Matthew Reeve. *Clefts and their relatives.* Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2012. 236 pp. [*Linguistik Aktuell*, 185.]

Reviewed by Vadim Kimmelman

The book *Clefts and their relatives* by Matthew Reeve offers a new account of the syntax and semantics of clefts in English and Russian. The book tries to solve a number of puzzles in a uniform way and raises the theoretically important issue of compositionality, which according to the author should be formulated in a non-traditional way. However, the Russian data used in the book are often debatable, so that some of the arguments for the proposed analysis are not convincing.

The book consists of six chapters. In the first chapter the author notes the lack of a thorough analysis of clefts in English and Russian. In the second he proposes a syntactic analysis of English clefts. The third chapter discusses the licensing of relative clauses in English clefts. The fourth offers an analysis of clefts in Russian similar to that proposed for English. In the fifth chapter the syntax of specificational sentences is discussed, and some remaining issues with the syntax of clefts are resolved. Chapter 6 concludes the book.

The main focus of this review is the analysis of Russian clefts, since this topic is of particular interest to *JSL* readers. However, in order to present the theory that Reeve proposes for Russian clefts we must first discuss his analysis of clefts in English, at least in outline. The discussion of the Russian clefts will contain more details, critical points, and counterexamples.

Examples in this review come from various sources. Some are taken from the book under review (listed as [R] and the page number). Most of the other examples come from the Russian National Corpus (RNC) (http://ruscorpora.ru/en/index.html) and from a small survey I created online to confirm my intuition on constructed examples. My respondents' judgments are reported for the relevant examples and are marked [Q].

1. Clefts in English

Clefts in English, such as (1), consist of a pronoun (*it*), a copula (*was*), a focused XP (*John*), and a restrictive relative clause, also known as the cleft clause (*that Mary saw*). The main question is what the syntactic relation is between these elements. Reeve proposes that the cleft pronoun is non-expletive, that the cleft clause is adjoined to the clefted XP, and that the cleft clause semantically modifies the initial pronoun. Reeve argues against other theories of clefts which either analyze the pronoun *it* as an expletive, thus unifying clefts with focus-fronting (Kiss 1998), or treat the cleft clause as extraposed from the cleft pronoun (Percus 1997). He also argues that the relative clause has to be licensed syntactically and semantically, but that in the case of clefts there are two separate licensers, each satisfying one of the conditions.

(1) It was JOHN that Mary saw. [R 1]



In chapter 2 Reeve provides arguments in favor of two of his claims, namely, that the pronoun in clefts is non-expletive and that the cleft clause is adjoined to the clefted XP and not to the pronoun.

Evidence for the non-expletive nature of the clause-initial pronoun is both syntactic and semantic. The first piece of syntactic evidence is that cleft *it*, but not expletive *it* (such as weather pronouns and raising *it*), can be replaced by a demonstrative pronoun *this*. Second, cleft *it* can control PRO, which is unexpected if it is an expletive, as in (2).

(2) a. It was THE FURNITURE that annoyed John on Sunday [despite PRO being THE DÉCOR the day before].

b. It seemed that John was wrong [without it/*PRO seeming that Mary was right]. [R 12, 11]

Third, evidence from Germanic languages suggests that there are different kinds of expletives and that languages can allow the use of *pro* for some expletives but not for others (Vikner 1995). However, in these languages *pro* is never allowed for referential pronouns. Therefore, it is expected that the cleft pronoun cannot be replaced by a *pro*, which is indeed the case. Fourth, in Italian, definite referential DP's can be replaced by a *pro*, but the use of *pro* is not allowed under verbs such as *believe*. Notably, cleft pronoun omission is also prohibited in these contexts. Finally, in French, raising of a referential DP across an overt experiencer is impossible (the so-called experiencer blocking effect; Chomsky 1995). However, expletive pronouns can raise across an overt experiencer. Cleft pronouns pattern with other referential DP's in not being able to raise in such a configuration.

Semantic evidence for the non-expletive nature of clefts is the fact that clefts are interpretatively parallel to specificational sentences. This is the basis for the claim that *it* in clefts, together with the cleft clause, forms a definite description that gives rise to the observed semantic effects. If *it* were an expletive, these semantic effects would be unexpected.

First, clefts and specificational sentences can both express information focus and contrastive focus, and in both types of constructions the information structure is fixed. So sentences like *It was JOHN that Mary hit* and *The one that Mary hit was JOHN* are functionally parallel: they can both express two types of focus, but in both cases *John* is the focus. Second, both clefts and specificational sentences have an existential presupposition, namely the existence of the clefted XP is presupposed. This can be shown by the fact that bare negatives are prohibited in these constructions (**It was NOTHING that he drank*), but not in constructions with focus fronting (*NOTHING, he drank* (p. 19)). Thirdly, both clefts and specificational sentences have the effect of exhaustivity, which means that the referent denoted by the clefted XP is the only individual for whom the property denoted by the cleft clause holds. This is manifested in the fact that clefts and specificational sen-

tences are incompatible with focus particles *also* and *even* while focus fronting constructions are compatible with them.

