1 Overture SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS

$$v \in \mathbb{F}_p, \ w \in \text{String}, \ \iota \in \text{Clients} \subset \mathbb{N}$$

$$\varepsilon ::= r[w] | s[w] | m[w] | p[w] | expressions$$
$$v | \varepsilon - \varepsilon | \varepsilon + \varepsilon | \varepsilon * \varepsilon$$

$$x ::= r[w]@\iota | s[w]@\iota | m[w]@\iota | p[w] | out@\iota$$
 variables

$$\pi ::= m[w]@\iota := \varepsilon @\iota \mid p[w] := e@\iota \mid out@\iota := \varepsilon @\iota \mid \pi; \pi \quad protocols$$

$$(\sigma, x := \varepsilon \mathfrak{G}_l) \Rightarrow \sigma\{x \mapsto \llbracket \sigma, \varepsilon \rrbracket_l\} \qquad \frac{(\sigma_1, \pi_1) \Rightarrow \sigma_2 \qquad (\sigma_2, \pi_2) \Rightarrow \sigma_3}{(\sigma_1, \pi_1; \pi_2) \Rightarrow \sigma_3}$$

2 Overture ADVERSARIAL SEMANTICS

$$(\sigma, x := \varepsilon @ \iota) \implies_{\mathcal{A}} \sigma \{x \mapsto \llbracket \sigma, \varepsilon \rrbracket_{\iota} \} \qquad \iota \in H$$

$$(\sigma, x := \varepsilon @ \iota) \implies_{\mathcal{A}} \sigma \{x \mapsto \llbracket rewrite_{\mathcal{A}}(\sigma_{C}, \varepsilon) \rrbracket_{\iota} \} \qquad \iota \in C$$

$$(\sigma, assert(\varepsilon_{1} = \varepsilon_{2})@ \iota) \implies_{\mathcal{A}} \sigma \qquad \text{if } \llbracket \sigma, \varepsilon_{1} \rrbracket_{\iota} = \llbracket \sigma, \varepsilon_{2} \rrbracket_{\iota} \text{ or } \iota \in C$$

$$(\sigma, assert(\phi(\varepsilon))@ \iota) \implies_{\mathcal{A}} \bot \qquad \text{if } \llbracket \sigma, \varepsilon_{1} \rrbracket_{\iota} = \llbracket \sigma, \varepsilon_{2} \rrbracket_{\iota} \text{ or } \iota \in C$$

$$(\sigma_{1}, \pi_{1}) \implies_{\mathcal{A}} \sigma_{2} \qquad (\sigma_{2}, \pi_{2}) \implies_{\mathcal{A}} \sigma_{3} \qquad \qquad \underbrace{(\sigma_{1}, \pi_{1}) \implies_{\mathcal{A}} \bot}_{(\sigma_{1}, \pi_{1}; \pi_{2}) \implies_{\mathcal{A}} \bot}$$

$$\underbrace{(\sigma_{1}, \pi_{1}; \pi_{2}) \implies_{\mathcal{A}} \sigma_{3}}_{(\sigma_{1}, \pi_{1}; \pi_{2}) \implies_{\mathcal{A}} \bot}$$

$$\underbrace{(\sigma_{1}, \pi_{1}; \pi_{2}) \implies_{\mathcal{A}} \bot}_{(\sigma_{1}, \pi_{1}; \pi_{2}) \implies_{\mathcal{A}} \bot}$$

3 Overture CONSTRAINT TYPING

$$\phi ::= x | \phi + \phi | \phi - \phi | \phi * \phi$$

$$E ::= \phi \equiv \phi | E \wedge E$$

We write $E_1 \models E_2$ iff every model of E_1 is a model of E_2 . Note that this relation is reflexive and transitive.

