

# The Moneylender as Middleman: Formal Credit Supply and Informal Loans in Rural India\*

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## Abstract

A majority of household borrowing in developing countries is from informal lenders. In this paper, I exploit exogenous weather-induced shocks to household credit demand and variation in bank credit supply to demonstrate that informal moneylenders rely on bank credit to ease lending capital constraints in rural India. I document that informal moneylenders use loans from banks as lending capital, and they increase borrowing from banks following weather-induced increases in household credit demand. Moreover, following an equivalent demand shock, districts with higher predicted bank credit supply see larger increases in household borrowing from moneylenders than those with lower predicted bank credit supply — driven by changes in moneylender supply rather than in household demand for credit overall. These results help explain the persistence of informal credit since they indicate that, rather than competing with informal moneylenders, banks effectively collaborate with them.

**JEL Codes:** G21, G23, O12, O16

**Keywords:** Moneylenders, Non-Bank Financial Intermediaries, Bank Credit

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# 1 Introduction

High-interest non-institutional lenders, such as informal moneylenders in South Asia or payday lenders in the United States, meet a large share of consumer credit needs.<sup>1,2</sup> In 2017, almost three-fourths of individuals who borrowed worldwide did so from a non-institutional source (World Bank, 2019). In developing countries in particular, informal or non-institutional lenders continue to lend extensively despite decades of expansions in their formal financial sectors. Given this co-existence, the nature of the relationship between the formal and informal sectors is important for understanding the impact of credit policies.

Prior literature has either considered a horizontal interaction, where the formal and informal sectors directly compete (Jacoby, 2008; Bell et al., 1997; Kochar, 1997; Jain, 1999; Giné, 2011); or a vertical interaction, where informal lenders act as middlemen who on-lend formal credit (Jacoby, 2008; Hoff and Stiglitz, 1998; Floro and Ray, 1997). However, empirical evidence examining moneylender credit supply is limited. I re-visit this debate in the context of rural India, where the incidence of household borrowing from both formal *and* informal institutions more than doubled over the last three decades (NSSO, 2013b; NAFIS, 2017).

I first document descriptive evidence on the informal moneylending market in India. I find that while the median moneylender plausibly earns margins above their marginal cost *and* average cost,<sup>3</sup> some moneylenders also earn interest rates below their average costs. While this could be because of short-run shocks to the demand these lenders face, it might also indicate a supply constraint — with below profit-maximizing quantities arising due to a shortfall in lending capital or another input. I also find that moneylenders do rely on formal credit for lending capital, and that the median moneylender who does so has borrowed 45% of all the credit they advance. In this paper, I explore whether informal moneylenders use bank credit to ease lending capital constraints.

I exploit exogenous weather-induced credit demand shocks and variation in bank credit supply, in combination with household and moneylender survey data, to provide evidence on the implications of the vertical relationship between banks and moneylenders for the informal credit market. I find that increases in household credit demand are associated with increases in moneylenders' own borrowing from banks, the amounts they lend to households and the interest rates they charge. In addition, I find that households borrow more from informal moneylenders when districts have a high supply of formal credit than when districts have a low supply of formal credit, following an equivalent demand shock. Since unanticipated demand shocks represent situations where informal moneylenders are more likely to

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<sup>1</sup>Here, I use the term institution to refer to formal financial institutions such as banks.

<sup>2</sup>Informal moneylending in South Asia is discussed more extensively in Aleem (1990); Timberg and Aiyar (1984); Bottomley (1963) among others; while examples of the literature on payday lending are Baradaran (2015); Allcott et al. (2020); Morse (2011).

<sup>3</sup>Data comes from a sub-sample of 372 private moneylenders in the NSS Unincorporated Non-Agricultural Enterprises surveys in 2015-16. Details on calculations are in section 3.

be constrained, these results suggest that the availability of formal credit eases informal moneylenders' lending capital constraints.

The approach in this paper relies on the relationship between monsoon rainfall and incomes in rural India — increases in monsoon rainfall increase incomes (Paxson, 1992; Jacoby and Skoufias, 1998; Wolpin, 1982; Jayachandran, 2006; Kaur, 2019; Santangelo, 2019; Emerick, 2018), which in turn impacts household credit demand. Intuitively, one might expect a decrease in incomes following a drought to increase rural household borrowing. However, I find that while household borrowing does go up following a negative rainfall shock, it goes up substantially more following a *positive* rainfall shock. I focus on the borrowing response to the positive shock here, and suggestive evidence indicates that it is driven by an increase in borrowing to finance lumpy expenditures (such as purchases of durable goods) when households lack savings.

Accompanying this increase in demand for informal moneylender credit is a contemporaneous increase in moneylenders borrowing from banks — a one standard deviation increase in monsoon rainfall in non-drought years increases household borrowing from moneylenders by 19% and increases moneylender borrowing from banks by 31%. Moneylenders also lend more to households, and charge higher interest rates, corresponding with the increase in borrowing and higher interest rates in the household sample. This effect is not driven by a change in the composition of households that borrow from moneylenders. A possible alternative explanation is that since a positive rainfall shock increases incomes all around, it increases the stock of lending capital that moneylenders have access to, therefore also increasing moneylender credit supply. However, the increase in the lenders' own borrowing from banks is inconsistent with an increase in lending capital, and instead consistent with borrowing to supplement lending capital. Another possibility is that banks are more likely to lend following a positive rainfall shock, and therefore lend more to moneylenders. However, I find that rainfall shocks do not impact total bank lending in a district.

To establish that a lack of bank credit constrains moneylenders' lending capital and results in fewer loans transacted, I then look at the differential impact of the credit demand shock across districts with high bank credit supply and those with low bank credit supply. Since observed bank credit is an equilibrium quantity, I predict bank credit supply in a district in a given year in the spirit of a 'shift-share' instrument (see for e.g., Greenstone et al. (2020)). While available district-level data does not disaggregate lending by banks, it does by bank-group,<sup>4</sup> loan-type,<sup>5</sup> and population group.<sup>6</sup> This enables purging bank-credit of district-level demand drivers, as well as sector-specific sorting or prioritizing by bank-groups. So, in this case, the 'shift' is the resultant growth in credit for a particular bank-group, while a 'share'

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<sup>4</sup>A bank-group, as the name suggests, is a group of banks. There are five bank groups — State Bank of India and its associates, nationalized banks, other public sector banks, foreign banks, private banks.

<sup>5</sup>This indicates the loan purpose for personal loans, and the industry otherwise.

<sup>6</sup>Population groups are urban, rural, semi-urban, metropolitan.

is a particular bank-group’s pre-period market share. The ‘shift-share’ for credit in a district is the inner-product of the shifts and shares in a given year. I use this measure to designate districts as having high formal credit supply when its value is above the median, and as having low formal credit supply when its value is below the median. I find that bank credit supply in districts predicted to have high supply is 10% higher than in those predicted to have low credit supply. Consequently, my findings indicate that a 10% expansion in bank credit enables 23% more rural household borrowing from moneylenders following a one standard deviation increase in monsoon rainfall in non-drought years.

Identification here relies on the assumption that a district having an above or below median credit supply does not also have above or below median unobserved shocks to outcomes. I address concerns that this might not hold by comparing observable district and household characteristics that might determine credit demand across high and low predicted credit supply district  $\times$  years, and find no significant differences in these characteristics. I also find that these results hold when controlling for a variety of district characteristics, household characteristics, and household fixed effects. In addition, since my focus here is on the rainfall shock and its interaction with the supply environment, any possible differences driven by the supply measure are absorbed by the supply environment indicator, similar to a standard difference-in-differences design (Frison and Pocock, 1992).

A second concern that might arise when interpreting these results is that an increase in formal credit supply increases the demand for informal credit directly, rather than increasing informal borrowing through its impact on moneylenders’ supply. This might arise if formal and informal credit are complements for a borrower; or through a general equilibrium effect where the increase in formal credit increases economic activity, and thus increases the demand for informal credit. I provide the following pieces of evidence to rule this out. First, this effect is unlikely to be driven by complementarity between formal and informal credit since most borrowers in the sample borrow from just one source in a given year. Complementarity arising from loans in a previous period is still consistent with the supply channel rather than the demand channel. Second, though districts with low formal credit supply see lower borrowing from informal moneylenders following a positive rainfall shock than districts with high formal credit supply; at the same time, districts with low formal credit supply see *higher* interest-free borrowing from friends or relatives following a positive rainfall shock than districts with high formal credit supply. This suggests that it is moneylender credit supply rather than household demand that drives this result. Third, when a district has below median formal credit supply, it also has higher informal market interest rates, suggesting that the effect is driven by a decline in supply rather than an increase in demand.

This paper contributes to several different strands of literature. First, this paper documents evidence that informal moneylenders in India rely on bank credit for part of their lending capital, and that this link helps them ease lending capital constraints, corroborating earlier theoretical analyses that consider a vertical relationship between informal moneylenders

and banks (Hoff and Stiglitz, 1998; Floro and Ray, 1997; Madestam, 2014). In addition, by providing descriptive evidence on the current functioning of moneylender markets in India both from national sample survey data, and a unique primary survey in the state of Telangana, this paper updates our understanding of these markets in the Indian context, complementing Aleem (1990) and Irfan et al. (1999).

The paper’s findings, however, differ from those in Ruiz (2013); Banerjee et al. (2020); Hoffmann et al. (2021) — where the authors find that formal or semi-formal credit crowds out informal credit and risk-sharing. While these papers consider changes on the extensive margin, with the entry of a new formal or semi-formal lender, here I consider an existing relationship between the formal and informal sector. In addition, a key difference from the present study is that in these cases, the banks, microfinance institutions or self-help groups specifically focus on lending to households that might otherwise be excluded from the formal sector. Formal banks in India are less likely to lend to small (rural) borrowers (Banerjee and Duflo, 2014); and, as demonstrated in Kanz (2016) and Giné and Kanz (2018), lower formal sector willingness to lend to rural households is associated with increased informal borrowing. Thus, this suggests that the interaction between formal and informal credit institutions depends on who is able to access credit through them.

The finding that bank credit crowds-in moneylender credit through a supply side channel also points to a consolidation of moneylender market power. This helps reconcile existing evidence on the impact of bank expansions in India. While Burgess and Pande (2005) and Young (2019) find that bank expansions in India increased output and growth, evidence on its distributional impacts is mixed. Studies suggests that bank expansions led to a decrease in poverty (Burgess and Pande, 2005) as well as an increase in inequality (Kochar, 2011; Ligon, 2005), with formal credit benefitting only certain households due to transaction costs (Sharma, 2010; Ghate, 1992), collateral requirements (Ghosh et al., 1999; Ghate, 1992) or poor enforcement mechanisms (Giné, 2011).

This study also contributes to the literature on household borrowing responses to income shocks by documenting that households in rural India increase borrowing following positive shocks, and to a smaller extent, following negative shocks. The increase in borrowing following positive shocks to finance lumpy spending appears to be driven by households that do not have savings; and this complements findings across contexts that when households gain access to credit, they borrow more for spending that has a durable component (Banerjee et al., 2015; Kaboski and Townsend, 2012; Ruiz, 2013). The results in this paper also document that households are less likely to have old outstanding loans following positive shocks, and thus increased new borrowing might also reflect a desire to improve standards of living (González, 2017) in a context where income might go towards repaying old loans, requiring or enabling new loans for purchases.

