



AUGUST 7-8, 2024
BRIEFINGS

Overcoming State: Finding Baseband Vulnerabilities by Fuzzing Layer-2

Speakers: Dyon Goos & Marius Muench

About Us






Dyon:

- Independent security researcher
- MSc (Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam)
- Spent the last 2 years in baseband stacks :)


Marius:

- Assistant Professor (University of Birmingham), UK
- Baseband research since 2018
- Co-creator of FirmWire
- Captures flags with Tasteless

This talk




Basebands




Basebands

- Modern phones are a collection of processors
 - Including: Application Processor (AP) & Cellular Processor (CP)
- CP also referred to as “Baseband”
 - Implements most layers of cellular communication stack
- Lucrative attack surface
 - Myriad of parsers, legacy code, obscure features




The code running on basebands

Custom Real-Time Operating Systems (RTOS), providing:




- Core OS functionality:
 - Scheduler, timers, interrupts
 - Messaging



- Cellular stack implementation:
 - Stack is split into “tasks”
 - Tasks communicate via message queues

Baseband Security Research

Plenty of attention in recent years, e.g.:




Basebanheimer
Now I Am Become Death, The Destroyer of Chains

TASZK WE FIND NEEDLES **hardwear.io** THE WORLD'S LEADING SOURCE FOR HARDWARE HACKING




black hat
USA 2023
AUGUST 9-10, 2023
BRIEFINGS
Over the Air, Under the Radar
Attacking and Securing the Pixel Modem

Xuan Xing, Eugene Rodionov, Xiling Gong, Farzan Karimi



Google
How to Hack Shannon Baseband (from a Phone)



5Ghoul
White Paper | Attack Overview | Targets | Impact | Descriptions | 5G Tooling & PoC

5Ghoul : Unleashing Chaos on 5G Edge Devices


Matheus E. Garbelini¹; Zewen Shang¹; Shijie Luo¹; Sudipta Chattopadhyay¹; Sumei Sun²; Ernest Kurniawan²

¹Singapore University of Technology and Design; ²I2R, A*STAR

There will be Bugs: Exploiting Basebands in Radio Layer Two


Daniel Komaromy

Baseband exploitation in public originally focused on message decoding bugs in layer 3 (NAS and RRC) and more recently in layer 4 (traffic over IP). In this presentation we uncover a new area of exploration for remote baseband exploitation in layer 2. In the past, this part of cellular specifications has been overlooked due to its function and packet size limitations. However, a deeper dive uncovers possibilities that show up in both old and new standards. Importantly, this is a layer that is below the ciphering applied to cellular communications providing an attack surface reachable not only with fake base stations but with direct MITM-ing of legitimate cell tower communications too. The presentation will describe the chain of vulnerabilities we have found and explain how to exploit them for remote code execution in the baseband of flagship Samsung smartphones. The new class of bugs meant new challenges both in developing and delivering an exploit. I will describe how we have modified radio software to inject a more complex sequence of malicious layer two traffic without the



Analyzing Cellular Basebands with
nsr & domenukk

CCCamp '23
2023-08-17



One SMS to Root Them All

Alexander Kozlov @NOum3nOn
Sergey Anufrienko @madprogrammer
Kaspersky ICS CERT



Cracking the 5G Fortress: Peering Into 5G's Vulnerability Abyss

Kai Tu | Research Assistant, The Pennsylvania State University
Yilu Dong | Research Assistant, The Pennsylvania State University
Abdullah Al Ishtiaq | Research Assistant, The Pennsylvania State University
Syed Md Mukit Rashid | Research Assistant, The Pennsylvania State University
Weixuan Wang | Graduate Researcher, The Pennsylvania State University
Tianwei Wu | Research Assistant, The Pennsylvania State University
Syed Raful Hussain | Assistant Professor, The Pennsylvania State University

What about Layer-2?

When we started, most research/findings focus on cellular L3 (or higher)



Let's have a look at layer-2 ourselves!