1

 The motivating idea is that we can interpret any protocol π as a set of equality constraints $\lfloor \pi \rfloor$ and use an SMT solver to verify properties relevant to correctness, confidentiality, and integrity. Further, we can leverage entailment relation is critical for efficiency—we can use annotations to obtain a weakened precondition for relevant properties. That is, given π , program annotations or other cues can be used to find a minimal E with $\lfloor \pi \rfloor \models E$ for verifying correctness and security.

3.1 Confidentiality Types

DepTy
$$\emptyset, E \vdash \phi : vars(\phi) \qquad \frac{E \land CODE}{E \models \phi \equiv \phi' \oplus r[w]@\iota \qquad \oplus \in \{+, -\} \qquad R, E \vdash \phi' : T}{R; \{r[w]@\iota\}, E \vdash \phi : \{c(r[w]@\iota, T)\}}$$

$$\begin{array}{ll} \text{Send} & \text{Seq} \\ \frac{R,E \vdash \lfloor \varepsilon@\iota \rfloor : T}{R,E \vdash x := \varepsilon@\iota : (x:T)} & \frac{R_1,E \vdash \pi_1 : \Gamma_1}{R_1;R_2,E \vdash \pi_1;\pi_2 : \Gamma_1;\Gamma_2} \\ \end{array}$$

Definition 3.1. $R, E \vdash \pi : \Gamma$ is *valid* iff it is derivable and $|\pi| \models E$.

$$\frac{\iota \in C}{\Gamma, C \vdash \Gamma(\mathsf{m}[w]@\iota)} \qquad \frac{\Gamma, C \vdash T_1 \cup T_2}{\Gamma, C \vdash T_1} \qquad \frac{\Gamma, C \vdash \{\mathsf{m}[w]@\iota\}}{\Gamma, C \vdash \Gamma(\mathsf{m}[w]@\iota)}$$

$$\frac{\Gamma, C \vdash \{r[w]@\iota\} \qquad \Gamma, C \vdash \{c(r[w]@\iota, T)\}}{\Gamma, C \vdash T}$$

THEOREM 3.2. If $R, E \vdash \pi : \Gamma$ is valid and for all H, C it is not the case that $\Gamma, C \vdash \{s[w]@\iota\}$ for $\iota \in H$, then π satisfies gradual release.

3.1.1 Example.

```
m[x]@1 := s2(s[x],-r[x],r[x])@2

// m[x]@1 == s[x]@2 + -r[x]@2

// m[x]@1 : { c(r[x]@2, { s[x]@2 }) }

m[y]@1 := OT(s[y]@1,-r[y],r[y])@2

// m[y]@1 == s[y]@1 + -r[y]@2

// m[y]@1 : { c(r[y]@2, { s[y]@1 }) }
```

3.2 Compositional Type Verification in Prelude

(*Need to fix the following to allow reduction of x. – Chris*)

$$\frac{e_1 \Rightarrow \varepsilon \qquad e_2 \Rightarrow \iota \qquad R_1, E \Vdash \lfloor \varepsilon @ \iota \rfloor : (R_2, T)}{R_1, E \vdash x := e_1 @ e_2 : (x : T, R_1; R_2, E \land x \equiv \lfloor \varepsilon @ \iota \rfloor)}$$

$$\frac{\text{Encode}}{e_1 \Rightarrow \varepsilon \qquad e_2 \Rightarrow \iota \qquad e_3 \Rightarrow \phi \qquad E \models \lfloor \varepsilon @ \iota \rfloor \equiv \phi \qquad R_1, E \Vdash \phi : (R_2, T)}{R_1, E \vdash x := e_1 @ e_2 \text{ as } e_3 : (x : T, R_1; R_2, E \land x \equiv \phi)}$$

$$\frac{\text{App}}{e_1 \Rightarrow \nu_1 \cdots e_n \Rightarrow \nu_n \qquad \rho = \lfloor \nu_1 / x_1 \rfloor \cdots \lfloor \nu_n / x_n \rfloor} \qquad E \models \rho(E_1)$$