Relatedly, evidence in the Indian context indicates that households accumulate savings in the form of ‘buffer-stocks’ of different assets or durable goods (Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1993;

Imai and Malaeb, 2015; Lim and Townsend, 1998), usually due to credit constraints. The increase observed in this paper is consistent with these findings in situations where households require or prefer a commitment device (Ashraf et al., 2006), or are present-biased/lack self-control (Banerjee and Mullainathan, 2010; Banerjee, 2013; Karlan et al., 2019). Finally, the modest increase in borrowing by some rural households during drought years, on the other hand, is consistent with the findings relating to risk-coping and consumption smoothing that credit serves an insurance purpose (Paxson, 1992; Eswaran and Kotwal, 1989; Udry, 1994; Demont, 2020; Lane, 2020; Kaboski and Townsend, 2005), suggesting that households employ a variety of strategies to respond to income shocks.

The rest of this paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 describes the context of household borrowing in rural India, Section 3 describes the informal moneylending market, Section 4 presents a simple theoretical framework, Section 5 describes the data and empirical strategy used in the paper, Section 6 discusses the results, and Section 7 concludes.

## 2 Background

Around half of all households in rural India are indebted,<sup>7</sup> and the median indebted household owed approximately ₹40,000 to its creditors in 2012-13.<sup>8</sup> Households across all levels of wealth borrow (NAFIS, 2017; Banerjee, 2003). They do so from a variety of sources, best represented as belonging to a continuum of informality-formality, where banks represent the most formal sources. Bank loans are usually larger than less formal loans; but tend to have lower interest rates than interest-bearing informal loans (Figure 1). However, while 79% of individuals in rural India had a bank account by 2017, only 17% of those who borrowed in 2017 did so from an institutional source (World Bank, 2019).

For banks themselves, credit to small borrowers is largely made available through ‘priority sector’ lending, under which 40% of credit is to be lent to sectors such as agriculture, micro, small and medium enterprises, as well as disadvantaged population groups.<sup>9</sup> Most often, these loans require at least two acres of land or gold as collateral, and additional documentation requirements introduce further friction to these transactions (Mowl, 2017). While banks usually meet these ‘priority sector’ targets, the administrative cost of lending in the priority sector is higher than in other sectors, and banks are more likely to lend to larger eligible borrowers (Banerjee and Duflo, 2014).<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>7</sup>53% of rural households were indebted in 2012-13 (NSSO, 2013b); 47.4% of them were indebted in 2016-17 (NAFIS, 2017); and this was up from 43% of households in 1993 (NSSO, 2013b)

<sup>8</sup>This is in 2012-13 prices, or ₹56,381 in current (2019-20) INR; and is equivalent to \$730 in 2012-13 USD or \$796 in current (2019-20) USD

<sup>9</sup>The Reserve Bank of India mandates that 40% of a bank’s Adjusted Net Bank Credit in the preceding year be lent to ‘priority’ sectors. Examples of qualifying disadvantaged groups are small and marginal farmers, artisans, small village and cottage industries, scheduled castes/scheduled tribes, individual women, self-help groups, etc.

<sup>10</sup>Consistent with this, banks lent agricultural loans to just 615 accounts in 2016, according to data



Less formal options than bank loans for households are loans from microfinance institutions or bank-linked self-help groups.<sup>11</sup> Self-help groups that are bank linked can themselves borrow from banks under ‘priority sector’ lending targets, and make such credit available to member households. However, such loans formed just 9% of loans taken and 3% of the amount borrowed by rural households in 2013 (NSSO, 2013b).<sup>12</sup> Finally come the least formal or informal loan options for households. Informal loans are either interest-free or interest-bearing, and the interest-bearing loans are usually from professional moneylenders, pawnbrokers, landlords, input-traders, local shop-keepers or friends and relatives, while interest-free loans tend to be from friends, relatives or patrons (Dréze et al., 1998; ICRISAT, 2014). Despite there being no explicit interest charged, such interest-free loans often come with implicit costs in the form of obligatory reciprocity (Ligon, 2005; Udry, 1994; Hayashi et al., 1996; Ambrus et al., 2014; Ligon and Schechter, 2012). In 2013, 31% of all loans transacted were interest-bearing non-institutional loans, while 20% of all loans were interest-free (NSSO, 2013b).

While credit is fungible, households do usually report what they borrow for. Around 70% of all loans are reported as being taken for non-productive needs — consumption expenditures, purchases of assets and durable goods, education, medical expenses, and religious, cultural or life-cycle events (NAFIS, 2017; NSSO, 2013a).<sup>13</sup> Loans for different purposes tend to be from different sources — loans for production are more likely to be from institutional sources, while loans for consumption are more likely to be from non-institutional sources (NSSO, 2013a). More specifically, pawnbrokers might help smooth income, self-help groups and banks might provide loans allowing economic investments, local moneylenders might provide large loans for life-cycle events, and ‘mobile lenders’ might help with emergency loans (Guérin et al., 2012).<sup>14,15</sup>

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obtained by the news website, *The Wire*. “Agricultural Loans Worth Rs 59,000 Crore Went to 615 Accounts in One Year,” by Dheeraj Mishra. Accessed on 11/12/2019 at: <https://thewire.in/agriculture/modi-govt-gave-agricultural-loans-worth-rs-59000-crore-to-615-accounts-in-one-year>

<sup>11</sup>Microfinance institutions often operate as RBI-regulated Non-Banking Financial Institutions (NBFCs) (RBI, 2018) and lend either to individual clients, or adopt the self-help group structure. Self-help groups (SHGs) themselves are groups of 10-15 individuals (usually women) who commit to weekly savings, and have access to loans through the group (Hoffmann et al., 2021).

<sup>12</sup>This had gone up to about 20% of loans taken and 10% of amount borrowed by 2017 (NAFIS, 2017) which is after the period considered in the main analyses in this paper.

<sup>13</sup>This is 70% by number of loans and 68% by amount borrowed in 2012-13 (NSSO, 2013b). In addition, this is different from findings in earlier studies such as Timberg and Aiyar (1984), Banerjee (2003) and in NSSO data for the year 1991 — all of which indicate that production is main reason households borrow.

<sup>14</sup>Guérin et al. (2012) observe this in Tamil Nadu, but this is also borne out in qualitative work in Bihar.

<sup>15</sup>The difference between ‘mobile lenders’ and other moneylenders appears to be that the latter are well-known, established or powerful people in the village and failing to repay such loans leads to a larger loss of status than other types of lenders.

### 3 A Description of the Moneylender Market

In this section, I consider informal moneylenders who lend locally at high interest rates, and describe how they operate using data from two sources — (1) a sample of 925 private moneylenders across India from two of the National Sample Survey’s Informal Enterprise rounds (2010-11, 2015-16); and (2) a primary phone survey of 140 moneylenders lending across thirty villages in Telangana (2019). Telangana has the highest incidence of indebtedness across all Indian states (NAFIS, 2017), and represents a context where rural households borrow extensively.

Multiple moneylenders operate in each of the thirty villages surveyed in Telangana, with residents on average borrowing from eight different lenders inside and two lenders outside the village. Each moneylender lends to their usual clientele of 12 to 14 borrowers; and half of lenders survey accept new clients only when someone they know vouches for the potential client, an additional third of lenders take on new clients when they can verify their backgrounds, and 5% of lenders do not intend to lend to new clients at all. This network-based screening makes one lender an imperfect substitute for another (Hoff and Stiglitz, 1998); and also indicates that these markets are segmented across the same caste and class lines that individuals’ networks are (Mookherjee and Motta, 2016; Khanna and Majumdar, 2020). Forty-one percent of lenders had started their lending in the preceding five years, suggesting that relatively free entry is possible. So, similar to prior literature (Aleem, 1990; Hoff and Stiglitz, 1990, 1998), this market can be described as monopolistically competitive.

Informal moneylenders charge high interest rates (NSSO, 2013b; ICRISAT, 2014; TNSMS, 2009; RBI, 2012; Hoffmann et al., 2021) — annualized rates in Telangana were between 12 and 120 percent in 2019 (Figure 3).<sup>16</sup> Lenders report increasing interest rates when demand increases, when business costs increase or when other lenders increase their rates (Figure 5); and might decrease interest rates if demand decreases substantially or if there is an increase in the number of competing lenders. Moneylenders are able to price-discriminate by quantity, charging lower interest rates for larger loans (also observed in Banerjee, 2003; Dasgupta et al., 1989); and borrower type (based on their relationship with the borrower, borrower’s occupation, or wealth). Lenders also offer some flexibility, adjusting repayment terms when necessary (also in Guérin et al., 2012). This often takes the form of higher interest rates when loans exceed their normal duration, and indicates that lenders effectively offer state-contingent contracts. Default is dissuaded through social or physical collateral. For instance, 58% of lenders surveyed in Telangana either required land or property documents, gold or other assets, promissory notes or a co-signer. In cases where lenders fear default, apart from additional interest or taking possession of collateral, lenders also report resorting to coercion

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<sup>16</sup>While the NSS firms survey did not collect data on interest rates charged, it enables backing out an implied rate based on interest payments received and total amount advanced — which indicates a median of 36% per year, but a much higher mean of 78% a year (Table ??), possibly due to instances of delayed payments or penalties.



or social pressure through the *Panchayat* or co-signer.<sup>17</sup>

Moneylenders rely on profits from their business, their own wealth or savings, as well as loans from both institutional and non-institutional sources for lending capital (Figure 6). To estimate margins that moneylenders earn, I combine data on interest receipts, total loan advances, cost of own and employee time, cost of capital and other explicit costs from the NSS sample with an estimate of an upper bound on default rates from the Telangana survey. This exercise suggests that the median moneylender earns margins of between 16% and 58% over their marginal cost.<sup>18</sup> Despite high margins on average, a large share of moneylenders are also estimated to earn interest or prices below their average costs (Figure 9). This might arise if lenders face short-term shocks that reduce demand; are close to exiting the market; or due to capacity constraints arising from shortfalls in lending capital or another input. Relating to the latter, I find that 35% of moneylenders surveyed in Telangana report that they borrowed from banks when faced with shortfalls in lending capital, while over 50% report that they would lend more if they were able to borrow from banks more easily (Figure 8). This motivates the analysis in the rest of the paper, where I evaluate whether loans from banks help moneylenders ease lending capital constraints.

## 4 Theoretical Framework

Motivated by evidence in section 3, I outline a model of a rural economy with borrowers and informal moneylenders, drawing on the theoretical literature on informal lending (for e.g., Karaivanov and Kessler, 2018; Hoff and Stiglitz, 1998) and earlier work relating to household consumption and loan decisions (for e.g. Ligon and Worrall, 2020; Ngo, 2018; Hanemann, 1984). I assume that moneylenders and banks interact vertically, such that moneylenders may borrow part of their lending capital from banks; and that borrowers may themselves borrow from informal lenders or banks. I then consider comparative statics with respect to exogenous income shocks.

