HEARERS AND SPEECH ACTS

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In conversations involving more than two people, most utterances are intended to be understood not only by the people being addressed, but also by the others. These utterances cannot be accounted for in current theories of speech acts unless several basic changes are made. In our proposal, the speaker performs two types of illocutionary act with each utterance. One is the traditional kind, such as an assertion, promise, or apology; this is directed at the addressees. The other, called an informative, is directed at all the participants in the conversation—the addressees and third parties alike. It is intended to inform all of them jointly of the assertion, promise, or apology being directed at the addressees. We present evidence that every traditional illocutionary act is performed by means of an informative.*

Although hearers play an essential role in speech acts, that role has never been fully examined. Consider requests, such as this one from 'Othello':

(1) *Othello, to Desdemona, in front of Iago and Roderigo:* Come, Desdemona.

In Searle's 1969 theory and its descendants—the STANDARD THEORIES as we will call them—Othello's request 'counts as an attempt to get H to do A'. It is an attempt by Othello to get the 'hearer' H to go with him. This, of course, is incorrect: by 'hearer', Searle really means 'addressee'.[1] Although Othello has an audience of three 'hearers'—Desdemona, Iago, and Roderigo—he isn't trying to get all three of them to go with him. His request is for Desdemona alone. She is an addressee, not just a hearer. The standard theories are theories about illocutionary acts directed at addressees.

Are there illocutionary acts directed at hearers such as Iago and Roderigo? The standard theories, by their silence on the question, appear to assume the answer is no.[2] This too seems incorrect. Although Othello isn't addressing Iago and Roderigo, he intends them to understand what he is saying. Indeed, he intends them to understand in the same way that he intends Desdemona to understand—by means of their recognition of his intentions, just as theories

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[1] Searle is in good company. Austin 1962, Bach & Harnish 1979, Bennett 1973, Chomsky 1975, Davison 1975, Fraser 1975, Garner 1975, Gordon & Lakoff 1971, Kempson 1975, 1977, Lewis 1969, and Morgan 1977 all use 'hearer' for 'addressee'. Donnellan 1968 and Grice 1968 refer to an undifferentiated 'audience'. Others, including Fillmore 1972, Green 1975, and Katz 1977, have used 'addressee'—though still others, such as R. Lakoff 1972 and Ervin-Tripp 1976, have used this interchangeably with 'hearer'.

[2] Allusions have been made to the effect of a third party on the significance of a speaker's utterance to an addressee (Bird 1975, Rubin 1978, Verschueren 1978), but no discussion of illocutionary acts toward these third parties has taken place (see also fns. 9 and 10, below).

of illocutionary acts require. The difference is that what Iago and Roderigo are to understand is not that they are to go with Othello, but that he is requesting Desdemona to go with him. As a first conjecture, then, Othello is performing illocutionary acts directed at all three hearers. However, the ones he is directing at Iago and Roderigo aren't the same as the ones he is directing at Desdemona.

In this paper, we argue that this conjecture is correct: Speakers perform illocutionary acts not only toward addressees, but also toward certain other hearers. We define a type of hearer we call a PARTICIPANT, whose role as hearer is distinct from the roles of both addressee and overhearer. In ex. 1, Iago, Roderigo, and Desdemona are participants; Desdemona is also the addressee. Then we take up three hypotheses:

(2) THE PARTICIPANT HYPOTHESIS. Certain illocutionary acts are directed at hearers in their roles as addressees, and others are directed at hearers in their roles as participants.

The first class, called ADDRESSEE-DIRECTED ILLOCUTIONARY ACTS, includes all the familiar illocutionary acts such as assertions, requests, promises, and apologies. It is the second class, called PARTICIPANT-DIRECTED ILLOCUTIONARY ACTS, that is new.

(3) THE INFORMATIVE HYPOTHESIS. The fundamental kind of participant-directed illocutionary act is one by which the speaker jointly informs all the participants fully of the illocutionary act that he is simultaneously performing toward the addressee or addressees.

These illocutionary acts will be called INFORMATIVES. This leads to the third hypothesis:

(4) THE INFORMATIVE-FIRST HYPOTHESIS. All addressee-directed illocutionary acts are performed by means of informatives.

By this hypothesis, Othello makes his request of Desdemona by means of an informative directed at Iago, Roderigo, AND Desdemona.[3]

This proposal has far-reaching consequences for speech-act theories. Ever since Austin 1962, the act of speaking has been divided by levels into component acts that are causally related: phonetic acts, locutionary acts, illocutionary acts, and perlocutionary acts, among others.[4] Our proposal is to add a new level—a new component act—to this causal chain. Consider an analogy (cf. Austin, 107): in shooting a gun, a person tenses certain muscles, by means of which he crooks his right index finger, by means of which he pulls the trigger, by means of which he shoots the gun. If no one had described the act of crooking the right index finger, which is a necessary component of this causal chain, then the theory of gun-shooting would be incomplete. For speech acts, since no one has described the act of informing participants, which is just as necessary a component of speaking, speech-act theories are likewise incom-

[3] Note that the third hypothesis presupposes the second, which in turn presupposes the first. So it is possible to accept the first hypothesis alone, the first two alone, or all three.

[4] By a 'causal' relation, we mean a 'by-means-of' relation. For discussion, see Austin 1962, Grice 1968, Goldman 1970, and our §5.

plete. They need to be amended by a new level of component acts, the informatives.

We take up the hypotheses roughly in order. In §1, we describe situations that appear to require participant-directed illocutionary acts. In §2, we describe these situations more completely. In §3, we argue that informatives are a type of illocutionary act. In §4, we lay out the evidence for the informative-first hypothesis. In §5, we show how this analysis accounts for two kinds of indirect illocutionary acts. In §6, we take up a family of participant-directed illocutionary acts called partial informatives. In §7, we analyse how informatives are used in deception. In §8, we summarize.

1. FIVE PROBLEMS. Are hearers like Iago and Roderigo truly the targets of illocutionary acts? We will describe five problems for the standard theories that appear to be resolved only if the answer is yes. For each problem, we will consider examples in which the speaker performs a traditional illocutionary act toward one hearer, and must be assumed at the same time and with the same utterance to be informing other hearers of that act. These other hearers will be called SIDE-PARTICIPANTS, and the acts of informing them INFORMATIVES.

1.1. CONVERSATIONS. In ordinary conversations, the information that the parties acquire accumulates in a principled way (see Gazdar 1979, Stalnaker 1978). Imagine Ann, Barbara, and Charles in a conversation. When Ann asks Barbara a question, Charles is expected to keep track of that question, even though he is not being addressed. And when Ann asks HIM a question, he is expected to keep track of the fact that Barbara—and Ann—are keeping track of this question too. That is, the parties to a conversation generally adhere to a PRINCIPLE OF RESPONSIBILITY: Each is responsible at all times for keeping track of what is being said, and for enabling everyone else to keep track of what is being said. Each party keeps a cumulative record that becomes part of everyone's COMMON GROUND, in the technical sense of Karttunen & Peters 1975, Stalnaker 1978, and Clark & Carlson 1981. With each contribution to the conversation, the current speaker presupposes the common ground already established; and all the parties, the speaker included, add what is new in that contribution to their common ground.

The problem this poses for the standard theories is that speakers cannot fulfill this responsibility without the use of informatives. Consider this example:

(5) *Charles, to Ann and Barbara:* What did the two of you do today?
Ann, to Charles, in front of Barbara: We went to the museum.
Barbara, to Charles, in front of Ann: Before that, we went to the theater.

Here Ann and Barbara take turns telling Charles what they did together. When Ann asserts that they went to the museum, she is addressing Charles. She can't be addressing Barbara, since she would be telling her something it was obvious to the two of them that Barbara already knew (cf. Searle 1969, Stalnaker 1978). Yet if the conversation is to accumulate, Ann must let Barbara know what she is telling Charles. Otherwise, Barbara cannot keep track of what is being said; she may repeat things Ann has already said. So Ann must

inform Barbara that she is telling Charles that they went to the museum. Barbara presupposes just that when she says *Before that, we went to the theater.*

If Barbara understands English, how could Ann fail to let her know what she was telling Charles? There are many ways. Ann could have told Charles *We went to the place you recommended to me this morning*, knowing that Barbara had no idea he had recommended the museum. In that case, Ann would have good reason for believing that Barbara could NOT determine what she was telling Charles and therefore would not be able to build on what she had just said: Barbara might mistakenly go on *And then we went to the museum*, duplicating Ann's contribution. So, to fulfill her responsibility, Ann must do more than tell Charles they went to the museum. She must tell him in such a way that she simultaneously informs Barbara of what she is telling him.

The need for informatives is especially clear for certain types of ellipsis in conversation; e.g.,

(6) *Charles, to Ann, in front of Barbara:* Did you like the museum?
Ann, to Charles, in front of Barbara: Yes, I did.
Charles, to Barbara, in front of Ann: What about you?
Barbara, to Charles, in front of Ann: I liked it too.

When Charles asks Ann his question, he must also be informing Barbara what he is asking Ann. Otherwise, he cannot be certain that Barbara will understand his highly elliptical question, *What about you?* Imagine instead that Charles had asked Ann *Did you like the place I recommended this morning?*, knowing that Barbara was not privy to that conversation: he couldn't then expect her to understand *What about you?* So Charles must do two things in uttering *Did you like the museum?*: (a) ask Ann whether she liked the museum, and (b) inform Barbara that he is asking Ann this. Only then will his next elliptical question be felicitous.

The necessity for informatives is also obvious whenever there is a change of addressee in the middle of an utterance. This often occurs with tag questions, as in this example from Graham Greene's *The human factor*:

(7) *Hargreaves, to Percival, in front of Daintry:* Daintry began his check with those, [turning to Daintry] didn't you?

In the first half, Hargreaves is making an assertion to Percival. Yet he must also be informing Daintry of that assertion; otherwise, he couldn't turn to Daintry and ask him to confirm it. Daintry, for example, must understand what *his check* and *those* refer to. With the tag question, there is a similar problem. As Millar & Brown (1979:44) point out for similar Scots examples: 'The speaker is not seeking confirmation of his proposition for his own sake—he is not uncertain of the truth of his proposition—but for the sake of the third party.' With his tag question, Hargreaves' main aim is not to ask Daintry the question, but to inform PERCIVAL that he is asking Daintry that question. Informatives are essential in both halves of his utterance.

1.2. INDIRECT ILLOCUTIONARY ACTS. In the standard theories, the speaker can perform one illocutionary act toward an addressee and thereby perform

another toward the same addressee. The first is called a direct illocutionary act; the second, an indirect illocutionary act (Bach & Harnish 1979, Morgan 1978, Searle 1975). Take this example:

(8) *Ann, to Barbara, in front of Charles:* Barbara, I insist that you tell Charles who we met at the museum today.

Ann is directly asserting that she insists that Barbara tell Charles something, and she is indirectly requesting Barbara to do this. Both the assertion and the request are addressed to Barbara. Now consider this:

(9) *Ann, to Charles, in front of Barbara:* Charles, I insist that Barbara tell you who we met at the museum today.

Again Ann is directly asserting that she insists that Barbara tell Charles something, and she is indirectly requesting Barbara to do this. In this case, however, the assertion is addressed to Charles, and the request to Barbara. Thus, there are two distinct types of indirect illocutionary acts: those like 8, in which the direct and indirect addressees are the same; and those like 9, in which they are different. These two types will be called LINEAR and LATERAL indirect illocutionary acts, respectively. The indirect addressees in the two types will be called LINEAR and LATERAL addressees, respectively.

Lateral indirect illocutionary acts pose a problem for the standard theories. In 9, the standard theories say that Ann's only direct illocutionary act is the assertion to Charles. But if she isn't performing any illocutionary act toward Barbara, how is it possible for her to perform an INDIRECT illocutionary act toward Barbara—the indirect request? In the standard theories, all indirect illocutionary acts are performed by means of direct ones aimed at the same hearer. These theories predict that the lateral request in 9 is not possible.

One solution is to deny that Ann's request in 9 is indirect. Instead, one would say that she is performing two DIRECT illocutionary acts—an assertion toward Charles, and a request of Barbara. There are two drawbacks to this. One is that, in 9, Ann is clearly addressing Charles, not Barbara. She uses the vocative *Charles*; and she speaks of Charles as *you*, but of Barbara in the third person. This solution would require a drastic revision of the notion of addressee. This solution also obliterates the parallels between 8 and 9: in 8, Ann's request is clearly indirect; in 9, it should be indirect for the same reasons.

