

1 Overture SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS

$v \in \mathbb{F}_p$, $w \in \text{String}$, $\iota \in \text{Clients} \subset \mathbb{N}$

$\varepsilon ::= r[w] \mid s[w] \mid m[w] \mid p[w] \mid$ *expressions*
 $v \mid \varepsilon - \varepsilon \mid \varepsilon + \varepsilon \mid \varepsilon * \varepsilon$

$x ::= r[w]@_\iota \mid s[w]@_\iota \mid m[w]@_\iota \mid p[w] \mid \text{out}@_\iota$ *variables*

$\pi ::= m[w]@_\iota := \varepsilon@_\iota \mid p[w] := e@_\iota \mid \text{out}@_\iota := \varepsilon@_\iota \mid \pi; \pi$ *protocols*

$$\begin{aligned} \llbracket \sigma, v \rrbracket_\iota &= v \\ \llbracket \sigma, \varepsilon_1 + \varepsilon_2 \rrbracket_\iota &= \llbracket \llbracket \sigma, \varepsilon_1 \rrbracket_\iota + \llbracket \sigma, \varepsilon_2 \rrbracket_\iota \rrbracket \\ \llbracket \sigma, \varepsilon_1 - \varepsilon_2 \rrbracket_\iota &= \llbracket \llbracket \sigma, \varepsilon_1 \rrbracket_\iota - \llbracket \sigma, \varepsilon_2 \rrbracket_\iota \rrbracket \\ \llbracket \sigma, \varepsilon_1 * \varepsilon_2 \rrbracket_\iota &= \llbracket \llbracket \sigma, \varepsilon_1 \rrbracket_\iota * \llbracket \sigma, \varepsilon_2 \rrbracket_\iota \rrbracket \\ \llbracket \sigma, r[w] \rrbracket_\iota &= \sigma(r[w]@_\iota) \\ \llbracket \sigma, s[w] \rrbracket_\iota &= \sigma(s[w]@_\iota) \\ \llbracket \sigma, m[w] \rrbracket_\iota &= \sigma(m[w]@_\iota) \\ \llbracket \sigma, p[w] \rrbracket_\iota &= \sigma(p[w]) \end{aligned}$$

$$\frac{(\sigma, x := \varepsilon@_\iota) \Rightarrow \sigma\{x \mapsto \llbracket \sigma, \varepsilon \rrbracket_\iota\} \quad \frac{(\sigma_1, \pi_1) \Rightarrow \sigma_2 \quad (\sigma_2, \pi_2) \Rightarrow \sigma_3}{(\sigma_1, \pi_1; \pi_2) \Rightarrow \sigma_3}}{(\sigma, x := \varepsilon@_\iota) \Rightarrow \sigma\{x \mapsto \llbracket \sigma, \varepsilon \rrbracket_\iota\}}$$

2 Overture CONSTRAINT TYPING

2.1 Constraint Satisfiability Modulo Finite Fields

$$\begin{aligned} \phi &::= x \mid \phi + \phi \mid \phi - \phi \mid \phi * \phi \\ E &::= \phi \equiv \phi \mid E \wedge E \end{aligned}$$

We write $E_1 \models E_2$ iff every model of E_1 is a model of E_2 . Note that this relation is reflexive and transitive.

$$\begin{aligned} \lfloor x \rfloor &= x & \lfloor \varepsilon_1 + \varepsilon_2@_\iota \rfloor &= \lfloor \varepsilon_2@_\iota \rfloor + \lfloor \varepsilon_1@_\iota \rfloor & \lfloor \varepsilon_1 - \varepsilon_2@_\iota \rfloor &= \lfloor \varepsilon_2@_\iota \rfloor - \lfloor \varepsilon_1@_\iota \rfloor \\ \lfloor \varepsilon_1 * \varepsilon_2@_\iota \rfloor &= \lfloor \varepsilon_2@_\iota \rfloor * \lfloor \varepsilon_1@_\iota \rfloor \end{aligned}$$