⇒ Let's start with the lowest hanging fruits:


- GSM Layer-2
- Fuzzing




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
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


5Ghoul : Unleashing Chaos on 5G Edge Devices
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¹Singapore University of Technology and Design
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Layer-3

Layer-2

Layer-1



RR : Radio Resource
MM : Mobility Management
CM : Connection Management
CC : Call Control
SMS : Short Messaging Service
SS : Supplementary Services


LAPDm : Link Access Protocol on the Dm Channel (LAPDm)

Phy : Physical


GSM Layer 2

- Link Access Protocol on the Dm Channel (LAPDm).
- Frame Concatenation
- PD: *information[0]* & *0xF*.

```
struct LAPDM_frame{  
    uint8_t addr;  
    uint8_t ctrl;  
    uint8_t len;  
    uint8_t information[N];  
} PACKED;
```



Our approach to fuzzing



Our Fuzzing Campaigns: FirmWire

- Full-system baseband emulator
 - Baseband emulation from boot
 - Fuzzing support via AFL++
 - Support for MTK & Exynos firmware
- Advantages:
 - Analyzable logs
 - Coverage tracking
 - Task-interaction



Fuzzing in FirmWire

- Requires injection of “Fuzzing Task”
 - Written in C, AFL wrapper present
 - Appears like an ordinary task for emulated CP
 - Sends messages to other tasks

```
#include <shannon.h>
#include <afl.h>


const char TASK_NAME[] = "AFL_DEMO\0";
static uint32_t qid;

int fuzz_single_setup()
{
    qid = queuename2id("TARGET_TASK_QUEUE");
    struct qitem_target * init =
        pal_MemAlloc(4, sizeof(struct qitem_target),
                     __FILE__, __LINE__);
    // setup init payload
    [...]


    pal_MsgSendTo(qid, init, 2);
    return 1;
}
```

The Plan: Fuzzing Layer-2

Existing Fuzzers (non-OTA)



Our Approach (GSM)




The Target: Galaxy S10e Firmware


- Latest phone model supported by FirmWire
- Released date: 2019
- Firmware date: March 2023
 - Original FirmWire bugs are patched




Challenges




The Challenges



Need to create fuzzing tasks



How to deal with complex baseband state



No support for recent phones


Challenge 1: Creating fuzzing tasks

Sending initialization messages



- All tasks are initialized, we should now be able to start fuzzing


Let's go fuzzing



AW DANG IT

.... but we initialized all tasks?

```
[CLAPD1 0x4105a44b 0b101: r / / / HEDGE/GSM/GL3/CLAPD/Code/Src/dl_uti.c] - Add concat buf - 4463223c
[GRR] 0x40f0f8d7 0b10: [../../../../HEDGE/GSM/GL3/GRR/Code/Src/rr_dedi.c] - Receive Data from Network (BTS)
[GRR] 0x40f0f907 0b10: [../../../../HEDGE/GSM/GL3/GRR/Code/Src/rr_dedi.c] - (CIO)## - In SemRecBtsData, TID : 0x0,
[MM] 0x40f439af 0b10: [../../../../HEDGE/NASL3/MM/Code/Src/mm_Main.c] - STACK ID - 0
[MM] 0x40f43561 0b10: [../../../../HEDGE/NASL3/MM/Code/Src/mm_Main.c] - MM Message Count -> 5
[MM] 0x40f5546d 0b10: [../../../../HEDGE/NASL3/MM/Code/Src/mm_CellIndication.c] - Resetting Sent Req Status
[MM] 0x41359a0f 0b10: [../../../../HEDGE/NASL3/MM/Code/Src/mm_Utils.c] - TRAP MESSAGE !!! - Invalid Request for
this State in mm_DecodeRrDataIndMsg !!!
```



Challenge 2 : Initialize the state

(1) Identifying crucial state beyond task initialization

```
iVar2 = mm_GetState ();
uVar3 = CONCAT44(iVar2 + -6, iVar2);
switch(iVar2) {
    case 6:
    case 7:
    case 8:
    case 9:
    case 0xd:
    case 0xf:
        break;
    default:
        mm_printTrapMessage ("mm_DecodeRrDataIndMsg", iVar2 + -6, local_10, local_c);
        return;
}
```

returns *(uint8_t*) 0x42e22f58

[1.67198][MM] 0x41359a0f 0b1: [../../HEDGE/NASL3/MM/Code/Src/mm_Utils.c] - TRAP MESSAGE !!! - Invalid Request for this State in mm_DecodeRrDataIndMsg !!!

