# Patterns for representing time-dependent content in OWL 2 ontologies

Niels Grewe<sup>1</sup>, Janna Hastings<sup>2,3</sup>, Ludger Jansen<sup>4</sup>, Chris Mungall<sup>5</sup>, Fabian Neuhaus<sup>6</sup>, Alan Ruttenberg<sup>7</sup>, Stefan Schulz<sup>8</sup>, Barry Smith<sup>7</sup> – (ALPHABETICAL ORDER)

<sup>1</sup>Institute of Philosophy, University of Rostock, Germany

<sup>2</sup>Cheminformatics and Metabolism, European Bioinformatics Institute (EMBL-EBI), Cambridge, UK

<sup>3</sup>Department of Philosophy, University of Geneva, Switzerland

<sup>4</sup>Institute of Philosophy, University of Münster, Germany

<sup>5</sup>Genomics Division, Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Berkeley, CA, USA

<sup>6</sup>Institute of Knowledge and Language Engineering, University of Magdeburg, Germany

<sup>7</sup>Institute for Health Informatics, State University of New York, Buffalo, NY, USA

<sup>8</sup>Institute for Medical Informatics, Statistics and Documentation, Medical University of Graz, Austria

Email: Niels Grewe - niels.grewe@uni-rostock.de; Janna Hastings\*- hastings@ebi.ac.uk; Ludger Jansen - ludger.jansen@uni-muenster.de; Chris Mungall - cjmungall@lbl.gov; Fabian Neuhaus - fneuhaus@ovgu.de; Alan Ruttenberg - alan.ruttenberg@gmail.com; Stefan Schulz - stefan.schulz@medunigraz.at; Barry Smith - phismith@buffalo.edu;

\*Corresponding author

#### **Abstract**

#### Rewrite abstract at the end

**Background:** OWL is a popular ontology development language which is supported by a wide range of tools such as editors and reasoners. It is increasingly being adopted by large scale biomedical ontologies such as the Gene Ontology and ChEBI. A limitation of OWL is that it only allows for the expression of binary relationships (object properties). In the biomedical domain, much of the knowledge that is represented in ontologies is linked to time in some fashion. For example, different developmental stages of an organism have different anatomical properties. Representing this information accurately often requires the use of ternary relations (i.e. with an additional parameter), not supported in OWL.

**Results:** In this paper we present two patterns that address this limitation, *viz.* TR (temporalized relations), which embeds temporalization into OWL object properties, and TQC (temporally qualified continuants), which assumes all continuant instances to be referred to in the context of a time point or interval. A series of 23 modelling examples was created, each of which represented a different type of modelling problems. Each of them

was challenged by one formally expressed competency question. A comparison to a manually created reference standard yielded 16 of 23 concordances for TQC and 8 of 23 for TR.

Conclusions: We found the TQC approach more powerful for addressing modelling problems and getting the correct entailments. TR offers a more compact representation but does not allow for explicit time reference for A-Box entities. Interaction with user communities and scaling experiments will be necessary to reach a decision about which should be the appropriate approach to be followed for an OWL version of BFO.

Keywords: biomedical ontology, time, temporal reasoning, OWL, BFO

#### Background

#### bfo-owl-time-introduction

This paper addresses a challenge that has arisen in the context of the Open Biomedical Ontologies (OBO) Foundry [1] community, in particular in relation to the implementation of the Basic Formal Ontology (BFO, [2]) version 2, in formalizations that use the Web Ontology Language (OWL, [3]). We will refer to BFO in what follows exclusively in relation to these OWL formalizations. The problem is of general interest to the ontology community as a whole, because it exposes and addresses a general weakness of ontologies and other semantic artefacts that use OWL and represent time-related aspects of their domain. The problem is not restricted to the life science context, and is, in fact, relevant to all domains in which objects change over time, or are related to each other in ways that depend on temporal contexts.

According to BFO and other foundational ontologies, a useful upper-level distinction is between those entities that exist in full at all times at which they exist (continuants), and those that unfold in time (occurrents). This is a distinction according to their temporal mode of existence. Temporal information is also relevant when specifying the relationships between continuant entities, particularly – as for most of the life sciences – where continuants such as organisms and their parts, molecules, shapes, and disorders not only persist, but also continuously change over time. They continuously gain and lose parts, qualities, and dispositions. Consequently, any relational expression which makes reference to a particular continuant can have different truth values at different times and would therefore be ambiguous if time were not made explicit in the statement.

The Relation Ontology (RO, [4]) proposed patterns for the definition of biological relations to be used throughout bio-ontologies such as the Gene Ontology [5], ChEBI [6] and various anatomy ontologies [7]. The relations proposed include **part of**, **has part**, **located in**, **participates in**, and **instance of**. The

Relation Ontology specifies exactly how relations at the class level were to be interpreted with regard to time. That is, in order to capture the statement that every red blood cell has some oxygen molecule located in it, the class-level relation statement RedBloodCell location\_of OxygenMolecule (i.e. the red blood cell is the location for an oxygen molecule) should be interpreted as the following first-order logic (FOL) statement:

$$\forall x \forall t : \mathbf{instance\_of}(x, RedBloodCell, t) \rightarrow \exists y : \mathbf{instance\_of}(y, OxygenMolecule, t) \land \mathbf{located\_in}(y, x, t)$$

$$\tag{1}$$

This equation says that at all times that a red blood cell exists, there exists some oxygen molecule (importantly, not necessarily the same one at different times) that is located in the red blood cell at that time. Note that instantiation of continuants such as red blood cells and oxygen molecules is also time-indexed in this pattern.

Most of the RO relations were subsequently merged into the BFO during the redesign project, such that BFO, in its second version, now provides definitions for foundational relations like parthood, participation, instantiation, among others. The BFO reference specification follows the RO pattern, allocating a time index to every relation in which a continuant is one of the relata.

The challenge is that, as can be seen in the above formula, relational expressions with a time index are ternary, that is, they take three parameters, viz. the two relata (which are particulars), and the time index. However, all current variants of the OWL language, for reasons of implementation and reasoning efficiency, allows only binary relations. Thus, when relations such as part\_of are used in class level axioms in practical OWL implementations the time index is lost, which can have surprising reasoning consequences.

#### The relation between OBO and OWL should be elucidated in more detail

The objective of this paper is the presentation and discussion of OWL design patterns that partly mitigate this limitation. It is organised as follows:

#### Revise

In the remainder of this Background, we give an overview of the OWL language and BFO-OWL ontology into which our proposal will be embedded, and outline our examples and competency questions. Thereafter, we survey the existing approaches to the representation of time-dependent information in scientific ontologies and we propose and discuss different design patterns and evaluate them against the given examples in the context of their completeness, user friendliness, and performance profile for common reasoning tasks. The concluding section presents our recommendations for the community.

#### **BFO**

Basic Formal Ontology (BFO) is an upper-level ontology designed to serve as a foundation upon which domain ontologies can be built [2]. It provides a set of upper-level classes and relations whose use helps to mitigate problems that arise when several domain ontologies are used together. For example, the root structure of two ontologies might partially overlap, in ways which leaves the intended interrelationships (for example what is meant by 'process' and 'event', or by 'object' and 'thing') remain unclear. Or the ontologies may make use of similarly named relations without clarifying whether the relations are intended to mean the same thing (e.g., has\_location, located\_in, included\_in,...). Ontologies may further re-implement or redefine classes that are defined differently elsewhere.

BFO offers a small set of foundational classes, together with descriptive axioms, which make use of a set of foundational relations intended to be used in multiple ontologies. Both classes and relations are domain-independent, although it is clearly stated that BFO's focus is on the representation of natural and applied sciences, with biology and medicine as their most important areas of application thus far . Domain-specific relations such as **is\_tautomer\_of** (a chemical relation used in ChEBI) or **is\_about** (from the information artifact ontology) are out of scope for BFO itself, but they should be covered by domain ontologies below BFO, defined according to the RO recommendations.

reference to website or BFO list

The uppermost partition in the BFO hierarchy reflects the temporal mode of existence: continuants are entities that (1) exist in full at any time that they exists at all, and (2) continue to exist self-identically for as long as they exist; occurrents are entities that unfold over a period of time and thus have temporal parts. For example, you are a continuant, while your life is an occurrent. A cell is a continuant, while the process of cell division is an occurrent. This makes clear that, for BFO, continuants may change even while preserving their identity.

BFO is, primarily, seen as an ontology of types (universals) rather than particulars (individuals). Types extend to general classes of particulars. For example, the authors of this article are particulars that instantiate the type *Human Being*; a red blood cell in the aorta of the first author and a hepatocyte in the liver of the last author are both particulars that instantiate the type *Red Blood Cell*. OWL ontologies however, subscribe to a set-theoretic semantics and represent particulars in their A-Box, and classes of particulars in their T-Box component.

Types and classes look,  $prima\ facie$ , isomorphic, and in practice the terms "type" and "class" are often used as synonyms. However, there are subtle differences: some classes can be straightforwardly defined via extensions of types: The class  $A_{class}$ , e.g., is defined as the cross-temporal aggregation of all entities that

BS: is it clear what this means (only for resid types)

 $\begin{bmatrix} \mathrm{BS:\ insert} \\ \mathrm{example} \end{bmatrix}$ 

instantiate the type  $A_{type}$ . However, classes can also be defined using logical operations such as negation, resulting in classes like *Non-human-animal*, which cannot be seen as the extensions of a single natural type.

n BFO, the realms of types and individuals are strictly disjoint. Thus, no individual can be instantiated and, by extension, no class can have classes as members. The relation **instance\_of** links individuals to their types. A single instance may instantiate many different types (or analogously, be member of many different classes).

In the remainder of this paper we will simplify our discussion by talking only about classes (independently of whether they are extensions of types) and about individuals (all of which are members of classes).

Fig. 1 shows the class and relation hierarchy of BFO 2.0.

Whereas BFO 1.x was restricted to a tree of mutually disjoint classes, BFO 2.0 now offers, in addition, an extensive set of relations. Most of these relations relate individuals, not classes or types, which means that when used in class-level axioms, they are subject to an appropriate quantification.

Axioms in BFO2 are mainly of the type domain and range restriction, e.g. they restrict the domain of the relation inheres\_in to specifically dependent continuants, and the range of the relation participant\_of to processes.

#### Web Ontology Language (OWL)

OWL (Web Ontology Language) is a family of ontology development languages developed in the context of the Semantic Web, standardised by the W3C, and supported by a wide range of tools including ontology editors such as Protégé and automated reasoners such as Fact++ or HermiT. The current version is OWL2 [3]. It incorporates several language profiles of different expressiveness. All but the profile OWL2 full are based on Description Logics (DLs), a family of representation formalisms all of which are decidable fragments of first-order logics and used extensively in formalizing domain ontologies [8]. They allow to organize classes and relations into hierarchies, and to formulate constraining axioms on classes and relations. Some DLs, including OWL-DL, also support assertions about individuals.

