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Abou-Chadi, Tarik

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# Niche Party Success and Mainstream Party Policy Shifts

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## How Green and Radical Right Parties Differ in Their Impact

Tarik Abou-Chadi\*

### **Abstract**

This article investigates the impact of niche party success on the policy agendas of mainstream parties. Following from the expected electoral effects of issue politicization, the success of radical right and green parties will cause different reactions from mainstream parties. While mainstream parties emphasize anti-immigrant positions in response to radical right success, green party success will have the opposite effect for environmental issues. Since green parties constitute issue owners, their success will make established parties deemphasize the environment. Analyzing time-series cross-section data for 16 Western European countries from 1980-2011, this paper empirically establishes that green and radical right parties differ in their effect on mainstream party behavior and that their impact depends on the ideological position and past electoral performance of the mainstream parties.

\*Humboldt-University Berlin (email: [tarik.abou-chadi@hu-berlin.de](mailto:tarik.abou-chadi@hu-berlin.de)). Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association (2013 Chicago) and at the General Conference of the European Political Science Association (2013 Barcelona). The author wishes to thank Pablo Barberá, Christoffer Green-Pedersen, Ellen Immergut, Martin Kroh, Nicolas Merz, Matthias Orłowski, Wouter van der Brug, Markus Wagner and Bernhard Wessels as well as three anonymous reviewers and the editor for valuable comments and the German National Science Foundation for financial support.

## Introduction

The emergence and electoral success of radical right and green parties in several Western Democracies has motivated a considerable amount of political science research. It has been argued that these so called “niche parties” have a distinct and novel impact on patterns of political competition since in contrast to other parties, they rarely adapt to shifts in public opinion,<sup>1</sup> and emphasize issues that depart from the traditional socio-economic cleavage.<sup>2</sup> Green parties as well as radical right parties mostly compete on one single issue, with the environment being related to green and immigration related to radical right parties. While a bigger part of scholarly attention has been dedicated to the ex-ante supply and demand side conditions for radical right and green party success,<sup>3</sup> a growing body of research deals with the question of how the emergence of niche parties restructures multi-party competition and the behavior of established parties. Empirical research does, indeed, indicate that established parties react to other parties’ policy positioning<sup>4</sup> as much as to the electoral success of niche parties.<sup>5</sup> In this sense, niche parties are increasingly regarded as “issue entrepreneurs” because they contribute to the evolution and politicization of new political issues.<sup>6</sup> Especially in the context of European integration, scholars have argued that successful radical right (and left) parties determine the politicization of this issue, and shape its importance for national political competition.<sup>7</sup> This perspective, however, does not consider the important role that mainstream parties play in determining whether issues can

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<sup>1</sup> Adams et al. 2006

<sup>2</sup> Wagner 2012a

<sup>3</sup> See for example Arzheimer 2009; Kitschelt and McGann 1995; Meguid 2005; Spoon 2011

<sup>4</sup> Adams 2012; Adams and Somer-Topcu 2009

<sup>5</sup> Bale et al. 2010; van Spanje 2010

<sup>6</sup> de Vries and Hobolt 2012; Spoon, Hobolt and de Vries 2014

<sup>7</sup> Hooghe and Marks 2009

be established on the political agenda.<sup>8</sup> There is still no encompassing approach explaining established parties' strategies when confronted with niche party success; nor has this topic been the subject of a broad empirical analysis.

This paper aims at filling this gap by providing a framework that predicts established parties' responses to niche party success by building on insights from theories of spatial and issue competition. The main argument is twofold: First, not all niche parties affect established parties in the same way. On the contrary, following from the different expected effects that politicization has on partisan realignment,<sup>9</sup> one should observe that radical right party success leads to an increase of anti-immigrant positions of established parties, whereas green-party success will decrease the emphasis on environmental issues. While niche party success always creates some pressure for mainstream parties to pick up their promoted issue, politicization of an issue also entails the risk of strengthening the niche party as a result of the increased salience of this issue. This risk will be considerably higher for green than for radical right parties because the environment can be seen as an issue with a high valence component and green parties as issue owners. On the other hand, politicization of the immigration issue constitutes an opportunity to mobilize left-authoritarian voters – a strategy which should be especially appealing to moderate right-wing parties. Second, the incentives to respond to niche party success are not homogenous across mainstream parties. The ideological position of mainstream parties determines their coalitional prospects with successful niche parties; and their past electoral performance

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<sup>8</sup> See also Green-Pedersen 2012

<sup>9</sup> This study follows Carmines and Wagner (2006) in conceptualizing partisan realignment as an incremental change linked to issue evolution rather than a radical change dependent on crucial elections.

affects how willing they are to adopt new policy profiles. These two factors will, thus, influence how susceptible established parties are to niche party success.

