

Vehicle Tutorial Chapter 1: Getting Started

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We will:

• ... introduce main building blocks of **Vehicle** as a programming language



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- ▶ ... get to practice working with **Vehicle**



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- ... use the famous ACAS Xu benchmark to show Vehicle's work flow – from specification to verification



We will:

- ... introduce main building blocks of Vehicle as a programming language
- ▶ ... get to practice working with **Vehicle**
- ... use the famous ACAS Xu benchmark to show Vehicle's work flow – from specification to verification
- ▶ ... identify PL problems that are resolved by **Vehicle**

Recap: four PL problems



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- I^O Interoperability properties are not portable between training/counter-example search/ verification.
- I^P Interpretability code is not easy to understand.
- I^{\int} Integration properties of networks cannot be linked to larger control system properties.
- E^G Embedding gap little support for translation between problem space (as in original spec) and input space (at neural network level).

Recap: ACAS Xu




A collision avoidance system for unmanned autonomous aircraft.

Inputs:

- \triangleright Distance to intruder, ρ
- \triangleright Angle to intruder, θ
- ightharpoonup Intruder heading, φ
- ightharpoonup Speed, v_{own}
- ightharpoonup Intruder speed, v_{int}

Outputs:

- Clear of conflict
- ► Strong left
- ▶ Weak left
- ► Weak right
- Strong right



ACAS Xu



Definition (ACAS Xu: Property 3)

If the intruder is directly ahead and is moving towards the ownship, the score for COC will not be minimal.

$$\begin{array}{l} 1500 \leq \rho \leq 1800 \; \land \\ -0.06 \leq \theta \leq 0.06 \; \land \\ \psi \geq 3.10 \; \land \\ v_{own} \geq 980 \; \land \\ v_{int} \geq 960 \; \Rightarrow \\ \text{the score for COC} \neq 0 \end{array}$$

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Vehicle' Syntax

Types

Let us build the ACAS Xu specification. We start with types of input and output vectors, as well as types of ACAS Xu networks

```
type InputVector = Vector Rat 5
type OutputVector = Vector Rat 5
```

@network

acasXu : InputVector -> OutputVector

The Vector type represents a mathematical vector, or in programming terms can be thought of as a fixed-length array.

Values



Types for values are automatically inferred by **Vehicle**. For example, we can declare the number π and its type will be inferred as rational:

pi = 3.141592

Working with vectors

some input or output pre-processing maybe expected when defining a neural network.

Example

It is assumed that the ACAS Xu inputs and outputs are normalised, i.e. the network does not work directly with units like m/s. However, the specifications we want to write should ideally concern the original units.

Working with vectors

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Example

It is assumed that the ACAS Xu inputs and outputs are normalised, i.e. the network does not work directly with units like m/s. However, the specifications we want to write should ideally concern the original units.

- ► This is an instance of <u>"problem space / input space</u> mismatch"
- ▶ ... that is very common in neural net verification
- ▶ Being able to reason about problem space (alongside the input space) is a feature that distinguishes **Vehicle** from majority of the mainstream neural network verifiers

Vector normalisation

For clarity, we define a new type synonym for unnormalised input vectors which are in the problem space.

```
type UnnormalisedInputVector = Vector Rat 5
```

Next we define the range of the inputs that the network is designed to work over.

```
minimumInputValues : UnnormalisedInputVector
minimumInputValues = [0.0, -pi , -pi , 100.0, 0.0]
```

```
maximumInputValues : UnnormalisedInputVector
maximumInputValues = [60261.0, pi, pi, 1200.0, 1200.0]
```

meanScalingValues : UnnormalisedInputVector

meanScalingValues = [19791.091, 0.0, 0.0, 650.0, 600.0]

Vector manipulation

An alternative method to vector definition is to use the 'foreach' constructor, which is used to provide a value for each 'index i'.

```
\label{limit_minimum} \begin{tabular}{ll} minimumInputValues : UnnormalisedInputVector \\ minimumInputValues = for each i . 0 \end{tabular}
```