OWL is increasingly used in bio-ontologies such as GO and ChEBI, and this in turn has been driving further biological applications. For example, aspects of OWL expressivity in ChEBI axioms have recently been used to implement an enhanced measure for class-class similarity [9].

As discussed above, the proper representation of temporal qualification requires the use of ternary relations, with time as third argument, and this takes us beyond OWL's limitation to binary relations. While there has been work on expressive DLs which might underlie future OWL extensions that are able to transcend this limitation [10] and also on description logics that explicitly account for temporality (e.g. [11]), there is currently no strong push towards standardisation of these formalisms, and tools suitable for end users are not yet available. Therefore, for the remainder of this paper, we will work within the expressivity of the core DL profile of OWL 2, which is specified in [12].

article from 1997

article found by Alan

BS: as set forth in Halmos? Or in 2FC or NBG?

The semantics of OWL are formalized using the principles of naive set theory . OWL object properties – what in BFO is called "relations" – are binary predicates between individuals. Well-formed class-level expression therefore require quantifiers when including object properties, such as  $\forall$  (only) or  $\exists$  (some).

For instance, the expression

specifies the class that contains all continuant individuals that are part of at least one member of the class *Cell*. The main axiom types available in OWL ontologies are rdfs: subClassOf, which allow the construction of class subsumption hierarchies, owl: equivalentClass, with which class logical equivalences can be captured, and rdf: Type, with which individuals can be assigned to the classes they are members of. For example,

$$CellMembrane$$
 subClassOf continuant\_part\_of some  $Cell$  (3)

means that every member of the class *CellMembrane* is part of at least one member of the class *Cell*. The big advantage of OWL ontologies is their formal rigor and their well-studied computational behaviour, their rather intuitive syntax (compared to first-order logics), especially when using Manchester syntax [?] the availability of editing tools like Protégé, and their support by DL reasoners like HermiT and Fact++, which perform reasoning tasks such as consistency and satisfiability checking.

#### Representing Time

#### The underspecification of time representations in OWL axioms

Both an axiom in the OBO representational syntax

more on OBO

and the OWL axiom (often considered equivalent)

$$CellMembrane$$
 subClassOf  $continuant part of$  some  $Cell$  (5)

do not exhibit any explicit commitment with regard to time. This is not a side issue, because it makes a difference whether, for example, a cell membrane is *always* part of some cell or only *at some time*. The lack of temporal definition of OWL statements is especially unsatisfactory when it comes to transitive properties like **continuant\_part\_of** or **located\_in**, where the suppression of the temporal factor can produce plainly wrong entailments, especially at the level of individuals, such as in the following example:

If we now assume that **Heart**#431 is later transplanted to **Patient**#115, we also have

located in 
$$(Heart #431, Patient #115)$$
 (7)

This would entail that one of the patients is located within the other, which is plainly wrong. Also, if we assume that the thrombus was no longer in the heart when it was transplanted to Patient#115, then the inference to

located in 
$$(Thrombus #398, Patient #115)$$
 (8)

which follows from the transitivity of the relation **located** in, is obviously invalid.

This has a far-reaching consequence: by default, OWL statements are temporally ambiguous in a way that may entail unintended consequences when domain ontologies are used for reasoning with real data. (A lack of an explicit treatment of temporal context has previously been implicated in an assessment of the quality of existential restrictions in OBO Foundry ontologies [13].)

#### Strengths of Relatedness

We can now propose a distinction between different temporal strengths of relatedness. These are to be satisfied by temporally qualified such as parthood defined in the OBO Relation Ontology and apply to relations between continuants only. We begin by characterising the ontological status of regions of time, henceforth referred to by the symbol t. Times are either time intervals or time points. We restrict ourselves to those ternary relations for which it can be assumed that whenever they hold for a time interval, they also

hold for any of its subintervals, including time points. For example, if a car is located in a garage during a day, then it is located therein at any time interval during that day. If a patient's cholesterol level is elevated for a whole year, it is elevated over any duration of time during this year. In the following, ternary relations are marked by the superscript  $^t$ , like in  $\mathbf{rel^t}$ , from which binary relations are distinguished by  $^b$ , like in  $\mathbf{rel^b}$ .

Formally:

$$\forall a, b, t, t' : \mathbf{rel}^{\mathbf{t}}(a, b, t) \wedge \mathbf{within}(t', t) \to \mathbf{rel}^{\mathbf{t}}(a, b, t')$$
(9)

These are called time-distributive relations.

#### Temporary Generic Relatedness (TGR)

Informally: for all instances a of A there is some time t and some instance b of B such that a is related to b at t. Examples:

- (a) for all apple seeds there is some apple such that the seed is part of the apple at some time;
- (b) for all trees there is some leaf such that the leaf is part of the tree at some time.

Formally:

$$TemporarilyRelated(A, B) =_{def} \forall a, t : \mathbf{inst}^{\mathbf{t}}(A, a, t)$$

$$\rightarrow \exists b, t' : (\mathbf{inst}^{\mathbf{t}}(B, b, t') \land \mathbf{rel}^{\mathbf{t}}(a, b, t') \land \mathbf{within}(t', t))$$

$$(10)$$

#### Permanent Generic Relatedness (PGR)

Informally: for all instances a of A there is, at all times t for which a exists, some instance b of B such that a is related to b at t, but not necessarily always the same b at all times t. Examples:

- (a) all cells have a water molecule as part at all times, but not always the same water molecule;
- (b) every bacterial colony has some bacteria as parts at all times, but not always the same bacteria.

$$Permanently Generically Related(A, B) =_{def} \forall a, t : \mathbf{inst}^{\mathbf{t}}(A, a, t)$$

$$\rightarrow \exists b : (\mathbf{inst}^{\mathbf{t}}(B, b, t) \land \mathbf{rel}^{\mathbf{t}}(a, b, t))$$
(11)

It is as PGR relations that the standard interpretation of OBO binary class-level relations are understood such as in formula (4) above, according to [4].

#### Permanent Specific Relatedness (PSR)

Informally, for all instances a of A there is, at all times t that a exists, an instance b of B such that a is related to b at t; in this case it is the same b at all times t. Examples:

- (a) a human being has a brain as part at all times, and it is necessarily the same brain;
- (b) a radioactively marked molecule of DNA has the radioactive isotope as part at all times, and it is necessarily the same radioactive isotope.

$$Permanently Specifically Related(A, B) =_{def} \forall a, t : \mathbf{inst}^{\mathbf{t}}(A, a, t)$$

$$\rightarrow \exists b : (\mathbf{inst}^{\mathbf{t}}(B, b, t) \land \mathbf{rel}^{\mathbf{t}}(a, b, t))$$

$$\wedge \forall t' : (\mathbf{inst}^{\mathbf{t}}(A, a, t') \rightarrow (\mathbf{rel}^{\mathbf{t}}(a, b, t') \land \mathbf{inst}^{\mathbf{t}}(B, b, t')))$$

$$(12)$$

#### Methods

#### Overview

Our goal here is to find an optimal way to represent, distinctively, the three temporal relatedness patterns TGR, PGR, and PSR in OWL ontologies. Two competing approaches are introduced and discussed, Temporalized Relations (TR) and Temporally Qualified Continuants (TQC). Whereas TR integrates time aspects into the definition of OWL object properties, TQC provides a way to model all instantiations of continuant classes as temporal slices of continuants. The approach pursued in this paper can be summarized as follows:

- Formulation of examples and competency questions which represent typical representational tasks and reasoning requirements;
- Formalization of the TR approach;
- Formalization of the TQC approach;
- Representation of examples by means of both TR and TQC;
- Evaluation of TR and TQC inlight of the identified competency questions.

#### **Examples and Competency Questions**

The following examples (EX) and competency questions (CQ) will be used for the comparison of the two representational approaches. For each temporal kind of relatedness (TGR, PGR, PSR), examples are cre-

ated according to the following criteria: class-level (c), individual-level (i) mereotopological (m+), nonmereotopological (m-), participation (p), with quantification over the participant (p1) and over the process (p2). In addition we will provide a class-level and an individual-level examples for a non-rigid classes, i.e. OWL classes whose members may not instantiate this class for all of their lifetime, such as *Student* or *Em*bryo [?]. For each CQ, its conformance to the corresponding EX is analyzed by the authors and decided of whether it is satisfiable with regard to the premise stated in the corresponding EX. Satisfiability of the example i means that there is at least one truth-making interpretation of the logical theory, consisting of the ontology O, together with the example  $EX_i$  and the competency querstion  $CQ_i$ .

copy the modified wording of the UCs an CQs to the Excel table

 $\bullet$  TGR\_cm+: Every tooth is part of an organism at some time.

Challenged by:

"tooth for which there is a time it is not part of any organism":  $\rightarrow$  satisfiable

motivating the choice of examples

• TGR\_cm+: Every human has no teeth at some time in their life. (For every human there is a time it lacks any part of type tooth)

Challenged by:

"A human having teeth at some time":  $\rightarrow$  satisfiable

• TGR\_cm-: Every apple is green at some time Challenged by:

"apple that at some time has no other color than read":  $\rightarrow$  satisfiable

• TGR\_cp1: Every vertebrate participates in some birth process at some time Challenged by:

"Vertebrate that at some time does not participate in a birth process":  $\rightarrow satisfiable$ 

• TGR\_cp2: Every fecundation has some spermatozoon as participant at some time Challenged by:

"Fecundation event for which there is never any spermatozoon that participates":  $\rightarrow unsatisfiable$ 

 $\bullet$  TGR\_im+: "The blood specimen bs430912 is in the lab996 during the whole time interval 2013-10-20."

