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# Disappearing Routine Jobs: Who, How, and Why?\*

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## Abstract

We study the deterioration of employment in middle-wage, routine occupations in the United States in the last 35 years. The decline is primarily driven by changes in the propensity to work in routine jobs for individuals from a small set of demographic groups. These same groups account for a substantial fraction of both the increase in non-employment and employment in low-wage, non-routine manual occupations observed during the same period. We analyze a general neoclassical model of the labor market featuring endogenous participation and occupation choice. In response to an increase in automation technology, the framework embodies a tradeoff between reallocating employment across occupations and reallocation of workers towards non-employment. Quantitatively, we find that this standard model accounts for a relatively small portion of the joint decline in routine employment and associated rise in non-routine manual employment and non-employment.

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# 1 Introduction

In the past thirty-five years, the US economy has seen a sharp drop in the fraction of the population employed in middle-skilled occupations. This employment loss is linked to the disappearance of *routine* occupations—those focused on a relatively narrow set of job tasks that can be performed by following well-defined instructions and procedures. This fall in per capita routine employment is a principal factor in the increasing polarization of the labor market, as employment shares have shifted toward the top and bottom tails of the occupational wage distribution. [Autor, Levy, and Murnane \(2003\)](#) and the subsequent literature suggest that job polarization is due to progress in automation technologies that substitute for labor in routine tasks.

In spite of the large and growing literature on polarization, relatively little is known regarding the process by which routine occupations have declined. This is true with respect to who the loss of routine job opportunities is affecting most acutely, and how they have adjusted in terms of employment and occupational outcomes.<sup>1</sup> And though the number of studies is growing, the quantitative role of progress in automation technology in the aggregate decline of routine employment is also unresolved. This paper contributes to these questions.

In [Section 2](#), we study the proximate empirical causes of the decline in per capita employment in routine occupations. In an accounting sense, roughly one-third of the fall observed in the past four decades is due to demographic compositional change within the US population. The more important factor is a sharp change in the propensity of individuals of given demographic characteristics to work in routine jobs. These composition and propensity effects are strongest for a relatively small set of demographic groups. As a result, the vast majority of the fall in routine employment can be accounted for by changes experienced by individuals of specific demographic characteristics.

For routine manual occupations, this is the group of young and prime-aged men with low levels of education. Increasing educational attainment and population aging in the US means that the fraction of individuals with these characteristics is falling.

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<sup>1</sup>An important exception is [Autor and Dorn \(2009\)](#) who consider changes in the age composition of different occupations. [Cortes \(2016\)](#) analyzes transition patterns out of routine occupations and the associated wage changes experienced by workers.

Moreover, these same demographic groups have experienced the sharpest drops in the propensity for routine manual employment. For routine cognitive occupations, the vast majority of the decline is accounted for by changes in employment propensities of young and prime-aged women with intermediate levels of education.

We next document the labor market outcomes that offset this fall in per capita routine employment. For the key demographic groups identified above, we see an increase in the propensity for non-employment (unemployment and labor force non-participation) and employment in non-routine manual occupations. These changes are relevant for two recent phenomena: (i) rising non-employment, and (ii) the reallocation of labor to low-wage occupations within the U.S. working-aged population. We show that the propensity changes of the key demographic groups responsible for the decline of routine employment also account for large fractions of the changes in (i) and (ii).<sup>2</sup>

In the remainder of the paper, we explore the role of advances in automation technology in accounting for these phenomena. We do so within the context of a general, flexible neoclassical model of the labor market featuring endogenous participation and occupational choice, presented in Section 3. Our main findings can be summarized as follows. In Section 4 we demonstrate analytically that advances in automation cause workers to leave routine occupations and sort into non-employment and non-routine manual jobs. We then show that the neoclassical framework embodies an important tradeoff: generating a role for increased automation in reallocating employment from routine to non-routine manual occupations comes at the expense of automation’s role in reallocation from employment to non-employment, and vice versa.

Section 5 discusses the quantitative specification of the model. In Section 6, we find that advances in automation technology—as measured by the increase in the stock of ICT (information and communications technology) capital valued in efficiency units—on its own accounts for a relatively small portion of the joint decline in routine employment and associated rise in non-routine manual employment and non-employment. While this result relates to the quantitative exercise we consider,

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<sup>2</sup>See [Autor and Dorn \(2013\)](#) and [Mazzolari and Ragusa \(2013\)](#) who discuss the relation between the rise of non-routine manual employment and the decline in routine employment. With respect to the rise in non-employment in the U.S., [Charles, Hurst, and Notowidigdo \(2013\)](#) discuss the role of the decline in manufacturing, [Beaudry, Green, and Sand \(2016\)](#) highlight a reversal in the demand for cognitive skills, and [Acemoglu et al. \(2016\)](#) discuss the role of increased import competition.

it is worth stressing that the theoretical approach that we outline in Sections 3 and 4 is a useful, general framework for future investigation.

With regards to the literature, our theoretical work is most closely related to [vom Lehn \(2015\)](#), who also studies technological change and job polarization in a neo-classical framework. Nonetheless, our analysis differs along a number of dimensions, with notable distinctions in modeling framework, the measurement of automation technology, and the nature of the accounting experiment. We discuss these differences in detail in Section 6. Finally, we note that our work is also related to the recent contributions of [Eden and Gaggl \(2016\)](#) (who study the role of automation for trends in productivity and labor’s share of national income) and [Morin \(2016\)](#) (who emphasizes the cyclical implications of computer adoption for routine employment).<sup>3</sup>

## 2 Empirical Facts

We begin by documenting the decline in the share of the U.S population working in routine occupations. We analyze whether these changes are due to changes in the demographic composition of the economy, or to changes in the propensity to work in routine occupations conditional on demographic characteristics. We then identify specific demographic groups that account for the bulk of the changes in routine employment.

Our analysis uses data from the Monthly Current Population Survey (CPS), the main source of U.S. labor market statistics, made available through IPUMS ([Flood et al. 2015](#)). We focus on the civilian, non-institutionalized population aged 20 to 64 years old, excluding those employed in agriculture and resource occupations.<sup>4</sup> Follow-

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<sup>3</sup>The empirical literature on job polarization is much larger and too vast to fully reference here. Much of the work exploits measures of “susceptibility” to automation based on the routine task intensity of employment (e.g. [Autor and Dorn 2013](#); [Autor, Dorn, and Hanson 2015](#); [Goos, Manning, and Salomons 2014](#); [Gregory, Salomons, and Zierahn 2016](#)); see (e.g. [Michaels, Natraj, and Van Reenen 2014](#); [Gaggl and Wright 2016](#); [Graetz and Michaels 2016](#)) for work using direct measures of ICT capital that largely focus on impacts at the industry or the firm level, rather than in aggregate.

<sup>4</sup>Given our interest in propensity changes for individuals with different levels of education, and the rise in educational attainment observed over time, one concern of including those in their early-20s might be misclassification due to college enrollment. In the Online Appendix (available as Supplementary Material from the ScienceDirect website), we show that all results obtained here in

ing the literature (e.g. Acemoglu and Autor 2011), we delineate occupations along two dimensions based on their task content: “cognitive” versus “manual,” and “routine” versus “non-routine.” The distinction between cognitive and manual occupations is based on the extent of mental versus physical activity. The distinction between routine and non-routine is based on the work of Autor, Levy, and Murnane (2003). If the tasks involved can be summarized as a set of specific activities accomplished by following well-defined instructions, the occupation is considered routine. If instead the job requires flexibility, creativity, problem-solving, or human interaction, the occupation is non-routine. We group employed workers as either *non-routine cognitive*, *routine cognitive*, *routine manual* or *non-routine manual* based on an aggregation of 3-digit Census Occupation Codes. Details of the precise mapping are provided in Cortes et al. (2015). All statistics are weighted using person-level weights.

The decline in routine employment since the late 1980s has been well documented in the literature for many developed countries (e.g. Goos and Manning 2007; Goos, Manning, and Salomons 2009; Acemoglu and Autor 2011; Jaimovich and Siu 2012). Table 1 presents the population share of routine employment based on our CPS data. In 1979, routine occupations employed 40.5% of the working-age population in the U.S. This fraction remained stable over the following decade, and then began to decline steadily, until reaching a level of 31.2% in 2014. The breakdown between routine cognitive and routine manual employment reveals that the stability over the 1980s is due to offsetting changes in each of these groups. The share of the population employed in routine manual occupations declines over the entire 1979-2014 period. The population share of routine cognitive employment increases between 1979 and 1989, then declines until the end of the sample period. Given the different timing of the decline in routine manual and routine cognitive employment, we separately analyze the 1979-2014 and the 1989-2014 periods.

## 2.1 Decomposing Labor Market Changes

The past four decades have also displayed marked changes in the educational and age composition of the population. Since demographic groups differ in their propensity to work in routine occupations, the decline of routine employment may be partially

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Section 2 are essentially unchanged when we limit attention to 25 to 64 year olds.

accounted for by these demographic changes. On the other hand, routine employment may be declining because of changes in the probability of working in such occupations for individuals with given demographic characteristics. These changes would be indicative of economic forces that change the labor market opportunities for specific groups of workers.

To investigate the relative importance of these two forces, we perform a set of decompositions where we divide the CPS sample into 24 demographic groups, based on the following three criteria: age, education, and gender. Specifically, we create three age groups (20-29, 30-49, 50-64, which we refer to as the young, prime-aged, and old respectively), four education groups (less than high school completion, high school diploma, some post-secondary, and college degree or higher), and two gender groups (females and males).

Denoting the fraction of the population in labor market state  $j$  at time  $t$  as  $\bar{\pi}_t^j$ , this can be written as:

$$\bar{\pi}_t^j = \sum_g w_{gt} \pi_{gt}^j, \quad (1)$$

where  $w_{gt}$  is the population share of demographic group  $g$  at time  $t$ , and  $\pi_{gt}^j$  is the fraction of individuals of demographic group  $g$  in state  $j$  at  $t$ . We consider five labor market states: employment in one of the four occupation groups described above, and non-employment (unemployment and labor force non-participation).

The change in the fraction of the population in state  $j$  can be written as:

$$\begin{aligned} \bar{\pi}_1^j - \bar{\pi}_0^j &= \sum_g w_{g1} \pi_{g1}^j - \sum_g w_{g0} \pi_{g0}^j \\ &= \sum_g \Delta w_{g1} \pi_{g0}^j + \sum_g w_{g0} \Delta \pi_{g1}^j + \sum_g \Delta w_{g1} \Delta \pi_{g1}^j. \end{aligned} \quad (2)$$

The first term,  $\sum_g \Delta w_{g1} \pi_{g0}^j$ , is a group size or *composition* effect, owing to the change in population share of demographic groups over time. The second component,  $\sum_g w_{g0} \Delta \pi_{g1}^j$ , is a *propensity* effect, due to changes in the fraction of individuals within groups in state  $j$ . The third term,  $\sum_g \Delta w_{g1} \Delta \pi_{g1}^j$ , is an *interaction* effect capturing the co-movement of changes in group sizes and changes in propensities.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup>A common empirical approach to such accounting exercises is to perform a Oaxaca-Blinder (OB) decomposition (Oaxaca 1973; Blinder 1973). This would derive from a linear probability regression

The results of this decomposition are presented in Table 2. We focus on two time intervals: the 35 year period from 1979 to 2014 exhibiting a monotonic decline in per capita employment in routine manual occupations in Panel A, and 1989–2014 exhibiting a similar decline in routine cognitive employment in Panel B. Columns (1) and (2) present the observed fraction of the population in each of the five labor market states. The total change in each of these population shares, displayed in Column (3), is decomposed into the composition, propensity, and interaction effect in Columns (4) through (6).

Panels A and B exhibit the well-documented increase in per capita employment in non-routine cognitive (NRC) occupations. This can be accounted for by composition change in the US population—the near doubling of the number of those with at least a college degree and, to a lesser extent, population aging (as both the highly educated and old have greater propensities for NRC work). In addition, we see increases in non-routine manual (NRM) employment in both periods, and a rise in non-employment during 1989–2014. Both of these are accounted for by propensity change, which we discuss further in Section 2.4.

Of principal interest are the declines in per capita routine manual (RM) employment in Panel A, and in per capita routine cognitive (RC) employment in Panel B. First, we note that the decline of RC is due entirely to declining propensities. In fact, the propensity change accounts for more than 100% of the total, as demographic change would have predicted an increase in the fraction of the population employed in RC occupations. With respect to the decline of RM employment, part of it is due to composition change, largely the shrinking population share with at most high school education. However, a greater proportion is due to the propensity effect—the fact that the likelihood of working in RM has fallen within demographic groups—either due to changes in behavior of otherwise identical individuals, or due to changing composition of unobservable characteristics for fixed demographic characteristics.<sup>6</sup> Indeed, given

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of inclusion in labor market states with age, education, and gender effects assumed to be additively separable. Our approach in equation (2) is equivalent to a OB specification where the regressors include a full set of interactions between demographic characteristics. This allows us to account for heterogeneity between groups in terms of propensity changes. Nonetheless, we display the results of the standard OB decomposition in the Online Appendix (available from the ScienceDirect website), and note that none of our findings are substantively altered.