### 4.1 Moneylenders' Credit Supply

I consider informal moneylenders who supply interest-bearing informal credit in a rural economy. Motivated by Aleem (1990), Hoff and Stiglitz (1998), and evidence from the Telangana Survey (2020), I assume that the informal moneylending market is monopolistically competitive. I abstract away from the possibility that lenders offer a menu of prices, and assume that each lender offers loans at a single interest rate which could be thought of as the average rate.

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<sup>17</sup>A few lenders report seizing durables from borrowers' homes, and one lender reported potentially sending goons after the borrower.

<sup>18</sup>This is comparable with estimates for traders in developing country contexts. Bergquist and Dinerstein (2019) observe markups of 40% among agricultural traders in Kenya, while Mitra et al. (2018) find 64% - 83% margins over farm-gate prices for agricultural middlemen in Eastern India.

## Set-up

Moneylenders are endowed with liquid capital,  $K$ , that incurs opportunity cost,  $\rho$ , per unit.<sup>19</sup> They may also borrow,  $G \leq \bar{G}$ , from banks at an exogenous interest rate,  $r_B$ , to supplement their stock of lending capital, where  $\bar{G}$  represents the local supply of bank credit in a given year. There are  $N_L$  such lenders in a monopolistically competitive market, with each earning zero profit in the long-run equilibrium. I consider the symmetric case with identical lenders, where each lender chooses the moneylending market interest rate,  $r_{ML}$ , that maximizes their profit. Each lender lends  $l = \frac{L}{N_L}$ , where  $L$  is total demand for moneylender credit at  $r_{ML}$ . A moneylender's profit is thus:

$$\Pi = r_{ML} \frac{L}{N_L} - r_B G - \rho K \quad (1)$$

The zero-profit condition implies,  $r_{ML} \frac{L}{N_L} = B(\frac{L}{N_L})$  in the long run, where  $B(\frac{L}{N_L})$  is the moneylender's outside option.

**Proposition 1.** *In the symmetric equilibrium, where lenders borrow from banks, each lender chooses an interest rate,  $r_{ML}^*$ , that satisfies  $L^* = (r'_B - r_{ML}^*) \frac{\partial L}{\partial r_{ML}}$ .*<sup>20</sup>

*Proof.* See Appendix. □

## 4.2 Household Demand for Moneylender Credit

### Set-up

I consider a continuum of borrowing households, indexed by an exogenous endowment,  $\theta$ . This endowment could be thought of as a household's landholdings or wealth, and is distributed according to the function,  $F(\cdot)$  over the interval  $[\theta_L, \theta_H]$ . Households make decisions pertaining to a two-season horizon, where each household derives a per-season utility,  $u(\cdot)$  (with  $u'(\cdot) > 0$ , and  $u''(\cdot) < 0$ ) from the consumption of a numeraire good,  $c_t$ .<sup>21</sup> A household may also choose to purchase a durable good or asset,  $D$ , at price,  $p > 1$  in season 1, and in doing so, benefits from the services,  $d$ , provided by  $D$  over both seasons.<sup>22</sup> Household

<sup>19</sup>I assume that  $K(R_1)$  is increasing in  $R_1$ , an exogenous income parameter. However, in this section, I assume that moneylenders lend more than  $K$  and so I consider a case where the marginal rupee that a moneylender lends is from a bank. So, the relationship between  $K$  and  $R_1$  does not appear in the comparative statics in the present case.

<sup>20</sup> $r'_B$  is the effective bank interest rate that moneylenders face including the shadow price when the bank supply constraint binds. So,  $r'_B = r_B + \lambda$

<sup>21</sup>I assume that the price remains unchanged across the two-seasons.

<sup>22</sup>This durable component could also be a production asset, in which case,  $d$  is interpreted as the additional income generated by the asset.

income depends on an exogenous season-specific productivity parameter,  $R_t$ .<sup>23</sup> In season 1, a household earns,  $R_1\theta$ , and expects to earn,  $\mathbb{E}[R_2]\theta$  in season 2.

**Assumption 1.** *Households with endowments greater than a threshold,  $\bar{\theta}(\bar{G})$  borrow from institutional sources, and households with endowments below  $\underline{\theta}$  borrow from interest-free non-institutional sources (friends and relatives).*

**Assumption 2.** *An exogenous decrease in bank credit decreases the number of borrowers that can borrow from banks, i.e.,  $\frac{d\bar{\theta}}{d\bar{G}} < 0$ .*

For a household that borrows from a moneylender, its utility across the two seasons is:

$$U_{ML} = u(c_1) + d\mathbb{1}\{D = 1\} + \beta\mathbb{E}\left[u(c_2) + d\mathbb{1}\{D = 1\}\right]$$

In addition, moneylenders report low default rates, and borrowers report that the penalties for default are high enough to prevent default (Telangana Survey, 2020), and so I explicitly assume this.

**Assumption 3.** *The cost of defaulting on moneylender loans is high enough to prevent default for all loan sizes, so  $\forall \theta$ ,  $U_{ML}(\text{repay}) > U_{ML}(\text{default})$ .*

Households decide whether to purchase durables or not, and accordingly choose a loan size. This allows me to define  $\hat{\theta}$  as the endowment at which a borrower in the moneylender market is indifferent between purchasing durables and not purchasing durables. All households with  $\theta > \hat{\theta}$  choose to borrow and purchase durables. As a result, when  $\underline{\theta} \leq \theta \leq \hat{\theta}$ , households choose to borrow,  $b_{ML}^*$ ; and when  $\hat{\theta} < \theta \leq \bar{\theta}$ , households choose to borrow,  $b_{ML,d}^*$ .

**Proposition 2.** *In equilibrium, households choose their borrowing,  $b_{ML}^*$  or  $b_{ML,d}^*$ , and the total household demand for moneylender credit is given by:  $L^* = \int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\hat{\theta}} b_{ML}^* f(\theta) d\theta + \int_{\hat{\theta}}^{\bar{\theta}} b_{ML,d}^* f(\theta) d\theta$*

*Proof.* See Appendix. □

The market equilibrium interest rate is the rate at which quantity demanded ( $\int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\hat{\theta}} b_{ML}^* f(\theta) d\theta + \int_{\hat{\theta}}^{\bar{\theta}} b_{ML,d}^* f(\theta) d\theta$ ) equals quantity supplied ( $(r'_B - r_{ML}^*) \frac{\partial L}{\partial r_{ML}}$ ), and so:

$$\int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\hat{\theta}} b_{ML}^* f(\theta) d\theta + \int_{\hat{\theta}}^{\bar{\theta}} b_{ML,d}^* f(\theta) d\theta = (r'_B - r_{ML}^*) \frac{\partial}{\partial r_{ML}} \left[ \int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\hat{\theta}} b_{ML}^* f(\theta) d\theta + \int_{\hat{\theta}}^{\bar{\theta}} b_{ML,d}^* f(\theta) d\theta \right] \quad (2)$$

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<sup>23</sup>  $R_1$  could be thought of as the monsoon realization in a given year, which impacts both agricultural and non-agricultural incomes alike (Table ??).  $R_2$  is the income shock in the non-monsoon season.

### 4.3 Implications of the Model

In the rural Indian context, rainfall during the monsoon increases local incomes (Table ??), and an increase in monsoon rainfall could be thought of as an increase in the season-1 exogenous income parameter,  $R_1$ . I relate the market equilibrium moneylender interest rate and equilibrium quantity borrowed to changes in  $R_1$ . Here,  $L^* = \int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\hat{\theta}} b_{ML}^* f(\theta) d\theta + \int_{\hat{\theta}}^{\bar{\theta}} b_{ML,d}^* f(\theta) d\theta$ .

**Proposition 3.** *An exogenous increase in the productivity parameter,  $R_1$ , increases the equilibrium informal interest rate,  $r_{ML}^*$ , i.e.,  $\frac{dr_{ML}^*}{dR_1} > 0$ ; and increases the equilibrium amount borrowed from informal moneylenders,  $L^*$ , i.e.,  $\frac{dL^*}{dR_1} > 0$  when  $\Phi_1 > \Phi_2$ .*

*Proof.* See Appendix. □

where,  $\Phi_1 = |[b_{ML}^*(\hat{\theta}) - b_{ML,d}^*(\hat{\theta})]f(\hat{\theta})\frac{\partial \hat{\theta}}{\partial R_1} - b_{ML}^*(\underline{\theta})f(\underline{\theta})\frac{\partial \underline{\theta}}{\partial R_1}|$  and  $\Phi_2 = |\int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\hat{\theta}} \frac{\partial b_{ML}^*}{\partial R_1} f(\theta) d\theta + \int_{\hat{\theta}}^{\bar{\theta}} \frac{\partial b_{ML,d}^*}{\partial R_1} f(\theta) d\theta|$ , and both are further described in the appendix.

The intuition behind this proposition is that an increase in  $R_1$  increases the number of households that choose to borrow and purchase durables, and when this is sufficiently large, borrower demand increases. Since the marginal rupee lent by the moneylender is borrowed from a bank,  $R_1$  does not impact the marginal cost of capital. As a result, equilibrium lending and interest rates increase.

**Proposition 4.** *When the bank credit supply constraint does not bind, an exogenous increase in the productivity parameter,  $R_1$ , increases the equilibrium amount moneylenders borrow from banks,  $G^*$  if  $\frac{dL}{dR_1} > \frac{dK}{dR_1}$ , and weakly decreases it otherwise.*

*Proof.* See Appendix. □

Following an income shock, a moneylender increases borrowing from banks only if the increase in a moneylender's own capital exceeds the increase in equilibrium lending, the lender decreases bank borrowing if the increase in a moneylender's own capital is lower than the increase in equilibrium lending, and bank borrowing stays the same if both change by an equal amount.

**Proposition 5.** *An exogenous increase in the productivity parameter,  $R_1$ , has a smaller impact on the equilibrium amount borrowed when the bank supply constraint binds than otherwise.*

*Proof.* See Appendix. □

A binding bank credit supply constraint represents a situation where a moneylender cannot supplement their lending capital by borrowing from banks anymore. As a result, when household demand for moneylender loans increases, moneylenders are unable to meet the demand because they are effectively unable to reach their unconstrained profit maximizing levels of lending.

## 5 Data and Empirical Strategy

### 5.1 Data and Descriptive Statistics

Data on household borrowing, loan terms, and investment/asset expenditures are primarily constructed from the rural sample of the Debt and Investment surveys conducted by India’s National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO). The resulting dataset comes from four survey rounds (2001-02, 2002-03, 2011-12, 2012-13), and is representative of India’s over 600 districts.<sup>24</sup> The survey data records all outstanding loans a household has, as well as all loan transactions over a shorter recall period. Expenditure data for a six month period is also based on recall. I use this survey structure to construct both a household-level dataset for outstanding loans and expenditures, and a household $\times$ month-level dataset for all loan transactions. Tables ?? and ?? show a number of household and loan characteristics from the NSS sample. A second source of data on household borrowing is the ICRISAT Village Dynamics survey, with data from 866 households in 18 villages in 9 districts in the states of Andhra Pradesh,<sup>25</sup> Maharashtra, Karnataka, Gujarat, and Madhya Pradesh.<sup>26</sup> Each household is surveyed every month between 2010 and 2014,<sup>27</sup> and the survey records monthly loan transactions, monthly consumption expenditures and monthly purchases of durables and capital assets.