Challenged by:

"The blood specimen bs430912 is in the lab lab100 during the whole time interval 2013-10-20. The two labs are in different places"  $\rightarrow unsatisfiable$ 

- TGR\_im-: "Joe's left ankle is swollen during the whole time interval 2013-10-20" Challenged by: "There is a time within the interval 2013-10-20 in which Joe's ankle is not swollen "  $\rightarrow$  unsatisfiable
- TGR\_ip: "Mary participated in the process of Mary's birth"

  Challenged by:

"There is a time in which Mary is not a participant in any birth process"  $\rightarrow$  satisfiable

- PGR\_cm+: "Every red blood cell always includes some oxygen molecule" Challenged by: "There are red blood cells without oxygen molecules"  $\rightarrow unsatisfiable$
- PGR\_cm+: "No apple has ever any tooth as part" Challenged by: "There are apples that have teeth at some time" → unsatisfiable
- PGR\_cm-: "Every electronic health record is always in some computer storage medium"

  Challenged by:

"There are electronic health records that are not in any computer storage medium" ounderbrack unsatisfiable

PGR\_cp1: "Every organism participates in some ecologic process at all times while alive"
 Challenged by:

"There are organisms that do not participate in any ecologic process at certain times"  $\rightarrow unsatisfiable$ 

• PGR\_cp2: "Every breathing process (in mammals) has at every time in its temporal extent some volume of air as participant"

Challenged by:

"There are parts of breathing processes (in mammals) in which no air volume participates"  $\rightarrow unsatisfiable$ 

• PGR\_im+: "Mary's blood always has as part some blood cell" Challenged by:

"There is a time in which Mary's blood is devoid of blood cells" → unsatisfiable

• PGR im-: "Joe's electronic health record always resides in some electronic storage medium"

Challenged by:

"There is a time in which Joe's electronic health record is on hard disk A and another time in which it is only on a different storage device"  $\rightarrow satisfiable$ 

• PGR\_ip: "Joe's breathing process has at every time during which it is occurring some volume of air as participant"

Challenged by:

"Joe's breathing process is without air at some time"  $\rightarrow unsatisfiable$ 

• PSR cm+: "Every human has a brain and it is always the same brain"

Challenged by:

"There is a time in which Joe does not have his original brain"  $\rightarrow unsatisfiable$ 

PSR cm+: "Every brain ventricle is part of a brain and it is always of the same brain"

Challenged by:

"A brain ventricle that is part of a human brain at some time and that is not part of any human brain at another time"

 $\rightarrow unsatisfiable$ 

PSR cm+: "No cell includes always the same volume of water during its lifetime"

Challenged by:

"A cell that always includes the same volume of water as long as it exists"

 $\rightarrow unsatisfiable$ 

• PSR cm-: "Every mammal has the same genetic sex during its entire life"

Challenged by:

"A mammal that is biologically male at some time and biologically female at some other time"  $\rightarrow$  unsatisfiable

• PSR\_cp1: "Every organism participates in its life, at every time at which it is alive, and it is always the same life"

Challenged by:

"Joe participates in two different lives"  $\rightarrow unsatisfiable$ 

• PSR\_cp2: "Every biological life has some organism as participant, and it is the same organism at every time during the course of this life"

Challenged by:

"A life that has for some time a human as participant and for some other time another organism as participant"  $\rightarrow unsatisfiable$ 

• PSR im+: "Mary has 'Mary's brain' as a proper part during her lifetime"

Challenged by:

"There is a time during which Mary has no brain"  $\rightarrow unsatisfiable$ 

• PSR im-: "Tibbles, a male cat, has the same genetic sex during his life"

Challenged by:

"Tibbles is female at some time during his life"  $\rightarrow unsatisfiable$ 

• PSR ip: "Joe participates in his life and not in any other life"

Challenged by:

"Joe participates in a human life and part of his life is a cat life"  $\rightarrow unsatisfiable$ 

BS: not very convincing

• NR t: "Every fetus is an embryo at some time.

Challenged by:

"There are fetuses that were never embryos"  $\rightarrow unsatisfiable$ 

• NR\_i: "John was a medical student from 2001-10-01 to 2007-06-30. Every person who is a medical student was a high school student at some time"

Challenged by:

"John was never a high school student"  $\rightarrow unsatisfiable$ 

#### Formalization of both TR and TQR

Both approaches were expressed in first order logic (FOL). FOL expressions are then transformed in a way that essentially preserves the semantics on the basis of the BFO 2 technical specification [14], but use exclusively binary relations. From the resulting formulas, corresponding OWL axioms can then be derived.

#### OWL Implementation and evaluation methods

The TR approach has already been implemented as an OWL ontology [2]. For this paper we have develop the TQR ontology by removing all TR-specific relations from the TR ontology and adding the additional content required for the TQC solution, using Protégé 4.3. These OWL files are then imported into the specific ontologies that implement the examples. We then assess the two sets of treatment of these examples in light of the above introduced competency questions formulated as DL queries. For each example and either the TR or the TQC ontology we investigate whether (i) the corresponding approach captures the intended semantics, (ii) whether it provides a correct answer to the related competency question, (iii) whether the solution is user-friendly, and (iv), whether it has a good computational performance.

#### Proposed Design Patterns Temporalized Relations (TR)

Of the three types of relational patterns, viz. temporary generic relatedness (TGR), permanent generic relatedness (PGR), and permanent specific relatedness (PSR), TGR and PSR have in common that they can be asserted between individuals: a token a can be temporarily related to a token b, e.g. a specific leaf is temporarily part of a specific plant, or a specific human, e.g. the U.S. president, is temporarily located at a specific place, e.g. inside Air Force One.

In a similar way, two individuals can be permanently related, for example via relations of structural dependence or essential parthood as in your body mass being permanently inherent in your body, or the sun being permanently part of our solar system.

This means that in all such cases we can hide the time argument within a so-called temporalized relation. We will in the following call this approach "binarization". For TGR the corresponding binarized (superscript  $^{b}$ ) derivates of ternary (superscript  $^{t}$ ) relations are introduced as follows:

rel at some time<sup>b</sup>
$$(a,b) =_{def} \exists t : rel^{t}(a,b,t)$$
 (13)

This relation schema can be used in FOL expressions such as the individual-level assertion

or in the class-level axiom

$$\forall a: \mathbf{inst^b}(Leaf, a) \to \exists b: \mathbf{inst^b}(Tree, b) \land \mathbf{part\_of\_at\_some\_time^b}(a, b)$$
 (15)

with the binary instantiation relation **inst**<sup>b</sup>:

$$\mathbf{inst}^{\mathbf{b}}(A, a) =_{def} \forall t : \mathbf{inst}^{\mathbf{t}}(A, a, t)$$
 (16)

Analogously, the PSR binarized relations are introduced as follows:

$$\mathbf{rel\_at\_all\_times^b}(a,b) =_{def} \forall t: \ (\mathbf{exists\_at^b}(a,t) \ \rightarrow \ \mathbf{exists\_at^b}(b,t) \ \land \ \mathbf{rel^t}(a,b,t))$$

This relation can be used in an FOL assertion such as:

or in the class-level axiom

$$\forall a: \mathbf{inst^b}(\mathit{Vertebrate}, a) \to \exists b: \mathbf{inst^b}(\mathit{Spine}, b) \land \mathbf{has} \ \mathbf{part} \ \mathbf{at} \ \mathbf{all} \ \mathbf{times^b}(a, b)$$
 (19)

Different sorts of temporalized relations behave differently as concerns properties such as transitivity. In case a ternary relation is 'transitive', i.e.

$$\mathbf{rel}^{\mathbf{t}}(a, b, t) \wedge \mathbf{rel}^{\mathbf{t}}(b, c, t) \to \mathbf{rel}^{\mathbf{t}}(a, c, t)$$
 (20)

the derived binarized relation is not transitive, if the underlying relation TGR (cf. Formula 13) is not necessarily identical for the conjoints in a transitive chain. If Obama is in Air Force One at some time, and Air Force One is in Oklahoma City Air Logistics Complex (OC-ALC) at some time, this does not imply that Obama was ever at OC-ALC. For the property of having an inverse relation, however, TGR relations face no problem.

$$\mathbf{rel}^{\mathbf{t}}(a, b, t) \iff \mathbf{rel}^{\mathbf{t}}(b, a, t)$$
 (21)

trivially entails

$$\mathbf{rel}^{\mathbf{b}}(a,b) \iff \mathbf{inv} \ \mathbf{rel}^{\mathbf{b}}(b,a)$$
 (22)

If Obama is contained in Air Force One at some time, then Air Force One is the container of Obama at some time.

Matters are different with PSR relations. Here, it can be shown that transitivity is maintained, because by 17 each such relation holds, for all times at which the first argument exists, this is also the case for the second argument, which thereby becomes the first argument of the next link in a transitivity chain. Binatry PSR relations, however, face problems when it comes to the existence of inverses. Again from (17), we see that the scope of the quantification over time is confined to the first argument. This entails the existence of the second argument only at times when the first argument exists. This however, does not preclude that the second might outlive the first. If we say that a certain vertebrate organism always has a spine, this does not preclude that the spine may still exist centuries after the animal's death. This means that the inverse of has\_part\_at\_some\_time<sup>b</sup> is not part\_of\_at\_some\_time<sup>b</sup>, but something like part of at some time at which the whole exists<sup>b</sup>.

But it is the PGR case which is the standard interpretation of class level relations in OBO-RO [4], and thus it is PGR that has influenced the development of biomedical ontologies for nearly a decade. On closer scrutiny, we can now see that some instances of OBO relational assertions in OBO foundy (candidate) ontologies [1] correspond not to PGR but to TGR, for example in the Foundational Model of Anatomy every human heart is asserted to be part of some human organism. Under real-world conditions the heart may still continue to exist after the death of the organism (undergoing preparation for transplantation). Every human may have had teeth, but toothless humans are still humans and teeth can outlive their bearers. In other cases, PGR relations may be specialized as PSR, especially in the case of dependent continuants: the same redness of a red blood cell inheres in the cell as long as the cell exists. Or the surface of your body or the headache in your head cannot migrate to a different body. Nevertheless there are enough cases in which PGR is the only acceptable interpretation, especially if we consider PSR as a specialization of PGR.

A major drawback for the temporalized relations approach is the fact that a PGR relation cannot be expressed by means of a relation between individual entities. For instance, the statement "Every cell nucleus is part of some cell at all times at which the nucleus exists" does not mean that a certain cell nucleus is part of a certain cell. It may become part of a different cell if the original cell fuses with another one. It is therefore not possible to assert PGR relations at the level of individuals. Therefore, the OBO standard case cannot be directly expressed using a temporalized relation.

However, there is a way to use temporalized relations to represent at least part of what is involved when we use relations for which PGR would be the most correct temporal strength. The reasoning is the following: If we want to express that classes A and B are related by a PGR relationship, such as A obo: located\_in B, we may resort to histories, which are occurrents and can therefore be related by binary relations. According

BS: Give a real example to BFO 2, a history is a complete process that is the sum of the totality of processes taking place in the spatiotemporal region occupied by a material entity or site. Thus, the history of a continuant c can be seen as a four-dimentional spacetime worm with a temporal extension that equals the timespan t during which c exists and a series of three-dimensional spatial extensions each of which is indexed indexed by some point  $t_i \in t$ .