A second solution is to drop the 'indirect performance criterion' that indirect illocutionary acts must be performed by means of direct illocutionary acts addressed to the same hearer or hearers. This move, however, would be self-defeating. In Searle's 1975 theory, it is this criterion that makes an illocutionary act indirect.[5] If it were dropped, indirect acts would become formally indistinguishable from direct acts, and much of the motivation for the theory would disappear.

A third solution is to bring in informatives. In uttering 9, Ann is informing Barbara of her assertion to Charles, and she is thereby making her indirect request of Barbara. This solution retains the idea that Ann's request of Barbara

[5] Cf. the inclusion principle discussed in §4, below.

is indirect. It also retains the indirect performance criterion, since Ann's indirect request is performed by means of a direct informative to the same hearer. The analysis which we will offer later differs from this solution only in some details.

Lateral indirect illocutionary acts must be contended with because they are so common: e.g.,

(10) *Charles, to Ann, in front of Barbara:* Ann, what's playing at the theater next week?
Ann, to Charles, in front of Barbara: Sorry, I don't know. But Barbara does.
Barbara, to Charles, in front of Ann: 'Much ado about nothing'.

In telling Charles that Barbara knows what's playing, Ann is indirectly and laterally asking Barbara to answer Charles' question. Again:

(11) *Father, to son, in front of daughter Julia:* Ned, go do your homework.
Ned, to father, in front of Julia: I can't. Julia stole all my pencils.
Julia, to father, in front of Ned: No, Papa, I did not.

When Ned addresses his father, he is laterally charging his sister with stealing his pencils, a charge she then laterally denies. Lateral indirectness like this is quite an ordinary part of conversations.[6]

In talking laterally, the speaker doesn't appear to be speaking to the indirect addressee, but to someone else, and this appearance is often useful. One example is what Greenburg 1964 has called the 'third person invisible'. Imagine that a grown son has brought home a female friend for his mother's approval:

(12) *Mother, to son, in front of his friend:* Does she want another cup of coffee?

In asking her son this, the mother is really telling the woman indirectly that she is refusing to speak to her. If the mother had said directly *I refuse to speak to you*, she would be belying her own words. She can accomplish what she wants only indirectly AND laterally, e.g. by telling her son *I refuse to speak to that woman*, or as in 12.

In other examples, the speaker makes a pretense of speaking linearly when the primary illocutionary act is lateral and indirect; e.g.,

(13) *Mother, to three-month-old, in front of father:* Don't you think your father should change your diapers?

[6] Evidently the use of lateral indirectness is acquired quite early. Sully (1896:474–5) gave several illustrations from the study of C., a somewhat precocious five-year-old:

> 'One day (the end of the seventh month) he was playing on the Heath under the eye of his mother. He had put on one of the seats a lot of grass and sand as fodder for his wooden horse. While he went away for a minute a strange nurse and children arrived, making a perfectly legitimate use of the bench by seating themselves on it, and in order to get room brushing away the precious result of his foraging expedition. On coming back and seeing what had happened he turned to his mother and swelling with indignation exclaimed loudly: "What do you mean by it, letting these children move away my things?" Of course this was intended to intimidate the real culprits, the children.'

(14) *Father, to dog, in front of son:* Lassie, Daniel is about to take you for a walk.

(15) *Mechanic, to automobile, in front of co-worker:* Damn it, car, I need two more hands to help me bolt your fender back on.

In 13, the mother is laterally and indirectly asking father to change the baby's diapers; in 14, the father is ordering the son to take the dog for a walk; and in 15 the mechanic is asking his co-worker for help. The pretenses are clear, because the direct illocutionary acts are aimed at things that couldn't be real targets of what the speakers are saying.

An extreme form of lateral indirectness is required when direct illocutionary acts are precluded by taboo. Certain Australian groups have 'mother-in-law languages' for talking in the presence of relatives with whom it is forbidden to speak (Dixon 1972, Thomson 1935). However, when a woman wants to communicate with her son-in-law, whom she cannot address directly, she can address a nearby dog or child. Thomson (485) describes how a Wik Monkan woman can ask her son-in-law for tobacco:

> 'She may not use direct talk (wik kōi'um) which is: ŋaindäŋ ŋaiya mai ken ya'a, "Son-in-law I tobacco nothing," but in ŋōnk wōnk tōnn [the avoidance language], speaking to her daughter's dog: kemiäŋ mampi ŋaiya kōn katume, "Daughter's son (i.e., the dog is the child of her tuwa [child]), I tobacco nothing." If he has none, instead of replying directly ŋaiya ya'a, he again addresses the dog: ŋaindäŋ ŋaiya katum, "Son (to his dog), I (have) nothing," or if he has a small piece only he may say inwé ŋainda wettä, "Here (is) son no good." Freely rendered "Son, here is a little no good piece."'

Interestingly, the Wik Monkan term for the avoidance language is *ŋōnk wōnk tōnn*, literally 'speech side another', which Thomson glosses as 'one side talk'. The woman is speaking 'one side' to her son-in-law. This is contrasted with *wik kōi'um* or 'straight talk', i.e. speech to linear addressees.

So lateral indirect illocutionary acts, though ubiquitous, cannot be accounted for by the standard theories. They appear to require the recognition of informatives.

1.3. DESIGNATING ADDRESSEES. In conversations with three or more parties, one person can 'speak to' the others without knowing which of them he is addressing; e.g.,

(16) *Charles, to Ann and Barbara:* Please return my map, whichever of you has it.

Imagine that Ann and Barbara know that Ann has the map, and that Charles has no idea which one of them has it. So Charles is making a request of Ann, but he doesn't know this. As far as he is concerned, he is aiming what he is saying as much at Barbara as at Ann.

The standard theories aren't equipped to handle 16; they presuppose that the speaker knows to whom he is addressing each illocutionary act. A request, says Searle (1969:57), is 'an attempt to get H to do A', where H is 'the hearer' 'in the presence of' whom the sentence is uttered. Charles, however, isn't trying to get both Ann and Barbara to return his map. The person he is trying to get to return the map is the one who has it, whichever one that may be.

Charles makes this explicit with his vocative, *whichever of you has it*. The problem is that Charles's intentions toward Ann and Barbara are identical. So if he is performing an illocutionary act toward, say, Ann—which he must be, if he is making a request—then he must also be performing an illocutionary act toward Barbara.

One solution is to assume that Charles is performing two illocutionary acts simultaneously. He is making a request of the person with the map, and he is informing the other person of that request. He lets the situation sort out which person is which. In this way, Charles is treating Ann and Barbara in virtually the same way. Later, we will return to such examples and offer a solution in which Charles treats Ann and Barbara entirely symmetrically. The point for now is that examples like 16 also appear to require informatives.

1.4. PUBLIC SIDE-PARTICIPANTS. On many occasions, government officials, television newsmen, and others are ostensibly addressing certain hearers, but their primary aim is to inform the on-looking public of what they are saying to these hearers. Consider, first, a television interview between, say, Crothers and Senator Smyth. In private, their talk might go like this:

(17) *Crothers, to Senator Smyth:* Well, Joe, what do you think of the New Hampshire stink?

Smyth, to Crothers: It's a goddam mess. If Bill doesn't watch his ass, Bert may take away all his marbles.

Before the television camera, however, Crothers and Smyth treat the unseen viewers as side-participants, and their utterances change radically:

(18) *Crothers, to Smyth:* Senator Smyth, what do you think of Jones's controversial remarks in the New Hampshire election campaign last week?

Smyth, to Crothers: They were unfortunate. If Senator Jones doesn't watch his step, Bert Appleman may get impatient with him and cut off all his campaign funds.

Crothers, to Smyth: You're speaking of Bert Appleman, the Democratic Party National Chairman, aren't you?

Smyth, to Crothers: Yes, I am.

The features that Crothers and Smyth add to accommodate the side-participants are of three types. First, the private references to Joe, to 'the New Hampshire stink', to Bill, to Bert, and to 'marbles' are filled out so that the television audience can understand them too. Second, when Smyth doesn't fill out his references enough, as with the mention of Bert Appleman, Crothers requests clarification, even though he himself knows perfectly well who is being referred to. Third, both men move into a register appropriate for their public personae: they avoid informality and offensive expletives.

Consider, next, open letters addressed to 'the President' or 'the oil companies' or 'Members of Congress', which are published as political advertisements in newspapers and magazines, or 'letters to the editor', which are expressly written for possible publication in the editor's newspaper or magazine.

Although these letters are addressed to the President, the oil companies etc., their main targets are the newspaper and magazine readers who are the side-participants in these public acts. Without informatives to these readers, the purpose of these public acts would be lost.

On other occasions, side-participants are desirable but not necessary. Consider public expressions of thanks, congratulations, apologies, and condolences:

(19) *Mayor, to fireman:* On behalf of the citizens of San Francisco, I thank you for saving three lives in last Thursday's fire, and in appreciation I give you this medal.

(20) *Duchess of Kent, to Billy Jean King on winning the women's finals at Wimbledon:* Congratulations on your fine performance. Here is the winner's cup.

(21) *The President, to Queen Elizabeth, as she steps out of an airplane in Washington:* Welcome to the United States.

In all three cases, the main point is to express a politically important feeling in public. The public is intended to bear witness to these feelings. Although these speakers could have expressed these feelings without any guests present, it is ordinarily the public participation in the expression of the feelings that counts.

With certain public acts, therefore, it is the informatives—the acts of informing the side-participants of what is being said—that fulfill the main purpose of what is being said.

1.5. INSTITUTIONAL WITNESSES. In Austin's classic work, the first three illocutionary acts mentioned are the marriage vow *I do*, the christening *I name this ship the Queen Elizabeth*, and the bequest *I give and bequeath my watch to my brother*. These attracted his attention because they are parts of 'accepted conventional procedures' in the church and the law; so it is easy to see when they are mis-invoked, mis-applied, or mis-executed—i.e., when they are infelicitous. As it happens, many such procedures also appear to require informatives for felicitous performance.

Consider the questioning of the defendant at a murder trial by the prosecuting attorney:

(22) *Attorney, to defendant, in front of judge, jury, and court officials:* When did you arrive at the bank?

The attorney is asking the defendant (the addressee) a question. But if this is to count as an official question, as a part of the official trial, then he must also be informing the judge, jury, and other court officials that he is asking the defendant that question. The informatives directed at these institutional witnesses are mandatory.

To see this, consider several ways in which the attorney could succeed in asking the defendant the right question, but without properly informing the institutional witnesses. He could speak in too low a voice; in that case, the judge would ask him to repeat the question so all could hear. Or he could leave the question ambiguous for the judge and jury between two interpretations of *bank*; in that case, the judge would ask him to clarify the question. More subtly,

he could phrase the question *When did you arrive at the place where Mary works?*, knowing that the suspect would understand that he was referring to the bank, but that the judge and jury couldn't (since they don't know of Mary or where she works). In that case, the defense attorney could object, and the judge would ask for a rewording. As in ordinary conversations, it isn't enough for the attorney to ask the witness a question that the witness fully understands. With his utterance, he must also properly inform the institutional witnesses of that question.

In many legal settings, the institutional witnesses sign documents affirming that they witnessed the appropriate illocutionary acts toward the addressees and accept these as felicitous—as not being false, or fraudulent, or insincere. This includes wills, contracts, and passport applications, as well as most actions in court. With a will, for example, it isn't legally sufficient for a person to make a bequest sincerely and in sound mind: he must properly inform two witnesses that he is doing so, and they must attest to this by signing the will. There is even a person specially designated as a legally certified side-participant to such acts: the notary public.

Consider, finally, the marriage vow made by the groom to the bride, as prescribed by the *Book of common prayer*:

(23) *Groom, to bride, in front of minister and wedding company:* In the Name of God, I, John, take you, Mary, to be my wife, to have and to hold from this day forward [etc.]

John could make this vow to Mary sincerely without anyone else around. But for it to count as a MARRIAGE VOW, he must also inform the minister and the wedding company that he is making this vow. As the *Book of common prayer* prescribes, 'it is required ... that the ceremony be attested by at least two witnesses.' What these witnesses must apparently attest to is not merely that John said the right words, but that he meant what he said. Before the ceremony, the witnesses are asked, 'If any of you can show just cause why they [the bride and groom] may not lawfully be married, speak now; or forever hold your peace.' If the witnesses believed that John's intentions were in any way insincere—e.g. that he planned to abandon Mary for another woman after the ceremony—they could not in good conscience attest to his marriage vow.[7]

The problem raised by these examples is the same as before: the standard theories say nothing about illocutionary acts directed at hearers other than the addressees. Yet for an attorney's question to be official, for a will to be legal, or for a marriage vow to be proper, the speaker must act toward the institutional

[7] Marriage appears to be the only Christian sacrament that requires official witnesses (aside from God—who, when not the addressee, is a side-participant in most sacramental speech acts). In a Roman Catholic marriage, witnesses may not have to be full side-participants in the sense we mean it, even though they ordinarily will. According to one Roman Catholic handbook (Jone 1959:523), 'Witnesses need not have the explicit intention of acting as witnesses to a marriage. It is sufficient if they do so accidentally, even though the contractants are not aware of this ... Marriage is also valid if the witnesses are forced to assist by violence, fear or deception.' We are indebted to A. P. Martinich for bringing these points to our attention. For a discussion of sacramental speech acts but without mention of witnesses, see Martinich 1975.

witnesses as well as toward his addressees. He must fully inform the witnesses of what he is doing to his addressees. Without informatives, these institutional procedures would collapse.

