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Part 1

Introduction

Introduce things here.

Part 2

The Basic Right

This work seeks to examine the moral principles which human and non-human coexistence on the planet. But before venturing into more uncertain territory, I will begin by sketching out a starting point:

The Basic Right: all animals have the right not to *used* as property, resources, or as mere means to an end.

In this section, I'll provide some arguments reasons to believe that the basic right exists and touch on how to determine which things are owed this right (which things are animals). This section won't contain an exhaustive argument for this right — several other works have already painstakingly laid out the arguments to support this basic right for animals. I will conclude by describing what implications this fundamental right has, and which implications it does not have.

2.0.1 Grounding the Right

For the purposes of this work, I take the view of fundamental rights advanced by Christine Korsgaard in *Fellow Creatures*.¹

Korsgaard's argument is established on the foundation of Kant's moral philosophy. Kant seeks to determine the presuppositions of valuing; the premises that are implicitly accepted any time we confer value upon something. There is no metaphysical "absolute" reference frame from which

1. kors.

“true” value can be determined. Rather, things are valuable insofar as they are valuable to a being.

Kant argues that rational beings can only pursue ends that are absolutely good, good from all perspectives.² So, an end that one rational being pursues is absolutely good and worthy of pursuit by any other. Humans have the capability to act as rational beings. When humans rationally act on ends, they confer absolute value on those ends, marking them as good absolutely. “By pursuing what is good for you as good absolutely, you show that you regard yourself as an end in itself, or perhaps to put it a better way, you make a claim to that standing.”³

This seems to leave animals — most of whom are not rational beings — out of the moral picture. If animals are not rational, then they cannot make a claim to standing as an end in themselves.

Korsgaard argues that Kant uses the phrase ‘end in itself’ to refer to two slightly different concepts. Kant sometimes refer to an ‘end in itself’ as a being who has the ability to legislate for itself and all rational beings. At other times, Kant refers to an ‘end in itself’ as a being whose ends are recognized as absolutely good and protected by universal legislation. Korsgaard argues that the two do not always need to be one and the same.

When we act as rational beings, we do not assert that only rational beings have value. After all, a rational being without any substance, form, or other natures would not have any ends within itself to seek or any desires to pursue. Instead, our rational nature confers value upon the ends we seek as animals, creatures who have representations of the world and seek good within it. We share these ends and this nature with other non-human animals, and so when we value ourselves as creatures that have a final good, we also confer value on other creatures with final goods. In her own words,

As rational beings, we need to justify our actions, to think there are reasons for them. That requires us to suppose that some ends are worth pursuing, are absolutely good. Without metaphysical insight into a realm of intrinsic values, all we have to go on is that some things are certainly good-for or bad-for us. That then is the starting point from which we build up our

2. kors.

3. kors.

system of values—we take those things to be good or bad absolutely—and in doing that we are taking ourselves to be ends in ourselves. But we are not the only beings for whom things can be good or bad; the other animals are no different from us in that respect. So we are committed to regarding all animals as ends in themselves.⁴

2.0.2 Coming Apart from Korsgaard

Thus far, it has been established that animals are ends in themselves. But this alone does not show the principle laid out in The Basic Right. We must ask what it means to be treated as an end, and how treatment as an end in the rational, legislative sense might differ from treatment as an end in the human sense.

Korsgaard comes to the conclusion that animals have a good, but because they lack rationality, they do not get an ‘equal vote’ in our interactions with them.⁵ Despite the fact that they cannot consent to our interactions with them, because our own moral legislation declares their ends to be worthy, we have a duty to treat animals in a manner that is consistent with their ends.⁶ Korsgaard distinguishes this treatment from treatment of animals “in ways to which they would consent if they could,” but she is unclear if the two generate different outcomes.⁷

However I think that Korsgaard’s conclusions entail the principle of the Basic Right, and that respect of the Basic Right is a subset of Korsgaard’s duties to treat animals in a manner consistent with their ends.

Consistent with Consent and Consistent with Good

A creature is an end in itself by virtue of the fact that it has a final good which it seeks through action. What is good-for the creature are things which the creature seeks by acting. Our knowledge of the good of creatures is only gained by observing the creature’s actions; what the creature seeks and avoids. When we assert that something is good for a creature, we assert that it is a thing that the creature would seek out or act towards.

4. kors.

5. kors.

6. kors.

7. kors.

When we interact in ways that are consistent with a creature's good, we interact in ways that are not contrary to things that are good for the creature — things that we think the creature would seek out as a final good.