Empirically, making use of the data of the Comparative Manifestos Project, this study investigates the impact of niche party success in a broad time-series cross-section analysis for 16 Western European countries from 1980-2011. It can be shown that green and radical right parties do, indeed, have a different effect and that this effect is dependent on established parties' characteristics. The empirical analysis also presents results that speak in favor of a causal relationship and reduce the possibility of reverse causality and omitted variable bias, both of which have rarely been discussed in other quantitative assessments of similar questions. The findings underline the important role that niche parties play in shaping multi-party competition, however, demonstrating that this role is more nuanced than currently assumed. The developed framework combines perspectives of spatial and issue competition in order to predict the strategic behavior of parties in reaction to the politicization of different issue types. It is, thus, not limited to radical right and green parties but can be applied to other parties and issues. Moreover, it presents a first step in conceptualizing the role of the interplay of mainstream and niche parties for the politicization and evolution of new issues. It thereby contributes to a bigger literature on party competition, representation and mass-party linkages.

Before explaining the empirical design and elaborating the argument in more detail, the next section will give a brief overview of theories of spatial and issue competition and their relevance for the relationship between niche party success and mainstream party behavior.

## **The Role of Niche Parties in Theories of Spatial and Issue Competition**

The evolution of party positions as a result of political competition has been explained following two different traditions of political science research: spatial and issue competition. Based on Anthony Downs' (1957) seminal work, political competition can be understood as parties competing through offering different positions on a policy dimension. The vote share of a party in this spatial conception of political competition is then determined by the distribution of the electorate on this issue dimension as people will vote for the party ideologically closest to them.<sup>10</sup> While in a two-party plurality context this should lead to a convergence to the median voter, several scholars have shown how changing conditions such as different party systems, non-policy factors and valence advantages can lead to a mix of centripetal and centrifugal tendencies.<sup>11</sup> Theories focusing on the supply side of political competition view the degree of convergence to the center and the "open space" that in turn emerges on the fringes as a main source of the varying success of niche and especially radical right parties.<sup>12</sup> Following this spatial logic of party competition if radical right parties emerge and gain electoral support, particularly conservative and moderate right-wing parties should be under pressure to move their position to the right, in order to prevent them from further success and permanently stealing votes from them. The same holds for left-of-center and green parties.<sup>13</sup> Empirical studies

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<sup>10</sup> Downs 1957; Enelow and Hinich 1982

<sup>11</sup> Adams, Merrill and Grofman 2005; Cox 1990; Wagner 2012b

<sup>12</sup> Kitschelt and McGann 1995

<sup>13</sup> Rohrschneider 1993

investigating this “contagious” effect of niche parties do indeed find an association between niche party strength and repositioning of established parties.<sup>14</sup>

Parties do not compete solely by offering different policy positions but also by emphasizing different issues - preferably issues they “own,” that is issues for which traditionally a majority of the electorate regards them as competent and expects high problem solving capacity of them.<sup>15</sup> This idea of issue competition can be understood as different parties trying to draw attention to different topics such as conservative parties trying to emphasize issues related to law and order or defense, while left-wing parties prefer issues such as social justice, welfare and education. However, it can be shown empirically that parties emphasize not only issues they own, but that they overlap considerably in their issue profiles.<sup>16</sup> One reason for this overlap is that parties cannot freely determine which issues they prefer to emphasize, but that they have an incentive to react to issues on the party system agenda.<sup>17</sup> In this sense, by putting a new issue on the agenda and increasing its salience, niche parties can act as issue entrepreneurs and put established parties under pressure to adapt their behavior accordingly.<sup>18</sup>

Hence, following these theories of spatial and issue competition, the success of green and radical right parties should cause mainstream parties to emphasize the environment and immigration more strongly and shift their position towards the niche party. Indeed, in a recent publication, Spoon, Hobolt and de Vries (2014) argue that parties should emphasize

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<sup>14</sup> Alonso and da Fonseca 2011; Dalton 2009; van Spanje 2010

<sup>15</sup> Budge and Farlie 1983; Petrocik 1996

<sup>16</sup> Green-Pedersen 2007

<sup>17</sup> Green-Pedersen and Mortensen 2010

<sup>18</sup> de Vries and Hobolt 2012; Meguid 2008

environmental issues more in response to the electoral threat posed by successful green parties. This perspective, however, does not take into account the strategic risk that is involved in reacting to the issues promoted by niche parties. If established parties pick up these issues this will lead to the politicization of an issue, i.e. its consolidation on the political agenda.<sup>19</sup> Politicization will determine which issues are on top of campaign agendas and, thus, affect how important positional distances are for individual vote decisions. This, in turn, may cause dynamics of partisan realignment, which established parties will take into account, when deciding on how to react to niche party success. On the one hand, politicization of a new issue might further strengthen the niche party and thereby cause voter movements away from established parties. On the other hand, it can also constitute an opportunity, as it may cause voter shifts from one established party to another, so that some established parties will have an interest in the politicization of an issue.