Challenge 2: Initialize the state

(2a) Fix up the state variables

- We need to fake a valid connection state
- Simple state constants, as well as ..

```
#ifdef SAMSUNG_S10e
....
uint32_t rr_state_addr = 0x4182cdcc;
uint32_t rr_cur_dlcaddr = 0x4182cf0e0;

uint32_t glapd_state_addr = 0x42c5cacc;
uint32_t mm_state_addr = 0x42e22f58;
....
#endif
```

```
.....
// make sure the baseband is in RR state 8
*(uint16_t*)rr_state_addr = 0x8;
//make sure the lapdm state is 2
*(uint8_t*)glapd_state_addr=0x2;
*(uint8_t*)(glapd_state_addr+0x2) = 0x1;
//make sure the mm state is 9
*(uint8_t*)mm_state_addr = 0x9;
//set the DLCI
*(uint8_t*)rr_cur_dlcaddr = 0x4;
....
```

Challenge 2: Initialize the state

(2b) .. more advanced state

```
#ifdef SAMSUNG_S10e  
....  
uint32_t rr_serv_cell_addr = 0x4182cdd8;  
....  
#endif  
  
struct rr_servingCell{  
    uint16_t arfcn;  
    uint16_t rxLvl;  
    uint8_t [0x17] unk;  
    uint8_t [0x3] mnc_mmc;  
    uint16_t lac;  
    uint8_t [0xd0] unk2;  
} PACKED;
```


Wait, unknown?

Only restore crucial state

```
....  
struct rr_servingCell *rr_servCell;  
rr_servCell = alloc(0xec);  
memset(rr_servCell, 0x0, 0xec);  
  
rr_servCell->arfcn = 0x35d;  
rr_servCell->mnc_mmc = 0x1869f;  
rr_servCell->lac = 0x3e8;  
  
*rr_serv_cell_addr = rr_servCell;  
....
```




```
[LAPDl 0x4195a44b 0b101: r / / / HEDGE/GSM/GL2/GLAPP/Code/Src/dl_uti.c] - Add concat buf . 4463223c  
[GRR] 0x40f0f8d7 0b10: [../../.../HEDGE/GSM/GL3/GRR/Code/Src/rr_dedi.c] - Receive Data from Network (BTS)  
[MM] 0x40f439af 0b10: [../../.../HEDGE/NASL3/MM/Code/Src/mm_Main.c] - STACK ID - 0 x0,  
[MM] 0x40f43561 0b10: [../../.../HEDGE/NASL3/MM/Code/Src/mm_Main.c] - MM Message Count -> 5  
[MM] 0x40f5546d 0b10: [../../.../HEDGE/NASL3/MM/Code/Src/mm_CellIndication.c] - Resetting Sent Req Status 97  
[CC] 0x40fe8cf8 0b101: [../../.../HEDGE/NASL3/CC/Code/Src/cc_Main.c] - ----- CC TASK  
-----  
[CC] 0x40fe87e3 0b10: [../../.../HEDGE/NASL3/CC/Code/Src/cc_Main.c] - cc_UpdStackId :CcCurrentStackId: 0  
[CC] 0x40ac21b1 0b101: [../../.../HEDGE/NASL3/CC/Code/Src/cc_MsgDescription.c] - cc_MapSubTypeToMessageNum SubType = 0x5
```



