nice and intricate, that they are incompatible
+with the genius of trials by jury. They require often such long,
+deliberate, and critical investigation as would be impracticable to
+men called from their occupations, and obliged to decide before they
+were permitted to return to them. The simplicity and expedition
+which form the distinguishing characters of this mode of trial
+require that the matter to be decided should be reduced to some
+single and obvious point; while the litigations usual in chancery
+frequently comprehend a long train of minute and independent
+particulars.
+
+It is true that the separation of the equity from the legal
+jurisdiction is peculiar to the English system of jurisprudence:
+which is the model that has been followed in several of the States.
+But it is equally true that the trial by jury has been unknown in
+every case in which they have been united. And the separation is
+essential to the preservation of that institution in its pristine
+purity. The nature of a court of equity will readily permit the
+extension of its jurisdiction to matters of law; but it is not a
+little to be suspected, that the attempt to extend the jurisdiction
+of the courts of law to matters of equity will not only be
+unproductive of the advantages which may be derived from courts of
+chancery, on the plan upon which they are established in this State,
+but will tend gradually to change the nature of the courts of law,
+and to undermine the trial by jury, by introducing questions too
+complicated for a decision in that mode.
+
+These appeared to be conclusive reasons against incorporating
+the systems of all the States, in the formation of the national
+judiciary, according to what may be conjectured to have been the
+attempt of the Pennsylvania minority. Let us now examine how far
+the proposition of Massachusetts is calculated to remedy the
+supposed defect.
+
+It is in this form: "In civil actions between citizens of
+different States, every issue of fact, arising in ACTIONS AT COMMON
+LAW, may be tried by a jury if the parties, or either of them
+request it."
+
+This, at best, is a proposition confined to one description of
+causes; and the inference is fair, either that the Massachusetts
+convention considered that as the only class of federal causes, in
+which the trial by jury would be proper; or that if desirous of a
+more extensive provision, they found it impracticable to devise one
+which would properly answer the end. If the first, the omission of
+a regulation respecting so partial an object can never be considered
+as a material imperfection in the system. If the last, it affords a
+strong corroboration of the extreme difficulty of the thing.
+
+But this is not all: if we advert to the observations already
+made respecting the courts that subsist in the several States of the
+Union, and the different powers exercised by them, it will appear
+that there are no expressions more vague and indeterminate than
+those which have been employed to characterize THAT species of
+causes which it is intended shall be entitled to a trial by jury.
+In this State, the boundaries between actions at common law and
+actions of equitable jurisdiction, are ascertained in conformity to
+the rules which prevail in England upon that subject. In many of
+the other States the boundaries are less precise. In some of them
+every cause is to be tried in a court of common law, and upon that
+foundation every action may be considered as an action at common
+law, to be determined by a jury, if the parties, or either of them,
+choose it. Hence the same irregularity and confusion would be
+introduced by a compliance with this proposition, that I have
+already noticed as resulting from the regulation proposed by the
+Pennsylvania minority. In one State a cause would receive its
+determination from a jury, if the parties, or either of them,
+requested it; but in another State, a cause exactly similar to the
+other, must be decided without the intervention of a jury, because
+the State judicatories varied as to common-law jurisdiction.
+
+It is obvious, therefore, that the Massachusetts proposition,
+upon this subject cannot operate as a general regulation, until some
+uniform plan, with respect to the limits of common-law and equitable
+jurisdictions, shall be adopted by the different States. To devise
+a plan of that kind is a task arduous in itself, and which it would
+require much time and reflection to mature. It would be extremely
+difficult, if not impossible, to suggest any general regulation that
+would be acceptable to all the States in the Union, or that would
+perfectly quadrate with the several State institutions.
+
+It may be asked, Why could not a reference have been made to the
+constitution of this State, taking that, which is allowed by me to
+be a good one, as a standard for the United States? I answer that
+it is not very probable the other States would entertain the same
+opinion of our institutions as we do ourselves. It is natural to
+suppose that they are hitherto more attached to their own, and that
+each would struggle for the preference. If the plan of taking one
+State as a model for the whole had been thought of in the
+convention, it is to be presumed that the adoption of it in that
+body would have been rendered difficult by the predilection of each
+representation in favor of its own government; and it must be
+uncertain which of the States would have been taken as the model.
+It has been shown that many of them would be improper ones. And I
+leave it to conjecture, whether, under all circumstances, it is most
+likely that New York, or some other State, would have been preferred.
+But admit that a judicious selection could have been effected in
+the convention, still there would have been great danger of jealousy
+and disgust in the other States, at the partiality which had been
+shown to the institutions of one. The enemies of the plan would
+have been furnished with a fine pretext for raising a host of local
+prejudices against it, which perhaps might have hazarded, in no
+inconsiderable degree, its final establishment.
+
+To avoid the embarrassments of a definition of the cases which
+the trial by jury ought to embrace, it is sometimes suggested by men
+of enthusiastic tempers, that a provision might have been inserted
+for establishing it in all cases whatsoever. For this I believe, no
+precedent is to be found in any member of the Union; and the
+considerations which have been stated in discussing the proposition
+of the minority of Pennsylvania, must satisfy every sober mind that
+the establishment of the trial by jury in ALL cases would have been
+an unpardonable error in the plan.
+
+In short, the more it is considered the more arduous will appear
+the task of fashioning a provision in such a form as not to express
+too little to answer the purpose, or too much to be advisable; or
+which might not have opened other sources of opposition to the great
+and essential object of introducing a firm national government.
+
+I cannot but persuade myself, on the other hand, that the
+different lights in which the subject has been placed in the course
+of these observations, will go far towards removing in candid minds
+the apprehensions they may have entertained on the point. They have
+tended to show that the security of liberty is materially concerned
+only in the trial by jury in criminal cases, which is provided for
+in the most ample manner in the plan of the convention; that even
+in far the greatest proportion of civil cases, and those in which
+the great body of the community is interested, that mode of trial
+will remain in its full force, as established in the State
+constitutions, untouched and unaffected by the plan of the
+convention; that it is in no case abolished3 by that plan; and
+that there are great if not insurmountable difficulties in the way
+of making any precise and proper provision for it in a Constitution
+for the United States.
+
+The best judges of the matter will be the least anxious for a
+constitutional establishment of the trial by jury in civil cases,
+and will be the most ready to admit that the changes which are
+continually happening in the affairs of society may render a
+different mode of determining questions of property preferable in
+many cases in which that mode of trial now prevails. For my part, I
+acknowledge myself to be convinced that even in this State it might
+be advantageously extended to some cases to which it does not at
+present apply, and might as advantageously be abridged in others.
+It is conceded by all reasonable men that it ought not to obtain in
+all cases. The examples of innovations which contract its ancient
+limits, as well in these States as in Great Britain, afford a strong
+presumption that its former extent has been found inconvenient, and
+give room to suppose that future experience may discover the
+propriety and utility of other exceptions. I suspect it to be
+impossible in the nature of the thing to fix the salutary point at
+which the operation of the institution ought to stop, and this is
+with me a strong argument for leaving the matter to the discretion
+of the legislature.
+
+This is now clearly understood to be the case in Great Britain,
+and it is equally so in the State of Connecticut; and yet it may be
+safely affirmed that more numerous encroachments have been made upon
+the trial by jury in this State since the Revolution, though
+provided for by a positive article of our constitution, than has
+happened in the same time either in Connecticut or Great Britain.