2. AUDIENCE DESIGN. If speakers relied solely on conventional linguistic devices to convey what they meant, everyone who knew the language should have equal ability to understand them. But the examples we have offered suggest quite the opposite: when the speakers design their utterances, they assign different hearers to different roles; and then they decide how to say what they say on the basis of what they know, believe, and suppose that these hearers, in their assigned roles, know, believe, and suppose. That is, a fundamental property of utterances is one that we will call AUDIENCE DESIGN. To characterize informatives properly, we must first characterize the roles to which these hearers are assigned, and the ways in which speakers design their utterances with these hearers in mind.

2.1. HEARER ROLES. Conversations consist, very roughly, of sequences of utterances among two or more people; with each utterance, the speaker performs one or more illocutionary acts directed at addressees. Consider one of these utterances:

(24) *Ann, to Barbara, in front of Charles, with David eavesdropping:* Barbara, when did the two of you arrive last night?

For every addressee-directed illocutionary act such as Ann's question to Barbara, we can identify four basic roles:

(a) SPEAKER (agent of the illocutionary act). This is the person who performs the illocutionary act: in 24, the role is filled by Ann.[8]

(b) PARTICIPANTS in the addressee-directed illocutionary act. These are the hearers who the speaker intends to 'take part in' the illocutionary act that is directed at the addressees. In 24, the participants include Barbara and Charles, but not David. What it means to 'take part in' an illocutionary act will be spelled out below.

(c) ADDRESSEES of the addressee-directed illocutionary act. Certain of the participants are intended to take on additional roles as addressees of the illocutionary act. In 24, Barbara is the addressee. The addressees are the partic-

[8] Just as the notion of hearer can be differentiated into various roles, so can that of speaker. Goffman 1979 distinguishes between the 'animator' of an utterance (the person uttering the words), the 'author' of the utterance (the person 'who has selected the sentiments that are being expressed and the words in which they are encoded'), and the 'principal' (the person who is 'committed to what the words say'). Suppose that George (standing with Jane) says to Julia, in front of Margaret, *Julia, Jane and I congratulate you on your new discovery*. Although George is the animator and the author of the utterance, he is merely the spokesman for the congratulations, for which he and Jane together are the principals. Informatives may aid in these distinctions. In George's utterance, George himself is informing Julia and Margaret of something; but what he is informing them of is the congratulations that he and Jane are jointly performing. George is the sole agent of the informative, but George and Jane jointly are the agents of the congratulations. Informatives would enable us to distinguish between the agents of the two illocutionary acts. In other ways too, this analysis would fit nicely into the informative analysis proposed in §4, below.

ipants who are, or could be, designated vocatively in the utterance, as Barbara is named in 24. They need not coincide with the set of hearers referred to by *you*, but need only be a sub-set of those hearers: in 24, *you* refers to both Barbara and Charles, whereas the only addressee is Barbara. The participants, then, divide into two sub-sets: those who are also addressees, like Barbara, and those who are not, like Charles. It is convenient to call the latter participants SIDE-PARTICIPANTS, the term we have already been using for these hearers.

(d) OVERHEARERS of the addressee-directed illocutionary act. These are the hearers who are NOT intended by the speaker to 'take part in' the illocutionary act, in the favored sense of 'take part in', but who are nevertheless listening in. In 24, David is an overhearer.[9]

These four roles are defined by the speaker. He defines his own role as speaker; he defines who is to 'take part in' his illocutionary act, separating the participants from the overhearers; and he defines who among the participants are to be addressees. He makes these role assignments by the way he designs his utterance, and by the way he positions himself with respect to the audience. We will take up these methods in our discussion of audience design and role assignment. On any occasion, the speaker may not succeed in getting his hearers to recognize the roles to which they are being assigned, despite a flawless performance on his part; hearers do make mistakes. For our purposes, however, these cases are irrelevant. What is relevant are the speaker's intentions about who is to assume which roles. It is these intended roles that are being designated as speaker, addressee, participant, and overhearer.

2.2. TYPES OF AUDIENCE DESIGN. The speaker designs his utterance with these roles in mind. In this way, audience design can be divided roughly into participant design, addressee design, and overhearer design.[10] The basic design, as we will present it, is for participants. Addressees and overhearers are taken care of in modulations on the basic design.

[9] These distinctions aren't altogether new. Virtually the same ones have been made in studies of the sequential organization of conversation (see fn. 10), although not with respect to the speaker's illocutionary intentions. Goffman's distinctions (1975:260; see also 1978, 1979) are very close to ours:

> 'Observe now that, broadly speaking, there are three kinds of listeners to talk; those who OVERhear, whether or not their unratified participation is inadvertent and whether or not it has been encouraged; those who are ratified participants but (in the case of more than two-person talk) are not specifically addressed by the speaker; and those ratified participants who ARE addressed, that is, oriented to by the speaker in a manner to suggest that his words are particularly for them, and that some answer is therefore anticipated from them, more so than from the other ratified participants.'

[10] Our concept of audience design has obvious roots in the notion of 'recipient design' used in studies of the sequential organization of conversation (cf. Sudnow 1972, Psathas 1979). Sacks et al. 1974, who attribute the concept to Garfinkel 1967, describe it as follows: 'By "recipient design" we refer to a multitude of respects in which the talk by a party in a conversation is constructed or designed in ways which display an orientation and sensitivity to the particular other(s) who are the co-participants.' Our notion of audience design encompasses overhearers as well as addressees and 'co-participants'.

The basic design is characterized by the principle of responsibility proposed earlier. By this principle, the speaker is responsible for designing his utterance so that all the parties to the conversation can keep track of what he is saying. This defines what might be called a CANONICAL CONVERSATION. With each contribution, the speaker assigns to every other party in the conversation the role of participant. The conversation can therefore accumulate as a whole, and the common ground that accrues is easy for everyone to keep track of.

In non-canonical conversations, this simplicity is lost. Imagine A talking with B, C, and D. If the conversation isn't canonical, A must keep track separately of his common ground with B, with C, and with D. If he knows B well, C moderately, and D very little, then there will be large disparities in common ground to begin with. If he informs B, C, and D of different things during the conversation, and if he is informed by them of different things, these disparities can only grow and become even more difficult to keep track of. The speaker's task is therefore greatly simplified in that most conversations, or most parts of conversations, are assumed to be canonical by all parties. The parties accomplish this by always assigning all other parties to the role of participant.

Although most conversations, or parts of conversations, are canonical, speakers can and do deal with disparities in common ground when they must. They exploit these disparities to say one thing to one group of participants while saying something else to another, or to carry out elaborate deceptions. We will return to these possibilities later.

The addressees are the ostensible targets of what is being said. Ordinarily, they are the participants for whom the speaker has the most direct and obvious goals in designing his utterances. In 5, when Ann tells Charles *We went to the museum*, she is making sure both Barbara and Charles understand what she is doing, but she has designed her utterance with Charles in particular in mind: she wants to get him to believe that they went to the museum. As a preparatory condition, then, she must assume, very roughly, that Charles doesn't already believe what she is asserting. She doesn't have to assume this for Barbara; indeed, Ann thinks that Barbara already does believe the proposition that she is asserting. Most of Searle's 'felicity conditions' for speech acts are satisfied as part of addressee design, not merely participant design.

Speakers also design their utterances with overhearers in mind. Although they don't intend the overhearers to 'take part in' what they are saying—in the favored sense of 'take part in'—they realize that the overhearers can nevertheless form conjectures or hypotheses about what they mean. The purpose of overhearer design is to deal with these hypotheses. By designing their utterances just right, speakers can lead overhearers to form correct hypotheses, incorrect hypotheses, or even no coherent hypotheses at all. If they know their overhearers, they can even design what they say to fit them in particular. These we will call KNOWN OVERHEARERS. Yet speakers also recognize the possibility of UNKNOWN OVERHEARERS, and they can design what they say with them in mind too. That is, speakers can harbor intentions toward both known and unknown overhearers, and can design their utterances accordingly. These in-

tentions, however, are different from those that speakers have toward the participants, as we will argue, in that they are not intended to be recognized as intended to be recognized.[11]

In the most obvious examples of overhearer design, speakers try to prevent overhearers from correctly guessing what they are saying. For example, there is the secrets-in-a-crowd scenario:

(25) *Ann, to Barbara, on crowded bus:* Do you remember that thing about you-know-who that we were talking about last week? Well, it happened.

Ann's references are designed to be opaque to everyone but Barbara, who is the only one for whom the last week's conversation is common ground. Similarly, there is the spelling ploy used by parents in front of children:

(26) *Father, to mother, in front of Johnnie:* What did you think of the b-i-c-y-c-l-e we saw in the store?

With spies, this sort of prevention is a sine qua non of communication. One strategy is to switch to a language not known to potential overhearers, namely a spy code.[12] Another is to switch to a code that masquerades as a genuine language, and thus leads overhearers to the wrong hypotheses.[13]

Overhearers are generally not meant to realize how utterances have been designed for them. The deception may be benign, as when a worker sings the praises of his boss while knowing that the boss may be overhearing. It is less benign when the same worker winks broadly at his co-workers to indicate the irony of his remarks. Other times, the design may have more serious ends, as when Hamlet, in Act III, Scene 1, plays the madman in talking to Ophelia—apparently to draw two known overhearers, the King and Polonius, into thinking that he is going mad. In these examples, the conjectures to which the overhearers are led are sometimes correct, and sometimes not.

[11] Consider what Goffman 1978 has called 'response cries', as when a man, walking alone down the street and slipping on some ice, says *Oops* loud enough for the people who happen to be watching to hear. As Goffman argues, the man intends these self-imprecations to be heard by people nearby, in order to let them know he is aware of what befell him and is in full control. Yet he isn't addressing those people. He intends his *Oops* to appear to be a self-imprecation that they just happen to overhear. In our terms, he intends them to recognize what he meant, but not by means of their recognition of his intention that they do so.

[12] Kahn 1967 gives the following example of a telegram from President Lincoln to Colonel Ludlow during the Civil War: 'Guard adam they at wayland brown for kissing venus correspondents at neptune are off nelly turning up can get shy detained tribune and times richardson the are ascertain and you fills belly this if detained please odor of ludlow commissioner.' Translation: 'For Colonel Ludlow. Richardson and Brown, correspondents of the *Tribune*, captured at Vicksburg, are detained at Richmond. Please ascertain why they are detained and get them off if you can. The President.'

[13] As in this World War II conversation between Kurusu, the Japanese Ambassador to the US, and Yamamoto, the Foreign Office American Division Chief, shortly before Pearl Harbor (from Kahn): 'But without anything, they want to keep carrying on the matrimonial question [i.e. the negotiations]. They do. In the meantime we're faced with the excitement of having a child born [i.e., we're faced with a crisis]. On top of that Tokugawa [i.e. the army] is really champing at the bit, isn't he?'

Another element in overhearer design is politeness and register (see Comrie 1976, Levinson 1979). In most societies, certain words are taboo in certain circumstances, in which they may not even be overheard. In urban America, obscenities freely used in locker rooms are often avoided in public places where they may be overheard.[14] The goal is to project the speaker's public persona and to avert overhearer discomfort. Many aspects of speech registers, from the oratorical to the intimate, have related origins, as do the Australian 'mother-in-law' languages mentioned above. Because it is forbidden to use ordinary speech in the presence of one's mother-in-law or other specified kin, what has developed is a special register, with its own vocabulary, that is used near a tabooed kin who might possibly overhear.

2.3. ROLE ASSIGNMENT. As a critical part of audience design, the speaker must designate which hearers are to take which roles. It is essential that the speaker and participants, and the speaker and addressees, mutually recognize which hearers are being designated as participants and which as addressees. How speakers accomplish this is a complicated topic (see Goffman 1979). We will mention only the major devices by which they do this: physical arrangement, conversational history, gestures, manner of speaking, and linguistic content. Most utterances rely on some combination of these five factors.