This doesn't mean, of course, that we must always act in ways that creatures would — it is permissible, after all, to take a cat to the vet. But taking a cat to the vet against their wishes is different from attempting to make a cat appreciate classical music, or choosing to kill the cat for use as coat-liner. In the former case, we take something we know the cat would act towards (good health), and intervene to use our greater knowledge of the situation (the vet is there to help) to help secure the cat's own final good. The euthanization case that Korsgaard gives may be something similar; a decision we can permissibly make for a creature because we have a greater knowledge of what death is.⁸ In the latter cases, we seek to impose some other good on the cat; goods that a cat would not act towards themselves.

Because our knowledge of a creature's good is defined by their actions and pursuits, I don't think there's very much daylight between Korsgaard's two moral guidelines of acting in ways that an animal could consent and acting in ways that are consistent with an animal's good. The one place where they may come apart is in treatment that would undermine a being's autonomy while still satisfying their good. For a rational being, this class of actions does not exist, because a rational being has no good other than their autonomous choices. Non-rational ends such as creatures mark their final goods as absolute, but do not legislate for others through their actions.

Note 1: change this slightly to say that creature's good and ways they would consent are the same; don't make this distinction

Deception, for example, is wrong because it undermines a rational being's autonomy, and it is not something a rational being could consent to. Non-rational beings cannot consent to treatment, but define their good through their actions over time. It would be permissible to deceive a cat (by offering a treat, or lying about a travel destination) to get them to go to the vet, as long as the ultimate aim of the action was consistent with the good of the cat.

8. kors.

Consistent with Good and Basic Right

I believe that, similarly, there is a narrow window between treating an animal in a manner which is consistent with their good and not treating an animal as a means to an end. I think that this gap is essentially closeable, depending on one's view of the moral

2.0.3 Epistemology of Subjectivity**2.0.4 Implications****2.0.5 Uncharted Territory**

Part 3

Animals and Property

In her work *Moral Status*, Mary Anne Warren argues that animals have a lower moral status than humans.¹ Warren's argument relies on the intuition that we are willing to kill rats that invade our homes where we would not be willing to kill human children if they were in the same position.

Warren's argument has already been rejected², but her hypothetical raises unanswered questions. Human and animal interests come into constant conflict over the Earth's land and resources. It seems as if any hard-line animal rights theory would be forced into an uncomfortable conclusion. To minimize killing animals over land or resource conflicts, humans would be forced to return to gatherer lifestyles.

In the previous section, I concluded that it is impermissible to use animals as mere resources for human ends. In this section, I will consider the duties we have to share the resources of the Earth with other animals.

Property, or something like it, is a pre-theoretical and pre-human notion. A beehive as the property of the bees who live in it. Marked territory seems like a kind of property that a wolf seeks to claim. And I am certainly unlikely to intrude on a bear in their hibernation den. TODO citations/explanations from Wildlife as Property Owners. If humans claim special protections and a right to defend their own property, then I don't think that it's unreasonable to think that animals might have similar, special rights to their own as well.

I will conclude that humans and animals both have subject-relative

1. Warren is a little dated... should I be bringing her up here?

2. that one 2007 paper

prerogatives to defend their rightfully acquired property. This prerogative permits the use of lethal defensive force as a final resort to defend a person's closely held property against nonhuman and human invaders alike. However, there are circumstances that might render humans liable to defensive force or intrusions by other beings.

Furthermore, I will argue that humans do not have a duty to re-wild long-held human spaces for the sake of other animals, but that all people have strong duties to reduce or eliminate the harm caused through continuing human expansion.

3.1 Defense of Property

Defense of property sometimes justifies actions that are otherwise impermissible. If a person is walking across the street in front of us, we may not demand that they leave. We certainly should not harm them or treat them as liable to harms. We can certainly demand that a person walking around our home leave. If they ignore the demand, they may be liable to harm.

These statements are relatively uncontroversial when referring to rational persons who willingly and knowingly trespass on private, individually owned or occupied property. This becomes less clear when discussing nonhuman animals. Few of them could be described as rational and even fewer might understand the concept of property. Even if they could, they might fall outside the covenant or agreement that protects property rights.

However, it seems like the concept of self-defense or defense of property can still be applied against animals. If there are insects living in my skin, I feel no qualms about killing them, even though they may not be aware they are invading my body.³ I am also willing to believe that it is easier to justify capturing or even killing rats in one's home rather than rats living in the woods.

In this section, I'll consider the nature of the right of property and the morality of defense of property. In the following section, I will expand on this baseline and apply the

3. I will assume for the moment that these insects should be accorded moral status though it is unclear.

3.1.1 Claiming Property

Property are the things that a being controls in order to secure their ends. To hold a resource as property is to have a rightful claim to use it for any purpose that does not interfere with the choice or similar right of another. To claim an unclaimed resource as property, one need only empirically control it and signal an intent to continue controlling it. The concept of property is not dependent on the existence of an agreement to enforce or define it.⁴

Consider a pared down example. A table is laid out with a collection of books on it, along with a sign saying “Free to Take.” I see a book I like, and I intend to collect it after class. If another person takes the book before I do, then they have not wronged me.