+It may be added that these encroachments have generally originated
+with the men who endeavor to persuade the people they are the
+warmest defenders of popular liberty, but who have rarely suffered
+constitutional obstacles to arrest them in a favorite career. The
+truth is that the general GENIUS of a government is all that can be
+substantially relied upon for permanent effects. Particular
+provisions, though not altogether useless, have far less virtue and
+efficacy than are commonly ascribed to them; and the want of them
+will never be, with men of sound discernment, a decisive objection
+to any plan which exhibits the leading characters of a good
+government.
+
+It certainly sounds not a little harsh and extraordinary to
+affirm that there is no security for liberty in a Constitution which
+expressly establishes the trial by jury in criminal cases, because
+it does not do it in civil also; while it is a notorious fact that
+Connecticut, which has been always regarded as the most popular
+State in the Union, can boast of no constitutional provision for
+either.
+
+
+PUBLIUS.
+
+1 It has been erroneously insinuated, with regard to the court
+of chancery, that this court generally tries disputed facts by a
+jury. The truth is, that references to a jury in that court rarely
+happen, and are in no case necessary but where the validity of a
+devise of land comes into question.
+
+2 It is true that the principles by which that relief is
+governed are now reduced to a regular system; but it is not the
+less true that they are in the main applicable to SPECIAL
+circumstances, which form exceptions to general rules.
+
+3 Vide No. 81, in which the supposition of its being
+abolished by the appellate jurisdiction in matters of fact being
+vested in the Supreme Court, is examined and refuted.
+
+
+
+
+
+FEDERALIST No. 84
+
+
+
+Certain General and Miscellaneous Objections to the Constitution
+Considered and Answered
+
+From McLEAN's Edition, New York.
+
+
+
+HAMILTON
+
+
+
+To the People of the State of New York:
+
+IN THE course of the foregoing review of the Constitution, I
+have taken notice of, and endeavored to answer most of the
+objections which have appeared against it. There, however, remain a
+few which either did not fall naturally under any particular head or
+were forgotten in their proper places. These shall now be
+discussed; but as the subject has been drawn into great length, I
+shall so far consult brevity as to comprise all my observations on
+these miscellaneous points in a single paper.
+
+The most considerable of the remaining objections is that the
+plan of the convention contains no bill of rights. Among other
+answers given to this, it has been upon different occasions remarked
+that the constitutions of several of the States are in a similar
+predicament. I add that New York is of the number. And yet the
+opposers of the new system, in this State, who profess an unlimited
+admiration for its constitution, are among the most intemperate
+partisans of a bill of rights. To justify their zeal in this
+matter, they allege two things: one is that, though the
+constitution of New York has no bill of rights prefixed to it, yet
+it contains, in the body of it, various provisions in favor of
+particular privileges and rights, which, in substance amount to the
+same thing; the other is, that the Constitution adopts, in their
+full extent, the common and statute law of Great Britain, by which
+many other rights, not expressed in it, are equally secured.
+
+To the first I answer, that the Constitution proposed by the
+convention contains, as well as the constitution of this State, a
+number of such provisions.
+
+Independent of those which relate to the structure of the
+government, we find the following: Article 1, section 3, clause 7
+"Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend further than to
+removal from office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any
+office of honor, trust, or profit under the United States; but the
+party convicted shall, nevertheless, be liable and subject to
+indictment, trial, judgment, and punishment according to law."
+Section 9, of the same article, clause 2 "The privilege of the
+writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in
+cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it."
+Clause 3 "No bill of attainder or ex-post-facto law shall be
+passed." Clause 7 "No title of nobility shall be granted by the
+United States; and no person holding any office of profit or trust
+under them, shall, without the consent of the Congress, accept of
+any present, emolument, office, or title of any kind whatever, from
+any king, prince, or foreign state." Article 3, section 2, clause
+3 "The trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall
+be by jury; and such trial shall be held in the State where the
+said crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed
+within any State, the trial shall be at such place or places as the
+Congress may by law have directed." Section 3, of the same
+article "Treason against the United States shall consist only in
+levying war against them, or in adhering to their enemies, giving
+them aid and comfort. No person shall be convicted of treason,
+unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act, or
+on confession in open court." And clause 3, of the same
+section "The Congress shall have power to declare the punishment of
+treason; but no attainder of treason shall work corruption of
+blood, or forfeiture, except during the life of the person attainted."
+It may well be a question, whether these are not, upon the
+whole, of equal importance with any which are to be found in the
+constitution of this State. The establishment of the writ of
+habeas corpus, the prohibition of ex-post-facto laws, and of
+TITLES OF NOBILITY, TO WHICH WE HAVE NO CORRESPONDING PROVISION IN
+OUR CONSTITUTION, are perhaps greater securities to liberty and
+republicanism than any it contains. The creation of crimes after
+the commission of the fact, or, in other words, the subjecting of
+men to punishment for things which, when they were done, were
+breaches of no law, and the practice of arbitrary imprisonments,
+have been, in all ages, the favorite and most formidable instruments
+of tyranny. The observations of the judicious Blackstone,1 in
+reference to the latter, are well worthy of recital: "To bereave a
+man of life, Usays he,e or by violence to confiscate his estate,
+without accusation or trial, would be so gross and notorious an act
+of despotism, as must at once convey the alarm of tyranny throughout
+the whole nation; but confinement of the person, by secretly
+hurrying him to jail, where his sufferings are unknown or forgotten,
+is a less public, a less striking, and therefore A MORE DANGEROUS
+ENGINE of arbitrary government." And as a remedy for this fatal
+evil he is everywhere peculiarly emphatical in his encomiums on the
+habeas-corpus act, which in one place he calls "the BULWARK of
+the British Constitution."2
+
+Nothing need be said to illustrate the importance of the
+prohibition of titles of nobility. This may truly be denominated
+the corner-stone of republican government; for so long as they are
+excluded, there can never be serious danger that the government will
+be any other than that of the people.
+
+To the second that is, to the pretended establishment of the
+common and state law by the Constitution, I answer, that they are
+expressly made subject "to such alterations and provisions as the
+legislature shall from time to time make concerning the same."
+They are therefore at any moment liable to repeal by the ordinary
+legislative power, and of course have no constitutional sanction.
+The only use of the declaration was to recognize the ancient law
+and to remove doubts which might have been occasioned by the
+Revolution. This consequently can be considered as no part of a
+declaration of rights, which under our constitutions must be
+intended as limitations of the power of the government itself.
+
+It has been several times truly remarked that bills of rights
+are, in their origin, stipulations between kings and their subjects,
+abridgements of prerogative in favor of privilege, reservations of
+rights not surrendered to the prince. Such was MAGNA CHARTA,
+obtained by the barons, sword in hand, from King John. Such were
+the subsequent confirmations of that charter by succeeding princes.
+Such was the PETITION OF RIGHT assented to by Charles I., in the
+beginning of his reign. Such, also, was the Declaration of Right
+presented by the Lords and Commons to the Prince of Orange in 1688,
+and afterwards thrown into the form of an act of parliament called
+the Bill of Rights. It is evident, therefore, that, according to
+their primitive signification, they have no application to
+constitutions professedly founded upon the power of the people, and
+executed by their immediate representatives and servants. Here, in
+strictness, the people surrender nothing; and as they retain every
+thing they have no need of particular reservations. "WE, THE
+PEOPLE of the United States, to secure the blessings of liberty to
+ourselves and our posterity, do ORDAIN and ESTABLISH this
+Constitution for the United States of America." Here is a better
+recognition of popular rights, than volumes of those aphorisms which
+make the principal figure in several of our State bills of rights,
+and which would sound much better in a treatise of ethics than in a
+constitution of government.