Data on moneylenders primarily comes from two rounds of the Unincorporated Non-Agricultural Enterprises surveys (or Informal Firms surveys) conducted by the NSSO (2010-11 and 2015-16). The surveys identify enterprises by their five-digit industrial codes, and include special codes specifically for private moneylenders. Across the rounds, a total of 925 moneylenders are surveyed, across 143 districts in 22 states. I pool the rural and urban samples in this dataset since rural households may borrow from nearby urban moneylenders, as indicated in [Telangana Survey \(2020\)](#). Data from this dataset allows identifying moneylenders’ own borrowing from banks and other sources. In addition, surveys in the 2015-16 survey round also specifically collected data on total loans advanced to households and non-households, as

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<sup>24</sup>The survey covers 634 districts in the 2012-13 round.

<sup>25</sup>The state is now split into Andhra Pradesh and Telangana.

<sup>26</sup>ICRISAT is an acronym for International Crops Research Institute for the Semi-Arid Tropics. In addition, one issue to note is that some of the 866 households from 2010 split over the rounds, and there are 870 unique households in 2014.

<sup>27</sup>Data from the year 2009 is excluded since transactions are not recorded by month, but in arbitrary chunks through the survey year – making it impossible to assign a transaction to a month or season.

well as interest payments received by the moneylenders. Table ?? describes characteristics of moneylenders in the NSS sample.

Finally, the analyses that follow also make use of data on rainfall, and bank lending at the district level in India. Rainfall data is from the University of Delaware Global Precipitation Archive’s Terrestrial Precipitation: 1900-2017 Gridded Monthly Time Series (version 5.01), and consists of monthly observations of rainfall from rain-gauge measurements interpolated to a  $0.5^\circ$  by  $0.5^\circ$  latitude-longitude grid (Willmott and Matsuura, 2018). Data on bank lending comes from the Reserve Bank of India’s Basic Statistical Returns for the years 1998 – 2016.<sup>28</sup>

## 5.2 The Effect of Rainfall on Rural Credit Market Outcomes

### 5.2.1 Rainfall Shocks and Rural Household Credit Demand

The empirical strategy in this paper relies on plausibly exogenous variation in rural households’ demand for credit. I argue that variation in realized monsoon rainfall constitutes such a shock. Using rainfall data from Willmott and Matsuura (2018), I define a rainfall shock as the deviation of a district’s total monsoon precipitation in a year from its historical mean, normalized by its standard deviation (Emerick, 2018). The rainfall for a given district is the rainfall in the grid cell nearest to the district’s centroid; and the historical mean and standard deviation for each grid-cell (and district) are computed from the 50-year distribution (1967-2017).

Monsoon rainfall in India extends from June to September. This coincides with the rain-fed, *khari*, agricultural season whose harvest occurs in October and November, following which incomes are realized. A good monsoon increases both agricultural incomes and, through a multiplier effect, non-agricultural incomes in a district (see, for e.g., Paxson, 1992; Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1993; Townsend, 1995; Jayachandran, 2006; Kaur, 2019; Santangelo, 2019; Emerick, 2018). I assume that rainfall shocks are transitory and serially uncorrelated, and demonstrate that they constitute shocks to income in Table ??.

Intuitively, one might expect that household demand for credit, particularly, informal credit from moneylenders, goes up following a drought. As seen in figure 9, while informal moneylender borrowing does see a modest increase in a drought year, informal borrowing sees a substantially larger increase following a positive rainfall shock.<sup>29</sup> This also reflects the predictions in section 4, which demonstrate that household responses to an income shock can be asymmetric. I focus on household responses to this positive shock in the rest of this paper. In addition, in order to be able to interpret the positive rainfall shock as a positive income

<sup>28</sup>This data is available on the RBI’s online data warehouse which is accessible at <https://dbie.rbi.org.in/> for the years 2014 onwards. Data for the years 1998 to 2014 was obtained through a Right to Information petition to the Reserve Bank of India.

<sup>29</sup>Figure 9 presents a graph of smoothed values from a kernel-weighted local polynomial regression of the incidence of borrowing from moneylenders on the rainfall shock variable.



shock, I focus on household transactions following the monsoon, i.e., from November to the following May, after incomes have been realized (Figure 10). Finally, I also demonstrate that these results are robust to restricting focus to the months of February - May alone, suggesting that they indeed occur after incomes are realized.

### 5.2.2 Empirical Strategy

I estimate the causal effect of a positive rainfall shock on household outcomes using household-level, household $\times$ month-level and loan-level data, using the following main specifications:

$$Y_{hdsmt} = \beta_1 Rain_{dt} + \mathbb{1}\{Drought\}_{dt} + \beta_2 \mathbb{1}\{Drought\}_{dt} \times Rain_{dt} + \mu_m + \psi_d + \tau_{st} + X_{it}\delta + \varepsilon_{hdsmt} \quad (3)$$

$$Y_{hdst} = \beta_1 Rain_{dt} + \mathbb{1}\{Drought\}_{dt} + \beta_2 \mathbb{1}\{Drought\}_{dt} \times Rain_{dt} + \psi_d + \tau_{st} + \lambda_h + \varepsilon_{hdst} \quad (4)$$

$$Y_{lhdmst} = \beta_1 Rain_{dt} + \mathbb{1}\{Drought\}_{dt} + \beta_2 \mathbb{1}\{Drought\}_{dt} \times Rain_{dt} + \mu_m + \psi_d + \tau_{st} + L_{lht}\phi + X_{ht}\delta + \varepsilon_{lhdmst} \quad (5)$$

where  $\mu_m$  denotes month-of-year fixed effects,  $\lambda_h$  denotes household fixed effects,  $\psi_d$  denotes district fixed effects,  $\tau_{st}$  denotes state $\times$ year fixed effects,  $X_{ht}$  denotes a vector of household characteristics, and  $L_{lht}$  is a vector of loan characteristics. In addition, I estimate the causal effect of a positive rainfall shock on moneylender outcomes using moneylender-level data, using the following specification:

$$Y_{ML,dst} = \beta_1 Rain_{dt} + \mathbb{1}\{Drought\}_{dt} + \beta_2 \mathbb{1}\{Drought\}_{dt} \times Rain_{dt} + \psi_d + \tau_{st} + M_{ML,t}\omega + \varepsilon_{ML,dst} \quad (6)$$

where  $\psi_d$  denotes district fixed effects,  $\tau_{st}$  denotes state $\times$ year fixed effects, and  $M_{ML,t}$  denotes a vector of moneylender characteristics.

The co-efficient of interest in each case is  $\beta_1$ , which represents the impact of a one standard deviation increase in rainfall during non-drought years on the relevant outcome.<sup>30</sup> All specifications also control for rainfall shocks in drought years, district fixed effects and state $\times$ year fixed effects. The state $\times$ year fixed effects account for state-level macroeconomic conditions or policies in a given year. Equation (3) represents a specification where the outcome is measured at the household $\times$ month level (e.g., any borrowing in that month), and so also controls for month-of-year fixed effects, and household characteristics. Equation (4) represents a specification where the outcome is measured at the household $\times$ year level, and where possible controls for household fixed effects. Equation (5) represents a specification where the outcome is measured at the loan level, and so also controls for month of year, household characteristics and loan characteristics. Finally, equation (6) represents a specification at

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<sup>30</sup>A drought is defined according to the Indian Meteorological Department's definition; and so takes a value of one when the rainfall deviation is below 60% of the IMD defined long-period mean for a district.

the moneylender $\times$ year level, and controls for moneylender characteristics. Robust standard errors in all specifications are clustered at the district-level.

Since loan-level outcomes, in particular, interest rates, are only observed when a loan has been transaction, the rainfall shock could potentially impact selection into borrowing. This might be of concern in the context of interest rates since ‘riskier’ borrowers might only get loans at higher interest rates. To address this, I also present loan-level results that correct for selection bias using a semi-parametric two-step procedure proposed by [Newey \(2009\)](#), discussed further in the appendix.

## 5.3 Heterogeneous Effects by District Bank Credit Supply

### 5.3.1 Predicting Bank Credit Supply

I employ the strategy in the previous section to establish that a positive rainfall shock increases rural household demand for moneylender loans. In addition, I use it to establish that the increase in household demand in turn affects moneylenders themselves by increasing a lender’s own borrowing from banks. To further my argument, I now turn to establishing how variation in the availability or unavailability of credit from banks in a district affects rural household borrowing outcomes.

The second part of my empirical strategy relies on estimating the differential effect of a rainfall shock on household borrowing when bank credit supply in a district is low versus when it is high. Since lending by banks is an equilibrium quantity determined by both demand and supply in that district in a given year, I first predict banking sector credit supply by employing a strategy that is similar to the construction of a ‘shift-share’ instrument (used in the context of bank credit in [Greenstone et al., 2020](#)).<sup>31</sup> Bank presence varies across districts in India. In addition, banks in India largely rely on their deposits to extend loans, and can move loanable funds across their branches ([Acharya and Kulkarni, 2019](#)). As a result, there is a bank-specific component to its credit-supply overall, and purging bank-sector lending of location- and sector-specific demand drivers, will allow backing out a measure of the sector’s credit supply.

To implement this, I use data from the Reserve Bank of India’s (RBI) Basic Statistical Returns on the total credit banks have extended — the credit limit or sum of all credit lines (as opposed to the credit outstanding). This data is made available by the RBI aggregated to the loan type  $\times$  population-group  $\times$  bank group level for a district in a given year. There are twenty-one loan-type categories and the loan-type indicates the purpose of a loan (such as housing loan, personal loan or loan for purchase of a consumer durable) for individual borrowers, and the industry the borrower belongs to when it is a business loan (for e.g., mining or textiles); the population-group indicates whether the loan is extended in

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<sup>31</sup>[Bartik \(1991\)](#); [Blanchard and Katz \(1992\)](#); [Card \(2001\)](#); [Autor and Hanson \(2013\)](#); [Caldwell and Danieli \(2018\)](#) use such a shift-share or ‘Bartik’ instruments in other contexts.

an urban, rural, semi-urban or metropolitan area; the bank-group is a group of banks and the groups are State Bank of India and its Associates, Nationalized Banks, Private Sector Banks, Regional Rural Banks and Foreign Banks.<sup>32</sup>

I use this data to predict the banking sector credit supply in a district $\times$ year. I first estimate an equation that decomposes the growth in credit extended between consecutive years as follows:

$$\Delta_{t-1}^t \log C_{irjd} = g_i + g_r + g_j + g_d + \epsilon_{irjd}$$

Here, the outcome is the change in credit between years,  $t$  and  $t - 1$  for an industry or sector,  $i$ , in a population sub-group,  $r$ , in a bank-group,  $j$  in district,  $d$ . The predicted bank-group specific change in credit supply,  $\hat{g}_t^j$ , is no longer driven by district-, industry-, or population-group- specific effects. For each pair of consecutive years, the predicted district-level credit supply is then the inner-product of  $\hat{g}_t^j$  and each bank-group's market-share in that district in the initial year,  $s_{t-1}^{jd}$ .