<sup>6</sup>Note also that there is a partially offsetting interaction effect, implying that there is a positive correlation between the changes in group sizes and the changes in propensities.



the strong increase in educational attainment, it is possible that the distribution of unobserved labor market productivity and/or leisure preferences of those with lower levels of education has shifted.

In the following subsections, we discuss how these composition and propensity changes for both routine occupational groups are concentrated within those of specific demographic characteristics.

## 2.2 Groups Accounting for the Decline in Routine Manual Employment

To determine the importance of each demographic group in accounting for the decline in per capita RM employment, we compute the change induced by each group  $g$ ,  $w_{g1}\pi_{g1}^j - w_{g0}\pi_{g0}^j$  from equation (2), as a fraction of the total change.

The results are presented in Table 3.A. Five groups stand out as accounting for the bulk of the decline: male high school dropouts of all ages and male high school graduates under the age of 50. These groups combined can account for 94% of the fall in RM employment.

Table 3.B indicates that individuals of these demographic characteristics contribute to both the composition and propensity effects documented in Table 2. First, these groups are shrinking in terms of their share of the population (i.e.,  $w_g$  is falling). While they represented nearly a quarter of the U.S. population in 1979, they represent less than 15% by 2014. Given that a large fraction of these low-educated men were employed in a routine manual occupation in 1979—as many as 63%, as indicated in the fourth column of the table—their fall in the population share has implied an important reduction in the overall share of RM employment, even holding propensities fixed.

More importantly, individuals within these key groups have experienced dramatic reductions in the propensity to work in RM (i.e.,  $\pi_g$  is falling as well). For example, the fraction has fallen by about 25 percentage points for low-educated young men; while more than 60% of such individuals worked in a routine manual occupation in 1979, this is closer to one-third in 2014. As a result, the bulk of the propensity change documented in Table 2 is due to these five demographic groups.

Given that these key groups have experienced substantial movement out of RM employment, we ask where they have sorted into instead. We illustrate this in Table 4 by presenting the *change* in the share of each demographic group across labor market states. The results indicate that their dramatic decline in the probability of working in RM is offset primarily by increases in non-employment and, to a smaller extent, increases in non-routine manual employment. Clearly individuals of these demographic characteristics have not benefited from the increase in employment in high-paying, non-routine cognitive occupations observed in the aggregate.

## 2.3 Groups Accounting for the Decline in Routine Cognitive Employment

We perform a similar analysis for the change in routine cognitive employment. Employment in these occupations peaks in 1989, so we focus on the 25 year period from then to the present. As documented in Table 2, more than 100% of the decline in per capita RC employment is accounted for by changes in propensity. Given this, we identify the key demographic groups in accounting for this propensity effect.

Table 5.A shows that the groups accounting for the bulk of the decline in RC propensity are young and prime-aged females with either high school diplomas or some post-secondary education. These four demographic groups alone account for 62% of the propensity effect.

The population shares and RC employment propensities for these groups are detailed in Table 5.B. All four groups experience obvious declines in their probability of working in RC, falling from approximately one-third in 1989 to one-quarter in 2014.

Given substantial movement out of RC employment, we ask where individuals with these characteristics have sorted into instead. Table 6 presents the change in the share of each demographic group across labor market states. As with the low-educated males identified in the decline of RM, these females with intermediate levels of education have not increased their propensity to work in high-paying, non-routine cognitive occupations. Instead, they have increased their propensities for non-employment and employment in non-routine manual occupations (with the former more prevalent among high school graduates, and the latter among those with

some college). Relative to the males identified in the previous subsection, we generally observe smaller increases in non-employment rates among the female groups that account for the bulk in the decline in RC propensity.

## 2.4 Aggregate Importance of these Demographic Groups

As discussed above, the decline in per capita employment in routine occupations is due largely to declining probability to work in such occupations, as opposed to change in demographic composition, and the effect of declining propensity is concentrated in a subset of demographic groups. Here, we ask how much of the aggregate change in various labor market outcomes can be accounted for by the propensity change of these key demographic groups.

To determine this, we perform a number of simple counterfactual exercises in Table 7. The first column reproduces the change in the population share of routine employment, non-routine manual employment, and non-employment—the figures in Column (3) of Table 2. The second column reproduces the propensity effect from Column (5) of Table 2. Note that this represents a counterfactual holding the population shares of all demographic groups constant at their benchmark level (1979 in Panel A, 1989 in Panel B) and allowing *all* group-specific propensities to change as empirically observed.

The third column presents the result of a counterfactual in which only the propensities of the *key groups* are allowed to change; demographic composition and all other propensities are held constant at benchmark levels. This represents how much of the changes in Columns (1) and (2) are accounted for by the “behavioral changes” in our key groups. Of the approximate 9 percentage point fall in per capita routine employment displayed in either Panel A or B, about 65% is accounted for by the propensity change of our key groups; about three-quarters of the propensity effect in Column (2) is accounted for by the propensity effect of our key groups. This indicates the aggregate quantitative importance of the propensity change in the groups that we have identified.

Interestingly, even though the demographic groups were chosen based on their importance in accounting for the decline in routine employment, Table 7 shows that

the behavioral change of these groups is also important in accounting for the aggregate changes in non-routine manual employment and non-employment. As evidenced in either panel, the propensity change of our key groups accounts for more than 100% of the observed increase in NRM employment, and about 60% of the increase due to total propensity change. Similarly, these groups account for a large share of the increase in non-employment. The increase in the fraction not working is evident only in the 1989-2014 period. As Panel B indicates, the propensity change of our key groups accounts for more than 100% of the observed increase in non-employment, and about 70% of the propensity effect.

The fourth column presents a counterfactual in which demographic composition changes as observed in the US data, and all propensities change, except those of the key groups; these propensities are held constant at benchmark levels. This allows us to ask how much of the observed changes can be mitigated by omitting their behavioral change. As indicated in Panel A, if the propensity change of the key groups responsible for the decline of routine employment had not occurred, NRM employment would only have risen by 0.85 percentage points. This mitigates  $3.00 \div 3.85 = 78\%$  of the observed increase. Similarly, in Panel B, omitting the key demographic groups mitigates  $(3.14 - 0.24) \div 3.14 = 92\%$  of the observed increase in non-employment.

To summarize, the changes in employment and occupational choice of a small subset of demographic groups account for a large share of the decline in routine employment. These same groups are also key in understanding the rise of non-employment in the U.S. observed in the past 25 years and, to a slightly lesser extent, the rise of non-routine manual employment observed since 1979. This suggests that these long-run labor market changes are closely linked phenomena.

### 3 Model

Motivated by the findings of Section 2, we present a simple equilibrium model of the market for those low- and middle-skill workers identified as most responsible for the decline in routine employment over the past three decades (namely, young and prime-aged high school graduates, young and prime-aged females with some college education, and male high school dropouts of all ages). Our model is a generalized

version of the model analyzed in [Autor and Dorn \(2013\)](#), extended along two key dimensions.

First, in addition to making an occupational choice between routine and non-routine manual jobs, individuals make a participation choice between working and non-employment. The empirical results presented in the previous section highlighted the importance of these two margins of labor adjustment. Second, we conduct our analysis making only minimal functional form and distributional assumptions on labor demand and labor supply. This generality allows us to characterize the theoretical and quantitative implications of progress in automation technology on labor market outcomes in a wide variety of parametric settings.

We use the model to study the role of advances in automation in rationalizing the changes in sorting of workers across employment in routine occupations, non-routine manual occupations, and non-employment. Given this goal, the analysis abstracts from other changes observed in the U.S. economy. For example, changes in the share of high-skilled workers and their occupational choice, changes in policy, and many other factors are likely to have contributed to the labor market outcomes discussed in [Section 2](#). By concentrating solely on the impact of improvements in automation technology, we are able to present precise results from a general framework, and provide a template for further quantitative research in evaluating the role of automation.

### 3.1 Labor Demand

Our theoretical results can be derived from a very agnostic specification of the demand for labor. In particular, we assume that GDP,  $Y_t$ , is produced with five factors of production via:

$$Y = G(K, L_C, L_M, [A + L_R^E]). \quad (3)$$

Here,  $K$  denotes capital (excluding the type of capital that relates to automation),  $L_C$  denotes the number of non-routine cognitive workers in the economy (“cognitive” hereafter),  $L_M$  denotes the number of non-routine manual workers (“manual”),  $L_R^E$  denotes the effective labor input of routine workers, and  $A$  denotes automation capital such as information and communication technology capital (“ICT” hereafter). As we discuss below, the amount of effective labor input differs from the measure of

workers in the routine occupation. Effective routine labor and automation capital are assumed to be perfect substitutes in the production of “routine factor input” which we denote as  $R = A + L_R^E$ . This assumption allows the model to maximize the effect of automation on routine employment.

The representative firm hires factor inputs and sells output in competitive markets. Profit maximization results in demand for routine and manual labor that equates wages to marginal products:

$$W_R = G_R(K, L_C, L_M, [A + L_R^E]), \quad (4)$$

$$W_M = G_{L_M}(K, L_C, L_M, [A + L_R^E]). \quad (5)$$

Note that  $W_R$  denotes the wage per unit of effective labor.

### 3.2 Labor Supply

Since the key demographic groups identified in Section 2 work almost exclusively in routine and manual occupations, we abstract from their ability to work in cognitive occupations. Hence, low-/middle-skilled individuals are assumed to make two discrete choices sequentially: first a decision whether to participate in employment or not and second, conditional on choosing to work, employment in the routine or manual occupation. We discuss these in reverse order.

**Occupation Decision** Individuals differ in their work ability,  $u$ , in the routine occupation where  $u \sim \Gamma(u)$ , where  $\Gamma$  denotes the cumulative distribution function (CDF). Given the wage per unit of effective labor,  $W_R$ , an individual (who has chosen to work) with ability  $u$  earns  $u \times W_R$  if employed in the routine occupation. Alternatively, the worker earns  $W_M$  if employed in the manual occupation, independent of  $u$  (i.e., all low- and middle-skill workers have equal ability, normalized to 1, in manual work).

Denote by  $u^*$  the “cutoff ability level” such that individuals with  $u < u^*$  optimally choose to work in the manual occupation, while those with  $u \geq u^*$  choose the routine occupation. The cutoff is defined by the indifference condition:

$$u^* W_R = W_M, \quad (6)$$

for individuals who have chosen to participate in employment.

**Participation Decision** Individuals differ in their disutility of labor (or alternatively, their utility value of home production/leisure),  $b$ , where  $b \sim \Omega(b)$ , and  $\Omega$  denotes the CDF. For simplicity, we assume that individuals choose whether to work prior to observing their routine work ability,  $u$ , knowing only that it is drawn from  $\Gamma$ .

As such, the expected return to working is given by:

$$b^* = W_M \Gamma(u^*) + W_R \int_{u^*}^{u^{max}} u \Gamma'(u) du \quad (7)$$

This anticipates the result that *ex post*, conditional on choosing to work, workers sort into the occupations according to the cutoff condition (6). Thus, *ex ante*, individuals with disutility  $b < b^*$  choose to work, while those with  $b \geq b^*$  optimally choose not to participate.<sup>7</sup>

### 3.3 Equilibrium

Labor market equilibrium implies that the demand for labor input in each occupation equals supply. Thus, for manual labor:

$$L_M = \Omega(b^*) \Gamma(u^*). \quad (8)$$

That is, given the participation rate,  $\Omega(b^*)$ , a fraction  $\Gamma(u^*)$  of the workers work in the manual occupation. Similarly, the number of workers in the routine occupation is given by:

$$L_R = \Omega(b^*) [1 - \Gamma(u^*)]. \quad (9)$$

Finally, in terms of efficiency units, the effective routine labor input is given by:

$$L_R^E = \Omega(b^*) \int_{u^*}^{u^{max}} u \Gamma'(u) du. \quad (10)$$

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<sup>7</sup>This sequential decision setup simplifies the model analysis. If individuals observed their disutility and routine work ability simultaneously, optimality would be characterized as a locus for the  $(b, u)$  cutoff.

### 3.4 The Response to Increased Automation

Sections 4 and 6 study the response of the cutoff values  $u^*$  and  $b^*$ , which characterize sorting of workers across occupations and non-employment, to changes in capital-embodied automation technology. The six equations that will be used throughout the analysis are the two labor demand equations, (4) and (5), the two labor supply equations, (6) and (7), and two of the three market clearing conditions, (8) and (10).