The next point that Reeve discusses in chapter 2 is that the cleft clause is a restrictive relative clause adjoined to the clefted XP. He makes several arguments.

First, both cleft clauses and restrictive relative clauses show alternations between the overt relative operator *that* or null:

(3) a. It was the VODKA which/that/Ø Boris drank.
b. I bought the vodka which/that/Ø Boris drank. [R 25]

Second, all overt relative operators (except *why*) can appear in clefts and (restrictive) relative clauses but not in other constructions. Third, cleft clauses and restrictive clauses show anti-*that*-trace effects (Cottell 2002). Finally, cleft clauses are strong islands, while if cleft clauses were selected clauses with the clefted XP moved out of them (as in Kiss 1998), they would have been weak islands. Details are given in section 2.4.2 of the book.

After that Reeve proceeds to show that there is a strong syntactic relation between the clefted XP and the cleft clause, while there is no such relation between *it* and the cleft clause. I will discuss his arguments briefly.

First, Reeve notices that VP-ellipsis is allowed with subject relatives and disallowed with object relatives (*Although not many people would ride with Fred who knew just him, some would ___ who knew his brother* vs. **Although he didn't call people up who are from Boston, he did ___ who are from New York* (Reeve 2012: 29)). He explains this by saying that an overt antecedent (the host of the relative) must be locally present in order for the VP-ellipsis to be allowed, which is the case in subject relatives, while in the case of object relatives the antecedent (the object) is elided. This predicts that this type of ellipsis is impossible with clefts because VP-ellipsis would delete the clefted XP which is the host of the cleft clause, and this prediction turns out to be true (**Although it probably wasn't John who cooked the stew, it might have been ___ who baked the cake*).

Second, he notes that when a subject hosting a relative undergoes A-movement to an upper clause, the extraposed relative must move to the upper clause as well to be in a local relation with the host. This analysis predicts that the raising of *it* should have no influence on the

position of the cleft clause, and this turns out to be true as well. The cleft clause must remain in the same clause with the clefted XP (4).

(4) a. ??It was believed [t_i to be JOHN] by everybody [that Mary saw]].
b. It was believed [t_i to be JOHN [that Mary saw]] by everybody]. [R 32]

On the other hand, if the clefted XP undergoes *wh*-movement then the extraposed clause has to move as well, which can be shown by the fact that it can obviate Condition C violations from an NP in an upper clause (5):

(5) a. *[It_j seemed to her_i [t_j to be JOHN [that $Mary_i$ saw]]].
b. [Who_j did it seem to her_i [to be t_j] [that $Mary_i$ saw]]? [R 32]

It is known that VP-fronting is possible with extraposed object relatives but not with extraposed subject relatives. Reeve's analysis predicts that clefts pattern with object relatives, and indeed VP-fronting is possible with this construction.

Further arguments show the strong connection between the clefted XP and the cleft clause. For instance, the clefted XP supplies a value for the gap in the cleft clause. This predicts that there should be no predicational clefts corresponding to predicational sentences, as in (6a), because the clefted predicate would not provide the value for the gap, as in (6b).

(6) a. The thing that I am pointing at is feline.
b. *It is feline that I am pointing at. [R 35, 36]

Furthermore, the features of the *wh*-operator in the cleft clause (such as [±human] and number features) are defined by the clefted XP:

(7) It is the teachers who/*which are/*is tired. [R 37]

Another argument comes from reduced relatives. Relatives in general can be reduced (*the man (who was) sitting outside*). However, reduced

relatives can only be extraposed when they are object relatives (*I saw a man yesterday now sitting outside*), not when they are subject relatives (**A man came into the room now sitting outside*). As predicted by Reeve's analysis, reduced clefted clauses are grammatical (*It was JOHN sitting outside*).

After having argued that there is a strong syntactic relation between the clefted XP and the cleft clause, Reeve proceeds to specify the type of relationship. He claims that there are two types of clefts in English. In some cases the clefted XP must originate inside the cleft clause and then move out (promotional derivation). This can be confirmed by a group of cases when cleft clauses pattern with relative clauses but not with specificational sentences, namely anti-connectivity effects, which means that there is evidence that the clefted XP c-commands the cleft. For instance, quantifier scope interactions are different in cleft clauses and specificational sentences. There are similar effects with pronouns which make clear that the clefted XP has moved from the cleft clause. In (8) the use of the reflexive pronoun shows that it must have been generated in the cleft clause in order to satisfy binding conditions.

(8) It was *HIM/HIMSELF that Bill asked Sue to wash. [R 44]

Sometimes, however, the relative clause is created not by a promotional derivation but by a matching derivation, when the head NP is base-generated outside the clause, while the overt relative operator is generated in the gap-position inside the clause. This accounts for anti-connectivity effects, among others. Clefts can be ambiguous between promotional derivation and matching derivation when there is an overt relative operator available. If it is not possible to use an overt relative operator, only the promotion analysis is possible.