$$\hat{B}_t^d = \sum_j s_{t-1}^{jd} \times \hat{g}_t^j$$

The paper's empirical strategy employs an indicator for whether a district experiences low bank credit supply in a given year, defined as follows:

$$\mathbb{L}_{dt} = \mathbb{1}\{B_{dt} < median\}$$

### 5.3.2 Empirical Strategy

In this section, I focus on the strategy that I employ to estimate the heterogeneous effects of a positive rainfall shock on household outcomes across district $\times$ years with above median predicted bank credit supply and below median predicted bank credit supply. I estimate the following specifications at the household-level, household $\times$ month-level and loan-level.

$$Y_{hdmst} = \delta_1 Rain_{dt} + \delta_2 \mathbb{L}_{dt} + \delta_3 Rain_{dt} \times \mathbb{L}_{dt} + \mu_m + \psi_d + \tau_{st} + X_{ht}\delta + \varepsilon_{hdmst} \quad (7)$$

$$Y_{hdst} = \delta_1 Rain_{dt} + \delta_2 \mathbb{L}_{dt} + \delta_3 Rain_{dt} \times \mathbb{L}_{dt} + \psi_d + \tau_{st} + \lambda_h + \varepsilon_{hdst} \quad (8)$$

$$Y_{lhdmst} = \delta_1 Rain_{dt} + \delta_2 \mathbb{L}_{dt} + \delta_3 Rain_{dt} \times \mathbb{L}_{dt} + \mu_m + \psi_d + \tau_{st} + L_{lht}\phi + X_{ht}\delta + \varepsilon_{lhdmst} \quad (9)$$

where, similar to above,  $\mu_m$  denotes month-of-year fixed effects,  $\lambda_h$  denotes household fixed effects,  $\psi_d$  denotes district fixed effects,  $\tau_{st}$  denotes state $\times$ year fixed effects,  $X_{ht}$  denotes a vector of household characteristics, and  $L_{lht}$  is a vector of loan characteristics.

The coefficients of interest here are  $\delta_1$ , which represents the impact of a positive rainfall shock on households when their district has above median or high bank credit supply; and  $\delta_3$  which represents the differential effect when the district has below median or low bank

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<sup>32</sup>There are a total of 50 banks in India - 19 nationalized banks, 22 private sector banks, 7 foreign banks and the State Bank of India (with five associate banks).

credit supply. All specifications also control for rainfall shocks in drought years (similar to the previous section, but not explicitly denoted in the equations here), district fixed effects and state×year fixed effects. In these, as in previous specifications, I control for state×year fixed effects to account for state-level macroeconomic conditions or policies in a given year. Equation (7) represents a specification where the outcome is measured at the household×month level, and additional controls include month-of-year fixed effects and household characteristics. Equation (8) represents a specification where the outcomes is measured at the household×year level and, where possible, controls for household fixed effects. Finally, equation (9) represents a specification where the outcome is measured at the loan level, and so also controls for month-of-year fixed effects, household characteristics and loan characteristics. As in the previous instance, robust standard errors in all specifications are clustered at the district level.

This empirical strategy exploring heterogeneous treatment effects relies on the assumption that districts with predicted bank credit supply above or below the median do not experience unobserved shocks to outcomes that are systematically above or below median. I probe the validity of this assumption in Table ??, where I compare district characteristics above and below the median of the predicted bank credit supply. Column 4 presents normalized differences in these means (Imbens and Rubin, 2015), which are estimated through linear regressions which control for district and state×year fixed effects and where standard errors are clustered at the district level (similar to the implementation in Hoffmann et al., 2021).<sup>33</sup> Reassuringly, none of the normalized differences are significant, nor do they exceed the 0.25 cut-off, above which linear regression methods are sensitive to specifications (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2009).

In the context of a standard ‘shift-share’ instrument, identification relies on the exogeneity of the pre-period market-shares (Goldsmith-Pinkham et al., 2020), or at the very least, requires that the ‘shift-share’ is uncorrelated with unobserved shocks to the outcomes, conditional on the controls (Baum-Snow and Ferreira, 2015). However, the empirical strategy here is similar to a difference-in-differences design; and focuses on the interaction between an indicator for whether the predicted credit supply or ‘shift-share’ is above or below median, and an exogenous positive rainfall shock. And so, here, any possible correlates of the pre-period market-share are absorbed by the low-supply indicator (Frison and Pocock, 1992), allowing a straight-forward interpretation of the interaction term.

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<sup>33</sup>Normalized differences are a scale-free measure of differences in covariate values defined by Imbens and Rubin (2015) as  $\hat{\Delta}_{HL} = \frac{\bar{x}_L - \bar{x}_H}{\sqrt{(s_L^2 + s_H^2)/2}}$ , where  $\bar{x}_i$  is the sub-sample mean and  $s_i^2$  is the sub-sample standard deviation, for the above median or below median groups.

## 6 Empirical Results and Discussion

### 6.1 The Effect of Rainfall Shocks on Rural Household Borrowing

#### Results and Robustness

In this section, I show that a positive rainfall shock in a non-drought year increases household borrowing from moneylenders, and the interest rates at which loans are transacted. Motivated by the model in section 4 and evidence in section 5, I focus on the impact of *positive* rainfall shocks on rural household borrowing in non-drought years. Tables ?? and ?? indicate that a one standard deviation increase in rainfall in a non-drought year or a 1% increase in a district's per capita GDP (Table ??) results in 1.4 percentage points more households borrowing from moneylenders (column 1, Table ??) — this is a 19% increase in the number of borrowers, and a 4% increase in the amounts borrowed by households over the seven months between two monsoons (columns 2 and 1 in Table ??).<sup>34</sup> However, there are no significant effects on either interest-free loans from friends or relatives (which tend to be smaller in size) or on loans from institutions (which may not readily lend to rural households for non-agricultural purposes). These results are robust to alternative definitions of the rainfall shock (Table A7), and iteratively dropping one state from the sample at a time does not significantly change these results (Figure A1).<sup>35</sup> Evidence from the ICRISAT sample (in Table A1) is similar, with a significant increase in borrowing from moneylenders following the year's monsoon. Reassuringly, a placebo test using the standardized deviation of the non-monsoon rainfall from its historical mean does not yield similar results (row 3, Table A7).<sup>36</sup>

Contemporaneous with this increase in borrowing from moneylenders, is a 3.5 percentage point increase in annualized moneylender interest rates (or an 8% increase over the mean of 41.83% per year) (Table ??). Figure 11 corroborates this, and demonstrates that in each month with higher household borrowing, interest rates tend to be higher. Finally, though there is no significant effect on moneylender interest rates in the ICRISAT sample, the point estimate is positive (column 7, Table A1). One concern while interpreting these results is that since moneylender interest rates are usually higher for more disadvantaged borrowers, this increase could well be driven by a change in the composition of borrowers alone. To address this, column 2 in Table ?? presents Newey (2009) selection corrected results, and reassuringly, the effect is similar. A second concern is that a positive income shock might not

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<sup>34</sup>Column 1 in Table ?? represents a monthly rather than yearly increase

<sup>35</sup>The percentile shock follows the definition in Jayachandran (2006), where the shock takes values -1 when monsoon rainfall is below the 20th percentile of the district's historical rainfall distribution; 1 when rainfall is above the 80th percentile of the district's historical rainfall distribution; and 0 otherwise. The fractional deviation defines the rainfall shock as the fractional difference between the monsoon rainfall in a given year from the district's Long Period Mean (or 50 year mean, as defined by the Indian Meteorological Department (IMD)).

<sup>36</sup>Non-Monsoon rainfall is the standardized deviation of the Oct - May rainfall in a given year from the district's historical mean, and is meant as a placebo test.

only impact household borrowing, but also increase lending capital that moneylenders have access to. In fact, Table A4 indicates that households are less likely to have old outstanding loans from moneylenders following a positive rainfall shock in a non-drought year, which is consistent with increased repayment. However, the increase in both household borrowing *and* in interest rates is consistent with a net increase in demand. Consistent with this, almost 93% of informal moneylenders in the [Telangana Survey \(2020\)](#) report increasing interest rates for all clients when demand goes up (Figure 5).

### Interpretation, Concerns and Alternative Explanations

A look at what households borrow for, in Table ??, suggests that this increase is driven by loans reported as being for consumption (though significant only at the 10% level); while Table ?? indicates that households spend significantly more on land and buildings following a positive rainfall shock. Similarly, results from the ICRISAT sample (Table A2) indicate that households increase consumption expenditures as well as purchases of durable goods following a positive rainfall shock. Further, correlational evidence in Table A3 suggests that the increase in borrowing from moneylenders following a positive rainfall shock is driven by households that also purchase durables in the same period. These results are consistent with predictions from the model in section 4, which demonstrates that an increase in household borrowing following an exogenous increase in incomes might arise due to an increase in borrowing to finance lumpy expenditures, such as purchases of durables and assets, or improvements to land and housing. These findings are also consistent with those in the literature that considers an increase in access to credit rather than an increase in incomes — where households borrow more for spending that has a durable component ([Banerjee et al., 2015](#); [Kaboski and Townsend, 2012](#); [Ruiz, 2013](#)).

A competing explanation might be that the increase in incomes increases the demand for non-tradable goods or services, leading to an increase in demand for credit for operating expenses in non-agricultural businesses.<sup>37</sup> However, Table ?? indicates lower expenditures on non-farm businesses. Yet another explanation might be that the positive rainfall shock increases demand for loans for agricultural expenses in the non-rain-fed *Rabi* season (which extends from October to January). However, the main household results persist when restricting the sample entirely to the lean season (February to May). Overall, given the fungibility of money and credit, this gives us an understanding of the proximate purpose for credit rather than the ultimate driver. In addition, other reasons for borrowing do not change the broader argument advanced in this paper, which primarily concerns the impact of an increase in household borrowing on a moneylender’s business.

Households are also less likely to have outstanding moneylender loans from preceding years (Table A4) following positive rainfall shocks in non-drought years. On the one hand, this suggests that some of the increased income might go towards repaying old loans, which

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<sup>37</sup>This is similar to the aggregate demand channel that the authors propose in [Breza and Kinnan \(2020\)](#).



could contribute to a need to borrow for lumpy expenditures. On the other hand, it is also consistent with a reduction in debt overhang, which might allow households to borrow more.<sup>38</sup> In addition, I find that the increase in borrowing following an increase in incomes is driven by households which lack savings (Table A5). This explains the need for credit, especially if households also want to improve their standards of living (González, 2017) or have growing social aspirations (Guérin et al., 2011). However, it is not clear why households are unable to save for such expenditures. Possible explanations are that this arises from a lack of access to a convenient savings avenue, a lack of a commitment device (such as in Ashraf et al., 2006) or from present-bias (such as in Banerjee and Mullainathan, 2010), but the analyses presented here cannot distinguish between these mechanisms.

## 6.2 The Effect of Rainfall Shocks on the Informal Moneylending Business

### Results and Robustness

In this section, I establish that an increase in rural household demand for moneylender loans leads to an increase in moneylenders' own borrowing from banks. Table ?? indicates that a one standard deviation increase in rainfall in a non-drought year or a 1% increase in a district's per capita GDP (Table ??) results in a 4.4 percentage point or 31% increase in the incidence of moneylenders themselves borrowing from banks (column 1, Table ??). This accompanies the 19% increase in the number of borrowers observed in the household sample. Cross-sectional data on moneylenders' loan advances and interest receipts also indicates that moneylenders report lending 12% more to households who are their clients, and that they charge interest rates that are effectively 19% higher (columns 2 and 3, Table ??). This corroborates findings from the household sample.