Histories can be related by occurrent parthood relations, as in every phase (temporal part) of the history of a cell nucleus is part of the history of some cell (not necessarily of the same cell). Continuants and their histories are related by the **has history**<sup>b</sup> relation (inverse: **history of**<sup>b</sup>).

If we want to express that all instances of the class A are always located in some instance of the class B we can express this in FOL by using the **temporal\_part\_of**<sup>b</sup> relation, which holds between two occurrents when the former is a phase or subprocess (a slice or segment) of the latter, as contrasted with **occurrent\_part\_of**<sup>b</sup>, which is the general inclusion relation between two occurrents. Fig. 2 visualizes a situation, in which every member of the class A – for instance a – is always located in some member of B, here represented by the four objects  $b_1$  to  $b_4$ . This is expressed by the fact that any temporal part of the history of a is part of the history of some member of B.

Formally, with  $h_a$  representing the history of a:

 $Permanently Generically Located In(A, B) =_{def}$ 

$$\forall a, h_a, h'_a, t : \mathbf{inst}^{\mathbf{t}}(A, a, t) \wedge \mathbf{inst}^{\mathbf{b}}(Occurrent, h'_a)$$

$$\wedge \mathbf{inst}^{\mathbf{b}}(Occurrent, h'_a) \wedge \mathbf{temporal\_part\_of}^{\mathbf{b}}(h'_a, h_a) \wedge \mathbf{history\_of}^{\mathbf{b}}(h_a, a) \rightarrow \qquad (23)$$

$$\exists b, h_b : \mathbf{inst}^{\mathbf{t}}(B, b, t) \wedge \mathbf{inst}^{\mathbf{b}}(History, j) \wedge$$

$$\mathbf{history\_of}^{\mathbf{b}}(h_b, b) \wedge \mathbf{occurrent\_part\_of}^{\mathbf{b}}(h'_a, h_b)$$

However, the inclusion of phases of histories does not allow a distinction between location and parthood [15], so that the relation between a pregnant organism and an embryo or foetus would not be distinguished between the relation between an organism and its brain.

This section should be revised by Alan. Especially the following issues should be discussed: (i) PGR for continuant - continuant relations which are not mereological, such as inherence, concretization, (ii) application to process participants

#### Temporally Qualified Continuants (TQC)

A temporal qualification of a continuant is the result of regarding the continuant as something that exists only within a certain portion of time. The temporally qualified entity, whoever, is not an additional entity

BS: this could be fixed by taking sites into account steschu: Example?

from the BFO point of view. Rather the only entity which exists is the continuant referred to as it exists over a specific period of time, which is within the time the continuant entity exists. TQCs are then best conceived as artifacts required to devise a model of BFO in OWL, rather than denizens of reality in their own right.

Formally, a temporally qualified continuant (TQC) is represented as a tuple ' $\langle a, t \rangle$ ', where a is an instance of a continuant and t is an instance of a temporal region.

TQCs are introduced only in the context of the OWL representation of an ontology. In the FOL representation of the same ontology, relations between continuant entities can be expressed in a time-indexed fashion as in 13. We will give a translation from TQC representation in OWL to the FOL representation using ternary relations.

For every continuant there is a temporal qualification that is maximal in that it covers the full temporal region over which that continuant exists. The temporal region over which the continuant exists matches the temporal region within which the history of the continuant unfolds. When instances of continuants are created in OWL, without specifying the temporal qualification, it is assumed that the maximal qualification is what is intended.

A separate temporal qualification of the same continuant entity is a different individual in the OWL ontology (related to a different temporal region), but not a different entity in the domain being represented. All of the different temporal qualifications of the same continuant entity share the property of having the same maximal temporal qualification.

The following additional binary relations (hence, representable as OWL object properties) are introduced into the ontology to support TQCs:

- has\_max (inverse max\_of) is a reflexive relation that relates any TQC instance to its related instance with the maximal temporal extension (which may be itself). Each TQC is related by has\_max to exactly one TQC.
- at\_some\_time is a reflexive, symmetric, and transitive relation that relates a TQC with each other TQC of the same continuant entity. This is expressed by their relation to the same maximal instance.
   We have chosen this relation name for a more intuitive understanding of OWL axioms where it is employed. at\_some\_time is equivalent to the concatenation has\_max o max\_of
- max\_of is a subrelation of at\_some\_time, which is not necessary if has\_max is represented as a reflexive relation)

- The asymmetric, irreflexive, and intransitive relation **has\_time** relates a TQC with its defining temporal region.
- within is a reflexive and transitive relation between time intervals.

#### Ludger: relation "equals"

All TQCs must have exactly one temporal region (thus, the has\_time relation should be considered functional). It follows that instantiation of continuants represented in OWL using the TQC pattern is necessarily time indexed – i.e. a temporal region must always be specified in any instantiation of a TQC. However, for the sake of usability, implementers may wish to assume that when instances of continuants are created in OWL without specifying the qualifying temporal region, the maximal qualification is what is intended.

This can be done with default values relating to the temporal region of the history? Also, how does a TQC relate to a history?

For clarity in the remainder of this discussion, we will use the notation  $A^{TQ}$  to denote the class of temporal qualifications of continuants of type A. Note that in the OWL version of an ontology using the TQC design pattern, only TQCs (and non-continuant types e.g. occurrents) will be included in the ontology. However, we need to distinguish between  $A^{TQ}$  and A for detailing the translation between OWL and FOLand vice versa. The following equation relates an instance of  $A^{TQ}$  (represented in OWL) to an instance of A (represented in FOL).

$$\forall x: (\mathbf{inst}^{\mathbf{b}}(A^{TQ}, x) \to \exists a, t_0, t_1: (\mathbf{inst}^{\mathbf{t}}(A, a, t_0) \land \mathbf{equals}(x, a, t_1) \land \mathbf{within}(t_1, t_0)))$$
 (24)

The intended meaning of the predicate **equals** is identity, and **within** specifies inclusion for temporal regions.

The relation **has max** links a TQC to the max TQC for that continuant. That is,

$$\forall x \mathbf{inst}^{\mathbf{b}}(A^{TQ}, x) \to \exists a, t : (\mathbf{inst}^{\mathbf{t}}(A, a, t) \land \mathbf{has}_{\mathbf{max}}(a, x))$$
 (25)

In the next sections, we will discuss the representation of the three different temporal strengths, linking from the standard representation in BFO FOL through the introduction of temporally qualified continuants to the proposed representation in OWL.

#### Temporary Generic Relatedness for TQCs

We rephrase the definition (10) given above by inserting temporally qualified continuants and derive the form that the relationship takes for temporally qualified continuants and a binary relationship. This is a

fairly transparent translation:

$$SomeTimeRelated(A, B) =_{def} \forall a, t : \mathbf{inst}^{\mathbf{b}}(A, \langle a, t \rangle)$$

$$\rightarrow \exists b, t_1 : (\mathbf{inst}^{\mathbf{b}}(B\langle b, t_1 \rangle) \wedge \mathbf{rel}^{\mathbf{b}}(\langle a, t_1 \rangle, \langle b, t_1 \rangle) \wedge \mathbf{within}(t_1, t))$$
(26)

We then use the at some time<sup>b</sup> and has max<sup>b</sup> relations and the TQC notation to eliminate the tuples:

$$SomeTimeRelated(A, B) =_{def} \forall x : \mathbf{inst^b}(A^{TQ}, x) \to \exists y, z \mathbf{inst^b}(A^{TQ}, y) \land \\ \mathbf{inst^b}(B^{TQ}, z) \land \mathbf{at\_some\_time^b}(y, x) \land \mathbf{rel^b}(y, z)$$

$$(27)$$

check use of () and

This means that the logical form of the expression of 'some time relatedness' is that at least one temporal qualification of A is related to some temporally qualified B instance. However, we need another axiom to constrain  $\mathbf{rel^b}$  in the above to ensure that the portions of time are appropriately overlapping, since  $\mathbf{rel^t}$  holds at one time only:

$$\forall x, y : \mathbf{rel^b}(x, y) \to \exists t, t_1 : (\mathbf{has} \ \mathbf{time^b}(x, t) \land \mathbf{has} \ \mathbf{time^b}(y, t_1) \land \mathbf{within}(t_1, t))$$
 (28)

Now we have derived a binary expression  $\mathbf{rel^b}$  and are free to use this in OWL axioms. Temporary relatedness is thus expressed in OWL as follows:

$$A^{TQ}$$
 subClassOf at some time<sup>b</sup> some(rel<sup>b</sup> some  $B^{TQ}$ ) (29)

Additionally, we ensure that sharing a temporal qualification amounts to being the same continuant:<sup>1</sup>

FIX FOR NEW APPROACH

$$A \text{ hasKey}(\text{has } \text{max}^{\mathbf{b}})$$
 (30)

Ludger: could lead to difficulties

A Box issues to be discussed separately?

#### Permanent Generic Relatedness for TQCs

Permanent generic relatedness is considered by some to be the most common interpretation of temporally unspecified relations in biology. We have previously defined it in (11), which can now be rephrased using

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>Implementers should note that OWL 2 only mandates this for *named* individuals.

the TCQ approach as follows:

$$\forall x: \mathbf{inst^b}(A^{TQ}, x) \to \exists y: \mathbf{inst^b}(B^{TQ}, y) \land \mathbf{rel^b}(x, y)$$
 (31)

Informally, this means that, whatever temporal qualification of an instance of A we choose, it will always be **rel**-related to some temporal qualification of type B, but we neither care nor enforce which one.

This is the easiest and most elegant translation case from the FOL perspective. Moving to OWL, the above axiom (31) appears as:

$$A^{TQ}$$
 subClassOf  $\mathbf{rel^b}$  some  $B^{TQ}$  (32)

The availability and elegance of permanent generic relatedness in this design pattern is noteworthy because it would not be possible in OWL 2 in the absence of temporally qualified continuants, as instantiation of classes and of object property tuples is rigid.

#### Permanent Specific Relatedness for TQCs

Permanent specific relatedness cannot elegantly be accommodated within the TQC design pattern.

If we do introduce an explicit object property, could we hope to arrive at implementing something like permanent specific relatedness (12)? Unfortunately, this assumption proves to be too naïve.