Let us see how 'foreach' works with vector indexing. We can now define the normalisation function that takes an input vector and returns the unnormalised version.

```
normalise : UnnormalisedInputVector -> InputVector
normalise x = foreach i .
  (x ! i - meanScalingValues ! i) / (maximumInputValues ! i)
```

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... our first acquaintance with functions!
```



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<name> : <type> <name> [<args>] = <expr>
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validInput : UnnormalisedInputVector -> Bool
validInput x = forall i .
  minimumInputValues ! i <= x ! i <= maximumInputValues ! i</pre>
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Our first acquaintance with predicates and quantifiers!

One of the main advantages of **Vehicle** is that it can be used to state and prove specifications that describe the network's behaviour over an infinite set of values.



Function Composition: Exercise

What are the types of functions 'acasXu' and 'normalise':

normAcasXu : UnnormalisedInputVector -> OutputVector

normAcasXu x = acasXu (normalise x)

Pre-defined functions and predicates



We have already used:

!

<=

Exercise

What do they stand for?

Lets verify ACAS Xu!



```
distanceToIntruder = 0 -- measured in metres
angleToIntruder = 1 -- measured in radians
intruderHeading = 2 -- measured in radians
speed = 3 -- measured in metres/second
intruderSpeed = 4 -- measured in meters/second

clearOfConflict = 0
weakLeft = 1
weakRight = 2
strongLeft = 3
strongRight = 4
```

The fact that all vector types come annotated with their size means that it is impossible to mess up indexing into vectors, e.g. if you changed 'distanceToIntruder = 0' to 'distanceToIntruder = 5' the specification would fail to type-check.



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directlyAhead : UnnormalisedInputVector -> Bool
directlyAhead x =
   1500 <= x ! distanceToIntruder <= 1800 and
   -0.06 <= x ! angleToIntruder <= 0.06</pre>
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Exercise!

- 1. Can you identify whether the specification is written in terms of input space or problem space? How do you know?
- 2. Can you spot another pre-defined **Vehicle** function? What is it?



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Exercise!

1. Can you guess the purpose of the syntax

```
@property
2
```

2. What kind of domain 'forall' ranges over? Is it finite or infinite?

How to run Vehicle



Checklist

- 1. a verifier installed (Marabou);
- 2. the actual network is supplied in an ONNX format
- 3. Vehicle is installed.

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
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Vehicle ...

the part that we have seen





Concluding Exercise



Which of the four PL problems we addressed?

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Harder Exercise: ACAS Xu Property 1

ACAS Xu Property 1 gives an idea how the *embedding gap* can arise not only when we reason about inputs, but also the outputs of networks!



- ► Can you formalise Property 1 in Vehicle?
- Can you spot the instance of the embedding gap, this time concerning the network's output?

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Definition (ACAS Xu: Property 1)

If the intruder is distant and is significantly slower than the ownship, the score of a COC advisory will always be below a certain fixed threshold:

$$(\rho \ge 55947.691) \land (v_{own} \ge 1145) \land (v_{int} \le 60)$$

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Note:

The ACAS Xu neural network outputs are scaled as follows: given an element x of the output vector, we scale it as: $\frac{x-7.518884}{373.94992}$.

Next Lecture: ϵ -ball Robustness

```
type Image = Tensor Rat [28, 28]
type Label = Index 10
validImage : Image -> Bool
validImage x = forall i i . 0 <= x ! i ! i <= 1
@network
classifier : Image -> Vector Rat 10
advises : Image -> Label -> Bool
advises x i = forall j . j != i => classifier x ! i > classifier x ! j
@parameter
epsilon : Rat
boundedByEpsilon : Image -> Bool
boundedByEpsilon x = forall i j . -epsilon <= x ! i ! j <= epsilon
robustAround : Image -> Label -> Bool
robustAround image label = forall pertubation .
 let perturbedImage = image - pertubation in
 boundedByEpsilon pertubation and validImage perturbedImage =>
    advises perturbedImage label
@dataset
trainingImages : Vector Image n
@dataset
trainingLabels : Vector Label n
@property
robust : Vector Bool n
robust = foreach i . robustAround (trainingImages ! i) (trainingLabels ! i)
```