Since there is an unanticipated increase in rural household demand for moneylender loans following the positive rainfall shock, this represents a situation where moneylenders are more likely to face lending capital constraints and therefore turning to bank credit to meet demand. Consistent with this, over 35% of moneylenders surveyed in Telangana (Telangana Survey, 2020) report borrowing from banks to meet lending capital shortfalls (Figure 8).<sup>39</sup>

### Interpretation, Concerns and Alternative Explanations

In the preceding section, I point out that increase in incomes due to a positive rainfall shock could also increase moneylenders' capital, particularly since repayment is also seen to increase. If an increase in supply is all that occurs, moneylenders are unlikely to borrow more from banks. So, the results are consistent with a *net* increase in demand over and above

<sup>38</sup>Notably, however, Kanz (2016) finds that a reduction in debt overhang in the formal sector following a government debt relief program in India in 2008 did not lead to more borrowing from banks subsequently. However, in the context of debt relief, borrowers' repayment incentives changes and so the context differs.

<sup>39</sup>In fact, one lender reported that he does so because his clients would not believe that he didn't have the money. In addition, moneylenders

any possibly increases in supply. A separate concern might be that banks are more willing to lend following a positive rainfall shock. Moneylenders surveyed in Telangana ([Telangana Survey, 2020](#)) report borrowing from banks largely through agricultural loans, gold loans, business loans and sometimes personal loans. Table ?? addresses concerns about loans in general, and indicates that rainfall does not impact the total bank credit lent in a district. While this does not address banks targeting lending more specifically to moneylenders in good rainfall years, it is unlikely that this occurs since moneylenders borrow under a variety of schemes.

### 6.3 Heterogeneity in Rural Household Borrowing Responses to Rainfall Shocks

#### Results and Robustness

Having established the nature of the interaction between moneylenders and banks, I now evaluate whether the availability, or lack of availability, of bank credit impacts households indirectly through the informal moneylending market. I use the predicted bank credit supply described in section 5 to designate districts as having low bank credit supply when this measure is below the median. I focus on the interaction between the rainfall shock and this low bank credit supply indicator to analyze differential effects of an exogenous increase in rural household credit demand across districts with high and low bank credit supplies.

Tables ?? and ?? demonstrate that, following an equivalent shock to household credit demand, the increase in household borrowing from moneylenders in a district with low bank credit supply is significantly smaller than the increase in a district with high bank credit supply (columns 1 and 2). So, a one standard deviation increase in rainfall in a non-drought year (or a 1% increase in district per capita incomes) leads to 1 percentage point more households borrowing from moneylenders when districts have low bank credit supply, but almost 3 percentage points more households borrowing from moneylenders when districts have high bank credit supply. So, effectively, 10% higher bank credit supply facilitates 1.8 percentage points or 12% more borrowing in the informal moneylender market during periods of high credit demand. These results persist when iteratively dropping one state from the sample at a time (Figure A2), and when I predict bank credit supply using outstanding credit or the number of loan accounts rather than the credit limit/credit line (Table A8).

#### Interpretation, Concerns and Alternative Explanations

While this does not impact the interpretation of results in the preceding sections, a concern here is that the observed heterogeneity might arise through a demand channel rather than the moneylender supply channel. One possibility is that this occurs because bank and moneylender credit are complements for borrowers, and so lower bank credit leads to lower demand for moneylender credit overall. For this to confound results, the same borrower should be borrowing from both a moneylender and a bank, and be more likely to do so when

bank credit supply is high, and less likely to do so bank credit supply is low. While column 5 in tables ?? and ?? might suggest that this is plausible, a further look at household data indicates that only 4% of households that borrow (and only 0.05% of households overall) borrow both from banks and moneylenders in a given year (including during the agricultural season). Thus, even if present, this effect is unlikely to solely drive these results.<sup>40,41</sup>

A second possibility is that low bank credit supply decreases the demand for informal moneylender loans through a general equilibrium effect since it decreases overall economic activity (see for e.g., Young, 2019; Breza and Kinnan, 2020; Burgess and Pande, 2005). However, columns 3 and 4 in Tables ?? and ?? indicate that — following a positive rainfall shock in non-drought years, households in districts predicted to have low bank credit supply increase their interest-free borrowing from friends or relatives. Table ?? indicates that low bank credit supply districts have significantly higher moneylender interest rates, and while interest rates increase following a positive rainfall shock in high bank supply districts, they do not increase by as much in low bank supply districts. This, together with the substitution to interest-free borrowing, suggests that low bank credit supply makes the marginal cost of borrowing from banks,<sup>42</sup> and hence of moneylender loans higher — with the higher cost likely dissuading borrowing from moneylenders, and making interest-free borrowing preferable.

## 6.4 Welfare Implications

These results thus indicate that as a result of the vertical interaction between moneylenders and banks, bank credit supply also impacts lending in the moneylender market. A 10% higher bank credit supply effectively facilitates 23% more loans in the moneylender market following a one standard deviation increase in rainfall in non-drought years. Households, however, are not entirely without options when bank credit supply is low — they are able to substitute interest-bearing moneylender loans with interest-free loans from friends or relatives. This substitution is not complete, however. Only 40% of the decline in moneylender borrowing is compensated by an increase in interest-free borrowing. So, from a household’s perspective, a 10% higher bank credit supply enables a 14% increase in borrowing in the informal market (both interest-bearing and interest-free) following a positive rainfall shock in non-drought years.

Since the substitution towards interest-free borrowing occurs when moneylender loans are more expensive, this also underscores the fact that interest-free loans also bear an implicit cost (Ligon, 2005; Udry, 1994; Hayashi et al., 1996; Ambrus et al., 2014; Ligon and Schechter,

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<sup>40</sup>Using the same specification as in this section, and regressing an indicator for whether a household has borrowed from both sources indicates that borrowing from both does not increase following a positive rainfall shock, and the interaction with low bank supply is negligible and not significant

<sup>41</sup>Conversely, low bank credit supply might lead to greater borrowing from both sources if households borrowing from banks are now rationed and so supplement the bank loan with a moneylender loan. However, this again is unlikely given the small fraction of households who borrow from both sources.

<sup>42</sup>The supply constraint can be thought of as an increase in the shadow price here.

2012). The increase in interest-free borrowing observed here is unlikely to be driven by a change in interest-free credit supply since borrowers do not increase interest-free borrowing when bank credit supply is high. Using values from Tables ?? and ??, back-of-the-envelope calculations suggest that the marginal borrower who is able to substitute from moneylender loans to interest-free loans when bank credit supply is low implicitly values the cost of ‘interest-free’ credit (in terms of the obligations it comes with) at 49.42% per year. This, however, does not take into consideration the complex social dynamics that render one source of credit preferable to another in different contexts.<sup>43</sup>

## 7 Conclusion

In this paper, I focus on the interaction between banks and moneylenders in rural India and find that it is best characterized as a vertical relationship where moneylenders borrow from banks and on-lend these loans to their clients. As a result, when faced with unanticipated increases in demand for credit, moneylenders rely on bank loans to ease lending capital constraints. This analysis also establishes that increases in bank-credit supply enable additional informal borrowing. However, moneylenders wield considerable market power, as indicated by their 16% - 58% margins over marginal cost in section 3 — suggesting that they accrue most of the surplus generated by the additional loans transacted. Moneylenders are thus able to successfully arbitrage across the formal and informal credit sectors.

In this context, continued household engagement with moneylenders is possibly because moneylenders offer greater flexibility to borrowers than formal institutions do, or because access to formal credit remains a challenge for some. While this does suggest that moneylenders provide a service borrowers value, high mark-ups and coercive enforcement mechanisms (Telangana Survey, 2020) also suggest that there remains the potential to make rural households better off by improving the availability of non-agricultural credit in particular.

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<sup>43</sup>For instance, borrowers value privacy and dignity when conducting financial transactions in any sphere (Mowl, 2017), and this likely factors into their decisions.

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
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
# Figures

Figure 1: Loan Size and Interest Rates by Lender Type




*Data: NSS Debt and Investment Survey, 2013*

Figure 2: Loan Terms by Lender Type




*Data: NSS Debt and Investment Survey, 2013*

Figure 3: Moneylender Interest Rates, 2019



*Data: Moneylender Survey (Telangana), 2020*


Figure 4: Moneylender Interest Rates, 2013 and 2019



*Data: Moneylender Survey (Telangana), 2020*




Figure 5: Reasons for which Moneylenders increase Interest Rates




*Data: Moneylender Survey (Telangana), 2020*

Figure 6: Moneylenders' Source of Lending Capital




*Data: Moneylender Survey (Telangana), 2020*

Figure 7: Moneylender Margins over Average Costs




*Data: NSS Informal Firms Survey, 2015-16*

Figure 8: Moneylenders' Bank Borrowing



*Data: Moneylender Survey (Telangana), 2020*

Figure 9: Asymmetric Effect of Rainfall Shocks on Rural Household Borrowing



*Data: NSS Debt and Investment Survey, 2001-02, 2002-03, 2011-12, 2012-13*

Figure 10: Monsoon Timing






Figure 11: Impact of Rainfall Shocks on Household Borrowing and Interest Rates (Month-wise)



*Data: NSS Debt and Investment Survey, 2001-02, 2002-03, 2011-12, 2012-13*


## Additional Figures

Figure A1: Rural Household Borrowing from Moneylenders: Iteratively Excluding States



Data: NSS Debt and Investment Survey, 2001-02, 2002-03, 2011-12, 2012-13

Figure A2: Rural Household Borrowing from Moneylenders across High and Low Formal Credit Supply: Iteratively Excluding States



Data: NSS Debt and Investment Survey, 2001-02, 2002-03, 2011-12, 2012-13

## Additional Tables

Table A1: Positive Rainfall Shocks and Household Borrowing (ICRISAT Sample)

	Moneylenders		Friends & Relatives		Institutions		Moneylender Interest
	Asinh real ₹		Asinh real ₹		Asinh real ₹		% per year
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Rainfall Shock	0.024** (0.009)	0.278*** (0.080)	0.049 (0.076)	0.553 (0.676)	0.099*** (0.010)	1.055*** (0.093)	1.563 (2.388)
Obs	4317	4317	4317	4317	4317	4317	1125
Clusters	9	9	9	9	9	9	9
Fixed Effects	District, State $\times$ Year						
Mean	0.24	₹5729.59	0.18	₹2103.75	0.09	₹6736.23	0.29

**Data:** ICRISAT Village Dynamics Studies Dataset. Monetary values are in 2010 ₹.

**Notes:** The rainfall shock is the standardized deviation of a district's June-September rainfall from its historical mean. Unit of observation is a household in columns (1) - (6) while it is a loan in column (7). Regressions control for caste, landholdings and whether the household split from a parent household during the study period. Outcomes in columns (1), (3) and (5) are dummies, which take a value of 1 when the household has borrowed from the source between Nov - May in the year. The outcome in columns (2), (4) and (6) is the inverse hyperbolic sine of the amount a household borrowed between Nov - May in the year. The outcome in column (7) is the annualized interest rate on loans from moneylenders. Standard errors are clustered at the district level.