$$\frac{e_1 \Rightarrow \nu_1 \cdots e_n \Rightarrow \nu_n \qquad \rho = \lfloor \nu_1 / x_1 \rfloor \cdots \lfloor \nu_n / x_n \rfloor}{R_1, E \vdash f(e_1, \dots, e_n) : (\rho(\Gamma), R_1; \rho(R), E \land \rho(E_2))}$$

$$\frac{S_{EQ}}{R_1, E_1 \vdash \pi_1 : (\Gamma_2, R_2, E_2)} \qquad R_2, E_2 \vdash \pi_2 : (\Gamma_3, R_3, E_3)}{R_1, E_1 \vdash \pi_1; \pi_2 : (\Gamma_2; \Gamma_3, R_3, E_3)}$$

Sig
$$C(f) = x_1, \dots, x_n, \mathbf{c} \qquad \rho = [v_1/x_1] \cdots [v_n/x_n] \qquad \emptyset, \rho(E_1) \vdash \mathbf{c} : (\rho(\Gamma), \rho(R), \rho(E_2))$$

$$f : \{E_1\} x_1, \dots, x_n \{\Gamma, R, E_2\}$$

Definition 3.3. sig is *verified* iff f : sig(f) is valid for all $f \in dom(sig)$.

The following theorem holds for protocols with default preprocessing.

THEOREM 3.4. If sig is verified and \emptyset , $\emptyset \vdash e : (\Gamma, R, E)$ then $e \Rightarrow \pi$ and $R, E \vdash \pi : \Gamma$ is valid.

3.3 Integrity Types

$$\frac{\Gamma, R_1, E \vdash_{\iota} \varepsilon_1 : T_1 \cdot \varsigma \qquad \Gamma, R_2, E \vdash_{\iota} \varepsilon_2 : T_2 \cdot \varsigma \qquad \oplus \in \{+, -, *\}}{\Gamma, R_1; R_2, E \vdash_{\iota} \varepsilon_1 \oplus \varepsilon_2 : T_1 \cup T_2 \cdot \varsigma}$$

$$\frac{\mathsf{SEND}}{\Gamma, R, E \vdash_{\iota} \varepsilon : T \cdot \mathcal{L}(\iota)} \qquad E' \models E \land x = \lfloor \varepsilon @ \iota \rfloor}{\Gamma, R, E \vdash_{\iota} x := \varepsilon @ \iota : \Gamma; x : T \cdot \mathcal{L}(\iota), E'}$$

ASSERT
$$E \models \lfloor \varepsilon_1 @ \iota \rfloor = \lfloor \varepsilon_2 @ \iota \rfloor$$

$$\overline{\Gamma, R, E \vdash \mathsf{assert}(\varepsilon_1 = \varepsilon_2) @ \iota : \Gamma, E}$$

$$\frac{\Gamma_1, R_1, E_1 \vdash \pi_1 : \Gamma_2, E_2}{\Gamma_1, R_1; R_2, E_1 \vdash \pi_1; \pi_2 : \Gamma_3, E_3} \qquad \frac{\Gamma_1, R_1, E_1 \vdash \pi_1 : \Gamma_2, E_2}{\Gamma_1, R_1; R_2, E_1 \vdash \pi_1; \pi_2 : \Gamma_3, E_3} \qquad \frac{\Gamma_1, R, E_1 \vdash \pi : \Gamma_2, E_2}{\Gamma_1, R, E_1' \vdash \pi : \Gamma_2, E_2} \qquad \frac{E_1' \models E_1'}{\Gamma_1, R, E_1' \vdash \pi : \Gamma_2, E_2'}$$

MAC

$$E \models \mathsf{m[wm]@}\iota = \mathsf{m[wk]@}\iota + (\mathsf{m[delta]@}\iota * \mathsf{m[ws]@}\iota) \qquad \Gamma(\mathsf{m[ws]@}\iota) = T \cdot \varsigma$$