- All tasks (and State) are initialized, we should now be able to start fuzzing

Let's go fuzzing pt 2




```
american fuzzy lop ++4.22a {default} (./firmwire.py) [explore]
process timing
    run time : 0 days, 1 hrs, 27 min, 54 sec
    last new find : 0 days, 0 hrs, 0 min, 0 sec
    last saved crash : 0 days, 0 hrs, 2 min, 18 sec
    last saved hang : none seen yet
cycle progress
    now processing : 1465.0 (74.7%)
    runs timed out : 0 (0.00%)
stage progress
    now trying : havoc
    stage execs : 2275/7680 (29.62%)
    total execs : 222k
    exec speed : 40.40/sec (slow!)
fuzzing strategy yields
    bit flips : 20/7640, 7/7623, 11/7589
    byte flips : 1/955, 3/938, 6/904
    arithmetics : 48/66.5k, 2/128k, 0/122k
    known ints : 5/8480, 26/35.3k, 25/50.3k
    dictionary : 0/0, 0/0, 0/0, 0/0
    havoc/splice : 1009/122k, 644/69.7k
    py/custom/rq : unused, unused, unused, unused
    trim/eff : 0.37%/4588, 97.17%
strategy: explore state: in progress
overall results
    cycles done : 0
    corpus count : 1962
    saved crashes : 15
    saved hangs : 0
map coverage
    map density : 1.63% / 27.95%
    count coverage : 1.66 bits/tuple
findings in depth
    favored items : 981 (50.00%)
    new edges on : 1284 (65.44%)
total crashes : 29 (15 saved)
total tmouts : 0 (0 saved)
item geometry
    levels : 20
    pending : 1716
    pend fav : 783
    own finds : 1896
    imported : 0
    stability : 99.96%
[cpu000: 37%]
```

```
[7.17742] [REG_SAP] 0x41122839 0b100: [../../../../../PSS/StackService/CNS/Common/Code/Src/ns_Main.c] - Stack Id: 0
[7.17782] [REG_SAP] 0x41122853 0b100: [../../../../../PSS/StackService/CNS/Common/Code/Src/ns_Main.c] - Creating Inst:
NS_INFORMATION_IND
[7.17820] [REG_SAP] 0x4112233b 0b101: [../../../../../PSS/StackService/CNS/Common/Code/Src/ns_OsInterface.c] - Allocating
memory size(107) from e/Src/ns_OsInterface.c (#163)
[7.17863] [REG_SAP] 0x411224a3 0b101: [../../../../../PSS/StackService/CNS/Common/Code/Src/ns_OsInterface.c] - Memory
allocated for message 0x760D, length 107
[7.18030] [REG_SAP] 0x4112233b 0b101: [../../../../../PSS/StackService/CNS/Common/Code/Src/ns_OsInterface.c] - Allocating
memory size(40) from e/Src/ns_ServiceHandlerEmm.c (#2503)
[7.18108] [REG_SAP] 0x4079a4a5 0b101: [../../../../../PSS/StackService/CNS/Common/Code/Src/ns_MsgInstance.c] -
ns_GetMsgInstance [MsgName : NS_INFORMATION_IND]
[7.18149] [REG_SAP] 0x407d9e3d 0b101: [../../../../../PSS/StackService/CNS/Common/Code/Src/ns_MsgHandler.c] - Message out:
BaseType 0, MsgCat 2, rtsInd 0
[7.18197] [REG_SAP] 0x4112233b 0b101: [../../../../../PSS/StackService/CNS/Common/Code/Src/ns_OsInterface.c] - Allocating
memory size(107) from e/Src/ns_MsgHandler.c (#336)
[7.18285] [REG_SAP] 0x407d9a1f 0b11: [../../../../../PSS/StackService/CNS/Common/Code/Src/ns_MsgHandler.c] - REG_SAP ==>
NS_INFORMATION_IND (Mbx 159)
[7.18330] [REG_SAP] pal_MsgSendTo+0x3ff (0x4100460f) pal_MsgSendTo(MTI (159)) - PALMsg<0x760d, REG_SAP (a5) -> MTI
(9f), 99 bytes>
[7.18368] [REG_SAP] 0x407d9a1f 0b11: [../../../../../PSS/StackService/CNS/Common/Code/Src/ns_MsgHandler.c] - REG_SAP ==>
NS_INFORMATION_IND (Mbx 5)
[7.18412] [REG_SAP] pal_MsgSendTo+0x3ff (0x4100460f) pal_MsgSendTo(ATI (5)) - PALMsg<0x760d, REG_SAP (a5) -> ATI
(5), 99 bytes>
[ERROR] firmwire.vendor.shannon.hooks: FATAL ERROR (REG_SAP): from 0x40effd05 [pal_PlatformMisc.c:146 - Fatal
error: PAL_MEM_GUARD_CORRUPTION pal_MemInterface.c Line 895]
```


Challenge 3: No support for recent phones

- Our fuzzing targeted a firmware from early 2023
- Confirm vulnerabilities OTA against newer devices
- Collect a bunch of crashing payloads
- Patch open source tooling to allow for automated testing.