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table A2: Effect of Positive Rainfall Shocks on Household Consumption and Purchases of Durables (ICRISAT Sample)

	Consumption Expenditure <small>(per capita)</small>			Any Durables	Durables
	Total	Food	Non-food	Purchased?	Expenditure
	(log real ₹)	(log real ₹)	(log real ₹)		(asinh real ₹)
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Rainfall Shock	0.055* (0.027)	0.024** (0.009)	0.088 (0.049)	0.136** (0.059)	1.117** (0.436)
Obs	4195	4195	4195	4317	4317
Clusters	9	9	9	9	9
Fixed Effects	District, State $\times$ Year				
Mean	₹1533.96	₹688.08	₹845.88	0.37	₹14100.82

**Data:** ICRISAT Village Dynamics Studies Dataset. Monetary values are in 2010 ₹.

**Notes:** The rainfall shock is the standardized deviation of a district's June-September rainfall from its historical mean. Unit of observation is a household. Regressions control for caste, landholdings and whether the household split from a parent household during the study period. The outcome in columns (1), (2), and (3) is the natural logarithm of the real value of consumption between Nov - May. The outcome in column (4) is a dummy which takes a value of 1 if the household has purchased any durables between Nov - May. The outcome in column (5) is the inverse hyperbolic sine of the real expenditure on durable goods between Nov - May. Standard errors are clustered at the district level.

\*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$



Table A3: Effect of Positive Rainfall Shocks on Household Borrowing across Households with/without Purchases of Durables (ICRISAT Sample)

	Moneylenders	Friends & Relatives	Institutions
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Rainfall Shock	0.017 (0.046)	0.06 (0.063)	0.109*** (0.027)
Any Durables	0.036* (0.015)	0.060** (0.025)	0.019 (0.015)
Rainfall Shock × Any Durables	0.023* (0.012)	0.016 (0.016)	-0.000 (0.007)
Obs	4317	4317	4317
Clusters	9	9	9
Fixed Effects	HH, District, State × Year		
Mean	0.20	0.15	0.06
(Omitted Group)			

**Data:** ICRISAT Village Dynamics Studies Dataset.

**Notes:** The rainfall shock is the standardized deviation of a district's June-September rainfall from its historical mean. Unit of observation is a household. Regressions control for caste, landholdings and whether the household split from a parent household during the study period. The outcome is a dummy variable which takes a value of one when a household has borrowed. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table A4: Rainfall and Incidence of Outstanding Loans from Prior Years

	Moneylenders	Friends & Relatives	Institutional
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Rainfall Shock	-0.003*** (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.003*** (0.001)
Obs	302512	302512	302512
Clusters	583	583	583
Fixed Effects	District, State $\times$ Year		
Mean	0.05	0.03	0.11

**Data:** NSS Debt and Investment Survey (2011-12, 2012-13)

**Notes:** Unit of observation is a household. Outcome is an indicator that takes a value of 1 when the household has outstanding loan borrowed prior to the reference year. The rainfall shock is the standardized deviation of a district's June-September rainfall from its historical mean. Outcome is the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of real amount borrowed by the household in the reference period (in the months specified). Standard errors are clustered at the district level. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table A5: Effect of Savings on Rural Household Borrowing Responses to Rainfall Shocks

	Moneylender		Friends & Relatives		Institutional	
	Sample 1	Sample 2	Sample 1	Sample 2	Sample 1	Sample 2
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Rainfall Shock	0.021*** (0.007)	0.060*** (0.021)	0.003 (0.005)	0.026 (0.016)	0.006 (0.009)	0.033 (0.023)
Savings	-0.003 (0.003)		-0.004 (0.003)		0.086*** (0.005)	
Rainfall Shock × Savings	-0.005 (0.003)	-0.035** (0.017)	-0.006** (0.003)	-0.020 (0.014)	0.001 (0.005)	-0.099*** (0.021)
Obs	836808	302512	836808	302512	836808	302512
Clusters	578	583	578	583	578	583
Month FE	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no
HH FE.	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes
Fixed Effects	District, State × Year					
Mean	₹829.10	₹1030.74	₹350.40	₹465.37	₹1834.46	₹2616.18

**Data:** NSS Debt and Investment Survey (2001-02, 2002-03, 2011-12 and 2012-13)

**Notes:** The rainfall shock is the standardized deviation of a district's June-September rainfall from its historical mean. 'Savings' is an indicator that takes a value of 1 when the household's savings in the first visit is above the median value for that year. This data was not collected in the second visit. So, the household fixed effects absorb the 'savings' dummy.

Sample 1 consists of all loans taken by a household in the survey year between October and May; the unit of observation is a household × month. Sample 2 consists of all loans taken by a household in the reference year and that are still outstanding at the end of the reference year; the unit of observation is a household. The outcome is the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of the real amount borrowed. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table A6: Asymmetric Effects of Rainfall Shocks on Rural Household Borrowing

	Moneylender		Friends & Relatives		Institutional	
	Sample 1	Sample 2	Sample 1	Sample 2	Sample 1	Sample 2
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Rainfall Shock	0.017** (0.007)	0.036** (0.018)	-0.000 (0.005)	0.021 (0.016)	0.012 (0.009)	-0.037 (0.027)
Drought	-0.055** (0.023)	-0.042 (0.065)	-0.016 (0.011)	-0.015 (0.045)	0.031 (0.025)	-0.078 (0.069)
Rainfall Shock × Drought	-0.033 (0.020)	-0.011 (0.066)	-0.011 (0.011)	-0.028 (0.039)	0.060*** (0.023)	0.013 (0.063)
Obs	836808	302512	836808	302512	836808	302512
Clusters	578	583	578	583	578	583
Month FE	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no
HH FE.	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes
Fixed Effects	District, State × Year					
Mean	₹829.10	₹1030.74	₹350.40	₹465.37	₹1834.46	₹2616.18

**Data:** NSS Debt and Investment Survey (2001-02, 2002-03, 2011-12 and 2012-13)

**Notes:** The rainfall shock is the standardized deviation of a district's June-September rainfall from its historical mean. 'Drought' is an indicator that takes a value of 1 when monsoon rainfall is 20 or more below the 50-year mean for a district. The Indian Meteorological Department uses this definition to designate a drought.

Sample 1 consists of all loans taken by a household in the survey year between October and May; the unit of observation is a household × month. Sample 2 consists of all loans taken by a household in the reference year and that are still outstanding at the end of the reference year; the unit of observation is a household. The outcome is the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of the real amount borrowed. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table A7: Alternate Definitions of Rainfall Shocks: Effect on Rural Household Borrowing

	Moneylender		Friends & Relatives		Institutional	
	Sample 1	Sample 2	Sample 1	Sample 2	Sample 1	Sample 2
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Percentile Shock	0.021*** (0.007)	0.052** (0.021)	0.002 (0.006)	0.019 (0.018)	0.009 (0.009)	0.007 (0.024)
Fractional Deviation	0.072** (0.030)	0.085* (0.051)	0.007 (0.018)	0.051 (0.041)	0.063 (0.039)	0.036 (0.066)
Non-Monsoon Rainfall	-0.005 (0.006)	0.033 (0.023)	-0.006 (0.004)	-0.030* (0.016)	-0.025*** (0.008)	0.013 (0.026)
Obs	836808	302512	836808	302512	836808	302512
Clusters	578	583	578	583	578	583
Month FE	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no
HH FE.	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes
Fixed Effects	District, State $\times$ Year					
Mean	₹829.10	₹1030.74	₹350.40	₹465.37	₹1834.46	₹2616.18

**Data:** NSS Debt and Investment Survey (2001-02, 2002-03, 2011-12 and 2012-13)

**Notes:** Following [Jayachandran \(2006\)](#), percentile shock takes values -1 when monsoon rainfall is below the 20th percentile of the district's historical rainfall distribution; 1 when rainfall is above the 80th percentile of the district's historical rainfall distribution; and 0 otherwise. Fractional deviation defines the rainfall shock as a the fractional difference between the monsoon rainfall in a given year from the district's Long Period Mean (or 50 year mean, as defined by the Indian Meteorological Department (IMD)). Non-Monsoon rainfall is the standardized deviation of the Nov - May rainfall in a given year from the district's historical mean, and is meant as a placebo test.

Sample 1 consists of all loans taken by a household in the survey year between October and May; the unit of observation is a household  $\times$  month. Sample 2 consists of all loans taken by a household in the reference year and that are still outstanding at the end of the reference year; the unit of observation is a household. The outcome is the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of the real amount borrowed. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

Table A8: Alternate Definitions of Formal Credit Supply Shocks:  
Effect of Formal Credit Supply on Household Borrowing Response to Rainfall Shocks

	Moneylender		Friends & Relatives		Institutional	
	Sample 1	Sample 2	Sample 1	Sample 2	Sample 1	Sample 2
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<b>Alternate Definition 1: ‘Shift-Share’ using Outstanding Credit</b>						
Rainfall Shock	0.027*** (0.009)	0.074*** (0.023)	-0.005 (0.007)	-0.002 (0.017)	0.021* (0.012)	0.013 (0.029)
Low Supply 2	0.004 (0.009)	-0.010 (0.047)	0.001 (0.008)	-0.042 (0.033)	-0.037*** (0.011)	-0.074 (0.055)
Rainfall Shock × Low Supply 2	-0.016* (0.009)	-0.070** (0.029)	0.010 (0.008)	0.043* (0.025)	-0.022* (0.011)	-0.054 (0.040)
Obs	836808	302236	836808	302236	836808	302236
Clusters	578	578	578	578	578	578
Month FE	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no
HH FE.	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes
Fixed Effects	District, State × Year					
Mean	₹829.10	₹1030.74	₹350.40	₹465.37	₹1834.46	₹2616.18
<b>Alternate Definition 2: ‘Shift-Share’ using Number of Accounts</b>						
Rainfall Shock	0.024** (0.010)	0.071*** (0.023)	-0.005 (0.007)	-0.004 (0.016)	0.024* (0.012)	-0.006 (0.028)
Low Supply 3	-0.001 (0.010)	0.014 (0.041)	0.006 (0.008)	-0.031 (0.031)	-0.015 (0.012)	-0.037 (0.046)
Rainfall Shock × Low Supply 3	-0.010 (0.009)	-0.061** (0.026)	0.009 (0.008)	0.044** (0.021)	-0.029*** (0.011)	-0.013 (0.038)
Obs	836808	302236	836808	302236	836808	302236
Clusters	578	578	578	578	578	578
Month FE	yes	no	yes	no	yes	no
HH FE.	no	yes	no	yes	no	yes
Fixed Effects	District, State × Year					
Mean	₹829.10	₹1030.74	₹350.40	₹465.37	₹1834.46	₹2616.18

**Data:** NSS Debt and Investment Survey (2001-02, 2002-03, 2011-12 and 2012-13)

**Notes:** The rainfall shock is the standardized deviation of a district’s June-September rainfall from its historical mean. ‘Drought’ is an indicator that takes a value of 1 when monsoon rainfall is 20 or more below the 50-year mean for a district. The Indian Meteorological Department uses this definition to designate a drought.