There is a difference in negation possibility in a clefted XP that is ambiguous between promoted and matched derivations compared to a clefted XP that is unambiguously promotional. For instance, PPs introduced by *in/on* allow an overt relative operator, as in (9a), while PPs introduced by *with* do not, as in (9b), so only the former can be created by a matching derivation. One notices that only the PP introduced by *in/on* and not the PP introduced by *with* can be clefted and negated (10).

(9) a. It was IN PARIS **where** she stayed.
b. It was WITH PAUL **that** she went. [R 53]

(10) a. It wasn't PARIS that she stayed in.
b. It wasn't IN PARIS that she stayed.
c. It wasn't PAUL that she went with.
d. #It wasn't WITH PAUL that she went. [R 53]

Furthermore, clefts are ambiguous between an information-focus interpretation and a contrastive interpretation, but some clefts, such as AP clefts, are only contrastive. This can be explained by the fact that promotional derivation (because of the A' movement used in it) obligatorily gives rise to a contrastive interpretation. Therefore, only clefts that can have overt relative operators can be used non-contrastively.

Having argued for the non-expletive nature of *it* and for the syntactic connection between the clefted XP and the cleft clause, in chapter 3 Reeve attempts to solve the problem of non-compositionality arising from his analysis, namely, that the cleft clause is syntactically related to the clefted XP while it should semantically restrict the reference of *it* to give rise to the presuppositions.

He notes that discontinuous modification (like the sort between *it* and the cleft clause) is attested in another construction as well. In (11) the presence of *only* makes the sentence grammatical, so it is reasonable to suggest that *only* licenses the relative clause.

(11) Who did you see that you like?
a. #I saw John that I like.
b. I only saw JOHN that I like. [R 60]

To account for examples like (11) and also for the clefts in English, Reeve proposes that restrictive relative clauses must satisfy two licensing conditions: (i) one that determines the constituent semantically modified by the relative clause and (ii) one that specifies the morpho-syntactic features of the relative operator. The syntactic condition requires surface locality while the semantic condition requires underlying locality. The licensing conditions are formulated in terms of c/m-

command and not in term of sisterhood, and so the two conditions can be satisfied by different hosts (12):

(12) *Syntactic licensing condition (non-sisterhood):* The relative clause and the extended nominal projection licensing it must be immediately dominated by adjunction segments (in the sense of May 1985) of the same category.

Thematic licensing condition (non-sisterhood): The θ-role borne by the relative clause must be θ-bound by a determiner which c-commands the relative and which the relative m-commands. [R 75, 78]

The two conditions are mostly satisfied by the same host, as in the case of ordinary restrictive relative clauses. However, in clefts *it* satisfies the thematic licensing condition while the clefted XP satisfies the syntactic licensing condition.

Since the two conditions are independent, it would seem that *it* would be able to license any relative, as in (13), where *John* would syntactically license the relative clause and *it* would thematically license it. Therefore, Reeve claims that there is a requirement of semantic equation between two licensers given in (14).

(13) *It annoyed John that I bought (meaning What I bought annoyed John). [R 80]

(14) *Equation condition:* The thematic licenser and the syntactic licenser must enter into a relation of semantic equation. [R 81]

In the case of clefts it is clear that *it* and the clefted XP are in a relation of semantic equation overtly manifested in the form of a copula. However, it is not clear to me how this formulation of the equation condition can account for *only* licensing a restrictive relative clause, because we can definitely not say that *only* itself enters into a relation of semantic equation with the syntactic host of the relative clause. Reeve appeals to the fact that the semantic description of *only* contains a relation of equation but this still means that (14) should be reformulated.

The proposed analysis makes several predictions, and Reeve proceeds to show that the predictions turn out to be true.

First, in order for the cleft clause to satisfy both conditions it must undergo extraposition to VP (details in section 3.4). There is evidence that this indeed happens: in German and Dutch, extraposed relatives always follow the verb in embedded sentences, but this extraposition is optional. However, extraposition of cleft relatives is obligatory. The same is true for relatives licensed by *only* in these languages.

Second, since *it* must bind the θ-role of the relative clause, it cannot bind anything else, which explains why there can be no phrasal subjects in clefts, as in (15). Third, thematic licensing by *it* predicts the impossibility of stacking cleft clauses, as in (16). Fourth, since thematic licensing applies on the underlying level, the relative clause licensed by *it* or *only* can move independently. This accounts for the fact that when *it* moves the relative clause does not. Finally, this analysis predicts that there can be some configurations in which both conditions cannot be satisfied simultaneously. Reeve argues that the case of *tough* movement is one such configuration, which explains the impossibility of *tough* movement in clefts, as in (17):

(15) *The man was John that I saw.

