The Ecumenical Perspective in Logic Lecture 2

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Plan: Lecture 2 ECUMENICAL SYSTEMS

- PRAWITZ' ECUMENICAL SYSTEM \mathcal{NE}
- KRAUSS' ECUMENICAL SYSTEM KrE
- BARROSO-NASCIMENTO's ECUMENICAL SYSTEM ECI
- ECUMENICAL SEQUENT CALCULUS
- AN ECUMENICAL TABLEAUX
- ECUMENICAL MODALITIES
- SOME INTERESTING QUESTIONS

ECUMENICAL SYSTEMS

PRAWITZ' ECUMENICAL SYSTEM \mathcal{NE}

We saw in the the first Lecture that Prawitz seems to agree with Quine, when he says:

When the classical and intuitionistic codifications attach different meanings to a constant, we need to use different symbols, and I shall use a subscript c for the classical meaning and i for the intuitionistic.

But, according to Prawitz, to assert that the classical and the intuitionistic codifications attach different meanings to some constant and to recognize the need to use different symbols corresponding to these different meanings is not a kind of trivial acceptance of Quine's position, for, as Prawitz puts it,

This does not imply that the classical meanings of these constants cannot be explained in the same general way as the intuitionistic meanings of the logical constants have been explained.

Important Slogan

Different connectives, but the same semantical fraework

In order to explore and develop this idea, Prawitz introduces:

- a language with some constants that are common for classical and intuitionistic logic (⊥, ¬, ∧, and ∀), constants that are classical (∨_c, →_c and ∃_c), and constants that are intuitionistic (∨_i, →_i, and ∃_i);
- an ecumenical natural deduction system in which, as we said, "the classical and intuitionistic constants can then have a peaceful coexistence in a language that contains both".

The language $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{E}}$ of the ecumeninal system $\mathcal{N}\mathcal{E}$ is defined as follow: Alphabet

- Classical Predicate letters: $P_c, Q_c, R_c, ...$
- ② Intuitionistic Predicate letters: $P_i, Q_i, R_i, ...$
- 1 Individual variables: x, y, z,...
- 1 individual parameters: a, b, c, ...
- **5** logical constants: \bot , \land , \neg , \lor_i , \lor_c , \rightarrow_i , \rightarrow_c , \forall , \exists_i and \exists_c .
- Auxiliary signs: '(', ')', ','.

The grammar for the language of $\mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{E}}$ is inductively defined in the usual way.

Besides 'pure" classical and "pure" intuitionistic formulas, we can also have "hybrid" formulas in the language, as for example,

- $((\neg p \vee_c q) \rightarrow_i r)$ and
- $\exists_c x (P(x) \to_i Q(x)).$

Intuitionistic rules

CLASSIC RULES

$$\begin{array}{c} [A,\neg B] \\ \hline A \to_c B & A & \neg B \\ \hline \bot & & \bot \\ \hline \\ [\neg A,\neg B] & & [\forall x.\neg A] \\ \hline \Pi \\ \hline A \to_c B & \lor_c \text{-int} & & \frac{A \lor_c B & \neg A & \neg B}{\bot} \lor_{c\text{-elim}} \\ \hline \begin{bmatrix} [\neg A,\neg B] & & [\forall x.\neg A] \\ \hline \Pi \\ \hline \bot & \bot \\ \hline \end{bmatrix} & & \Pi \\ \hline \bot & \exists_c x.A & \forall x.\neg A \\ \hline \bot & \exists_c -\text{elim} & \frac{\bot}{\exists_c x.A} & \exists_c -\text{int} \\ \hline \begin{bmatrix} [\neg P_i(t)] \\ \hline \bot \\ \hline \end{bmatrix} & & \Pi \\ \hline \begin{bmatrix} [\neg P_i(t)] \\ \hline \bot \\ \hline \end{bmatrix} & & \Pi \\ \hline \begin{bmatrix} [\neg P_i(t)] \\ \hline \end{bmatrix} & & \Pi \\ \hline \end{bmatrix} \\ \hline P_c(t) & \neg P_i(t) & P_c -\text{elim} & & \frac{\bot}{P_c(t)} & P_c -\text{int} \\ \hline \end{array}$$

