> **Spoiler:** Both Ninan and Pearson are wrong because they cannot account for the full linguistic picture. But they are also right at the same time. The firsthand experience is epiphenomenal (Ninan), yet there is presuppositional content as well (Pearson).

1. The cake was delicious.

(1) brings the following intuition, called *Acquaintance Inference*: "The speaker must have tried the food." Is this always the case? Of course not, it would be very boring. There are certain elements, `obviators`, that remove this imposed intuition.

2. COVERT EXPERIENCERS
   a. ❤️ The cake was delicious, and I enjoyed eating it.
   b. 💔 The cake was delicious, but I am happy that I missed it.
   c. ❤️‍🩹 The cake `might` have been delicious, though I am happy that I missed it.

What can mend ❤️‍🩹 weird sentences like (2b)?
- Epistemic modal auxiliaries: `must, might`
- Epistemic adverbs: `probably, possibly, maybe`
- Future markers: `will, be going to`
- Clarity markers: `obviously, certainly, apparently`

What is more interesting is that these `obviators` do not uniformly affect *minimally* different constructions as in (3).

What happens if we introduce experiences overtly?

3. OVERT EXPERIENCERS
   a. ❤️ The cake was delicious *to me*, and I enjoyed eating it.
   b. 💔 The cake was delicious *to me*, but I am happy that I missed it.
   c. ❤️‍🩹 The cake `might` have been delicious *to me*, though I am happy that I missed it.

What about other menders ❤️‍🩹?
- Epistemic modal auxiliaries: must 💔, `might` ❤️‍🩹
- Epistemic adverbs: probably, possibly, maybe 💔
- Future markers: `will, be going to` ❤️‍🩹
- Clarity markers: obviously, certainly, apparently 💔

This irregular behavior of various `obviators` cannot be explained by previous accounts.

Ninan (2014): ✨Magic of pragmatics✨ Sentences like (2b) is weird because one must have enough justification to assert tastiness, thus prior experience (direct or indirect).

Evidence: (i) Attitude verbs as `obviators` and (ii) AI survives under negation. Negation does not affect knowledge requirements, but modalized propositions are not subject to same restrictions.

Problems with Ninan (2014): overt experiencer (4) and non-autocentricity (5)	**Ninan's Predictions**	**Reality**
4. a. The San Juans must be beautiful, but I have never seen them.	❤️‍🩹	❤️‍🩹
b. The San Juans must be beautiful to me, but I have never seen them	❤️‍🩹	💔
5. a. Hobbes's new food is tasty, but no cat has ever tried it yet.	💔	💔
b. Hobbes's new food `must` be tasty, but no cat has ever tried it yet.	💔	❤️‍🩹

Pearson (2013): ✨Presupposition and Metalanguage✨ There is a presupposition failure. Sentences like (2b) come with certain presuppositions about the taster, which tells us that the same taster must have a firsthand experience with what is being tasted.

Evidence: (i) AI cannot be canceled, (ii) AI survives under negation, **(iii)** acts like individual-level predicates. By creating a parallelism between individual-level predicates and AI, she gets the firsthand experience for free.

(iii) also solves the puzzle with non-autocentricity. When the speaker is not introduced in the target audience, they will be irrelevant, and thus they will not be considered for the presupposition.

The main problem with Pearson (2013): Overgeneration. If `obviation` is about *being irrelevant*, why should it be limited to only `must`, and not include explicit denials as in (2b)? There is no definition of *being irrelevant*.

And even when, the speaker is *necessarily irrelevant*, there are contradictory continuations as in (6). Genericity-related predictions also do not hold: instance-hood of dispositional generics should pattern like PPTs, but they don't (7).

	Pearson's Prediction	Reality
6. Just look at it! The cake is delicious, but I am going to find it disgusting.	💔	💔
7. a. Even though your son hasn't smiled yet, given his age, he `obviously` does.	❤️	💔
b. Even though your son hasn't smiled yet, given his age, he `obviously can.`	❤️	❤️

A&K Analysis: ✨Presuppositions, Indices, and Monsters✨ AI should be introduced as a presupposition but it should be largely agnostic about other aspects of the semantics of PPTs, i.e. judge, object, world, time, etc. Thus, A&K works with indices of evaluations.

8. a. ⟦ tasty ⟧$^{c,<w,t,K,j>}$= λo: K directly settles whether o is tasty for j in w at t. 1 iff o is tasty for j in w at t
   b. K directly settles whether p.

9. ⟦ The cake is delicious ⟧$^{c,<w,t,K,j>}$= λo: K directly settles whether cake is delicious for j in w at t. 1 iff cake is delicious for j in w at t.

Since AI is a presupposition, they handle AI under negation. Non-autocentricity uses are also not a problem. Since they introduced judge *<j>* separately from the set of propositions that can settle AIs *<K>*, they do not have to be the same person.

What about `obviation` cases?
"`must`" is only licensed when the p is not available in *K, set of propositions that encode direct knowledge*.
The main job of "`must`" is to transform K to $\bigcap K$, *the set worlds compatible with what is known directly **and indirectly***.
(2c) is fine because "`must`" makes sure that whether the knowledge is direct and indirect does not matter.
🤡 Other `obviators`? 🤡 Future research 🤡

What about overt tasters?
🤡 "tasty" and "tasty to somebody" are basically different predicates 🤡

10. ⟦ tasty to γ⟧^{c,i}= λo: the K of ⟦γ⟧^{c,i} in w at t directly settles whether o is tasty to ⟦γ⟧^{c,i} in w at t. 1 iff o is tasty to ⟦γ⟧^{c,i} in w at t

11. ⟦ The cake is delicious to me ⟧$^{c,<w,t,K,j>}$= λo: K directly settles whether cake is delicious to *speaker(c)* in w at t. 1 iff cake is delicious to *speaker(c)* in w at t.