$$\lfloor \text{OT}(\varepsilon_1@_{\iota_1}, \varepsilon_2, \varepsilon_3)@_{\iota_2} \rfloor = (\lfloor \varepsilon_1@_{\iota_1} \rfloor \wedge \lfloor \varepsilon_3@_{\iota_2} \rfloor) \vee (\neg \lfloor \varepsilon_1@_{\iota_1} \rfloor \wedge \lfloor \varepsilon_2@_{\iota_2} \rfloor)$$

$$\lfloor x := \varepsilon@_\iota \rfloor = x \equiv \lfloor \varepsilon@_\iota \rfloor \quad \lfloor \pi_1; \pi_2 \rfloor = \lfloor \pi_1 \rfloor \wedge \lfloor \pi_2 \rfloor$$

The motivating idea is that we can interpret any protocol π as a set of equality constraints $\lfloor \pi \rfloor$ and use an SMT solver to verify properties relevant to correctness, confidentiality, and integrity. Further, we can leverage entailment relation is critical for efficiency– we can use annotations to obtain a weakened precondition for relevant properties. That is, given π , program annotations or other cues can be used to find a minimal E with $\lfloor \pi \rfloor \models E$ for verifying correctness and security.

2.1.1 Example: Correctness of 3-Party Addition.

```

m[s1]@2 := (s[1] - r[local] - r[x])@1
m[s1]@3 := r[x]@1
m[s2]@1 := (s[2] - r[local] - r[x])@2
m[s2]@3 := r[x]@2
m[s3]@1 := (s[3] - r[local] - r[x])@3
m[s3]@2 := r[x]@3
p[1] := (r[local] + m[s2] + m[s3])@1
p[2] := (m[s1] + r[local] + m[s3])@2
p[3] := (m[s1] + m[s2] + r[local])@3
out@1 := (p[1] + p[2] + p[3])@1
out@2 := (p[1] + p[2] + p[3])@2
out@3 := (p[1] + p[2] + p[3])@3

```

Letting π be this protocol, we can verify correctness as:

$$[\pi] \models \text{out}@3 \equiv s[1]@1 + s[2]@2 + s[3]@3$$

2.2 Confidentiality Types

```

t ::= x | c(x, T)
T ∈ 2t
Γ ::= ∅ | Γ; x : T

```

Definition 2.1. $R_1; R_2 = R_1 \cup R_2$ iff $R_1 \cap R_2 = \emptyset$.

$\frac{\text{DEFTY}}{\emptyset, E \vdash \phi : \text{vars}(\phi)}$	$\frac{\text{ENCODE} \quad E \models \phi \equiv \phi' \oplus r[w]@_t \quad \oplus \in \{+, -\} \quad R, E \vdash \phi' : T}{R; \{r[w]@_t\}, E \vdash \phi : \{c(r[w]@_t, T)\}}$
$\frac{\text{SEND} \quad R, E \vdash [\varepsilon@_t] : T}{R, E \vdash x := \varepsilon@_t : (x : T)}$	$\frac{\text{SEQ} \quad R_1, E \vdash \pi_1 : \Gamma_1 \quad R_2, E \vdash \pi_2 : \Gamma_2}{R_1; R_2, E \vdash \pi_1; \pi_2 : \Gamma_1; \Gamma_2}$

Definition 2.2. $R, E \vdash \pi : \Gamma$ is *valid* iff it is derivable and $[\pi] \models E$.

$\frac{\iota \in C}{\Gamma, C \vdash_{\text{leak}} \Gamma(m[w]@_t)}$	$\frac{\Gamma, C \vdash_{\text{leak}} T_1 \cup T_2}{\Gamma, C \vdash_{\text{leak}} T_1}$	$\frac{\Gamma, C \vdash_{\text{leak}} \{m[w]@_t\}}{\Gamma, C \vdash_{\text{leak}} \Gamma(m[w]@_t)}$
$\frac{\Gamma, C \vdash_{\text{leak}} \{r[w]@_t\} \quad \Gamma, C \vdash_{\text{leak}} \{c(r[w]@_t, T)\}}{\Gamma, C \vdash_{\text{leak}} T}$		