Participants are often distinguished from overhearers by physical arrangement. Hearers in the same group as the speaker can ordinarily assume they are intended to be participants, whereas other hearers cannot. What constitutes a group (a 'with', in Goffman's 1971 terminology) is highly constrained by physical arrangement. The people must be near each other relative to the space available—not separated by obvious physical or psychological barriers, and accessible to each other auditorily and visually (see Goffman 1963, 1971).

Participants are also distinguished from overhearers by the history of the ongoing conversation. If certain hearers were participants during the last utterance, and if the speaker gives no indication to the contrary, then they can assume that they are also participants for the current utterance. It may happen that two parties in a group exchange so many remarks that they come to define their own conversation, with the others splitting off into a separate conversation. It can also happen that one party in a group comes to be ignored, and is no longer taken to be a participant in what is being said.

Addressees are generally designated in part by gestures. They can be picked out by eye contact, sometimes accompanied by a hand gesture or nod of the head. Furthermore, certain people in a group can be excluded as addressees or participants by the speaker's turning his back on them. The advantage of gestures is that they are public acts, easily recognized simultaneously by all the parties involved.

Addressees and participants can also be designated by manner of speaking.

[14] Strikingly, it isn't the meaning of a particular expression that is eschewed, but rather its form or sound. As Randolph 1928 has noted, people will use circumlocutions like *She's ready to go* or *The hammer's back* just to avoid saying *The gun's cocked*. The idea is, apparently, that an overhearer might hear only the critical word, and mistake it for an obscenity.

By whispering, a speaker can select a small group of people as participants or addressees, letting everyone else know they are not participants. By speaking in a markedly loud voice, a speaker can do just the opposite. At a restaurant, Ann might say to her companion *This could do with a little salt*, asking him to pass the salt. By saying this loudly within earshot of the waiter, she could designate the waiter as participant and indicate that he instead was to fulfill her request. By using a high pitch, a speaker can designate children as opposed to adults as participants; by over-articulating, a speaker can likewise designate foreigners.

Finally, of course, addressees, participants, and overhearers are often designated through the content of what is said. Addressees can be defined by vocatives and other devices. Participants can be brought in by prefatory utterances, such as *George and Julia, I want you to hear what I have to say to Edward*, and in other ways. Overhearers can be excluded as participants by similar devices. Later we will take up devices for designating addressees in some detail.

In summary, speakers intend certain hearers to fill certain roles, and they design their utterances accordingly. In particular, they have devices for getting hearers to recognize mutually who is to take which roles. Most of these devices derive not from the content of what is said, but from such factors as the physical arrangement of the hearers, the history of the conversation, gestures, and the manner of speaking. All these factors, whether 'linguistic' or not, must be considered part of the means by which the speaker performs illocutionary acts. They are crucial for designating to whom these acts are directed.

3. INFORMATIVES. So far our characterization of informatives has been informal. We now consider them more closely, taking up three issues. First, are informatives truly illocutionary acts? Second, to whom are informatives directed? And third, how would informatives be characterized in the standard theories?

3.1. INFORMATIVES AS ILLOCUTIONARY ACTS. Informatives are speech acts—but which type are they? Since they are performed with whole utterances, they cannot be propositional acts such as reference or predication (Searle 1969). The obvious candidates are Austin's locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary acts.

Informatives are clearly not locutionary acts, since these are merely acts of 'saying something' (Austin, 94). In ex. 1, Othello's locutionary act consists of saying the imperative sentence *Come, Desdemona* with *come* and *Desdemona* having a certain meaning and reference. Since locutionary acts aren't directed by speakers to specific hearers, Othello's act of informing Iago and Roderigo of his request to Desdemona cannot be a locutionary act. In Austin's scheme, locutionary acts would be used in performing informatives, and so they would be kept conceptually distinct.

Nor are informatives perlocutionary acts. In uttering ex. 1, Othello is trying to get Desdemona to go with him. If she then goes with him, she does so only as a consequence of her understanding what he meant. Ever since Austin,

consequences such as this have been called perlocutionary effects. These are distinguished from illocutionary effects, which consist of hearers' understandings of what speakers mean. Imagine, then, that (in uttering ex. 1) Othello is also trying to get Iago and Roderigo to stay behind. If they do so, that would be another perlocutionary effect of Othello's utterance. But it would be a consequence of their understanding that he was asking Desdemona to go with him. Our interest, however, is not in the consequences of their understanding what he meant, but in the understanding itself. Our interest, therefore, is in illocutionary effects and in the illocutionary acts that produced them.

In the standard theories, illocutionary acts are distinguished from other speech acts at the utterance level by the fact that they require reflexive intentions—Grice's 'm-intentions' (Bach & Harnish 1979, Grice 1957, 1968, 1969, Schiffer 1972, Searle 1969, Strawson 1964). What is required, as Searle (47) put it, is that 'the speaker S intends to produce an illocutionary effect IE in the hearer H by means of getting H to recognize S's intention to produce IE.' So Othello intends to get Desdemona to understand that he wants her to go with him. But according to this criterion, he gets her to understand this by getting her to recognize his intention to get her to understand this. If informatives are illocutionary acts, Othello must intend to get Iago and Roderigo to understand that he is requesting Desdemona to go with him by means of getting them to recognize his intention to get them to understand that he is doing that. Note that Othello could intend some overhearing guard to guess what he means too. But if he doesn't intend to do so by means of getting the guard to recognize that intention, then he isn't performing an illocutionary act toward that guard. Let us call a communicative intention that is less than an m-intention (like this one) a PARTIAL INTENTION.

There is good evidence that informatives require m-intentions, not partial intentions. Let us return to our example of a lateral indirect request:

(9) *Ann, to Charles, in front of Barbara:* Charles, I insist that Barbara tell you who we met at the museum today.

Ann is indirectly asking Barbara to tell Charles who they met. By the standard theories, requests like this, whether direct or indirect, require m-intentions. How does Ann make this request? She can do it, we argued, only by informing Barbara of her assertion to Charles. Suppose that this informative were based on a partial intention; i.e., Ann didn't intend Barbara to understand by means of her recognition of any of Ann's intentions. If so, there would be no way for Ann to get Barbara to recognize her INDIRECT intention to get Barbara to tell Charles who they met at the museum; and this recognition is necessary for such a request. Put simply, m-intentions cannot be indirectly conveyed by partial intentions. Ann's informative must involve m-intentions.

Consider another example given above:

(16) *Charles, to Ann and Barbara:* Please return my map, whichever of you has it.

Charles is requesting one of the women—he doesn't know which—to return his map; and he is informing the other woman of that request. By definition, he has m-intentions toward the first woman. But since he doesn't know which woman that is, he must have m-intentions toward the second woman as well.

Since he is only informing the second woman of his request, that informative must involve m-intentions.

'Letters to the editor', intended for publication, force the same conclusion. When people write such letters, they write, in all respects but one, as if they were talking to the newspaper readers and not just the editor. They intend the readers to understand them just as if they were writing them directly—as if addressing them as 'Dear reader'. So if m-intentions are required for 'Dear reader', then they are also required for 'Dear editor'. 'Dear editor' is different only in that the writers are simply informing readers of what they are saying to the editor, whom they address as *you*. Their informatives, therefore, must involve m-intentions.

Finally, consider three-way conversations, as in these two examples:

(27) *Charles, to Barbara, in front of Ann:* Did the two of you go to the museum?
Barbara, to Charles, in front of Ann: Yes, we did.
Charles, to Barbara, in front of Ann: And then what?

(28) *Charles, to Ann, in front of Barbara:* Did the two of you go to the museum?
Ann, to Charles, in front of Barbara: Yes, we did.
Charles, to Barbara, in front of Ann: And then what?

For Charles to expect Barbara to grasp the ellipsis of *And then what?* in either 27 or 28, he must make sure she understood the prior question—regardless of whether it was addressed to Barbara herself, as in 27, or to Ann, as in 28. How can he make sure? In 27, it is easy, for he has asked Barbara the prior question directly; he therefore has all the proper m-intentions toward her. In 28, he makes sure only by informing Barbara of that prior question. Intuitively, however, the informative in 28 serves as just as good an antecedent as the direct question in 27. If it does, then it too must involve m-intentions.

The case, however, can be made even stronger. Suppose that Ann and Barbara went to both the Tate and the British Museum, and that Barbara had talked with Charles only about going to the Tate. Barbara didn't know, however, what Ann had discussed with Charles—they might have talked about either museum—and she knew that Charles realized this. In 27, Charles could expect Barbara to recognize that the museum to which he was referring was the Tate, since it was the only museum they had discussed together; i.e., he could expect her to pick out the Tate by means of her recognition of his intention. In 28, however, he could NOT expect her to know to which museum he was referring unless he again intended her to understand by means of her recognition of his intention; otherwise, she could equally well assume he was referring to the British Museum, which she could assume he had discussed previously with Ann. So, for the informative in 28 to serve as a proper antecedent for the elliptical question, it requires an m-intention. A partial intention won't do.

If informatives require m-intentions, they must in this sense be a kind of illocutionary act. What distinguishes them is that they are directed not at addressees, but at participants, which may also include hearers other than

addressees. So good evidence exists for the participant hypothesis that certain illocutionary acts are directed at addressees, and others are directed at participants.

Our scheme involves a basic contrast between participants and overhearers. Participants are intended to take part in addressee-directed illocutionary acts, and overhearers aren't. Now we can say what 'taking part in' means: Hearers are intended to take part in an addressee-directed illocutionary act whenever they are m-intended to understand it. What distinguishes overhearers from participants, therefore, is that overhearers aren't m-intended to understand.

3.2. SPEECH ACTS TO PARTICIPANTS. In each of our examples, the speaker informs the side-participants of the illocutionary act which he is directing at the addressee. In ex. 5, when Ann tells Charles *We went to the museum*, she is informing Barbara that she is telling Charles that they went to the museum. That, however, can't be all that Ann is doing. If she is to enable the conversation to accumulate, she must also inform Charles that she is informing Barbara of her assertion. If she doesn't, Charles cannot assume that Barbara can build on what Ann has told him. The same goes for our other examples.

Informatives, then, are directed at all the participants, not just at the side-participants. This is captured in the participant hypothesis, which states that one class of illocutionary acts is directed at addressees, and another at participants. As a first approximation, an informative is an act by the speaker to make it known to the participants what illocutionary act he is performing for the addressees.

This characterization, however, isn't quite right, since it omits an essential aim of informatives—to make it public knowledge among the speaker and participants what the speaker is doing with his utterance. In 24, when Ann asks Barbara in front of Charles, *Barbara, when did the two of you arrive last night?*, she isn't informing Barbara and Charles separately. She intends Barbara to know that Charles knows, to know that he knows she knows, to know that he knows that she knows that he knows, and so on ad infinitum. This is what is technically called MUTUAL KNOWLEDGE between Barbara and Charles (cf. Schiffer). Ann also intends Barbara to know that her question is mutually known by her and Charles, and she intends Charles to know that it is mutually known by her and Barbara, and so on. With these additions, we require what is technically known as COMMON KNOWLEDGE in a group (Lewis 1969).[15] To make it clear that we are using these technical definitions, we will hyphenate them as 'common-knowledge', 'commonly-known' etc. Thus, in uttering 24, Ann intends to make it commonly-known among Ann, Barbara, and Charles that, in uttering 24, she is asking Barbara when Barbara and Charles arrived the night before.

[15] Schiffer (131) also considers mutual knowledge within a group, but his formulation is not equivalent to Lewis' common knowledge. For one thing, his definition allows for a proposition to be mutually known within a group without its being mutually known between two members of the group. Bach & Harnish give a similar definition, but without the infinite iterations of either Lewis or Schiffer.

In the standard theories, each type of illocutionary act, such as informatives, has associated with it a set of felicity conditions—the necessary and sufficient conditions 'for the successful and non-defective performance of the act' (Searle 1969).[16] Since informatives are the means by which speakers 'tell' participants what they are doing to addressees, they resemble the illocutionary acts which Searle has called 'representatives', and which Austin (as well as Bach & Harnish) has called 'constatives'. This class includes forms of 'telling' such as assertions, reports, claims, and allegations. On that model, the felicity conditions for informatives should look something like this (where 'x' is the sentence uttered, 'S' is the speaker, 'A' is the addressee or addressees, 'P' is the participant or participants, and 'I' is the illocutionary act which S is directing at A):[17]

(29) Preparatory condition: In uttering x, S is performing I addressed to A.
Sincerity condition: S wants it to be commonly-known among S and P that, in uttering x, S is performing I addressed to A.
Propositional content condition: S predicates that, in uttering x, S is performing I addressed to A.
Essential condition: S's uttering x counts as an attempt by S to make it commonly-known among S and P that, in uttering x, S is performing I addressed to A.