(16) It was JOHN that Mary hit that Bill disliked.
≠ The one that Mary hit that Bill disliked was John. [R 90]

(17) *It was tough to prevent from being JOHN that Mary hit. [R 103]

At the end of the chapter Reeve discusses another prediction of the theory, namely that sometimes only the thematic but not the syntactic licensing condition needs to apply. He argues that this is exactly what happens in the case of *it*-extraposition constructions (like *It proved his guilt that John bought a gun*) which do not need syntactic licensing because the CP does not contain a gap. Reeve shows that the syntactic properties of this construction are defined by the presence of thematic but not syntactic licensing.

2. Clefts in Russian

Having proposed his detailed theory of clefts in English, in chapter 4 Reeve applies it to Russian data. He claims that on an abstract level

clefts show a three-way dependency between the cleft pronoun, the cleft clause, and the clefted XP: the pronoun thematically licenses the cleft clause, and the clefted XP syntactically licenses the cleft clause, while the pronoun and clefted XP are connected by copular syntax. In Slavic languages, according to Reeve, the same three-way dependency describes cleft constructions, the only difference being that the cleft clause is not a relative clause.

Reeve proposes the structure in (18) for Russian clefts. This structure is modified in chapter 5 but the modification does not concern the main principles of this analysis.

(18) Èto VODKU Boris vypil.
it vodka Boris drank
'It is vodka that Boris drank.' [R 152]



There are several crucial points in this analysis. First, clefts are parallel to focus fronting because the focused XP moves to the SpecIP position in both constructions. Second, clefts in Russian are monoclausal in this analysis. Third, Reeve proposes that there are two IP projections present and that *èto* is a DP filling the specifier position of the highest IP (i.e., *èto* is a subject). In the following sections Reeve argues for these points.

First, he shows that clefts in Russian behave like focus fronting and not like a construction with a restrictive relative clause. He gives a very clear argument that there are no relative clauses in clefts in Russian, namely, that relative clauses in general must be introduced by a relative operator, while in clefts (and focus fronting) the presence of a relative operator is excluded, as shown in (19).

(19) a. Ja uvidela knigu, kotoraja/čto/ *Ø ležit na stole.
I saw book which/ that/ Ø lie on table
'I saw the book which was lying on the table.'

b. VODKU *kotoruju/ *čto/ OKØ ja ljublju pit'.
vodka which/ that Ø I love drink
'VODKA I love to drink.'

c. Èto VODKU *kotoruju/ *čto/ OKØ ja ljublju pit'.
this vodka which/ that Ø I love drink
'It's vodka that I love to drink.' [R 130]

Further Reeve proceeds to claim that unlike in English (20), in Russian ellipsis of the cleft clause is impossible both with and without *èto*, which means that the constructions have the same structure. However, example (21), which is a slightly modified example from Reeve (p. 131), shows that ellipsis is possible with focus fronting but not with clefts.

(20) a. What did John say that Bill drank? John said that it was the VODKA (that Bill drank).

b. *John said that Bill drank the water. No, John said that the VODKA *(Bill drank).

(21) a. Petja skazal čto Maša vypila vodu, a Vasja
Petja said that Masha drank water but Vasja
skazal čto VODKU (Maša vypila).
said that vodka Masha drank
'Petja said that Masha drank water, but Vasja said that vodka (she drank).'

(21) b. Petja skazal čto Maša vypila vodu, a Vasja
Petja said that Masha drank water but Vasja
skazal čto èto VODKU *?(Maša vypila)
said that this vodka Masha drank
'Petja said that Masha drank water, but Vasja said that it was vodka (she drank).' [adapted from R 131]

A small corpus search confirms this intuition. There were quite a few cases of ellipsis with focus fronting in the complement of a speech matrix verb, shown in (22), but examples with ellipsis in clefts in the same context were not found. The noun *pulej* 'bullet' is in instrumental case, showing that this is definitely an instance of ellipsis.

(22) Da, esli by èto ne bylo bredom, ja skazal by,
yes if COND this not was nonsense I say COND
čto pulej...
that $bullet_{INST}$
'Yes, if it was not nonsense, I would say that with a bullet [he was killed].' [RNC]

As further arguments that clefts and focus-fronting behave in a similar way note that the same types of XPs that can be fronted can also be clefted, and that connectivity effects associated with movement arise in a similar fashion in both constructions. For the sake of space I do not discuss the arguments here. Despite the issue with ellipsis raised above, the arguments that clefts and focus fronting have much in common are fairly convincing.

The next point that Reeve makes is that clefts in Russian are monoclausal. He gives several arguments in favor of this claim. I will change the order of his arguments here for the sake of clarity.

First, one can see that VP-adverbs cannot appear between *èto* and the fronted XP, while IP adverbs can, as seen in (23). This is explained by the fact that there is no V between the fronted XP and *èto*.