It would require an additional axiom to ensure that only TQCs of the same continuant instance are involved for the second relatum. Unfortunately, we cannot provide an accurate translation of this kind of relatedness into OWL 2, though we can achieve the following first order translation in TQC-talk:

This formula seems really wrong

$$\forall x: \mathbf{inst}^{\mathbf{b}}(A^{TQ}, x) \rightarrow$$

$$\exists y: \mathbf{inst}^{\mathbf{b}}(B^{TQ}, y) \wedge \mathbf{rel}^{\mathbf{b}}(x, y) \wedge$$

$$\forall x_{1}, a: ((\mathbf{inst}^{\mathbf{b}}(A^{TQ}, x_{1}) \wedge \mathbf{has}_{\mathbf{max}^{\mathbf{b}}}(a, x) \wedge \mathbf{has}_{\mathbf{max}^{\mathbf{b}}}(a, x_{1})) \wedge$$

$$\exists y_{1}, b: (\mathbf{inst}^{\mathbf{b}}(B^{TQ}, y_{1}) \wedge \mathbf{has}_{\mathbf{max}^{\mathbf{b}}}(b, y) \wedge \mathbf{has}_{\mathbf{max}^{\mathbf{b}}}(b, y_{1}) \wedge$$

$$\mathbf{rel}^{\mathbf{b}}(x_{1}, y_{1})))$$

$$(33)$$

This would require three variables  $(x, y, y_1)$  to be bound by a quantifier at the same time, which is incompatible with any OWL translation.

The following according to Niels' proposal

Table 1: Overview of results of competency question. Comparison between TR and TQC. The asterisk marks those examples which could con be fully modelled.

(see separate PDF file)

A possible way of expressing (most of) the notion of 'permanent specific relatedness' is a syntactic variant of the 'some time relatedness' pattern:

$$Permanent Specifically Related(A, B) =_{def} \forall x : \mathbf{inst^b}(A^{TQ}, x) \to \exists y, z \mathbf{inst^b}(A^{TQ}, y) \land \mathbf{inst^b}(B^{TQ}, z) \land \mathbf{has} \mathbf{max^b}(y, x) \land \mathbf{rel^b}(y, z)$$

$$(34)$$

In the same way as in formula ?? we can translate this straightforwardly into OWL axioms. Temporary relatedness is thus expressed in OWL as follows:

$$A^{TQ}$$
 subClassOf has  $\max^{\mathbf{b}}$  some( $\operatorname{rel}^{\mathbf{b}}$  some  $B^{TQ}$ ) (35)

#### Results

#### OWL models

According to the specifications two different OWL models for BFO have been developed. The first one, implementing the TR (temporalized relations) approach, is a minor update to the BFO2OWL "Graz" release (July 2012), with 78 object properties. The second one was newly built following the BFO2 specification and extending the set of object properties only by "at some time", "has max" and "spans", with a total number of 58 object properties.

The results of the OWL implementations of the examples can be inspected in the additional files. Table 1 provides an overview of the results. Each of the 23 examples had been implemented in both TQR and TR. In TR the models for STR\_im+, STR\_im-, PGR\_im-, NR\_t and NR\_i were underspecified, as the TR implementation does not address specific time intervals.

#### Numbers will have to be adjusted

Of those competency questions for which satisfiability was expected (n=5), the TR model was satisfiable in one case, whereas the TQC model was satisfiable in all cases.

Ludger: additional tasks for these results would be good

Of the competency questions for which insatisfiability was expected (n= 18), this could be confirmed by the TR model in seven cases, whereas it was obtained by the TQC model in eleven cases.

In detail the following observations are considered noteworthy for the comparison between the two approaches. :

• TR models do not make their semantics explicit, and therefore they are too strong for a certain class of modelling requirements. For instance, we want to say that every tooth is part of an organism at least during some time, but it can have an independent existence outside the organism during some other time. from the body, e.g. teeth. Introducing "extracted tooth" as a defined subclass of tooth, it would inherit the axiom that each instance of tooth is part of some body at some time, which does not hold for anything as long at it instantiates this subclass.

#### to be discussed more in detail, after introducing additional examples

In TR this produces a contradiction, due to the abovementioned reason, whereas in the TQC approach the statement there are temporal slices (TQCs) in which the parthood predicate does not hold perfectly harmonizes with the statement that it holds with other TQCs.

#### contradiction needs to be demonstrated.

- As TR does not provide sufficient resources that would allow for stating a relatedness during a certain time, important inferences such as that an object cannot be at a place p' at a given time because it is already at p (which does not share parts with p') cannot be drawn. However, also TQR here reaches its limits if the reasoning has to account for different, possibly overlapping time intervals. A case in question is our example with the swollen ankle. Both approaches fail to demonstrate the contradiction in the statement that the ankle is swollen during a given time period but is not swollen during an interval within that period.
- As a consequence of the previous observation, the representation of phased sortals, here the embryo / fetus example, is incomplete and leads to inconsistencies in case the phased sortal classes are introduced as disjoint. A distinction between (i) c being a member of  $C_1$  at one time and  $C_2$  at a different time, and (ii) c being a member of the intersection of the classes  $C_1$  and  $C_2$  is not possible.
- As generical permanent relatedness can only be expressed in TR for mereological relations, we would expect a wrong result in the example with a generically dependent continuant, viz the electronic health

find related work, e.g. re Allan's interval calculus and

Table 2: Classification times of ontologies in ms				
	$\mathbf{TR}$	$\mathrm{TQC}$	$\mathrm{TR} + \mathrm{examples}$	$\mathbf{TQC} + \mathbf{examples}$
$\operatorname{Fact}++$	217	185	1,008	2,050
$\operatorname{HermiT}$	$2,\!580$	1,736	41,801	$38,\!665$

record. What happens is that in PGR\_cm- the TR model produces a correct result, however based on an incomplete premise, *viz.* that every data instance is on some storage device only for some time. This model would also hold for data instances that are not stored anywhere during a ceratin time.

• As it should have been expected, TR fares better with specific permanent relatedness. The advantage is exemplified in the PSR\_cm+ reasoning example, where the (wrong) model in which a human gets a brain transplant is rejected. However, both TR and TQC approaches fail with the example of changing sex in mammals.

Classification times were measured for the DL classifiers Fact++ and HermiT 1.3.8. using an 8 core lenovo Think Pad T530 laptop with 8 GByte memory, cf. Table 2.

Results of table 2 should be discussed. How many runs have been measured?

#### Discussion

In the following, we will provide a survey of existing approaches and discuss them in the light of our models.

#### Histories in BFO 2

LJ: move to TR section?

BFO 2, which is currently available as an advanced draft [14], sketches out a more detailed theory of the relationship between continuants and occurrents they participate in. Specifically, BFO 2 makes the assumption that for each material object there exists a special process, the *history* of the object, which encompasses "the totality of processes taking place in the spatiotemporal region occupied by the entity." This means that there is a one to one correspondence between continuants and certain processes, which effectively provides a "bridge" between a 3D and a 4D perspective. Histories have been previously discussed in [16], but there is still no complete formal theory for them.

#### Conventional Modellers' Strategy for Temporalised Relations in OWL DL

As explicit semantics for modelling temporal dynamics are not available in OWL 2, modellers tend to implicitly treat object properties as committing to a "for all times" interpretation in order to avoid obvious problems with the entailed models. For instance, in the Foundational Model of Anatomy (FMA), the object property has part is transitive, and used in axioms such as

$$Lung$$
 subClassOf has part some  $LobeOfLung$  (36)

and

$$LobeOfLung$$
 subClassOf has part some  $BronchiopulmonarySegment$  (37)

If the underlying interpretation were "part for some time", transitivity of the binary has\_part could no longer be taken for granted.

It is surprising that it has not been spotted earlier that virtually all OWL ontologies contain axioms on classes of continuants using binary object properties and leave the exact interpretation with respect to time unexplained. In a similar vein RDF encoded triple data abound in which the temporal context is ignored, or, at best, derivable from the context.

To address this mismatch we sketch here a possible elucidation which consists in a modification of the interpretation function. We here make explicit what seems to be trivial for many OWL DL users, viz. that a DL formula is to be interpreted as the set of possible worlds over which the formula holds, which would also include all temporal contexts.

The general strategy of this interpretation is to augment the interpretations of class members and object properties in the OWL model with an additional time index t which specifies that the entity in question exists (object property holds) at t. Class instances then become pairs and object property instances triples. In order to keep the surface grammar and overall semantics intact, the interpretations of all OWL axioms will be prepended with a conditionalised universal quantification over t hat specifies that the axiom should hold at all times that the entity in question exists. Time instants are hereby external to the domain. For example, the interpretation of a class assertion axiom that asserts that a is an instance of class C, as long as a exists, would then read (domain  $\Delta$ , interpretation  $\cdot^{\mathcal{I}}$ ):

$$\forall t: \langle a^{\mathcal{I}}, t \rangle \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}} \to \langle a^{\mathcal{I}}, t \rangle \in C^{\mathcal{I}}$$
(38)

Table 3: Syntactical representations of (permanent) relatedness expressions

OBO Syntax	OWL (Manchester Syntax)	First Order Logic
[Term] id: $A$ relationship: $\mathbf{rel^b}\ B$	$A \; \mathtt{subClassOf} \; \mathbf{rel^b} \mathtt{some} B$	$\forall a, t : \mathbf{inst}^{\mathbf{t}}(A, a, t) \to \\ (\exists b : \mathbf{inst}^{\mathbf{t}}(B, b, t) \land \\ \mathbf{rel}^{\mathbf{t}}(a, b, t))$

We implicitly assume that  $\Delta$  contains individual/time-point pairs only for those times at which an individual exists. Notably, this is only sufficient to express rigid instantiation: Whenever an individual exists at all, it is also a member of the class it instantiates. The interpretation of temporality-sensitive relations will become clear when we spell out the semantic rules of existential quantification and value restriction, both of which assert permanent generic relatedness because they apply existential quantification over the object property range so that at each point in time a different individual of class B can serve as a relatum. We will use the canonical structural syntax [17] to ease comparison with the specified semantics [12].

#### Existential quantification (rel<sup>b</sup> some B)

ObjectSomeValuesFrom
$$(\mathbf{rel^b}, B)^{\mathcal{I}} =_{def}$$

$$\{\langle a^{\mathcal{I}}, t \rangle \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}} \mid \exists b : \langle a^{\mathcal{I}}, b, t \rangle \in \mathbf{rel^t}^{\mathcal{I}} \land \langle b, t \rangle \in B^{\mathcal{I}} \}$$
(39)

#### Value restriction (rel<sup>b</sup> only B)

ObjectAllValuesFrom
$$(\mathbf{rel}^{\mathbf{b}}, B)^{\mathcal{I}} =_{def}$$

$$\{\langle a^{\mathcal{I}}, t \rangle \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}} \mid \forall b : \langle a^{\mathcal{I}}, b, t \rangle \in \mathbf{rel}^{\mathbf{t}^{\mathcal{I}}} \to \langle b, t \rangle \in B^{\mathcal{I}}\}$$
(40)

In OWL object property assertions the time index is bound through universal quantification again:

ObjectPropertyAssertion(
$$\mathbf{rel^b}, a, b$$
) =<sub>def</sub>  $\forall t : \langle a^{\mathcal{I}}, t \rangle \in \Delta^{\mathcal{I}} \to \langle a^{\mathcal{I}}, b^{\mathcal{I}}, t \rangle \in \mathbf{rel^t}^{\mathcal{I}}$  (41)

Hence, object property assertions specify permanent relatedness. Disregarding the difference between specific and generic permanent relatedness for the time being, this interpretation of OWL 2 at least successfully mimics the semantics of class level relations intended by the relations ontology (RO, [4]) and allows us to think of the syntactical forms represented in Table 3 as equivalent.