We proceed by log-linearizing these equilibrium conditions. Denoting the percentage deviations of a variable from steady state by a circumflex, the demand for routine labor (4) becomes:

$$\widehat{W}_R = \eta_{G_R, L_M} \widehat{L}_M + \eta_{G_R, R} [\lambda \widehat{A} + (1 - \lambda) \widehat{L}_R^E], \quad (11)$$

where:

$$\lambda = \frac{A}{A + L_R^E} \in (0, 1). \quad (12)$$

Here,  $\eta_{G_R, R}$  denotes the elasticity of the marginal product,  $G_R$ , with respect to the routine factor input,  $R$ , and  $\eta_{G_R, L_M}$  denotes the elasticity with respect to  $L_M$ . The log-linearization of the demand for manual labor (5) gives:

$$\widehat{W}_M = \eta_{G_{L_M}, L_M} \widehat{L}_M + \eta_{G_{L_M}, R} [\lambda \widehat{A} + (1 - \lambda) \widehat{L}_R^E], \quad (13)$$

where  $\eta_{G_{L_M}, L_M}$  is the elasticity of the marginal product,  $G_{L_M}$ , with respect to  $L_M$  and  $\eta_{G_{L_M}, R}$  is the elasticity with respect to the routine input,  $R = A + L_R^E$ .

The occupation choice condition (6) becomes:

$$\widehat{u}^* = \widehat{W}_M - \widehat{W}_R. \quad (14)$$

The log-linearization of the participation condition (7) implies:

$$b^* \widehat{b}^* = W_M \Gamma(u^*) \widehat{W}_M + W_M \Gamma'(u^*) u^* \widehat{u}^* + \left[ W_R \int_{u^*}^{u^{max}} u \Gamma'(u) du \right] \widehat{W}_R - W_R \Gamma'(u^*) [u^*]^2 \widehat{u}^*.$$

Using condition (6), this simplifies to become:

$$\widehat{b}^* = \psi \widehat{W}_M + (1 - \psi) \widehat{W}_R, \quad (15)$$

where:

$$\psi = \frac{u^* \Gamma(u^*)}{u^* \Gamma(u^*) + \int_{u^*}^{u^{max}} u \Gamma'(u) du} \in (0, 1). \quad (16)$$



Finally, the log-linearization of (8) and (10) imply:

$$\widehat{L}_M = \mu \widehat{b}^* + \nu \widehat{u}^*, \quad (17)$$

$$\widehat{L}_R^E = \mu \widehat{b}^* - \xi \widehat{u}^*, \quad (18)$$

where:

$$\mu = \frac{\Omega'(b^*)b^*}{\Omega(b^*)} \geq 0, \quad \nu = \frac{\Gamma'(u^*)u^*}{\Gamma(u^*)} \geq 0, \quad (19)$$

and using Leibniz's rule:

$$\xi = \frac{\Gamma'(u^*)u^{*2}}{\int_{u^*}^{u^{max}} u\Gamma(u)du} \geq 0. \quad (20)$$

Note that because  $\Omega(b^*)$  is the employment participation rate,  $\mu$  is the elasticity of the participation rate with respect to  $b^*$ . Similarly, since  $\Gamma(u^*)$  is the fraction of workers who choose the manual occupation,  $\nu$  is the elasticity of the “occupational choice” rate with respect to  $u^*$ . Finally, we note that  $\psi$  in equation (15) can be expressed as:

$$\psi = \frac{\xi}{\nu + \xi}. \quad (21)$$

Thus, the response of non-employment, routine employment, and manual employment, depends on parameters related to (i) the distribution of routine work ability,  $\nu$  and  $\xi$ ; (ii) the distribution of the disutility of labor,  $\mu$ ; (iii) the ratio of factors of production,  $\lambda$ ; and (iv) own and cross elasticities of marginal products. The generality with which we have presented our framework allows the reader to simply “plug in” values of interest in order to evaluate the impact of changes in automation.

## 4 Theoretical Analysis

In this section, we demonstrate the usefulness of the model of Section 3 in analyzing the role of progress in automation technology on labor market outcomes for the low-/middle-skilled workers of interest. We first determine the sign of the response of non-employment, routine employment, and manual employment to changes in automation technology, when imposing a minimal set of assumptions on model parameters. We then show how the presence or absence of a participation decision affects the response of sorting across routine and manual occupations (conditional on working). All proofs are presented in the Online Appendix (available as Supplementary Material from the ScienceDirect website).

## 4.1 Signing the Effects of Automation

To proceed, we make the natural assumption that  $\eta_{G_R,R} < 0$  and  $\eta_{G_{L_M},L_M} < 0$ ; that is, production exhibits diminishing marginal product with respect to routine and manual factor inputs. We show by way of a simple example that the model is consistent with the empirical findings of Section 2, namely an increase in non-employment,  $\hat{b}^* < 0$ , and an increase in manual versus routine employment (conditional on working),  $\hat{u}^* > 0$ , in response to an increase in automation, i.e.  $\hat{A} > 0$ .

**Proposition 1** *Let the cross elasticities in production be zero, i.e.  $\eta_{G_R,L_M} = \eta_{G_{L_M},R} = 0$ . Then, for all values of  $\lambda$ ,  $\mu$ ,  $\nu$ , and  $\xi$ , an increase in automation technology increases non-employment, and reallocates employment from the routine to the manual occupation.*

The economics of this case are as follows. In response to an increase in automation, the supply of routine factor input increases. Given diminishing returns, this leads to a fall in the routine occupation wage. Since cross elasticities are zero, the wage in the manual occupation is not affected directly by the change in automation. As such, conditional on participation, workers move from the routine to the manual occupation. Given diminishing (or even constant) marginal product of manual labor, the wage in the manual occupation is either falling (or constant). Since the return to employment is a weighted average of the routine and manual wages, the *ex ante* wage falls. Hence, participation falls.

## 4.2 The Effects of a Participation Margin

As discussed above, an increase in automation causes workers to leave the routine occupation and sort into the manual occupation. Here we explore how the inclusion or exclusion of an employment participation choice affects the degree of occupational reallocation. Since we are especially interested in the case when the degree of occupational reallocation is maximized, we assume non-diminishing marginal product of manual labor,  $\eta_{G_{L_M},L_M} = 0$ . From equation (13), this eliminates the fall in the manual wage as workers move into the manual occupation. We obtain the following result.

**Proposition 2** *Let the following elasticities in production be zero:  $\eta_{G_R, L_M} = \eta_{G_{L_M}, R} = \eta_{G_{L_M}, L_M} = 0$ . Then, the presence of a participation margin mitigates the degree of occupational reallocation from the routine to the manual occupation.*

As we show in the Online Appendix, the response of the occupation cutoff to an automation shock is given by:

$$\hat{u}^* = \left[ \frac{\lambda}{(1-\lambda)\xi - \frac{1}{\eta_{G_R, R}} + (1-\psi)(1-\lambda)\mu} \right] \hat{A}. \quad (22)$$

Note the final term in the denominator,  $(1-\psi)(1-\lambda)\mu \geq 0$ , and recall from equations (17) and (18) that  $\mu$  is the elasticity of the participation rate with respect to  $b^*$ . Hence, all else equal, the response of occupational reallocation,  $\hat{u}^*$ , is maximized when participation does not adjust,  $\mu = 0$ . In other words, the higher is the elasticity parameter on participation, the smaller is the movement of workers from routine to manual (conditional on working).

The intuition is as follows. An increase in automation technology drives down the marginal product of routine labor. With a constant wage in the manual occupation, there must be movement of labor out of the routine occupation, until the cutoff equation (6) is satisfied for the marginal worker. When there is no employment participation choice, the number of workers is fixed; all adjustment comes from occupational reallocation out of routine jobs. With endogenous participation, some of the adjustment comes from fewer workers selecting into employment. All else equal, a reduction in the number of workers raises the marginal product of routine labor; this allows equilibrium to be attained with less occupational reallocation than otherwise.

In summary, this proposition highlights an important tradeoff in neoclassical analyses of automation's impact on labor market outcomes. Maximizing the impact of advances in automation on occupational reallocation requires abstracting from participation choice. However, endogenizing the decision to work mitigates the impact on occupational sorting.

## 5 Quantitative Specification

In the next two sections we study the quantitative effect of automation. We discuss the quantitative specification of the model here. We pick 1989 as the “steady state” around which the model economy is linearized, since this year corresponds to the maximum in per capita routine employment as displayed in Table 1. Numerical results are presented in Section 6.

### 5.1 Shares

**Labor Values** While the demographic groups identified in Section 2 account for the bulk of routine employment, other groups account for important shares of manual employment and non-employment. The Online Appendix details the shares (of population, employment, income) delineated across the “key” and “other” groups used in the quantitative analysis, and we highlight selected values here that are relevant for the analysis.

Within the key group, the employment rate (or employment “propensity” using the terminology of Section 2) was 72.7% in 1989, and conditional on employment, the fraction working in routine occupations was 81.6% (to align with the model, we exclude the 13.7% working in cognitive occupations). Given a specification of the distribution of routine work ability (discussed below), we calculate the average efficiency in routine work for our key group. We use this average efficiency as the efficiency of routine workers from the other demographic group. This allows us to have a simple aggregation of the effective routine labor input.

As a point of reference in evaluating the results of Section 6, the employment rate of the key group fell to 64.9% by 2014, and the fraction of workers employed in routine occupations fell to 69.1%.

**Routine Factor Inputs** Calibrating  $\lambda$  in equation (11) requires specifying the ratio of service flows from automation capital,  $A$ , to effective routine labor,  $L_R^E$ . Since we have specified these inputs to be perfect substitutes in production, we can measure this ratio empirically as the ratio of their factor shares of national income. Using

CPS data and data from [Eden and Gaggl \(2016\)](#) (see below) we obtain a 1989 value of  $\lambda = 0.0845$ .

## 5.2 Elasticities and Distributions

**Participation Elasticity** Recall that  $\mu$  is the elasticity of the participation rate (in employment versus non-employment) with respect to  $b^*$ . To quantify this participation elasticity, we decompose the elasticity of the participation rate with respect to  $b^*$  into: (i) the elasticity of the participation rate with respect to the wage, divided by (ii) the elasticity of  $b^*$  with respect to the wage.

Part (i) can be identified empirically. The literature studying the earned income tax credit (EITC) provides various estimates of the wage elasticity of the participation rate. The handbook chapter by [Hotz and Scholz \(2003\)](#) suggests a value between 0.97 and 1.69. As such we take 1.3 as a benchmark estimate. Part (ii) can be pinned down theoretically. The cutoff condition, equation (15), implies that the elasticity of  $b^*$  with respect to an equal percentage change in the routine and manual wage equals 1. Hence, we specify  $\mu = 1.3$  as a useful benchmark in our numerical analysis. However, given that the mapping between the EITC literature and our model is not perfect, we consider also a higher value of  $\mu = 2$ .<sup>8</sup>

**Production Function Elasticities** We restrict attention to the case when own elasticities are negative,  $\eta_{G_R,R} < 0$  and  $\eta_{G_{L_M},L_M} < 0$ . With respect to cross elasticities in production, we consider several cases. First, we study cross elasticities that are zero, i.e.  $\eta_{G_R,L_M} = \eta_{G_{L_M},R} = 0$ .

For cases where cross elasticities differ from zero, we note that our neoclassical production framework implies the following relation across the different production elasticities

$$\frac{(W_M L_M)/Y}{(W_R R)/Y} \times \left( \eta_{G_{L_M},R} \right)^2 = \eta_{G_R,R} \times \eta_{G_{L_M},L_M}. \quad (23)$$

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<sup>8</sup>As will become clear, values lower than  $\mu = 1.3$  make the model unable to match the facts regarding participation.

There are two steps to this derivation. First, note that the cross elasticities are given by

$$\eta_{G_R, L_M} \equiv \left( \frac{\partial G_R}{\partial L_M} \right) \left( \frac{L_M}{G_R} \right), \quad (24)$$

$$\eta_{G_{L_M}, R} \equiv \left( \frac{\partial G_{L_M}}{\partial R} \right) \left( \frac{R}{G_{L_M}} \right), \quad (25)$$

which using the fact that the firm's FOCs (4) and (5) require wages to equal marginal products, can be written as

$$\eta_{G_R, L_M} \equiv \left( \frac{\partial G_R}{\partial L_M} \right) \left( \frac{L_M}{W_R} \right), \quad (26)$$

$$\eta_{G_{L_M}, R} \equiv \left( \frac{\partial G_{L_M}}{\partial R} \right) \left( \frac{R}{W_M} \right), \quad (27)$$

Using Young's theorem,  $\partial G_R / \partial L_M = \partial G_{L_M} / \partial R$ , it follows that the ratio of the cross elasticities is given by:

$$\frac{\eta_{G_R, L_M}}{\eta_{G_{L_M}, R}} = \frac{W_M L_M}{W_R R} = \frac{(W_M L_M)/Y}{(W_R R)/Y}. \quad (28)$$

Hence, the ratio of elasticities must equal the ratio of manual labor's share of income to the share of income paid to all routine factors of production.<sup>9</sup> In the data, this ratio of income shares is equal to 0.1355, disciplining the relative magnitude of cross elasticities.