+
+But a minute detail of particular rights is certainly far less
+applicable to a Constitution like that under consideration, which is
+merely intended to regulate the general political interests of the
+nation, than to a constitution which has the regulation of every
+species of personal and private concerns. If, therefore, the loud
+clamors against the plan of the convention, on this score, are well
+founded, no epithets of reprobation will be too strong for the
+constitution of this State. But the truth is, that both of them
+contain all which, in relation to their objects, is reasonably to be
+desired.
+
+I go further, and affirm that bills of rights, in the sense and
+to the extent in which they are contended for, are not only
+unnecessary in the proposed Constitution, but would even be
+dangerous. They would contain various exceptions to powers not
+granted; and, on this very account, would afford a colorable
+pretext to claim more than were granted. For why declare that
+things shall not be done which there is no power to do? Why, for
+instance, should it be said that the liberty of the press shall not
+be restrained, when no power is given by which restrictions may be
+imposed? I will not contend that such a provision would confer a
+regulating power; but it is evident that it would furnish, to men
+disposed to usurp, a plausible pretense for claiming that power.
+They might urge with a semblance of reason, that the Constitution
+ought not to be charged with the absurdity of providing against the
+abuse of an authority which was not given, and that the provision
+against restraining the liberty of the press afforded a clear
+implication, that a power to prescribe proper regulations concerning
+it was intended to be vested in the national government. This may
+serve as a specimen of the numerous handles which would be given to
+the doctrine of constructive powers, by the indulgence of an
+injudicious zeal for bills of rights.
+
+On the subject of the liberty of the press, as much as has been
+said, I cannot forbear adding a remark or two: in the first place,
+I observe, that there is not a syllable concerning it in the
+constitution of this State; in the next, I contend, that whatever
+has been said about it in that of any other State, amounts to
+nothing. What signifies a declaration, that "the liberty of the
+press shall be inviolably preserved"? What is the liberty of the
+press? Who can give it any definition which would not leave the
+utmost latitude for evasion? I hold it to be impracticable; and
+from this I infer, that its security, whatever fine declarations may
+be inserted in any constitution respecting it, must altogether
+depend on public opinion, and on the general spirit of the people
+and of the government.3 And here, after all, as is intimated
+upon another occasion, must we seek for the only solid basis of all
+our rights.
+
+There remains but one other view of this matter to conclude the
+point. The truth is, after all the declamations we have heard, that
+the Constitution is itself, in every rational sense, and to every
+useful purpose, A BILL OF RIGHTS. The several bills of rights in
+Great Britain form its Constitution, and conversely the constitution
+of each State is its bill of rights. And the proposed Constitution,
+if adopted, will be the bill of rights of the Union. Is it one
+object of a bill of rights to declare and specify the political
+privileges of the citizens in the structure and administration of
+the government? This is done in the most ample and precise manner
+in the plan of the convention; comprehending various precautions
+for the public security, which are not to be found in any of the
+State constitutions. Is another object of a bill of rights to
+define certain immunities and modes of proceeding, which are
+relative to personal and private concerns? This we have seen has
+also been attended to, in a variety of cases, in the same plan.
+Adverting therefore to the substantial meaning of a bill of rights,
+it is absurd to allege that it is not to be found in the work of the
+convention. It may be said that it does not go far enough, though
+it will not be easy to make this appear; but it can with no
+propriety be contended that there is no such thing. It certainly
+must be immaterial what mode is observed as to the order of
+declaring the rights of the citizens, if they are to be found in any
+part of the instrument which establishes the government. And hence
+it must be apparent, that much of what has been said on this subject
+rests merely on verbal and nominal distinctions, entirely foreign
+from the substance of the thing.
+
+Another objection which has been made, and which, from the
+frequency of its repetition, it is to be presumed is relied on, is
+of this nature: "It is improper," say the objectors, "to confer such
+large powers, as are proposed, upon the national government, because
+the seat of that government must of necessity be too remote from
+many of the States to admit of a proper knowledge on the part of the
+constituent, of the conduct of the representative body." This
+argument, if it proves any thing, proves that there ought to be no
+general government whatever. For the powers which, it seems to be
+agreed on all hands, ought to be vested in the Union, cannot be
+safely intrusted to a body which is not under every requisite
+control. But there are satisfactory reasons to show that the
+objection is in reality not well founded. There is in most of the
+arguments which relate to distance a palpable illusion of the
+imagination. What are the sources of information by which the
+people in Montgomery County must regulate their judgment of the
+conduct of their representatives in the State legislature? Of
+personal observation they can have no benefit. This is confined to
+the citizens on the spot. They must therefore depend on the
+information of intelligent men, in whom they confide; and how must
+these men obtain their information? Evidently from the complexion
+of public measures, from the public prints, from correspondences
+with their representatives, and with other persons who reside at the
+place of their deliberations. This does not apply to Montgomery
+County only, but to all the counties at any considerable distance
+from the seat of government.
+
+It is equally evident that the same sources of information would
+be open to the people in relation to the conduct of their
+representatives in the general government, and the impediments to a
+prompt communication which distance may be supposed to create, will
+be overbalanced by the effects of the vigilance of the State
+governments. The executive and legislative bodies of each State
+will be so many sentinels over the persons employed in every
+department of the national administration; and as it will be in
+their power to adopt and pursue a regular and effectual system of
+intelligence, they can never be at a loss to know the behavior of
+those who represent their constituents in the national councils, and
+can readily communicate the same knowledge to the people. Their
+disposition to apprise the community of whatever may prejudice its
+interests from another quarter, may be relied upon, if it were only
+from the rivalship of power. And we may conclude with the fullest
+assurance that the people, through that channel, will be better
+informed of the conduct of their national representatives, than they
+can be by any means they now possess of that of their State
+representatives.
+
+It ought also to be remembered that the citizens who inhabit the
+country at and near the seat of government will, in all questions
+that affect the general liberty and prosperity, have the same
+interest with those who are at a distance, and that they will stand
+ready to sound the alarm when necessary, and to point out the actors
+in any pernicious project. The public papers will be expeditious
+messengers of intelligence to the most remote inhabitants of the
+Union.
+
+Among the many curious objections which have appeared against
+the proposed Constitution, the most extraordinary and the least
+colorable is derived from the want of some provision respecting the
+debts due TO the United States. This has been represented as a
+tacit relinquishment of those debts, and as a wicked contrivance to
+screen public defaulters. The newspapers have teemed with the most
+inflammatory railings on this head; yet there is nothing clearer
+than that the suggestion is entirely void of foundation, the
+offspring of extreme ignorance or extreme dishonesty. In addition
+to the remarks I have made upon the subject in another place, I
+shall only observe that as it is a plain dictate of common-sense, so
+it is also an established doctrine of political law, that "STATES
+NEITHER LOSE ANY OF THEIR RIGHTS, NOR ARE DISCHARGED FROM ANY OF
+THEIR OBLIGATIONS, BY A CHANGE IN THE FORM OF THEIR CIVIL GOVERNMENT."4
+The last objection of any consequence, which I at present
+recollect, turns upon the article of expense. If it were even true,
+that the adoption of the proposed government would occasion a
+considerable increase of expense, it would be an objection that
+ought to have no weight against the plan.
+
+The great bulk of the citizens of America are with reason
+convinced, that Union is the basis of their political happiness.
+Men of sense of all parties now, with few exceptions, agree that it
+cannot be preserved under the present system, nor without radical
+alterations; that new and extensive powers ought to be granted to
+the national head, and that these require a different organization
+of the federal government a single body being an unsafe depositary
+of such ample authorities. In conceding all this, the question of
+expense must be given up; for it is impossible, with any degree of
+safety, to narrow the foundation upon which the system is to stand.