This approach also retains standard transitivity semantics of OWL 2 object properties, so that quantification over time maintains transitivity of the relation in question. This can be shown, e.g. for the transitive

relation has\_part: if an organism has some heart at any time, and if this heart has some heart valve at any time, then the organism has some heart valve at any time:

$$\frac{A \text{ subClassOf has\_part}^{\mathbf{b}} \text{ some } B}{A \text{ subClassOf has\_part}^{\mathbf{b}} \text{ some } C}$$

And while there is nothing to be gained by actually modifying OWL 2 to use this interpretation, it is very important that ontology engineers are aware of the implications of their modelling decisions with regard to relations that are sensitive to the issue of temporal strength. However, this approach still has the consequence that "temporary relatedness" cannot be expressed directly in an OWL 2 ontology, so we need to look for more involved solutions to the problem.

#### Reification

A common strategy to work around the limitations of description logics is to represent ternary relations through reification. Reification involves the introduction of a class  $C_{rel^t}$  for each ternary relation  $rel^t$ . The relata of  $rel^t$  are then connected to instances of  $C_{rel^t}$  by three new binary relations  $\mathbf{R_1^b}$ ,  $\mathbf{R_2^b}$ ,  $\mathbf{R_3^b}$ . The instance-level assertion

$$\mathbf{rel}^{\mathbf{t}}(a,b,t)$$

would then be transformed into the following statement:

Changed from list of statements to proper axiom

$$\exists x : C_{\mathbf{rel}^{\mathbf{t}}}(x) \land \mathbf{R}_{1}^{\mathbf{b}}(x, a) \land \mathbf{R}_{2}^{\mathbf{b}}(x, b) \land \mathbf{R}_{3}^{\mathbf{b}}(x, t)$$

$$\tag{42}$$

Such proposals have, with a varying degree of sophistication, seen quite a bit of dissemination in the ontology engineering community [18], but they suffer from unavoidable drawbacks. Most obviously, they are rather complex. This bears the risk of errors in the ontology engineering process and decreases reasoning efficiency [19]. To address the complexity problem, it has been suggested to select reification classes based on what seems ontologically "fitting" for the domain of an ontology [20].

unclear how transitive relations can be expressed by this without proliferation of object properties

#### Welty/Fikes: Fluents

The prototypical approach for dealing with temporally changing information in OWL within a fourdimensionalist framework was provided by [21]. And while the proponents agree that the 4D approach is "clearly not something that immediately appeals to common sense", they also claim that it "gives us another tool to use when solving a practical problem." To this end, they present an ontology that models fluents, i.e. "relations that hold within certain time interval but not in others." This works by considering all entities as four dimensional entities that have temporal parts (time slices), such that the material object property assertions hold (synchronously) between time slices. For example, temporary relatedness could be expressed as in (43).

$$Leaf \ \mathtt{subClassOf} \ \mathtt{inverseOf}(\mathbf{time\_slice\_of^b}) \ \mathtt{some} \ (\mathbf{has\_part^b} \ \mathtt{some} \ (\mathbf{time\_slice\_of^b} \ \mathtt{some} \ \mathit{Tree}))$$

This is by far one of the most straightforward translations of the four-dimensionalist commitment, but it suffers from considerable verbosity. It gets even worse if permanent relatedness is concerned. In this case, the above expression would have to be amended to include an inverseOf(time\_slice\_of<sup>b</sup>) only clause to ensure that all time slices of the entity are appropriately related to a time slice of the other entity.

#### Zamborlini/Guizzardi: Moments, Relators and Qua-Individuals

The commitment that some relational expressions are in fact better accounted for as proper entities is also prominent in Zamborlini and Guizzardi's treatment of contingent properties [22]. For them, certain "material relations" only hold by virtue of a separate truthmaker, the so called *relator*, which is formed by combining the "qua individuals" that partake in the relation. Qua individuals abstract away certain aspects of an individual so that only that information remains which is relevant for the individuals participation in the relation.

Both kinds of entities are examples of "moments" in their nomenclature, which are said to inhere in individual entities and can thus be compared to dependent continuants or occurrents (respectively) in BFO parlance. But while relators might often be appropriately represented by BFO processes, the admissibility of qua individuals into BFO might be questionable since they can hardly be aligned with BFO's realist commitment (where sheer abstractions could only be regarded as artefacts of a persons though process).

Underneath the level of qua individuals (e.g. "LeafQuaPartOfTree") and relators, there is the assumption of an ontology of time slices not unlike the one in [21], such that temporal overlap between the qua individuals related by the relator can be enforced.

Zamborlini and Guizzardi cite as an advantage for this approach that it is capable of representing the persistence of a relationship across multiple time slices without mentioning each explicitly (because the

relator is associated with the qua-individual and not its time slice). This is part of a set of requirements suggested for modelling temporally changing information:

- 1. Avoid duplication of the other time slices if one entity partaking in the relation changes.
- 2. Provide a consistent ontological interpretation of contingent (non-rigid) instantiation.
- 3. Avoid repeating persisting properties for each time slice
- 4. Ensure that immutable properties of an entity cannot be overridden by a time slice.

We believe these points to be a good starting point for the evaluation of any proposal to address the problem of time-dependent relation and should be used to supplement our initial requirements.

#### Gangemi: Descriptions and Situations

#### should specify what is meant by situations here

Aldo Gangemi's DnS pattern [23] deserves mention because it treats time-dependence of relations as a special case of perspectivity which can be accounted for by the very heavy-duty reification mechanism of descriptions and situations. In this case, the suggestion is to use the situation pattern in order to associate the relata and their temporal context with a common situation, which is effectively a reified assertion (a proposition). Again, such entities are figments of the mind and can only be admitted into a realist ontology such as BFO as such – rather than being a general way to refer to arbitrary facts.

Notably, though, Gangemi reminds us of the fact that OWL 2's haskey axiom can be used circumvent the problem of possible duplication of instances for the same relational n-tuple: If a situation S

#### don't understand

were to use the properties has timeStamp<sup>b</sup>, has subject<sup>b</sup>, and has object<sup>b</sup>, the axiom

$$S \text{ hasKey(has timeStamp}^b, has subject}^b, has object}^b)$$
 (44)

would ensure that duplicate entities would be coalesced in the model.

#### Temporal extension to Description Logics

Extensions to description logics to include temporal notions have been proposed by ...

We have not considered these approaches because they are not covered by the OWL specification and do not yet provide mature tools like editors and reasoners.

#### Performance

The benchmark results show no great differences between TR and TQC, however with quite lower classification times for Fact++ compared with HermiT. If adding examples the decrease in performance is more accentuated for TQC compared to TR, which is explained by the lower number of assertions about individuals in the latter, due to the impossibility of representing specific times.

We also observed that declaring the has\_max relation as functional has a negative impact on the Fact++ reasoner, which fails to terminate, while HermiT does terminate. (Check). Setting has\_max and max\_of to be reflexive causes inconsistencies (explanations hint at an interference with existsAt).

#### Relevance (or not) to other top-level ontologies

size=]do we

#### **Patterns**

From a usability point of view, TR may have an advantage due to the embedding of a complex meaning within relations. While the higher number of relations might complicate navigation in relation hierarchies, the axioms built out of them appear more straightforward. However, this requires that users completely understand the meaning of each relation. This is a challenge especially with the inverse relations, and the unintuitive fact that, e.g. 'has part at all times' is not the inverse of 'part of at all times'.

TQC is the leaner ontology, due to a much more concise set of relations. However, it requires a fundamental understanding of the meaning of TQCs. Syntactically, most axioms look the same as in the modelling strategies that ignore temporal qualification. This might be a advantage for the adaption of existing domain ontologies. The expression of "some time" relatedness requires an additional nesting, using the relation "at\_some\_time", which connects temporal instances of the same continuant. In particular, four patterns can be distinguished:

• Class-level assertion A valid for a given TQC individual c:

$$\mathbf{c}$$
 Type  $A$  (45)

• Class-level assertion A valid for all related temporal slices of a given TQC individual c:

at some time value c subClassOf 
$$A$$
 (46)

• Class-level assertion A valid for at least one temporal slice for each member of a TQC class C:

$$C ext{ subClassOf at some time some } A$$
 (47)

• Class-level assertion A valid for all related temporal slices of all members of a TQC class C:

$$C ext{ subClassOf } A$$
 (48)

#### **Conclusions**

In this paper we have addressed an inhering limitation of current OWL dialects, viz. their limitation to binary relations, whereas the current version of the Basic Formal Ontology, BFO2, requires ternary relations wherever continuants are involved. The argument is that relations between continuants (such as spatial location) as well as between a continuant and an occurrent (e.g. participation of an object in a process) are time dependent. Therefore, such relationships require time as a third parameter. Up to now, builders of OWL ontologies have tacitly assumed relational expressions in OWL to range over all instants in time. This assumption falls short of expressing relationships that do not hold for all times the relata exists, which entails improper and underspecified expressions both regarding assertions about individuals and about classes.

Two principally different approaches have been introduced, viz. TR (temporalized relations), which embeds temporalization into OWL object properties, and TQC (temporally qualified continuants), which assumes all continuant instances to be temporally qualified, i.e. referred to in the context of a time point or interval. Whereas both approaches manage quite well to distinguish between temporary and permanent relatedness, they fundamentally differ in their account of the latter. Here, TQC offers a straightforward solution for what we call generic relatedness, which focuses the type of the relata rather than on the individual permanence of relationship. In contrast, TR prefers permanent specific relatedness and only offers an indirect approach to represent generic relatedness, which is furthermore limited to the spatial inclusion relation (expressed as the spatiotemporal inclusion relation between the histories or the related continuants.

A series of 23 modelling examples was created, each of which represented a different type of modelling problems. Each of them was challenged by one competency question, expressed as DL queries for class-level examples, and A-level expressions in case of individual-level examples. They were tested for satisfiability and compared to the theoretically established reference standard.