3.3. A NOTATION. To express the parallels between addressee- and participant-directed illocutionary acts, we need a notation. Let us return to Othello's utterance: *Come, Desdemona*. His request has three arguments: the speaker (Othello), the addressee (Desdemona), and the requested act that she go with him. This might be represented as a three-place function as follows: *Request(O, D, 'D go with O')*. Likewise, Othello's informative has three arguments: the speaker (Othello), the participants (Desdemona, Iago, and Roderigo), and the request of which he is informing them. This might be represented as follows:

(30) Inform(O, D & I & R, I_1)

Here I_1 stands for *Request(O, D, 'D go with O')*, where *I* represents 'illocu-

[16] Searle (54) notes that the failure to satisfy only some of these conditions is sufficient 'to vitiate the act in its entirety'. Thus Bach & Harnish (55) separate 'success' conditions—those conditions 'that are singly necessary and jointly sufficient for the performance of an act'—from felicity conditions 'that are not success conditions but are required for non-defectiveness.' We agree with Bach & Harnish that the role of such felicity conditions in a theory of speech acts is unclear. From our point of view, it is the speaker's illocutionary intentions, as captured in Searle's essential condition (which Bach & Harnish consider a success condition), that are definitive for the act in question. As Searle himself notes (69), 'In general the essential condition determines the others.'

[17] The informative defined here is a JOINT INFORMATIVE, in which the participants are collectively informed. We take this to be the unmarked case. One can also define an ELEMENTARY INFORMATIVE, in which the speaker informs each participant separately, and doesn't intend his addressee-directed illocutionary acts to become common-knowledge among the participants. The situations that require elementary informatives appear to be rare (see Clark & Carlson 1982).

tionary act'.[18] In ex. 1, therefore, Othello can be said to be performing two illocutionary acts with the same utterance:

(31) a. Inform(O, D & I & R, I_1)
b. Request(O, D, 'D go with O') = I_1

This notation makes it easy to express several constraints on the relation between the addressee-directed and participant-directed acts that can be performed by a single utterance. First, the agents of the two acts must be identical:[19] in 31, Othello is the first argument of both the Inform and the Request. Second, the targets of the one act—the addressees—must be included among the targets of the other—the participants: in 31, the second argument of the Request (Desdemona) is included in the second argument of the Inform (Desdemona, Iago, and Roderigo).[20] Finally, the third argument of the Inform must refer to the addressee-directed illocutionary act: in 31, the third argument of the Inform is the Request. In this analysis, informatives like 31a always come paired with addressee-directed illocutionary acts like 31b.

4. INFORMATIVE-FIRST HYPOTHESIS. For each addressee-directed illocutionary act, there is an informative to let the participants know of that act. In ex. 1, along with Othello's request of Desdemona, there is an informative for Desdemona, Iago, and Roderigo:

(32) a. Informative: Inform(O, D & I & R, I_1)
b. Addressee-directed illocutionary act: I_1 = Request(O, D, 'D go with O')

What is the connection between 32a and 32b?

One possibility is that they are performed independently and in parallel. This can be diagrammed as follows, with the arrows indicating the direction of causation:

(33) Inform(O, D & I & R, I_1)
⇗
Othello's utterance
⇘
Request(O, D, 'D go with O')

Othello would be uttering *Come, Desdemona* in order to perform the informative and the request independently. This would be comparable to a person's fanning himself in order to cool himself and to exercise his wrist. Since he can cool himself without exercising his wrist, and can exercise his wrist without cooling himself, these two acts are independent. But can Othello inform Desdemona of his request without making that request, or make his request of

[18] This notation doesn't try to capture all the niceties of the logical form of illocutionary acts. It is intended to represent only roughly the content and force the speaker intends and certain relations among them.

[19] However, see fn. 8 above.

[20] Note that these targets can be designated either referentially, as here, or attributively, as we have discussed in §4.

Desdemona without informing her of it? It appears not. The independence model is inappropriate at the outset.

The second and third possibilities are more promising. In the addressee-first model, 32a is performed by means of 32b, as in this diagram:

(34) O's utterance ⇒ Request(O, D, 'D go with O') ⇒ Inform(O, D & I & R, I_1)

Othello makes a request of Desdemona; and by doing so under the appropriate conditions, he informs everyone of his request. In the informative-first model, in contrast, 32b is performed by means of 32a, as in this diagram:

(35) O's utterance ⇒ Inform(O, D & I & R, I_1) ⇒ Request(O, D, 'D go with O')

Othello informs Desdemona, Iago, and Roderigo that he is making a request of Desdemona, and by doing this, he also makes the request of Desdemona. In both models, one act is performed by means of another—just as, in shooting a gun, the act of pulling the trigger is performed by means of the act of crooking the right index finger.

The natural place to compare these two models is in speech situations with more than one hearer, where the speaker can have different targets for his informatives and his addressee-directed illocutionary acts. There he must often distinguish addressees from participants. As we noted earlier, he has many ways of getting the participants to recognize who the addressees are; but the principal way is with vocatives. Most vocatives studied so far in linguistics have been the canonical kind: proper names of single individuals, as in *Come, Desdemona*. But they also occur in many other forms, and these provide a surprising line of evidence for distinguishing the addressee-first and the informative-first models.

4.1. THE INCLUSION PRINCIPLE. The basic function of vocatives is to designate addressees. They generally do this by distinguishing the addressees from the other participants. In ex. 1, there are two 'audiences': the participants (Desdemona, Iago, and Roderigo); and the addressee (Desdemona). Let us call these two sets of hearers 'Set 1' and 'Set 2'. In using the vocative, Othello is indicating to Set 1 that he is assigning the role of addressee for this particular request to Desdemona (Set 2) and not to Iago and Roderigo (Set 2′). He is directing his vocative at Set 1 as a means of getting them to recognize Set 2 as distinct from Set 2′. Since performing the vocative is an integral part of performing both the informative and the request, Othello must be performing the informative to Set 1 as a means of making the request to Set 2.[21]

What we will here call the INCLUSION PRINCIPLE is one we have met before: when one illocutionary act is used as a means for performing another, the targets of Set 1 must contain the targets of Set 2. This is a basic assumption

[21] Consider the request *One of you guys, help yourself to the last beer*. In the vocative, the plural *you guys* requires the targets of the vocative to be more than one guy; but in the request proper, the singular *yourself* requires the target of the request to be exactly one person. The contrast between the two sets of targets is directly indicated in the plural *you* vs. the singular *you*.

of Searle's analysis of indirect speech acts. When someone asserts *This soup needs salt* as a means of requesting someone to pass the salt, the addressee of the request must also be an addressee of the assertion. Searle's idea is that the speaker gets the addressee to recognize his request by getting him to recognize the assertion and to see that it isn't sufficient in the circumstances. Without this assumption, Searle's analysis would fall apart.

The inclusion principle rules out the addressee-first hypothesis, while leaving the informative-first hypothesis intact. Recall that, in the informative-first hypothesis, Othello performs his informative (one illocutionary act) as a means of performing his request (another illocutionary act). In the addressee-first hypothesis, he does the reverse. So in the informative-first hypothesis, the targets of the first act (Set 1) include the targets of the second (Set 2); but in the addressee-first hypothesis, the targets of the first (Set 2) do not include the targets of the second (Set 1). The inclusion principle, therefore, is in direct conflict with the addressee-first model. In plainer words, Othello cannot make a request of Desdemona as a means of informing Iago and Roderigo—since to inform them, he would have to be directing the request at them too, which he isn't.

This conclusion is a general one. If we accept the inclusion principle, then the addressee-first model is ruled out in favor of the informative-first model.

4.2. THE EQUIPOTENTIALITY PRINCIPLE. An additional principle applies when vocatives are either attributive (Donnellan 1966, 1968) or indefinite. Consider the attributive vocative here:

(36) *George, to Alistair and Fergus:* The last one of you to leave, turn out the lights.

Suppose that George has no way of knowing who will leave first, Alistair or Fergus. He cannot direct his vocative at the actual addressee (the person who is to turn out the lights) since he doesn't know which one that is. All he can do is direct it at both Alistair and Fergus—and intend each of them, by recognizing who is picked out, to recognize which one is the addressee. So, by the inclusion principle, George can only make his request via his informatives, as in this diagram (with the first causal link from George's utterance omitted):

(37) Inform(G, A & F, I_1) $\Rightarrow$ Request(G, the last one to leave = X, 'X turn out the lights')

Only in this way is the target of the request (Set 2) included in the targets of the informative (Set 1).

The second principle at work here is one we will call the EQUIPOTENTIALITY PRINCIPLE. When a speaker directs what he says at several hearers at once, not knowing which of them he is actually addressing, each hearer has an equal potential of being an addressee. So the speaker must have the same intentions toward all the hearers; he cannot have special intentions toward any individual hearer. The principle is this: Whenever the speaker cannot indicate to each of two or more participants whether or not that participant is an addressee, the speaker must have the same m-intentions toward each of them, regardless of who the addressees actually are.

In 36, the only m-intentions that George has equally toward Alistair and Fergus are in his informatives. All George can do directly to either Alistair or Fergus is inform him of the request he is making of the person who leaves last. That works out just right, however—since, by informing each of them of that request, he will automatically make the request of the right person as well. Suppose that George utters 36 at noon, and the first person to leave does not do so until midnight. Although, in one sense, he will have performed both the informatives and the request at noon, the addressee of the request won't become specified, and hence the request itself won't become operative, until midnight. By the equipotentiality principle, then, George can make his request only by means of his informatives.

The inclusion and equipotentiality principles also apply to indefinite vocatives:

(38) *Schwartz, to history students:* Any of you who needs a syllabus, raise your hand.

Schwartz is directing the vocative *any of you who needs a syllabus* at each of the history students; he is thereby indicating to each of them who are the addressees of his request and who aren't. Since these addressees are a sub-set of all the history students that he is informing, by the inclusion principle, he must be using the informative as a means of making that request, as in this diagram:

(39) Inform(S, students, I_1) $\Rightarrow$ I_1 = Request(S, X = any student who needs a syllabus, 'X raise his hand')

The equipotentiality principle leads to the same conclusion. Take the point of view of a student called Margaret. Since Schwartz cannot know whether or not she is an addressee of his request, he must treat her precisely as he is treating all other students. All he can do is inform her that he is making a request of any student who needs a syllabus; but that will do very well. If she happens to be such a student, he will thereby have made a request of her, even though he needn't know that he has done so. If she happens not to be such a student, he will only have informed her that he was making a request of the needy students. To treat Margaret and her fellow students as equally potential addressees of his request, Schwartz must inform each of them of that request, and only by that means make the request of the particular ones who need a syllabus.

It might be objected that vocatives shouldn't be considered a genuine part of the utterances in which they are found: they would be considered separate utterances whose function is to constrain the associated illocutionary acts. Thus Othello would be performing two utterances: with *Desdemona,* he would be 'addressing' all three participants in order to designate which one is to be the addressee of his other utterance; with *come,* he would be making a request of the designated addressee. We could then separate the 'addressees' of the two utterances—the utterance of *Desdemona* is 'addressed' to three people, and the utterance of *come* only to one.

Even if vocatives WERE assumed to be separate utterances, other addressee-specifying devices work the same way. Consider these examples:

(40) *Othello, to Desdemona, in front of Iago and Roderigo:* I want Desdemona to come.

(41) *George, to Alistair and Fergus:* Would the last one to leave please turn out the lights?

(42) *Schwartz, to history students:* Any of you who needs a syllabus should raise your hand.

In these parallels to exx. 1, 36, and 38 respectively, the addressees are specified only through the content of what is requested. The expressions *Desdemona* and *the last one to leave* and *any of you who needs a syllabus* cannot be extirpated and treated as separate utterances.

Even 'hidden' vocatives, as in 40–42, are unnecessary. Suppose that George is on the roof, out of sight, and is requesting Alistair and Fergus to hand him up certain tools one by one. Further, George doesn't know that Alistair has the saw. George could then say:

(43) *George, in the direction of Alistair and Fergus:* Hand me the saw.

Alistair and Fergus are both intended to recognize that George is addressing his request to the person with the saw. How? From the fact that George is requesting the saw, and the person who he intends should carry out that request is the one with the saw. We might call this process 'addressing by attribution', as if George had said *The one of you with the saw, hand it to me.* He is treating Alistair and Fergus as equally potential addressees, even though he hasn't made that explicit with a vocative or other linguistic device. Here too, therefore, George can make his request only by means of his informatives.