The second step is that by definition the product of the cross elasticities must equal the product of the own elasticities, i.e.

$$\eta_{G_R, L_M} \times \eta_{G_{L_M}, R} \equiv \eta_{G_R, R} \times \eta_{G_{L_M}, L_M}. \quad (29)$$

Combining then equations (28) and (29) leads to (23). Equation (23) provides an empirical restriction on the (absolute value of the) cross elasticities as a function of the own elasticities, while permitting routine and manual inputs to be either gross

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<sup>9</sup>This uses the fact that the wage per unit of effective routine labor must equal the rental rate per unit of automation capital service flow in equilibrium.

complements or substitutes. In considering different values of the own elasticities, we refer to the empirical work of [Lichter, Peichl, and Siegloch \(2015\)](#) who conduct a meta analysis of 151 different studies containing 1334 estimate of the own-wage elasticity of labor demand. We consider the range of estimates that they provide for the U.S. which lies between 0 and  $-3$ .<sup>10</sup> Then, for every combination of the own elasticities we use (23) to recover the value for  $\eta_{G_{L_M}, R}$ . Using this value of  $\eta_{G_{L_M}, R}$  in (28) we recover the value of  $\eta_{G_R, L_M}$ .

**Routine Ability Distribution** Finally, to specify  $\nu$  and  $\xi$ , we need to make choices on the distribution of routine work ability,  $\Gamma$ . We consider three possibilities to explore the robustness of our findings. The first is a degenerate distribution of routine ability, equal to the ability in the manual occupation. In Section 6, we discuss how assuming identical work ability in both occupations generates sharp results that are *independent* of the production elasticities.

In the remaining two cases, we assume  $\Gamma$  to be either uniform or Pareto. In the case of the uniform skill distribution, we specify the support to be  $[0, u^{max}]$  so that:

$$\Gamma(u) = \frac{u}{u^{max}}. \quad (30)$$

This implies:

$$\xi = \frac{u^{max} u^{*2}}{u^{max} - u^*}, \quad \nu = 1. \quad (31)$$

In the case of the Pareto distribution:

$$\Gamma(u^*) = 1 - \left( \frac{u_{min}}{u^*} \right)^{\kappa_u}, \quad (32)$$

which implies:

$$\xi = \kappa_u - 1, \quad \nu = \kappa_u \left( \frac{u_{min}}{u^*} \right)^{\kappa_u} \left[ 1 - \left( \frac{u_{min}}{u^*} \right)^{\kappa_u} \right]^{-1}. \quad (33)$$

In both cases, we have two values to pin down in order to specify  $\nu$  and  $\xi$ . These are  $u^{max}$  and  $u^*$  for the uniform,  $\kappa_u$  and  $(u_{min}/u^*)$  for the Pareto. We use the same two

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<sup>10</sup>[Lichter, Peichl, and Siegloch \(2015\)](#) have assembled 287 estimates for the U.S. Of these, 11 are positive which we discard from the analysis. Of the remaining 276 estimates, about 95% lie between 0 and  $-3$  which is the range we consider. We are grateful to the authors of [Lichter, Peichl, and Siegloch \(2015\)](#) for kindly sharing their data with us; all errors in their use are our own.

moments in the data to identify these. The first is the fraction of workers (conditional on working) employed in the manual occupation in 1989,  $\Gamma(u^*) = 0.184$ . The second data moment is the ratio of national income shares paid to routine and manual workers in 1989; the ratio of income shares is given by  $\left(\frac{u^{max}-u^*}{u^{max}u^{*2}}\right)$  for the uniform distribution and  $\left(\frac{\kappa_u}{\kappa_u-1}\right)\left(\frac{u_{min}}{u^*}\right)^{\kappa_u}\left[1-\left(\frac{u_{min}}{u^*}\right)^{\kappa_u}\right]^{-1}$  for the Pareto distribution. We measure this ratio to equal 6.757. Solving these two moment conditions for two unknowns results in  $\xi = 0.148$  and  $\nu = 1$  for the uniform distribution, and  $\xi = 1.680$  and  $\nu = 11.866$  for the Pareto distribution.<sup>11</sup>

### 5.3 Automation Shock

To measure the increase in automation since 1989 (or the magnitude of the “automation shock,” given our focus on linearized dynamics), we relate capital-embodied automation technology,  $A$ , to measured ICT capital using the data of [Eden and Gaggl \(2016\)](#). Crucially, ICT capital is expressed in real, *effective* units in their data, using detailed asset-level price deflators for both investment flows and existing stocks, obtained from the BEA Fixed Asset Accounts. This aligns [Eden and Gaggl \(2016\)](#)’s empirical measure with the construct of the model.

Simply using the percentage growth rate of ICT capital between 1989 and 2014 neglects the fact that along a balanced growth path (BGP) with constant labor allocations, all forms of capital are expected to grow, at potentially different rates. As is well known, the growth rate of ICT capital has exceeded that of other forms of capital at least since the 1970s, prior to the decline of per capita routine employment, which as we discuss below is consistent with a BGP. As such, we measure the shock as the *deviation* of ICT capital from a balanced growth trend with “automation-specific” technical change since 1989.

To do so, we adapt the now-standard methodology of [Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell \(1997\)](#) to the model of Section 3. The details are provided in the Online Appendix. Briefly, we combine the price and quantity data of [Eden and Gaggl \(2016\)](#) with NIPA data for Real GDP to construct a counterfactual series for the stock of automation capital that would have obtained had the economy been along a BGP

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<sup>11</sup>For the Uniform distribution  $\xi$  also equals the ratio of the manual to routine workers, hence the value of  $0.148 = 6.7568^{-1}$ .



from 1989–2014. We then compare the actual series to the counterfactual, and find the actual series to be approximately 100 log points higher in 2014. Thus, in our quantitative analysis we use  $\hat{A} = 1$  as our automation shock and consider robustness to alternative values.

## 6 Numerical Results

Here we evaluate the model’s quantitative predictions. As the previous section indicates, our analysis is broad and agnostic, within the neoclassical tradition of [Greenwood, Herkowitz, and Krusell \(1997\)](#) and [Krusell et al. \(2000\)](#)—frameworks that have become standard building blocks to analyze the effects of capital-embodied technical change and its labor market implications. Our approach allows for an agnostic specification of labor demand with few restrictions, and a standard approach to labor supply with respect to employment and occupational choice. But obviously, the results rely on specific qualitative and quantitative choices. For example, automation is proxied as efficiency units of ICT capital, and advances in automation measured as deviations of its stock from a (specific) balanced growth trend. Different assumptions would lead to different results, warranting future investigation that we believe is aided by the simple, linearized analytical framework developed here.

Given an increase in capital-embodied automation technology as measured in [Section 5](#), we solve for the response of sorting between routine/manual occupations and non-employment choice for the key demographic group. Recall that in the data, the key group’s employment rate fell from 72.7% to 64.9%, and conditional on employment, the fraction working in manual occupations rose from 18.4% to 30.9%, between 1989–2014. We begin the analysis with the the case of a degenerate distribution of routine work ability, equal to the ability in the manual occupation. This serves as a useful benchmark.

### 6.1 Homogeneous Routine Ability

In this case all workers are equally productive in both occupations (with productivity normalized to unity). Thus, in equilibrium  $W_M = W_R$ ; furthermore, the participation

equation implies that  $b = W_M = W_R$ . In the Online Appendix, we show that *irrespective* of the production elasticities, following an automation shock, the response of the fraction of workers (conditional on working) who sort into the manual occupation is given by:

$$(1 - \Gamma(u^*)) \left( \frac{\lambda}{1 - \lambda} \right) \hat{A}, \quad (34)$$

where, with a slight abuse of notation,  $(1 - \Gamma(u^*))$  denotes the steady state fraction of workers who sort into the routine occupation in 1989. Furthermore, the response of the employment rate is given by:

$$- (1 - \Gamma(u^*)) \left( \frac{\lambda}{1 - \lambda} \right) \hat{A}. \quad (35)$$

This allows for an easy quantification of the effects of automation. From Section 5,  $\lambda/(1 - \lambda) = 0.0923$ . The fraction of workers in the key group employed in manual occupations in 1989 is 0.184. Given our estimate of  $\hat{A} = 1$ , following the automation shock the fraction of workers employed in manual occupations equals  $\exp[0.0923 \times (1 - 0.184) \times 1 + \log(0.184)] = 0.198$ . Similarly, the employment rate falls to  $\exp[-0.0923 \times (1 - 0.184) \times 1 + \log(0.727)] = 0.674$ . The corresponding empirical values in 2014 are 30.9% and 64.9%, respectively. Hence, the model underpredicts both the reallocation to the manual occupation and the reallocation to non-employment.

Finally, the simplicity of this analysis also allows us to ask what value of  $\hat{A}$  is required to “reverse engineer” the changes observed in the data for the key group. To account for all of the occupational reallocation via the automation shock would require  $\hat{A} = 6.04$ . This value would also allow the model to explain more than 100% of the change in employment rate. Hence, the change in automation technology, in log deviation terms, would need to be *six* times greater than the one indicated in Section 5.

## 6.2 Heterogeneous Routine Ability

In this subsection, we analyze the case with heterogeneous routine work ability when cross elasticities in production are zero, i.e.  $\eta_{G_R, L_M} = \eta_{G_{L_M}, R} = 0$ . This implies that changes in automation do not have a direct effect on the marginal product of manual

labor. This case is informative given the analytical results of Propositions 1 and 2 presented in Section 4.

In the rest of this Section, we discuss the specification with Pareto distributed ability; the results with the uniform distribution are presented in the Online Appendix. We solve the model for values of the own elasticities,  $\eta_{G_R,R}$  and  $\eta_{G_{L_M},L_M}$ , that lie in the interval  $[-3, 0)$ , with the elasticity of participation set to the benchmark value of  $\mu = 1.3$ . Recall that:

$$\Omega(b^*) = \text{Participation rate}, \quad (36)$$

$$\Gamma(u^*) = \text{Fraction in manual occupation}, \quad (37)$$

implying that in the linearized equilibrium:

$$\frac{\Omega'(b^*)b^*}{\Omega(b^*)}\hat{b} = \mu \times \hat{b} = \widehat{\text{Participation rate}}, \quad (38)$$

$$\frac{\Gamma'(u^*)u^*}{\Gamma(u^*)}\hat{u} = \nu \times \hat{u} = \widehat{\text{Fraction in manual occupation}}. \quad (39)$$

For each combination of parameter values, the solution of the linearized model yields values for  $\hat{u}$  and  $\hat{b}$ , from which we recover the employment rate and occupational sorting in response to the automation shock.

Each dot in Figure 1 depicts the employment rate on the vertical axis and, conditional on working, the fraction of workers in manual occupations on the horizontal axis, for specific pairs of  $(\eta_{G_R,R}, \eta_{G_{L_M},L_M})$ . These elasticities are reported, in that order, to the right of each dot (for visual clarity we do so only for selected elasticity pairs).

Figure 1 illustrates that the effects of an increase in automation are of the correct sign relative to Proposition 1: with the original 1989 allocation located at the upper-left corner, employment falls and workers reallocate toward the manual occupation. But matching the magnitude of change in either variable is a challenge for the model. In terms of occupational reallocation, the model can account for at most about 50%, represented by the point furthest to the right in the diagram. In this parametrization, the model accounts for less than one-third of the fall in the employment rate. This occurs when  $\eta_{G_{L_M},L_M} = -0.001$  and  $\eta_{G_R,R} = -3$ , when the demand curve for manual labor is flat, and much steeper for the routine factor input. Thus, the elasticities must be at opposing extreme values.

When the elasticities are flipped, with  $\eta_{G_{L_M}, L_M} = -3$  and  $\eta_{G_{R,R}} = -0.001$ , the model generates a larger fall in employment, but very little reallocation of labor across occupations. This highlights the importance of the relative magnitudes of  $\eta_{G_{R,R}}$  and  $\eta_{G_{L_M}, L_M}$ . Consider the “flattest” locus of points with  $\eta_{G_{L_M}, L_M} = -0.001$  (the second number to the right of each dot). As  $\eta_{G_{R,R}}$  becomes more negative, there is greater response of occupational reallocation in response to an increase in automation; however, there is comparatively little change in the employment rate. Larger responses in employment require values of  $\eta_{G_{L_M}, L_M}$  that are larger in absolute value (more negative). But along any locus where  $\eta_{G_{R,R}}$  is constant (the first number to the right of a dot), increasingly negative values of  $\eta_{G_{L_M}, L_M}$  move in the “wrong” south-westerly direction.