+The two branches of the legislature are, in the first instance, to
+consist of only sixty-five persons, which is the same number of
+which Congress, under the existing Confederation, may be composed.
+It is true that this number is intended to be increased; but this
+is to keep pace with the progress of the population and resources of
+the country. It is evident that a less number would, even in the
+first instance, have been unsafe, and that a continuance of the
+present number would, in a more advanced stage of population, be a
+very inadequate representation of the people.
+
+Whence is the dreaded augmentation of expense to spring? One
+source indicated, is the multiplication of offices under the new
+government. Let us examine this a little.
+
+It is evident that the principal departments of the
+administration under the present government, are the same which will
+be required under the new. There are now a Secretary of War, a
+Secretary of Foreign Affairs, a Secretary for Domestic Affairs, a
+Board of Treasury, consisting of three persons, a Treasurer,
+assistants, clerks, etc. These officers are indispensable under any
+system, and will suffice under the new as well as the old. As to
+ambassadors and other ministers and agents in foreign countries, the
+proposed Constitution can make no other difference than to render
+their characters, where they reside, more respectable, and their
+services more useful. As to persons to be employed in the
+collection of the revenues, it is unquestionably true that these
+will form a very considerable addition to the number of federal
+officers; but it will not follow that this will occasion an
+increase of public expense. It will be in most cases nothing more
+than an exchange of State for national officers. In the collection
+of all duties, for instance, the persons employed will be wholly of
+the latter description. The States individually will stand in no
+need of any for this purpose. What difference can it make in point
+of expense to pay officers of the customs appointed by the State or
+by the United States? There is no good reason to suppose that
+either the number or the salaries of the latter will be greater than
+those of the former.
+
+Where then are we to seek for those additional articles of
+expense which are to swell the account to the enormous size that has
+been represented to us? The chief item which occurs to me respects
+the support of the judges of the United States. I do not add the
+President, because there is now a president of Congress, whose
+expenses may not be far, if any thing, short of those which will be
+incurred on account of the President of the United States. The
+support of the judges will clearly be an extra expense, but to what
+extent will depend on the particular plan which may be adopted in
+regard to this matter. But upon no reasonable plan can it amount to
+a sum which will be an object of material consequence.
+
+Let us now see what there is to counterbalance any extra expense
+that may attend the establishment of the proposed government. The
+first thing which presents itself is that a great part of the
+business which now keeps Congress sitting through the year will be
+transacted by the President. Even the management of foreign
+negotiations will naturally devolve upon him, according to general
+principles concerted with the Senate, and subject to their final
+concurrence. Hence it is evident that a portion of the year will
+suffice for the session of both the Senate and the House of
+Representatives; we may suppose about a fourth for the latter and a
+third, or perhaps half, for the former. The extra business of
+treaties and appointments may give this extra occupation to the
+Senate. From this circumstance we may infer that, until the House
+of Representatives shall be increased greatly beyond its present
+number, there will be a considerable saving of expense from the
+difference between the constant session of the present and the
+temporary session of the future Congress.
+
+But there is another circumstance of great importance in the
+view of economy. The business of the United States has hitherto
+occupied the State legislatures, as well as Congress. The latter
+has made requisitions which the former have had to provide for.
+Hence it has happened that the sessions of the State legislatures
+have been protracted greatly beyond what was necessary for the
+execution of the mere local business of the States. More than half
+their time has been frequently employed in matters which related to
+the United States. Now the members who compose the legislatures of
+the several States amount to two thousand and upwards, which number
+has hitherto performed what under the new system will be done in the
+first instance by sixty-five persons, and probably at no future
+period by above a fourth or fifth of that number. The Congress
+under the proposed government will do all the business of the United
+States themselves, without the intervention of the State
+legislatures, who thenceforth will have only to attend to the
+affairs of their particular States, and will not have to sit in any
+proportion as long as they have heretofore done. This difference in
+the time of the sessions of the State legislatures will be clear
+gain, and will alone form an article of saving, which may be
+regarded as an equivalent for any additional objects of expense that
+may be occasioned by the adoption of the new system.
+
+The result from these observations is that the sources of
+additional expense from the establishment of the proposed
+Constitution are much fewer than may have been imagined; that they
+are counterbalanced by considerable objects of saving; and that
+while it is questionable on which side the scale will preponderate,
+it is certain that a government less expensive would be incompetent
+to the purposes of the Union.
+
+
+PUBLIUS.
+
+1. Vide Blackstone's "Commentaries," vol. 1., p. 136.
+
+2. Vide Blackstone's "Commentaries," vol. iv., p. 438.
+
+3. To show that there is a power in the Constitution by which
+the liberty of the press may be affected, recourse has been had to
+the power of taxation.  It is said that duties may be laid upon the
+publications so high as to amount to a prohibition.  I know not by
+what logic it could be maintained, that the declarations in the
+State constitutions, in favor of the freedom of the press, would be
+a constitutional impediment to the imposition of duties upon
+publications by the State legislatures. It cannot certainly be
+pretended that any degree of duties, however low, would be an
+abridgment of the liberty of the press.  We know that newspapers
+are taxed in Great Britain, and yet it is notorious that the press
+nowhere enjoys greater liberty than in that country. And if duties
+of any kind may be laid without a violation of that liberty, it is
+evident that the extent must depend on legislative discretion,
+respecting the liberty of the press, will give it no greater
+security than it will have without them. The same invasions of it
+may be effected under the State constitutions which contain those
+declarations through the means of taxation, as under the proposed
+Constitution, which has nothing of the kind. It would be quite as
+significant to declare that government ought to be free, that taxes
+ought not to be excessive, etc., as that the liberty of the press
+ought not to be restrained.
+
+
+
+
+
+FEDERALIST No. 85
+
+
+
+Concluding Remarks
+
+From MCLEAN's Edition, New York.
+
+
+
+HAMILTON
+
+
+
+To the People of the State of New York:
+
+ACCORDING to the formal division of the subject of these papers,
+announced in my first number, there would appear still to remain for
+discussion two points: "the analogy of the proposed government to
+your own State constitution," and "the additional security which
+its adoption will afford to republican government, to liberty, and
+to property." But these heads have been so fully anticipated and
+exhausted in the progress of the work, that it would now scarcely be
+possible to do any thing more than repeat, in a more dilated form,
+what has been heretofore said, which the advanced stage of the
+question, and the time already spent upon it, conspire to forbid.
+
+It is remarkable, that the resemblance of the plan of the
+convention to the act which organizes the government of this State
+holds, not less with regard to many of the supposed defects, than to
+the real excellences of the former. Among the pretended defects are
+the re-eligibility of the Executive, the want of a council, the
+omission of a formal bill of rights, the omission of a provision
+respecting the liberty of the press. These and several others which
+have been noted in the course of our inquiries are as much
+chargeable on the existing constitution of this State, as on the one
+proposed for the Union; and a man must have slender pretensions to
+consistency, who can rail at the latter for imperfections which he
+finds no difficulty in excusing in the former. Nor indeed can there
+be a better proof of the insincerity and affectation of some of the
+zealous adversaries of the plan of the convention among us, who
+profess to be the devoted admirers of the government under which
+they live, than the fury with which they have attacked that plan,
+for matters in regard to which our own constitution is equally or
+perhaps more vulnerable.