 $\Gamma, R, E \vdash assert(m[wm] = m[wk] + (m[delta] * m[ws]))@\iota : \Gamma; m[ws]@\iota : T \cdot High, E$

4 Prelude SYNTAX AND SEMANTICS

$$\ell \in \text{Field, } y \in \text{EVar, } f \in \text{FName} \\ e ::= v \mid r[e] \mid s[e] \mid m[e] \mid p[e] \mid e \ binop \ e \mid \text{let } y = e \ \text{in } e \mid \\ f(e, \ldots, e) \mid \{\ell = e; \ldots; \ell = e\} \mid e.\ell \\ \mathbf{c} ::= m[e] @e := e@e \mid p[e] := e@e \mid \text{out}@e := e@e \mid \text{assert}(e = e)@e \mid \\ f(e, \ldots, e) \mid \mathbf{c}; \mathbf{c} \mid \text{pre}(E) \mid \text{post}(E) \\ \\ binop ::= + \mid -\mid *\mid ++ \\ v ::= w \mid \iota \mid \varepsilon \mid \{\ell = v; \ldots; \ell = v\} \\ fn ::= f(y, \ldots, y) \{e\} \mid f(y, \ldots, y) \{\mathbf{c}\} \\ \phi ::= r[e] @e \mid s[e] @e \mid m[e] @e \mid p[e] \mid \text{out} @e \mid \phi + \phi \mid \phi - \phi \mid \phi * \phi \\ E ::= \phi \equiv \phi \mid E \land E$$

$$\frac{e[v/y] \Rightarrow v'}{\text{let } y = v \text{ in } e \Rightarrow v'}$$

$$\frac{C(f) = y_1, \dots, y_n, e \qquad e_1 \Rightarrow v_1 \cdots e_n \Rightarrow v_n \qquad e[v_1/y_1] \cdots [v_n/y_n] \Rightarrow v}{f(e_1, \dots, e_n) \Rightarrow v}$$