Hence, Figure 1 illustrates a quantitative tradeoff between responsiveness on the participation and occupational sorting margins. Greater occupational reallocation requires values of  $\eta_{G_{L_M}, L_M}$  closer to zero, so that the manual wage does not fall “too fast” with increased employment. But this relatively flat labor demand curve implies little change in the employment rate. Generating greater responses of employment to automation requires steep labor demand curves, resulting in little response in occupational sorting.

Figure 1 is also useful to explore the effect of heterogeneity on our results. Near the bottom-left corner of the figure, we plot the response generated from the version with homogenous work ability across occupations discussed above. For every point with  $\eta_{G_{R,R}} < \eta_{G_{L_M}, L_M}$  the amount of occupation reallocation is higher in the presence of heterogeneity. This can be shown formally in the limiting case for  $\eta_{G_{R,R}} < \eta_{G_{L_M}, L_M} = 0$ .<sup>12</sup> In particular, as workers move from routine to manual occupations, the routine wage rises. The greater the heterogeneity in routine ability, the smaller is the impact of the marginal worker on effective routine labor input which determines the wage (marginal product). Thus, with greater heterogeneity, more reallocation of workers out of the routine occupation is required to satisfy the occupational sorting condition,

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<sup>12</sup>Specifically, with homogenous ability, the change in the number of workers working in the manual occupation is given by  $\left(\frac{1-\Gamma(u^*)}{\Gamma(u^*)}\right) \left(\frac{\lambda}{1-\lambda}\right) \hat{A}$ . In the case with Pareto distributed ability, the change is given by  $\left(\frac{\kappa_u}{\kappa_u-1}\right) \left(\frac{1-\Gamma(u^*)}{\Gamma(u^*)}\right) \left(\frac{\lambda}{1-\lambda}\right) \hat{A}$ . Greater heterogeneity (i.e. a thicker right tail,  $\kappa_u \rightarrow 1$ ) increases the reallocation from routine to manual; as  $\kappa_u \rightarrow \infty$  the Pareto converges to a degenerate distribution, and the response of occupation sorting converges to that with homogenous ability.

equation (14).

This analysis also has implications for the behaviour of relative wages. Equation (14) (in linearized form, which we reproduce here):

$$\widehat{u}^* = \widehat{W}_M - \widehat{W}_R, \quad (40)$$

states that the change in the marginal ability,  $u^*$ , is equal to the change in relative wages (per effective unit of labor). As we show in the Online Appendix, the ratio of manual to routine wage per effective unit increased by about 10%, 1989–2014.

This implies an increase in  $u^*$  and, thus, an increase in the fraction of workers who select into the manual occupation. All cases in Figure 1 are qualitatively consistent with this. Quantitatively, note that the maximal change in  $u^*$  is  $\widehat{u}^* = 0.0360$  or 3.6%, corresponding to the maximal value obtained on the horizontal axis. This is only about one-third of the empirically observed change in relative wages, another manifestation of the challenge that the benchmark model faces in rationalizing the data.

Figure 2 investigates the effect of changes in the participation elasticity, with  $\mu = 1.3$  depicted as circle dots, and  $\mu = 2$  as square dots. For any pair of the production elasticities, the larger is  $\mu$  the greater is the response of the employment rate. However, for the square dot furthest to the right in the diagram, the model accounts for only about 50% of the change in both occupational sorting and the fall in employment.<sup>13</sup>

The figures in the Online Appendix replace the analysis of Figure 1 for the case when routine work ability is uniformly distributed. As in the Pareto case, the overall impact of an increase in automation on labor market outcomes is small. Moreover, the effect on occupational sorting is smaller than in the Pareto case displayed above.<sup>14</sup>

To summarize, when changes in automation have no direct effect on the marginal product of labor in the manual occupation (i.e., when cross elasticities are zero), this neoclassical framework has only modest ability to generate the response of employment and occupational sorting observed in the data. This is true despite considering a wide range of parameter values.

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<sup>13</sup>In experiments not presented here, results were largely unchanged for greater values of  $\mu$  that far exceed those in the range reported in Hotz and Scholz (2003).

<sup>14</sup>This can be formally shown for the limiting case of  $\eta_{G_{L_M}, L_M} = 0$  and  $\eta_{G_R, R} \rightarrow -\infty$ .

### 6.3 Non-Zero Cross Elasticities

We now discuss results when cross production elasticities differ from zero. The empirical literature is silent on whether manual and routine inputs are gross complements or substitutes. With respect to analytical results, [Autor and Dorn \(2013\)](#) show that for their functional form assumptions, simultaneous employment and wage polarization can only be rationalized when manual and routine labor are gross complements. For the sake of completeness and generality, we consider both positive and negative values of cross elasticities.

Figure 3 depicts the case when the two occupational inputs are complements, Figure 4 for the case of substitutes. Each dot depicts the employment rate on the vertical axis, and the fraction employed in the manual occupation (conditional on working) on the horizontal axis, for specific triplets of  $\eta_{G_R,R}$ ,  $\eta_{G_{L_M},L_M}$ ,  $\eta_{G_{L_M},R}$  (recall that  $\eta_{G_R,L_M}$  is determined by equation (23)). For visual clarity, we report the elasticity values (in the listed order, to the right of each dot) only for the case when  $\eta_{G_{L_M},L_M} = -0.001$ , but the figures report all the different elasticity combinations. Again, the Online Appendix displays the results for the case when routine work ability is uniformly distributed.

In this case, the automation shock has a direct effect of increasing the marginal product of labor in the manual occupation. This amplifies reallocation towards the manual occupation. However, it severely reduces the model's ability to generate reductions in employment, since the negative effect of the shock on wages is dampened. Accordingly, Figure 3 displays a larger set of parameters with more reallocation towards the manual occupation (conditional on working) and less change in the employment rate relative to Figure 1. Overall, the quantitative implications of the complements case are similar to the case when the cross elasticities are zero and  $\eta_{G_{L_M},L_M} = -0.001$ .

When the two inputs are substitutes, the automation shock has a direct effect of decreasing the marginal product of labor in the manual occupation. Not surprisingly, Figure 4 indicates that this dampens the incentive to reallocate towards the manual occupation. In fact, there are now parameterizations where an increase in automation causes reallocation *towards* the routine occupation, conditional on working. Overall, considering cross elasticities in production that differ from zero does not substantively

alter the conclusion from Subsections 6.1 and 6.2. The neoclassical framework is only modestly successful at generating the observed changes in the low- and middle-skill labor market in response to increased automation.

Our findings contrast with those in vom Lehn (2015). We note three important distinctions. The first is the nature of the analysis; while we focus *solely* on quantifying the role of advances in automation technology, vom Lehn (2015), considers *both* the role of technical change and changes in the distribution of labor market skill. A second difference is in terms of the measurement of capital-embodied technology; we equate automation with ICT capital, whereas vom Lehn (2015) considers total non-residential equipment. Finally, we consider labor market responses to deviations in the *empirically observed* ICT capital stock from a BGP. In contrast, vom Lehn (2015) studies a representative agent problem for consumption, investment, and hours worked given a time path of *equipment investment specific technical change*. As such, the resulting capital stock in vom Lehn (2015) is the one implied by his model dynamics, as opposed to actual changes in observable capital stocks which we use. Hence, our analysis is more prescriptive in nature, providing an agnostic framework for evaluating results for a wide range of parameterizations.

## 6.4 What Would it Take?

Finally, we ask what combination of parameter values and automation shock magnitude is required to account for *both* the observed occupational reallocation and employment change. With zero cross elasticities, doubling the *log deviation* shock (i.e. using  $\hat{A} = 2$ ) comes close to matching the empirical changes. This is depicted in Figure A.4 in the Online Appendix. This is similarly true for the case when factors are complements or substitutes, results we make available upon request.

It is important to understand what these shock magnitudes mean. In our benchmark specification,  $\hat{A} = 1$  in log terms, implying that ICT capital has nearly tripled ( $\exp(1) = 2.71$ ) in *levels* relative to a balanced growth trend. A value of  $\hat{A} = 2$  implies a *greater than seven fold* ( $\exp(2) = 7.38$ ) increase. This highlights the challenge faced by advances in automation, as represented by measured changes in the stock of (quality adjusted) ICT capital, as the single force responsible for the changes in labor market outcomes experienced by the key demographic group studied here.

## 7 Conclusions

The share of employment in middle-skilled occupations has experienced a strong decline over recent decades. In this paper we show that this is primarily due to a fall in the propensity to work in these occupations conditional on demographic characteristics, rather than being driven by changes in the demographic composition of the economy. These propensity changes are concentrated among a relatively small subset of workers, who have experienced an increase in their propensity for non-employment (unemployment or non-participation) and their propensity to work in low-paying non-routine manual occupations. In fact, we show that these groups can account for a substantial fraction of the aggregate increase in non-employment and non-routine manual employment.

To shed light on the role of advances in automation technology in accounting for these phenomena, we study a flexible neoclassical model of the labor market, with endogenous occupation and participation decisions driven by worker heterogeneity. We show analytically that advances in automation cause workers to leave routine occupations and sort into non-employment and non-routine manual jobs. However, in the quantitative cases we consider, advances in automation technology on their own are unable to jointly generate changes in occupational shares and employment propensities that are quantitatively similar to those observed in the data for our key demographic group. We conclude that within the neoclassical context, accounting for a significant fraction of the changes along both margins requires relatively extreme combinations of parameter values and automation shock magnitude.

These results raise the question of what forces can account for our empirical findings. This paper has concentrated solely on the impact of automation. However, other changes have occurred in the U.S. economy that could have affected occupational choice and employment during the time period under study. Potentially relevant factors that we have abstracted from include changes in the share of high-skilled workers and their occupational choice, outsourcing and trade, and changes in policy affecting the incentive to participate in the labor market. In our view, the generality of our model provides a useful template for future quantitative research in evaluating the role of automation and other factors in contributing to the labor market outcomes discussed in the paper.




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
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Figure 1: Employment Rate and Occupation Choice




Notes: Each dot corresponds to different values of  $(\eta_{G_R, R}, \eta_{G_{L_M}, L_M})$  as indicated to the right of selected dots. All simulations use a Pareto distribution for ability and  $\mu = 1.3$ . In 1989, the employment rate was 72.7%, and conditional on employment, the fraction working in manual occupations was 18.4% (“north-west” corner). In 2014 the employment rate fell to 64.9%, and conditional on employment, the fraction in manual occupations increased to 30.9%, off the scale of the figure in the “south-east” direction.

Figure 2: Employment Rate and Occupation Choice: The effect of  $\mu$




Notes: Each dot corresponds to different values of  $(\eta_{G_R,R}, \eta_{G_{L_M},L_M})$  and  $\mu$ . The blue circle dots use  $\mu = 1.3$ , the red square dots use  $\mu = 2$ . All simulations use a Pareto distribution for ability. In 1989, the employment rate was 72.7%, and conditional on employment, the fraction working in manual occupations was 18.4% (“north-west” corner). In 2014 the employment rate fell to 64.9%, and conditional on employment, the fraction in manual occupations increased to 30.9%, off the scale of the figure in the “south-east” direction.

Figure 3: Employment Rate and Occupation Choice: Complements



Notes: Each dot corresponds to different values of  $(\eta_{G_R, R}, \eta_{G_{L_M}, L_M}, \eta_{G_{L_M}, R})$  as indicated to the right of selected dots. All simulations use a Pareto distribution for ability and  $\mu = 1.3$ . In 1989, the employment rate was 72.7%, and conditional on employment, the fraction working in manual occupations was 18.4% (“north-west” corner). In 2014 the employment rate fell to 64.9%, and conditional on employment, the fraction in manual occupations increased to 30.9%, off the scale of the figure in the “south-east” direction.

Figure 4: Employment Rate and Occupation Choice: Substitutes



Notes: Each dot corresponds to different values of  $(\eta_{G_R, R}, \eta_{G_{L_M}, L_M}, \eta_{G_{L_M}, R})$  as indicated to the right of selected dots. All simulations use a Pareto distribution for ability and  $\mu = 1.3$ . In 1989, the employment rate was 72.7%, and conditional on employment, the fraction working in manual occupations was 18.4%. In 2014 the employment rate fell to 64.9%, and conditional on employment, the fraction in manual occupations increased to 30.9%, off the scale of the figure in the “south-east” direction.

Table 1: Routine Employment Per Capita

	1979	1989	1999	2009	2014
Routine	0.405	0.406	0.376	0.317	0.312
Routine Cognitive	0.173	0.196	0.182	0.169	0.161
Routine Manual	0.232	0.210	0.194	0.148	0.151

Note: Share of the population employed in routine occupational groups based on individuals aged 20-64 from the monthly Current Population Survey, excluding those employed in agriculture and resource occupations.