+
+The additional securities to republican government, to liberty
+and to property, to be derived from the adoption of the plan under
+consideration, consist chiefly in the restraints which the
+preservation of the Union will impose on local factions and
+insurrections, and on the ambition of powerful individuals in single
+States, who may acquire credit and influence enough, from leaders
+and favorites, to become the despots of the people; in the
+diminution of the opportunities to foreign intrigue, which the
+dissolution of the Confederacy would invite and facilitate; in the
+prevention of extensive military establishments, which could not
+fail to grow out of wars between the States in a disunited
+situation; in the express guaranty of a republican form of
+government to each; in the absolute and universal exclusion of
+titles of nobility; and in the precautions against the repetition
+of those practices on the part of the State governments which have
+undermined the foundations of property and credit, have planted
+mutual distrust in the breasts of all classes of citizens, and have
+occasioned an almost universal prostration of morals.
+
+Thus have I, fellow-citizens, executed the task I had assigned
+to myself; with what success, your conduct must determine. I trust
+at least you will admit that I have not failed in the assurance I
+gave you respecting the spirit with which my endeavors should be
+conducted. I have addressed myself purely to your judgments, and
+have studiously avoided those asperities which are too apt to
+disgrace political disputants of all parties, and which have been
+not a little provoked by the language and conduct of the opponents
+of the Constitution. The charge of a conspiracy against the
+liberties of the people, which has been indiscriminately brought
+against the advocates of the plan, has something in it too wanton
+and too malignant, not to excite the indignation of every man who
+feels in his own bosom a refutation of the calumny. The perpetual
+changes which have been rung upon the wealthy, the well-born, and
+the great, have been such as to inspire the disgust of all sensible
+men. And the unwarrantable concealments and misrepresentations
+which have been in various ways practiced to keep the truth from the
+public eye, have been of a nature to demand the reprobation of all
+honest men. It is not impossible that these circumstances may have
+occasionally betrayed me into intemperances of expression which I
+did not intend; it is certain that I have frequently felt a
+struggle between sensibility and moderation; and if the former has
+in some instances prevailed, it must be my excuse that it has been
+neither often nor much.
+
+Let us now pause and ask ourselves whether, in the course of
+these papers, the proposed Constitution has not been satisfactorily
+vindicated from the aspersions thrown upon it; and whether it has
+not been shown to be worthy of the public approbation, and necessary
+to the public safety and prosperity. Every man is bound to answer
+these questions to himself, according to the best of his conscience
+and understanding, and to act agreeably to the genuine and sober
+dictates of his judgment. This is a duty from which nothing can
+give him a dispensation. 'T is one that he is called upon, nay,
+constrained by all the obligations that form the bands of society,
+to discharge sincerely and honestly. No partial motive, no
+particular interest, no pride of opinion, no temporary passion or
+prejudice, will justify to himself, to his country, or to his
+posterity, an improper election of the part he is to act. Let him
+beware of an obstinate adherence to party; let him reflect that the
+object upon which he is to decide is not a particular interest of
+the community, but the very existence of the nation; and let him
+remember that a majority of America has already given its sanction
+to the plan which he is to approve or reject.
+
+I shall not dissemble that I feel an entire confidence in the
+arguments which recommend the proposed system to your adoption, and
+that I am unable to discern any real force in those by which it has
+been opposed. I am persuaded that it is the best which our
+political situation, habits, and opinions will admit, and superior
+to any the revolution has produced.
+
+Concessions on the part of the friends of the plan, that it has
+not a claim to absolute perfection, have afforded matter of no small
+triumph to its enemies. "Why," say they, "should we adopt an
+imperfect thing? Why not amend it and make it perfect before it is
+irrevocably established?" This may be plausible enough, but it is
+only plausible. In the first place I remark, that the extent of
+these concessions has been greatly exaggerated. They have been
+stated as amounting to an admission that the plan is radically
+defective, and that without material alterations the rights and the
+interests of the community cannot be safely confided to it. This,
+as far as I have understood the meaning of those who make the
+concessions, is an entire perversion of their sense. No advocate of
+the measure can be found, who will not declare as his sentiment,
+that the system, though it may not be perfect in every part, is,
+upon the whole, a good one; is the best that the present views and
+circumstances of the country will permit; and is such an one as
+promises every species of security which a reasonable people can
+desire.
+
+I answer in the next place, that I should esteem it the extreme
+of imprudence to prolong the precarious state of our national
+affairs, and to expose the Union to the jeopardy of successive
+experiments, in the chimerical pursuit of a perfect plan. I never
+expect to see a perfect work from imperfect man. The result of the
+deliberations of all collective bodies must necessarily be a
+compound, as well of the errors and prejudices, as of the good sense
+and wisdom, of the individuals of whom they are composed. The
+compacts which are to embrace thirteen distinct States in a common
+bond of amity and union, must as necessarily be a compromise of as
+many dissimilar interests and inclinations. How can perfection
+spring from such materials?
+
+The reasons assigned in an excellent little pamphlet lately
+published in this city,1 are unanswerable to show the utter
+improbability of assembling a new convention, under circumstances in
+any degree so favorable to a happy issue, as those in which the late
+convention met, deliberated, and concluded. I will not repeat the
+arguments there used, as I presume the production itself has had an
+extensive circulation. It is certainly well worthy the perusal of
+every friend to his country. There is, however, one point of light
+in which the subject of amendments still remains to be considered,
+and in which it has not yet been exhibited to public view. I cannot
+resolve to conclude without first taking a survey of it in this
+aspect.
+
+It appears to me susceptible of absolute demonstration, that it
+will be far more easy to obtain subsequent than previous amendments
+to the Constitution. The moment an alteration is made in the
+present plan, it becomes, to the purpose of adoption, a new one, and
+must undergo a new decision of each State. To its complete
+establishment throughout the Union, it will therefore require the
+concurrence of thirteen States. If, on the contrary, the
+Constitution proposed should once be ratified by all the States as
+it stands, alterations in it may at any time be effected by nine
+States. Here, then, the chances are as thirteen to nine2 in
+favor of subsequent amendment, rather than of the original adoption
+of an entire system.
+
+This is not all. Every Constitution for the United States must
+inevitably consist of a great variety of particulars, in which
+thirteen independent States are to be accommodated in their
+interests or opinions of interest. We may of course expect to see,
+in any body of men charged with its original formation, very
+different combinations of the parts upon different points. Many of
+those who form a majority on one question, may become the minority
+on a second, and an association dissimilar to either may constitute
+the majority on a third. Hence the necessity of moulding and
+arranging all the particulars which are to compose the whole, in
+such a manner as to satisfy all the parties to the compact; and
+hence, also, an immense multiplication of difficulties and
+casualties in obtaining the collective assent to a final act. The
+degree of that multiplication must evidently be in a ratio to the
+number of particulars and the number of parties.
+
+But every amendment to the Constitution, if once established,
+would be a single proposition, and might be brought forward singly.
+There would then be no necessity for management or compromise, in
+relation to any other point no giving nor taking. The will of the
+requisite number would at once bring the matter to a decisive issue.
+And consequently, whenever nine, or rather ten States, were united
+in the desire of a particular amendment, that amendment must
+infallibly take place. There can, therefore, be no comparison
+between the facility of affecting an amendment, and that of
+establishing in the first instance a complete Constitution.
