

# CS 4530: Fundamentals of Software Engineering

## Module 15.2: Threat Modeling

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# Learning Objectives for this Module

- By the end of this module, you should be able to:
  - Appreciate the need for threat modelling
  - Understand the process of threat modeling
  - Understand the STRIDE framework
  - Integrate threat modelling with requirements

# Outline of this lecture

1. The need for Threat Modelling
2. The Threat Modelling Method
3. The STRIDE Framework
4. How to Apply Threat Modelling in an Agile Process Model

# Secure By Design

- Traditional Software Process Models do not bake security into the software development lifecycle.
  - Security issues are usually an after thought.
- The modern approach to secure software engineering is to **consider security during the design phase**.
- A useful method to do secure by design is through **threat modeling**.

# What is Threat Modeling?

- **Identification:** Recognizing potential threats to your system.
- **Assessment:** Evaluating the likelihood and impact of each threat.
- **Countermeasures:** Implementing strategies to mitigate or prevent identified threats.
- **Review:** Regularly reviewing and updating threat models to adapt to evolving risks.

# Getting Started with Threat Modelling

- Concentrate on technical risks rather than broad threats.
  - Are there any missing controls?
  - Is there a data flow that can be abused?
  - Technical threats combine to create broad threats.
  - Focusing on vague nation-state attacks and zero-day exploits can overshadow essential application security details.

# Getting Started with Threat Modelling

- Collaborate with stakeholders
  - Diverse views on security are necessary to define a comprehensive model.
  - Product owners or clients must be involved to gain perspective on user behavior and prioritizing risks.

# Getting Started with Threat Modelling

- Frequent and small iterations
  - Start with the thinnest slice of the system. E.g.,
    - User registration flow.
    - A microservice and its collaborating services.
    - Current iteration
  - Repeat and refine them.
- Defining a threat model upfront for the entire system is counter productive.



# Basic Structure of Threat Modeling in Agile

An effective threat modeling session must deal with the three primary questions

| Activity            | Question                  | Outcome                                      |
|---------------------|---------------------------|--|
| Explain and explore | What are you building?    | A technical diagram                          |
| Brainstorm threats  | What can go wrong?        | A list of technical threats                  |
| Prioritize and fix  | What are you going to do? | Add prioritized fixes to backlog (todo list) |

## An Example


“As a customer, I need a page where I can see my customer details so I can confirm they are correct”

*An Epic (high-level requirement) in Agile*

- Epics are specified as user stories*
- and broken down into sprints.*


# An Example

- What are we building?
- Use a sketch to represent
  - relevant components
  - users that interact with a component
  - collaborative components




# An Example

- What are we building?
- Explicitly model data flows in the sketch.
- Data flows help show where requests originate (source).
- Label networks and show boundaries between them.
  - Collaborate with DevOps if you need to include firewalls and load balancers in the analysis.



# An Example

- What are we building?
- Identify and show assets e.g., personally identifiable information (PII), your application has access to.
  - Often derived from business requirements and the operating environment.



# Brainstorming Threats


- The **STRIDE** framework is useful to reason about potential threats.
  - **S**poofing.
  - **T**ampering.
  - **R**epudiation.
  - **I**nformation Disclosure.
  - **D**enial of Service.
  - **E**levation of Privilege.

# Security Properties

- A *threat* is a potential danger or risk that could compromise the CIA properties of an application.
  - **C***onfidentiality*: Ensuring that sensitive information is accessible only to authorized individuals or entities.
  - **I***ntegrity*: Guaranteeing that data remains unchanged and uncorrupted during storage, transmission, or processing.
  - **A***vailability*: Ensuring that information and resources are accessible and usable when needed by authorized users.
- Addressing the STRIDE threats helps meet the CIA properties of a system

# Back to The Example


- Using the STRIDE model, we should identify possible threats that can happen on each flow.
  - Customer -> UI
  - Customer -> Identity Service
  - UI -> BFF
  - BFF -> Customer Service





# Back to The Example

- Using the STRIDE model, we should identify possible threats that can happen on each flow.
  - Customer -> UI
  - Customer -> Identity Service
  - UI -> BFF
  - BFF -> Customer Service



# Prioritize and Fix

- Threats need to be prioritized as teams don't have unlimited bandwidth and some threats may not be significant.
- Prioritization criteria:
  - Will the threats jeopardize organization objectives?
  - Opinion of product owners and security teams.
  - What does everyone on the team think? Vote!
- Aim to address at least three threats. Could be more but three is a manageable number.



# Prioritize and Fix

- Threats of the highest priority must be added to the requirements (or backlog for agile).
- Few ways to concretely document.
  - **Conditions of Satisfaction:** Extend an extended scenario with additional (security) constraints in a way that is testable.
  - **Story:** The identified threat might need a story of its own.
  - **Definition of Done (DoD):** If all features need to be extended then specify it as a DoD applicable to all features.
  - **Epics:** A significant architecture specification to address a threat. E.g., adding an identity provider or configuring a network gateway.

# Example Specification

- Suppose the team identified the following threats to be addressed:
  - Authorization bypass when accessing an API.
  - XSS attack via user input.
  - Denial of service from the internet.

Given the user is logged in  
When they request to view their profile page  
And they have a valid token  
Then their profile page is displayed

Given the user is logged in  
When they request to view their profile page  
But they do not have a valid token  
Then they are asked to login or signup

*Extend the existing view user profile page scenario with **conditions of satisfaction** for authorization bypass.*

All API changes tested for sanitization of XSS and SQL injection attacks.

*This applies to all features. Hence, expressed as **Definition of Done**.*

all Internet facing UI and API requests to pass through the Content Delivery Network to prevent DDoS attacks.

*An **epic** that requires architectural changes in collaboration with a security expert and the DevOps team.*

# Additional Reading

- A Guide to Threat Modeling by Jim Gumbley.
  - <https://martinfowler.com/articles/agile-threat-modelling.html>