Table 2: Decompositions based on age-education-gender groups

	Pre	Post	Total	Difference		
				Composition	Propensity	Interaction
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<b>A. 1979-2014</b>						
<i>Number of Obs</i>	<i>976,672</i>	<i>922,931</i>				
NRC (%)	21.5	28.2	+6.7	+9.7	−2.9	−0.0
RC (%)	17.3	16.1	−1.2	+0.6	−2.0	+0.3
RM (%)	23.2	15.1	−8.1	−5.2	−5.7	+2.7
NRM (%)	8.4	12.3	+3.9	−1.9	+6.6	−0.8
Not Working (%)	29.6	28.3	−1.3	−3.1	+4.0	−2.2
<b>B. 1989-2014</b>						
<i>Number of Obs</i>	<i>977,282</i>	<i>922,931</i>				
NRC (%)	24.7	28.2	+3.5	+6.3	−2.7	−0.1
RC (%)	19.6	16.1	−3.5	+0.3	−3.9	+0.2
RM (%)	21.0	15.1	−5.9	−3.5	−4.0	+1.6
NRM (%)	9.6	12.3	+2.7	−1.7	+4.7	−0.3
Not Working (%)	25.2	28.3	+3.1	−1.4	+5.9	−1.3

Notes: Composition of the population across different occupational groups and not working, based on individuals aged 20-64 from the monthly Current Population Survey, excluding those employed in agriculture and resource occupations. NRC stands for Non-Routine Cognitive, RC for Routine Cognitive, RM for Routine Manual, and NRM for Non-Routine Manual. Column (1) shows the composition for the initial period (1979 in Panel A; 1989 in Panel B); Column (2) shows the composition for the final period (2014 in both Panels). Column (3) shows the total change for the entire period, which is decomposed into the fraction attributable to changes in the composition of demographic groups in the population (Column (4)), changes in the propensity to enter the different categories conditional on demographic characteristics (Column (5)), and the interaction of the two (Column (6)). See text for full details.

Table 3.A: Fraction of change in Routine Manual employment accounted for by each demographic group, 1979-2014

	Males			Females		
	<i>20-29</i>	<i>30-49</i>	<i>50-64</i>	<i>20-29</i>	<i>30-49</i>	<i>50-64</i>
Less Than High School	<b>10.26</b>	<b>19.60</b>	<b>18.66</b>	3.60	8.41	5.60
High School Diploma	<b>30.86</b>	<b>14.88</b>	-4.03	7.39	6.62	0.30
	<i>All Ages</i>			<i>All Ages</i>		
Some College	-13.55			-2.88		
At Least College	-4.41			-1.33		

Table 3.B: Key demographic groups: Routine Manual

	Population Share (%)			Fraction in RM (%)		
	1979	2014	Change	1979	2014	Change
<i>Male High School Dropouts</i>						
Age 20-29	1.90	0.89	-1.01	61.58	37.87	-23.70
Age 30-49	4.12	2.06	-2.06	63.19	48.94	-14.25
Age 50-64	4.68	1.51	-3.17	43.09	32.92	-10.17
<i>Male High School Graduates</i>						
Age 20-29	6.27	3.82	-2.45	61.36	34.99	-26.36
Age 30-49	7.51	6.60	-0.91	55.11	44.39	-10.72

Notes: Table 3.A presents the fraction of the total change in the population share of Routine Manual (RM) employment that can be attributed to the changes experienced by each demographic group (by age, education and gender). The analysis is based on individuals aged 20-64 from the monthly Current Population Survey, excluding those employed in agriculture and resource occupations. The changes accounting for the majority of the total change are highlighted in bold. Table 3.B presents the change in the population share and the propensity to be employed in RM occupations for these key groups.

Table 4: Change in the Fraction of Workers in each Group, 1979-2014 (p.p.)

	NRC	RC	RM	NRM	Not Working
<i>Male High School Dropouts</i>					
Age 20-29	-1.10	2.16	-23.70	7.47	15.17
Age 30-49	-4.95	0.62	-14.25	9.02	9.55
Age 50-64	-6.31	-0.12	-10.17	2.66	13.95
<i>Male High School Graduates</i>					
Age 20-29	-3.81	5.22	-26.36	7.79	17.16
Age 30-49	-8.37	0.64	-10.72	5.32	13.13

Notes: The table details the changes in the fraction of workers in each occupational category and not working among the groups identified as accounting for the majority of the decline in RM employment. NRC stands for Non-Routine Cognitive, RC for Routine Cognitive, RM for Routine Manual, and NRM for Non-Routine Manual.

Table 5.A: Fraction of change in Routine Cognitive employment propensity accounted for by each demographic group, 1989-2014

	Males			Females		
	<i>20-29</i>	<i>30-49</i>	<i>50-64</i>	<i>20-29</i>	<i>30-49</i>	<i>50-64</i>
High School Diploma	-2.35	3.16	3.13	<b>14.80</b>	<b>24.13</b>	3.54
Some College	2.15	5.43	2.38	<b>12.27</b>	<b>10.62</b>	1.50
	<i>All Ages</i>			<i>All Ages</i>		
Less Than High School	0.65			3.37		
At Least College	8.75			6.46		

Table 5.B: Key demographic groups: Routine Cognitive

	Population Share (%)			Fraction in RC (%)		
	1989	2014	Change	1989	2014	Change
<i>Female High School Graduates</i>						
Age 20-29	5.82	3.05	-2.77	32.61	22.73	-9.89
Age 30-49	10.58	5.57	-5.01	32.68	23.81	-8.87
<i>Females with Some College</i>						
Age 20-29	3.88	4.70	0.82	36.77	24.46	-12.31
Age 30-49	5.48	6.32	0.84	33.04	25.50	-7.54

Notes: Table 5.A presents the fraction of the total change in the propensity to work in a Routine Cognitive (RC) occupation that can be attributed to the changes experienced by each demographic group (by age, education and gender). The analysis is based on individuals aged 20-64 from the monthly Current Population Survey, excluding those employed in agriculture and resource occupations. The changes accounting for the majority of the total change are highlighted in bold. Table 5.B presents the change in the population share and the propensity to be employed in RC occupations for these key groups.

Table 6: Change in the Fraction of Workers in each Group, 1989-2014 (p.p.)

	NRC	RC	RM	NRM	Not Working
<i>Female High School Graduates</i>					
Age 20-29	-2.58	-9.89	-4.39	7.06	9.79
Age 30-49	-2.05	-8.87	-3.34	6.28	7.99
<i>Females with Some College</i>					
Age 20-29	-4.42	-12.31	-1.16	9.94	7.96
Age 30-49	-3.78	-7.54	-0.24	7.44	4.11

Notes: The table details the changes in the fraction of workers in each occupational category and not working among the groups identified as accounting for the majority of the decline in the propensity to work in RC occupations. NRC stands for Non-Routine Cognitive, RC for Routine Cognitive, RM for Routine Manual, and NRM for Non-Routine Manual.

Table 7: Observed and counterfactual changes in population shares (p.p.)

	Observed (1)	Propensity (2)	Accounting CF (3)	Mitigating CF (4)
<b>A. 1979-2014</b>				
Routine	-9.30	-7.67	-6.20	-5.37
Non-Routine Manual	3.85	6.55	4.17	0.85
Non-Employment	-1.27	4.03	3.14	-2.81
<b>B. 1989-2014</b>				
Routine	-9.37	-7.90	-5.68	-5.36
Non-Routine Manual	2.71	4.68	2.81	0.57
Non-Employment	3.14	5.88	4.21	0.24

Column (1) shows the total observed change in the fraction of the population in different labor market categories, based on individuals aged 20-64 from the monthly Current Population Survey, excluding those employed in agriculture and resource occupations. Column (2) shows the counterfactual changes that are obtained when allowing for changes in the propensities to enter different labor market categories among all demographic groups, holding the composition of demographic groups in the population at benchmark levels. Column (3) shows the counterfactual changes that are obtained when holding the composition of all demographic groups in the population at benchmark levels, and holding the propensities at benchmark levels for all groups except those identified as being key for the decline in routine employment. Column (4) shows the counterfactual changes that are obtained when allowing the composition of demographic groups to change as in the data, while holding the propensities at benchmark levels only for the groups identified as being key for the decline in routine employment.

## Online Appendix for:

“Disappearing Routine Jobs: Who, How, and Why?”

Guido Matias Cortes (York University and RCEA)

Nir Jaimovich (University of Zurich and NBER)

Henry E. Siu (University of British Columbia and NBER)

## Appendix A Empirical Facts: 25–64 Year Olds

Since individuals in their early-20s might still be enrolled in college, we replicate the findings from Section 2, considering only those aged 25-64 years old. These are Tables A.1–A.7. As a very brief summary, the time series patterns in Tables A.1 and A.2 are very similar. In terms of the demographic groups that are most relevant in accounting for the decline in Routine Manual employment, young male high school dropouts become relatively less important, prime-age female high school dropouts more important. The decline in the propensity to work in Routine Cognitive occupations is still primarily accounted for by women with intermediate levels of education, primarily the prime-aged. Overall, no major differences in terms of the key substantive messages emerge.

## Appendix B Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition

The analysis in the main body of the text considers the effect of composition and propensities by allowing for changes across specific age-education-gender cells. Here we present the results of a more standard (but more restrictive) Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, where the probability of being in each labor market state at each point in time is modeled as a linear probability model which depends on age, education, and gender, but without allowing for interactions between these variables. The results are shown in Table A.8. This more restrictive model gives relatively more weight to the composition effect in accounting for the decline in Routine Manual employment; however, the results are broadly in line with the key findings discussed in the main body of the text.

## Appendix C Proofs

**Proof of Propositions 1-2** Start with the occupation cutoff equation (14) and substitute into it the expression for the loglinearized marginal productivities (equations 11-13). Similarly, substitute the log-linearized marginal productivities into the employment participation decision (equation 7). We then obtain the following relation between the  $\hat{b}^*$  and  $\hat{u}^*$

$$\hat{b}^* = \eta_{G_{L_M}, L_M} \hat{L}_M - (1 - \psi) \hat{u}^*. \quad (\text{A.1})$$

Substituting the expression for manual labor (equation 17) we get,

$$\left[1 - \eta_{G_{L_M}, L_M} \mu\right] \hat{b}^* = \left[\eta_{G_{L_M}, L_M} \nu - (1 - \psi)\right] \hat{u}^*. \quad (\text{A.2})$$

Note that the coefficient on  $\hat{b}^*$  is positive while the coefficient on  $\hat{u}^*$  is negative, thus establishing that  $\hat{b}^*$  and  $\hat{u}^*$  must move in opposite directions.

With equation (A.2) we can then substitute for  $\hat{b}^*$  throughout the labor and marginal productivities expressions showing up in the the occupation cutoff equation (14), ending up with the following equation that relates  $\hat{u}^*$  to the automation shock  $\hat{A}$ ,

$$\left[ \psi - \left( \frac{\eta_{G_{L_M}, L_M} \nu - (1 - \psi)}{1 - \eta_{G_{L_M}, L_M} \mu} \right) (1 - \eta_{G_{R,R}}(1 - \lambda)) \mu - \eta_{G_{R,R}}(1 - \lambda) \xi \right] \hat{u}^* = -\eta_{G_{R,R}} \lambda \hat{A} \quad (\text{A.3})$$

Note that all of the coefficients multiplying  $\hat{u}^*$  on the left-hand-side are positive, and that the coefficient on the right-hand-side multiplying  $\hat{A}$  is positive as well. Thus, in response to a positive automation shock the occupation cutoff increases, i.e. conditional on working the share of workers who work in manual increases. Moreover, from equation (A.2) it then follows that in response to a positive automation shock, employment rates fall.

Finally, we note that the proof of Proposition 2 follows directly from equation (A.3). Setting  $\eta_{G_{L_M}, L_M} = 0$  and rearrange the terms then equation (22) follows. We note that evaluating equation (22) with  $\mu = 0$  is indeed the result of a model where there is no participation margin.