(23) Èto *vsegda/ OKverojatno BORIS p'et vodku.
this always/ probably Boris drink vodka
'It is *always/probably Boris who drinks vodka.' [R 138–39]

Second, in English imperatives are restricted to matrix clauses and so cannot appear in clefts. In Russian, however, clefts can be imperative, which shows that they are monoclausal:

(24) a. *It's you who be quiet!
b. Èto TY molči!
this you be-quiet
'You be quiet!' [R 139]

Finally, Reeve refers to the fact that copula insertion in clefts is impossible, as shown in (25). He claims that the impossibility of copular insertion in clefts in general is explained by the fact that the copula cannot select IP or CP as its complement. This point is not really crucial for the argument, but one must notice that it is not confirmed by the data: a copula can select for CP in Russian, shown in (26) (compared to Reeve's example (33) on page 138).

(25) Èto (*byla) VODKU Boris vypil.
It was vodka Boris drank
'It was vodka that Boris drank.' [constructed example]

(26) Pervaja mysl' byla čto starik umiraet.
first thought was that old-man die
'The first thought was that the old man was dying.' [RNC]

Reese's arguments that clefts in Russian are monoclausal are convincing. Next he turns to the most controversial (and the most original) point in his analysis, namely that there are two IP projections in Russian clefts. First he tries to show that there are facts confirming the existence of the two projections.

His first point concerns negation. He argues that the negation that appears in clefts between the pronoun and the clefted XP is not constituent negation but sentential negation, made possible by the presence of the IP projection there. This is demonstrated by the fact that constituent negation is normally not compatible with sentential negation, shown by (27a), while in clefts the combination of two negative particles is possible, as shown by (27b). In (27) I use (un)grammatical-

ity markings as used by Reeve, although the example is modified (I have used different lexical items but kept the structure).

(27) a. *Ja ne KAŠU ne s"el, a SUP.
I not porridge not eat but soup
'*I did not eat not porridge, but soup.'

b. Èto ja ne KAŠU ne s"el, a SUP.
this I not porridge not eat but soup
'It wasn't porridge that I didn't eat, but soup.' [Q]

However, I and the participants of my online survey strongly disagree with the judgments on these sentences. For most people (27a) and (27b) are absolutely equal in acceptability, some people saying they are both perfectly normal and some saying that they are both strange-sounding. A few respondents claim that (27a) is better than (27b), and only one respondent says that (27b) is better but that (27a) is still grammatical. Therefore, Reeve's argument cannot be valid.[1]

The second argument comes from Serbo-Croatian. In this language superiority effects connected to multiple *wh*-movement only arise in biclausal constructions. However, in clefts superiority effects also apply. Reeve claims that this can be explained by connecting superiority effects to the presence of IP nodes that have to be crossed. I am not convinced that an argument from Serbo-Croatian is valid for the analysis of Russian because Reeve does not show that clefts in Serbo-Croatian have the exact same properties as Russian clefts.

[1] Furthermore, the idea that the negation in clefts is sentential is not confirmed by other tests either. For instance, sentential negation licenses negative-polarity items in Russian in (ia), while constituent negation cannot do that in (ib). As (ic) shows, negation in clefts cannot do that either.

(i) a. Vanja ne uvidel nikogo.
Vanya not saw nobody
'Vanya hasn't seen anyone.'

b. *Ne Vanja uvidel nikogo.
not Vanya saw nobody
'Not Vanya has seen anyone.'

c. *Èto ne Vanja uvidel nikogo.
this not Vanya saw nobody
'It wasn't Vanya who has seen anyone.'

In addition note that the cleft pronoun in Russian clefts can actually appear twice when there is a *wh*-word involved, as in (28). Would this example make Reeve claim that there are three IP nodes in this sentence? Probably not, as the first *èto* actually precedes the moved *wh*-word, so it should be located somewhere in the CP layer, but it is unclear where it is generated. Further studies of Russian clefts should probably propose an account for such cases as well.[2]

(28) a. Èto KTO èto u nas plačet?
this who this at us cry
'Who is it crying here?'

b. Èto KTO èto tut kogo pobil?
this who this here whom beat
'Who is it that has beaten whom here?'
[constructed examples]

To sum up, neither piece of evidence for the presence of the two IP nodes in Russian clefts is convincing, the first being based on inadequate data and the second coming from a different language. Let us turn to the arguments for the specifier of IP status of *èto* in Russian clefts.

The first argument is that analyzing *èto* in clefts as a pronominal in SpecIP allows unifying this use of *èto* with cases in which *èto* is clearly pronominal, such as (29).

(29) Èto udivljaet, čto Maks— špion.
this surprises that Max spy
'It's surprising that Max is a spy.' [R 169]

Furthermore, Reeve claims that a unified analysis of *èto* can also cover the cases of *èto* appearing in bare copular sentences, as in (30a). He claims that the most reasonable analysis of such sentences is that *èto* is not a realization of a functional head but a DP coreferential with the

[2] Also one should note that *wh*-questions with *èto* are actually not contrastive.

first DP in the sentence. He claims that this construction is parallel in structure to pronoun doubling, as in (30b).

