

# When War Sparks Unrest: Evidence from the Russo-Japanese War and the First Russian Revolution

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## ONLINE APPENDIX

### A1 Detailed Historical Narrative

On February 8, 1904<sup>1</sup>, without the declaration of war, Japan started the siege of Port Artur – a naval base Russia leased from China, and so the war started. Basically, it was a colonial war for control over Korea, northern China, and some Pacific islands. Some historians argue that Russia is primarily responsible or even “provoked” Japan (Ascher, 2004; Pipes, 2011). Regardless of the responsibility, Japan was perceived as a weak and inferior state by the Russian elites and people alike, and initially, support for the war and the Russian government was high.

However, Russian forces were scattered through vast territories and the only way to send reinforcements from the European part (where the majority of people lived) was through the single Trans-Siberian railroad, which was still under construction. The majority of the navy was in the European seas as well. Overall, the war effort was disorganized and there were constantly not enough soldiers on the frontline. One piece of evidence of how poorly it was planned comes from the Military Ministry’s own report to the emperor. In the report for the action in the year 1903 (Military Ministry, 1905) – the year just before the start of the war – Japan is mentioned only in the context of research of their military tactics and suitability of the Korean peninsula for the warfare. While there were a few mobilizations in the Far East by the end of the year, there were no major preparations for the war (note that the report was compiled a few years later and was submitted to the

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<sup>1</sup>The dates will be provided using the Julian calendar (Old Style), which was thirteen days behind the Gregorian calendar (New Style) in the 20th century. Russia switched to the New Style in February 1918.

emperor, so there was no reason to withhold any information). And in the 1902 report (Military Ministry, 1904), Japan is not mentioned at all!




Figure A1: Dynamics of independent variables: conscription rate among the conscriptable population and exposure to partial mobilizations. Each line is the time-series for an individual province.

In order to obtain additional forces and compensate for the losses, the conscription quotas increased significantly as the draft occurred in the fall of 1904. The conscription quotas (number of men per province) increased by an average of 36%: from the pre-war average conscription rate among the conscriptable population (see the operationalization in the next section) of 0.33 (262,795 conscripts nationwide) to 0.45 (367,378 conscripts nationwide) in 1904. In addition, throughout the year (starting in April) some uyezds (counties or districts, second-level administrative divisions) held partial mobilizations with a total of about one million reservists mobilized. The nationwide dynamics are shown in figure A1 and the maps are in Appendix.

The military failures slowly changed the public mood. Moreover, the economy was disrupted by the need to transport troops and military supplies at the expense of other goods. In the summer of 1904, reactionary Minister of Internal Affairs V. Plehve was assassinated, and Nicholas II choose a more liberal candidate to replace him. The new minister started small concessions to the civil society and particularly zemstva (local governments). However, the public perceived it as a sign of weakness and increased criticism and the confrontations with government (Ascher, 2004). Zemstvo representatives gathered in Saint-Petersburg in late 1904 and voted for the constitutional change and the

introduction of parliament, while the police did not interfere. Returning to their uezds, zemstva representatives started local campaigns.

In December 1904, while the Baltic and Black Sea fleets sailed around Africa on their way to the Far East, Japan captured Port Arthur and took about 25,000 prisoners. In the meantime, the “Bloody Sunday” occurred on January 9, 1905. A secret police agent, priest George Gapon, was a prominent labor leader. Industrial workers in St. Petersburg were on strike since late December 1904, so in an attempt to channel the discontent, Gapon decided to organize a mass demonstration to present a petition of grievances to the tsar. He obtained authorization from the city administration under the condition that the procession would not go to the Winter Palace. The peaceful demonstration holding icons stumbled upon armed forces, wasn’t able to disperse, and was shot. 200 people were killed, 800 more were wounded (Pipes, 2011). This was the start of the mass strikes, which the government tried to shut down with the police and the army. The First Russian Revolution began. In February 1905 the Russian army lost the major land battle under Mukhden – the largest battle at that point in history. At the same time, Nicholas II continued to make small concessions, agreeing to have some kind of (unelected) council of the “worthiest men”.



Figure A2: Dynamics of dependent variables: peasant unrest incidents per million rural population and workers strikes per thousand workers. Each line is the time-series for an individual province.

In May 1905, Russia lost a major naval battle near the Tsushima Strait. The Russian fleet was destroyed. With American President Theodor Roosevelt being the intermedi-

ary, the peace talks started in Portsmouth. Thanks to the diplomatic talents of S. Witte – head of the Russian delegation – the peace terms were reasonably good for Russia: few concessions were made. Nationwide strikes and popular unrest grew, with a peak in October. Also, in the middle of October, a new annual draft started and ended successfully in November, filling up above 95% of the quota. Nicholas was choosing between military dictatorship and more concessions and picked the latter (arguably, there was no capacity to shut down the upheaval). On October 17, 1905, the October Manifesto was signed by the tsar and published. It granted the people civil rights, extended the franchise, and introduced the parliamentary body – the State Duma. The reaction was two-fold: while some celebrated, reactionary-minded crowds responded with a wave of pogroms. When the police failed to stop the pogromists, the peasants perceived it as a sign of weakness and increased seizing of the landlords’ properties. In December 1905, the Bolshevik’s attempt to continue the revolution until the abolition of the monarchy was crushed by the government, concluding the first stage of the revolution (Pipes, 2011).

In 1906-1907, popular unrest decreased as the more institutions promised by the October Manifesto offered new channels for grievances. In addition, after the censorship was lifted in late 1905, debates started to take place in the public sphere (Ascher, 2004). The popular protests dynamic is summarized in figure A2 and the maps in Appendix. The Fundamental Laws of 1906 – basically, the proto-constitution – were half-hearted as the tsar still appointed the ministers and was able to dissolve the Duma. The first Duma, with a liberal majority (the socialists boycotted the elections), pushed for further democratization and was dissolved on July 8, 1906. The government willing to find a strongman to handle the revolution appointed P. Stolypin – governor of Saratov province – as the Minister of Interior, impressed by how he handled the peasant unrest. He introduced nationwide martial laws with field courts passing death sentences. Peasant disturbances and socialist terror were contained. In order to fight the root cause of peasant discontent, Stolypin started his agrarian reform in late 1906 set to provide peasants with land titles they desired. The results of this reform, which are beyond the scope of the paper, were mixed (Castañeda Dower & Markevich, 2019; Chernina et al., 2014). The Second Duma, being even more radical than the first one as socialists participated in the elections, was dissolved in what became known as the Coup of June 1907, which ended the First Russian Revolution. After the more restrictive electoral laws were passed, the more conservative Third Duma started its term in November 1907 (Pipes, 2011).

