



Alternative Consensus

HOW MIGHT A DISTRIBUTED LEDGER WORK?



Blockchain and Bitcoin



Key characteristics of blockchain

- *Decentralisation.*
 - *Peer to peer to network*
- *Persistency.*
 - *Transactions stored persistently*
- *Anonymity.*
 - *Avoid Identity exposure*
- *Auditability.*
 - *Easily verifiable and traceable*

**Blockchain challenges and opportunities: a survey - by
Zibin Zheng et al., 2018**

Categories

- Public blockchain
 - Anybody can join anytime
- Private blockchain
 - Fully controlled by one organization who could determine the final consensus
- Consortium blockchain
 - Only a selected set of nodes are responsible for validating the block

Comparison

Table 1 Comparisons among *public blockchain*, *consortium blockchain* and *private blockchain*

| <i>Property</i> | <i>Public blockchain</i> | <i>Consortium blockchain</i> | <i>Private blockchain</i> |
|-------------------------|-----------------------------|-------------------------------|-------------------------------|
| Consensus determination | All miners | Selected set of nodes | One organisation |
| Read permission | Public | Could be public or restricted | Could be public or restricted |
| Immutability | Nearly impossible to tamper | Could be tampered | Could be tampered |
| Efficiency | Low | High | High |
| Centralised | No | Partial | Yes |
| Consensus process | Permissionless | Permissioned | Permissioned |

Basics: The consensus problem

There are n nodes, that each have an input value. Some of these nodes are faulty or malicious. A distributed consensus protocol has the following two properties:

- It must terminate with all honest nodes in agreement on the value.
- The value must have been generated by an honest node.

Consensus in Bitcoin

What will the consensus be about?

What are the practical challenges?

- latency, lack of global clock, arbitrary failures
- no control on identities
- arbitrary failures, including deliberate attempts to subvert

What about those consensus impossibility results?

Consensus in Bitcoin




Nakamoto consensus

- **Proof of Work**: Random node in the network gets to choose the next block to be added.
- Other nodes choose to accept/reject block: ideally based on **validity of transactions** (unspent, signed).
- Incentives for proof of work: **Block reward, transaction fees**.
- **Forking** possible: Only the blocks in the longest chain will typically be accepted by the majority.

Consensus in Bitcoin

Nakamoto consensus: potential problems?


- Stealing coins: Not without breaking digital signature
- Denial of service: "Victim" needs to wait for a next honest random node.
- Double spending: May succeed (the double-spend probability decreases exponentially with the number of confirmations)



Mining and proof of work

- Hash puzzle: Difficult to compute
 $H(\text{nonce}||\text{prev_hash}||\text{tx}||\text{tx}||\dots||\text{tx}) < \text{target}$
- Parametrizable cost: Rate limit the block creation ~10 minutes per block
- Trivial to verify: For other nodes to validate


Hardware investment and operational (electricity) costs are barriers to entry and abuse (but also cause of concentration).



Bitcoin: bits & pieces


Bitcoin Network

- Randomized peering
- Flooding based transaction propagation
With local checks: race condition
- Block propagation: forks & longest chain



Bitcoin: bits & pieces

Bitcoin Fork Projects



In order to secure a blockchain ... it's estimated that both Bitcoin and Ethereum burn over \$1 million worth of electricity and hardware costs per day as part of their consensus mechanism.

- VITALIK BUTERIN



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Bitcoin's Energy Consumption Can Power An Entire Country -- But EOS Is Trying To Fix That

**Sherman Lee** Contributor ⓘ*I write about deep tech, crypto, and artificial intelligence.*



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


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
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Estimated Electricity Cost Of Mining One Bitcoin By Country



Source: <https://powercompare.co.uk/bitcoin-electricity-cost/>


The Bitcoin POW mechanism is so costly that it consumes the same amount of electricity it takes to power a country like Switzerland in one year. Bitcoin’s current estimated annual electricity consumption is 61.4 TWh, which is also equivalent to 1.5% of the electricity consumed in the United States.



Proof of X

Proof of Stake

- And others: Burn, Elapsed time, Capacity



Proof-of-X

- Proof-of-X (PoX) schemes is an umbrella term for systems that replace PoW with more useful and energy-efficient alternatives to Proof-of-Work (PoW).

Proof-of-Stake

Miner/Mining Vs. Validator/Minting or forged

- POS requires people to prove the ownership of a certain amount of currency
 - It is believed that people with more currencies would be less likely to attack the network.
 - If richest person attacks, currency value falls and it may be a loss for the attackers!
- Many blockchains adopt PoW at the beginning and transform to PoS gradually.
 - For instance, Ethereum is planning to move from Ethash (a kind of PoW) (Wood, 2014) to Casper (a kind of PoS) (Zamfir, 2015).

Proof-of-Stake

- PoS alternatives consume less energy and reach higher transactions per second.
- But they have also still to prove their attack-resistance in real open public settings like PoW so far.
- Challenge for proof-of-stake systems is to keep track of the changing stakes of the stakeholders.

Proof-of-Stake

- Selection by account balance would result in undesirable centralization because the single richest member would have a permanent advantage as it gets richer.
- Different versions: random selection, age-based stake selection (number of coins stake multiply by the time they have been staked, when selected, time reset to 0)...

Proof-of-Stake: Randomization

- Blackcoin (Vasin, 2014) uses randomization to predict the next generator.
- It uses a formula that looks for the lowest hash value in combination with the size of the stake.

