

Neural Network Verification With Vehicle: Chapter 2 - Getting Started

ICFP'23 Tutorial

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1. introduce main building blocks of **Vehicle** as a programming language
2. get to practice working with **Vehicle**
3. use the ACAS Xu benchmark to show **Vehicle**'s verification work flow
4. identify PL problems that are resolved by **Vehicle**

Recap: four PL problems

I^O Interoperability – properties are not portable between training/counter-example search/ verification.

I^P Interpretability – code is not easy to understand.

$I^\int$ Integration – properties of networks cannot be linked to larger control system properties.

E^G Embedding gap – little support for translation between problem space and input space.

Recap: ACAS Xu

A collision avoidance system for unmanned autonomous aircraft.

Inputs:

- Distance to intruder, ρ
- Angle to intruder, θ
- Intruder heading, φ
- Speed, v_{own}
- Intruder speed, v_{int}

Outputs:

- Clear of conflict
- Strong left
- Weak left
- Weak right
- Strong right



ACAS Xu

Definition (ACAS Xu: Property 3)

If the intruder is directly ahead and is moving towards the ownship, the score for COC will not be minimal.

$$1500 \leq \rho \leq 1800 \ \wedge -0.06 \leq \theta \leq 0.06 \ \wedge \psi \geq 3.10 \ \wedge v_{own} \geq 980 \ \wedge v_{int} \geq 960$$
$$\Rightarrow$$
$$\exists a \in \{SL, L, R, SR\}. f(\theta, \rho, \varphi, v_{own}, v_{int})_{COC} < f(\theta, \rho, \varphi, v_{own}, v_{int})_a$$

Types

Let us build the ACAS Xu specification.
We start with types of input and output vectors, as well as types of ACAS Xu networks

```
type InputVector = Vector Rat 5
type OutputVector = Vector Rat 5

@network
acasXu : InputVector -> OutputVector
```

The Vector type represents a mathematical vector, or in programming terms can be thought of as a fixed-length array.

Values

Types for values are automatically inferred by **Vehicle**. For example, we can declare the number π and its type will be inferred as rational:

```
pi = 3.141592
```

Working with vectors

Problem: The trained ACAS Xu network assumes that the inputs and outputs are normalised to values (roughly) between -2 and 2.

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Being able to write specifications about the problem space is a feature that distinguishes **Vehicle** from other neural network verifiers platforms.

Vector normalisation

For clarity, we define a new type synonym for unnormalised input vectors which are in the problem space.

```
type UnnormalisedInputVector = Vector Rat 5
```

Next we define the range of the inputs that the network is designed to work over.

```
minimumInputValues : UnnormalisedInputVector
minimumInputValues = [0.0, -pi , -pi , 100.0, 0.0]

maximumInputValues : UnnormalisedInputVector
maximumInputValues = [60261.0, pi, pi, 1200.0, 1200.0]

meanScalingValues : UnnormalisedInputVector
meanScalingValues = [19791.091, 0.0, 0.0, 650.0, 600.0]
```

Vector manipulation

An alternative method to vector definition is to use the ‘foreach‘ constructor, which is used to provide a value for each ‘index i‘.

```
minimumInputValues : UnnormalisedInputVector
minimumInputValues = foreach i . 0
```

Let us see how ‘foreach‘ works with vector indexing.
We can now define the normalisation function that takes an input vector and returns the unnormalised version.

```
normalise : UnnormalisedInputVector -> InputVector
normalise x = foreach i .
  (x ! i - meanScalingValues ! i) / (maximumInputValues ! i)
```

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... our first acquaintance with functions!

Functions and types


```
<name> : <type>
<name> [<args>] = <expr>
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```
validInput : UnnormalisedInputVector -> Bool
validInput x = forall i .
  minimumInputValues ! i <= x ! i <= maximumInputValues ! i
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validInput : UnnormalisedInputVector -> Bool
validInput x = forall i .
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```

Our first acquaintance with predicates and quantifiers!

One of the main advantages of **Vehicle** is that it can be used to state and prove specifications that describe the network's behaviour over an infinite set of values.

Functions and types

Function Composition: Exercise

What are the types of functions ‘acasXu‘ and ‘normalise‘:

```
normAcasXu : UnnormalisedInputVector -> OutputVector
normAcasXu x = acasXu (normalise x)
```

Let's verify ACAS Xu!