## A2 Data Description

As the main independent variable, I use the conscription rate among the conscriptable population: the share of males who have turned 21 minus the army cossacks (and Muslims

and Christian Ossetians in the Caucasus provinces) who were not conscripted. The Military Ministry published annual reports with province-level conscription quotas, as well as the total population enlisted for conscription and the final total amount of conscripted people. 1897 census data is used in the calculation, and as I do not have a detailed age composition by gender, estate, and religion I do not adjust for the age structure. However, as I study the period before the demographic transition and the within-country mobility was limited for the majority of the population because of the internal passport system, I assume its structure to be uniform within the country. I assume that the family structure and the share of only children and sole breadwinners is uniform as well. In this way, in order to get the conscriptable population count, I divide the nationwide conscriptable population count proportionally by the share of males excluding non-conscriptable groups to get the denominator for each province. So, to get the conscription rate for the individual province-year, I use the following formula:

$$\text{conscription}_{it} = \frac{\text{conscription quota}_{it}}{\text{enlisted}_t \times \frac{\text{conscriptable}_i}{\sum_{j=1}^N \text{conscriptable}_j}}$$

Where  $\text{conscription}_{it} \in [0, 1]$  is the conscription rate among the conscriptable population in the province  $i$  in the year  $t$  – the variable I use. The conscription quota $_{it} \in \mathbb{N}_0$  variable is the conscription quota number, the original indicator I have.  $\text{enlisted}_t$  is the nationwide total number of people enlisted for conscription in a year  $t$ .  $\text{conscriptable}_i$  is the number of conscriptable people of all ages in province  $i$ : all males minus army cossacks and Muslims and Ossetians in Caucasus provinces (see figure A21 for the map). Note that this indicator is based on the census data and thus is time-invariant. Lastly,  $\sum_{j=1}^N \text{conscriptable}_j$  is the nationwide total number of conscriptable people based on these province-level measures.

Original data on peasant revolts for the years 1895-1904 comes from the “chronicles” of peasant movements by Anfimov, 1998 and for 1905-1907 from the collection *Russian Revolution of 1905-1907: 50 years 1905-1955 (Revolyutsiya 1905-1907 gg. v Rossii: 50 let 1905-1955)*, 1955 and also additional regional sources<sup>2</sup>. The data on the industrial worker strikes originally comes from the Industrial Survey conducted in 50 European provinces by Varzar, 1905, 1910, 1908. I normalize this data by the millions of rural<sup>3</sup> population and thousands of workers respectively.

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<sup>2</sup>Including Leshenko, 1977 covering Ukraine, Shmygin, 1962 covering the Volga region, Abramov, 1956 and Egorov, 1948 – Central Black Earth region, Shabunya, 1962 – Belarus, Popov, 1954 – Central Russia, Lyaskovskiy, 1958 – Central Asia, and Goryushkin et al., 1985 – Siberia

<sup>3</sup>While the census provides data on the peasant estate, I consider the rural population to be a more accurate denominator. The peasants who moved to the cities and became industrial workers are still counted as peasants in the census. On the other hand, when Soviet historians collected data on “peasant revolts,” their agenda was to portray maximum struggle under the old regime, so they were inclusive in documenting all rural unrest, not specifically peasant.

## A3 Results

### A3.1 Scope Conditions Test

The Crimean War of 1853-1856 was fought around the Black Sea, with Crimean being the main battleground (hence, the name). Notably, the Taurida province (as well as some others) were directly exposed to the warfare, including to the enemy's violence. In this way it is not exactly the case in which the only exposure is through the own state, however, most of the provinces of the empire were unaffected by the warfare (and I exclude Taurida from the analysis), so my argument still applies to them. Moreover, as the sound defeat in the Crimean War was one of the motivation for the 1874 military reform, and it was the last large interstate war before the reform, this case is particularly interesting.

I use the data on peasant revolts and population figures compiled by Finkel et al., 2015. To estimate the effect of military defeat, which happens simultaneously for all provinces, I leverage the interrupted time-series design:

$$\text{unrest}_{it} = \tau\theta_t + \beta\text{post defeat}_t + \pi\text{years post defeat}_t + \alpha_i + \varepsilon_{it} \quad (\text{A1})$$

Here  $\theta_t$  is the rolling variable for year controlling for the linear time trend,  $\text{post defeat}_t$  is the dummy taking value 1 for all years after the military defeat occurs (and 0 before), and  $\text{years post defeat}_t$  is the continuous variable for the years past the defeat (it takes 0 before). In this model,  $\beta$  estimates the immediate effect (discontinuity) of military defeat on unrest which is my coefficient of interest, and  $\pi$  estimates the difference between pre- and post-defeat trends which can be the result of other factors.

The results of model specification (A1) on the Crimean War case are in figure A3 and for reference, figure A4 depicts the estimate for the Russo-Japanese War. While in 1905 there is a strong immediate positive effect of defeat on unrest which decreases with time, there is no such discontinuity in 1856. The post-1856 trend line however shows the increase in peasant unrest, but it is likely the impact of the changing post-war political environment.

To test if the fact of war with the draft army is enough to lead to mass unrest even in the absence of defeat, I turn to the case of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878, which the Russian empire won. The war was fought in Balkans and South Caucasus. That was the first interstate war, Russian empire fought after the reform of 1874 with largely the conscription-based army.

The data on conscription quotas is again collected from the Military Ministry's reports (Military Ministry, 1877-Military Ministry, 1881), and the data on unrest is taken from




Figure A3: Effect of military defeat on peasant unrest: evidence from the Crimean War. The blue line is the interrupted time-series model fit. The war started in 1853 and ended in 1856. The dependent variable is the number of peasant unrest incidents per million peasants.




Figure A4: Effect of military defeat on peasant unrest: evidence from the Russo-Japanese War. The blue line is the interrupted time-series model fit. The war started in 1904 and ended in 1905. The dependent variable is the number of peasant unrest incidents per million rural population.

Table A1: effect of conscription of unrest around the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878

	Peasant Unrest (raw)				Peasant Unrest			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Conscription quota (raw)	-0.0002 (0.0003)	-0.0001 (0.0003)						
Conscription quota (raw) $\times$ 1876			-0.0001 (0.0003)	-0.0001 (0.0003)				
Conscription quota (raw) $\times$ 1877			-0.0001 (0.0003)	-0.0001 (0.0003)				
Conscription quota (raw) $\times$ 1878			-0.0002 (0.0003)	-0.0002 (0.0003)				
Conscription quota (raw) $\times$ 1879			-0.0001 (0.0003)	-0.0001 (0.0003)				
Conscription quota (raw) $\times$ 1880			-0.0002 (0.0003)	-0.0001 (0.0003)				
Conscription					4.728 (4.262)	4.023 (4.043)		
Conscription $\times$ 1876							1.624 (4.809)	1.144 (4.730)
Conscription $\times$ 1877							5.278 (4.252)	4.574 (4.091)
Conscription $\times$ 1878							2.568 (4.598)	1.983 (4.562)
Conscription $\times$ 1879							6.751 (4.793)	6.292 (4.726)
Conscription $\times$ 1880							4.640 (4.378)	3.852 (4.142)
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R <sup>2</sup>	0.474	0.480	0.480	0.486	0.461	0.475	0.474	0.488
Num. obs.	255	250	255	250	165	165	165	165
N Clusters	51	50	51	50	33	33	33	33

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \* $p < 0.1$ . Robust-standard errors clustered at province level in parentheses

The unit of analysis is province-year. The dependent variables are the raw count of peasant unrest incidents and peasant unrest incidents per million people. Conscription is the rate of conscription quota over the male population. Controls include crop failure and lagged crop failure.