(30) a. Ciceron èto Tullij.
Cicero this Tully
'Cicero is Tully.'

b. Žizn' ona voobšče nelegkaja.
life it usually not-easy
'Life is usually not easy.' [R 148, 147]

One should notice, however, that this analysis of bare copular sentences is only one of the possible analyses (see Geist 2007 and also Markman 2008), so in order to use this point it is necessary to show that this analysis is superior. One of the arguments that Reeve gives in favor of this analysis is that under the other analysis one would expect to be able to combine pronominal *èto* with copular *èto*. But this is not possible; see (31a). However, despite being marked—probably because the use of two instances of one word in two different functions in juxtaposition is always awkward—such examples are grammatical and occur in the corpus, as seen in (31b). One can see that the first instance of *èto* is pronominal, and not just a repetition of the copular *èto*, because it is used in combination with *vot*, forming a deictic expression 'this one here'.

(31) a. *Èto èto Ivan.
this this Ivan
'This, this is Ivan.'

b. A vot èto — èto myšelovka.
and here this this mousetrap
'And this one here is a mousetrap.' [RNC]

The next argument for the subject status of *èto* is that some IP-adverbs cannot follow the subject in Russian, and the same adverbs cannot follow *èto* in clefts. The adverbs that Reeve gives as an example are *možet byt'* 'perhaps' and *čestno* 'frankly'. In my idiolect the evaluative meaning 'frankly' can only be expressed by the expression *čestno govorja* 'frankly speaking', so I will disregard this adverb. However,

with *možet byt'* it is possible to show that this adverb can in fact follow both subjects and *èto* in clefts, as seen in (32), although in both cases it should be preceded and followed by prosodic breaks. The arguments therefore cannot stand.

(32) a. Moi slova možet byt' prozvučat paradoksal'no,...
my words may be will-sound paradoxically
'My words will perhaps sound paradoxical...'

b. Èto možet byt' Var'ka pis'mo napisala...[3]
this may be Varka letter wrote
'It is perhaps Varka who wrote the letter...' [RNC]

Reeve's final argument for the subject position of *èto* is that it interferes with the control of PRO in clausal complements, as in (33). The obvious explanation for (33b) is that *èto* blocks the local relationship between the subject *on* 'he' and PRO, occupying an A-position as well. One should notice that another explanation for the ungrammaticality of this example would be that *èto* occupies some position in the extended CP projection and this layer is lacking in the case of infinitival clausal complements with PRO.[4]

(33) a. On xočet PRO VODU pit'.
he wants water to-drink
'He wants it to be water that he drinks.' [R 151]

b. *On xočet èto PRO VODU pit'.
he wants this water to-drink

To sum up, the evidence for the claim that *èto* is in the subject position in clefts is controversial. Some data directly contradicts Reeve's claims, while other data are inconclusive. More research is needed to prove this theory.

Having argued for the syntactic position of *èto*, Reeve proceeds to argue that the pronoun thematically licenses the cleft clause in Russian

[3] It is clear from the following text that *Var'ka* is contrastively focused.

[4] Recall the clefts with two instances of *èto* where it is clear that the first instance of *èto* should be in the CP layer. Also, for this argument to stand it is not crucial that *èto* be in CP—it should be in some XP-projection which is lacking in infinitival complements.

in a way similar to English clefts, despite the fact that there is no relative clause in Russian clefts. This allows him to explain the interpretative parallels between clefts and specificational sentences rather than focus-fronting sentences, as well as some syntactic properties of Russian clefts.

First, Reeve notices that unlike focus fronting, clefts and specificational sentences in Russian give rise to the same presuppositions as English clefts. For instance, a negative quantifier cannot be the clefted XP or the predicate in specificational sentences, but it can be focus-fronted, as shown in (34). Clefts and specificational sentences are incompatible with particles meaning 'also' and 'even'.

(34) a. *Èto NIČEGO ja ne el.
this nothing I not ate
'*It was nothing that I ate.'

b. *To, čto ja (ne) (s")el— èto NIČEGO.
that what I not ate this nothing
'*What I ate was nothing.'

c. NIČEGO ja ne el.
nothing I not ate
'I ate nothing.' [R 158]

Second, Reeve shows that there is an interpretative difference between clefts and specificational sentences, namely, that the former are always contrastive in Russian. He claims that focus-fronting sentences are also always contrastive, and that the contrastiveness arises because of the A'-movement. In clefts the clefted XP must undergo A'-movement in order for the thematic licensing condition to be satisfied. Therefore, clefts are always contrastive.