On the other hand, imagine I actually did take the book. Another person sees it in my bag and chooses to take it from me. This person has wronged me because they used an object which I had marked as my property in a way that I did not authorize.

This example also demonstrates that an interest-based theory of property alone is insufficient. In both cases, my interests are set back by equal amounts. However, I am only wronged in the latter case.

This description is rather simple and far from complete. I will readily admit that there are certain restrictions in claiming property — it would probably be wrong for a person to take all of the books, for example. Rights of property can be modified or clarified by political bodies. In addition, there is a distinction between property (specific pieces of real property, objects, and agreements) and wealth (the degree that the sum total of one’s property allows them to secure their ends). While there ought to be relatively stringent protections over individual pieces of property (something like eminent domain/takings requirements), enforceable obligations to transfer a certain amount of wealth need not be as strongly justified and compensated.

3.1.2 Property in a State of Nature

Even within a state of nature, prior to any unification of will or hypothetical agreements, intruding upon a person’s rightfully claimed personal

4. Perhaps I should make this section more explicitly Kantian? It’s based closely on foundations in Ripstein and descriptions in Quong

property renders the intruder liable to defensive harm unless the property owner is duty-bound to accept the intrusion. Establishing that property may be defended in a state of nature is important because we are (quite literally) in a state of nature with the other animals.

Consider an example given by Jonathon Quong. A shipwrecked sailor washes up to the shore of a deserted island. Her leg is wounded. In order to save a limb, she can use a special piece of seaweed that has washed up on shore with her. She uses the seaweed to cover the wound. Soon after, another person washes up alongside. The second person also requires the seaweed to staunch a wound. The second person has an interest in the seaweed that is equal to the interest of the first person. It seems clear here that the second person could not take the seaweed from the first.⁵

To extend the example, let's say that the sailor needs to set the seaweed aside temporarily. If she demonstrates a need and intent to continue using it, then she has demarcated it as her property. The second person ought not take the seaweed from the first even though it is no longer directly connected to her person. If the second person does so, then they render themselves liable to proportional defensive harm from the first.

In a pre-political state, there is no assurance that a right to property will be respected.⁶ In a way, a person is still subject to the choices and good graces of others. Remaining in this state would be wrong for all rational beings. As Japa Pallakathiyil notes, a lack of assurance does not necessarily imply that a person's right loses all *moral* force. Pallakathiyil goes on to argue that the state of nature renders a person's right inconclusive, rendering their use of defensive force impermissible. I find this argument lacking.⁷ My intuition is that it remains permissible to use defensive force over clearly determined property even in the absence of a political body.

3.1.3 The Agent-Relative Prerogative

In the previous section, I stated that a person can become liable to proportional defensive harm when they intrude on another person's property. This is only applicable when a person is rational (can respond to moral

5. Quong

6. Ripstein

7. I could break out into a longer discussion of Pallakathiyil here but I don't want to but it seems like I really should.

reasons) and aware that the object they are interacting with is another's property.⁸

This position is insufficient to explain situations where the intruder is not rational or responsible for their intrusion — the innocent attacker. This situation describes most intrusions by non-human animals, all of whom are nonrational or unfamiliar with human conventions and signs that claim property.

I will adopt Jonathon Quong's explanation of the morality of defense against an innocent attacker. Quong's explanation relies on the agent-relative prerogative. The agent-relative prerogative is a principle which states that an agent is permitted to weigh their own ends more heavily than another's interests. The prerogative can also extend to other beings that an agent is responsible for or have strong relations with — for example, a person is also permitted to give greater weight to the interests of their child. I will not make an extensive argument for it here; see Quong for a more detailed discussion.⁹

In a situation when at least one being's rights will be violated (like an innocent attack), the agent-relative prerogative gives an agent the permission to prefer that another's rights are violated instead of their own. This permits proportional self-defense against innocent attackers.

3.1.4 Proportionality and Property

The proportionality constraint of self-defense requires acts of defense to not cause much more harm than they seek to prevent. In paradigm cases of defensive force against a liable attacker, the attacker's interests are weighed less heavily because they have made themselves liable. In addition, a defender (but not a third party) is permitted to weigh their own interests more heavily under the agent-relative prerogative.

In contrast, in a case of defense against an innocent attacker, the attacker's interests do not have a reduced strength. Instead, the defender's agent-relative prerogative and increased weight to their own interests is the only justification for their defense. A third-party would not have reason to prefer the defender's interests over the attacker's.