THEOREM 2.3. *If $R, E \vdash \pi : \Gamma$ is valid and there exists no H, C and $s[w]@_t$ for $\iota \in H$ with $\Gamma, C \vdash_{\text{leak}} \{s[w]@_t\}$, then π satisfies gradual release.*

2.2.1 Examples.

```

m[s1]@2 := (s[1] - r[local] - r[x])@1
m[s1]@3 := r[x]@1

// m[s1]@2 : { c(r[x]@1, { c(r[local]@1, {s[1]@1} ) } ) }
// m[s1]@3 : { r[x]@1 }

```

```

50 m[x]@1 := s2(s[x], -r[x], r[x])@2
51
52 // m[x]@1 == s[x]@2 + -r[x]@2
53 // m[x]@1 : { c(r[x]@2, { s[x]@2 }) }
54
55 m[y]@1 := OT(s[y]@1, -r[y], r[y])@2
56
57 // m[y]@1 == s[y]@1 + -r[y]@2
58 // m[y]@1 : { c(r[y]@2, { s[y]@1 }) }
59

```

3 Overture ADVERSARIAL SEMANTICS

$$\begin{aligned}
 (\sigma, x := \varepsilon @ \iota) &\Rightarrow_{\mathcal{A}} \sigma \{x \mapsto \llbracket \sigma, \varepsilon \rrbracket_{\iota}\} & \iota \in H \\
 (\sigma, x := \varepsilon @ \iota) &\Rightarrow_{\mathcal{A}} \sigma \{x \mapsto \llbracket \text{rewrite}_{\mathcal{A}}(\sigma_C, \varepsilon) \rrbracket_{\iota}\} & \iota \in C
 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 (\sigma, \text{assert}(\varepsilon_1 = \varepsilon_2) @ \iota) &\Rightarrow_{\mathcal{A}} \sigma & \text{if } \llbracket \sigma, \varepsilon_1 \rrbracket_{\iota} = \llbracket \sigma, \varepsilon_2 \rrbracket_{\iota} \text{ or } \iota \in C \\
 (\sigma, \text{assert}(\phi(\varepsilon)) @ \iota) &\Rightarrow_{\mathcal{A}} \perp & \text{if } \neg \phi(\sigma, \llbracket \sigma, \varepsilon \rrbracket_{\iota})
 \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned}
 &\frac{(\sigma_1, \pi_1) \Rightarrow_{\mathcal{A}} \sigma_2 \quad (\sigma_2, \pi_2) \Rightarrow_{\mathcal{A}} \sigma_3}{(\sigma_1, \pi_1; \pi_2) \Rightarrow_{\mathcal{A}} \sigma_3} & \frac{(\sigma_1, \pi_1) \Rightarrow_{\mathcal{A}} \perp}{(\sigma_1, \pi_1; \pi_2) \Rightarrow_{\mathcal{A}} \perp} \\
 &\frac{(\sigma_1, \pi_1) \Rightarrow_{\mathcal{A}} \sigma_2 \quad (\sigma_2, \pi_2) \Rightarrow_{\mathcal{A}} \perp}{(\sigma_1, \pi_1; \pi_2) \Rightarrow_{\mathcal{A}} \perp}
 \end{aligned}$$

3.1 Compositional Type Verification in *Prelude*

$\ell \in \text{Field}, y \in \text{EVar}, f \in \text{FName}$
 $e ::= \nu \mid r[e] \mid s[e] \mid m[e] \mid p[e] \mid e \text{ binop } e \mid \text{let } y = e \text{ in } e \mid f(e, \dots, e) \mid \{\ell = e; \dots; \ell = e\} \mid e.\ell$
 $c ::= m[e]@e := e@e \mid p[e] := e@e \mid \text{out}@e := e@e \mid \text{assert}(e = e)@e \mid f(e, \dots, e) \mid c; c \mid \text{pre}(E) \mid \text{post}(E)$
 $\text{binop} ::= + \mid - \mid * \mid ++$
 $\nu ::= w \mid \iota \mid \varepsilon \mid \{\ell = \nu; \dots; \ell = \nu\}$
 $fn ::= f(y, \dots, y)\{e\} \mid f(y, \dots, y)\{c\}$
 $\phi ::= r[e]@e \mid s[e]@e \mid m[e]@e \mid p[e] \mid \text{out}@e \mid \phi + \phi \mid \phi - \phi \mid \phi * \phi$
 $E ::= \phi \equiv \phi \mid E \wedge E$