As a result, concordance with the reference standard was achieved for 16 of 23 representations using the TQC approach, and 8 of 23 using TR. The lower result for TR is affected by its limited expressiveness regarding time-indexed relationships at the level of individuals. Since the reference to time is contained in the (primitive) meaning the object properties, it offers no resource of precisely expressing time-related assertions on the level of individuals. This is possible with TQC. Each individual-level statement in which a continuant is involved is necessarily time indexed. Statements that range about continuants at several time instants require class-level expressions, as classes of TQCs have to be built. More advanced querying, e.g. involving nested time intervals are not supported. They may require an additional rule language, which, however lies beyond the scope of this paper.

reference to Batsakis / Petrakis 2012

The decision whether to prefer TR or TQC as basis of an OWL version of BFO2, will have to been taken after more case studies and in dialogue with the BFO user community.

#### Author's contributions in alphabetical order

Niels Grewe produced the first formalization of the TQC approach and described the related work. Chris Mungall participated in the discussion of the TR approach. Janna Hastings contributed to the foundations of the TQC approach and participated in the editing of the final version. Ludger Jansen contributed to the TQC formalizations and the related work. Fabian Neuhaus refined the TQC approach. Alan Ruttenberg formulated the TR approach and implemented the TR version of BFO. Barry Smith is the main author of BFO 2 and contributed to discussions around TR and TQC. Stefan Schulz contributed to the first sketch of TQC, created the examples and competency questions, the OWL implementations for the TQR scenarios and the examples, performed the experiments and edited the final version.

#### Acknowledgements

Research by NG, LJ and SS for this paper has been supported by the German Science Foundation (DFG), grant JA1904/2-1, SCHU 2515/1-1 as part of the research project "Good Ontology Design". JH is supported by the European Union under EU-OPENSCREEN. The authors would like to thank Melissa Haendel, David Osumi-Sutherland, Colin Batchelor and Veruska Zamborlini for helpful discussions.

#### References

- Smith B, Ashburner M, Rosse C, Bard J, Bug W, Ceusters W, Goldberg LJ, Eilbeck K, Ireland A, Mungall CJ, The OBI Consortium, Leontis N, Rocca-Serra P, Ruttenberg A, Sansone SA, Scheuermann RH, Shah N, Whetzel PL, Lewis S: The OBO Foundry: coordinated evolution of ontologies to support biomedical data integration. Nature Biotechnology 2007, 25(11):1251-1255.
- 2. BFO 2 OWL Group: **BFO 2 OWL Preview Release**[http://purl.obolibrary.org/obo/bfo/2012-11-15-bugfix/bfo.owl].
- 3. Grau BC, Horrocks I, Motik B, Parsia B, Patel-Schneider P, Sattler U: **OWL 2: The next step for OWL**. Web Semantics 2008, **6**:309-322, [http://portal.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1464505.1464604].
- 4. Smith B, et al.: **Relations in biomedical ontologies**. Genome Biology 2005, **6**(5):R46, [http://genomebiology.com/2005/6/5/R46].
- 5. The Gene Ontology Consortium: Gene ontology: tool for the unification of biology. Nat. Genet. 2000, 25:25-9
- 6. Hastings J, de Matos P, Dekker A, Ennis M, Harsha B, Kale N, Muthukrishnan V, Owen G, Turner S, Williams M, Steinbeck C: The ChEBI reference database and ontology for biologically relevant chemistry: enhancements for 2013. Nucleic Acids Research 2013, 41(Database issue):D456-63.
- 7. Mungall CJ, Torniai C, Gkoutos GV, Lewis SE, Haendel MA: **Uberon**, an integrative multi-species anatomy ontology. *Genome Biology* 2012, **13**.
- 8. Baader F, Calvanese D, McGuiness D, Nardi D, Patel-Schneider P: Description Logic Handbook, 2nd Edition. Cambridge University Press 2007.
- 9. Ferreira JD, Hastings J, Couto FM: Exploiting disjointness axioms to improve semantic similarity measures. *Bioinformatics* 2013, **29**:2781–2787.
- Calvanese D, De Giacomo G, Lenzerini M: Conjunctive Query Containment in Description Logics with n-ary Relations. In Proceedings of the 1997 Description Logic Workshop (DL'97). Edited by Brachman R, et al. 1997:5-9.
- 11. Wolter F, Zakharyashev M, Mosurovicz M: **Temporalizing Description Logic: a point based approach**. Bulletin of the Italian Association for Artificial Intelligence 2001, 14:16-20.
- 12. Motik B, Patel-Schneider P, Cuenca Grau B: **OWL 2 Web Ontology Language Direct Semantics** 2009, [http://www.w3.org/TR/2009/REC-owl2-direct-semantics-20091027/].
- 13. Boeker M, Tudose I, Hastings J, Schober D, Schulz S: Unintended consequences of existential quantifications in biomedical ontologies. *BMC Bioinformatics* 2011, **12**(456).
- 14. Smith Bt: Basic Formal Ontology 2.0. Draft Specification and User's Guide 2012, [http://purl.obolibrary.org/obo/bfo/2012-07-20/Reference].
- 15. Jansen L, Schulz S: Crisp islands in vague seas. Cases of determinate parthood relations in biological objects. In *Mereology and the Sciences*. Edited by Calosi C, Graziani P, Springer 2014.
- 16. Smith B, Grenon P: The Cornucopia of Formal-Ontological Relations. Dialectica 2004, 58(3):279-296.
- 17. Motik B, Patel-Schneider P, Parsia B: **OWL 2 Web Ontology Language Structural Specification and Functional-Style Syntax** 2009, [http://www.w3.org/TR/2009/REC-owl2-syntax-20091027/].
- 18. Aranguren M, et al.: Nary Relationship. In Ontology Design Pattern Public Catalog 2009[http://www.gong.manchester.ac.uk/odp/html/Nary Relationship.html].
- 19. Grewe N: A generic reification strategy for n-ary relations in DL. In Proceedings of the 2nd workshop of the GI-Fachgruppe 'Ontologien in Biomedizin und Lebenswissenschaften' (OBML): Mannheim, Germany, Sep 9-10. Edited by Herre H, et al. 2010:N1-5.
- 20. Severi P, Fiadeiro J, Ekserdjian D: Guiding Reification in OWL through Aggregation. In Proceedings of the 2010 Description Logic Workshop (DL2010). Edited by Haarslev V, Toman D, Weddell G 2010:416-427.
- 21. Welty C, Fikes R: A Resuable Ontology for Fluents in OWL. In *Proceedings of FOIS-2006*. Edited by Bennett B, Fellbaum C 2006:226-236.

- 22. Zamborlini V, Guizzardi G: On the Representation of Temporally Changing Information in OWL. In EDOCW, IEEE Computer Society 2010:283–292, [http://dblp.uni-trier.de/db/conf/edoc/edoc/2010w.html# ZamborliniG10].
- 23. Gangemi A: Super-duper Schema: an OWL2+RIF DnS Pattern. In Proceedings of DeepKR Challenge Workshop at KCAP11. Edited by Chaudry V 2011[http://www.ai.sri.com/halo/public/dkrckcap2011/Gangemi.pdf].

## Figures

 $[width{=}120mm]bfograph.png$ 

Figure 1: Classes and relations in BFO  $2.0\,$ 

## [width = 120mm] trgraph.png

Figure 2: Permanent generic location as inclusion of histories. The object a (depicted as a spatiotemporal "worm") is always included in some member of the class B, viz  $b_1$ ,  $b_2$ ,  $b_3$ ,  $b_4$ .

### **Tables**

Big table, encompassing all examples and competency questions. The source of this table is an Excel spreadsheet, from which a PDF file was created

Table 1. Results

examples and competency questions for both TR and TQC approaches. For each example and modelling approach the satisfiability is given: Y = satisfiable and N = not satisfiable. The reasoning example can be inspected in the additional files.

## Additional Files BFO OWL with temporalized relations

This file (bfo\_tr.owl) corresponds to "BFO OWL Graz" as released in July 2012. It includes temporalized relations such as "has continuant part at all times", "inheres in at some time" etc.

#### BFO OWL with temporally qualified continuants

This file (bfo\_tqc.owl)corresponds does not include temporalized relations and strictly follows the relations as provided by the BFO reference guide. All ternary relations are reduced to binary object properties involving temporally qualified continuants (TQCs). For the handling of TQCs additional object properties were added, as described in this paper.

#### examples for temporalized relations

This file (bfo tr uc.owl)contains the examples as described in this paper. It imports bfo tr.owl.

#### examples for temporally qualified continuants

This file (bfo tqc uc.owl) contains the examples as described in this paper. It imports bfo tqc.owl.




Fig. 1

'one-dimensional temporal region''zero-dimensional temporal region'