8. For example, a rational elephant may not become liable to defensive harm because they may not be aware of the kinds of signals used by humans to claim property.

9. maybe I should motivate it just a little more though

The fact that the defender's rightful property is endangered is a threshold condition for the use of defensive force. The proportionality of the defensive force is determined in part by the strength of the defender's interests that are at stake. This means that proportionality will look very different for different pieces of property. A piece of seaweed or a plot of farmland that is critical to one's life or livelihood represents a strong interest. On the other hand, other rightfully possessed things may be less important and permit a lesser amount of defensive force to be used to preserve them.

3.2 Non-Rational Animals and Non-Rational Humans

The previous section described a right of property and rightful defense of property against innocent, human attackers. In this section, I will describe some of the differences between innocent human attackers and non-rational animal attackers and why they are relevant to ethics.

There are important differences between non-human and human animals. These differences are unrelated to the mental capacities of different beings. Instead, these differences have to do with the special relational duties we have to most non-rational humans and the differences in size and number that necessitate violent response against nonhumans in more cases than for humans.

The intuitions highlighted by Mary Anne Warren pick out these differences rather than differences in the underlying duties we owe to humans and animals because of their basic capacities. I am not arguing that there are no differences in capacity-based duties towards humans and nonhumans. Instead, I am arguing that these differences are not necessary to explain differing intuitions about the permissibility of defensive force.¹⁰

10. The argument structure here is similar to the section in Palmer that references Pogge's work. The idea is to show that different intuitions about humans and animals can be explained without reference to moral status by pointing to all of the other different factors.

3.2.1 Beneficence

In Clare Palmer's *Animal Ethics in Context*, Palmer argues for a limited version of the Laissez-Faire Intuition (LFI). Palmer's version of the LFI holds that we have few, if any duties of beneficence to wild animals that are unaffected by human actions. However, we owe wild animals duties of beneficence when we benefit from institutions that harm them, when we form inter-special communities with them,¹¹ or when we are causally responsible for unwarranted harm to them.

In most circumstances, we have few obligations of beneficence to the rats, raccoons, and other liminal animals that largely benefit from human expansion and human spaces.

The obligation of beneficence is related to self defense because it sets an upper bound on the proportionality of self-defense through the agent-relative prerogative. In paradigm cases of self-defense, the offending party has made themselves liable in some way when they choose to take a violent action.

But the logic of self-defense through the agent-relative prerogative is different. When defending oneself against a non-culpable attacker, we do not assume that the attacker has forfeited or decreased the strength of their rights against being harmed. Instead, the defender is permitted to take harmful defensive action because they are permitted to weigh their own interests, goals, and projects more highly than that of the attacker. If they may prevent harm to themselves by redirecting it towards a third party (without *using* that third party's body or property in the process), then they are permitted to do so.

Their obligation of beneficence to that third party sets an upper bound on the amount of harm they may redirect relative to the amount of harm they would accept. Let's say that a defender must kill an innocent attacker in order to prevent the loss of a leg. This might very well be permissible under the agent-relative prerogative.

If a defender would be duty-bound to accept the loss of a leg to (for example) save 5 innocent attackers, then they may not defend themselves against those innocent attackers for the sake of their leg. This does not imply that they may defend themselves against 3 attackers — it is worse to cause harm than to fail to rescue a person from harm. However, the benef-

11. Garibaldi

icence continues to serve as an upper limit, a maximum on the amount of harm that can be imposed to protect oneself.

Beneficence can be more than just an upper limit. The degree of beneficence that we owe to a person is directly related to the strength of their interests compared to ours. If we have a strong duty of beneficence to a person (or animal), then we ought to meet their ends even at considerable personal cost. Their interests weigh heavily on the scale compared to our own.

It is a similar weighing of interests that determines proportionality for defense against innocent attackers. We are permitted to weigh our own interests more heavily than the equal interests of another. The weight we give the other being's interests is directly related to the comparison underlying the obligation of beneficence. The main difference between defense against innocent attackers and the duty of beneficence is that the former case is concerned with doing harm and the latter with giving aid. In general, it is worse to do harm than to fail to give aid, so the scales are adjusted slightly differently in the case of innocent self defense. But the quantity measured (the difference in weight between the defender and the attacker's interests) is the same in both cases.

So, when we have a greater relational obligation of beneficence to someone, we also have greater duties to accept the harm they innocently impose in order to avoid harming them.

Note that the general duty of beneficence is different from specific compensatory duties. My obligation to repair the damage that I caused to another person's car doesn't make me more liable to the innocent threats that they may impose. However, my general relational duties of beneficence towards a person (say, because they are my family member or coworker) give me a reason to weigh their interests more heavily both in my duties of beneficence and my prerogative of defense against innocent attackers.