+
+In opposition to the probability of subsequent amendments, it
+has been urged that the persons delegated to the administration of
+the national government will always be disinclined to yield up any
+portion of the authority of which they were once possessed. For my
+own part I acknowledge a thorough conviction that any amendments
+which may, upon mature consideration, be thought useful, will be
+applicable to the organization of the government, not to the mass of
+its powers; and on this account alone, I think there is no weight
+in the observation just stated. I also think there is little weight
+in it on another account. The intrinsic difficulty of governing
+thirteen States at any rate, independent of calculations upon an
+ordinary degree of public spirit and integrity, will, in my opinion
+constantly impose on the national rulers the necessity of a spirit
+of accommodation to the reasonable expectations of their
+constituents. But there is yet a further consideration, which
+proves beyond the possibility of a doubt, that the observation is
+futile. It is this that the national rulers, whenever nine States
+concur, will have no option upon the subject. By the fifth article
+of the plan, the Congress will be obliged "on the application of the
+legislatures of two thirds of the States, which at present amount to
+nine, to call a convention for proposing amendments, which shall be
+valid, to all intents and purposes, as part of the Constitution,
+when ratified by the legislatures of three fourths of the States, or
+by conventions in three fourths thereof." The words of this
+article are peremptory. The Congress "shall call a convention."
+Nothing in this particular is left to the discretion of that body.
+And of consequence, all the declamation about the disinclination to
+a change vanishes in air. Nor however difficult it may be supposed
+to unite two thirds or three fourths of the State legislatures, in
+amendments which may affect local interests, can there be any room
+to apprehend any such difficulty in a union on points which are
+merely relative to the general liberty or security of the people.
+We may safely rely on the disposition of the State legislatures to
+erect barriers against the encroachments of the national authority.
+
+If the foregoing argument is a fallacy, certain it is that I am
+myself deceived by it, for it is, in my conception, one of those
+rare instances in which a political truth can be brought to the test
+of a mathematical demonstration. Those who see the matter in the
+same light with me, however zealous they may be for amendments, must
+agree in the propriety of a previous adoption, as the most direct
+road to their own object.
+
+The zeal for attempts to amend, prior to the establishment of
+the Constitution, must abate in every man who is ready to accede to
+the truth of the following observations of a writer equally solid
+and ingenious: "To balance a large state or society Usays hee,
+whether monarchical or republican, on general laws, is a work of so
+great difficulty, that no human genius, however comprehensive, is
+able, by the mere dint of reason and reflection, to effect it. The
+judgments of many must unite in the work; experience must guide
+their labor; time must bring it to perfection, and the feeling of
+inconveniences must correct the mistakes which they INEVITABLY fall
+into in their first trials and experiments."3 These judicious
+reflections contain a lesson of moderation to all the sincere lovers
+of the Union, and ought to put them upon their guard against
+hazarding anarchy, civil war, a perpetual alienation of the States
+from each other, and perhaps the military despotism of a victorious
+demagogue, in the pursuit of what they are not likely to obtain, but
+from time and experience. It may be in me a defect of political
+fortitude, but I acknowledge that I cannot entertain an equal
+tranquillity with those who affect to treat the dangers of a longer
+continuance in our present situation as imaginary. A nation,
+without a national government, is, in my view, an awful spectacle.
+The establishment of a Constitution, in time of profound peace, by
+the voluntary consent of a whole people, is a prodigy, to the
+completion of which I look forward with trembling anxiety. I can
+reconcile it to no rules of prudence to let go the hold we now have,
+in so arduous an enterprise, upon seven out of the thirteen States,
+and after having passed over so considerable a part of the ground,
+to recommence the course. I dread the more the consequences of new
+attempts, because I know that powerful individuals, in this and in
+other States, are enemies to a general national government in every
+possible shape.
+
+
+
+PUBLIUS.
+
+1 Entitled "An Address to the People of the State of New
+York."
+
+2 It may rather be said TEN, for though two thirds may set on
+foot the measure, three fourths must ratify.
+
+3 Hume's "Essays," vol. i., page 128: "The Rise of Arts and
+Sciences."
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of The Federalist Papers, by 
+Alexander Hamilton and John Jay and James Madison
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diff --git a/data/cluster/generated/README.txt b/data/cluster/generated/README.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ef12055
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/cluster/generated/README.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
+This directory contains R code for generating three clusters from a normal distribution, possibly varying the cluster means and the variances. Two data sets have been generated and placed in the directory, along with a plot of the clusters for each. 
+
+clusters_equal_variance.dat: x and y dimensions have variance of 1.0
+clusters_bigger_x_variance.dat: x has variance of 5.0 and y has variance of 1.0
+
+Both data sets have the same cluster means:
+
+  centroid1 = c(-1,-1)
+  centroid2 = c(6,4)
+  centroid3 = c(-2,8)
+
+By looking at the R code, it should be straightforward to see how to make simple changes to come up with different clusters.
+
+Email Jason Baldridge (jasonbaldridge@gmail.com) if you have any questions.
diff --git a/data/cluster/generated/clusters_bigger_x_variance.dat b/data/cluster/generated/clusters_bigger_x_variance.dat
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..750adee
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/cluster/generated/clusters_bigger_x_variance.dat
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+1 1 4.57 0.83
+2 1 -1.67 -0.8
+3 1 -4.91 -1.6
+4 1 -4.18 -0.26
+5 1 4.75 -0.14
+6 1 -8.92 0.91
+7 1 -5.79 -0.71
+8 1 -1.28 -1.76
+9 1 4.27 -3.31
+10 1 -5.07 -2.3
+11 1 -9.75 -0.09
+12 1 1.37 -1.53
+13 1 -4.57 -2.03
+14 1 -6 -0.59
+15 1 -1.77 -0.85
+16 1 -4.06 -0.9
+17 1 -6.85 -2.67
+18 1 3.61 -0.81
+19 1 -6.38 -0.97
+20 1 -5.13 -1.49
+21 1 2.64 -2.77
+22 1 -7.05 -0.13
+23 1 -8.11 0.81
+24 1 -11.85 -1.16
+25 1 -8.08 -0.69
+26 1 -3.86 -1.27
+27 1 0.84 1.14
+28 1 -3.51 -1.15
+29 1 -4.96 -1.03
+30 1 0.61 0.22
+31 1 -3.22 0.6
+32 1 2.42 -2.7
+33 1 4.07 -0.47
+34 1 -2.71 -1.09
+35 1 -4.39 0.92
+36 1 -3.1 -1.14
+37 1 -2.53 0.58
+38 1 -1.9 -2.74
+39 1 -4.22 -2.12
+40 1 -2.76 -1.23
+41 1 -4.86 -1.61
+42 1 -7.23 -2.69
+43 1 -8.03 -1.77
+44 1 1.01 -1.5
+45 1 -3.92 0.03
+46 1 -3.71 -0.96
+47 1 -5.73 -1.11
+48 1 -0.08 -0.65
+49 1 -1 -1.05
+50 1 5.45 1.5
+51 2 7.8 2.28
+52 2 0.27 3.03
+53 2 4.92 4.1
+54 2 4.96 3.11
+55 2 9.11 3.2
+56 2 7.62 3.49
+57 2 -1.37 3.12
+58 2 15.33 4.92
+59 2 6.36 4.71
+60 2 -3.27 5.12
+61 2 6.93 4.15
+62 2 9.95 4.53
+63 2 6.32 2.56
+64 2 7.13 2.79
+65 2 0.8 2.54
+66 2 -3.86 4.06
+67 2 -2.88 2.58
+68 2 7.04 3.39
+69 2 3.53 3.39
+70 2 10.9 4.24
+71 2 6.82 2.45
+72 2 5.44 2.77
+73 2 4.8 3.27
+74 2 6.51 4.43
+75 2 13.48 3.93
+76 2 8.02 5.29
+77 2 -5.59 4.98
+78 2 10.49 3.56
+79 2 7.26 3.83
+80 2 9.36 2.81
+81 3 -11.67 7.65
+82 3 -1.95 8.68
+83 3 -4.31 7.76
+84 3 0.79 8.95
+85 3 3.39 9.38
+86 3 -6.63 8.11
+87 3 -4.99 8.3
+88 3 1.97 9.23
+89 3 8.5 7.96
+90 3 -3.38 8.11
+91 3 -0.08 8.29
+92 3 -1.22 9.26
+93 3 3.11 6.56
+94 3 7.2 8.73
+95 3 -5.15 7.34
+96 3 -6.59 8.1
+97 3 -5.08 7.92
+98 3 -2.03 7.18
+99 3 6.1 9.95
+100 3 9.8 5.99
diff --git a/data/cluster/generated/clusters_bigger_x_variance.png b/data/cluster/generated/clusters_bigger_x_variance.png
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diff --git a/data/cluster/generated/clusters_equal_variance.dat b/data/cluster/generated/clusters_equal_variance.dat
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..f0c83d5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/cluster/generated/clusters_equal_variance.dat
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diff --git a/data/cluster/generated/generate_clusters.R b/data/cluster/generated/generate_clusters.R
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..670973f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/cluster/generated/generate_clusters.R
@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+# Generate clusters for clustering 
+
+# Set equal to 1 to generate clusters with spread out x values
+unequal_x_variance = 1
+
+# Generate clusters with equal variance in x and y dimensions.