Gokmen and Kofanov, 2020. Population figures come from 1858 governors' reports, collected by Kessler and Markevich, 2020. To the best of my knowledge, there is no data on mobilizations in 1877 available. Note that due to the limited population data availability, there are fewer provinces in this analysis<sup>4</sup> so it is not necessarily sufficient. I use the design identical to the main analysis two-way fixed effects and the dynamic two-way fixed effects specifications. The results are in table A1: neither of the models rejects the null that the effect of conscription on unrest is zero. The sizes of the effects are also an order of magnitude lower compared to the analysis of the Russo-Japanese War case.

### A3.2 Alternative Explanations

First, my theory proposes that the effect of conscription on unrest goes through the grievances and blame attribution. So, one alternative explanation, which removes this channel, is the mechanical effect of population extraction and displacement disrupting the local economy (Dower & Markevich, 2018; Voth et al., 2022). If this alternative explanation is true, the effect of population displacement should be larger in places with lower population or lower population density as it is harder to replace the drafted men with fewer people around<sup>5</sup>.

To test it, I use the models with interaction terms using the rural population (for peasant unrest), number of workers (for strikes), and population density (for both dependent variables) as moderators. Models (1), (2), (5), and (6) in table A2 provide the results. The only significant interaction term is the positive effect of conscription and population density, with all others being statistically insignificant even at the 10% significance level. This exercise shows no evidence in favor of this alternative explanation.

Second, my theory is centered on the conscription and extraction of people. However, given that the effect is primarily driven by the period after the defeat, there is an alternative explanation through demobilizations. After the end of the war, mobilized men (but not conscripts) would return to their homes through late 1905-1906. Given that the system of partial mobilizations was poorly organized, and mobilized soldiers were actively engaged in military disturbances on their way to the frontline (Military Ministry, 1907), it is natural to assume that they will also engage in unrest upon their return or otherwise influence local political (Cagé et al., 2021; Koenig, 2023; Yi, forthcoming). As unrest spiked in 1905-1906 and the only significant [conscription  $\times$  year] effect explains unrest in 1906, this alternative seems plausible.

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<sup>4</sup>This sample excludes western provinces and Oblast' Voiska Donskogo

<sup>5</sup>This proposition is based on the assumption that the same conscription rate will be more disruptive due to the lower absolute number of men available as the replacements, which depends on the economy of scale.

Table A2: alternative explanations (direct effects of time-invariant moderators are absorbed by province fixed effects)

	Peasant Unrest				Worker Strikes			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Conscription	-1905.195 (2184.507)	-235.690 (151.840)	224.181** (107.142)	484.324* (239.663)	102.845 (60.306)	25.270 (16.645)	15.609 (14.129)	69.989 (47.654)
Mobilizations	339.828 (370.933)	10.995 (31.243)	26.695 (25.907)	16.957 (36.699)	10.677 (6.922)	6.018* (3.280)	5.542** (2.448)	6.469** (2.832)
Conscription $\times$ rural population (log)	145.955 (152.635)							
Mobilizations $\times$ rural population (log)	-22.443 (25.175)							
Conscription $\times$ population density		13.099*** (3.489)				-0.230 (0.415)		
Mobilizations $\times$ population density		0.334 (0.345)				-0.010 (0.043)		
Conscription $\times$ repartition commune				-312.372 (207.400)				-70.971 (40.032)
Mobilizations $\times$ repartition commune				-5.546 (30.306)				-5.311** (1.890)
Conscription $\times$ industrial workers (log)					-9.099 (5.764)			
Mobilizations $\times$ industrial workers (log)					-0.528 (0.646)			
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Demobilizations	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No
Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R <sup>2</sup>	0.565	0.593	0.562	0.566	0.478	0.473	0.474	0.551
Num. obs.	300	300	300	300	270	270	270	270
N Clusters	50	50	50	50	45	45	45	45

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \* $p < 0.1$ . Robust-standard errors clustered at province level in parentheses

The unit of analysis is province-year. The dependent variables are peasant unrest incidents per million rural population and worker strikes per thousand industrial workers. Conscription is the rate of conscription quota over the conscriptable population and mobilizations are the share of uyezds exposed to mobilizations in a province, weighted by population. Controls include crop failure and lagged crop failure. Demobilizations are the sum of mobilizations in 1904 and 1905 after the end of the war and 0 before 1905.

I test this alternative explanation by adding control for demobilizations in the baseline specification. I measure demobilizations as the sum of exposure to mobilizations in 1904 and 1905 after the end of the war, and 0 before the end. The results are in models (3) and (7) in table A2. The positive effects of conscription on peasant unrest and of mobilizations on worker strikes persist in both magnitude and significance with this additional control.

Last, another possible mechanism linking the extraction of people to grievance and unrest is the repartition peasant commune. By the start of the 20th century, most of the peasant land in the empire was owned collectively by the commune. Communal land was periodically redistributed (repartitioned) between the peasants. This repartition ensured access to land for all members of the commune, serving as a social insurance tool (Nafziger, 2010). In this way, the extraction of people will be less of a problem in places with such a commune. Spatially, repartition commune prevailed in the majority Russian regions (in most of the European part of the empire, except for the western provinces), so it is an alternative explanation for the minorities effect.

To test this hypothesis, I use the data on provinces with repartition commune from Chernina et al., 2014. The interaction term specification is estimated with the repartition commune presence as the moderator. Models (4) and (8) show the results. There is no moderating effect of the repartition commune on peasant unrest, so there is no evidence in favor of the “insurance” alternative for the peasants. There is, however, significant negative effect of the interaction between mobilizations and repartition commune on worker strikes. This result is theoretically challenging, as the communal institutions shouldn’t affect the industrial workers, unless those are the seasonal workers who still work on the land. But, importantly, the total effect of mobilizations on strikes remains positive ( $6.469 - 5.311 > 0$ ).

## A4 Sensitivity analysis

### A4.1 Identification Assumptions

To formally test the exogeneity of my independent variables, I use plausibility tests based on the reversed main specification with conscription and mobilizations or their growth as dependent variables (tables A6, A7). There is no effect of unrest in previous periods, so I assume it to be plausibly exogenous. There is however the significant negative effect of peasant unrest on mobilizations $_{t+1}$ . This is a statistical artifact of the lack of mobilizations in 1906 after the biggest wave of unrest in 1905. If 1906 is dropped there

is no significant effect in the reversed model, however the baseline specifications remain significant.