Fig. 2

	Example		TR pattern		TQC pattern	
	Satisfiabilit	y (ex	pected) Satisfiability	TR	Satisfiability TQC	
+ E	Every tooth is part of an organism at some time tooth for which there is a time it is not part of any organism	Υ	tooth subclassOf 'part of continuant at some time' some organism tooth and not ('part of continuant at all times' some organism)	Υ	tooth subClassOf 'at some time' some ('part of continuant' some organism) tooth and 'at some time' some ('part of continuant' only (not organism))	Y
STR_cm+	Every human has no teeth at some time in their life		human subclassOf not ('has continuant part at all times' some tooth)		human and subClass Of 'at some time' some ('has continuant part' only (not tooth))	
-L	A human having teeth at some time  Every apple is green at some time	Υ	human and 'part of continuant at some time' some tooth apple subClassOf 'has quality at some time' some 'green color'	Υ	human and 'at some time' some ('has continuant part' some tooth) apple subClassOf 'at some time' some ('has quality' some 'green color')	Υ
STR_cm-	apple that is only red at some time	Υ	apple and 'has quality at some time' only ('red color' or not color) and 'has quality at some time' some 'red color'	N	apple and 'at some time' some ('has quality' only ('red color' or not color))	Υ
_cp1	Every vertebrate participates in some birth process at some time		vertebrate subClassOf 'participates in at some time' some 'birth process'		vertebrate subClassOf 'at some time' some ('participates in' some 'birth process')	
cp2 STR_	Vertebrate that at some time does not participate in a birth process Every fecundation has some spermato-zoon as participant at some time	Υ	vertebrate and not ('participates in at all times' some 'birth process') fecundation subClassOf 'has participant at some time' some spermatozoon	Υ	vertebrate and 'at some time' some (not ('participates in' some 'birth process') ) fecundation subClassOf 'has participant' some spermatozoon	Υ
STR_cp2	Fecundation event for which there is never any spermatozoon that participates	N	fecundation and not ('has participant at some time' some spermatozoon)	N	fecundation and not ('has participant' some spermatozoon)	N
÷ E	The blood specimen bs430912 is in the lab lab996 during the whole time interval 2013-10-20.		bs 430912' 'located in at some times' 'lab 996'	*	'bs 430912 at 2013-10-20' 'located in' 'lab 110 at 2013-10-20'	
STR_im+	The blood specimen bs430912 is in the lab lab100 during the whole time interval 2013-10-20. The labs do not share any facilities	N	bs 430912 'located in at some times' 'lab 100' 'located in at all times' value 'lab 100' subClassOf not('located in at all times' value 'lab 996')	Υ	'bs 430912 at 2013-10-20' 'located in' 'lab 996 at 2013-10-20'	N
Ė	Joe's left ankle is swollen during the whole time interval 2013-10-20		Joe's left ankle' value 'has quality at some time' some swollen	*	'Joe`s left ankle at 2013-10-20' Type 'has quality' some swollen	
STR_im-	There is a time within the interval 2013-10- 20 in which his ankle is not swollen	N	Joe's left ankle' value not ('has quality at all times' some swollen)	Υ	('has max' value 'Joe`s left ankle max') and spans some ('temporal part of' value 2013-10- 20) and not ('has quality' some swollen)	Υ
STR_ip	Mary participated in the process of Mary's birth There is a time in which Mary is not a participant in any birth process	Υ	Mary 'participates in at some time' 'Mary's birth' Mary Type not ('participates in at all times' some 'birth process')	N	'Mary max' Type ('at some time' some ('participates in' value 'Mary`s birth')) ('has max' value 'Mary max') and not ('participates in' some 'birth process')	Υ
	Every red blood cell always includes some oxygen molecule		history of' some 'red blood cell' subClassOf 'has occurrent part' some ('part of occurrent' some ('history of' some 'oxygen molecule'))		'red blood cell' subClassOf 'location of' some 'oxygen molecule'	
PGR_cm+	There are red blood cells without oxygen molecules	N	red blood cell' and 'has continuant part at some time' only (not 'oxygen molecule') 'history of' some apple subClassOf not ('has	Υ	'red blood cell' and (not ('location of' some 'oxygen molecule'))	N
ā	No apple has ever any tooth as part		occurrent part' some ('part of occurrent' some ('history of' some tooth)))		apple subClassOf not ('has continuant part' some tooth)	
	An apple that has a tooth at some time	N	apple and 'has continuant part at some time' some tooth electronic health record' subClassOf 'generically	Υ	Apple and 'has continuant part' some tooth 'electronic health record' subClassOf	N
PGR_cm-	Every electronic health record is always on some computer storage		depends on at some time' some 'computer storage' electronic health record' and not ('generically	*	'generically depends on' some 'computer storage'	
PG	There are electronic health records that are not on a computer storage	N	depends on at some time' some 'computer storage'	N	'electronic health record' and not ('generically depends on' some 'computer storage')	N
PGR_cp1	Every organism always participates in some ecologic process  There are organisms that do not participate		organism subClassOf 'participates in at some time' some 'ecologic process' organism and not ('participates in at all times'		organism subClassOf 'participates in' some 'ecologic process' organism and not ('participates in' some	
PG	in any ecologic process at some time	N	some 'ecologic process') temporal part of' some 'breathing process'	N	'ecologic process')	N
PGR_cp2	Every breathing process has always some volume of air as participant		subClassOf 'has occurrent part' some ('part of occurrent' some ('history of' some 'volume of air'))		'temporal part of' some 'breathing process' SubClassOf 'has participant' some 'volume of air'	
P	There are parts of breathing processes in which no air volume participates	N	'temporal part of' some 'breathing process' and not ('has participant at some time'some 'volume of air')	N	'temporal part of' some 'breathing process' and not ('has participant' some 'volume of air')	N
PGR_im+	Mary's blood always has as part some blood cell		history of 'value 'Mary's blood' subClassOf 'has occurrent part' some ('part of occurrent' some ('history of 'some 'blood cell'))		'has max' value 'Mary`s blood max' subClassOf 'has continuant part' some 'blood cell'	
PG	There is a time in which Mary's blood is devoid of blood cells	N	nistory of value 'Mary's blood' and 'has continuant part at some time' only (not 'blood cell')	Υ	'has max' value 'Mary`s blood max' and not ('has continuant part' some 'blood cell') 'has max' value 'Joe`s health record'_max	N
Ė	Joe's electronic health record always resides on some electronic storage medium		Joe's health record' Type 'generically depends on at some time' some 'computer storage'	*	subClassOf 'generically depends on' some 'computer storage'	
PGR_im	There is a time in which Joe's electronic health record is on hard disk A and another time in which it is only on a different storage	Υ	'Joe's health record' 'generically depends on at some time' 'Hard disk A') not ('Joe's health record' 'generically depends on at some time' 'hard disk A')	N	'max of' some ('generically depends on' some ('has max' value 'Hard disk A max')) and 'max of' some (not ('generically depends on' some ('has max' value 'Hard disk A max')))	Υ

	Example TR pattern				TQC pattern		
	Satisfiabilit	ty (ex		y TR	Satisfiability TQC		
PSR_cm+ PGR_ip	Joe's breathing process has always some volume of air as participant		'temporal part of' value 'Joe's breathing process' subClassOf 'has occurrent part' some ('part of occurrent' some ('history of' some 'volume of air'))		'temporal part of' value 'Joe's breathing process' subClassOf 'has participant' some 'volume of air'		
	Joe's breathing process is without air at some time	N	arr i) temporal part of' value 'Joe's breathing process' and not ('has participant at some time'some 'volume of air')	Υ	'temporal part of' value 'Joe's breathing process' and 'has participant' only (not 'volume of air')	N	
	Every human has a brain and it is always the same brain		human subClassOf 'has continuant part at all times' some brain Joe 'has continuant part at some time' 'Joe s first		human subClassOf 'has max' some ('has continuant part' some brain)		
	There is a time in which Joe does not have his first brain	N	brain' Joe 'has continuant part at some time' 'Joe`s second brain' not (Joe 'has continuant part at all times' 'Joe`s	N	'Joe at t2' value not ('has continuant part' some ('has max' value 'Joe`s first brain max')) and ('has continuant part' some ('has max' value 'Joe`s second brain max')	Υ	
	No cell includes always the same volume of water during its lifetime A cell that always includes the same volume of water as long as it exists	N	first hrain'l cell subClassOf not ('is location of at all times' some 'volume of water') cell and 'is location of at all times' some 'volume of water'	N		*	
PSR_cp1 PSR_cm-	Every mammal has the same biological sex during its life		mammal subClassOf ('has quality at all times' some 'biological sex') and ( ('has quality at all times' only 'male biological sex') or ('has quality at all times' only 'female biological sex') )		mammal and ('has quality' some 'male biological sex') SubClassOf not ('at some time' some ('has quality' only 'female biological sex'))		
					mammal and ('has quality' some 'female biological sex') SubClassOf not ('at some time' some ('has quality' only 'male biological sex'))		
	A mammal that is male at some time and female at some other time	N	mammal and 'has quality at some time' some ('female biological sex') and 'has quality at some time' some 'male biological sex'	Υ	mammal and 'at some time' some (mammal and 'has quality' some 'male biological sex') and 'at some time' some (mammal and 'has quality' some 'female biological sex')	Υ	
	Every organism always participates in its life, and it is always the same		organism subClassOf 'participates in at all times' some 'biological life' Joe 'participates in at some time' 'Joe's first life'		organism subClassOf 'has max' some ('participates in' some 'biological life')		
	Joe participates in two different lives	N	Joe 'participates in at some time' 'Joe`s second life' not (Joe 'participates in at some time' 'Joe`s first life')	N	('has max' value 'Joe max') and 'participates in' value 'Joe`s first life' and 'participates in' value 'Joe`s second life'+A35	Υ	
PSR_cp2	Every biological life always has some organism as participant, and it is always the same		biological life' subClassOf 'has participant at all times' some organism		temporal part of biological life' subClassOf 'has participant' some ('max of' some organism)		
	A life that has for some time a human as participant and for some other time another organism as participant	N	('has participant at some time' some human) and ('has participant at some time' some (not human)) and 'biological life'	Υ	('has participant' some human) and ('has participant' some (not human)) and 'biological life'	Υ	
PSR_im+	Mary has 'Mary`s brain' as a proper part during her lifetime		Mary 'has continuant part at all times' 'Mary`s brain'		'Mary max' Type 'has continuant part' some ('has max' value 'Mary`s brain max')		
<u>87</u>	There is a time in which Mary has no brain	N	Mary type 'has continuant part at some time' only (not brain)	N	('has max' value 'Mary max') and not ('has continuant part' some brain) 'has max' value 'Tibbles max' SubClassOf	Υ	
PSR_im-	Tibbles, a male cat, has the same sex during his life		'Tibbles sex' 'quality of at all times' Tibbles 'Tibbles sex' type Male 'biological sex'		('bearer of' some 'male biological sex') and ('bearer of' only ('male biological sex' or (not ('biological sex'))))		
	Tibbles is female at some time during his life  Joe participates in his life and not in any other life	N	Tibbles type 'has quality at some time' only (not 'male biological sex')  Joe Type 'participates in at all times' some 'biological life'	Y	'has max' value 'Tibbles max' and ('bearer of' some 'female biological sex') 'has max' value 'Joe max' subClassOf 'participates in' value 'Joe's life'	N	
PSR_ip	Joe participates in a human life and part of his life is a cat life	N	Joe Type 'participates in at some time' only ('cat life' or not 'biological life') and 'participates in at some time' only ('human life' or not 'biological life')	Υ	('has max' value 'Joe max') and 'participates in' some 'cat F38	Υ	
$^{\sf NR}_{\sf -t}$	Every fetus is an embryo at some time.  Nothing can be both an embryo and a fetus at the same time		fetus disjointWith embryo	*	fetus subClassOf 'at some time' some embryo. embryo disjointWith fetus		
2	There are fetuses that were never embryos	N	fetus and not embryo	Υ	fetus and not ('at some time' some embryo)	N	
NR_i	John was a medical student from 2001-10- 01 to 2007-06-30. Every person who is a			ı.	'medical student' subClassOf 'at some time' some 'high school student'		
	medical student was a high school student at some time		John Type 'medical student'	*	'John at 2001-10-01 to 2007-06-30 'at some time' 'John max' 'John at 2001-10-01 to 2007- 06-30' spans '2001-10-01 to 2007-06-30'		
	John was never a high school student	N	John Type not ('high school student')	Υ	'has max' value 'John max' and not ('at some time' some 'high school student')	N	