3.2.2 Proxy Rationality

As Christine Korsgaard puts it, animal + rational \neq human. A non-rational human is (almost always) dependent on other humans to survive. Many non-rational animals are capable of securing their own ends without human help.

Non-rational humans are generally in the care of other, rational hu-

3.2. *NON-RATIONAL ANIMALS AND NON-RATIONAL HUMANS* 19

mans. Human communities and sometimes individual humans usually have strong duties of beneficence to care for non-rational humans. When non-rational humans are in the care of rational humans, that human can take on some of the duties of ensuring that a non-rational human secures their ends in accordance with the relevant duties and laws that would apply if the non-rational human were rational.

Rational humans are responsible for the actions of non-rational humans in their care. I don't mean this in the retrospective sense of culpability or moral responsibility. Rather, I mean it in the prospective sense. If a child steals a candy bar from a store, their parent is not morally responsible for the theft. However, the parent is responsible for making the store whole and educating their child, if appropriate.

Parents or other guardians can also be responsible in the retrospective sense. A parent may be negligent, permitting their child to intrude on others' personal space. If so, that parent would be culpable for their negligence and responsible for apologizing to others and making them whole. It is not always the case that the guardians of non-rational humans actually act in accordance with their duties. But the important thing is that those duties actually exist and have a person that ought to fulfill them.

This is not true of many non-rational animals. These animals cannot fulfill duties¹² and do not have a 'proxy' rational agent that can take responsibility for their actions.

The upshot of all this is that when there is some assurance that property rights will be respected or duly compensated, the importance of defending the right decreases. In addition, a guardian's responsibility can provide some assurance that future trespasses do not occur. We can infer that a rat who is expelled may intrude again if they are not left far away, but we cannot infer the same when we return a non-rational human (or animal) to their guardian.¹³

12. I think they can have duties though. Most humans aren't rational most of the time, but we can enforce duties against them while they're asleep. Similarly, I can enforce a duty against an animal who would have had such a duty were they rational.

13. I don't think I'm being incredibly clear in this passage whether the existence of the duty is important or whether the pragmatic assurance is important. I'm not too clear on that myself.

3.2.3 Size, Number, and Future Expectations

There are a few pragmatic concerns that makes violence against non-human invaders necessary more often than violence against human invaders. Non-human animal invaders are often smaller than humans. There are also more of them. In common cases, they also multiply — a few rats in a home today may mean a dozen in a few months.

The first two points have to do with the necessity constraint of self-defense. In cases of self defense, no person deserves to be harmed. Instead, costs are distributed in the fairest way possible. However, overall costs should still be minimized. If a defender can take choose between a less harmful defense and a more harmful defense (both of which fully address the threat), they have an obligation to choose the former. That obligation has nothing to do with the degree of status or consideration given to the attacker.

Because humans often occupy spaces designed for humans, it is often possible to address innocent human invaders using non-lethal means. However, non-human invaders occupy spaces in our walls and crevices in such a way that it is more difficult to find them and more difficult to remove them non-lethally. This doesn't mean that they have fewer moral rights — if it were possible to do so, there would still be an obligation to take the least harmful means. Instead, it just means that in some cases, it might be permissible to kill a nonhuman animal where a human threat could be addressed without violence.

The final point — the fact that contramensal animals often multiply — has to do with the magnitude of the threat. The presence of several termites in the walls does not necessarily weigh greatly on the interests of the humans who live there. However, a few termites will likely become a few thousand. So, the anticipated threat that the termites present is not just their presence in the wall, but in the likely future harm that they might impose.

The likely possibility of escalating harm permits a wider scope of defensive actions now in order to avoid future harms in addition to imminent harms.

3.2.4 The Role of Moral Status

The three non-capacity characteristics that humans often have (stronger duties of beneficence, proxy rationality, and pragmatic differences) explains most of the difference between defense against, say, rats and defense against, say, children. Companion animals and domestic animals have all three of these qualities. Defenders have stronger duties of beneficence, the animals are in the care and control of a guardian, and they are few in number, large in size, and slow in reproduction. When we compare dogs and children, I think the gap in our intuitions about the morality of self defense certainly shrinks.

There is still a gap — and maybe that gap is attributable to a difference in relative moral status. But that does relatively light lifting compared to these other features. It also only ‘kicks in’ in situations when we must compare the interests of humans and animals anyway (like innocent self-defense or lifeboat scenarios). It does not permit the treatment of animals as if they have no ends at all.

It certainly doesn’t do to what Warren, DeGrazia, and others want it to do in permitting animal research or hunting.