Politicization, conceptualized in this way, combines perspectives of spatial and issue competition, since it results not only from a direct saliency-increase but can also be the consequence of positional shifts. Taking or changing a position on an issue promoted by a niche party necessarily means an increase in salience because parties need to promote this position, which will in turn establish it on the party system agenda. Bonnie Meguid similarly argues that accommodative and adversarial strategies (i.e. shifting the position towards or away from the niche party) will make a party more visible in respect to the promoted issue.<sup>20</sup> While the direct saliency-increase through this position taking might be relatively marginal, it is nonetheless difficult to predict the extent of saliency increase

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<sup>19</sup> Green-Pedersen 2010, Green-Pedersen 2012

<sup>20</sup> Meguid 2008, 94



since, in particular, the mass media can work as an additional agenda setter in response to political developments.<sup>21</sup> Hence, taking a position on a new issue is always linked to the risk of increasing the salience of an issue. Moving towards the position of a niche party, will, thus, be a very costly strategy if the expected voter shifts following politicization go away from the established party. On the other hand, if established parties expect to benefit from the politicization of an issue, they have a big incentive to pick up the issue and move their position.

Building on this argument about the strategic considerations of politicization, the next section will elaborate how reactions of established parties to niche party success depend on the type of niche party as well as mainstream party characteristics.

### **The Impact of Niche Party Success on Mainstream Party Behavior**

While most research on niche parties has treated radical right and green parties as substantially the same, or has focused on one of the two types, it is the goal of this section to provide a framework which can account for varying strategies of established parties, depending on the risks and opportunities of partisan realignment associated with politicization of the niche party issue. These risks and opportunities will be different for radical right and green parties because they compete on different types of issues and vary in their degree of issue ownership. Moreover, these strategic incentives will not be

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<sup>21</sup> Walgrave and van Aelst 2006

homogenous across mainstream parties, but will also vary with their ideological position and electoral performance.

Following Stokes' (1963) seminal critique of Downs' spatial theory of voting, it is possible to distinguish positional and valence issues. Position-issues are characterized by a set of alternatives on which voters have different preferences, while valence issues are issues that are generally seen as positive or negative with parties competing over competence.<sup>22</sup> These types of issues lead to different dynamics of political competition. Whereas parties' position taking will mainly determine competition over positional issues, issue ownership and salience constitute the key components of competition over a valence issue. With green parties above all campaigning on the issue of the environment and radical right parties focusing on immigration, they represent these two different issue types. This distinction is of course ideal-typical, and one might doubt that issues are either completely valence or completely positional. However, the environment surely constitutes an issue with a high valence component. While there might be an argument about how important it is, only few voters would not perceive a pollution-free environment as an actual goal. On the other hand, there is far less agreement about immigration in the electorate, with positions already varying strongly on the question of how much immigration there should be and which immigrants should be allowed to enter a country. A first distinction between radical right and green parties lies, thus, in the first competing on a polarized and more positional issue, while the latter compete on an issue with a high valence component. This distinction affects the strategic choices available to established parties. In response to radical right party

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<sup>22</sup> Stokes 1963


success, established parties are far more likely to make positional changes on the immigration issue, whereas reactions to green party success will be more limited to the saliency dimension of environmental issues. Moreover, these different issue types are also linked to different degrees of issue ownership, which, in turn, determines the risk of losing own supporters to a niche party in case of politicization of an issue.

As discussed earlier, the concept of issue ownership can be understood as different parties being perceived as being better able to handle specific problems and, thus, benefitting from their salience. More precisely one should distinguish a competence and an associative dimension of issue ownership.<sup>23</sup> Competence represents a party's perceived problem solving capacity, whereas the associative dimension includes the feeling of intuitively linking a party to an issue. Using data from the third wave of the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (2012) in Austria, Finland, France, Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden, Figure 1 shows that green parties' issue ownership (on the competence dimension) of the environment issue is much higher than radical right parties' issue ownership of immigration.

**Figure 1 – Issue ownership of green and radical right parties**

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<sup>23</sup> Walgrave, Lefevere and Tresch 2012



While 42 per cent of those who perceive environment as the most or second most important problem name a green party as the most competent to deal with this issue, only 16 per cent do so for immigration and radical right parties.<sup>24</sup> This difference is statistically highly significant. While there is no broad comparative assessment yet, Walgrave et al. find that in Belgium the associative issue ownership of green parties is much higher than that of radical right parties.<sup>25</sup>

<sup>24</sup> The exact wording of the question is: “What do you think is the (second) most important political problem facing [COUNTRY] today?” About 6 per cent of the respondents name the environment as the first or second most important problem; about 14 per cent do so for immigration. The coding of the answers given to the most important problem question is very diverse among the CSES studies. The sample here is, thus, limited to those countries, which are part of the quantitative analysis and where some homogeneity among these categories could be established.