$$\begin{aligned}
 R \Vdash x : (\emptyset, \{x\}) &\quad \frac{R \Vdash \phi : (R_1, T) \quad r[w]@_{\iota} \notin R \quad \oplus \in \{+, -\}}{R_1 \Vdash \phi \oplus r[w]@_{\iota} : (R_1 \cup \{r[w]@_{\iota}\}, \{c(r[w]@_{\iota}, T)\})} \\
 &\quad \frac{R \Vdash \phi_1 : (R_1, T_1) \quad R \Vdash \phi_2 : (R_2, T_2) \quad \oplus \in \{+, -, *\}}{R_1 \Vdash \phi_1 \oplus \phi_2 : (R_1; R_2, T_1 \cup T_2)}
 \end{aligned}$$

(*Need to fix the following to allow reduction of x . – Chris*)

$$\begin{array}{c}
 \text{MMSG} \\
 \frac{e_1 \Rightarrow \varepsilon \quad e_2 \Rightarrow \iota \quad R_1 \Vdash [\varepsilon @ \iota] : (R_2, T)}{R_1 \vdash x := e_1 @ e_2 : \{E\} \ x : T, R_1; R_2 \ \{E \wedge x \equiv [\varepsilon @ \iota]\}} \\
 \\
 \text{ENCODE} \\
 \frac{e_1 \Rightarrow \varepsilon \quad e_2 \Rightarrow \iota \quad e_3 \Rightarrow \phi \quad E \models [\varepsilon @ \iota] \equiv \phi \quad R_1 \Vdash \phi : (R_2, T)}{R_1 \vdash x := e_1 @ e_2 \text{ as } e_3 : \{E\} \ x : T, R_1; R_2 \ \{E \wedge x \equiv \phi\}} \\
 \\
 \text{APP} \\
 \frac{\text{sig}(f) = \Pi x_1, \dots, x_n. \{E_1\} \ \Gamma, R \ \{E_2\} \quad e_1 \Rightarrow v_1 \ \dots \ e_n \Rightarrow v_n \quad \rho = [v_1/x_1] \ \dots \ [v_n/x_n] \quad E \models \rho(E_1)}{R_1 \vdash f(e_1, \dots, e_n) : \{E\} \ \rho(\Gamma), R_1; \rho(R) \ \{E \wedge \rho(E_2)\}} \\
 \\
 \text{SEQ} \\
 \frac{R_1 \vdash \pi_1 : \{E_1\} \ \Gamma_2, R_2 \ \{E_2\} \quad R_1 \vdash \pi_2 : \{E_2\} \ \Gamma_3, R_3 \ \{E_3\}}{R_1 \vdash \pi_1; \pi_2 : \{E_1\} \ \Gamma_2; \Gamma_3, R_2; R_3 \ \{E_3\}} \\
 \\
 \text{SIG} \\
 \frac{\rho = [v_1/x_1] \ \dots \ [v_n/x_n] \quad \emptyset \vdash \rho(c) : \{\rho(E_1)\} \ \rho(\Gamma), \rho(R) \ \{E\} \quad E \models \rho(E_2) \quad C(f) = x_1, \dots, x_n, c}{f : \Pi x_1, \dots, x_n. \{E_1\} \ \Gamma, R \ \{E_2\}}
 \end{array}$$

Definition 3.1. sig is verified iff $f : \text{sig}(f)$ is valid for all $f \in \text{dom}(\text{sig})$.

The following theorem holds for protocols with default preprocessing.

THEOREM 3.2. If sig is verified and $\emptyset \vdash e : \{\emptyset\} \ \Gamma, R \ \{E\}$ then $e \Rightarrow \pi$ and $R, E \vdash \pi : \Gamma$ is valid.