Apart from that, TWFE models require the following assumptions in order to be unbiased (Imai & Kim, 2021): (a) homogeneous treatment effects, (b) parallel trends, and (c) linear additivity. Assumption (a) directly contradicts my third hypothesis and the results of the heterogeneous treatment effects analysis. In this way, the TWFE coefficients from the baseline specification (??) provide the weighted effect across subgroups. As for the assumption (b), with a continuous treatment Callaway et al., 2021 recommend using “strong” version  $\mathbb{E}[\text{unrest}_t(c) - \text{unrest}_{t-1}(0)] = \mathbb{E}[\text{unrest}_t(c) - \text{unrest}_{t-1}(0) | \text{conscription} = c]$ . This “strong” assumption requires for all levels of conscription, “the average change in outcomes over time across all units, if they had been assigned that amount of dose, is the same as the average change in outcomes over time for all units that experienced that dose” (Callaway et al., 2021, p. 11) meaning that there is no time-varying effect outside the treatment period. This assumption is supported by the event-study results. I also run an additional model with the baseline TWFE specification, but only on the pre-treatment period, and find no significant effect (see table A5). Finally, for (c), I expect it to hold.

To account for possible SUTVA violations, I control for the spatial spillovers of conscription and mobilizations as a further robustness check. Also, as the literature on mass protests heavily emphasizes the diffusion of protests (Barrie, 2018; Huang et al., 2019), I additionally model spatial and temporal lag of the dependent variables. The results of the main analysis hold, see the table A8.

Additionally, I provide a placebo treatment/outcome test, also known as the parallel trends test (Eggers et al., 2021). In order to do that, I run the baseline specification (??) but with the lagged dependent variable. The results are in the table A10. There is no significant relationship between conscription and mobilizations and either of the dependent variables $_{t-1}$ . This also provides evidence that the parallel trends assumption might hold. In this line, I also test another TWFE specification assumption – no lagged treatment effects (Imai & Kim, 2019), see results in table A11. There are no statistically significant lagged treatment effects.

## A4.2 Robustness

I also use a different measure for the conscription rate by simply normalizing it on the total population rather than to conscriptable males. Also, total exposure to mobilizations is utilized. That is, if the uyezds were exposed to more than one mobilization in a given year, they are counted more than once. As for the dependent variables, I normalize

the unrest by peasant estate rather than by rural population figure. The results are in table A12, the direction, magnitude, and significance of the effects from the main analysis mostly hold.

To further test the robustness of the results, I add time-invariant controls that interacted with the year fixed effects to the baseline specification. Moreover, I also use negative binomial models for the count data to re-estimate the baseline specification, but with the raw number of incidents as the dependent variable. The results are in tables A9 and A17, the direction and magnitude of the effects hold, and significance mostly holds.

Finally, to check the stability of the sample, I drop individual military okrugs and the first and last years. I also run (under-controlled) models on the unrestricted sample, which includes Asia, the Caucasus, and Poland. Results are in tables A13, A14, A15, and A16, direction, magnitude of the effects holds, and significance mostly holds.

### A4.3 Alternative Specification

Finally, I use a different panel estimator and an alternative specification, leveraging the conscription shock of 1904. To begin with, following the suggestions of Millimet and Bellemare, 2023, I make use of the first difference (FD) estimate for the panel data as an alternative to TWFE. The panel FD specification is as follows:

$$\Delta \text{unrest}_{it} = \beta \Delta \text{conscription}_{i,t-1} + \sigma \Delta \text{Mobilizations}_{it} + \kappa X_{it} + \nu_{it} \quad (\text{A2})$$

where  $\Delta \text{unrest}_{it}$  is the change between the periods  $t - 1$  and  $t$  in the number of peasant unrest incidents per million rural population and worker strikes per thousand industrial workers.  $\Delta \text{conscription}_{i,t-1}$  is the change between the periods  $t - 2$  and  $t - 1$  in the conscription rate among the conscriptable population.  $\Delta \text{Mobilizations}$  is the change between the periods  $t - 1$  and  $t$  in the exposure of a province  $i$  to mobilizations, measured as the share of uyezds exposed to mobilizations, weighted by population.  $X_{it}$  is the vector of time-varying and optionally time-invariant controls.  $\nu_{it}$  is an idiosyncratic error term.

FD requires a weaker form of the strict exogeneity assumption, compared to TWFE. While TWFE requires no time-varying heterogeneous effects (HTE) over the entire period to be unbiased, FD requires no time-varying HTE between the two consecutive periods, which is more feasible (Millimet & Bellemare, 2023). In this way, FD provides a more robust estimate, trading it to one time period lost due to differencing. Also, note that the fixed effects are differenced out here. The panel FD results are in table A19, the direction and significance of the effects hold, while the magnitude is larger as first differences have different ranges compared to the original numbers.

Next, I utilize an alternative identification strategy. Conscription rates are mostly stable before the war (1901-1903) and after the war started (1904-1906), with 1904 being the discontinuity. Mobilizations also start with the war, see figures A1, A5, and A6. In this way, this increase in conscription and mobilizations in 1904 offers likely exogenous (see below) shock, which I leverage in the following “static” FD estimate. Since almost all the variation in both peasant unrest and worker strikes comes from 1905 onwards (see figures A2, A7), I collapse the panel into two periods. Pre-treatment: 1901-1903 conscription and 1902-1904 unrest, and post-treatment: 1904-1906 conscription, mobilizations, and 1905-1907 unrest. Conscription and unrest figures are averaged within these new periods. The cross-section specification is as follows:

$$\Delta\text{unrest}_i = \beta\Delta\text{conscription}_i + \sigma\text{Mobilizations}_i + \kappa X_i + \nu_i \quad (\text{A3})$$

Where  $\Delta\text{unrest}_i$  is the change between the 1902-1904 and 1905-1907 averages of peasant unrest incidents per million rural population and worker strikes per thousand industrial workers.  $\Delta\text{conscription}_i$  is the change between the 1901-1903 and 1904-1906 averages of the conscription rate among the conscriptable population.  $\text{Mobilizations}_i$  is the exposure to mobilizations of the province  $i$ , measured as the proportion of uyezds exposed to mobilizations in 1904, weighted by population.  $X_i$  is the optional vector of time-invariant controls.  $\nu_i$  is the individual error term.

Again, the key identifying assumption is the treatment exogeneity, which is tested with the pre-treatment observable indicators. The results of this exercise are shown in table A18.  $\Delta\text{conscription}_i$  or  $\text{Mobilizations}_{1904}$  are not associated with the pre-treatment unrest indicators, and while there are a few significant time-invariant predictors, they are differenced out. The results of the specification (A3) are presented in the table A3: the first difference of conscription remains the significant positive predictor of peasant unrest. The magnitude is larger since the first differences of conscription rate and unrest are on a different scale compared to the baseline TWFE specification. However, there is no significant effect of either treatment on worker strikes. Overall, this confirms the main results of the analysis for peasant unrest and again suggests that the highly organized group of industrial workers was not affected by this shock in the same way.