<sup>25</sup> Walgrave, Lefevere and Tresch 2012, 5

Following from the different type of issues they compete on as well as their varying degree of issue ownership, green parties can be expected to benefit much more from politicization of their issue than radical right parties. For established parties this means that the risk of politicization of the environment issue, thereby causing partisan realignment in favor of green parties, is very high. As also Riker (1996) has shown, if a party is able to dominate political discourse on an issue, other parties have a strategic incentive to drop this issue. Hence, as soon as green parties gain electoral support, other parties will have an incentive to not compete on environmental issues. This line of argumentation, diverges from Spoon et al. (2014), who, analyzing the impact of green party success from an issue entrepreneurial perspective, show that other parties emphasize environmental issues more, when green parties are successful. The methods and results sections will elaborate in more detail how the design applied in this study differs from Spoon et al. and how the contrasting findings can be explained.

In contrast to the environment, since immigration is a strongly positional issue and radical right parties are not perceived as dominantly competent on this issue, politicization will not necessarily lead to an increase in radical right party strength. Hence, whereas the issue ownership of green parties provides an incentive for established parties to deemphasize environmental issues as a response to green parties' electoral success, this is not the case for radical right parties and the immigration issue. Radical right parties should, thus, indeed, function as issue entrepreneurs, since the costs of not re-positioning and not responding to an issue on the agenda outweigh the possible risks of the politicization of the immigration issue.

For some established parties the politicization of the immigration issue should even be beneficial since it creates an opportunity for partisan realignment towards their party. A substantial share of the Western European electorate can be identified as left-authoritarian.<sup>26</sup> This part of the electorate, however, lacks representation on the supply side of politics, i.e. on the party level.<sup>27</sup> Having to choose between representation on one of these two dimensions, left-authoritarian voters tend to privilege economic over second dimension issues such as immigration and European integration and, thus, vote for parties located on the left of the economic left-right dimension.<sup>28</sup> Since, however, issue salience affects the degree of issue voting, politicization of immigration can shift this balance towards the socio-cultural dimension. Emphasizing the immigration issue and thereby establishing it on the political agenda can, thus, be a valuable strategy for conservative and other right-of-center parties to attract left-authoritarian voters. The same mechanism, however, does not hold for mainstream left parties and the environment. Environmental issues by large can be integrated into the socio-economic dimension and, thus, create far less political potential.<sup>29</sup> Moreover, as outlined before, green parties dominate the discourse on the environment and will be the beneficiaries of partisan realignment in case of politicization.

Hence, taking into account the discussed risks and opportunities resulting from issue politicization, established parties should react differently to radical right and green party

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<sup>26</sup> Kitschelt 1994; Kriesi et al. 2006

<sup>27</sup> van der Brug and van Spanje 2009

<sup>28</sup> Lefkofridi, Wagner and Willmann 2013

<sup>29</sup> In a detailed analysis of voter and party positions Kriesi and colleagues (2008) colleagues show that environmental protection can be integrated into the socio-economic left-right dimension. Immigration, however, constitutes a main component of a second, socio-cultural dimension.

success. While the success of niche parties exerts some pressure on mainstream parties to shift their position and put the according issues on the agenda, politicization of an issue always includes the risk of strengthening the according niche parties, thereby causing partisan realignment away from established and towards the new parties. This risk will be considerably higher for green than for radical right parties because the environment can be seen as an issue with a high valence component and green parties as issue owners of this issue. On the other hand, politicization of the immigration issue constitutes an opportunity to appeal to new voter groups especially those that can be identified as left-authoritarian.

Four hypotheses about the impact of niche party success on the policy agendas of established parties follow from this theoretical framework:

H1a: Increasing radical right party support causes mainstream parties to shift towards anti-immigrant positions

H1b: Increasing radical right party support causes mainstream parties to emphasize the immigration issue

H2a: Increasing green party support will not affect mainstream parties' positions on environmental issues

H2b: Increasing green party support will cause mainstream parties to deemphasize environmental issues