NEUTRAL RULES

PROOFS AND LOGICAL CONSTANTS

for these sentences. The intuitionistic meaning of disjunction and existence are in the same way determined by the canonical forms of arguments for $A_1 \vee A_2$ and $\exists x A(x)$, which are indicated by the figures

$$\begin{array}{ccc} \Sigma & \Sigma \\ \underline{A_i} & \text{and} & \underline{A(t)} \\ \overline{A_1 \vee A_2} & & \overline{\exists} x A(x) \end{array}$$

(i=1 or 2), while the classical meaning of disjunction and existence is determined by specifying other canonical forms, which are at the same time the forms of canonical arguments for $\neg(\neg A \land \neg B)$ and $\neg \forall x \neg A(x)$ i.e. the forms

$$\begin{array}{ccc}
[\neg A][\neg B] & [\neg A(t)] \\
\Sigma & \Sigma \\
\frac{\bot}{A \lor B} & \frac{\bot}{\exists x A(x)}
\end{array}$$

where \(\text{ stands for falsehood.} \)



Example 1:
$$\vdash_{\mathcal{NE}} (((p \rightarrow_i q) \rightarrow_i p) \rightarrow_c p)$$

$$\frac{[p]^{1} \qquad [\neg p]^{2}}{1 \frac{\frac{\bot}{q}}{(p \to_{i} q)} \to_{i} -Int} \qquad [((p \to_{i} q) \to_{i} p)]^{3} \to_{i} -Elim \qquad [\neg p]^{2}}{2, 3 \frac{\bot}{(((p \to_{i} q) \to_{i} p) \to_{c} p)} \to_{c} -Int}$$

Example 2:
$$\vdash_{\mathcal{NE}} (p \lor_c \neg p)$$

$$\frac{ \begin{array}{ccc} [\neg p]^1 & [\neg \neg p]^2 \\ \hline \frac{\bot}{(p \vee_c \neg p)} & 1, 2 \end{array}$$

$$\begin{array}{c} \mathsf{Example 3:} \; \vdash_{\mathcal{NE}} (\neg \forall x \neg A(x) \to_i \exists_c x A(x)) \\ \\ \underline{ \begin{array}{c} [\forall x \neg A(x)]^1 & \neg \forall x \neg A(x) \\ \hline \\ \underline{ } \vdots \\ \hline \exists_c x A(x) \\ \hline \\ (\neg \forall x \neg A(x) \to_i \exists_c x A(x)) \end{array} 1 \end{array}$$

Very important: the following result states that logical consequence in $\mathcal{N}\mathcal{E}$ is intrinsically intuitionistic.

Theorem 1

 $\Gamma \vdash B$ is provable in \mathcal{NE} iff $\vdash_{\mathcal{NE}} \bigwedge \Gamma \rightarrow_i B$.

Exercise 1: Show:

- $\vdash_{\mathcal{N}\mathcal{E}} (((p \to_i q) \to_c p) \to_c p)$
- $\vdash_{\mathcal{NE}} (((p \rightarrow_c q) \rightarrow_c p) \rightarrow_c p)$
- $\vdash_{\mathcal{NE}} (A \to_i B) \to_i (A \to_c B)$
- $\vdash_{\mathcal{NE}} (A \land B) \rightarrow_i \neg (\neg A \lor_c \neg B)$
- $\vdash_{\mathcal{NE}} (A \land B) \rightarrow_i \neg (A \rightarrow_c \neg B)$
- $\vdash_{\mathcal{NE}} \neg (\neg A \land \neg B) \leftrightarrow_i (A \lor_c B)$
- $\vdash_{\mathcal{NE}} \neg (A \land \neg B) \leftrightarrow_i (A \rightarrow_c B)$

As in the case of classical and intuitionistic logic, the introduction and elimination rules of the system \mathcal{NE} may produce detours. We may introduce a formula by an application of an introduction rule and immediately after use this formula as the major premiss of an elimination rule. Some detours of this kind may be hidden by applications of \forall_i -elimination and \exists_i -elimination. We introduce now these detours and the operations whose aim is to eliminate them.

Definition 2

A formula A in a derivation Π is a $\emph{maximum formula}$ if and only if

- A is the major premiss of an application of an α -introduction rule and at the same time the major premiss of an application of an α -elimination rule.
- **②** A is the conclusion of an application of \vee_i -elimination or \exists_i -elimination and at the same time major premiss of an application of an elimination rule.