3.1.1 Examples.

```

andtableygc(g,x,y)
{
  let table = (~r[g],~r[g],~r[g],r[g])
  in permute4(r[x],r[y],table)
}

m[x]@1 := s2(s[x],r[x],~r[x])@2 as s[x]@2 xor r[x]@2

// m[x]@1 : { c(r[x]@2, { s[x]@2 }) }

m[y]@1 := OT(s[y]@1,r[y],~r[y])@2 as s[y]@1 xor r[y]@2;

// m[y]@1 : { c(r[y]@2, { s[y]@1 }) }

m[ag]@1 := OT4(m[x]@1, m[y]@1, andtable(ag,r[x],r[y]))@2
as ~( (r[x]@2 = m[x]@1) and (r[y]@2 = m[y]@1) ) xor r[ag]@2

// m[ag]@1 : { c(r[ag]@2, { r[x]@2, r[y]@2, m[x]@1, m[y]@1 }) }

```

```

148 p[o] := OT2(m[ag]@1, perm2(r[ag],(false,true)))@2
149
150 // p[o] : { c(r[ag]@2, {r[x]@2, r[y]@2, m[x]@1, m[y]@1}), r[ag]@2 }
151
152 out@1 := p[o]@1
153
154 // out@1 == s[x] and s[y]
155
156 encodegmw(in, i1, i2) {
157   m[in]@i2 := (s[in] xor r[in])@i1;
158   m[in]@i1 := r[in]@i1
159 }
160
161 andtablegmw(x, y, z) {
162   let r11 = r[z] xor (m[x] xor true) and (m[y] xor true) in
163   let r10 = r[z] xor (m[x] xor true) and (m[y] xor false) in
164   let r01 = r[z] xor (m[x] xor false) and (m[y] xor true) in
165   let r00 = r[z] xor (m[x] xor false) and (m[y] xor false) in
166   { row1 = r11; row2 = r10; row3 = r01; row4 = r00 }
167 }
168
169 andgmw(z, x, y) {
170   let table = andtablegmw(x,y,z) in
171   m[z]@2 := OT4(m[x],m[y],table,2,1)
172   as ~((m[x]@1 xor m[x]@2) and (m[y]@1 xor m[y]@2)) xor r[z]@1;
173   m[z]@1 := r[z]@1
174 }
175
176 // and gate correctness postcondition
177 { } andgmw { m[z]@1 xor m[z]@2 == (m[x]@1 xor m[x]@2) and (m[y]@1 xor m[y]@2) }
178
179 // and gate type
180 andgmw :
181   Pi z,x,y .
182   { }
183   { { r[z]@1 },
184     (m[z]@1 : { r[z]@1 }; m[z]@2 : {c(r[z]@1, { m[x]@1, m[x]@2, m[y]@1, m[y]@2 })} ),
185     m[z]@1 xor m[z]@2 == (m[x]@1 xor m[x]@2) and (m[y]@1 xor m[y]@2)}
186
187 xorgmw(z, x, y) {
188   m[z]@1 := (m[x] xor m[y])@1; m[z]@2 := (m[x] xor m[y])@2;
189 }
190
191 decodegmw(z) {
192   p["1"] := m[z]@1; p["2"] := m[z]@2;
193   out@1 := (p["1"] xor p["2"])@1;
194   out@2 := (p["1"] xor p["2"])@2
195 }
196

```

```

197
198 prot() {
199   encodegmw("x", 2, 1);
200   encodegmw("y", 2, 1);
201   encodegmw("z", 1, 2);
202   andgmw("g1", "x", "z");
203   xorgmw("g2", "g1", "y");
204   decodegmw("g2")
205 }
206
207 {} prot { out@1 == (s["x"]@1 and s["z"]@2) xor s["y"]@1 }
208
209