Proof-of-Stake: Coin age

- Peercoin (King and Nadal, 2012) favours coin age-based selection.
- In Peercoin, older and larger sets of coins have a greater probability of mining the next block.
- Once a user has forged a block, their coin age is reset to zero and then they must wait at least 30 days again before they can sign another block.

Proof-of-Capacity

- Sometimes stake could be other things.
- For example, proof of capacity (burstcoin, 2014).
- In proof-of-capacity, participants vote on new blocks weighted by their capacity to allocate a non-trivial amount of disk space.
- Other Examples: PermaCoin, SpaceMint

Proof-of-Capacity

- PermaCoin repurposes Bitcoin's PoW with a more broadly useful task: providing a robust, distributed storage.
- SpaceMint employs a consensus protocol based on a non-interactive variant of proof-of-capacity (called proof-of-space).

Proof-of-Deposit

- Miners ‘lock’ a certain amount of coins, which they cannot spend for the duration of their mining.
- One such system is Tendermint, where a miner’s voting power is proportional to the amount of coins they have locked.
- Deposit could be revoked if they misbehaved.

Proof-of-Activity

- To combine the benefits of POW and POS, proof of activity (Bentov et al., 2014) is proposed.
- In proof of activity, a mined block (based on PoW) needs to be signed by N validators (PoS) to be valid.
- In that way, if some owner of 50% of all coins exists, he/she cannot control the creation of new blocks on his/her own.
- Since POA marries POW and POS, it draws criticism for its partial use of both.

Delegated Proof-of-Stake

- In Delegated PoS (DPOS), stake-holders don't vote on the validity of the blocks themselves, but vote (proportionately weighted based on the stake) to elect delegates to do the validation on their behalf.
- The major difference between POS and DPOS is that POS is a direct democratic while DPOS is representative democratic.
- Users can also delegate their voting power to another user who will vote on their behalf.

Delegated Proof-of-Stake

- Higher Throughput: With significantly fewer nodes to validate the block, the block could be confirmed quickly, making the transactions confirmed quickly.
- Dishonest delegates could be voted out easily.
- Examples: Steem and BitShares

Proof-of-Burn

- Method for distributed consensus and an alternative to Proof of Work and Proof of Stake
- Miners prove that they have destroyed a quantity of coins, for example by sending them to a verifiably unspendable address.
- Slimcode implemente this approach in 2014 but has recently been discontinued.

Proof-of-Elapsed-Time

- Often used on the permissioned blockchain networks.
- Each node in the blockchain network generates a random wait time and goes to sleep for that specified duration.
- The one to wake up first – that is, the one with the shortest wait time – wakes up and commits a new block to the blockchain, broadcasting the necessary information to the whole peer network
- The same process then repeats for the discovery of the next block.

Proof-of-Elapsed-Time

- The POET network consensus mechanism needs to ensure two important factors:
 - First, that the participating nodes genuinely select a time that is indeed random and not a shorter duration chosen purposely by the participants in order to win, and
 - Second, the winner has indeed completed the waiting time.

Proof-of-Elapsed-Time

- The POET concept was invented during early 2016 by Intel.
- It offers a readymade high tech tool to solve the computing problem of "random leader election."

Hyperledger Fabric : PBFT

- Practical byzantine fault tolerance (PBFT) is a replication algorithm to tolerate byzantine faults (Miguel and Barbara, 1999).
- Hyperledger Fabric (hyperledger, 2015) utilises the PBFT as its consensus algorithm since PBFT could handle up to $1/3$ malicious byzantine replicas.

Ripple

- Ripple (Schwartz et al., 2014) is a consensus algorithm that utilises collectively-trusted subnetworks within the larger network.
- In the network, nodes are divided into two types: **server** for participating consensus process and **client** for only transferring funds.
- In contrast to that PBFT nodes have to ask every node in the network, each Ripple server has a Unique Node List (UNL) to query.

Ripple

- UNL is important to the server. When determining whether to put a transaction into the ledger, the server would query the nodes in UNL.
- If the received agreements have reached 80%, the transaction would be packed into the ledger.
- For a node, the ledger will remain correct as long as the percentage of faulty nodes in UNL is less than 20%.


Consensus: A Comparison

Table 2 Typical consensus algorithms comparison

| <i>Property</i> | <i>PoW</i> | <i>PoS</i> | <i>PBFT</i> | <i>DPOS</i> | <i>Ripple</i> | <i>Tendermint</i> |
|--------------------------|-----------------|------------|--------------------|-------------|---------------------|------------------------|
| Node identity management | Open | Open | Permissioned | Open | Open | Permissioned |
| Energy saving | No | Partial | Yes | Partial | Yes | Yes |
| Tolerated | < 25% | < 51% | < 33.3% | < 51% | < 20% | < 33.3% |
| power of adversary | computing power | stake | faulty replicas | validators | faulty nodes in UNL | byzantine voting power |
| Example | Bitcoin | Peercoin | Hyperledger Fabric | Bitshares | Ripple | Tendermint |

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Distributed ledger technologies



Proof of X: Attacks

- **nothing-at-stake attack:** A miners are incentivized to extend every potential fork. Since it is computationally cheap to extend a chain, in the case of forks, rational miners mine on top of every chain to increase the likelihood of getting their block in the right chain.
- **grinding attack:** A miner re-creates a block multiple times until it is likely that the miner can create a second block shortly afterwards.
- **long-range attack:** An attacker can bribe miners to sell their private keys. If these keys had considerable value in the past, then the adversary can mine previous blocks and re-write the entire history of the blockchain.