3.3 Animals as Property Holders

I think that animals clearly mark and claim property as well. Cheryl Abbate Liability to defensive harm. Humans become liable to defensive harm when they intrude on animal property. If I poke a beehive, I am perfectly liable for the stings that I receive afterwards, and I shouldn’t use defensive force against the bees. Same goes for poking around in bare caves and sticking a hand down a snakehole.

Part 4

Risk of Harm to Non-human Animals

Risks of harm pervade our daily lives. Driving cars, operating oil refineries, and even flipping light switches impose risks on other beings. The moral boundaries of imposing risk are hardly settled even in the case of humans. However, the issue has yet to be directly addressed in the case of non-human animals, even though it has a tremendous significance in environmental and public policy.

In this chapter, I will briefly sketch a theory of risk imposition that is informed by the basic deontic views I have accepted in previous sections. I will then identify three elements of the ethics of risk imposition that are unique to nonhuman animals.

First, I'll address the intuition that it is worse to impose risk on wildlife than it is to impose risk on contact-zone or liminal animals. Second, I will discuss the relationship between human duties to avoid imposing risk and the expansion of animal population. Third, I will consider the problem of vultures, or the moral value of secondary benefits generated through potentially wrongful risk imposition.

4.1 A General View of Risk

Discussions of the moral permissibility of risk can be divided into two different categories: the duties of an individual risk-imposer, or the duties of a regulator setting rules for individual risk imposition. For the purposes

of this paper, I will collapse the two discussions by setting aside practical considerations about the implementation or enforcement of policy. What I am interested in is the values that regulators and individuals alike should seek to uphold.

4.1.1 Cost-Benefit Analysis

The dominant view in modern U.S. regulation is cost-benefit analysis, a close relative of expected utility theory. Regulators use economic methods to estimate the cost that a person is willing to pay to avoid a particular amount of risk. This measure is used to ‘price’ a human life, providing a guidepost to determine the costs that must be paid in order to avoid risky actions. This measure is often referred to as the Willingness To Pay (WTP) metric.

This view is defended by Cass Sunstein, who argues in favor of its efficacy and that this measure is consistent with consequential and deontological theories. It seeks to maximize expected consequences and also treats people in accordance with the rules they create for themselves, thus respecting their dignity.¹

Apart from possible methodological shortcomings,² this view is most closely criticized by Lisa Heirtzerlinger, who argues that Sunstein essentially assumes that risk impositions are de facto permissible and that safety precautions are sometimes required. Sunstein does not ever consider that the risky activity as a whole might be impermissible, or consider what the justification for engaging in the activity might be.

In addition to Heirtzerlinger’s criticism, Sunstein’s argument is also vulnerable to the objection that the methodology of WTP does not capture what it is permissible for *other* people to do to me. I may rightfully choose to save \$50 of my dollars by accepting some small risk. However, this is not evidence that I would endorse the rule that some other person could benefit to the tune of \$50 while exposing *me* to the same risk.³ While Sunstein argues that production costs will eventually be passed down to the consumer, Sunstein does not consider that the person at risk and the person benefiting could be different — a factory could impose risk of harm

1. cite

2. cite

3. Hanson diver

to people around area A, but produce products which are primarily sold in area B. In this situation, the residents of area B are benefiting from the loss of residents of A with no clear economic mechanism to correct this inequity.

A more fundamental concern with the WTP approach is that it violates some of the core commitments of deontological ethics; namely, that it assigns a price to that which is priceless — a life. Though Sunstein and advocates of WTP argue that their practice does not assign a price to life, and merely a cost for some statistical benefits. Despite this rhetorical shift, the WTP theorist would still be acting as though they had assigned a fixed price to dignity.⁴

The issue with the rhetorical shift is further revealed by Lisa Heitzler, who enumerates a number of uncomfortable consequences of the WTP metric that really seem like instances of valuing dignity itself, despite what the economists might respond.

Importantly, the cost-benefit analysis view reduces the value of animals and the environment to the instrumental costs that people are willing to pay to protect them. Non-human animals generally do not actively participate in the human economy, so we cannot determine a WTP metric for them, no matter what normative force it would carry. This use of the WTP metric treats the environment and other animals as merely instrumental and only worth the price that humans are willing to pay. The single strongest argument in favor of the WTP metric is that it describes self-authored preferences regarding risk, and in a way respects the agency of a person. However, this argument does not apply to the way that WTP is used to price other animals and the environment.

Even if cost-benefit analyses are the most efficient way to regulate and control our environmental impact in an increasingly complex economy (as Richard Posner argues)⁵, because of the preceding problems, cost-benefit analyses do not have great normative force and cannot serve as the guideposts of or moral values. Instead, it must be the other way around — we should appraise the moral values we hold and perhaps accept cost-benefit analyses as the lesser of many evil means to best uphold those values.