OTA Setup


- Hardware
 - SDR (BladeRF 2.0 micro xA4)
 - USB hub + cables
 - Raspberry Pi 4
 - Faraday Cage
- Software
 - Open source GSM Base Station software :
Yate v6.2.1 / YateBTS v6.1.1
- Tested Phone:
 - Google Pixel 6 and 8
 - Samsung Galaxy S10e, S22, A14



```
02-24 07:11:12.305 1098 1161 D RFSD      : [ModemStateMonitor::OnModemCrashOrReset]
Modem is STATE_CRASH_EXIT or STATE_CRASH_RESET
02-24 07:11:14.286 1088 1219 D DMD      : ModemStateMonitor : Modem CRASH!!! 
02-24 07:11:14.286 1088 1219 D DMD      : ModemStateMonitor : Check the state again
after 2 seconds later.
02-24 07:11:14.305 1098 1161 D RFSD      : [ModemStateMonitor::OnModemCrashOrReset]
Modem is STATE_CRASH_EXIT or STATE_CRASH_RESET
02-24 07:11:16.286 1088 1219 D DMD      : ModemStateMonitor : Modem CRASH!!! 
02-24 07:11:16.287 1088 1219 D DMD      : ModemStateMonitor : Check the state again
after 2 seconds later.
02-24 07:11:16.306 1098 1161 D RFSD      : [ModemStateMonitor::OnModemCrashOrReset]
Modem is STATE_CRASH_EXIT or STATE_CRASH_RESET
02-24 07:11:18.287 1088 1219 D DMD      : ModemStateMonitor : Modem CRASH!!! 
02-24 07:11:18.287 1088 1219 D DMD      : ModemStateMonitor : Check the state again
after 2 seconds later.
```



Found Vulnerabilities



Showcase

	ID	Tested Phones	Affected Protocol	What?	Severity	Reported in
Previously Unknown	CVE-2023-50807	Pixel 6, S22	MM	Heap-based buffer overflow	8.1	Oct-23
	CVE-2023-50805	Pixel 6, 8, S22	RR	Heap-based buffer overflow	8.1	Oct-23
	CVE-2024-28068	S22, A14	SS/GPRS	Null-Pointer Deref	5.3	Jan-24
Duplicates (unpatched at time of testing)	N/A - internal find	Pixel 6, S22, A14	CC/SS	Heap-based buffer overflow	N/A	Jan-24
	N/A - internal find	A14	SMS	Stack-based buffer overflow	N/A	Jan-24
Under Disclosure	CVE-XXXX-YYYYYY CVE-XXXX-YYYYYY CVE-XXXX-YYYYYY	-	-	-	-	-

Example bug : CVE-2023-50807 (MM)

- MM Information message
 - Holds information about the network

05 32 45 8c 03 03 03 ...
48 41 41 00 01 04 00 ...

IE	Presence	Value
MM PD	M	0x05
MsgType	M	0x32
Full Network Name	O	0x43
Short Network Name	O	0x45
Local Time Zone	O	0x46
Universal time	O	0x47
LSA Identity	O	0x48
Network Daylight Saving Time	O	0x49

Example Bug: CVE-2023-50807 (MM)


05 32 45 8c 03 03 03 ...
48 **41** 41 00 01 04 00 ...

- LSA Identity IE
- LSA Identity IE length

```
void mm_getIe(uint8_t *src, int p2){  
    uVar1 = mm_getIeLength(p2);  
    if((p2 == 0x3c) && (3 < uVar1)) uVar1 = 3;  
    memcpy(src, IE_buf, uVar1);  
}  
  
void ns_ServiceHandlerEmm(..) {  
    uint8_t* buf = mem_Alloc(0x6f);  
    memcpy(buf+0x58, src, IE_len);  
}
```

- LSA Identity IE length
should be fixed to 3 bytes
 - Value from the first check is not propagated

Demo : Triggering the vulnerability



Defenses

- Recent shift in vendor's approaches:
 - More hardening for basebands (good)!
- Recently introduced defenses:
 - Heap Sanitization (Pixel 8)
 - More consistent use of XN
 - Allow 2G

Google Security Blog

The latest news and insights from Google on security and safety on the Internet

Hardening cellular basebands in Android


December 12, 2023

Allow 2G

2G is less secure, but may improve your connection in some locations. For emergency calls, 2G is always allowed.



Wrapping Up



Limitations/Future Work

- State needs to be reversed for every image
 - Potential for automation
- What if we cannot replicate a vulnerability OTA?
 - FirmWire support for firmware targeting recent firmware
- What about 3G/4G/5G?
 - More reversing, more harnessing, more state, more everything

Key Takeaways

- State is key to overcome fuzzing roadblocks when fuzzing across communication stacks
- Fuzzing older firmware images can lead to discovering vulnerabilities in the newest devices
- Despite years of research, critical vulnerabilities still hide in 2G implementations.

Questions