```
distanceToIntruder = 0   -- measured in metres
angleToIntruder    = 1   -- measured in radians
intruderHeading    = 2   -- measured in radians
speed              = 3   -- measured in metres/second
intruderSpeed      = 4   -- measured in meters/second

clearOfConflict = 0
weakLeft        = 1
weakRight       = 2
strongLeft      = 3
strongRight     = 4
```

The fact that all vector types come annotated with their size means that it is impossible to mess up indexing into vectors, e.g. if you changed 'distanceToIntruder = 0' to 'distanceToIntruder = 5' the specification would fail to type-check.

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```
directlyAhead : UnnormalisedInputVector -> Bool
directlyAhead x =
  1500  <= x ! distanceToIntruder <= 1800 and
  -0.06 <= x ! angleToIntruder    <= 0.06
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  1500  <= x ! distanceToIntruder <= 1800 and
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Exercise!

1. Can you identify whether the specification is written in terms of input space or problem space? How do you know?

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```
movingTowards : UnnormalisedInputVector -> Bool
movingTowards x =
  x ! intruderHeading >= 3.10  and
  x ! speed           >= 980   and
  x ! intruderSpeed   >= 960
```

There is little left to do!

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```
minimalScore : Index 5 -> UnnormalisedInputVector -> Bool
minimalScore i x =
   forall j . i != j => normAcasXu x ! i < normAcasXu x ! j
```

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Exercise!

1. What kind of domain ‘forall‘ ranges over? Is it finite or infinite?

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```
@property
property3 : Bool
property3 = forall x . validInput x and
                       directlyAhead x and
                       movingTowards x =>
                       not (minimalScore clearOfConflict x)
```

There is little left to do!

If the intruder is directly ahead and is moving towards the ownship, the score for COC will not be minimal.

```
@property
property3 : Bool
property3 = forall x . validInput x and
                       directlyAhead x and
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```

Exercise!

1. Can you guess the purpose of the ‘@property‘ syntax?
2. What kind of domain ‘forall‘ ranges over? Is it finite or infinite?

How to run Vehicle

Checklist

1. Vehicle and Marabou are installed.
2. navigate to `examples/chapter2/acasXu` in the tutorial repo.

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```
vehicle verify \
  --specification acasXu.vcl \
  --verifier Marabou \
  --network acasXu:acasXu_1_7.onnx \
  --property property3

Verifying properties:
property3 [========================================] 1/1 queries
  result:  counterexample found
  x: [1799.9886669999978, 1.9509286320000003e-2,
                      3.09999732192, 980.0, 1017.6036]
```

Verifier limitations

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What does Vehicle do when you write such a specification?

Use the type-checker over and over...



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

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

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

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

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

Secondary type systems...

These secondary type-systems not possible without:

- A modular type-checker that is generic over the set of builtin types.
- Backtracking instance search.
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The user is expected to make very little use of these features!

What we've seen in this chapter ...



DL2	PGD	**Marabou**	Agda, Coq,
ACT	FGSM	Eran	KeymaeraX
etc.	etc.	etc.	etc.

Concluding Exercise

Which of the four PL problems we addressed?

- I^O Interoperability – properties are not portable between training/counter-example search/ verification.
- I^P Interpretability – code is not easy to understand.
- $I^\int$ Integration – properties of networks cannot be linked to larger control system properties.
- E^G Embedding gap – little support for translation between problem space and input space.

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Definition (ACAS Xu: Property 1)

If the intruder is distant and is significantly slower than the ownship, the score of a COC advisory will always be below a certain fixed threshold:

$$(\rho \geq 55947.691) \wedge (v_{own} \geq 1145) \wedge (v_{int} \leq 60)$$
$$\Rightarrow \text{the score for COC is at most } 1500$$

where the neural network outputs are scaled as follows: given an element x of the output vector, we scale it as: $\frac{x - 7.518884}{373.94992}$.

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- Can you formalise Property 1 in Vehicle?
- Can you spot the embedding gap, this time concerning the network's output?