Finally, I also use an alternative event study estimate based on Freyaldenhoven et al., 2021, which also leverages the same FD treatment effect estimate. There are three differences in this approach compared to the dynamic TWFE specification in the main analysis: the effect is normalized to set the effect in period treatment-1 (in my case, conscription in 1903) to 0, the cumulative effect of the FD of the treatment is estimated

Table A3: first-difference estimate

	$\Delta$ Peasant Unrest				$\Delta$ Worker Strikes			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
$\Delta$ Conscription	936.871*** (331.678)	988.928** (402.031)	1408.806** (644.312)	1870.740** (721.903)	-28.306 (30.664)	40.122 (67.998)	113.923 (85.683)	84.266 (54.231)
Mobilizations <sub>1904</sub>		-7.516 (26.788)	-22.421 (27.848)	-51.089 (30.581)		-9.999 (7.602)	-9.345 (8.977)	-5.748 (5.595)
(Intercept)	-52.041 (35.807)	-51.962 (35.905)	472.391 (355.091)	798.389** (362.575)	7.130** (3.352)	7.365* (3.820)	58.202 (45.182)	39.268 (27.082)
Popultion	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
Geography	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
Minorities	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
Pre-war conscription	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
Pre-revolution unrest	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
R <sup>2</sup>	0.145	0.353	0.406	0.536	0.184	0.406	0.504	0.702
Num. obs.	50	50	50	45	45	45	45	45

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \* $p < 0.1$ . Robust-standard errors

The unit of analysis is province. The dependent variables are the change between the 1902-1904 and 1905-1907 average numbers of peasant unrest incidents per million rural population and worker strikes per thousand industrial workers.  $\Delta$  Conscription is the change between the 1901-1903 and 1904-1906 averages of conscription rate among the conscriptable population. Mobilizations<sub>1904</sub> is the province exposure to mobilizations, measured as the share of uyezds exposed to mobilizations in 1904, weighted by population. Population controls include: province population (log), share of rural population, and population density. Geography controls are the province centroid longitude and latitude. Minorities control for the share of ethnic Russians and religious orthodox. Pre-war conscription is the average conscription rate between the 1901-1903. Pre-revolution unrest is the average numbers of peasant unrest incidents per million rural population and worker strikes per thousand industrial workers in 1902-1904.

(which also results in too wide confidence intervals since I have the treatment applied every year, not just once), and sup-t bands are used instead of confidence intervals. The results are presented in figure A9 and table A20, the key result of the baseline event-study (effect of conscription in 1905 on peasant unrest in 1906) holds. The pre-trends are also insignificant in this specification as well.

## Software

R version 4.3.1 (R Core Team, 2023) was used with the following R packages: estimatr v. 1.0.0 (Blair et al., 2022), eventstudyr v. 1.1.1 (Freyaldenhoven et al., 2023), ggpubr v. 0.6.0 (Kassambara, 2023), ggspatial v. 1.1.8 (Dunnington, 2023), panelView v. 1.1.16 (Mou et al., 2023), plyr v. 1.8.8 (Wickham, 2011), sf v. 1.0.14 (Pebesma, 2018; Pebesma & Bivand, 2023), tidyverse v. 2.0.0 (Wickham et al., 2019).

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## A5 Additional Figures




Figure A5: Year-to-year correlation in conscription rate among the conscriptable population for the provinces under study.




Figure A6: Dynamic of independent variables: conscription rate among the conscriptable population and exposure to partial mobilizations. Light gray error bars show the sample standard error.




Figure A7: Dynamic of dependent variables: peasant unrest incidents per million rural population and workers strikes per thousand workers. Light gray error bars show the sample standard error.




Figure A8: Ethnic and religious composition according to the 1897 census, provinces under study are circled in red. Background tile from OSM is used (c) OpenStreetMap contributors.




Figure A9: Event study results: the effect of  $\text{conscription}_{t-1}$  on  $\text{unrest}_t$  are depicted (effects of  $\text{conscription}_{1904}$  on  $\text{unrest}_{1905}$  is set to 0). The war started in 1904 and ended in 1905, the revolution started in 1905 and ended in 1907. The unit of analysis is province-year. The dependent variables are peasant unrest incidents per million rural population and worker strikes per thousand industrial workers. Conscription is the rate of conscription quota over the conscriptable population and mobilizations are the share of uyezds exposed to mobilizations in a province, weighted by population. Controls include crop failure and lagged crop failure.




Figure A10: conscription rates among the conscriptable population before and after the start of the war, provinces under study are circled in red. Background tile from OSM is used (c) OpenStreetMap contributors.




Figure A11: Partial mobilizations in 1904, provinces under study are circled in red. Background tile from OSM is used (c) OpenStreetMap contributors.




Figure A12: Partial mobilizations in 1905, provinces under study are circled in red. Background tile from OSM is used (c) OpenStreetMap contributors.






Figure A13: Conscription increase with the start of the war, provinces under study are circled in red. Background tile from OSM is used (c) OpenStreetMap contributors.




Figure A14: Baseline peasant unrest incidents per million rural population, provinces under study are circled in red. Background tile from OSM is used (c) OpenStreetMap contributors.




Figure A15: Peasant unrest incidents per million rural population in 1905, provinces under study are circled in red. Background tile from OSM is used (c) OpenStreetMap contributors.




Figure A16: Peasant unrest incidents per million rural population in 1906-07, provinces under study are circled in red. Background tile from OSM is used (c) OpenStreetMap contributors.




Figure A17: Baseline worker strikes per thousand workers, provinces under study are circled in red. Background tile from OSM is used (c) OpenStreetMap contributors.




Figure A18: Workers strikes per thousand workers in 1905, provinces under study are circled in red. Background tile from OSM is used (c) OpenStreetMap contributors.




Figure A19: Worker strikes per thousand workers in 1906-07, provinces under study are circled in red. Background tile from OSM is used (c) OpenStreetMap contributors.




Figure A20: Number of the industrial workers per thousand people. Background tile from OSM is used (c) OpenStreetMap contributors.




Figure A21: Share of the conscriptable males. Background tile from OSM is used (c) OpenStreetMap contributors.



Figure A22: Military okruga. Background tile from OSM is used (c) OpenStreetMap contributors.






Figure A23: Uezds exposed to each wave of mobilization. Background tile from OSM is used (c) OpenStreetMap contributors.

