

Lab 2 Seguridad y Criptografía

Course code: MC1003

Due: **Friday**, July 15, 2022 at 23:59 (Central Standard Time)

Total points: 8 points

1. Bad Randomness (2 points)

Similar to what you already saw in the first lab assignment, randomness is very important when generating a public/private key pair for RSA.

- (a) (1 point) Consider two public keys, $\mathbf{pk}_1 = (N_1, e = 0x10001)$ and $\mathbf{pk}_2 = (N_2, e = 0x10001)$, where N_1 and N_2 share a common prime number due to bad randomness.

How can you now recover the private keys \mathbf{sk}_1 and \mathbf{sk}_2 ? Explain.

- (b) (1 point) Let

$N_1 = 3191126887972615359290614465423702737629560512224421362292218$
6521905706566982029803162058645560935018590239228741916856548386
9084514809211975590029999236821122153516531910565008616422920925
4228987186394891976910232210959241025633092028975573883011389722
3085997490143812504556443250361624670954182290699884363278896117
2605137280117142722161916237200250585743393911611344274558441736
4996680200108408543401578860426401824083723554066997979115966564
1798142182641260977245871174011676056877150506997452523149677619
5953621847224278399730697928005114610975430161066051857688562011
37690019195422872853821674569617291045348689

and

$N_2 = 2974909823454495072255372891548773688903200086623543999022467$
2856459603959762999494308747194494532325885995604229460732526748
4687019494831477425294160828530141507244395018121377632483415533
2988620945592689590638946639393125918717934581961833169538313169
7541789713809171851909036255858913738517079097328136385803271665
2133964017976667193266598715152688529584420815646951260766155936
9054493310117931572471531397815533956702789954596499920156558650
3260559560324485135168632732813082657924153077728565345736780910
6580860151881978913299910731466013368844781142051348853597520697
12996903473839150213862565214367526184271213.

Factor both numbers N_1 and N_2 .

2. More Bad RSA Keys (2 points)

Another way that public/private key pair is badly generated is when the prime numbers p and q are too close to each other.

(a) (1 point) Consider a public keys using

$$\begin{aligned} N &= p \cdot q \\ &= 314016126875281779302159431488488093115189046484126236482204915 \\ &\quad 609991340471333874040354042341733057218806041430395854865153171948 \\ &\quad 649065482112587211864283172597729433990414542217434075944706200739 \\ &\quad 779364975019945830098835338412775961037281658461017374918168066900 \\ &\quad 672214636768857244499390228999231849898924217272412805966068322075 \\ &\quad 075909470987926837448053744638809590938334487898848200820107586057 \\ &\quad 378687987837181569188381155145733282549352429930054333651262644777 \\ &\quad 514440263106662377444759572773862096315793552433161710729694614564 \\ &\quad 951925949303268644429565120775803679205230567650406387740097425194 \\ &\quad 69467742782525619657333117 \end{aligned}$$

where $p - q$ is very small.

Recover the private prime factors p and q of N .

Hint: Search online for Fermat's factorization method.

(b) (1 point) Extend Fermat's factorization method to factor

$$\begin{aligned} N &= p \cdot q \\ &= 618752364007207591284109412150164794536132821231986673313770167 \\ &\quad 666039276659973971632204267869151951518253690386309534000786674238 \\ &\quad 456324047639814703435669870984983017537303908576121222975508358496 \\ &\quad 548283646706099968170026242959094629203442925615417525282417850631 \\ &\quad 666359680631223552558952827856980824209037759395888246042660163687 \\ &\quad 894752081110174188325115259010287761255186924559097596512151988429 \\ &\quad 143545671180788398203180995440625529174570765881435456358896432403 \\ &\quad 381754998817473476518850943688321960813315691821991508381900490665 \\ &\quad 384772634214473523184400845072371017080529293748496097572434607853 \\ &\quad 13196143175160485430252643 \end{aligned}$$

where $2p - q$ is very small.

Recover the private prime factors p and q of N .

3. Wiener's Attack (4 points)

Read §15.4.3 from "Cryptography Made Simple" or read the paper "The Wiener Attack on RSA Revisited: A Quest for the Exact Bound" by Susilo, Tonien, and Yang.

Recover the private exponent d from the public key

$$\text{pk} = (N, e)$$

= (315722536689462233683401571007219877667462184637368247835056351319
210538803987413206448754213295042179334164223369184162634085389521
779865089941755911827689502071473361884324551246675142018673769092
277881349413235559024950492336012876964568163854559077250328865620
514543224686682146256123171099930786205296397746165184436778043914
088916419031755368476860302116325236607820372134470884791312695652
042823246635174217060484029106510997449740567867278129911921769970
507394714033694216171600037722890482678090224699159245693859425690
221787742258341655710536572001294010527641200208773139834090049325
71630004656678491554033,
70842151944435991603396143211389289832143622696644005079902586919862
345673473795328097002322568057156698994351254555897663956004135335
035738229891028238788265400363178482454918347634606932994120116192
108273115875003116576214398931478155828448147486509421864497870611
508277539582253193781641690857245219504455168163924433928359460573
621757335385561924119945058585926126628057117144491458995441663546
604657945675704685630348191661091057981949364165491498644122187090
178645268101228621558578266015743026594422606666430661142213748521
044284255031353739855694998382513818025590477358168385962206534549
21257900296590700089).