```

3.2 Integrity Types

VALUE	SECRET	RANDO
$\Gamma, \emptyset, E \vdash_i v : \emptyset \cdot \text{High}$	$\Gamma, \emptyset, E \vdash_i s[w] : \{s[w]@i\} \cdot \mathcal{L}(i)$	$\Gamma, \emptyset, E \vdash_i r[w] : \{r[w]@i\} \cdot \mathcal{L}(i)$
MESG	PUBM	INTEGRITYWEAKEN
$\Gamma, \emptyset, E \vdash_i m[w] : \Gamma(m[w]@i)$	$\Gamma, \emptyset, E \vdash_i p[w] : \Gamma(p[w])$	$\frac{\Gamma, R, E \vdash_i \varepsilon : T \cdot \zeta_1 \quad \zeta_1 \leq \zeta_2}{\Gamma, R, E \vdash_i \varepsilon : T \cdot \zeta_2}$
ENCODE		
$\frac{\Gamma, \emptyset, E \vdash_i \varepsilon : T \cdot \zeta \quad E \models \lfloor \varepsilon@i \rfloor = \phi \oplus r[w]@i' \quad \oplus \in \{+, -\}}{\Gamma, r[w]@i, E \vdash_i \varepsilon : \{c(r[w]@i', \Gamma(\phi))\} \cdot \zeta}$		
BINOP		
$\frac{\Gamma, R_1, E \vdash_i \varepsilon_1 : T_1 \cdot \zeta \quad \Gamma, R_2, E \vdash_i \varepsilon_2 : T_2 \cdot \zeta \quad \oplus \in \{+, -, *\}}{\Gamma, R_1; R_2, E \vdash_i \varepsilon_1 \oplus \varepsilon_2 : T_1 \cup T_2 \cdot \zeta}$		
SEND		ASSERT
$\frac{\Gamma, R, E \vdash_i \varepsilon : T \cdot \mathcal{L}(i) \quad E' \models E \wedge x = \lfloor \varepsilon@i \rfloor}{\Gamma, R, E \vdash x := \varepsilon@i : \Gamma; x : T \cdot \mathcal{L}(i), E'}$		$\frac{E \models \lfloor \varepsilon_1@i \rfloor = \lfloor \varepsilon_2@i \rfloor}{\Gamma, R, E \vdash \text{assert}(\varepsilon_1 = \varepsilon_2)@i : \Gamma, E}$
SEQ		CONSTRAINT
$\frac{\Gamma_1, R_1, E_1 \vdash \pi_1 : \Gamma_2, E_2 \quad \Gamma_2, R_2, E_2 \vdash \pi_2 : \Gamma_3, E_3}{\Gamma_1, R_1; R_2, E_1 \vdash \pi_1; \pi_2 : \Gamma_3, E_3}$		$\frac{\Gamma_1, R, E_1 \vdash \pi : \Gamma_2, E_2 \quad E'_1 \models E'_1 \quad E_2 \models E'_2}{\Gamma_1, R, E'_1 \vdash \pi : \Gamma_2, E'_2}$
MAC		
$\frac{E \models m[wm]@i = m[wk]@i + (m[\text{delta}]@i * m[ws]@i) \quad \Gamma(m[ws]@i) = T \cdot \zeta}{\Gamma, R, E \vdash \text{assert}(m[wm] = m[wk] + (m[\text{delta}] * m[ws]))@i : \Gamma; m[ws]@i : T \cdot \text{High}, E}$		

4 Prelude SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS

 $\ell \in \text{Field}, y \in \text{EVar}, f \in \text{FName}$

$$\begin{aligned} e &::= v \mid r[e] \mid s[e] \mid m[e] \mid p[e] \mid e \text{ binop } e \mid \text{let } y = e \text{ in } e \mid \\ &\quad f(e, \dots, e) \mid \{\ell = e; \dots; \ell = e\} \mid e.\ell \\ c &::= m[e]@e := e@e \mid p[e] := e@e \mid \text{out}@e := e@e \mid \text{assert}(e = e)@e \mid \\ &\quad f(e, \dots, e) \mid c; c \mid \text{pre}(E) \mid \text{post}(E) \\ \text{binop} &::= + \mid - \mid * \mid ++ \\ v &::= w \mid \iota \mid \varepsilon \mid \{\ell = v; \dots; \ell = v\} \\ fn &::= f(y, \dots, y)\{e\} \mid f(y, \dots, y)\{c\} \\ \phi &::= r[e]@e \mid s[e]@e \mid m[e]@e \mid p[e] \mid \text{out}@e \mid \phi + \phi \mid \phi - \phi \mid \phi * \phi \\ E &::= \phi \equiv \phi \mid E \wedge E \end{aligned}$$

