# Dynamic Hooks: Hiding Control Flow Changes within Non-Control Data

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#### Motivation

- In general, malware needs to intercept events within the system
- Event interception requires us to divert the control flow at runtime
- This is accomplished by installing hooks into the control flow

#### Motivation

- Types
  - Change code(Code Hooks)
  - Change function pointer(Data Hooks)
- Researchers have presented effective detection mechanisms for both types
- How can we evade existing detection mechanisms?

#### Definition

- Control data
  - Target location of a branch instruction
- Non-control data
  - Never contains the target address for a control transfer
- Transient
  - We consider control data to be transient when it cannot be reached through a pointer-chain originating from a global variable
- Persistent
  - We consider control data that is reachable through a global variable as persistent

#### Attacker model

- We already control the target application
  - We are not affected by most protection mechanisms
  - We can modify internal data structures and attack internal functions
  - We can prepare our shellcode in advance

# High-Level Overview

- Fundamental idea
  - Hide desired control flow change within non-control data such that there is no clear connection between the changes that the malware conducts and the actual control flow change

### Example

- [next+8] = prev
- [prev] = next
- We focus on 8-byte writes
- Mov [rax], rbx

```
1 struct list_head {
2     struct list_head *next;
3     struct list_head *prev;
4 };
5
6 static void list_del(struct list_head *entry)
7 {
8     entry ->next ->prev = entry ->prev;
9     entry ->next = entry ->next;
10 }
```

# Program Slicing

- Mov [<destination>], <source>
- Backwards breadth-first search on the assembly-level
- Extract path if destination and source originate from a global variable
- Implementation: IDA Pro

# Symbolic Execution

- Transform extracted path into VEX IR(pyvex)
- Map VEX statements into Z3 expressions
- Check satisfiability of conditional branches
- Generate detailed information about controlled registers

### Experiments

- Implemented three prototypes of dynamic hooks
- Control Hook: Interception of system calls(Linux)
- Data Hook: Backdoor(Linux)
- Control Hook: Interception of process termination(Windows)

OS	Size	Instructions	8-byte moves	Slices	Paths
Linux 3.8 64-bit (vmlinux)	18.8 MB	1,976,441	42,130 (2.1%)	1753 (4%)	566 (32%)
Windows 7 SP1 64-bit (ntoskrnl.exe)	5.3 MB	1,330,791	26,694 (2.0%)	5450 (20%)	379 (07%)