Designating addressees by attribution, as in 43, is commonplace in advertisements. When a television pitchman suggests to his viewers *Treat your child to One-a-Day vitamins,* he is addressing only those viewers with minor children. He intends each viewer to understand what he is suggesting, in order to recognize whether or not he or she is an addressee. The informative must come first.

4.3. THE PRINCIPLE OF INDIVIDUAL RECOGNITION. Very often, what the speaker is requesting is a coördinated or joint act on the part of two or more addressees:

(44) *Noah, to Shem and Ham:* Begin the trick now.

Suppose that what Noah is requesting of Shem and Ham is a particularly complicated knife-juggling trick that the two of them can only do jointly. It is one of many such tricks they could do; and if either one begins the wrong trick, it could be dangerous. Now Noah isn't asking Shem and Ham to do their parts of the trick separately. He is asking the pair of them to do an act that they can do only as a pair, at least in the way he intends. He is making a collective request. If he had said *Close your eyes,* he would have been making a distributive request, since he would be asking each of them to close his eyes independently.

Collective requests like 44 force us to make explicit a basic assumption of all theories of illocutionary acts. When a speaker performs an illocutionary act, he intends his addressees to recognize certain of his intentions. Now recognition is a mental process that each individual person does on his own:

two people may individually recognize the same person, or the same picture, or the same speaker's intention; but it isn't generally assumed that a pair of people, as a collection, jointly recognize that picture, or that person, or that speaker's intention. No one mental system could carry out the single act of recognition; at no one place could that act occur. Speakers, presumably, take this assumption for granted. They adhere to what we will call the PRINCIPLE OF INDIVIDUAL RECOGNITION (Clark & Carlson 1982): Speakers can have m-intentions toward one or more individual hearers at a time, but not toward a collection of hearers.

This principle raises a special problem for collective requests. When Noah asks Shem and Ham to close their eyes in a distributive request, he is in effect making two individual requests, one to Shem and one to Ham. He has m-intentions toward each of them individually and at the same time. Indeed, each can comply without knowing whether the other has been asked to do the same thing. If Noah had said *Do now what I earlier asked you to do,* where neither knew what the other had been told, they could each have recognized his request and complied. All this is not possible with the collective request in 44.

First, Shem and Ham need to be jointly informed of Noah's request. Consider Shem's point of view: by himself, he can recognize that Noah intends him and Ham to begin the trick. But does Ham recognize these intentions? As assurance, Noah must inform Shem that Ham knows about the request too; otherwise, Shem has no guarantee that he and Ham can coördinate the trick successfully and safely. But Shem realizes that the same reasoning applies for Ham, and so Noah must inform them both equally of the request. What if, for example, Shem thought they were being asked to do knife trick Number 4, while believing that Ham thought it was trick Number 9? Thus Noah cannot request a collective act of Shem and Ham, as in 44, without informing them jointly of that request. The informative is a necessary condition for that request.

With the principle of individual recognition, the informative is more than just a necessary condition. In 44, the target of Noah's request is really the PAIR Shem and Ham. But since Noah cannot intend them as a pair to recognize his intention that the pair of them is to begin the trick now, he cannot make that request directly. The only illocutionary act Noah can direct at Shem individually, or at Ham individually, is the one informing each of them of that collective request. To make the request itself, Noah must intend them to recognize that he is informing them jointly of the request as a means of addressing it to the pair of them. It is through the joint informative, so to speak, that Noah welds Shem and Ham—two otherwise individual recognizers—into a collective recognizer. If we call this collective recognizer Shem-and-Ham, then Noah's illocutionary acts can be diagrammed this way:

(45) Inform(N, S & H, I_1) $\Rightarrow$ I_1 = Request(N, S-&-H, 'S-&-H begin trick')

Genuine collective requests, therefore, can be performed only by means of informatives to the individual addressees who make up the collection of addressees.

In 44, two hearers were being addressed collectively. The participants can also be treated collectively:

(46) *Adam, to Cain and Abel:* One of you, give me a hand.

Adam is requesting of either Cain or Abel, but not both, that that person give him a hand. He is leaving it up to them jointly to decide which one is to do it—Cain or Abel. But since he doesn't know which one he is making the request of, he cannot make his request of that person directly. By the equipotentiality principle, all he can do is inform them both of that request. When they decide on the addressee, he will thereby have made the request of that person. But Cain and Abel's choice of an addressee must be done jointly; and so they must be jointly informed of the request, just as Shem and Ham had to be jointly informed of Noah's collective request. On both counts, therefore, the request must be performed by means of the informative, and not vice versa.

With distributive requests such as *Close your eyes,* the speaker makes the same request of several addressees at once. He can also make DIFFERENT requests of several addressees at once:

(47) *Ann, to Barbara, Charles, and David:* Barbara, Charles, and David, please shake hands with Evelyn, Frank, and George, respectively.

Barbara is being asked to do one thing, Charles another, and David a third. For Ann to make these separate requests in this way, she can't intend each addressee to understand his own request and nothing more. Barbara, for example, must recognize what all three are being asked to do in order to see which one she is to do. This is even clearer here:

(48) *Ann, to Barbara, Charles, and David:* The first three of you to arrive, please shake hands with the next three people to walk in the door, respectively.

Here each of the addressees must understand how they are distributed across the first three people to walk in the door. In these examples too, then, it appears that the only way that Ann can make the separate requests of each of them is by informing all three of them of the requests she is making.

4.4. SINGLE NAMEABLE ADDRESSEES. What about Othello's *Come, Desdemona*? We have already argued that the vocative *Desdemona* is directed not at Desdemona alone, but at Desdemona, Iago, and Roderigo. It therefore isn't part of the request, which is directed only at Desdemona. It must be part of the informative, which is the only illocutionary act directed at all three hearers. We have also argued that the vocative is the means by which Othello designates the addressee of the request. So the informative of which the vocative is a part must also be the means by which Othello performs the request for which the designation of the addressee is required. In short, Othello must be performing the request by means of the informative like this:

(49) Inform(O, D & I & R, I_1) $\Rightarrow$ Request(O, D, 'D go with O')

The informative-first hypothesis is needed on independent grounds for requests like these:

(50) *Othello, to Desdemona, Iago, and Roderigo:* Come, Desdemona and anyone else who is interested in coming.

(51) *Othello, to Desdemona, Iago, and Roderigo:* Come, Desdemona and the other one of you who is supposed to come.

In 50, since the second conjunct of the vocative is indefinite (as in 38), it requires the informative to precede the request; therefore, with the full vocative, the informative must also precede the request. The same logic applies to 51. Now if ex. 1 were claimed to work according to the addressee-first model, and 50–51 according to the informative-first model, there would be a glaring inconsistency: one analysis would be claimed for *Come, Desdemona* alone, but quite the opposite for *Come, Desdemona* when it was part of 50–51. The three analyses become consistent only when it is assumed that all three requests are performed by means of informatives.

The final case to consider, and the simplest, is the one where the speaker addresses a single hearer without any other participants around:

(52) *Othello, to Desdemona:* Come, Desdemona.

By the standard theories, Othello here is doing only one thing: he is making a request of Desdemona. Yet as at least some have noted (cf. Schiffer), Othello is also informing Desdemona of that request. He must be informing her of it if what he means in 52 is to be distinguished from what he means in ex. 1. In 1 and 52, he is making the identical request of Desdemona. The only difference between 1 and 52 lies in the informative—whether he is informing three participants of that request, or one.

Indeed, in ex.1, it might be critical for Othello to make clear to Desdemona which informative he intended. If he were informing her alone, his indirect message could be one thing; if he were informing all three jointly, it could be another—that, e.g., he was indirectly asking Iago and Roderigo to stay behind. Thus, for the analyses of 1 and 52 to be consistent, it must be assumed that the request in both is being performed by means of the informative.

This conclusion is also dictated by the logic of the situation. With the informative in 52, Othello can only be making one particular request; yet he can make that very same request with the informative in ex. 1. Logically, therefore, the informative entails the request, but not vice versa. Now in all the analyses in which one illocutionary act is used as a means of performing another, as in indirect speech acts (Searle 1975, Bach & Harnish 1979, Clark 1979), the means entail the ends—given appropriate auxiliary assumptions—and not vice versa. In our examples, therefore, the informatives must be the means, and the addressee-directed illocutionary acts the ends. This is precisely what the informative-first hypothesis claims.

To summarize briefly, we have offered evidence that, regardless of how many addressees or participants there are, and regardless of how the addressees are designated, every addressee-directed illocutionary act must be performed by means of informatives. We will refer to this as the INFORMATIVE ANALYSIS.

4.5. CONDITIONAL REQUESTS. Since some of the examples we have offered behave in certain ways like conditional illocutionary acts, one might suggest that they can be handled by what we will call the CONDITIONAL ANALYSIS OF VOCATIVES. In this analysis, the ordinary request in 36 would be treated as equivalent to the following conditional request:

(53) *George, to Alistair and Fergus:* If you (yourself) are the last to leave, turn out the lights.

Here both Alistair and Fergus would be addressees, but the request would become operative only for the person who is actually last to leave. Likewise, 38 would be equivalent to this:

(54) *Schwartz, to history students:* If you (yourself) are someone who needs a syllabus, raise your hand.

All the history students would be addressees of the request, but the request would become operative only for the students who need a syllabus (see Rescher 1966).

Plausible as the conditional analysis first appears, it has crippling faults. The first is that it violates the notion of addressee. In this analysis, ex. 1 would be treated as equivalent to the following:

(55) *Othello, to Desdemona, Iago, and Roderigo:* If you are Desdemona, then come.

All three hearers would be treated as addressees; but since the conditional wouldn't be satisfied for Iago and Roderigo, the request would become operative only for Desdemona. The problem is that, in ex. 1, Othello is NOT addressing Iago and Roderigo. He cannot be said to be making a request of all three of them. The only addressee of his request is Desdemona. This is why we introduced the notion of participant in the first place. Categorizing all three hearers as addressees of the request is simply incorrect.

The same goes for other more complicated vocatives. In requests, the addressees are the requestees—the hearers who are to do what the speaker is requesting (Searle 1969, Bach & Harnish). In 36, that hearer isn't BOTH Alistair AND Fergus, as the conditional analysis in 53 would have it, but only the one who leaves last, precisely as specified in the vocative. If we change 36 to an apology—*The last one of you to leave, I apologize for not showing you out*—then the hearer to whom George is apologizing is still EITHER Alistair OR Fergus, but not both. Because the conditional analysis of vocatives systematically miscategorizes non-addressees as addressees, it must be incorrect.

For other vocatives, the conditional analysis gives the wrong result altogether. It would claim, for example, that 46 is equivalent to the following:

(56) *Adam, to Cain and Abel:* If you (yourself) are one of the two of you [OR: If you are either Cain or Abel but not both], give me a hand.

The conditional here would be true for both Cain and Abel separately, specifying they should both help Adam; but in 46, Adam wants only one of them to help him. For this reason, too, the conditional analysis of vocatives is unworkable.

4.6. PERFORMATIVES. The informative analysis is a close cousin of what has been called the CONSTATIVE ANALYSIS OF PERFORMATIVE UTTERANCES (cf. Bach & Harnish). Consider this example of what Austin called 'performative utterances':

(57) *Oscar, to Diana:* Diana, I request you to come.

According to the constative analysis, this is both an assertion and a request, and the request is performed by means of the assertion. Oscar is asserting to

Diana that he is requesting her to go with him; and he is THEREBY, according to a convention of language use, requesting her to go with him. The arguments for such an analysis (see Bach & Harnish, 203–33), and against the major alternative (the 'performative hypothesis'—see Gazdar, 15–35), are very strong indeed.[22]

The informative analysis is like the constative analysis in several ways. First, both Othello and Oscar make their requests by means of an assertion-like illocutionary act. In Othello's case, it is an informative; in Oscar's, an assertion. Second, the targets of Othello's informative and Oscar's assertion may include hearers other than the addressee of the request. In Othello's case, they include Iago and Roderigo; in Oscar's, they may also include others, e.g.,

(58) *Oscar, to Diana, Ian, and Robert:* I request the one of you who has my keys to come.

Third, the connections between Othello's informative and request, and between Oscar's assertion and request, are both based on convention.

The informative analysis can be viewed as an extension of the constative analysis to include hearers other than addressees. First, note that there can be more than one performative verb per utterance, each with its own addressees:

(59) *Professor, to students:* I announce to those of you who are interested that I hereby promise those of you who come early tomorrow that I will answer your questions about the last exam.

