TRƯỜNG ĐẠI HỌC KHOA HỌC VÀ CÔNG NGHỆ HÀ NỘI UNIVERSITY OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY OF HANOI UNIVERSITÉ DES SCIENCES ET DES TECHNOLOGIES DE HANOI




INTRUSION DETECTION AND PREVENTION system

Final projects report

Ransomware attack

Vũ Đức Hiếu_BI12-162

Target system: Windows 7 x64 IPv4 address: 192.168.58.141



I) Scanning the environment

- The tool that I used: Greenbone Vulnerability Management (GVM)



There are 2 vulnerabilities in the system: DCE/RPC and MSRPC Services Enumeration Reporting and Microsoft Windows SMB Server Multiple Vulnerabilities-Remote (4013389)



- SMB: Server Message Block Protocol a client-server communication protocol used for sharing access to files, printers, serial ports.
- On windows 7, the vulnerability Microsoft Windows SMB Server Multiple Vulnerabilities-Remote (4013389) can lead to critical remote code execution.
 - ⇒ the attacker can gain unauthorized access, execute remote code.
- Based on this vulnerability, I will attack though this weak point to get RCE and use ransomware attack.
- Ransomware is malware designed to deny a user or organization access to files on their computer by encrypting these files and demanding a ransom payment for decryption key.
 - ⇒ The victim must pay the ransom to regain access to their files.
- Ransom: Win32/WannaCrypt.

III) Attack simulation

Before attacking the target, I want to note that the IP of my target system changes from 192.168.58.141 to 198.168.58.145 after suspending the VMware workstation.

```
Connection-specific DNS Suffix : localdomain
Link-local IPv6 Address . . : fe80::586e:dd91:c140:a5ex11
IPv4 Address . . . : 192.168.58.141
Subnet Mask . . . . : 255.255.25
Default Gateway . . . : 192.168.58.2

Iunnel adapter isatap.localdomain:


Media State . . . . . : Media disconnected
Connection-specific DNS Suffix : localdomain

Iunnel adapter isatap.(9CC13607-0179-45A8-80A8-932DCA3FB8FB):

Media State . . . . : Media disconnected
Connection-specific DNS Suffix : PMEDIA SUFFIX : PMEDIA
```

- Tool: Metasploit


- Firstly, I show options to understand more clearly and i can see options RHOSTS (remote host) and LHOST (listen host)



```
\frac{\text{msf6}}{\text{rhost}} = \frac{\text{msf6}}{192.168.58.145}
\frac{\text{msf6}}{\text{rhost}} = \frac{192.168.58.145}{192.168.58.145}
\frac{\text{msf6}}{\text{msf6}} = \frac{192.168.58.135}{192.168.58.135}
\frac{192.168.58.135}{192.168.58.135}
```

- I exploit the target system. When the tool exploits successfully, I upload the malware that I have prepared before.

- As we can see, the file wannacry.exe is in the directory C:\windows.



- Finally, I run the file on my Kali Linux and see the result.

```
07/14/2009
12/22/2023
                            3,514,368 wannacry.exe
07/14/2009
           12:32 PM
                        <DIR>
                                      Web
07/14/2009
           12:09 PM
                                  403 win.ini
                                5,349 WindowsUpdate.log
12/22/2023
           09:01 PM
          08:14 AM
07/14/2009
                               9,728 winhlp32.exe
12/21/2023 11:45 AM
                       <DIR>
                                      winsxs
                             316,640 WMSysPr9.prx
06/11/2009
          03:52 AM
07/14/2009 08:39 AM
                               10,240 write.exe
             28 File(s)
                             8,652,315 bytes
             50 Dir(s) 15,031,668,736 bytes free
C:\Windows>wannacrv.exe
wannacry.exe
```



- The result shows that all my files have been encrypted and the only way to get my files recovered is submitting the payment.

IV) Solution with Firewall/IDS/IPS

1) Firewall

- Configuring firewall to block unnecessary or unused ports.
- Employing application control feature to limit the execution of unauthorized or non-essential applications on the network.

2) IDS/IPS

- Using IDS with signature-based detection to identify known patterns associated with ransomware attacks and update the IDS signatures.
- Writing IPS rules to inspect network traffic for known ransomware signatures and behavior patterns so that IPS can actively block or mitigate threats before they reach their targets.

V) Implementation and evaluation

- Writing snort IPS rules to block ms17_010_enternalblue attack by adding eternalblue signatures in the file rules.
- Configure the firewall of the system to block SMB RPORT 445 or update the operating system to have the newest update from Microsoft security.

VI) Discussion

- In the worst case, we must disable any shared drives or network connections and report the incident that our system is infected. Next, we must restore the files from the backups and ensure that the backups were not related to the ransomware.
- The way to avoid similar threats is patching and updating the operating system to avoid vulnerabilities.