**The Homogenous Agents Economy** Abusing the notation of the heterogeneous agents economy, denote the fraction of workers who are working by  $\Omega$  and by  $\Gamma$  the fraction of workers who conditional on working work in manual occupations. Thus,



the measure of manual and routine workers (from our key demographic groups) are given by:

$$L_M = \Omega\Gamma, \quad (\text{A.4})$$

$$L_R = \Omega(1 - \Gamma). \quad (\text{A.5})$$

Log-linearizing these equations we obtain:

$$\widehat{L}_M = \widehat{\Omega} + \widehat{\Gamma}, \quad (\text{A.6})$$

$$\widehat{L}_R = \widehat{\Omega} - \frac{\Gamma}{1 - \Gamma} \widehat{\Gamma}. \quad (\text{A.7})$$

Since are indifferent between participating (which has a constant value) or working in a manual or routine occupation it follows that:

$$\widehat{W}_R = \widehat{W}_M = 0. \quad (\text{A.8})$$

Then, log-linearizing the marginal productivities expressions and substituting their values into the cutoff condition above implies that  $\widehat{L}_M = 0$  and  $\widehat{L}_R = -\frac{A}{L_R}$ .  $\widehat{L}_M = 0$  implies then that  $\widehat{\Omega} = -\widehat{\Gamma}$ , and from  $\widehat{L}_R = -\frac{A}{L_R} \widehat{A}$  and it follows that  $\widehat{\Gamma} = (1 - \Gamma(u^*)) \frac{A}{L_R} \widehat{A}$ .

**Proof of Effects of Heterogeneity** In the homogeneous agents economy all workers are indifferent between working in manual and routine occupations. Hence  $\widehat{W}_M = \widehat{W}_R$ . Substituting into this equation the expressions for the labor in routine and manual it then follows that the change in the measure of workers working in manual occupation is given by  $\left(\frac{1 - \Gamma(u^*)}{\Gamma(u^*)}\right) \frac{A}{L_R} \widehat{A}$ . For the case of the heterogeneous economy, we follow the same strategy. We start with the occupation cutoff equation (14) and substitute into it the expression for the loglinearized marginal productivities (equations 11-13). This ends up with the following relation between  $\widehat{u}^*$  and  $\widehat{A}$ ,  $\widehat{u}^* = \frac{1}{\xi} \frac{A}{L_R^E} \widehat{A}$ . Then, to translate it into the measure of workers working in manual occupation we need to multiply the right hand side by  $\nu$ . Then, under the Pareto distribution,  $\frac{\nu}{\xi} = \frac{\kappa_u}{\kappa_u - 1}$ .

## Appendix D The Labor Expressions

While the “key” demographic group identified in Section 2 (young and prime-aged high school graduates, young and prime-aged females with some college education,

and male high school dropouts of all ages) accounts for the bulk of routine employment, other groups (hereafter “other”) account for important shares of manual employment and non-employment, and thus matter for the calibration of the model. Here we list the values used in the analysis; all are based on CPS data. All data refers to 1989 values, the base year of comparison.

First, define  $S'_D$  to be the share of the “key” group in the economy’s population; this amount to  $S'_D = 0.482$ . To align with the model, we exclude those who work in cognitive jobs; this necessitates a renormalization. The fraction in cognitive occupations is  $s_{D,C} = 0.137$ . It follows that the population share of the key group that is either non-employed, or employed in routine or manual occupations is  $S_D = S'_D * (1 - s_{D,C}) = 0.416$ .

Within the key group, the fraction not employed is  $s_{D,NE} = 0.273$ . Conditional on working, the share in manual occupations is  $p_{D,M} = 0.186$ . This implies that the fraction, conditional on working, in routine occupation is  $p_{D,R} = 0.814$ .

With these expressions we can define the fraction of the population from the “other” group that is working in routine and manual. Since the overall share of the population that is employed in the manual occupation is  $L_M = 0.0958$ , the contribution of the other group is  $L_{O,M} = L_M - L_{D,M} = L_M - S_D * (1 - s_{D,NE}) * p_{D,M} = 0.0395$ . Similarly for the (efficiency unweighted) share of routine workers in the economy,  $L_R = 0.406$ . Hence,  $L_{O,R} = L_R - L_{D,R} = L_R - S_D * (1 - s_{D,NE}) * p_{D,R} = 0.159$ .

Finally, note that the key demographic group considered in this paper is conditioned on age, in addition to education and gender. But given the “comparative statics” nature of our analysis, without explicit consideration of life-cycle dynamics, one might consider conditioning on gender and education alone (that is, including high school graduates of either gender, females with some college, and male high school dropouts, from the old age group). We have considered this alternative classification and calibration. Specifically, this delivers targets that are very similar to those above:  $\hat{S}'_D = 0.592$ ,  $\hat{s}_{D,C} = 0.139$ ,  $\hat{S}_D = 0.511$ ,  $\hat{s}_{D,NE} = 0.307$ ,  $\hat{p}_{D,M} = 0.184$ ,  $\hat{p}_{D,R} = 0.816$ ,  $\hat{L}_{O,M} = 0.0306$ ,  $\hat{L}_{O,R} = 0.117$ . Crucially, this alternative calibration does not have any substantive effect on the results of Section 6; for brevity, we make the numerical details of this available upon request.

**Effective routine labor input** The efficiency-weighted routine labor input generated by the “key” group is given by:

$$L_{D,R}^E = S_D * (1 - s_{D,NE}) * \int_{u^*}^{u^{max}} u \Gamma'(u) du. \quad (\text{A.9})$$

This is the share in total population of the group that is employed in routine, times their ability units. For the case of the Pareto distribution discussed in 6.2, this can be expressed as:

$$L_{D,R}^E = S_D * (1 - s_{D,NE}) * \frac{\kappa_u}{\kappa_u - 1} u_{min}^{\kappa_u} (u^*)^{1-\kappa_u}. \quad (\text{A.10})$$

In order to deliver an expression for  $L_R^E$  via simple aggregation, we assume that the average efficiency in routine work of the key group is the routine efficiency in the “other” group. We first compute for the key group:

$$L_{D,R}^{Avg,E} = \frac{L_{D,R}^E}{L_{D,R}} = \frac{\int_{u^*}^{u^{max}} u \Gamma'(u) du}{p_{D,R}}, \quad (\text{A.11})$$

which in the Pareto case is simply given by:

$$L_{D,R}^{Avg,E} = \frac{\kappa_u}{\kappa_u - 1} u^*. \quad (\text{A.12})$$

We use this average to construct  $L_{O,R}^E = L_{O,R} * L_{D,R}^{Avg,E}$ . It follows that the economy-wide effective routine labor input is:

$$L_R^E = L_{D,R}^E + L_{O,R}^E = L_{D,R}^{Avg,E} \times (L_{D,R} + L_{O,R}), \quad (\text{A.13})$$

and in the case of the Pareto distribution:

$$L_R^E = \frac{\kappa_u}{\kappa_u - 1} u^* \times L_R. \quad (\text{A.14})$$

As discussed in the text,  $\kappa_u$  and  $\frac{u_{min}}{u^*}$  are calibrated by matching the fraction of workers (conditional on working) employed in the manual occupation, and the ratio of national income shares paid to routine and manual workers, both in 1989. For our benchmark case we find  $\kappa_u = 2.6798$  and  $\frac{u_{min}}{u^*} = 0.9262$ ; for alternative case (where we do not condition on age in defining the “key” group),  $\kappa_u = 2.6798$  and  $\frac{u_{min}}{u^*} = 0.9268$ .

Finally, because automation capital and routine labor input have been specified as perfect substitutes in production, it follows that  $\frac{w_R \times A}{w_R \times L_R^E} = \frac{A}{L_R^E}$  equals the ratio of their factor shares of national income. Hence,  $\frac{A}{L_R^E} = 0.0923$ . Without loss of generality we normalize  $A = 1$ , which implies  $L_R^E = 0.0923^{-1} = 10.8342$ . Given this, (A.14) pins down the value of  $u^*$ .

**Relative wages** The above expressions allow us to discuss the behavior of relative wages. Dividing the empirically observed total wage bill for routine workers by  $L_R^E$  delivers the routine wage (per unit of effective labor). Similarly, the (effective) manual wage is the total wage bill for this occupational group divided by the number of such workers. In the benchmark calibration, the ratio of the routine to manual wage equaled 0.0597 in 1989.

To find this ratio in 2014 we proceed as follows. We assume that the parameters of the Pareto distribution ( $\kappa_u$  and  $u_{min}$ ) have not changed between 1989 and 2014. To identify  $u_{min}$ , note that equation (A.14) identifies  $u^* = \frac{10.8342}{L_R} \times \frac{\kappa_u - 1}{\kappa_u} = 16.74$ , implying that  $u_{min} = 15.51$ .

Given the observed income shares in 2014 and the fraction of the key group in routine vs. manual occupations, we find the ratio of the wages. Recall from equation (A.14) that  $L_R^E = \frac{\kappa_u}{\kappa_u - 1} u^* \times L_R$ , so we need to find the new value of  $u^*$ . The share of the key group that (conditional on working) works in routine fell from 0.816 to 0.691. This identifies the 2014 value of  $u^* = 17.80$ . Moreover, the share in population of routine workers fell from 0.4075 to 0.312, and the share in population of manual workers increased from 9.6% to 12.3%. Hence, in 2014 we obtain  $L_R^E = 8.86$ . In 2014, the share of labor income that the routine occupations accounted for was 36.4%, while the share that manual occupations accounted for was 9.5%. It then follows that the ratio of the routine to manual wages fell by approximately 10%, to 0.0532.

## Appendix E Balanced Growth Path

To measure advances in automation technology, in terms of the deviation of ICT capital (i.e., capital-embodied automation technology) from a balanced growth trend, we proceed as follows. We suppose that prior to 1989, the economy was on a BGP “automation-specific” technical change in the sense of Greenwood, Herkowitz, and Krusell (1997).

To characterize the BGP, assume that non-ICT capital evolves according to:

$$K_{t+1} = (1 - \delta_K)K_t + I_{NICT,t}, \quad (\text{A.15})$$

where  $\delta_K$  denotes the depreciation rate and  $I_{NICT,t}$  denotes investment of non-ICT capital. ICT capital (automation capital) evolves according to:

$$A_{t+1} = (1 - \delta_A)A_t + q_t \times I_{ICT,t}, \quad (\text{A.16})$$

where  $\delta_A$  and  $I_{ICT,t}$  denote the depreciation rate and investment, and growth in  $q_t$  represents automation-specific technical change. As in [Greenwood, Herkowitz, and Krusell \(1997\)](#),  $q_t$  can be measured as the inverse of the relative price of ICT to consumption goods at date  $t$ ; the gross growth rate of  $q_t$  is  $\gamma_q$ .

Given an aggregate resource constraint that features additivity,  $Y = I_{ICT} + I_{NICT} + C$ , each component on the right-hand side grows at the growth rate of Real GDP (the left-hand side). Define this gross growth rate as  $\gamma$ . As such, the growth rate of automation capital,  $A$ , along a BGP is  $\gamma \times \gamma_q$ .

Characterizing a BGP requires a production function that admits balanced growth. Consider the general case of:

$$Y = G(K, Z \times L_C, Z \times L_M, [A + Z \times L_R^E]), \quad (\text{A.17})$$

where  $Z$  is labor-augmenting productivity, and  $G(\cdot)$  is constant returns to scale. Optimality entails:

$$W_R = Z \times G_4(\cdot), \quad (\text{A.18})$$

$$W_N = Z \times G_3(\cdot), \quad (\text{A.19})$$

$$R_A = G_4(\cdot). \quad (\text{A.20})$$

Looking at factor income shares:

$$\frac{W_R L_R^E / Y}{R_A A / Y} = \frac{Z L_R^E}{A} \quad (\text{A.21})$$

A BGP with constant labor allocations requires  $Z$  and  $A$  to grow at the same rate. Constant labor also means that the wages (per efficiency unit),  $W_R$  and  $W_M$  grow at the same rate for the occupational cutoff condition to be constant.<sup>1</sup> In addition, all wage rates must grow at rate  $\gamma$  in order for income shares to be constant on the BGP. Finally, a constant income share for ICT income,  $\frac{R_A A}{Y}$ , implies that  $R_A$  grows (i.e., it falls) at rate  $\frac{1}{\gamma_q}$ .

[Eden and Gaggl \(2016\)](#) construct the relative price and quantities of (quality adjusted) ICT capital and estimate its depreciation rate.<sup>2</sup> Given these, we construct the average growth of  $q$  until 1989. Combining this with the growth rate of Real GDP starting in 1989, we construct a counterfactual series for the stock of ICT capital that

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<sup>1</sup>Constant labor in a growth economy also requires restrictions on the specification of preferences for the representative household. These conditions are well known; see, for instance, [King, Plosser, and Rebelo \(1988\)](#).


<sup>2</sup>We are grateful to Eden and Gaggl for kindly sharing their data with us; all errors are our own.

would have obtained had the economy been along a BGP from 1989–2014. We then compare the actual to the counterfactual series and find that the actual series is approximately 100 log points higher in 2014.

## Appendix F Additional Figures


The figures at the end of this document correspond to the case of Uniform distribution (Figures [A.1-A.3](#)) and depict the results of a doubling of the automation shock (Figure [A.4](#)).