## A6 Additional Tables

Table A4: Event-study estimates

	Peasant Unrest			Worker Strikes		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Conscription $\times$ 1902	-122.097 (142.568)	-88.769 (136.236)	-148.474 (148.023)	55.253** (21.006)	59.339** (21.891)	59.385** (25.292)
Conscription $\times$ 1903	10.081 (158.151)	38.379 (153.567)	-21.619 (158.846)	56.456** (20.656)	59.935** (21.605)	59.983** (25.459)
Conscription $\times$ 1904	-76.190 (128.083)	-126.297 (141.258)	-55.923 (125.829)	51.575** (19.241)	40.182** (18.432)	40.115** (14.592)
Conscription $\times$ 1905	119.462 (164.355)	164.413 (163.972)	135.629 (164.873)	18.787 (22.218)	26.003 (23.415)	26.022 (24.451)
Conscription $\times$ 1906	242.329** (105.617)	263.470** (107.146)	221.536** (108.450)	22.543* (13.116)	25.094* (13.767)	25.128 (16.121)
Conscription $\times$ 1907	-19.189 (99.470)	5.084 (95.949)	-39.011 (100.120)	24.971* (13.650)	27.998* (14.361)	28.033 (16.868)
Mobilizations		30.120 (27.327)			5.501* (2.677)	
Mobilizations $\times$ 1904			-16.027 (15.788)			5.541 (5.370)
Mobilizations $\times$ 1905			53.996 (39.651)			5.481 (3.954)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R <sup>2</sup>	0.564	0.571	0.577	0.467	0.489	0.489
Num. obs.	300	300	300	270	270	270
N Clusters	50	50	50	45	45	45

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \* $p < 0.1$ . Robust-standard errors clustered at province level in parentheses

The effect of conscription <sub>$t-1$</sub>  and mobilizations <sub>$t$</sub>  on unrest <sub>$t$</sub>  is estimated. The war started in 1904 and ended in 1905, revolution started in 1905 and ended in 1907. The unit of analysis is province-year. The dependent variables are peasant unrest incidents per million rural population and workers strikes per thousand industrial workers. Conscription is the rate of conscription quota over the conscriptable population and mobilizations are the share of uyezds exposed to mobilizations in a province, weighted by population. Controls include crop failure and lagged crop failure.

Table A5: pre-war period

	Peasant Unrest		Worker Strikes	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Conscription	103.911 (76.064)	136.631 (94.049)	-2.512 (2.499)	-2.457 (2.649)
Controls	No	Yes	No	Yes
Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R <sup>2</sup>	0.380	0.454	0.484	0.488
Num. obs.	150	150	135	135
N Clusters	50	50	45	45

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \* $p < 0.1$ .

Robust-standard errors clustered at province level in parentheses

The unit of analysis is province-year, sample is reduced to the pre-war period. The dependent variables are peasant unrest incidents per million rural population and worker strikes per thousand industrial workers. Conscription is the rate of conscription quota over the conscriptable population. Controls include crop failure and lagged crop failure.

Table A6: exogeneity check

	Conscription Rate <sub><math>t+1</math></sub>				Mobilizations <sub><math>t+1</math></sub>			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Peasant unrest	0.000 (0.000)		0.000 (0.000)	0.000 (0.000)	-0.000* (0.000)		-0.000** (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)
Workers strikes		-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)		0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)
Controls	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R <sup>2</sup>	0.947	0.949	0.949	0.950	0.735	0.730	0.732	0.732
Num. obs.	300	270	270	270	300	270	270	270
N Clusters	50	45	45	45	50	45	45	45

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \* $p < 0.1$ . Robust-standard errors clustered at province level in parentheses

The unit of analysis is province-year. The dependent variables are the conscription rate among the conscriptable population and the share of uyezds exposed to mobilizations in a province. Peasant unrest is the number of incidents per million rural population and worker strikes are normalized per thousand industrial workers. Controls include crop failure and lagged crop failure.



Table A7: exogeneity check – growth

	$\Delta$ Conscription Rate				$\Delta$ Mobilizations			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Peasant unrest	−0.000 (0.000)		−0.000 (0.000)	−0.000 (0.000)	0.001 (0.003)		0.001 (0.003)	0.001 (0.004)
Workers strikes		−0.001 (0.000)	−0.001 (0.000)	−0.001 (0.000)		−0.056 (0.082)	−0.054 (0.082)	−0.062 (0.083)
Controls	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R <sup>2</sup>	0.780	0.795	0.796	0.796	0.662	0.664	0.665	0.667
Num. obs.	250	225	225	225	250	180	180	180
N Clusters	50	45	45	45	50	45	45	45

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \* $p < 0.1$ . Robust-standard errors clustered at province level in parentheses

The unit of analysis is province-year. The dependent variables are the change in conscription rate among the conscriptable population and the change in the share of uyezds exposed to mobilizations in a province. Peasant unrest is the number of incidents per million rural population and worker strikes are normalized per thousand industrial workers. Controls include crop failure and lagged crop failure.

Table A8: additional controls

	Peasant Unrest				Worker Strikes			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Conscription	208.523* (104.208)	223.649** (104.470)	309.060** (117.979)	287.360** (124.888)	19.462 (15.700)	18.520 (16.820)	17.317 (14.032)	19.075 (14.363)
Mobilizations	24.543 (24.492)	23.893 (24.432)	20.438 (23.111)	20.406 (23.294)	5.559** (2.423)	5.637** (2.435)	5.815** (2.664)	5.801** (2.697)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Dep. var. autocorr.	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes
Dep. var. spatial autocorr.	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
Spillovers	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R <sup>2</sup>	0.558	0.554	0.563	0.566	0.475	0.473	0.473	0.475
Num. obs.	300	300	300	300	270	270	270	270
N Clusters	50	50	50	50	45	45	45	45

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \* $p < 0.1$ . Robust-standard errors clustered at province level in parentheses

The unit of analysis is province-year. The dependent variables are peasant unrest incidents per million rural population and worker strikes per thousand industrial workers. Conscription is the rate of conscription quota over the conscriptable population and mobilizations are the share of uyezds exposed to mobilizations in a province, weighted by population. Controls include crop failure and lagged crop failure, dependent variable lag, dependent variable spatial lag (Queen-I weights), and conscription and mobilization spillovers within military okrug.

Table A9: additional time-invariant controls interacting with year fixed effects

	Peasant Unrest				Worker Strikes			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Conscription	192.225*	201.319*	72.890	241.854*	19.125	29.150	12.140	3.143
	(104.562)	(110.431)	(113.673)	(133.167)	(16.107)	(17.343)	(13.447)	(18.395)
Mobilizations	21.060	22.506	2.322	19.065	6.428**	5.228**	1.660	3.934**
	(27.814)	(24.894)	(22.705)	(22.163)	(2.401)	(2.406)	(2.205)	(1.809)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Population (log)	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No
Share rural population	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No	No
Minorities share	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes	No
Geography	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R <sup>2</sup>	0.567	0.560	0.649	0.627	0.487	0.488	0.623	0.545
Num. obs.	300	300	300	300	270	270	270	270
N Clusters	50	50	50	50	45	45	45	45

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \* $p < 0.1$ . Robust-standard errors clustered at province level in parentheses

The unit of analysis is province-year. The dependent variables are peasant unrest incidents per million rural population and worker strikes per thousand industrial workers. Conscription is the rate of conscription quota over the conscriptable population and mobilizations are the share of uyezds exposed to mobilizations in a province, weighted by population. Controls include crop failure and lagged crop failure, province population (log of), share of rural population in province, share of non-Russians and non-orthodox population, and province centroid longitude and latitude.

