




Auth0 by Okta

A Passwordless Future!

Passkeys and WebAuthn for Java developers

Deepu K Sasidharan






Hi, I'm Deepu K Sasidharan

- JHipster co-chair
- Java Champion
- Creator of KDash, JDL Studio, JWT UI
- OSS aficionado, polyglot dev,
author, speaker
- Developer Advocate @ Okta



@depu105@mastodon.social deepu.tech
[deepu05](https://www.linkedin.com/in/depu05)




Why passwordless?

The password problem



Verizon Data Breach Investigation Report




The human problem





Knowledge-based




Phishing



Remote replay



Data breach




Reuse & share



Password management


Passwordless




Passwordless future == Passkeys

Public-key cryptography


Pair of mathematically linked keys





Authenticator


Can create and store public-private key pairs



Platform authenticators

Built into the device

- TouchID
- FaceID
- Smartphone authenticators
- Windows Hello



Roaming authenticators

Removable device via USB, NFC, Bluetooth

- Yubikey
- Google Titan
- Smartphones

FIDO == Authentication standard

Based on public key cryptography.

FIDO2

WebAuthentication (WebAuthn)

Client to Authenticator Protocol (CTAP)

WebAuthn == W3C standard

WebAuthn is the standard that allows for passkeys implementation





Illustration based on <https://webauthn.me/introduction>


Client to Authenticator Protocol

Communicate with authenticators over USB, NFC, and Bluetooth



*Passkeys == Discoverable
passwordless FIDO credentials*

It uses asymmetric public key cryptography




- Private key synced between devices in same ecosystem and backed up to cloud
- Better usability
- One time enrollment
- Can be restored on device loss or on new device
- Less secure than device-bound passkeys


- Private key stored only on the device
- Not as convenient as synced passkeys
- Each device needs enrollment
- No recovery or backups
- Most secure option

*How does the magic
happen?*

Registration flow



Authentication flow



Why passkeys?



Knowledge-based




Phishing



Remote replay



Data breach



Reuse & share



Password management



Discoverable




Phishing resistant



Remote attack resistant



Breach resistant




Not reusable & shareable*



Easier to maintain

Passkeys security and usability spectrum

Best experience



Challenges

- *OS/Browser support*
- *Cloud vendor reliance*
- *Enterprise use cases*
- *Reset & recovery*



Passkeys in Spring Boot web app using an IdP

Auth0 by Okta as IdP

```
# Create a Spring Boot web app
$ curl -G https://start.spring.io/starter.tgz \
    -d dependencies=web,okta -d baseDir=passkey-demo | tar -xzvf -

# Add controller for @GetMapping("/")

# Create an Auth0 account and configure tenant to enable passkeys
# Login to the tenant
$ auth0 login

# Create an Auth0 app
$ auth0 apps create \
  --name "Spring Boot Passkeys" \
  --description "Spring Boot Example" \
  --type regular \
  --callbacks http://localhost:8080/login/oauth2/code/okta \
  --logout-urls http://localhost:8080 \
  --reveal-secrets

# Update OIDC credentials
# Start the app
$ ./gradlew bootRun
```



a0.to/spring-passkey

Passkeys in Java apps

WebAuthn4j

- FIDO2 conformant
- Supports attestation validation
- Supports all attestation formats
- Suitable for relying party server implementation
- Supports passkeys
- Used by Keycloak
- Has Spring Security support
- Kotlin friendly

java-webauthn-server

- Not 100% FIDO2 conformant
- Supports attestation validation
- All attestation formats not supported
- Suitable for relying party server implementation
- Supports passkeys
- From Yubico

Passkeys with Spring Security and WebAuthn4j

Spring Boot web app as a relying party server using WebAuthn4j

WebAuthn4J Spring Security

```
# Clone the repo  
$ git clone https://github.com/deepu105/webauthn4j-spring-boot-passkeys-demo  
  
# Start the app  
$ ./gradlew bootRun
```



a0.to/spring-webauthn

Passkeys with Spring Security

spring-security-webauthn

- Provides default registration and login pages
- Will become a Spring Security core option
- Based on WebAuthn4j
- At experimental stage now
- Expected in Spring Security 6.4 (November, hopefully)

*How does it differ from
WebAuthn MFA?*

Passkeys

- Implemented using WebAuthn and FIDO2
- Can be synced or device-bound
- Discoverable credentials (Resident keys)
- Can be used for account registration as first factor
- Enrollment required only once for synced passkeys

WebAuthn MFA

- Implemented using WebAuthn and FIDO2
- Only device-bound
- Non-Discoverable credentials
- Can only be second factor after account registration with password
- Enrollment required on each device

Resources

<https://learnpasskeys.io>

<https://webauthn.me/passkeys>

<https://passkeys.dev>

<https://passkey.org>

<https://fidoalliance.org/passkeys>



Auth0 by Okta

Make login our problem. Not yours.

How we can help:



Authentication



Authorization



Security

Single Sign-On | Adaptive Multi-Factor Authentication | Universal Login | Passwordless |
Bot Detection & Prevention | Security Center | Breached Password Detection |
Brute Force Protection | FGA



Try Free Today:

Free Plan (forever) \$0
Up to 7,500 monthly active users. Unlimited user logins. Includes passkeys support*.
No credit card required.

Special Plans for Startups & Nonprofits

Plans for Everyone

B2C: your users are consumers
B2B: your users are businesses or a mix of businesses and consumers

Enterprise: Best for production applications that need to scale - Contact Us

Thank You



Subscribe to our newsletter

a0.to/nl-signup/java



*Try our free Spring Boot
microservices workshop*

a0.to/spring-boot