As usual, we have some operations, the so-called reductions, whose aim is to locally eliminate maximum formulas. The reductions for \land , \neg , \forall and for the intuitionistic operators are the usual Prawitz-reductions (including the permutative reductions).

\rightarrow_i -reduction

$$\begin{array}{ccc} & & & \Pi_1 \\ & \Pi_2 & & & [A]^n \\ \Pi_1 & & B & & & [A] \\ \underline{A} & & \overline{(A \to_i B)} & n & & \text{reduces to} \\ & & & B & & B \end{array}$$

Π_1	$[A(a)]^n$		Π_1
A(t)	Π_2	reduces to	[A(t)]
$\exists_i x A(x)$	C_{n}		$\Pi_2[a/t]$
\overline{C}	11		C

\vee_i -permutative reduction

reduces to

The new reductions for the classical operators are:

\rightarrow_c -reduction

\vee_c -reduction

\forall_c -reduction

Definition 3

The ecumenical degree of A, ed(A), and is defined as follows:

- $\operatorname{ed}(\phi) = 0$, for any propositional variable ϕ .
- ② ed(A \square B) = ed(A) + ed(B) + 1, if \square is \wedge or an intuitionistic operator.
- $ed(A \vee_c B) = ed(A) + ed(B) + 4$
- $\bullet \operatorname{ed}(\mathsf{A} \to_c \mathsf{B}) = \operatorname{ed}(\mathsf{A}) + \operatorname{ed}(\mathsf{B}) + 3$

Definition 4

The ecumenical degree of a derivation Π , $ed(\Pi)$, is defined as max $\{ed[A] : A \text{ is maximum formula in } \Pi\}$.

Definition 5

A derivation Π is *normal* if and only if $ed[\Pi] = 0$.

Definition 6

A derivation Π is called critical if and only if

- **1** In ends with an application of an elimination rule α .
- ② The major premiss A of α is a maximum formula.
- For every proper subderivation Π' of Π , $\operatorname{ed}[\Pi'] < \operatorname{ed}[A] = \operatorname{ed}[\Pi]$.

Lemma 7

Let Π_1 / A and A/ Π_2 be two derivations in \mathcal{NE} such that $\operatorname{ed}(\Pi_1) = n1$ and $\operatorname{ed}(\Pi_2) = n2$. Then, $\operatorname{ed}[(\Pi_1/[A]/\Pi_2)] = \max\{\operatorname{ed}[A], n1, n2\}$.

Proof.

Induction on the length oh Π_2 .

Lemma 8

If Π reduces to Π' , then $ed[\Pi'] \leq ed[\Pi]$.

Proof.

Directly from the form of the reductions and the definition of the complexity measure "ed".

Lemma 9

Let Π be a critical derivation of $\Gamma \vdash A$. Then, Π reduces to a derivation Π' of $\Delta \subseteq \Gamma \vdash A$ such that $d(\Pi') < d(\Pi)$.

Proof: By induction on the length of Π .

Lemma 10

Let Π be a derivation of $\Gamma \vdash A$ such that $\operatorname{ed}[\Pi] > 0$. Then, Π reduces to a derivation Π' of $\Delta \subseteq \Gamma \vdash A$ such that $\operatorname{ed}[\Pi'] < \operatorname{ed}[\Pi]$.

Proof.

Directly from lemma [3] using induction on the length of Π .

Theorem 11

Let Π be a derivation of $\Gamma \vdash A$. Then, Π reduces to a normal derivation Π' of $\Delta \subseteq \Gamma \vdash A$.

Proof.

Directly from lemma [4] by induction on the degree of Π .

The basic idea rests on the observation that classical mathematics uses the logical operators

and, or, if-then, for all, there exists

with two different meanings. One meaning is constructive and is determined by the rules of intuitionistic logic. The other meaning involves proofs by contradiction and becomes non-constructive through the elimination of double negation. Such proofs are usually called indirect. These two meanings can only be separated as long as one abstains from eliminating double negations. With elimination of double negation the two meanings fuse and the proof loses its constructive validity.

(Peter Krauss, 1992)

In this section we introduce a formal system of first-order logic which permits us to distinguish between two different meanings of the logical operators and, or, if-then, for all, there exists. The logical operator 'not' will be used with one meaning only.