$$\frac{e_1 \Rightarrow v_1 \cdots e_n \Rightarrow v_n}{\{\ell_1 = e_1; \dots; \ell_n = e_n\} \Rightarrow \{\ell_1 = v_1; \dots; \ell_n = v_n\}} \qquad \frac{e \Rightarrow \{\dots; \ell = v; \dots\}}{e \cdot \ell \Rightarrow v} \qquad \frac{e_1 \Rightarrow w_1 \qquad e_2 \Rightarrow w_2}{e_1 + e_2 \Rightarrow w_1 w_2}$$

```
149
                 \frac{e_1 \Rightarrow \varepsilon_1 \qquad e_2 \Rightarrow \varepsilon_2 \qquad e \Rightarrow \iota}{(\pi, (E_1, E_2), \text{ on, assert}(e_1 = e_2)@e) \Rightarrow (\pi; \text{assert}(\varepsilon_1 = \varepsilon_2)@\iota, (E_1, E_2 \land \lfloor \varepsilon_1@\iota \rfloor = \lfloor \varepsilon_2@\iota \rfloor), \text{ on)}}
150
151
153
                                \frac{e_1 \Rightarrow \varepsilon_1 \qquad e_2 \Rightarrow \varepsilon_2 \qquad e \Rightarrow \iota}{(\pi, (E_1, E_2), \mathsf{off}, \mathsf{assert}(e_1 = e_2)@e) \Rightarrow (\pi; \mathsf{assert}(\varepsilon_1 = \varepsilon_2)@\iota, (E_1, E_2, \mathsf{off})}
155
                  \frac{e_1 \Rightarrow w \qquad e_2 \Rightarrow \iota_1 \qquad e_3 \Rightarrow \varepsilon \qquad e_4 \Rightarrow \iota_2}{(\pi, (E_1, E_2), \mathsf{on}, \mathsf{m} \llbracket e_1 \rrbracket @ e_2 := e_3 @ e_4) \Rightarrow (\pi; \mathsf{m} \llbracket w \rrbracket @ \iota_1 := \varepsilon @ \iota_2, (E_1 \land \mathsf{m} \llbracket w \rrbracket @ \iota_1 = \lfloor \varepsilon @ \iota_2 \rfloor, E_2), \mathsf{on})}
157
159
                                  \frac{e_1 \Rightarrow w \qquad e_2 \Rightarrow \iota_1 \qquad e_3 \Rightarrow \varepsilon \qquad e_4 \Rightarrow \iota_2}{(\pi, (E_1, E_2), \mathsf{off}, \mathsf{m[}e_1]@e_2 := e_3@e_4) \Rightarrow (\pi; \mathsf{m[}w]@\iota_1 := \varepsilon@\iota_2, (E_1, E_1), \mathsf{off})}
160
161
162
                                                            (\pi, (E_1, E_2), \mathsf{on}, \mathsf{pre}(E)) \Rightarrow (\pi, E_1, E_2 \land E, \mathsf{off})
163
164
165
                                                         (\pi, (E_1, E_2), \mathsf{off}, \mathsf{post}(E)) \Rightarrow (\pi, (E_1 \land E, E_2), \mathsf{on})
               (\pi_1, (E_{11}, E_{12}), sw_1, c_1) \Rightarrow (\pi_2, (E_{21}, E_{22}), sw_2) \qquad (\pi_2, (E_{21}, E_{22}), sw_2, c_2) \Rightarrow (\pi_3, (E_{31}, E_{32}), sw_3)
167
                                                          (\pi_1, (E_{11}, E_{12}), sw_1, \mathbf{c}_1; \mathbf{c}_2) \Rightarrow (\pi_3, (E_{31}, E_{32}), sw_3)
170
                                                                                    C(f) = y_1, \ldots, y_n, \mathbf{c}
                    \underline{e_1 \Rightarrow v_1 \cdots e_n \Rightarrow v_n} \qquad (\pi_1, (E_{11}, E_{12}), sw_1, \mathbf{c}[v_1/y_1,] \cdots [v_n/y_n]) \Rightarrow (\pi_2, (E_{21}, E_{22}), sw_2)
171
172
                                                   (\pi_1, (E_{11}, E_{12}), sw_1, f(e_1, \dots, e_n)) \Rightarrow (\pi_2, (E_{21}, E_{22}), sw_2)
173
174
           5 EXAMPLES
175
                     encodegmw(in, i1, i2) {
176
                         m[in]@i2 := (s[in] xor r[in])@i2;
177
                         m[in]@i1 := r[in]@i2
178
                     }
179
180
                     andtablegmw(b1, b2, r) {
181
                         let r11 = r xor (b1 xor true) and (b2 xor true) in
                         let r10 = r xor (b1 xor true) and (b2 xor false) in
183
                         let r01 = r xor (b1 xor false) and (b2 xor true) in
184
                         let r00 = r xor (bl xor false) and (b2 xor false) in
185
                         \{ \text{ row1} = \text{r11}; \text{ row2} = \text{r10}; \text{ row3} = \text{r01}; \text{ row4} = \text{r00} \}
186