Table A10: placebo test

	Peasant Unrest <sub><math>t-1</math></sub>				Worker Strikes <sub><math>t-1</math></sub>			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Conscription	-59.387		-69.429	-77.671	0.548		0.383	0.279
	(56.401)		(65.766)	(73.310)	(0.883)		(0.940)	(0.981)
Mobilizations		-6.010	-6.892	-6.724		-0.134	-0.130	-0.130
		(6.650)	(7.389)	(7.166)		(0.106)	(0.111)	(0.113)
Controls	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R <sup>2</sup>	0.249	0.251	0.262	0.271	0.341	0.345	0.345	0.355
Num. obs.	250	250	250	250	225	225	225	225
N Clusters	50	50	50	50	45	45	45	45

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \* $p < 0.1$ . Robust-standard errors clustered at province level in parentheses

The unit of analysis is province-year. The dependent variables are lagged peasant unrest incidents per million rural population and lagged worker strikes per thousand industrial workers. Conscription is the rate of conscription quota over the conscriptable population and mobilizations are the share of uyezds exposed to mobilizations in a province, weighted by population. Controls include crop failure and lagged crop failure.

Table A11: lagged effect

	Peasant Unrest <sub>t+1</sub>				Worker Strikes <sub>t+1</sub>			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Conscription	161.279 (215.667)		194.819 (210.913)	243.206 (197.663)	40.574 (24.881)		34.522 (22.141)	33.352 (21.653)
Mobilizations		23.505 (21.919)	23.020 (21.486)	21.623 (21.621)		-5.232 (3.830)	-4.762 (3.455)	-4.758 (3.457)
Controls	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R <sup>2</sup>	0.569	0.550	0.573	0.591	0.491	0.465	0.510	0.511
Num. obs.	250	300	250	250	225	270	225	225
N Clusters	50	50	50	50	45	45	45	45

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \* $p < 0.1$ . Robust-standard errors clustered at province level in parentheses

The unit of analysis is province-year. The dependent variables are leads of peasant unrest incidents per million rural population and leads of worker strikes per thousand industrial workers. Conscription is the rate of conscription quota over the conscriptable population and mobilizations are the share of uyezds exposed to mobilizations in a province, weighted by population. Controls include crop failure and lagged crop failure.

Table A12: alternative measures

	Peasant Unrest	Peasant Unrest (alt)	Worker Strikes	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Conscription (alt)	28063.985** (10484.617)		32267.481*** (11451.346)	1011.335 (1481.652)
Mobiliations (alt)	34.992* (19.293)		38.117* (19.470)	−4.781 (2.930)
Conscription		260.656** (111.280)		
Mobilizations		25.785 (23.977)		
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R <sup>2</sup>	0.573	0.565	0.586	0.482
Num. obs.	300	300	300	270
N Clusters	50	50	50	45

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \* $p < 0.1$ . Robust-standard errors clustered at province level in parentheses

The unit of analysis is province-year. The dependent variables are peasant unrest incidents per million rural population, peasant unrest incidents per million peasants and worker strikes per thousand industrial workers. Conscription is the rate of conscription quota over the conscriptable population, conscription (alt) is the rate of quota over the total population, mobilizations are the share of uyezds exposed to mobilizations in a province, weighted by population, and mobilizations (alt) are the sum of the shares of uyezds exposed to each wave of mobilization in a province, weighted by population. Controls include crop failure and lagged crop failure.

Table A13: individual military okruga dropped

	Peasant Unrest							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Conscription	183.674 (124.140)	270.146** (117.922)	215.466* (105.914)	166.401* (90.296)	218.053** (104.239)	262.171* (151.561)	224.999* (113.422)	192.641* (101.570)
Mobilizations	18.711 (26.141)	33.268 (26.052)	35.367 (23.535)	16.622 (28.338)	23.024 (25.201)	5.545 (27.732)	19.646 (25.631)	29.519 (25.865)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Saint-Petersburg okrug	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Kazan' okrug	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Odessa okrug	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Kyiv okrug	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Warsaw okrug	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Moscow okrug	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Vilna okrug	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Voisko Donskoe	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R <sup>2</sup>	0.559	0.589	0.554	0.505	0.550	0.600	0.545	0.559
Num. obs.	258	240	276	258	294	216	264	294
N Clusters	43	40	46	43	49	36	44	49

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \* $p < 0.1$ . Robust-standard errors clustered at province level in parentheses

The unit of analysis is province-year. The dependent variable is the number of peasant unrest incidents per million rural population. Conscription is the rate of conscription quota over the conscriptable population and mobilizations are the share of uyezds exposed to mobilizations in a province, weighted by population. Controls include crop failure and lagged crop failure.

Table A14: individual military okruga dropped

	Worker Strikes							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Conscription	31.113 (18.302)	21.235 (18.133)	15.790 (15.495)	27.436 (16.799)	7.213 (11.575)	15.569 (20.615)	2.228 (15.948)	14.317 (14.729)
Mobilization	4.991* (2.608)	8.050*** (2.760)	5.693** (2.465)	7.602** (2.823)	5.143** (2.499)	4.005 (2.588)	2.115 (2.043)	6.341** (2.540)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Saint-Petersburg okrug	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Kazan' okrug	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Odessa okrug	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Kyiv okrug	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Warsaw okrug	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Moscow okrug	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
Vilna okrug	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Voisko Donskoe	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	No
Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R <sup>2</sup>	0.467	0.486	0.469	0.498	0.547	0.492	0.408	0.478
Num. obs.	234	222	246	234	264	192	234	264
N Clusters	39	37	41	39	44	32	39	44

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \* $p < 0.1$ . Robust-standard errors clustered at province level in parentheses

The unit of analysis is province-year. The dependent variable is the number of workers strikes per thousand industrial workers. Conscription is the rate of conscription quota over the conscriptable population and mobilizations are the share of uyezds exposed to mobilizations in a province, weighted by population. Controls include crop failure and lagged crop failure.

Table A15: first and last year dropped

	Peasant Unrest			Worker strikes		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Conscription	216.061** (105.630)	456.457*** (144.049)	605.360*** (148.249)	23.301 (16.111)	25.280 (22.138)	36.716 (25.954)
Mobilizations	20.997 (24.197)	24.555 (24.468)	23.241 (24.238)	5.963** (2.492)	5.770** (2.455)	6.342** (2.663)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
1902	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No
1907	Yes	No	No	Yes	No	No
Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R <sup>2</sup>	0.577	0.573	0.612	0.513	0.506	0.566
Num. obs.	250	250	200	225	225	180
N Clusters	50	50	50	45	45	45

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \* $p < 0.1$ . Robust-standard errors clustered at province level in parentheses

The unit of analysis is province-year. The dependent variable is the number of workers strikes per thousand industrial workers. Conscription is the rate of conscription quota over the conscriptable population and mobilizations are the share of uyezds exposed to mobilizations in a province, weighted by population. Controls include crop failure and lagged crop failure.