(Peter Krauss, 1992)

Rules for classical conjunction

Rules for the universal quantifier

$$\begin{array}{c} [\exists_i x \neg A(x)] \\ \Pi \\ \frac{\bot}{\forall_c x A(x)} \, \forall_c \text{-Int} \end{array} \qquad \frac{\forall_c x A(x)}{\neg \neg A(x/t)} \, \forall_c \text{-Elim}$$

Example: $(\forall_i x \neg \neg A(x) \rightarrow_i \neg \neg \forall_c x A(x))$

$$\frac{\frac{\left[\forall_{i}x\neg\neg A(x)\right]^{4}}{\neg\neg A(a)} \frac{\left[\neg A(a)\right]^{1}}{\left[\neg A(a)\right]^{2}}}{\frac{\bot}{\forall_{c}xA(x)}} \frac{1}{2} \frac{1}{\left[\neg\forall_{c}xA(x)\right]^{3}} \frac{\frac{\bot}{\neg\neg\forall_{c}xA(x)}}{3} \frac{3}{\left(\forall_{i}x\neg\neg A(x)\rightarrow_{i}\neg\neg\forall_{c}xA(x)\right)} 4$$

Exercise 2: Show that these expressions are equivalent.

- $\forall_i x (A \to_i \exists_c y B)$
- $\forall_i x (A \to_c \exists_i y B)$
- $\forall_c x(A \rightarrow_i \exists_i yB)$

The rules for \wedge_c and \forall_c are harmonic!.

Interesting remarks!

- \wedge_c does not have PROJECTIONS!!
- \forall_c does not have INSTANTIATIONS!!

Main idea: "a *generalist approach* that consists of adding general rules which allow the introduction of ecumenical versions of any formula. Thus, instead of directly defining assertion conditions for specific ecumenical connectives, the generalist approach aims to define assertion conditions for ecumenical formulas in general, so as we can introduce the remaining ecumenical operators as special cases of the general rule."

Instead of ecumenical operators, ecumenical formulas, A^i and A^c .

The new rules

$$\begin{array}{ccc}
[\neg A] & & & & \\
\Pi & & & & \\
\underline{\perp}_{A^c} I_C & & & & \\
\end{array}$$

The new rules are harmonic

$$\frac{[A]^{1}}{(A \vee \neg A)} \frac{[\neg (A \vee \neg A)]^{2}}{[\neg (A \vee \neg A)]^{2}}$$

$$\frac{\frac{\bot}{\neg A} 1}{(A \vee \neg A)} \frac{[\neg (A \vee \neg A)]^{2}}{[\neg (A \vee \neg A)]^{2}}$$

$$\frac{\bot}{(A \vee \neg A)^{c}} 2$$

Initial Sequent and Structural Rules

$$\begin{array}{ccc} \hline A, \Gamma \Rightarrow A & \text{init} & \hline \bot, \Gamma \Rightarrow A \\ \hline \\ \Gamma \Rightarrow \bot & \hline \\ \Gamma \Rightarrow A & \hline \\ \hline \end{array} \begin{array}{cccc} \Gamma \Rightarrow A & A, \Delta \Rightarrow C \\ \hline \\ \Gamma, \Delta \Rightarrow C & \hline \end{array}$$

Classical rules

$$\frac{A, \Gamma \Rightarrow \bot \qquad B, \Gamma \Rightarrow \bot}{(A \vee_c B), \Gamma \Rightarrow \bot} \qquad \frac{\neg A, \neg B, \Gamma \Rightarrow \bot}{\Gamma \Rightarrow (A \vee_c B)}$$

$$\frac{(A \to_c B), \Gamma \Rightarrow A \qquad B, \Gamma \Rightarrow \bot}{(A \to_c B), \Gamma \Rightarrow \bot} \qquad \frac{A, \neg B, \Gamma \Rightarrow \bot}{\Gamma \Rightarrow (A \to_c B)}$$

$$\frac{A[y/x], \Gamma \Rightarrow \bot}{\exists_c x A(x), \Gamma \Rightarrow \bot} \qquad \frac{\Gamma, \forall x \neg A(x) \Rightarrow \bot}{\Gamma \Rightarrow \exists_c x A(x)}$$