Reeve proceeds to show that it is indeed true that the clefted XP has to undergo movement; moreover, the clefted XP must move out of the VP in order to create the open position that will allow θ-binding of the cleft clause by *èto*. This predicts that the clefted XP must immediately follow *èto*. This fact is crucial for Reeve to prove that θ-binding between the pronoun and the cleft clause takes place. However, the idea that the clefted XP must undergo fronting is very controversial. In reality the clefted XP can move to the preverbal position or stay in situ

while the contrastive interpretation will still be present, as in (35). Therefore, explaining the contrastive interpretation through the necessity of *èto* to thematically bind the cleft clause is not possible.

(35) a. Net, èto VANJU ona uvidela, a ne Petju.
no this Vania she saw but not Petia
'No, it's Vania that she saw, not Petia.'

b. Net, èto ona VANJU uvidela, a ne Petju.
no this she Vania saw but not Petia
'No, it's Vania that she saw, not Petia.'

c. Net, èto ona uvidela VANJU, a ne Petju.
no this she saw Vania but not Petia
'No, it's Vania that she saw, not Petia.' [Q]

According to my intuition and intuitions of most of my respondents, (35a) and (35b) are both grammatical, (35b) sounding even better than (35a). For many (but not all) (35c) is equally well formed, while for some it is worse than (35a–b) but not ungrammatical. Basically what these examples show is that the clefted XP has to be marked by the phrasal accent but it does not have to move.

Reeve argues that the apparent cases of non-moved clefted XPs are not clefts. He discusses sentences with broad focus and sentences in which *èto* serves as a connector. However, as (35) clearly shows, sentences with narrow contrastive focus can still contain non-moved clefted XPs. Setting this issue aside, one of his arguments that constructions with *èto* as a connector are different from clefts appears to be valid. For instance, in (36) the focus of the question is *vse* 'everyone'—a quantifier which cannot be the clefted XP in "normal" clefts. However, it is not exactly clear to me why sentences with broad focus, such as (37), should be syntactically different from clefts. The meaning of this construction seems to be different—it does not involves contrast—but the syntactic differences argued for by Reeve are not convincing.

(36) Èto ja VSEX včera vstretil na ulice?
this I everyone yesterday meet on street
'Did I meet EVERYONE outside yesterday?' [R 166]

(37) Čto slučilos'? Èto BOMBA vzorvalas'.
what happened this bomb explode
'What has happened? A bomb has exploded.'
[constructed example]

Finally, Reeve claims that his analysis explains why English-style clefts (with relative clauses) are not available in Russian. He notes that in Russian extraposition of restrictive relative clauses is not possible, while such extraposition is necessary to create the appropriate configuration for licensing. In some other Slavic languages, such as Bulgarian and Serbo-Croatian, such extraposition is possible and so are English-style clefts. Here again I have to give a counterexample showing that the extraposition of restrictive clauses is possible in (colloquial) Russian as well. Example (38) is similar to Reeve's examples from Bulgarian and Serbo-Croatian (p. 168). However, in Russian, English-style clefts are definitely ungrammatical.

(38) Bud' ty každym prokljata, kto tebja uvidit!
be you each damned who you see
'May you be damned by everyone who sees you!' [RNC]

To sum up, in chapter 4 Reeve successfully argues for the monoclausal status of clefts in Russian and for similarities between clefts and focus-fronting sentences. However, the arguments for the most crucial points—the presence of two I nodes; the subject status of *èto*; and the presence of thematic licensing of the cleft clause—are partially based on incorrect data and thus are not valid.

In chapter 5 Reeve proposes a syntactic analysis of specificational sentences (and clefts). He notes that in English there is a compositionality problem with respect to the relation between the cleft pronoun and the clefted XP. For the matching clefts it is possible to say that the copula is a two-place predicate, the pronoun being its subject and the clefted XP being its object. This cannot be correct for promotion clefts because the position of the clefted XP is not argumental (the argument of the copula in this case is actually the CP out of which the XP moves). In Russian furthermore there is no copula at all, so the same analysis is not possible.

He argues instead that the syntax of clefts involves a functional head (Eq) in the extended verbal projection, which is not found in predicational sentences. This functional head has the semantic effect of *ident* operation to the post-copular XP, turning it into an identity predicate which can then be applied to the pre-copular XP and gives rise to equative reading. Furthermore, this functional head associates with focus; in other words, its internal argument must be the focus of the sentence (so the problem with promotional clefts is solved). This functional head must be filled by a lexical item, which in English is the copula and in Russian the pronoun *èto*. The revised structures of English and Russian clefts are given in (39):

(39) a. It is JOHN that Mary saw. [R 182]



b. Èto VODKU Boris vypil.
it vodka Boris drank
'It is vodka that Boris drank.' [R 185]



Basically the same structure is used in specificational sentences in Russian:

(40) Soldat èto Ivan.
soldier this Ivan
'The soldier is Ivan.' [R 185]



This theory makes several predictions. For instance, since the functional head Eq associates with focus, post-copular XP in specificational (but not predicational) sentences must always be in focus, which turns out to be true. Also this analysis predicts that since multiple association with focus is possible, so should multiple clefting be, which turns out to be true as well, as shown in (41). Finally, this analysis predicts that focus projection in specificational sentences is impossible, which is also confirmed by the data.

