




Chapter 13.2 Authentication Protocols





- Published protocols are often found to have flaws and need to be modified
- Key issues are
 - *Confidentiality
 - To prevent masquerade and to prevent compromise of session keys, essential identification and session key information must be communicated in encrypted form
 - Timeliness to prevent replay attacks

Replay Attacks

- A valid signed message is copied and later resent
 - Simple replay: the opponent simply copies a message and replays it later
 - Repetition that can be logged: an opponent can replay a timestamped message within the valid time window
 - *Repetition that cannot be detected: may arise because the original message could have been suppressed and thus did not arrive at its destination; only the replay message arrives.
 - Backward replay without modification: a replay back to the sender
 - When using symmetric encryption, the sender cannot easily recognize the difference between messages sent and messages received.

Replay Attacks

- Countermeasures
 - Attach a sequence number to each message used in an authentication exchange
 - ➤ Generally impractical requires each party to keep track of the last sequence number for each claimant it has dealt with
 - Timestamps: party A accepts a message as fresh only if the message contains a timestamp that, in A's judgment, is close enough to A's knowledge of current time.
 - ➤ Needs synchronized clocks

Replay Attacks (Cont.)

- Countermeasures
 - Nonce: a random number that illustrate the freshness of a session.
 - >Party A sends B a nonce and requires that the subsequent response received from B contains the correct nonce value.

4

Using Symmetric Encryption

- As discussed previously can use a two-level hierarchy of keys
- Usually with a trusted Key Distribution Center (KDC)
 - ♦ Each party shares own master key with KDC
 - KDC generates session keys used for connections between parties
 - * Master keys used to distribute these to them



Needham-Schroeder Symmetric Key Protocol

- Original third-party key distribution protocol
- For session between A B mediated by KDC
- Protocol:
- **1.** A->KDC: $ID_A || ID_B || N_1$
- **2**. KDC -> A: $E_{Ka}[Ks || ID_B || N_1 || E_{Kb}[Ks || ID_A]]$
- 3. A -> B: $E_{Kb}[K_S||ID_A]$
- **4.** B -> A: $E_{Ks}[N_2]$
- **5.** A -> B: $E_{Ks}[f(N_2)]$



Attack: Needham-Schroeder Protocol

- 3. A -> B: $E_{Kb}[Ks||ID_A]$
- **4.** B -> A: $E_{Ks}[N_2]$
- **5.** A -> B: $E_{Ks}[f(N_2)]$
- Suppose that an attacker X has been able to compromise an old session key.



Attack: Needham-Schroeder Protocol

- $\mathbf{3.A} \rightarrow \mathbf{B}$: $E_{Kb}[Ks||ID_A]$
 - **4.** B -> A: $E_{Ks}[N_2]$
 - **5.** A -> B: $E_{Ks}[f(N_2)]$
- Suppose that an attacker X has been able to compromise an old session key.
- X can impersonate A and trick B into using the old key by simply replaying step 3.
- Unless B remembers indefinitely all previous session keys used with A, B will be unable to determine that this is a replay.
- X then intercepts the step 4 and sends bogus messages to B that appear to B to come from A using an authenticated session key



Solution: Needham-Schroeder Protocol

- Use a timestamp T that assures A and B that the session key has only just been generated.
- Revised protocol:
- **1.** A->KDC: $ID_A || ID_B || N_1$
- **2**. KDC -> A: $E_{Ka}[Ks || ID_B || N_1 || E_{Kb}[Ks || ID_A || T]]$
- $\begin{array}{ll} \textbf{3. A -> B:} & & E_{Kb}[Ks\|ID_A\|\textbf{T}] \\ \textbf{4. B -> A:} & & E_{Ks}[N_2] \\ \end{array}$
- 5. A -> B: $E_{Ks}[f(N_2)]$

Timestamp

- Principals can verify the timeliness by checking: $|\text{Clock} T| < \Delta t_1 + \Delta t_2$
 - Ati: The estimated normal discrepancy between the KDC's clock and the local clock (principals' clock)
 - ❖∆t₂: The expected network delay time
- Need to synchronize clock

Suppress-Replay Attacks


- Suppress-replay attacks: when the sender's clock is ahead of the receiver's clock, the opponent can intercept a message from the sender and replay it later when the timestamp in the message becomes current at the receiver's site.
 - Replaying a message to purchase oil stocks one day later could result in a purchase when the stock price had already changed significantly.


Suppress-Replay Attacks


- Suppress-replay attacks: when the sender's clock is ahead of the receiver's clock, the opponent can intercept a message from the sender and replay it later when the timestamp in the message becomes current at the receiver's site.
 - Replaying a message to purchase oil stocks one day later could result in a purchase when the stock price had already changed significantly.
- Countermeasure:
 - Enforce the requirement that parties regularly check their clocks against the KDC's clock.
 - Rely on handshaking protocols using nonces.

Using Public-Key Encryption

- Have a range of approaches based on the use of publickey encryption
- Need to ensure have correct public keys for other parties
- Various protocols exist using timestamps or nonces









- Required when sender and receiver are not in communications at same time (eg. email)
- Have header in clear so can be delivered by email system
- May want contents of body protected & sender authenticated

Using Symmetric Encryption

- Can refine use of KDC but cannot have exchange of nonces:
- **1.** A->KDC: $ID_A || ID_B || N_1$
- **2**. KDC -> A: $E_{Ka}[Ks \parallel ID_B \parallel N_I \parallel E_{Kb}[Ks \parallel ID_A]]$
- **3.** A -> B: $E_{Kb}[Ks||ID_A] || E_{Ks}[M]$

Using Symmetric Encryption

- Can refine use of KDC but cannot have exchange of nonces:
- **1.** A->KDC: $ID_A || ID_B || N_I$
- **2**. KDC -> A: $E_{Ka}[Ks \parallel ID_B \parallel N_I \parallel E_{Kb}[Ks \parallel ID_A]]$
- **3.** A -> B: $E_{Kb}[Ks||ID_A] || E_{Ks}[M]$
- Guarantees that only the intended recipient of a message will be able to read it.
- Does not protect against replays
 - Could rely on timestamp in message, though email delays make this problematic

Assignment 4

- Due: April 16th (Monday)
- Done individually or by a group of two students
- Two choices: rootkit or PGP (choose ONE of them)

Assignment 4: Choice I

- choice I: Rootkit
- Find and download a windows rootkit that enables the attacker to hide files or processes, and demonstrate how to do it.
- You will need to install a virtual machine (e.g. virtualbox) and execute the rootkit inside the virtual machine.
- Demo: April 16th at G25 (or during Nikhil's office hours before April 16th)

Cs558: Introduction to security

Assignment 4: Choice II

- choice II: PGP
- Find PGP software that supports confidentiality and digital signature, and show how to use PGP to provide confidentiality and digital signature.
- You can choose any email client and any PGP software.
- Demo: April 16th at 625 (or during Nikhil's office hours before April 16th)