$$\frac{p \Rightarrow p}{\neg p, p \Rightarrow \bot}$$

$$\frac{\neg p, p \Rightarrow \bot}{\neg p, p \Rightarrow q}$$

$$\frac{\neg p \Rightarrow (p \rightarrow_i q) \qquad p \Rightarrow p}{\neg p, ((p \rightarrow_i q) \rightarrow_i p) \Rightarrow p}$$

$$\frac{\neg p, ((p \rightarrow_i q) \rightarrow_i p) \Rightarrow \bot}{\neg p, ((p \rightarrow_i q) \rightarrow_i p) \Rightarrow \bot}$$

$$\frac{\neg p, ((p \rightarrow_i q) \rightarrow_i p) \Rightarrow \bot}{\Rightarrow (((p \rightarrow_i q) \rightarrow_i p) \rightarrow_c p)}$$

(Renato R. Leme, Giorgio Venturi, Bruno Lopes, Marcelo Coniglio)

$$\frac{S, T(A \land B)}{S, TA, TB} \qquad \frac{S, F(A \lor_c B)}{S, T(\neg A), T(\neg B)}$$

$$\frac{S, T(\neg A)}{S, FA} \qquad \frac{S, F(A \to_c B)}{S, TA, T(\neg B)}$$

$$\frac{S, F(A \wedge B)}{S, FA|S, FB} \qquad \frac{S, T(A \rightarrow_i B)}{S, FA|S, TB} \qquad \frac{S, T(A \vee_i B)}{S, TA|S, TB}$$

$$\frac{S, T(A \rightarrow_c B)}{S, FA|S, F(\neg B)} \qquad \frac{S, T(A \vee_c B)}{S, F(\neg A)|S, F(\neg B)}$$

An example

```
(0,0)
F(p \vee_c \neg p)
   (1,0)
    T\neg p
   (2,0)
   T \neg \neg p
   (7,0)
    Fp
   (18, 2)
    F \neg p
  (47, 18)
     Tp
   END
```

The semantics of modal logics is often determined by means of *Kripke models*. Here, we will follow the approach where a modal logic is characterized by the respective interpretation of the modal model in the meta-theory (called *meta-logical characterization*).

Formally, given a variable x, we recall the standard translation $trm[\cdot]_x$ from modal formulas into first-order formulas with at most one free variable, x, as follows:

- if p is atomic, then $trm[p]_x = p(x)$;
- $trm[\bot]_x = \bot;$
- for any binary connective \star , $trm[(A \star B)]_x = (trm[A]_x \star trm[B]_x);$
- for the modal connectives

$$\begin{array}{lcl} trm[\Box A]_x & = & \forall y(R(x,y) \to trm[A]_y) \\ trm[\Diamond A]_x & = & \exists y(R(x,y) \land trm[A]_y) \end{array}$$

where R(x, y) is a binary predicate.



Such a translation has as underlying motivation the interpretation of alethic modalities in a Kripke model $\mathcal{M} = (W, R, V)$:

- $\mathcal{M}, w \models \Box A$ iff for all v such that w R v, $\mathcal{M}, v \models A$.
- $\mathcal{M}, w \models \Diamond A$ iff there exists v such that w R v and $\mathcal{M}, v \models A$.

R(x,y) then represents the accessibility relation R in a Kripke frame. This intuition can be made formal based on the one-to-one correspondence between classical/intuitionistic translations and Kripke modal models.

The object-modal logic OL is then characterized in the first-order meta-logic ML as $\vdash_{OL} A$ iff $\vdash_{ML} \forall x.trmAx$ Hence, if ML is classical logic (CL), the former definition characterizes the classical modal logic K, while if it is intuitionistic logic (IL), then it characterizes the intuitionistic modal logic IK.

We can adopt now adopt an ecumenical meta-theory (given by the system \mathcal{NE}), hence characterizing what we will define as the ecumenical modal logic \mathcal{EK} .