4. Uncertainty Kant

5. cite

4.1.2 Risks as Reciprocal, Connected Practices

Sven Ove Hanson's view of risk as a set of connected social practices could provide a moral foundation for our imposition of risk on our fellow creatures. Hanson argues for a 'fair exchange of risk' model, concluding with the principle that:

Exposure of a person to risk is acceptable if (i) this exposure is part of a persistently justice-seeking social practice of risk-taking that works to her advantage and which she de facto accepts by making use of its advantages, and (ii) she has as much influence over her risk-exposure as every similarly exposed person can have without the loss of the benefits that justify that exposure.⁶

This principle is agreeable, and Hanson argues for it capably. It provides an ethical basis for many day-to-day practices that essentially everyone would like to accept as permissible. It also outlines the reasons that we can call another to account for their risk taking. We might argue that imposed risk is unreasonable (it goes beyond common social practice); that it is unjust (it is unevenly concentrated); or that it is unaccepted (the relevant class of people exposed to risk have not had the opportunity to accept it, or have explicitly rejected it).

Hanson's view is also consistent with the intuition that, all things being equal, it is worse to impose risk on people outside of community that benefits from the risk imposition than it is to impose risk on people inside of that community. In other words, it would be worse to divert a U.S. factory's pollution to a town in Canada than towards a town on this side of the border. This acknowledges the political dimension of risk and the role that consent and appropriate procedure play in risk imposition.

One point that Hanson does not make about reciprocal risk exchange but ultimately bolsters his stance is that it may not actually be necessary for a person to exercise their liberty to take risks under a social agreement for them to benefited by that liberty. In other words, if my neighbor and I both have equal say in a rule that permits everyone to use a driving lawnmower, it is not necessarily unfair or unequal to me if I do not use a driving lawnmower. I retain the option to use one of I choose; I am held

6. hanson 107

to the same rules as my neighbor even if I do not seek to exercise them to the fullest extent.

Of course, if the rules are structured to permit all of my neighbor's desires and none of mine, I might claim that the rules are unjust. In practice, there is a preference to permit risky activities of the upper classes when equally risky behaviors of the impoverished are condemned.⁷

4.1.3 "Social Practice"

One ambiguity in Hanson's view is how widely to draw the net of 'social practice.' Does social practice include any and all socially-acceptable risky acts? We might accept that driving is a social practice, whereas archery is not, as Jonathan Quong argues.⁸ Or, we might choose a broader view that collects and considers essentially all permitted social practices as one big social exchange.

I don't think that there are moral reasons to distinguish between activity types in this way. As Helen Frowe argues, if a risky action earns the actor some benefit at the cost of some risk of harm to others, the class of the action does not seem to affect its morality.

It may be legal to drive around for enjoyment but not shoot guns up in the air for enjoyment, even if both impose the same risk to others. But I think that this is a convenience of legislation and not a moral implication. We all agree to some level of risk that we tolerate in order to benefit from those impositions and impose risks of our own, but this exchange doesn't speak to the class or type of token actions of risk so long as they have acceptable costs and sufficient benefits.

So, when Hanson discusses the social practice of risk-taking, he must refer to it in the broadest sense; all risky acts which, taken together, leave us better off than the absence of all these acts.

4.1.4 Deep Detour into Hanson and Sunstein [Optional section for expansion]

While Hanson's principles may be useful to regulators, it does not provide substantial guidance regarding individual tokens of risk imposition.

7. cite e.g. francione

8. cite

In brief, the problem of precautions remains unsolved, generating several puzzles about how actual tokens should be evaluated and when precautions are required.

I think that the way to do this is a baseline maximum of risk that a person may be willing to accept. This line can be crossed if it is necessary to preserve dignity elsewhere, but never merely for material gain. There is no difference between a dollar of material gain and a million; material gain is material gain. The only thing that matters is the rules we articulate for ourselves and each other, thus preserving dignity. This would lead to some kind of regulation like best-in-class requirements for safety. More to think about this, might not be necessary to include.

4.2 Animals and Reciprocal Risks

Hanson does not consider risks imposed to non-human animals. However, I believe that non-human animals fit well into this framework.

In this section, I am most interested in non-domesticated liminal and wild animals. Domesticated animals fit clearly into Hanson's framework as wards of people that do buy into systems of risk and have representation in the way that risks are permitted.

Hanson's view requires that (1) beings accept benefits from risky practices, (2) beings have influence over the risky practices that are conducted, and (3) that the risky practices are justice-seeking, aiming to equalize costs and benefits. On first glance, it seems as if non-human animals cannot possibly fit this framework because non-human animals do not themselves engage in significantly risky practices towards human life.