Table A16: unrestricted sample

	Peasant Unrest			Worker Strikes		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Conscription	86.497 (89.200)	281.250*** (81.954)	135.334* (71.308)	41.027** (16.728)	10.765 (14.580)	25.737 (18.123)
Mobilizations	29.033 (21.562)			2.671 (2.626)		
Controls	No	Yes	No	No	Yes	No
Main sample	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Poland	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Caucasus	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes
Asia	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	No
Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R <sup>2</sup>	0.536	0.540	0.507	0.463	0.446	0.462
Num. obs.	354	348	480	312	270	336
N Clusters	59	58	80	52	45	56

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \* $p < 0.1$ . Robust-standard errors clustered at province level in parentheses

The unit of analysis is province-year. The dependent variables are peasant unrest incidents per million rural population and workers strikes per thousand industrial workers. Conscription is the rate of conscription quota over the conscriptable population and mobilizations are the share of uyezds exposed to mobilizations in a province, weighted by population. Controls include crop failure and lagged crop failure.

Table A17: Negative binomial models

	Peasant Unrest	Worker Strikes		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Conscription	22.67*** (1.658)	3.706 (2.732)	25.25*** (2.343)	-1.200 (3.860)
Mobilizations	0.0959 (0.2368)	0.3987 (0.4907)	0.2399 (0.2463)	0.2921 (0.3221)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	No	Yes	No	Yes
Num. Obs.	294	294	285	285
Squared Correlation	0.29000	0.67682	0.68667	0.85744
Pseudo R <sup>2</sup>	0.14737	0.18097	0.18833	0.23738
BIC	2,455.5	2,399.0	2,110.2	2,029.4
Over-dispersion	0.90055	1.2510	0.92005	1.6032

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \* $p < 0.1$ 

Robust-standard errors clustered at province level in parentheses

The unit of analysis is province-year. The dependent variables are counts of peasant unrest incidents and workers strikes. Conscription is the rate of conscription quota over the conscriptable population and mobilizations are the share of uyezds exposed to mobilizations in a province, weighted by population. Controls include crop failure and lagged crop failure.

Table A18: first-difference estimate, exogeneity check

	$\Delta$ Conscription		Mobilizations <sub>1904</sub>	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Conscription <sub>1901–1903</sub>	0.165*	0.133	3.798**	3.161*
	(0.083)	(0.106)	(1.445)	(1.786)
Population (log)	0.009	0.008	−0.291**	−0.253*
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.117)	(0.134)
Russians share	−0.001	−0.002	−0.109	−0.276*
	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.140)	(0.160)
Orthodox share	−0.000	0.009	0.194	0.481
	(0.012)	(0.017)	(0.232)	(0.296)
Population density	0.000	−0.000	0.003	0.002
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.003)	(0.003)
Rural population share	0.075*	0.086*	−0.602	−0.468
	(0.040)	(0.047)	(0.687)	(0.856)
Longitude	−0.000	−0.000	0.010	0.004
	(0.000)	(0.001)	(0.006)	(0.008)
Latitude	−0.000	0.000	−0.018	−0.013
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.013)	(0.015)
Peasant unrest (pre-revolution)	0.000	0.000	−0.001	−0.001
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)
Worker strikes (pre-revolution)		0.005		−0.369
		(0.010)		(0.331)
(Intercept)	−0.134	−0.139	4.600**	4.088*
	(0.107)	(0.116)	(2.161)	(2.321)
R <sup>2</sup>	0.605	0.604	0.447	0.480
Num. obs.	50	45	50	45

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \* $p < 0.1$ . Robust-standard errors in parentheses

The unit of analysis is province. The dependent variables are the change between the 1901-1903 and 1904-1906 averages of conscription rate among the conscriptable population and province exposure to mobilizations, measured as the share of uyezds exposed to mobilizations in 1904, weighted by population.

Table A19: first-difference estimate

	$\Delta$ Peasant Unrest				$\Delta$ Worker Strikes			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
$\Delta$ Conscription	760.895*** (118.930)	858.208*** (145.151)	857.054*** (147.272)	858.600*** (147.816)	62.427*** (16.969)	79.416*** (20.568)	81.121*** (21.028)	81.792*** (21.150)
$\Delta$ Mobilizations		26.750** (12.266)	26.234** (12.414)	26.221** (12.487)		4.638*** (1.480)	4.645*** (1.476)	4.690*** (1.489)
(Intercept)	-14.604*** (2.796)	-16.795*** (3.424)	-14.595*** (4.020)	-10.591 (31.764)	-1.144*** (0.374)	-1.528*** (0.457)	-1.584*** (0.534)	9.870 (7.950)
Controls	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	No	Yes	Yes
Time-invariant controls	No	No	No	Yes	No	No	No	Yes
R <sup>2</sup>	0.305	0.332	0.333	0.333	0.199	0.277	0.281	0.284
Num. obs.	250	250	250	250	225	225	225	225
N Clusters	50	50	50	50	45	45	45	45

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \* $p < 0.1$ . Robust-standard errors clustered on province level in parentheses

The unit of analysis is province-year. The dependent variables are the change between the periods  $t - 1$  and  $t$  in the number of peasant unrest incidents per million rural population and worker strikes per thousand industrial workers.  $\Delta$  Conscription is the change in conscription rate among the conscriptable population between the periods  $t - 2$  and  $t - 1$ .  $\Delta$  Mobilizations is the change in province exposure to mobilizations, measured as the share of uezds exposed to mobilizations, weighted by population between the period  $t - 1$  and  $t$ . Controls include crop failure and lagged crop failure. Time-invariant controls include province population (log), share of rural population, population density, province centroid longitude and latitude, the share of ethnic Russians and religious orthodox.

Table A20: Event-study estimates based on Freyaldenhoven et al., 2021

	Peasant Unrest		Worker Strikes	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Conscription (lead)	269.003 (303.625)	258.842 (331.597)	63.102** (27.926)	53.746** (25.606)
Conscription (fd)	450.925** (208.682)	476.030* (267.068)	-11.258 (16.456)	9.083 (20.723)
Conscription (fd lag)	1069.003** (443.012)	1084.059** (460.923)	45.159 (58.133)	58.425 (59.126)
Conscription (lag2)	917.134 (617.028)	973.884 (774.771)	-58.619 (41.351)	-7.495 (49.416)
Mobilizations		6.032 (36.034)		4.995 (3.137)
Controls	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Province FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Year FE	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R <sup>2</sup>	0.791	0.791	0.720	0.734
Num. obs.	150	150	135	135
N Clusters	50	50	45	45

\*\*\* $p < 0.01$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \* $p < 0.1$ . Robust-standard errors clustered at province level in parentheses

The unit of analysis is province-year. The dependent variables are peasant unrest incidents per million rural population and workers strikes per thousand industrial workers. The effect of  $\text{conscription}_{t-1}$  and  $\text{mobilizations}_t$  on  $\text{unrest}_t$  is estimated. FD (first difference) estimates the effect of the increase in conscription in 1904. The unit of analysis is province-year. The dependent variables are peasant unrest incidents per million rural population and workers strikes per thousand industrial workers. Conscription is the rate of conscription quota over the conscriptable population and mobilizations are the share of uezds exposed to mobilizations in a province, weighted by population. Controls include crop failure and lagged crop failure.