The over-all assertion is directed at all the students; the announcement is directed at the interested students; and the promise is directed at the interested students who come early the next day. As 59 shows, there is nothing odd about using one illocutionary act as a means of performing another, each with different addressees. It is a simple thing to view the assertion itself as performed by means of yet another illocutionary act with its own more inclusive set of target hearers. Imagine adding, in 59, two teaching assistants who know what the professor is going to announce:

(60) *Professor, to students, in front of two teaching assistants:* I announce to those of you who are interested that I hereby promise those of you who come early tomorrow that I will answer your questions about the last exam.

To handle the two extra side-participants, 60 requires an even higher illocutionary act—namely, the informative—which is directed at all the participants, i.e. the students plus teaching assistants. The informative, therefore, is like an extra higher performative that is added to inform the participants of what is being performed.

[22] Linguists such as G. Lakoff 1975, Ross 1970, and Sadock 1974 have proposed handling performative utterances like 57 by treating their illocutionary force as part of the sentence meaning. In reviewing the evidence and arguments for this 'performative hypothesis', Gazdar (15) argues convincingly that the hypothesis is seriously inadequate: 'So inadequate, in fact, that it requires replacement rather than repair.' As for other arguments for the constative analysis, see Aaquist 1972, Bach 1975, Harder 1978, Heal 1974, Kempson 1977, Lewis 1970, Warnock 1973, and Wiggins 1971.

4.7. THE INFORMATIVE ANALYSIS. What precisely is the connection between informatives and their associated addressee-directed illocutionary acts? What do we mean by saying that Othello performs his informative A as a means for performing his request B—i.e., that his informative 'comes first'? Austin, in his original discussion of locutionary, illocutionary, and perlocutionary acts, drew parallels with the component acts of shooting a gun. We will appeal to a general analysis of such intentional human acts by Goldman.

The connection between Othello's A and B appears to be the same as that between pairs of what Goldman has called 'level-generational' acts. Consider John's pulling the trigger of a gun (act X) and John's shooting the gun (act Y). Just as act Y is performed by means of act X, so Othello's act B is performed by means of act A. That is, the relation between A and B, as between X and Y, is asymmetric, irreflexive, and transitive. Nevertheless A and B, like X and Y, are performed simultaneously, and over the same time interval—neither one being a temporal part of the other. These are properties of level-generational acts.

One sub-type of level-generational acts is generated by convention, e.g. John's extending his arm out the car window and his signaling for a turn. Likewise, there is a convention according to which Othello's performance of the informative A justifies the further ascription to Othello of his making the request B. The informative is first, therefore, only in the sense that it is the means by which the addressee-directed illocutionary act is performed.

5. INDIRECTNESS. In 'talking' to side-participants, speakers often do more than merely inform. They ask questions, criticize, offer congratulations, make requests, and do many other things. How do they do this? We have argued that they can perform these indirect acts only by means of informatives; now we consider how this might be done. Somewhat surprisingly, we are forced to argue that the standard analysis of indirect speech acts is not just incomplete, but in certain respects incorrect.

5.1. LATERAL INDIRECT SPEECH ACTS. Let us return to the indirect requests in §1.2, repeated here for convenience:

(8) *Ann, to Barbara, in front of Charles:* Barbara, I insist that you tell Charles who we met at the museum today.

(9) *Ann, to Charles, in front of Barbara:* Charles, I insist that Barbara tell you who we met at the museum today.

In 8, the indirect request has the same addressee, Barbara, as the direct assertion; so it is a LINEAR indirect request. In the standard theories (see Bach & Harnish 1979, Clark 1979, Grice 1975, Morgan 1978, and Searle 1975), Ann makes the assertion as a means of making the request—a relation that might be diagrammed like this:

(61) Assert(A, B, 'B must tell C who A & B met')
↓
Request(A, B, 'B tell C who A & B met')

The single arrow represents a 'by-means-of' relation that we will keep distinct from the relation represented by the double arrow, which is subject to different conventions.

Because of the informative analysis, however, we must add two informatives to this diagram. First, Ann is informing both Barbara and Charles of her assertion to Barbara, and is thereby making that assertion:

(62) Inform(A, B & C, I_1) $\Rightarrow$ I_1 = Assert(A, B, 'B must tell C who A & B met')

Also, Ann is informing both Barbara and Charles of the indirect request she is making of Barbara. By the informative analysis, this part is diagrammed as follows:

(63) Inform(A, B & C, I_2) $\Rightarrow$ I_2 = Request(A, B, 'B tell C who A & B met')

That is, in the circumstances we are assuming, both Barbara and Charles are m-intended to recognize the request Ann is making of Barbara. But for CHARLES to recognize the indirect request, the 'by-means-of' arrow cannot connect 'Assert' and 'Request' themselves, as in 61. This is impossible by the principle of inclusion, since Charles isn't a target of either of those two illocutionary acts. Instead, the arrow must connect the 'Inform' for the 'Assert' and the 'Inform' for the 'Request', as follows:

(64) Inform(A, B & C, I_1) $\Rightarrow$ I_1 = Assert(A, B, 'B must tell C who A & B met')

↓

Inform(A, B & C, I_2) $\Rightarrow$ I_2 = Request(A, B, 'B tell C who A & B met')

Note that, if Charles weren't present, all that would change would be the informatives—which would be directed at Barbara alone. This is as it should be, since the only difference with and without Charles present is in who is being informed of the assertion and the request.

The diagram in 64 represents all we want to say, at this level of detail, about Ann's indirect request in 8. Ann is informing Barbara and Charles both about her direct assertion and about her indirect request. She is making her request indirectly. And, conforming to the informative analysis, she is making both her assertion and her request by means of informatives. What 64 spells out (but 61 doesn't) are Ann's intentions toward Charles. If Charles could make his reasoning explicit, it would go roughly as follows: 'Ann is informing me that she is insisting to Barbara that Barbara tell me about someone they met. Why would she be informing Barbara and me of that assertion? If she is being coöperative in these circumstances, she must be indirectly informing both of us that she is also REQUESTING Barbara to tell me about that person. In so doing, of course, she is also requesting Barbara to tell that to me.'

Let us turn to 9, in which Ann is making the same request of Barbara as in 8—though her assertion is addressed not to Barbara, but to Charles. In the traditional analysis, the diagram parallel to 61 would be as follows:

(65) Assert(A, C, 'B must tell C who A & B met')

↓

Request(A, B, 'B tell C who A & B met')

This, of course, is impossible by the principle of inclusion, since the target of the 'Assert', Charles, doesn't include the target of the 'Request', Barbara.

Further, 65 doesn't spell out the needed informatives. For all the reasons we brought up for 8, the needed representation is the following:

(66) Inform(A, B & C, I_3) $\Rightarrow$ I_3 = Assert(A, C, 'B must tell C who A & B met')

↓

Inform(A, B & C, I_2) $\Rightarrow$ I_2 = Request(A, B, 'B tell C who A & B met')

With the informative analysis, therefore, 8 and 9 are given a uniform treatment, yielding the parallel representations in 64 and 66. The only difference between 64 and 66 is in the addressees of the direct assertion: in 8, it is Barbara, and in 9, it is Charles. So this analysis provides a natural extension from linear indirect speech acts (like 8) to lateral indirect speech acts (like 9). The standard theories, as we noted, say nothing about examples like 9; and it is hard to see how they could be extended to cover them. All this is further evidence for the validity of the informative analysis.

5.2. COMPLEX INDIRECT SPEECH ACTS. With ordinary linear indirectness, utterances can become very complicated; but with lateral indirectness, the possibilities almost defy imagination. For a relatively simple example, consider this:

(67) *Ann, to Barbara, in front of Charles, David, and Ewan:* Barbara, I insist that Charles tell you the joke about the two Irishmen.

At one level, Ann is informing everyone that she is asserting to Barbara that she insists Charles tell her a joke; she is thereby making that assertion to Barbara. At a second level, dependent on the first, she is also informing everyone that she is asking Charles to tell Barbara that joke, and she is thereby asking Charles to tell it. Suppose, however, that it is common-knowledge among Ann, David, and Ewan—but not Barbara and Charles—that David can't stand Charles' jokes, which he has heard many times before. By informing David and Ewan of her request to Charles, then, Ann is also informing the two of them that she is warning David to leave, and she is thereby warning David to leave. The situation can be diagrammed as follows:

(68) Inform(A, B & C & D & E, I_1) $\Rightarrow$ I_1 = Assert(A, B, 'A insist C tell joke')

↓

Inform(A, B & C & D & E, I_2) $\Rightarrow$ I_2 = Request(A, C, 'C tell joke to B')

↓

Inform(A, D & E, I_3) $\Rightarrow$ I_3 = Warn(A, D, 'D should leave')

A number of points should be noted here. First, there are distinct addressees at the three different levels of this diagram: Barbara, Charles, and David. In principle, there is no limit to the number of levels or distinct indirect addressees associated with these levels. Second, the participants change from one informative to the next: the participants for the first two informatives are Barbara, Charles, David, and Ewan, whereas those for the third are only David and

Ewan. As specified by the principle of inclusion, the only requirement is that the participants in each indirect informative be included in those of the informative by which it is performed. Third, there is no obvious way of describing this situation in the standard theories.

Analyses like this make it possible to explicate utterances that turn on rather subtle effects:

(69) *Mother, whispering to son, out of earshot of father:* Eat your peas.

(70) *Mother, aloud to son, in front of father:* Eat your peas.

Suppose it is common-knowledge to the mother, father, and son that the father metes out punishment at the behest of the mother, and that she could well ask him to punish the son if he doesn't eat his peas. In 69, the only participant is the son, and so there is no immediately implied threat. In 70, since the father is also a participant, there is an immediately implied threat. The utterance in 69 might be diagrammed this way:

(71) $\text{Inform}(M, S, I_1) \Rightarrow I_1 = \text{Request}(M, S, \text{'eat peas'})$

What introduces the threat in 70 is the fact that the son realizes that the mother is not only informing the father of the request, but also indirectly requesting him to punish the son if he doesn't eat his peas. The utterance might be diagrammed like this:

(72) $\text{Inform}(M, F \,\&\, S, I_1) \Rightarrow I_1 = \text{Request}(M, S, \text{'eat peas'})$
$\downarrow$
$\text{Inform}(M, F \,\&\, S, I_2) \Rightarrow I_2 = \text{Request}(M, F, \text{'punish if needed'})$
$\downarrow$
$\text{Inform}(M, F \,\&\, S, I_3) \Rightarrow I_3 = \text{Warn}(M, S, \text{'eat or else'})$

In 70, the mother's meaning 'Eat your peas or else' is three-removes indirect.

In a traditional analysis of 70, one might be tempted to say that the mother is asking the son to eat his peas—and, because he knows the father might punish him if he doesn't, she is thereby also making a threat. This analysis, however, misses an essential element: the mother can make her threat only because the son recognizes that she is also indirectly asking the father to punish him if he doesn't eat his peas. The threat depends on the son's being informed of her conditional request to the father. The perspicuous characterization of 70 therefore requires all the apparatus in 72.

6. PARTIAL INFORMATIVES. In the informatives considered so far, the speaker informs all the participants fully of the speech acts being directed at the addressees. When Othello says *Come, Desdemona,* he doesn't hold back any aspect of his request from Iago and Roderigo. Many 'informatives', however, involve something less than full disclosure. In those with which we are concerned, it isn't that the speaker intends to deceive the participants: quite the opposite. He tacitly obtains their coöperation in not telling them everything. This criterion—less than full disclosure with the tacit coöperation of the participants—defines a family of illocutionary acts we will call PARTIAL INFORMATIVES. These differ from the informatives discussed so far, which we will identify when necessary as FULL INFORMATIVES.

Imagine that Helen and Sam are at Nancy's party, and that the following occurs:

(73) *Helen, to Sam, in front of Nancy:* Sam, we mustn't forget the appointment.
Helen, to Nancy, in front of Sam: Sorry, Nancy, but we have to leave now.

Imagine further that it is mutually understood between Helen and Sam that Nancy has no way of identifying the appointment to which Helen is referring. So, in her first utterance, Helen is informing Nancy that she is reminding Sam not to forget an appointment. This informative, however, is incomplete. What Helen is actually reminding Sam of is THE appointment—say, their appointment with a lawyer to discuss a contested will—which is an appointment that Nancy cannot identify. If Helen were addressing Nancy, she wouldn't have said *the appointment*, but *an appointment*, as in *Sam and I have an appointment—sorry, but we have to leave now*. By definition, then, Helen's illocutionary act to Nancy is not a proper informative: It doesn't inform Nancy of the FULL illocutionary act being directed at Sam.