While the main distinction made here is about the type of niche party, according to the presented framework established parties should also vary in their susceptibility to niche party success depending on their own ideological position and past electoral performance. First, politicization of niche party issues affects mainstream parties in a different way because they differ in their coalitional prospects with emerging niche parties. How much the success of a niche party affects the possibilities of getting into office depends on the mainstream party's ideological position. Moderate right-wing parties will have a higher incentive to politicize the immigration issue in response to radical right party success since these parties constitute a potential partner to form a coalition.<sup>30</sup> Moreover, as outlined before, using the immigration issue to potentially cause realignment of left-authoritarian voters that have traditionally identified with left-wing parties, will be an especially appealing strategy for mainstream conservative parties. Parties of the Left not only are very unlikely to form a coalition with a radical right party, but by politicizing the immigration issue might also disqualify themselves for coalitions with other left-of-center parties.<sup>31</sup> The incentive to deemphasize environmental issues as a response to green party success, on the other hand, should be stronger for right-of-center parties. Green parties are more likely to form a coalition with left-wing parties and politicizing the environment issue should generally favor parties which are located left of the center.

Second, since past election results constitute a source of information about voters' preference distributions,<sup>32</sup> they will influence parties' predisposition to adopt new issues

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<sup>30</sup> Bale 2003

<sup>31</sup> Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup 2008

<sup>32</sup> Budge 1994



and change their position. Losers and winners of elections have, thus, different incentives to respond to niche party success. As has been demonstrated in the literature on issue evolution and party campaigning, parties which have lost votes at a previous election should be more likely to shift their position<sup>33</sup> or contribute to the politicization of a new issue.<sup>34</sup> Politicizing immigration in response to radical right party success will be especially appealing to those parties that have not performed well in past elections and because of that feel a need to change their profile and campaigning strategies. In contrast, since green parties are issue owners and dominate the discourse on the environment, established parties have an incentive to drop the issue no matter how well they performed at past elections.

Three more hypotheses follow from these considerations:

H3a: The more to the right a mainstream party can be located the more it will shift towards anti-immigrant positions and increase the salience of the immigration issue in response to radical right party success

H3b: The more to the right a mainstream party can be located the more it will deemphasize environmental issues in response to green party success

H4: The more votes a mainstream party has lost at a previous election the more it will shift towards anti-immigrant positions and increase the salience of the immigration issue in response to radical right party success

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<sup>33</sup> Somer-Topcu 2009

<sup>34</sup> Riker 1986, Riker 1996

This section provided an encompassing framework to predict the different effects of niche party success on established parties' policy agendas. The next section will test the derived hypotheses in a time-series cross-section analysis of Western European countries.

### **The Impact of Niche Parties on Mainstream Party Behavior – Empirical Analysis**

The formulated hypotheses will be analyzed using data mainly from the Comparative Manifesto Project.<sup>35</sup> The data set is based on the coding of quasi-sentences following 56 issue categories which are then used to estimate how much emphasis is put on an issue in a manifesto. The items, thus, measure position and salience of an issue in a manifesto. The data set contains party manifestos in 42 countries, many of them reaching back until 1945 and allows evaluating the effect of niche party support on mainstream party manifestos cross-nationally and over time. The analyses presented here are based on a subset including all significant mainstream parties in 16 Western European countries from 1980-2011.<sup>36</sup> The remaining sample includes 521 party manifestos.<sup>37</sup>

### **Operationalization**

In order to test the hypotheses derived in the last section, it is necessary to estimate the effect of niche party support on mainstream parties' issue positions as well as issue emphasis. The measure for position is constructed in a similar way to Kim and Fording (2003): In order to obtain a measure of position which is independent of salience, one can

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<sup>35</sup> Budge et al. 2001; Klingemann et al. 2006; Volkens et al. 2012

<sup>36</sup> Parties are coded as mainstream parties if they belong to one of the following party family categories provided by the Manifesto data set: social democratic, liberal, conservative or christian democratic. The countries included are: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland.

<sup>37</sup> The number of observations in the statistical analysis is then further reduced due to missing values on the independent variables such as immigration rates.

make use of the paired nature of the manifesto data and subtract the summed share of a positive category of the summed share of a negative category. This difference is then divided by the sum of positive and negative categories. Saliency is simply measured by the sum of positive and negative shares.

Since the manifesto data does not include direct items of party positions on immigration, it is measured using item per607 “Multiculturalism: Positive” and item per608 “Multiculturalism: Negative.” Statements against multicultural societies and appeals for cultural homogeneity represent the idea of cultural protectionism which can be regarded as the main ideological offer presented by radical right parties.<sup>38</sup> A measure of the position on multiculturalism is then calculated according to the description given above:

$$Multiculturalism (Pos.) = \frac{per608 - per607}{per608 + per607}$$

The higher a party scores on this measure, the more it represents restrictive policies towards citizenship acquisition and immigration in an election. A measure of the saliency of multiculturalism is calculated as follows:

$$Multiculturalism (Sal.) = per608 + per607$$

In line with the idea that the environment constitutes a valence issue, there is no pair of environment categories but only one item (per501) representing pro-environment statements. However, in order not to simply assume the non-existence of a positional dimension, item per410 “Productivity” is used as an opposite of “Environmental

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<sup>38</sup> Norris 2005, 166ff.

