## Privacy-Preserving Spam-Protected Gossip-Based Routing

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
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## WAKU2-RELAY: Anonymous P2P Gossip-Based Routing

WAKU2-RELAY [1] follows a publisher-subscriber messaging model with gossip-based routing (extension of libp2p GossipSub-v1.1 [2])


Messages are anonymous i.e. protocol message headers carry no personally identifiable information about the message origin



## Spam and Denial-of-Service Attack

We define spammers as entities that publish a large number of messages in a short amount of time, and cause Denial-of-Service.


Spam Protection = Controlled Messaging Rate



### Global Spam Protection and Anonymity

Routing peers can not distinguish between spam messages and non-spam messages.

Solutions like IP blocking are not effective.



### Related Works

Proof-of-work [3] deployed by Whisper [4]

- Computationally expensive
- Not suitable for network of heterogeneous peers with limited resources Peer Scoring [2] in libp2p
- Local to each peer
- No global identification of spammer
- Subject to inexpensive attacks using bots


#### WAKU2-RLN-RELAY

WAKU2-RLN-RELAY [6] = WAKU2-RELAY + Rate Limiting Nullifiers [5]


- A protocol-level solution
- Computationally efficient and suitable for resource-restricted devices
- Privacy-preserving
- Global spam protection
- Sybil attack mitigation
- Built-in economic incentives where spammers are financially punished and those who find spammers are rewarded.

## RLN: Rate Limiting Nullifier

#### **Anonymous Signaling**



#### **Double Signaling and Slashing**




# WAKU2-RLN-RELAY: Spam-Protected Gossip--Based Routing

RLN group: Peers subscribed to the same topic

**External Nullifier/Epoch:** the number of T seconds that elapsed since the Unix epoch event. Each peer locally keeps track of the current epoch.

Messaging rate: 1 per Epoch.

Merkle Tree: Peers construct and update the Membership Merkle tree locally using events emitted from the membership contract.



### Future Works

- Benchmarking
- > Efficient Merkle tree maintenance
  - P2p network of full-nodes and light-nodes
  - Partial view of Merkle tree
- > Real-time removal of spammers using off-chain/p2p solutions
- Cost-effective way of member insertion and deletion using layer 2 solutions

#### References

- 1. WAKU2-RELAY specifications, https://rfc.vac.dev/spec/11
- 2. Vyzovitis D, Napora Y, McCormick D, Dias D, Psaras Y. GossipSub: Attack-resilient message propagation in the Filecoin and ETH2. 0 networks. arXiv preprint arXiv:2007.02754. 2020 Jul 6.
- 3. C. Dwork and M. Naor, "Pricing via processing or combatting junk mail," in Annual international cryptology conference. Springer, 1992.
- 4. Whisper https://eips.ethereum.org/eips/eip-627
- 5. RLN specifications, https://rfc.vac.dev/spec/32
- 6. WAKU2-RLN-RELAY specifications, https://rfc.vac.dev/spec/17