Helen's act toward Nancy is, nevertheless, illocutionary. Helen intends Nancy to come to know a particular part of what she is reminding Sam of, and Nancy is intended to come to this knowledge by means of her recognition of Helen's intentions. Since it is mutually understood that Nancy can't identify the appointment referred to, she will recognize that she is intended to know only part of what Sam is being reminded of. Helen is completely aboveboard in withholding this information, which she will generally have a good reason for withholding. The information may be trivial, or irrelevant, or personal. Helen's illocutionary act, therefore, is related to, but distinct from, the full informatives we defined earlier. That is our reason for calling the new category partial informatives.

In the standard theories, partial informatives would be subject to the same felicity conditions as full informatives, except for the appropriate deletions. Consider the sincerity condition for full informatives, as given in 29 above. If 73 were a full informative, this phrase would read: 'Helen is reminding Sam not to forget their appointment with the lawyer to discuss a contested will.' But with 73 as a partial informative, this phrase must read 'Helen is reminding Sam not to forget AN appointment.' The same phrase would also need altering in the propositional content and essential conditions. It is important to note that there is no general way of altering this phrase: only a number of particular ways, each definite but distinct. The only constraint seems to be that the altered phrase specify a logical entailment of the speech act which S is actually performing addressed to A. In 73, reminding Sam of AN appointment is entailed by reminding Sam of THE appointment that they have with the lawyer.

However, Helen's first utterance in 73 has one more twist. We have been supposing that it is mutually obvious to both Helen and Sam that Nancy doesn't know of the relevant appointment, and that Sam does. Sam is therefore being informed both that Helen is reminding him about THE appointment, and that

she is informing Nancy only about AN appointment. The situation looks something like this:

(74) Inform(H, S, I_1) $\Rightarrow$ I_1 = Assert(H, S, 'Don't forget the appointment')
↓
Inform(H, S, I_2) $\Rightarrow$ I_2 = Request(H, S, 'Leave the party')
Part-inform(H, S & N, I_1)
↓
Inform(H, S & N, I_2)

The partial informative to Sam and Nancy is something being done in addition to what is going on privately between Helen and Sam. This extra twist is needed to account for how each hearer perceives the situation.

When Nancy's and Sam's roles are reversed, the situation is quite different. Consider this:

(75) *Helen, to Nancy, in front of Sam:* Sam and I mustn't forget an appointment we have. Sorry, but we have to leave.

Helen is telling Nancy about AN appointment, but laterally she is reminding Sam about THE appointment they have with the lawyer to discuss the contested will. Let us assume the case in which Nancy is intended to realize that Sam is being reminded of an appointment of which he knows the identity. Then the situation is as follows:

(76) Inform(H, S & N, I_1) $\Rightarrow$ I_1 = Assert(H, N, 'Not forget an appt.')
↓
Inform(H, S, I_2) $\Rightarrow$ I_2 = Assert(H, S, 'Not forget the appt.')
Part-inform(H, S & N, I_2)

The critical point here is that Helen makes her definite reference for Sam indirectly and by means of a full informative. In this respect, 73 and 75 are not symmetrical.

Ex. 73 illustrates one of the main reasons for partial informatives: It is often impossible to satisfy both the addressees AND the side-participants in the same utterance. In 73, Helen would be required to use a definite reference (*the appointment*) with Sam, but an indefinite reference (*an appointment*) with Nancy. It is impossible to satisfy both listeners at once. The rule, apparently, is this: Satisfy the addressee first. In many instances the rule automatically leads to partial informatives, but it also accounts for the reversed cases like 75.

Another branch in the family of partial informatives is an outgrowth of ellipsis:

(77) *Jane, to son Ned, in front of guests:* Stop playing with your food or else.

Imagine that Jane intends Ned to realize that the threatened punishment is banishment to his room, but doesn't intend the guests to realize this. By being elliptical, Jane is informing the guests that there IS a threatened punishment, but not what it is.

In the extreme, the speaker may inform side-participants only about the bare outline of the direct illocutionary acts he is performing. Imagine that Anne,

who doesn't know French, is in France with Desmond, who is fluent:

(78) *Anne, to Desmond:* Let's go to the train station.
Desmond, to Anne: Okay. I'll just ask someone how to get there.
Desmond, to passerby, in front of Anne: Pourriez-vous me dire où je peux trouver un taxi?

With this last utterance, Desmond doesn't intend to inform Anne that he is trying to find a taxi. Yet he can intend to inform her that he is performing some speech act relevant to their getting to the station. As usual, Anne is to arrive at her beliefs by means of her recognition of Desmond's intentions to this effect; but the only evidence she is provided of his intentions is his last utterance, the general situation, and the fact that he is speaking in French. Desmond's lateral act toward Anne is no less an illocutionary act for all this. It too is a partial informative.

Partial informatives, then, range from virtually full informatives to ones that reveal almost nothing: they constitute a family of types. They are mainly useful for efficiency of communication. If speakers had to fill the participants in on every detail of what they were saying, conversations would get nowhere. Partial informatives help to keep them running smoothly.

7. DECEPTION. An important virtue of the standard theories is that they can account for certain kinds of deception, such as lies, misleading questions, and false promises. Yet there are other types of deception that involve more than one hearer, and these the standard theories cannot account for.[23] These new types of deception are readily described and accounted for in the informative analysis.

Illocutionary acts, as we noted earlier, rely on the common ground between the speaker and the targets of his illocutionary acts. In actual conversations, the common ground between the speaker and one participant may be very different from that between him and another participant. If the speaker is aware of these differences and able to keep track of them, he can exploit them to his advantage. What they allow him to do is to convey one thing to one hearer, and something else to another. We will consider three types of deception that turn on such discrepancies. The first two involve collusion—between the speaker and an addressee, and between the speaker and a side-participant—while the third exploits a disparity in common ground between two addressees.

7.1. SPEAKER–ADDRESSEE COLLUSION. Imagine that Ann and Ben are spies who have agreed on a code in which, among other things, *The train arrives at two* is to mean 'The dictator has been assassinated.' The two meet at a party and speak in front of Charles, who is not a spy and is not privy to the code:

(79) *Ann, to Ben, in front of Charles:* The train arrives at two.

Ann is asserting to Ben that the dictator has been assassinated; but she intends

[23] Harder & Kock 1976 analyse a number of types of deception in terms of 'presupposition failures', with a straightforward interpretation of disparities in the speaker's and hearer's assessment of their common ground. Verschueren, in discussing their work, notes (131): 'They are not able to, or simply neglect to account for speech events involving more than two participants.'

Charles to believe that she is telling Ben that the train arrives at two. The situation is like this:

(80) Inform(A, B, I_1) $\Rightarrow$ I_1 = Assert(A, B, 'Dictator killed')
↓
Inform(A, B & C, I_2)
where I_2 = Assert(A, B, 'Train arrives at two')

The second informative, which is performed in parallel with the first, is misleading to Charles because Ann isn't in fact telling Ben that the train arrives at two. The speaker, through collusion with the addressee, is deceiving a side-participant.

We don't have to appeal to spies for examples of this kind of deception. Instances can be found in perfectly ordinary conversations, as in this utterance at a party:

(81) *Helen, to Sam, in front of hostess Nancy:* Dear, we must be going.

Helen is telling Sam that they must be going, and is indirectly requesting him to take her home. She is accomplishing this by informing both Sam and Nancy of these acts. Suppose, however, that Helen is also indirectly threatening Sam that if they don't leave now, she will take the car and make him walk home. Sam is intended to recognize this threat based on their particular common ground—a conversation the two of them had earlier. Nancy isn't intended to be informed of the threat, since she wasn't privy to that conversation. So although Nancy is a participant in the assertion and the indirect request, she is not a participant in the indirect threat. She is being led to believe that all Helen is doing is making the assertion and the indirect request—which isn't true.

In both examples, the deception is accomplished by means of discrepancies in common ground. With more side-participants, and more chances for such discrepancies, one can build as complicated examples of deception as one likes.

7.2. SPEAKER–PARTICIPANT COLLUSION. Imagine that Ann and Charles have just discussed, privately, how absurd deerstalker caps look, and then Ann utters this:

(82) *Ann, to Ben, in front of Charles:* What a handsome deerstalker you are wearing!

Ben is intended to take this as a sincere compliment, but Charles isn't. Charles is intended to recognize that Ann is being insincere—that she is making fun of Ben's deerstalker for Charles' benefit.

This is an example of 'playing to the audience'. The 'audience', here Charles, is being informed of the speaker's acts towards the addressee; but he is intended to recognize the insincerity of the compliment, and to take the speaker as laterally doing something more—making fun of the addressee. The addressee is deceived in two ways: he is duped into thinking that the compliment is sincere, and he is kept ignorant of a lateral indirect illocutionary act that is also being performed.

Quite a different use of speaker–participant collusion is found in Edward

Albee's 'Who's afraid of Virginia Woolf?' In Act I, Martha mentions 'my son' to two guests who don't realize that she has no son. As a way of getting back at Martha, her husband George, who knows the deceit, takes up her false reference in addressing the two guests:

(83) *George, to Honey and Nick, in front of Martha:* There are very few things in this world that I AM sure of ... national boundaries, the level of the ocean, political allegiances, practical morality ... none of these would I stake my stick on any more ... but the one thing in this whole stinking world I am sure of is my partnership, my chromosomological partnership in the ... creation of our ... blond-eyed, blue-haired ... son.

Honey and Nick are intended to take this assertion at face value; but laterally, Martha is intended to recognize that she is being castigated for bringing the subject up.

7.3. TWO ADDRESSEES—TWO MEANINGS. Speakers can also deceive one addressee about what they are saying to another addressee. Consider this example of Searle's (1969:70–71):

> 'Suppose at a party a wife says, "It's really quite late." That utterance may be at one level a statement of fact; to her interlocutor, who has just remarked on how early it was, it may be (and be intended as) an objection; to her husband it may be (and be intended as) a suggestion or even a request ("Let's go home") as well as a warning ("You'll feel rotten in the morning if we don't").'

For Searle, this was an example of how 'one and the same utterance may constitute the performance of several different illocutionary acts', i.e. several different addressee-directed illocutionary acts. However, it is also an example of a situation that cannot be adequately described without reference to informatives.

Let us consider the wife's utterance:

(84) *Wife, to husband and another guest:* It's really quite late.

The wife is making an assertion to both the guest and the husband. To the guest, she is using the assertion indirectly to make an objection. To her husband, she is using it indirectly to make a request and a warning. What else is happening? Searle doesn't say. Suppose that the wife is informing both her husband and the guest about the assertion and objection to the guest. But also suppose that she isn't informing the guest about the indirect request and warning to her husband, which she can accomplish because the guest lacks the necessary common ground. As far as the guest is concerned, she is simply making an assertion and thereby objecting to him. The situation looks like this:

(85) $\text{Inform}(W, H \,\&\, G, I_1) \Rightarrow I_1 = \text{Assert}(W, H \,\&\, G, \text{'It's late'})$

$\downarrow$

$\text{Inform}(W, H \,\&\, G, I_3) \Rightarrow I_2 = \text{Object}(W, G, \text{'You're wrong'})$

$\text{Inform}(W, H, I_3) \Rightarrow I_3 = \text{Request}(W, H, \text{'Let's go'})$

$\downarrow$

$\text{Inform}(W, H, I_4) \Rightarrow I_4 = \text{Warn}(W, H, \text{'You'll feel rotten'})$

The wife's deception of the guest cannot be characterized without reference to the informatives. Traditional analyses provide no way of specifying that the husband is being informed of the assertion, objection, request, and warning, while the guest is being informed only of the assertion and objection. The informative analysis provides a way. Like the other examples of collusion, this one gives us still another reason for introducing informatives into the general theory of illocutionary acts.

8. CONCLUSION. With the informative analysis, we are proposing a fundamental addition to the standard theories of speech acts. In our proposal, each traditional illocutionary act, which is directed at addressees, is performed by means of an informative—a logically-prior illocutionary act that is directed at participants. When only one hearer is present, there is little change from the standard analyses of illocutionary acts; this may be why informatives were not noted before. But when more than one hearer is present, informatives take on major importance. They are required, we have argued, to account for the cumulative nature of conversations, lateral indirect illocutionary acts, official and public side-participants, and the many ways in which addressees can be designated: collectively, distributively, attributively, indefinitely, and even singly by name.

With the introduction of informatives, the theory of speech acts gains enormously in power and breadth of application. It is no longer limited to illocutionary acts directed solely at one person: now it applies to genuine conversations in which three or more people address each other in a variety of ways, while adhering to their responsibility to keep everyone informed. It now recognizes an important reality of ordinary talk. Speakers make distinctions among addressees, participants, and overhearers—and in what they communicate to each.

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