Protection: Positive”.<sup>39</sup> An emphasis on industrial productivity and economic growth can be regarded as standing in opposition to a focus on a pollution free environment and more sustainable growth. Position and salience are calculated accordingly:

$$Environment (Pos.) = \frac{per501 - per410}{per501 + per410}$$

$$Environment (Sal.) = per501 + per410$$

The main independent variables of interest are *radical right* and *green party support*, measured as their vote share at the previous parliamentary election.<sup>40</sup> Radical right parties were coded according to Norris (2005) and Mudde (2007) and all electoral results are taken from the *Parliament and Government Composition Database (ParlGov)*.<sup>41</sup> If there was more than one radical right or green party with a vote share high enough to be reported by the ParlGov database, the sum of their vote shares is used for this election in order to measure the combined amount of pressure that is put on mainstream parties. A list of all radical right and green parties included can be found in table A1 in the online appendix.<sup>42</sup>

All models control for *party size* and if a party was in *government* during the election period before the election manifesto. The information on party size (in vote share) and government status are again based on data from the ParlGov database. The models

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<sup>39</sup> Additional analyses using different operationalizations of the dependent variable can be found in the online-appendix

<sup>40</sup> One exception is the result of the French Front National in the election of 2002. Due to their success in the presidential campaign they decided not to run in the parliamentary election and to concentrate all their efforts. For this election the result of the first round of the presidential election is used.

<sup>41</sup> Döring and Manow 2011

<sup>42</sup> Since the Portuguese green party ran together with the communist party from 1987 (see Spoon et al. 2013) one could argue that it should not be counted as a green party. The results presented include the Portuguese greens but are robust against excluding Portugal from the analysis.

investigating the impact of radical right support additionally include a control for the *number of immigrants*. Higher rates of immigration might cause radical right party success as well as influence mainstream party agendas since they are likely to affect general attitudes concerning immigration. The number of immigrants is measured as the log of the average of incoming migrants in the previous election period. Models on green party support instead include the log of *GDP per capita* (as a proxy for the degree of post-materialism of a society) and a time dummy for the period following the *Chernobyl* disaster, which increased the salience of environmental issues and created high levels of support for environmental movements and green parties. Summary statistics for all variables can be found in Table A2 in the online appendix.

### **Model Specification**

Several pooled time-series cross-section models are estimated with OLS to assess the impact of radical right and green party support on mainstream party policy agendas. In order to account for serial correlation and panel-specific heteroskedasticity the models include a lagged dependent variable, and panel corrected standard errors are calculated.<sup>43</sup> The lagged dependent variable also has a substantial meaning since party manifestos are not always written from scratch, but are heavily based on previous manifestos. All models also include party-dummy fixed effects to account for unit specific heterogeneity. The inclusion of the fixed effects reduces the analyzed variation to the within-party variation over time and, thus, controls for time-constant party and country specific particularities. The following two basic models are estimated for issue position and salience respectively:

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<sup>43</sup> Beck and Katz 1995, Beck and Katz 1996

$$(1) \text{Multiculturalism}_{i,t} = \beta_0(\text{Multiculturalism}_{i,t-1}) + \beta_1(\text{radicalrightsupport}_{i,t-1}) + \beta_2(\text{partysize}_{i,t}) + \beta_3(\text{government}_{i,t}) + \beta_4(\text{immigration}_{i,t}) + v_i + \varepsilon_{i,t}$$

$$(2) \text{Environment}_{i,t} = \beta_0(\text{Environment}_{i,t-1}) + \beta_1(\text{greensupport}_{i,t-1}) + \beta_2(\text{partysize}_{i,t}) + \beta_3(\text{government}_{i,t}) + \beta_4(\text{GDP}_{i,t}) + \beta_5(\text{Chernobyl}_t) + v_i + \varepsilon_{i,t}$$

where i is an indication for party and t for election date.

This design differs in three main aspects from Spoon et al. (2014) who investigate the effect of green party strength on other parties' issue emphasis on environmental protection also using the Manifesto data. First, in contrast to Spoon et al. (who only use per501 as their dependent variable) this study distinguishes between position and salience of the dependent variable. As will be discussed later, robustness checks using different operationalizations of the dependent variable (including only using per501) confirm the findings of the basic regression models. Second, this analysis does not include a measure of green issue salience among the electorate as a control variable. Such a variable is highly endogenous to the process under investigation here because party positions and their issue emphases of course determine which problems are regarded as most pressing among citizens.<sup>44</sup> The most important difference in this design lies in the inclusion of party fixed effects, which is essential to make causal claims about the effect of niche party success on mainstream party

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<sup>44</sup> This becomes even more problematic considering that the according item in the Eurobarometer data is only measured at 3 time points for the period between 1979 and 2001. Simply imputing the values for the other time periods seems questionable.

behavior.<sup>45</sup> Limiting the analysis to the variation over time, has the essential advantage of controlling for time constant party and country characteristics which are likely to bias the findings. In particular, this concerns the possibility that the population in some countries might simply be more pro-environment than in others, which would explain both, the success of green parties and the issue emphasis/position of mainstream parties. A positive correlation between green party support and mainstream parties' emphasis on environmental protection based on cross-sectional analyses involves, thus, the high risk of being spurious.