Figure A.1: Employment Rate and Occupation Choice: Uniform Distribution



Notes: Each dot corresponds to different values of  $(\eta_{G_R,R}, \eta_{G_{L_M},L_M})$ . All simulations use a Uniform distribution for ability and  $\mu = 1.3$ . In 1989, the employment rate was 72.7%, and conditional on employment, the fraction working in manual occupations was 18.4% (“north-west” corner). In 2014 the employment rate fell to 64.9%, and conditional on employment, the fraction in manual occupations increased to 30.9%, off the scale of the figure in the “south-east” direction.


Figure A.2: Employment Rate and Occupation Choice: Complements (Uniform Distribution)



Notes: Each dot corresponds to different values of  $(\eta_{G_R,R}, \eta_{G_{L_M},L_M}, \eta_{G_{L_M},R})$ . All simulations use a Uniform distribution for ability and  $\mu = 1.3$ . In 1989, the employment rate was 72.7%, and conditional on employment, the fraction working in manual occupations was 18.4%. In 2014 the employment rate fell to 64.9%, and conditional on employment, the fraction in manual occupations increased to 30.9%, off the scale of the figure in the “south-east” direction.




Figure A.3: Employment Rate and Occupation Choice: Substitutes (Uniform Distribution)



Notes: Each dot corresponds to different values of  $(\eta_{G_R,R}, \eta_{G_{L_M},L_M}, \eta_{G_{L_M},R})$ . All simulations use a Uniform distribution for ability and  $\mu = 1.3$ . In 1989, the employment rate was 72.7%, and conditional on employment, the fraction working in manual occupations was 18.4%. In 2014 the employment rate fell to 64.9%, and conditional on employment, the fraction in manual occupations increased to 30.9%, off the scale of the figure in the “south-east” direction.

Figure A.4: Employment Rate and Occupation Choice:  $\hat{A} = 2$



Notes: Each dot corresponds to different values of  $(\eta_{G_R,R}, \eta_{G_{L_M},L_M})$ . All simulations use a Pareto distribution for ability and  $\mu = 1.3$ . In 1989, the employment rate was 72.7%, and conditional on employment, the fraction working in manual occupations was 18.4% (“north-west” corner). In 2014 the employment rate fell to 64.9%, and conditional on employment, the fraction in manual occupations increased to 30.9%.

Table A.1: Routine Employment Per Capita

	1979	1989	1999	2009	2014
Routine	0.393	0.400	0.372	0.318	0.313
Routine Cognitive	0.166	0.190	0.178	0.166	0.158
Routine Manual	0.226	0.209	0.195	0.152	0.155

Note: Share of the population employed in routine occupational groups based on individuals aged 25-64 from the monthly Current Population Survey, excluding those employed in agriculture and resource occupations.

Table A.2: Decompositions based on age-education-gender groups

	Pre	Post	Difference			
			Total	Composition	Propensity	Interaction
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<b>A. 1979-2014</b>						
<i>Number of Obs</i>	<i>823,961</i>	<i>828,582</i>				
NRC (%)	23.1	30.1	+7.1	+10.0	−3.0	+0.1
RC (%)	16.6	15.8	−0.9	+0.7	−1.9	+0.3
RM (%)	22.6	15.5	−7.2	−5.3	−4.3	+2.4
NRM (%)	8.1	11.5	+3.4	−2.1	+6.3	−0.8
Not Working (%)	29.6	27.1	−2.5	−3.3	+2.9	−2.1
<b>B. 1989-2014</b>						
<i>Number of Obs</i>	<i>860,405</i>	<i>828,582</i>				
NRC (%)	26.3	30.1	+3.9	+6.6	−2.7	+0.0
RC (%)	19.0	15.8	−3.3	+0.2	−3.7	+0.2
RM (%)	20.9	15.5	−5.5	−3.7	−3.3	+1.6
NRM (%)	9.0	11.5	+2.5	−1.8	+4.6	−0.4
Not Working (%)	24.7	27.1	+2.4	−1.2	+5.0	−1.4

Notes: Composition of the population across different occupational groups and not working, based on individuals aged 25-64 from the monthly Current Population Survey, excluding those employed in agriculture and resource occupations. NRC stands for Non-Routine Cognitive, RC for Routine Cognitive, RM for Routine Manual, and NRM for Non-Routine Manual. Column (1) shows the composition for the initial period (1979 in Panel A; 1989 in Panel B); Column (2) shows the composition for the final period (2014 in both Panels). Column (3) shows the total change for the entire period, which is decomposed into the fraction attributable to changes in the composition of demographic groups in the population (Column (4)), changes in the propensity to enter the different categories conditional on demographic characteristics (Column (5)), and the interaction of the two (Column (6)). See text for full details.

Table A.3.A: Fraction of change in Routine Manual employment accounted for by each demographic group, 1979-2014

	Males			Females		
	<i>25-29</i>	<i>30-49</i>	<i>50-64</i>	<i>25-29</i>	<i>30-49</i>	<i>50-64</i>
Less Than High School	5.70	<b>27.38</b>	<b>25.70</b>	2.29	<b>11.54</b>	7.69
High School Diploma	<b>17.10</b>	<b>22.53</b>	-3.89	4.44	9.31	0.71
	<i>All Ages</i>			<i>All Ages</i>		
Some College		-18.86			-3.93	
At Least College		-5.89			-1.80	

Table A.3.B: Key demographic groups: Routine Manual

	Population Share (%)			Fraction in RM (%)		
	1979	2014	Change	1979	2014	Change
<i>Male High School Dropouts</i>						
Age 30-49	4.91	2.34	-2.57	63.19	48.94	-14.25
Age 50-64	5.58	1.72	-3.86	43.09	32.92	-10.17
<i>Male High School Graduates</i>						
Age 25-29	3.26	2.01	-1.25	62.55	40.46	-22.08
Age 30-49	8.96	7.49	-1.47	55.11	44.39	-10.72
<i>Female High School Dropouts</i>						
Age 30-49	5.47	2.06	-3.41	18.59	9.34	-9.26

Notes: Table A.3.A presents the fraction of the total change in the population share of Routine Manual (RM) employment that can be attributed to the changes experienced by each demographic group (by age, education and gender). The analysis is based on individuals aged 25-64 from the monthly Current Population Survey, excluding those employed in agriculture and resource occupations. The changes accounting for the majority of the total change are highlighted in bold. Table A.3.B presents the change in the population share and the propensity to be employed in RM occupations for these key groups.

Table A.4: Change in the Fraction of Workers in each Group, 1979-2014 (p.p.)

	NRC	RC	RM	NRM	Not Working
<i>Male High School Dropouts</i>					
Age 30-49	-4.95	0.62	-14.25	9.02	9.55
Age 50-64	-6.31	-0.12	-10.17	2.66	13.95
<i>Male High School Graduates</i>					
Age 25-29	-4.81	4.80	-22.08	7.41	14.69
Age 30-49	-8.37	0.64	-10.72	5.32	13.13
<i>Female High School Dropouts</i>					
Age 30-49	-0.67	-0.40	-9.26	7.53	2.80

Notes: The table details the changes in the fraction of workers in each occupational category and not working among the groups identified as accounting for the majority of the decline in RM employment. NRC stands for Non-Routine Cognitive, RC for Routine Cognitive, RM for Routine Manual, and NRM for Non-Routine Manual.

Table A.5.A: Fraction of change in Routine Cognitive employment propensity accounted for by each demographic group, 1989-2014

	Males			Females		
	<i>25-29</i>	<i>30-49</i>	<i>50-64</i>	<i>25-29</i>	<i>30-49</i>	<i>50-64</i>
High School Diploma	-1.36	3.85	3.82	<b>8.12</b>	<b>29.37</b>	4.31
Some College	0.72	6.61	2.89	5.20	<b>12.93</b>	1.83
	<i>All Ages</i>			<i>All Ages</i>		
Less Than High School	1.15			4.58		
At Least College	9.77			6.21		

Table A.5.B: Key demographic groups: Routine Cognitive

	Population Share (%)			Fraction in RC (%)		
	1989	2014	Change	1989	2014	Change
<i>Female High School Graduates</i>						
Age 25-29	3.64	1.55	-2.09	31.00	22.86	-8.14
Age 30-49	12.10	6.32	-5.78	32.68	23.81	-8.87
<i>Females with Some College</i>						
Age 30-49	6.27	7.17	0.91	33.04	25.50	-7.54

Notes: Table A.5.A presents the fraction of the total change in the propensity to work in a Routine Cognitive (RC) occupation that can be attributed to the changes experienced by each demographic group (by age, education and gender). The analysis is based on individuals aged 25-64 from the monthly Current Population Survey, excluding those employed in agriculture and resource occupations. The changes accounting for the majority of the total change are highlighted in bold. Table A.5.B presents the change in the population share and the propensity to be employed in RC occupations for these key groups.

Table A.6: Change in the Fraction of Workers in each Group, 1989-2014 (p.p.)

	NRC	RC	RM	NRM	Not Working
<i>Female High School Graduates</i>					
Age 25-29	-3.17	-8.14	-4.24	7.22	8.34
Age 30-49	-2.05	-8.87	-3.34	6.28	7.99
<i>Females with Some College</i>					
Age 30-49	-3.78	-7.54	-0.24	7.44	4.11

Notes: The table details the changes in the fraction of workers in each occupational category and not working among the groups identified as accounting for the majority of the decline in the propensity to work in RC occupations. NRC stands for Non-Routine Cognitive, RC for Routine Cognitive, RM for Routine Manual, and NRM for Non-Routine Manual.



Table A.7: Observed and counterfactual changes in population shares (p.p.)

	Observed (1)	Propensity (2)	Accounting CF (3)	Mitigating CF (4)
<b>A. 1979-2014</b>				
Routine Cognitive	-0.9	-1.9	-1.2	-0.0
Routine Manual	-7.2	-4.3	-3.8	-5.1
Non-Routine Manual	3.4	6.3	3.8	1.0
Non-Employment	-2.5	2.9	2.3	-3.5
<b>B. 1989-2014</b>				
Routine Cognitive	-3.3	-3.7	-2.1	-1.9
Routine Manual	-5.5	-3.3	-2.9	-3.7
Non-Routine Manual	2.5	4.6	2.6	0.7
Non-Employment	2.4	5.0	3.6	0.1

Column (1) shows the total observed change in the fraction of the population in different labor market categories, based on individuals aged 25-64 from the monthly Current Population Survey, excluding those employed in agriculture and resource occupations. Column (2) shows the counterfactual changes that are obtained when allowing for changes in the propensities to enter different labor market categories among all demographic groups, holding the composition of demographic groups in the population at benchmark levels. Column (3) shows the counterfactual changes that are obtained when holding the composition of all demographic groups in the population at benchmark levels, and holding the propensities at benchmark levels for all groups except those identified as being key for the decline in routine employment. Column (4) shows the counterfactual changes that are obtained when allowing the composition of demographic groups to change as in the data, while holding the propensities at benchmark levels only for the groups identified as being key for the decline in routine employment.

Table A.8: Oaxaca-Blinder Decompositions

	Pre	Post	Total	Difference		
				Composition	Propensity	Interaction
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<b>A. 1979-2014</b>						
<i>Number of Obs</i>	<i>976,672</i>	<i>922,931</i>				
NRC (%)	21.5	28.2	+6.7	+10.1	−3.1	−0.4
RC (%)	17.3	16.1	−1.2	+1.3	−2.3	−0.2
RM (%)	23.2	15.1	−8.1	−7.1	−4.6	+3.6
NRM (%)	8.4	12.3	+3.9	−1.6	+6.3	−0.8
Not Working (%)	29.6	28.3	−1.3	−2.8	+3.6	−2.1
<b>B. 1989-2014</b>						
<i>Number of Obs</i>	<i>977,282</i>	<i>922,931</i>				
NRC (%)	24.7	28.2	+3.5	+6.6	−2.8	−0.3
RC (%)	19.6	16.1	−3.5	+0.8	−4.1	−0.1
RM (%)	21.0	15.1	−5.9	−4.7	−3.2	+2.0
NRM (%)	9.6	12.3	+2.7	−1.6	+4.5	−0.2
Not Working (%)	25.2	28.3	+3.1	−1.2	+5.7	−1.4

Notes: The table presents the results of a standard Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, with linear controls for education (four educational category dummies), age (three age group dummies) and gender. The analysis is based on individuals aged 20-64 from the monthly Current Population Survey, excluding those employed in agriculture and resource occupations. NRC stands for Non-Routine Cognitive, RC for Routine Cognitive, RM for Routine Manual, and NRM for Non-Routine Manual. Column (1) shows the composition for the initial period (1979 in Panel A; 1989 in Panel B); Column (2) shows the composition for the final period (2014 in both Panels). Column (3) shows the total change for the entire period, which is decomposed into the fraction attributable to changes in composition (Column (4)), changes in propensities (Column (5)), and the interaction of the two (Column (6)).