The ecumenical translation $trme[\cdot]_x$ from propositional ecumenical formulas into \mathcal{NE} is defined in the same way as the modal translation $trm[\cdot]_x$. For the case of modal connectives, as in the case of FOL, the interpretation of ecumenical consequence should be essentially intuitionistic. This implies that the box modality (\square) is a neutral connective. The diamond (\diamondsuit), on the other hand, has two possible interpretations: classical and intuitionistic, since its leading connective is an existential quantifier. Hence we should have the ecumenical modalities: \square , \diamondsuit_i , \diamondsuit_c , determined by the translations

- $trme[\Box A]_x = \forall y (R(x, y) \rightarrow_i trmeAy)$
- $trme[\diamondsuit_i A]_x = \exists_i y (R(x, y) \land trme[A]_y)$
- $trme[\diamondsuit_c A]_x = \exists_c y(R(x,y) \land trme[A]_y)$

The basic idea behind labeled proof systems for modal logic is to internalize elements of the associated Kripke semantics (namely, the worlds of a Kripke structure and the accessibility relation between them) into the syntax.

Labeled modal formulas are either labeled formulas of the form x:A or relational atoms of the form xRy, where x,y range over a set of variables and A is a modal formula. Labeled sequents have the form $\Gamma \vdash x:A$, where Γ is a multiset containing labeled modal formulas. The labeled ecumenical system \mathcal{EK} is presented in the next slide.

$$\begin{array}{c} \underline{x:A,\Gamma\Rightarrow x:\bot} \\ \overline{\Gamma\Rightarrow x:\neg A} \end{array} \xrightarrow{\begin{array}{c} x:A,\Gamma\Rightarrow z:C \\ \hline x:A,\Gamma\Rightarrow z:C \end{array}} \xrightarrow{\begin{array}{c} x:B,\Gamma\Rightarrow z:C \\ \hline \Gamma\Rightarrow x:A_1\vee_i A_2 \end{array}} \\ \\ \underline{\begin{array}{c} x:A,\Gamma\Rightarrow z:\bot \\ \hline x:A\vee_c B,\Gamma\Rightarrow z:\bot \end{array}} \xrightarrow{\begin{array}{c} \Gamma,x:\neg A,x:\neg B\Rightarrow x:\bot \\ \hline \Gamma\Rightarrow x:A\vee_c B \end{array}} \\ \\ \underline{\begin{array}{c} x:A,\Gamma\Rightarrow z:\bot \\ \hline x:A\vee_c B,\Gamma\Rightarrow z:\bot \end{array}} \xrightarrow{\begin{array}{c} \Gamma,x:\neg A,x:\neg B\Rightarrow x:\bot \\ \hline \Gamma\Rightarrow x:A\vee_c B \end{array}} \\ \\ \underline{\begin{array}{c} x:A\to_i B,\Gamma\Rightarrow x:A \\ \hline x:A\to_i B,\Gamma\Rightarrow z:C \end{array}} \xrightarrow{\begin{array}{c} \Gamma,x:\neg A,x:\neg B\Rightarrow x:\bot \\ \hline \Gamma\Rightarrow x:A\vee_c B \end{array}} \\ \\ \underline{\begin{array}{c} x:A\to_i B,\Gamma\Rightarrow x:A \\ \hline x:A\to_i B,\Gamma\Rightarrow z:\bot \end{array}} \xrightarrow{\begin{array}{c} x:A,\Gamma\Rightarrow x:B \\ \hline \Gamma\Rightarrow x:A\to_i B \end{array}} \\ \\ \underline{\begin{array}{c} x:A\to_c B,\Gamma\Rightarrow x:A \\ \hline x:A\to_c B,\Gamma\Rightarrow z:\bot \end{array}} \xrightarrow{\begin{array}{c} x:A,x:\neg B,\Gamma\Rightarrow x:\bot \\ \hline \Gamma\Rightarrow x:A\to_c B} \end{array}} \\ \\ \underline{\begin{array}{c} x:A\to_c B,\Gamma\Rightarrow x:A \\ \hline x:A\to_c B,\Gamma\Rightarrow z:\bot \end{array}} \xrightarrow{\begin{array}{c} x:A,x:\neg B,\Gamma\Rightarrow x:\bot \\ \hline \Gamma\Rightarrow x:A\to_c B,\Gamma\Rightarrow x:\bot \end{array}} \end{array}} \\ \\ \underline{\begin{array}{c} x:A\to_c B,\Gamma\Rightarrow x:A \\ \hline R:A\to_c B,\Gamma\Rightarrow x:A \\ \hline \end{array}} \xrightarrow{\begin{array}{c} x:A,\Gamma\Rightarrow x:A \\ \hline R:A\to_c B,\Gamma\Rightarrow x:A \\ \hline \end{array}} \xrightarrow{\begin{array}{c} x:A,x:\neg B,\Gamma\Rightarrow x:\bot \\ \hline \end{array}} \xrightarrow{\begin{array}{c} x:A,x:\neg B,x:\bot \\ \hline \end{array}} \xrightarrow{\begin{array}{c}$$