## Results

**Table 1 – Results basic regression models**

	(1)	(2)		(3)	(4)
	Multiculturalism Position	Multiculturalism Salience		Environment Position	Environment Salience
Lagged DV	0.018 (0.117)	0.411* (0.160)	Lagged DV	0.043 (0.104)	0.187 (0.108)
<b>Radical Right Support (t-1)</b>	<b>0.032** (0.008)</b>	<b>0.085** (0.032)</b>	<b>Green Party Support (t-1)</b>	<b>-0.030 (0.017)</b>	<b>-0.456** (0.165)</b>
Immigration (log)	0.164** (0.028)	0.282* (0.113)	GDP per Capita (log)	0.193 (0.106)	0.986 (0.716)

<sup>45</sup> The F-Tests for models only including the party fixed effects indeed show that they are statistically significant. Figure A1 in the online appendix additionally presents the variation in their effects for the four basic models.

Party Size	-0.010 (0.010)	0.023 (0.019)	Party Size	0.004 (0.006)	0.069* (0.034)
Government Party	-0.233** (0.074)	-0.272 (0.250)	Government Party	0.048 (0.048)	0.732* (0.309)
			Chernobyl	-0.046 (0.084)	1.863** (0.697)
Party Fixed Effects			Party Fixed Effects		
Observations	202	365	Observations	406	429
R-squared	0.732	0.590	R-squared	0.625	0.833

Panel corrected standard errors in parentheses

\*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05

**Main Effects.** Table 1 presents the results for the basic regression-models. As can be seen, radical right and green parties do, indeed, differ in their impact on established parties' agendas.<sup>46</sup> Radical right party support has a significant positive effect. With growing vote share of a radical right party at the previous election, mainstream parties shift their profile towards a more ethno-cultural and restrictive position on immigration. In response to an increase in radical right party support, mainstream parties equally increase the salience of the multiculturalism issue. An increasing number of immigrants not only causes parties to talk more about immigration, but also to shift their position towards a more restrictive profile. Parties in government, on the other hand, take a more positive position on multiculturalism. The findings in Model 1 and 2, thus, support hypotheses 1a and 1b;

<sup>46</sup> The difference in the number of observations between the position and valence models is due to the calculation procedure. If a manifesto does not include any statements belonging to one of the categories this will lead to a missing value for the position variable, while it will be zero for salience.



radical right parties function as issue entrepreneurs and exert the contagious effect that has been found in other studies. Green party support, on the other hand, has no significant effect on mainstream party positions on environmental issues. The sign of the b-coefficient is even negative, indicating that facing green party success, established parties rather move away from a pro-environment position. With an increase in green party vote share, mainstream parties, however, significantly decrease the salience of environmental issues in their manifestos. Hence, as predicted by the presented framework and in line with hypotheses 2a and 2b, facing a successful issue owner, established parties do not change their position in direction of the niche party and deemphasize the promoted issue.

These results have important implications for the study of niche parties, multi-party competition and mass-elite linkages. The finding that actual levels of immigration affect parties' positions and issue salience speaks in favor of the dynamic representation model of political parties<sup>47</sup> and demonstrates how globalization and de-nationalization are, indeed, reshaping the political space in Western Europe.<sup>48</sup> While confirming the contagious effect of radical right parties, they speak against the idea that green party success is the driving force behind the issue evolution of environmental issues. On the contrary, in line with Green-Pedersen (2012) these findings emphasize the role of mainstream parties and their anticipation of electoral consequences when analyzing issue politicization.

