Fast Evasion Detection & Alert Management in Tree-Ensemble-Based Intrusion Detection Systems


Valency Oscar Colaco & Simin Nadjm-Tehrani

Linköping University, Sweden






A Machine Learning Based Intrusion Detection System (ML-IDS) protects systems against cyber-attackers







But an attacker could evade the ML-IDS








Motivation

- ML-IDSs are susceptible to evasion attacks
- ML-IDSs may produce many false alarms, causing alert fatigue
- ML-IDSs should not have high prediction times






Some Insights into Adversarial Examples








Some Insights into Adversarial Examples








Targeted Regions for Evasion Attacks







Targeted Regions for False Alarms








Verifier of Tree Ensembles (VoTE)


Törnblom & Nadjm-Tehrani, WAISE 2019





Failed Mappings → Counterexample Regions

Mappings that violate the property consist solely of individual counterexamples







Contributions


- A method to detect evasions & produce nuanced alert insights
- **Iceman**: prototype system of an evasion-hardened, flow re-annotatable IDS
- Evaluation on four real-world case studies & SOTA comparison





Proposed System: Iceman

Evasion-hardened and Flow Re-annotatable Tree Ensemble IDS








Counterexample (CEX) Region Generator

Pre-computing regions of likely evasion manipulation that attackers would normally target to evade detection




CEX Region Generator






Adversarial Analyzer

Measuring an example's adversarialness






The distance between the incoming vector and a CEX region is calculated using the **weighted l**_o **distance**






Adversarial Analyzer

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
This distance (**adversarial score**) is thresholded to postulate flows as adversarial and non-adversarial





Flow Re-annotator

Additional Quaternary Labels based on Postulated Evasion Likelihood







Alert Consolidator

Combining the IDS output into a single tuple (alert level, recommendation)


Flow Re-annotations		Alert Level	Alert Recommendation
True Negative Flow	s to	0	Benign Flow, Do Nothing!
True Positive Flow	maps	1	Attack, Investigate Now!
False Negative Flow		2	Evasion Attempt, Investigate Now!
False Positive Flow		3	Likely False Alarm, Investigate Later!

Alert Consolidation Strategy





Proposed Workflow







Experimental Setup

- 4 Datasets: APA-DDoS, CIC-IoT-2023, HCRL-Survival-Analysis, CIC-IoV-2024
- Equal ratio of adversarial and non-adversarial samples
- Compare Iceman to 2 methods: OC-Score and GROOT Forests
 - Detection Accuracy & Matthews Correlation Coefficient
 - Average Prediction Times
 - Accuracy of Alert Filtering & Prioritization





Baseline IDS Performance

Iceman hardens a baseline Tree Ensemble IDS


Case Study	Baseline Tree Ensemble IDS	Accuracy Score	Matthew's Correlation Coefficient
APA-DDoS	XGBoost GBM (depth = 5, trees = 50)	1.00	1.00
CIC-IoT-2023	XGBoost GBM (depth = 5, trees = 25)	1.00	0.91
HCRL-Survival-Analysis	Random Forest (depth = 10, trees = 50)	1.00	1.00
CIC-IoV-2024	Random Forest (depth = 10, trees = 25)	1.00	1.00





Accuracy of Baseline Detectors is Preserved

Good Detection Accuracy despite Evasion Attacks








Well Balanced Detection Performance

Good Matthew's correlation coefficient in four case studies








Low Prediction Latency

5-115x faster compared to OC-Score







Good Alert Management Performance

Accurate Alert Filtering and Alert Prioritization

Case Study	Alert Prioritization Accuracy	Alert Filtering Accuracy
APA-DDoS	1.00	1.00
CIC-IoT-2023	0.98	0.98
HCRL-Survival-Analysis	0.99	0.99
CIC-IoV-2024	1.00	1.00





Conclusion

- Our method can have benefits for safety and security
- Crafting counterexample regions is time-consuming but done offline
- Scalability depends on underlying formal verification tool
- Future Works → Counterexample-**Region** Guided Inductive Synthesis





Questions?

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