$$\frac{xRy, y: A, x: \Box A, \Gamma \Rightarrow z: C}{xRy, x: \Box A, \Gamma \Rightarrow z: C} \Box L \quad \frac{xRy, \Gamma \Rightarrow y: A}{\Gamma \Rightarrow x: \Box A} \Box R \quad \frac{xRy, y: A, \Gamma \Rightarrow z: C}{x: \Diamond_i A, \Gamma \Rightarrow z: C} \diamondsuit_i R$$

$$\frac{xRy, \gamma: A, \Gamma \Rightarrow z: C}{x: \Diamond_i A, \Gamma \Rightarrow z: C} \diamondsuit_i R$$

 $\frac{xRy, \Gamma \Rightarrow y : A}{xRy, \Gamma \Rightarrow x : \Diamond_c A} \diamond_i R \quad \frac{xRy, y : A, \Gamma \Rightarrow z : \bot}{x : \Diamond_c A, \Gamma \Rightarrow z : \bot} \diamond_c L \quad \frac{x : \Box \neg A, \Gamma \Rightarrow x : \bot}{\Gamma \Rightarrow x : \Diamond_c A} \diamond_c R$

We can show in \mathcal{EK} : $\diamondsuit_c A \equiv_i \neg \Box \neg A$

$$\frac{x: \Box \neg A \Rightarrow x: \Box \neg A}{x: \Box \neg A, \neg \Box \neg A \Rightarrow x: \bot}$$
$$x: \neg \Box \neg A \Rightarrow x: \diamondsuit_c A$$

$$\frac{xRy, y: A \Rightarrow y: a}{xRy, y: A, y: \neg A \Rightarrow y: \bot}$$

$$xRy, y: A, x: \Box \neg A \Rightarrow y: \bot$$

$$xRy, y: A, x: \Box \neg A \Rightarrow z: \bot$$

$$\frac{x: \diamondsuit_c A, x: \Box \neg A \Rightarrow z: \bot}{x: \diamondsuit_c A, x: \Box \neg A \Rightarrow x: \bot}$$

$$\frac{x: \diamondsuit_c A, x: \Box \neg A \Rightarrow x: \bot}{x: \diamondsuit_c A, \Rightarrow x: \neg \Box \neg A}$$

Some interesting questions and properties

1. One or two negations?

We saw that in Prawitz' system \mathcal{NE} and in Krauss' system we have just one negation (negation is a neutral operator) and that although the system defined by Gilles Dowek begins with two negations, at some point in the paper (p.232), Dowek concludes that the system can work with just one negation. The problem now is: why do we have just one negation, given that we have two implications and that the negation of A could be understood as "A implies \bot "?

2. Strange Classical Operators!

- Classical implication \rightarrow_c does not satisfy the rule of modus ponens.
- Classical conjunction \wedge_c does not satisfy projections
- Classical universal quantifier \forall_c does not satisfy instantiation.

2. Purity

We saw that the classical rule are formulated with the aid of occurrences of negations. Is is possible to define rules for the classical operators that are PURE, i. e., that does not use ocurrences of negation?

Definition 12

A formula B is called *externally classical* (denoted by B^c) if and only if B is \bot , a classical predicate letter, or its main operator is classical (that is: \to_c, \lor_c, \exists_c). A formula C is *classical* if it is built from classical atomic predicates using only the connectives: $\to_c, \lor_c, \exists_c, \neg, \land, \forall$, and the unit \bot .

For externally classical formulas we can now prove the following theorems:

$$\bullet \vdash_{\mathcal{NE}} (A \to_c B^c) \to_i (A \to_i B^c).$$



Exercise:

Show that if A is externally classical , then $\Gamma, \neg A \vdash \bot$ implies $\Gamma \vdash A$.

Exercise:

Prove the normalization theorem for Krauss' system KrE.