                     }
187
188
                     and gmw(z, x, y) {
189
                         pre();
190
                         let r = r[z] in
191
                         let table = andtablegmw(m[x], m[y], r) in
192
                         m[z]@2 := OT4(m[x], m[y], table, 2, 1);
193
                         m[z]@1 := r@1;
194
                         post(m[z]@1 xor m[z]@2 == (m[x]@1 xor m[x]@2) and (m[y]@1 xor m[y]@2))
195
196
```

```
}
197
198
          xorgmw(z, x, y)  {
199
            m[z]@1 := (m[x] \times m[y])@1; m[z]@2 := (m[x] \times m[y])@2;
200
          }
201
202
203
         decodegmw(z) {
            p["1"] := m[z]@1; p["2"] := m[z]@2;
204
            out@1 := (p["1"] xor p["2"])@1;
205
            out@2 := (p["1"] \times p["2"])@2
206
          }
207
208
          encodegmw("x",2,1);
209
          encodegmw("y", 2, 1);
210
          encodegmw("z",1,2);
211
          andgmw("g1", "x", "z");
212
          xorgmw("g2","g1","y");
213
214
         decodegmw("g2")
         pre();
         post(out@1 == (s["x"]@1 and s["z"]@2) xor s["y"]@1)
218
       secopen(w1,w2,w3,i1,i2) {
219
            pre(m[w1++"m"]@i2 == m[w1++"k"]@i1 + (m["delta"]@i1 * m[w1++"s"]@i2 /\
                m[w1++"m"]@i2 == m[w1++"k"]@i1 + (m["delta"]@i1 * m[w1++"s"]@i2));
221
            let locsum = macsum(macshare(w1), macshare(w2)) in
222
            m[w3++"s"]@i1 := (locsum.share)@i2;
223
            m[w3++"m"]@i1 := (locsum.mac)@i2;
224
            auth(m[w3++"s"],m[w3++"m"],mack(w1) + mack(w2),i1);
225
            m[w3]@i1 := (m[w3++"s"] + (locsum.share))@i1
226
       }
227
228
229
       _{\text{open}(x,i1,i2)}
230
         m[x++"exts"]@i1 := m[x++"s"]@i2;
231
         m[x++"extm"]@i1 := m[x++"m"]@i2;
232
         assert(m[x++"extm"] == m[x++"k"] + (m["delta"] * m[x++"exts"]));
233
         m[x]@i1 := (m[x++"exts"] + m[x++"s"])@i2
234
       }`
235
236
       _{\text{sum}}(z, x, y, i1, i2) \{
237
            pre(m[x++"m"]@i2 == m[x++"k"]@i1 + (m["delta"]@i1 * m[x++"s"]@i2 /\
238
                m[y++"m"]@i2 == m[y++"k"]@i1 + (m["delta"]@i1 * m[y++"s"]@i2));
239
            m[z++"s"]@i2 := (m[x++"s"] + m[y++"s"])@i2;
240
            m[z++"m"]@i2 := (m[x++"m"] + m[y++"m"])@i2;
241
            m[z++"k"]@i1 := (m[x++"k"] + m[y++"k"])@i1;
242
            post(m[z++"m"]@i2 == m[z++"k"]@i1 + (m["delta"]@i1 * m[z++"s"]@i2)
243
       }
244
245
```

```
246
        sum(z,x,y) \{ sum(z,x,y,1,2); sum(z,x,y,2,1) \}
247
248
        open(x) \{ open(x,1,2); open(x,2,1) \}
249
251
        sum("a", "x", "d");
253
        open("d");
        sum("b","y","e");
        open("e");
255
        let xys =
            macsum(macctimes(macshare("b"), m["d"]),
257
                    macsum(macctimes(macshare("a"), m["e"]),
                            macshare("c")))
259
        let xyk = mack("b") * m["d"] + mack("a") * m["e"] + mack("c")
260
261
        secopen("a", "x", "d", 1, 2);
262
          secopen("a", "x", "d", 2, 1);
263
          secopen("b", "y", "e", 1, 2);
          secopen("b", "y", "e", 2, 1);
265
          let xys =
            macsum(macctimes(macshare("b"), m["d"]),
267
                    macsum(macctimes(macshare("a"), m["e"]),
269
                            macshare("c")))
270
          in
          let xyk = mack("b") * m["d"] + mack("d") * m["d"] + mack("c")
271
272
          in
          secreveal(xys,xyk,"1",1,2);
273
          secreveal(maccsum(xys,m["d"] * m["e"]),
274
                     xyk - m["d"] * m["e"],
275
                      "2",2,1);
276
          out@1 := (p[1] + p[2])@1;
277
          out@2 := (p[1] + p[2])@2;
278
279
280
281
282
283
284
285
286
287
288
289
290
291
292
293
```