+outputName = "clusters_equal_variance"
+variance_in_x = 1.0
+variance_in_y = 1.0
+
+# Generate clusters with greater variance in x dimension.
+if (unequal_x_variance) {
+  outputName = "clusters_bigger_x_variance"
+  variance_in_x = 5.0
+}
+
+# Three centroids are supported. You can change their x/y values here.
+centroid1 = c(-1,-1)
+centroid2 = c(6,4)
+centroid3 = c(-2,8)
+
+outputFile = paste(outputName,"dat",sep=".")
+outputPdf = paste(outputName,"pdf",sep=".")
+
+# Three clusters in 2 dimensions
+createCluster <- function(numPoints, centroid, xvariance=1.0, yvariance=1.0) {
+  xmean = centroid[1]
+  ymean = centroid[2]
+  cbind(rnorm(numPoints,mean=xmean,xvariance),rnorm(numPoints,mean=ymean,yvariance))
+}
+
+cluster1 = cbind(1, createCluster(50,centroid1,variance_in_x,variance_in_y))
+cluster2 = cbind(2, createCluster(30,centroid2,variance_in_x,variance_in_y))
+cluster3 = cbind(3, createCluster(20,centroid3,variance_in_x,variance_in_y))
+
+data = round(rbind(cluster1,cluster2,cluster3),2)
+
+pdf(outputPdf)
+
+plot(cluster1[,2:3],xlab="x value",ylab="y value",xlim=c(-12,12),ylim=c(-12,12))
+points(cluster2[,2:3],pch=2)
+points(cluster3[,2:3],pch=3)
+points(centroid1[1],centroid1[2],pch=20,col="blue")
+points(centroid2[1],centroid2[2],pch=20,col="blue")
+points(centroid3[1],centroid3[2],pch=20,col="blue")
+abline(v=0,lty=2)
+abline(h=0,lty=2)
+
+dev.off()
+
+write.table(data, file=outputFile, quote=FALSE, col.names=FALSE)
+
+
diff --git a/data/cluster/schools/README.txt b/data/cluster/schools/README.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a42a22a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/cluster/schools/README.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,18 @@
+Achievement Test Scores, New Haven Schools
+
+Measurements at the beginning of the 4th grade (when the national average is 4.0) and of the 6th grade in 25 schools in New Haven. 
+
+Variables:
+
+        4th grade reading
+        4th grade arithmetic
+        6th grade reading
+        6th grade arithmetic 
+
+So, a line like 
+
+BARNARD            3.9         3.8        5.9        6.2 
+
+means that Barnard school had a 3.9 for 4th graders' reading, 3.8 for 4th graders' arithmetic, 5.9 for 6th graders' reading, and 6.2 for 6th graders' arithmetic.
+
+Data obtained from: http://www.uni-koeln.de/themen/statistik/data/cluster/
diff --git a/data/cluster/schools/achieve.dat b/data/cluster/schools/achieve.dat
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c12957c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/data/cluster/schools/achieve.dat
@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+BALDWIN            2.7         3.2        4.5        4.8 
+BARNARD            3.9         3.8        5.9        6.2 
+BEECHER            4.8         4.1        6.8        5.5 
+BRENNAN            3.1         3.5        4.3        4.6 
+CLINTON            3.4         3.7        5.1        5.6 
+CONTE              3.1         3.4        4.1        4.7 
+DAVIS              4.6         4.4        6.6        6.1 
+DAY                3.1         3.3        4.0        4.9 
+DWIGHT             3.8         3.7        4.7        4.9 
+EDGEWOOD           5.2         4.9        8.2        6.9 
+EDWARDS            3.9         3.8        5.2        5.4 
+HALE               4.1         4.0        5.6        5.6 
+HOOKER             5.7         5.1        7.0        6.3 
+IVY                3.0         3.2        4.5        5.0 
+KIMBERLY           2.9         3.3        4.5        5.1 
+LINCOLN BASSETT    3.4         3.3        4.4        5.0 
+LOVELL             4.0         4.2        5.2        5.4 
+PRINCE             3.0         3.0        4.6        5.0 
+ROSS               4.0         4.1        5.9        5.8 
+SCRANTON           3.0         3.2        4.4        5.1 
+SHERMAN            3.6         3.6        5.3        5.4 
+TRUMAN             3.1         3.2        4.6        5.0 
+WEST HILLS         3.2         3.3        5.4        5.3 
+WINCHESTER         3.0         3.4        4.2        4.7 
+WOODWARD           3.8         4.0        6.9        6.7
diff --git a/homework/hw3/hw3_answers.txt b/homework/hw3/hw3_answers.txt
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..99803f9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/homework/hw3/hw3_answers.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+Applied-NLP, Homework 3 Answers
+
+Name: 
+EID:
+
+Link to applied-nlp fork: 
+
+--------------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+Problem 1
+
+Part (b): Provide the requested output.
+
+
+Problem 2
+
+* Provide th command line call and the output.
+
+
+Problem 3
+
+Part (a): Provide the clusters and any comments.
+
+
+Part (b): Discuss outliers.
+
+
+Part (c): Your interpretation for output when k=4.
+
+
+Problem 4
+
+* Describe what you found.
+
+
+Problem 5
+
+* Describe result of using z-score transform on the simple features.
+
+
+
+Problem 6
+
+
+
+Problem 7
+
+
+
+
+
+
diff --git a/lib/pca_transform-0.7.2.jar b/lib/pca_transform-0.7.2.jar
new file mode 100644
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diff --git a/src/main/scala/appliednlp/app/Cluster.scala b/src/main/scala/appliednlp/app/Cluster.scala
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..93bbb9b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/main/scala/appliednlp/app/Cluster.scala
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+package appliednlp.app
+
+import org.apache.log4j.Level
+import org.apache.log4j.Logger
+import nak.cluster.Point
+import nak.cluster.ClusterConfusionMatrix
+import nak.cluster.ClusterReport
+import nak.cluster.Kmeans
+import nak.cluster.DistanceFunction
+import nak.cluster.PointTransformer
+
+import appliednlp.cluster._
+
+/**
+ * A standalone object with a main method for reading an input file and running
+ * k-means with different options.
+ */
+object Cluster {
+
+  def main(args: Array[String]) {
+    // Parse and get the command-line options
+    val opts = ClusterOpts(args)
+    
+    // This tells the k-means algorithm how much debugging information to show you
+    // while you run the algorithm. 