Though nonhumans do not themselves generate significant risks, many of them do benefit greatly from the risky practices that constitute urban life. The cars that rumble by bring home an important source of food for raccoons. The factory that produces french fries will benefit the pigeons that feast on leftovers in a parking lot.⁹ Many liminal animals thrive among the risks of urban life and derive benefits from the processes that generate that risk. Not least among the benefits is the exclusion of less-adapted competitors that would otherwise fight for the same resources.

I want to be careful here in not referencing the abstract idea of 'animals'

9. Zoopolis

or ‘the animal.’ I am not saying that the class of liminal animals benefits, or that the class of racoons benefit. Classes of beings do not ‘benefit,’ at least not in the way that biotic ethicists mean. I do not mean that urban life allows more pigeons to exist than the absence of urban life, or that ‘the pigeon’ flourishes more in urban life. If I were to make these claims, I would but up against a non-identity problem because different species and kinds of animals would exist without an urban landscape. Instead, what I mean is that most *individual* pigeons eat food that would not be available but for a complex web of exchanged risks and make nests in buildings that would not be there but for social practices of risking.

An important benefit of this view is that it explains the intuition that it is worse to expose non-contact zone animals to risks than it is to expose liminal or contact-zone animals to risk. This is because those individual animals are much more likely to benefit from human social practices of risking. This intuition is seen in, for example, Donaldson & Kymlicka’s discussion of wildlife bridges over remote roads, but neglect of the possibility of ‘squirrel bridges’ over town streets.¹⁰ This is not to say that squirrel bridges should not be built, or even that they are not obligatory. Instead, my conclusion is that harm to creatures that do not benefit from human practices of risking is more morally bad than harm to creatures that do benefit.

4.2.1 Objections

There are two primary objections that can be made against including animals within reciprocal risk relationships in this way. The first is that human social practices of risking are made *for* humans; the benefits they generate for the other animals is merely incidental. This undercuts the idea that animals can be said to be coequal beneficiaries of a risky system. The second is that there is no necessary condition between the imposition of risk on these animals and the benefits they garner. It would be possible for people to provide the same benefits to other animals with far fewer risks.

The primary problem with both of these objections is that they are both equally applicable to the case of humans. Social practices of risking are not made to benefit any specific person; in a way, any benefit they generate

10. Cite

for an individual are merely side effects of the churning of a much larger system. In addition, it is not clear that the *intention* underlying the benefit is morally significant (even if an intention can be ascribed to the social practice of risk, which no single agent authorizes or enacts). It is not by the benevolence of the butcher or the baker that a person is able to enjoy their seitan and bread, but they are certainly still deriving a benefit.¹¹

The second objection could also apply to humans — no person actually accepts or desires to take on a specific risk. In many circumstances, it would be possible for a society to choose to protect a person from all risks while still providing them with all of the benefits of society. However, this is just an elevation of one person above all others; the system of risk-taking as a whole is necessary to enjoy the benefits in general whether we choose to insulate one person or not. In this case, we insult the dignity of most people by holding that one otherwise co-equal beneficiary should bear no costs at all.

Similarly, we could theoretically limit all of the risk that we impose upon an animal while still working to provide them the same benefits. But this would be elevating that animal above all others and above humans. Limiting all risk would result in dramatic changes to the urban and suburban landscape that they benefit from.

4.2.2 Representation

The one piece of the puzzle that is currently missing are the justice-seeking and co-representation elements of the reciprocal risk principle. Currently, individual, non-endangered or migratory animals are essentially excluded from direct consideration by regulatory agencies and legislatures that determine acceptable exposures of risk.

This is wrong for two reasons. First, lack of representation of interests of beings that have a real stake in rulemaking is wrong and causes impositions of risk under those rules to be wrong. Second, pragmatically, the scales are tipped against just distribution of costs and benefits because of this lack of representation.

This may be remedied by appointing representatives of non-human an-

11. You could say at least that the butcher and baker intend to serve the person even if not benevolently... the rats that eat the baker's scraps may not owe her anything. Something to consider.

imals on road, emissions, and other environmental safety organizations. This may seem to contradict the role of these animals (as Donaldson and Kymlicka would put it) as denizens, not co-equal citizens. However, there are circumstances when it is clear that denizens should be given input — maybe not on the political community's core values and aims, but certainly on specific items that are particularly relevant to their well being and reflect the basic duties of the political community towards them. For example, migrant workers who are most at risk of illness due to pesticide use should have a say (if not a near-dispositive say) in the way that pesticides are applied and regulated.

Though denizens are not of the political community in the same way as citizens, they share in the social practices of risking and have the right to representation in the bodies that govern this practice.

4.3 Restitution

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