

CCA-Security.

→ If Adversary has access to the decryption server so now the Adversary has both access to encryption & decryption which can decrypt all the ciphertext except the chosen cipher text. (CCA)

Ep Cryptosystem is CCA-Secure if for all PPT adversaries A :

$$P[b_{\text{guess}} = b] \leq 1/2 + \text{negl}(n)$$

Encrypt then Authenticate

$$C = (r, F_{k_1}(r) + m), \text{MAC}_{k_2}(r, F_{k_1}(r) + m)$$

CCA-Secure Encryption

Construction let $\Pi_E = (\text{Gen}_E, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ be a private key encryption scheme and let $\Pi_M = (\text{Gen}_M, \text{Mac}, \text{Vrfy})$ be a message authentication code. Define an encryption scheme $(\text{Gen}', \text{Enc}', \text{Dec}')$ as follows:

- Gen': on input 1^n , run $\text{Gen}_E(1^n)$ and $\text{Gen}_M(1^n)$ to obtain keys k_1, k_2
- Enc': on input a key (k_1, k_2) and a plaintext message m , compute $C \leftarrow \text{Enc}_{k_1}(m)$ and $t \leftarrow \text{Mac}_{k_2}(C)$ and output the ciphertext $\langle C, t \rangle$
- Dec': On input a key (k_1, k_2) and a ciphertext $\langle C, t \rangle$, first check whether $\text{vrfy}_{k_2}(C, t) \stackrel{?}{=} 1$. If yes, then output $\text{Dec}_{k_1}(C)$; if no, then output \perp .

The above is a CCA-secure private-key encryption scheme.