(41) It was [at Knock] [a century ago] that the Virgin appeared to local peasants. [R 192]

In chapter 6 Reeve discusses the main theoretical consequence of his work, namely that the conception of compositionality should be broadened, going beyond the rule-by-rule hypothesis. To explain properties of clefts in English and Russian he needs the option that a relative clause can be licensed by two different licensers, and that a functional head can select the focused constituent as its argument. These possibilities are not available under the traditional notion of compositionality.

3. General Evaluation

Reeve's book definitely presents interest to researchers working on the structure of clefts in Germanic and Slavic languages. Reeve creates an elaborate and original theory of clefts with far-reaching theoretical consequences. He revises traditional theories of clefts and argues against them, and his arguments are often convincing.

On the other hand, his analysis of clefts in Russian is often based on incorrect data. Reeve convincingly argues for the monoclausal structure of clefts and correctly summarizes parallels between clefts and focus fronting on the one hand and between clefts and specificational sentences on the other hand. However, the core of his analysis, namely the presence of two I nodes, the subject position of *èto*, and the presence of thematic licensing of the cleft clause by the cleft pronoun, is not well supported. I have to conclude that Reeve's contribution to the debate on the syntax of Russian clefts raises some important issues but does not solve the puzzle.

The weakness of the empirical basis of this work is rather saddening. The sources of grammaticality judgments of the examples used in the book are often not reported. Nowadays it is easily possible to use the Russian National Corpus, which contains a large amount of Russian text, and allows for searching by morphological features. Furthermore, it is relatively easy to organize a survey to test grammaticality judgments if the necessary examples are not available in the corpus. Therefore, a solid basis of real data should be a prerequisite for any good theoretical study.

References

Chomsky, Noam. (1995) *The Minimalist program*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Cottell, Siobhán. (2002) *The comparative syntax of cleft constructions*. Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wales, Bangor.

Geist, Ljudmila. (2007) "Predication and equation in copular sentences: Russian vs. English". Ileana Comorovski and Klaus von Heusinger, eds. *Existence: Semantics and syntax*. Berlin: Springer, 79–105.

Kiss, Katalin É. (1998) "Identificational focus versus information focus". *Language* 74(2): 245–73.

Markman, Vita G. (2008) "Pronominal copula constructions are what? Reduced specificational pseudo-clefts!" Charles B. Chang and Hannah J. Haynie, eds. *Proceedings of the 26th West Cost Conference on Formal Linguistics*. Somerville, CA: Cascadilla Press, 366–74.

May, Robert. (1985) *Logical form*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Percus, Orin. (1997) "Prying open the cleft". Kiyomi Kusumoto, ed. *Proceedings of 27th Annual Meeting of the North East Linguistics Society*. Amherst, MA: GLSA, 337–51.

Vikner, Sten. (1995) *Verb movement and expletive subjects in the Germanic languages*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Spuistraat 210
1012VT Amsterdam
The Netherlands
v.kimmelman@uva.nl

Received: December 2012

John Frederick Bailyn. *The syntax of Russian*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012. xvii + 373 pp.

Reviewed by Egor Tsedryk

Rich case morphology and word order flexibility are two interrelated properties of Russian that have long intrigued syntacticians from various schools and traditions. In *The syntax of Russian*, Bailyn dismisses anything that could potentially be qualified as "optional" or "non-configurational" in Russian. In a nutshell, he claims that: (i) Russian has the same major constituents as English, including verb phrase (VP) and determiner phrase (DP); (ii) case marking is a by-product of syntactic configurations, and it is attributed to a limited number of categories; (iii) basic word order is Subject-Verb-Object (SVO), while other patterns are derived by movement; (iv) discourse-related movement occurs at the level of Functional Form,[1] which is "a point of interface between linguistic and non-linguistic [discursive] systems" (320).

As Bailyn notes in the preface, his general goal is to describe the main structural properties of modern Russian. Thus, he targets a large readership, including anyone interested in Russian or in syntax more generally. At the same time he has a narrower goal of highlighting those aspects of Russian that represent a particular interest in current syntactic theory. In my opinion, this book is more successful in achieving its narrower goal. A reader who does not have a background in minimalism, or more generally in generative syntax, may find it difficult to follow, especially parts two and three.

The book contains seven chapters organized into three parts. The first part (Basic configurations, chapters 1–3) follows the logic of an introductory textbook in syntax: it outlines the internal structure of phrases, describes constituency tests applicable to Russian, and presents the minimal structure of main and subordinate clauses. The second two parts (Case, chapters 4–5, and Word order, chapters 6–7) reveal the syntactic nature of core cases (Nominative, Accusative, Da-

[1] I follow Bailyn in his use of capitalization for certain terms and concepts.