$$\frac{e[v/y] \Rightarrow v'}{\text{let } y = v \text{ in } e \Rightarrow v'}$$

$$\frac{C(f) = y_1, \dots, y_n, e \quad e_1 \Rightarrow v_1 \dots e_n \Rightarrow v_n \quad e[v_1/y_1] \dots [v_n/y_n] \Rightarrow v}{f(e_1, \dots, e_n) \Rightarrow v}$$

$$\frac{e_1 \Rightarrow v_1 \dots e_n \Rightarrow v_n}{\{\ell_1 = e_1; \dots; \ell_n = e_n\} \Rightarrow \{\ell_1 = v_1; \dots; \ell_n = v_n\}} \quad \frac{e \Rightarrow \{\dots; \ell = v; \dots\}}{e.\ell \Rightarrow v} \quad \frac{e_1 \Rightarrow w_1 \quad e_2 \Rightarrow w_2}{e_1 ++ e_2 \Rightarrow w_1 w_2}$$

$$\frac{e_1 \Rightarrow \varepsilon_1 \quad e_2 \Rightarrow \varepsilon_2 \quad e \Rightarrow \iota}{(\pi, (E_1, E_2), \text{on}, \text{assert}(e_1 = e_2)@e) \Rightarrow (\pi; \text{assert}(\varepsilon_1 = \varepsilon_2)@_{\iota}, (E_1, E_2 \wedge \lfloor \varepsilon_1 @_{\iota} \rfloor = \lfloor \varepsilon_2 @_{\iota} \rfloor), \text{on})}$$

$$\frac{e_1 \Rightarrow \varepsilon_1 \quad e_2 \Rightarrow \varepsilon_2 \quad e \Rightarrow \iota}{(\pi, (E_1, E_2), \text{off}, \text{assert}(e_1 = e_2)@e) \Rightarrow (\pi; \text{assert}(\varepsilon_1 = \varepsilon_2)@_{\iota}, (E_1, E_2, \text{off}))}$$

$$\frac{e_1 \Rightarrow w \quad e_2 \Rightarrow \iota_1 \quad e_3 \Rightarrow \varepsilon \quad e_4 \Rightarrow \iota_2}{(\pi, (E_1, E_2), \text{on}, m[e_1]@e_2 := e_3@e_4) \Rightarrow (\pi; m[w]@_{\iota_1} := \varepsilon@_{\iota_2}, (E_1 \wedge m[w]@_{\iota_1} = \lfloor \varepsilon@_{\iota_2} \rfloor, E_2), \text{on})}$$

$$\frac{e_1 \Rightarrow w \quad e_2 \Rightarrow \iota_1 \quad e_3 \Rightarrow \varepsilon \quad e_4 \Rightarrow \iota_2}{(\pi, (E_1, E_2), \text{off}, m[e_1]@e_2 := e_3@e_4) \Rightarrow (\pi; m[w]@_{\iota_1} := \varepsilon@_{\iota_2}, (E_1, E_1), \text{off})}$$

$$(\pi, (E_1, E_2), \text{on}, \text{pre}(E)) \Rightarrow (\pi, E_1, E_2 \wedge E, \text{off})$$

$$(\pi, (E_1, E_2), \text{off}, \text{post}(E)) \Rightarrow (\pi, (E_1 \wedge E, E_2), \text{on})$$

$$\frac{(\pi_1, (E_{11}, E_{12}), \text{sw}_1, c_1) \Rightarrow (\pi_2, (E_{21}, E_{22}), \text{sw}_2) \quad (\pi_2, (E_{21}, E_{22}), \text{sw}_2, c_2) \Rightarrow (\pi_3, (E_{31}, E_{32}), \text{sw}_3)}{(\pi_1, (E_{11}, E_{12}), \text{sw}_1, c_1; c_2) \Rightarrow (\pi_3, (E_{31}, E_{32}), \text{sw}_3)}$$