Sample 1 consists of all loans taken by a household in the survey year between October and May; the unit of observation is a household × month. Sample 2 consists of all loans taken by a household in the reference year and that are still outstanding at the end of the reference year; the unit of observation is a household. The outcome is the inverse hyperbolic sine transformation of the real amount borrowed. Standard errors are clustered at the district level. \*  $p < 0.10$ , \*\*  $p < 0.05$ , \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$

# Mathematical Appendix

## Proof of Proposition 1:

In period 1, a moneylender solves:

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{r_{ML}, G} \quad & \Pi = r_{ML} \frac{L}{N_L} - \rho K - r_B G \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & G = \begin{cases} 0, & \text{if } \frac{L}{N_L} < K \\ \bar{G}, & \text{if } \frac{L}{N_L} \geq K + \bar{G} \\ \frac{L}{N_L} - K, & \text{otherwise} \end{cases} \end{aligned} \quad (1)$$

I consider the symmetric equilibrium, and so the long-run zero-profit condition is  $r_{ML} \frac{L}{N_L} = B(\frac{L}{N_L})$ , and this determines the number of lenders,  $N_L$ . Fixed costs of lending are assumed to be zero. The first order conditions with respect to  $r_{ML}$  and  $G$  together yield,  $L^* = (r_B + \lambda_1 - r) \frac{\partial L}{\partial r}$  when  $G > 0$  and  $L^* = (\rho - r) \frac{\partial L}{\partial r}$  when  $G = 0$ , where  $\lambda_1$  is the shadow price of bank credit when the bank credit constraint binds, and 0 otherwise. Define  $r'_B = r_B + \lambda_1$ . So,  $L^* = (r'_B - r) \frac{\partial L}{\partial r}$  when moneylenders are capital constrained.

## Proof of Proposition 2:

Households make decisions pertaining to a two-season horizon. They are indexed by an exogenous endowment,  $\theta$ , and earn an income  $R_t \theta$  in each season.  $R_t$  is an *i.i.d* exogenous season-specific income shock or a productivity parameter. They derive utility from a numeraire good,  $c_t$ , and can choose whether to purchase a durable good or asset,  $D$  at price,  $p$ . Purchasing  $D$  results in a per-season utility,  $d$ , from the services that  $D$  provides if  $D$  is to be interpreted as a durable good. Alternatively,  $d$  represents the additional per-season income from the purchase of a production asset,  $D$ . Households are not endowed with a savings technology, but have access to credit. So, households choose borrowing,  $b$  and whether to purchase the durable good/asset,  $D$ . In the case where households have access to loans from a moneylender, they solve:

$$\max_{D, b} U_{ML} = u(R_1 \theta + b - p \mathbb{1}\{D = 1\}) + d \mathbb{1}\{D = 1\} + \beta \mathbb{E}_1 \left[ u(R_2 \theta - r_{ML} b) + d \mathbb{1}\{D = 1\} \right] \quad (2)$$

Households observe their season-1 income,  $R_1 \theta$  while making their decisions, and expect income in season-2 to be  $\mathbb{E}[R_2] \theta$ . Recall the assumption that the cost of defaulting is high enough for incentive compatibility constraint to be satisfied, and so households always repay their loans. The model does not consider state-contingent contracts, for simplicity.

Define  $b_{ML}^*(\theta) = \underset{b}{argmax} u(R_1\theta + b) + \beta \mathbb{E}_1[u(R_2\theta - r_{ML}b)]$ , the optimal loan size when a household with endowment,  $\theta$ , does not purchase  $D$ ; and define  $b_{ML,d}^*(\theta) = \underset{b}{argmax} u(R_1\theta + b - p) + \beta \mathbb{E}_1[u(R_2\theta - r_{ML}b)] + (1 + \beta)d$ , the optimal loan size when a household with endowment,  $\theta$  purchases,  $D$ .

Households do not purchase  $D$  when  $U(\theta, b_{ML}^*; D = 0) > U(\theta, b_{ML,d}^*; D = 1)$ ; and households purchase  $D$  when  $U(\theta, b_{ML}^*; D = 0) \leq U(\theta, b_{ML,d}^*; D = 1)$ . Define  $\hat{\theta}$ , the endowment where  $U(\theta, b_{ML}^*; D = 0) = U(\theta, b_{ML,d}^*; D = 1)$ . So, households with  $\theta < \hat{\theta}$  do not purchase  $D$ , and those with  $\theta \geq \hat{\theta}$  purchase  $D$ . So, total household demand is:

$$L^* = \int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\hat{\theta}} b_{ML}^* f(\theta) d\theta + \int_{\hat{\theta}}^{\bar{\theta}} b_{ML,d}^* f(\theta) d\theta \quad (3)$$

### Proof of Proposition 3:

The moneylending market equilibrium equates household demand with moneylender supply,  $\int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\hat{\theta}} b_{ML}^* f(\theta) d\theta + \int_{\hat{\theta}}^{\bar{\theta}} b_{ML,d}^* f(\theta) d\theta = (r'_B - r_{ML}^*) \frac{\partial}{\partial r_{ML}} \left[ \int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\hat{\theta}} b_{ML}^* f(\theta) d\theta + \int_{\hat{\theta}}^{\bar{\theta}} b_{ML,d}^* f(\theta) d\theta \right]$ , where  $L^* = \int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\hat{\theta}} b_{ML}^* f(\theta) d\theta + \int_{\hat{\theta}}^{\bar{\theta}} b_{ML,d}^* f(\theta) d\theta$ . Totally differentiating this gives us:

$$\frac{dr_{ML}^*}{dR_1} = \frac{-\frac{\partial L}{\partial R_1} - \frac{\partial r'_B}{\partial R_1} \frac{\partial L}{\partial R_1} - (r_{ML}^* - r'_B) \frac{\partial^2 L}{\partial r \partial R_1}}{2 \frac{\partial L}{\partial r} + (r_{ML}^* - r'_B) \frac{\partial^2 L}{\partial r^2}} \quad (4)$$

and,

$$\frac{dL^*}{dR_1} = \frac{\partial L^*}{\partial R_1} + \frac{\partial L^*}{\partial r_{ML}^*} \frac{dr_{ML}^*}{dR_1} \quad (5)$$

We know that:

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\partial L^*}{\partial R_1} &= \overbrace{[b_{ML}^*(\hat{\theta}) - b_{ML,d}^*(\hat{\theta})] f(\hat{\theta}) \frac{\partial \hat{\theta}}{\partial R_1} - b_{ML}^*(\underline{\theta}) f(\underline{\theta}) \frac{\partial \underline{\theta}}{\partial R_1}} \\ &\text{positive extensive margin change} + \underbrace{\int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\hat{\theta}} \frac{\partial b_{ML}^*}{\partial R_1} f(\theta) d\theta + \int_{\hat{\theta}}^{\bar{\theta}} \frac{\partial b_{ML,d}^*}{\partial R_1} f(\theta) d\theta}_{\text{negative intensive margin change}} \end{aligned} \quad (6)$$



Define  $\Phi_1 = |[b_{ML}^*(\hat{\theta}) - b_{ML,d}^*(\hat{\theta})]f(\hat{\theta})\frac{\partial \hat{\theta}}{\partial R_1} - b_{ML}^*(\underline{\theta})f(\underline{\theta})\frac{\partial \underline{\theta}}{\partial R_1}|$  and  $\Phi_2 = |\int_{\underline{\theta}}^{\hat{\theta}} \frac{\partial b_{ML}^*}{\partial R_1} f(\theta) d\theta + \int_{\hat{\theta}}^{\bar{\theta}} \frac{\partial b_{ML,d}^*}{\partial R_1} f(\theta) d\theta|$ . When  $\Phi_1 > \Phi_2$ , the exogenous in income is large enough such that the extensive margin changes dominate, and we observe an increase in household demand. This implies that the numerator in (4) is negative when the moneylender borrows from banks and the bank credit constraint does not bind (i.e.,  $\frac{\partial r_B'}{\partial R_1} = 0$ ). When the bank credit constraint binds, an increase in  $R_1$  reduces the shadow price of capital since  $K$  increases. In this case, the numerator in (4) is negative only when  $\frac{\partial L}{\partial R_1} > 0$  is large enough. Finally, by the second order condition, the denominator is negative. Thus,  $\frac{dr_{ML}^*}{dR_1} > 0$ . In addition, this implies that  $\frac{dL^*}{dR_1} > 0$  since  $|\frac{\partial L^*}{\partial R_1}| > |\frac{\partial L^*}{\partial r_{ML}^*} \frac{dr_{ML}^*}{dR_1}|$ .

#### Proof of Proposition 4:

Recall that, for moneylenders, borrowing from banks,  $G$  meets shortfalls in lending capital. So,  $G = \frac{L^*}{N_L} - K$  when the bank credit constraint does not bind. So,  $\frac{dG}{dR_1} = \frac{1}{N_L} \frac{dL^*}{dR_1} - \frac{dK}{dR_1}$ . So,  $\frac{dG}{dR_1} \leq 0$  as  $\frac{dL^*}{dR_1} \leq N_L \frac{dK}{dR_1}$ . When the bank credit constraint binds, and increase in  $R_1$  does not change the amount borrowed, but reduces the shadow price on bank credit. Finally, when moneylenders do not borrow from banks, an increase in  $R_1$  may not impact borrowing, or cause banks to switch into borrowing when  $\frac{dL^*}{dR_1} > N_L \frac{dK}{dR_1}$ .

#### Proof of Proposition 5:

When the bank credit supply binds, an increase in  $R_1$  drives up the shadow price of capital, and hence  $r_{ML}^*$ . In addition, at  $L^*$ ,  $\frac{\partial^2 L}{\partial r^2} > 0$ , so  $|\frac{\partial L^*}{\partial r_{ML}^*}|_{\bar{G} \text{ binding}} > |\frac{\partial L^*}{\partial r_{ML}^*}|_{\bar{G} \text{ not binding}}$ . And,  $|\frac{\partial r_{ML}^*}{\partial R_1}|_{\bar{G} \text{ binding}} > |\frac{\partial r_{ML}^*}{\partial R_1}|_{\bar{G} \text{ not binding}}$ . So,  $\frac{dL^*}{dR_1}_{\bar{G} \text{ binding}} < \frac{dL^*}{dR_1}_{\bar{G} \text{ not binding}}$ .

## Selection Correction Procedure

Newey (2009) proposes a semi-parametric selection-correction method. The method relies on a control function that is the a power series of the probability of selection into the sample under consideration. In this paper, I use a third-order power series control function of the probability of selection, following the implementation in Botsch and Malmendier (2020) and Hoffmann et al. (2021). The probability of selection is computed using a probit model that includes an instrument for selection and the same set of controls as in the household specification. Standard errors are bootstrapped with 5000 repetitions. I use the incidence of births in the household in the preceding year as an instrument for selection into the sample. The incidence of a birth in the preceding year is a plausibly exogenous event that is likely to increase household expenses due to expenditures relating to child-birth. An increase in expenditures is likely to require borrowing for any purpose later in the year. This is similar in spirit to the instrument used in (Hoffmann et al., 2021), where the authors use the incidence of health shocks as an instrument for selection into the credit market.