+    val logLevel = if (opts.verbose()) Level.DEBUG else Level.INFO
+    Logger.getRootLogger.setLevel(logLevel)
+    
+    // Your code starts here. You'll use and extend it during every problem.
+
+
+  }
+
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * An object that sets of the configuration for command-line options using
+ * Scallop and returns the options, ready for use.
+ */
+object ClusterOpts {
+
+  import org.rogach.scallop._
+  
+  def apply(args: Array[String]) = new ScallopConf(args) {
+    banner("""
+Cluster application using nak.cluster.Kmeans
+
+The distance functions are standard cosine, euclidean, and manhattan.
+
+The transform option is one ident, zscore, and pca.
+ - ident: no transformation of the input points
+ - zscore: use standard z-scores in each dimension to scale the points
+ - pca: scale the points with z-scores, then run PCA and use (as transformed dimensions) only the principle components that explain 95% of the variance
+
+For usage see below:
+	     """)
+
+    val featureTypes = Set("standard","schools","countries","fed-simple","fed-full")
+    val transformers = Set("i","ident","z","zscore","p","pca")
+    val distanceFunctions = Set("c","cosine","e","euclidean","m","manhattan")
+    val transform = opt[String]("transform", default=Some("ident"), validate = transformers, descr = "The transformation to use. Possible values: " + transformers.toSeq.sorted.mkString(",") )
+    val distance = opt[String]("dist", default=Some("cosine"), validate = distanceFunctions, descr = "The distance function to use. Possible values: " + distanceFunctions.toSeq.sorted.mkString(",") )      
+    val features = opt[String]("features", default=Some("standard"), validate = featureTypes, descr = "The type of features to extract. Possible values: " + distanceFunctions.toSeq.sorted.mkString(",") )
+    val k = opt[Int]("num-clusters",short='k', required=true, validate = (0<), descr="The number of clusters to find.")
+    val help = opt[Boolean]("help", noshort = true, descr = "Show this message")
+    val verbose = opt[Boolean]("verbose")
+    val showCentroids = opt[Boolean]("output-centroids",short='c', descr="Show centroids.")
+    val report = opt[Boolean]("output-report",short='r', descr="Show full cluster report.")
+    val filename = trailArg[String]("filename", descr = "The input filename.")
+  }
+}
diff --git a/src/main/scala/appliednlp/cluster/PointCreator.scala b/src/main/scala/appliednlp/cluster/PointCreator.scala
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..baf63a0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/main/scala/appliednlp/cluster/PointCreator.scala
@@ -0,0 +1,139 @@
+package appliednlp.cluster
+
+import nak.cluster._
+import nak.util.CollectionUtil._
+import chalk.util.SimpleTokenizer
+
+import org.apache.log4j.Logger
+import org.apache.log4j.Level
+
+/**
+ *  Read data and produce data points and their features.
+ *
+ *  @param filename the name of the file containing the data
+ *  @return a triple, the first element of which is a sequence of id's
+ *     (unique for each row / data point), the second element is the sequence
+ *     of (known) cluster labels, and the third of which is the sequence of
+ *     Points to be clustered.
+ */
+trait PointCreator extends (String => Iterator[(String,String,Point)])
+
+/**
+ * Read data in the standard format for use with k-means.
+ */
+object DirectCreator extends PointCreator {
+
+ def apply(filename: String) = List[(String,String,Point)]().toIterator
+
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * A standalone object with a main method for converting the achieve.dat rows
+ * into a format suitable for input to RunKmeans.
+ */
+object SchoolsCreator extends PointCreator {
+
+  def apply(filename: String) = List[(String,String,Point)]().toIterator
+
+}
+
+/**
+ * A standalone object with a main method for converting the birth.dat rows
+ * into a format suitable for input to RunKmeans.
+ */
+object CountriesCreator extends PointCreator {
+
+  def apply(filename: String) = List[(String,String,Point)]().toIterator
+
+}
+
+/**
+ * A class that converts the raw Federalist
+ * papers into rows with a format suitable for input to Cluster. As part of
+ * this, it must also perform feature extraction, converting the texts into
+ * sets of values for each feature (such as a word count or relative
+ * frequency).
+ */
+class FederalistCreator(simple: Boolean = false) extends PointCreator {
+
+  def apply(filename: String) = List[(String,String,Point)]().toIterator
+
+  /**
+   * Given the text of an article, compute the frequency of "the", "people"
+   * and "which" and return a Point per article that has the frequency of
+   * "the" as the value of the first dimension, the frequency of "people"
+   * for the second, and the frequency of "which" for the third.
+   *
+   * @param texts A sequence of Strings, each of which is the text extracted
+   *              for an article (i.e. the "text" field produced by
+   *              FederalistArticleExtractor).
+   */
+  def extractSimple(texts: IndexedSeq[String]): IndexedSeq[Point] = {
+    Vector[Point]()
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Given the text of an article, extract features as best you can to try to
+   * get good alignment of the produced clusters with the known authors.
+   *
+   * @param texts A sequence of Strings, each of which is the text extracted
+   *              for an article (i.e. the "text" field produced by
+   *              FederalistArticleExtractor).
+   */
+  def extractFull(texts: IndexedSeq[String]): IndexedSeq[Point] = {
+    Vector[Point]()
+  }
+
+}
+
+object FederalistArticleExtractor {
+  /**
+   * A method that takes the raw Federalist papers input and extracts each
+   * article into a structured format.
+   *
+   * @param filename The filename containing the Federalist papers.
+   * @return A sequence of Maps (one per article) from attributes (like
+   *         "title", "id", and "text") to their values for each article.
+   */
+  def apply(filename: String): IndexedSeq[Map[String, String]] = {
+
+    // Regex to identify the text portion of a document.
+    val JustTextRE = (
+      """(?s)\*\*\* START OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG.+""" +
+      """\*\*\*(.+)\*\*\* END OF THIS PROJECT GUTENBERG""").r
+
+    // Regex to capture different parts of each article.
+    val ArticleRE = (
+      """(?s)(\d+)\n+""" + // The article number.
+      """(.+?)\n+""" + // The title (note non-greedy match).
+      """((?:(?:For|From)[^\n]+?)?)\s+""" + // The publication venue (optional).
+      """((?:(?:Monday|Tuesday|Wednesday|Thursday|Friday|Saturday|Sunday).+\d\d\d\d\.)?)\n+""" + // The date (optional).
+      """((?:MAD|HAM|JAY).+?)\n+""" + // The author(s).
+      """(To the [^\n]+)""" + // The addressee.
+      """(.+)""" // The text.
+      ).r
+
+    val book = io.Source.fromFile(filename).mkString
+    val text = JustTextRE.findAllIn(book).matchData.next.group(1)
+    val rawArticles = text.split("FEDERALIST.? No. ")
+
+    // Use the regular expression to parse the articles.
+    val allArticles = rawArticles.flatMap {
+      case ArticleRE(id, title, venue, date, author, addressee, text) =>
+        Some(Map("id" -> id.trim,
+          "title" -> title.replaceAll("\\n+", " ").trim,
+          "venue" -> venue.replaceAll("\\n+", " ").trim,
+          "date" -> date.replaceAll("\\n+", " ").trim,
+          "author" -> author.replaceAll("\\n+", " ").trim,
+          "addressee" -> addressee.trim,
+          "text" -> text.trim))
+
+      case _ => None
+    }.toIndexedSeq
+
+    // Get rid of article 71, which is a duplicate, and return the rest.
+    allArticles.take(70) ++ allArticles.slice(71, allArticles.length)
+  }
+
+}