$$\frac{C(f) = y_1, \dots, y_n, c \quad e_1 \Rightarrow v_1 \dots e_n \Rightarrow v_n \quad (\pi_1, (E_{11}, E_{12}), \text{sw}_1, c[v_1/y_1] \dots [v_n/y_n]) \Rightarrow (\pi_2, (E_{21}, E_{22}), \text{sw}_2)}{(\pi_1, (E_{11}, E_{12}), \text{sw}_1, f(e_1, \dots, e_n)) \Rightarrow (\pi_2, (E_{21}, E_{22}), \text{sw}_2)}$$

5 EXAMPLES

```

295
296 secopen(w1,w2,w3,i1,i2) {
297     pre(m[w1++"m"]@i2 == m[w1++"k"]@i1 + (m["delta"]@i1 * m[w1++"s"]@i2 /\
298         m[w1++"m"]@i2 == m[w1++"k"]@i1 + (m["delta"]@i1 * m[w1++"s"]@i2));
299     let locsum = macsum(macshare(w1), macshare(w2)) in
300     m[w3++"s"]@i1 := (locsum.share)@i2;
301     m[w3++"m"]@i1 := (locsum.mac)@i2;
302     auth(m[w3++"s"],m[w3++"m"],mack(w1) + mack(w2),i1);
303     m[w3]@i1 := (m[w3++"s"] + (locsum.share))@i1
304 }
305
306
307 _open(x,i1,i2){
308     m[x++"exts"]@i1 := m[x++"s"]@i2;
309     m[x++"extm"]@i1 := m[x++"m"]@i2;
310     assert(m[x++"extm"] == m[x++"k"] + (m["delta"] * m[x++"exts"]));
311     m[x]@i1 := (m[x++"exts"] + m[x++"s"]@i2
312 }`
313
314 _sum(z, x, y,i1,i2) {
315     pre(m[x++"m"]@i2 == m[x++"k"]@i1 + (m["delta"]@i1 * m[x++"s"]@i2 /\
316         m[y++"m"]@i2 == m[y++"k"]@i1 + (m["delta"]@i1 * m[y++"s"]@i2));
317     m[z++"s"]@i2 := (m[x++"s"] + m[y++"s"]@i2);
318     m[z++"m"]@i2 := (m[x++"m"] + m[y++"m"]@i2);
319     m[z++"k"]@i1 := (m[x++"k"] + m[y++"k"]@i1);
320     post(m[z++"m"]@i2 == m[z++"k"]@i1 + (m["delta"]@i1 * m[z++"s"]@i2)
321 }
322
323 sum(z,x,y) { _sum(z,x,y,1,2);_sum(z,x,y,2,1) }
324
325 open(x) { _open(x,1,2); _open(x,2,1) }
326
327
328 sum("a","x","d");
329 open("d");
330 sum("b","y","e");
331 open("e");
332 let xys =
333     macsum(macctimes(macshare("b"), m["d"]),
334         macsum(macctimes(macshare("a"), m["e"]),
335             macshare("c")))
336 let xyk = mack("b") * m["d"] + mack("a") * m["e"] + mack("c")
337
338 secopen("a","x","d",1,2);
339     secopen("a","x","d",2,1);
340     secopen("b","y","e",1,2);
341     secopen("b","y","e",2,1);
342
343

```



```

344   let xys =
345       macsum(macctimes(macshare("b"), m["d"]),
346             macsum(macctimes(macshare("a"), m["e"]),
347                     macshare("c")))
348   in
349   let xyk = mack("b") * m["d"] + mack("d") * m["d"] + mack("c")
350   in
351   secreveal(xys,xyk,"1",1,2);
352   secreveal(maccsum(xys,m["d"] * m["e"]),
353             xyk - m["d"] * m["e"],
354             "2",2,1);
355   out@1 := (p[1] + p[2])@1;
356   out@2 := (p[1] + p[2])@2;
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