**Robustness and Causality.** The functional form of the models in table 2 including levels (instead of differences) of the dependent and independent variable as well as a lagged

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<sup>47</sup> Stimson, Mackuen and Erikson 1995

<sup>48</sup> Kriesi et al. 2008

dependent variable assumes an instantaneous response function with a geometrically decaying effect of  $\beta_1$  of the size of  $\beta_0$ .<sup>49</sup> An autoregressive distributed lag (ADL) model (i.e. including an additional lag of the independent variable) would allow a more flexible adaption rate and would, thus, allow investigating a more nuanced dynamic relationship over time. However, since the size of  $t$  in this study is rather small (we are dealing with elections and not country-years), the information to estimate these additional parameters is limited, which makes this procedure problematic for the data at hand. In order to get an impression of these dynamics, however, table A3 in the online appendix presents the results of an ADLLDV2 (ADL with two lagged dependent variables) model which allows assessing the nature of the dynamic relationship due to the nested structure of these models.<sup>50</sup> Three of the four additional lagged independent variables (vote share of radical right and green parties at  $t-2$ ) are far from statistical significance implying instantaneous adaption rates. None of the additional lagged dependent variables reaches statistical significance. This supports the use of the functional form specified in equation (1) and (2). Only model 4 which estimates the effect of green party support on the salience of environmental issues shows an additional significant negative lag for green party support. This finding implies that established parties might deemphasize environmental issues in response to green parties' electoral success with a certain time lag. Due to the rather limited number of elections per country, however, these findings should be interpreted cautiously and at best seen as indicative. The following analyses are again based on the levels specification presented in equation (1) and (2).

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<sup>49</sup> Beck and Katz 2011

<sup>50</sup> Beck and Katz 2011, 340

As an additional robustness check tables A4 and A5 in the online appendix present the effect of radical right and green party support on different measures of the respective dependent variable. The measurement of the dependent variable in table A4 follows Alonso and da Fonseca (2011) who suggest a different operationalization of immigration using the Manifesto data. Here, too, we find a statistically significant positive effect of the vote share of radical right parties on anti-immigrant positioning and the salience of immigration issues. Table A5 presents the regression results for two alternative measures of environmental issues. First, only per501 (Environmental Protection: Positive) is used as a dependent variable. While this makes it impossible to fully distinguish between changes in position and salience, this specification allows a more straight-forward comparison with the effects found by Spoon et al. (2013), who use exactly this dependent variable to measure the salience of environmental protection. Model 2 and 3 present estimates for another dependent variable adding an additional item per416 (Anti-Growth Economy: Positive) to our earlier operationalization. A focus on anti-growth policies and sustainable development can be regarded as an additional positive mentioning of the environment, representing a contrast to the category productivity. As model 1 in table A5 shows, green party support has a negative effect on pro-environment statements, confirming the earlier findings. In response to green party success, mainstream parties, indeed, deemphasize environmental protection. Model 2 and 3, as well, are in line with the hypotheses showing that green party success does not significantly affect positions on the environment, while with an increase in green party vote share established parties significantly deemphasize the salience of environmental issues. Using different operationalizations of the dependent variables, thus, confirms the findings in table 1.

Two main problems arise in interpreting these effects as a causal impact of niche party success on mainstream party behavior: reverse causality and omitted variable bias. As Meguid (2005; 2008) has convincingly argued, the success of niche parties is highly dependent on mainstream party strategies. Hence, it is possible that established parties' issue strategies on immigration and the environment determine niche party vote share and not the other way around, as has been argued here. A simple Granger reverse causality model<sup>51</sup> constitutes a possibility to assess reverse causality by running regression models using the dependent variable at t-1 to predict the independent variable at time t.<sup>52</sup> As models 1 and 3 in table A6 in the online appendix show, a party's position on immigration or environment does not significantly affect the vote share of radical right or green parties at the subsequent election, thus, speaking against reverse causality for these models. Model 4 does show a significant effect of environmental salience on green party support. However, since this effect is positive, reverse causality, here, even constitutes a bias against our earlier findings, which describe a negative impact of green party support on salience of the environment. Finally, model 2 shows a significant positive effect of a party's immigration emphasis on radical right party success. This does, indeed, indicate that reverse causality constitutes a potential problem when interpreting the effect of radical right support on mainstream parties' emphasis of the immigration issue. It is, thus, not possible to fully identify a causal effect for this relationship, which should rather be interpreted as correlational.

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<sup>51</sup> Sargent 1976

<sup>52</sup> It should be mentioned that since these regressions use single party positions/emphases as their independent variable, they cannot serve as a direct test for Meguid's theory, which is based on party system characteristics (the issue strategies of several parties).

A second problem for interpreting the effects as a causal impact of niche party success arises from possible omitted variable bias. While one might find an association between increasing vote share of niche parties and movements towards their emphasized issues by established parties, this could be caused by shifts in public attitudes. The literature on party competition has convincingly demonstrated that mainstream parties, indeed, react to shifts in public opinion.<sup>53</sup> Hence, if public opinion determines both mainstream parties' issue position/emphasis and niche party success, then one would find an association without any causal link between the two. Looking at the results presented here, however, this constitutes a problem only for the impact of radical right parties and not for green parties. It is possible that a shift towards an anti-immigrant public attitude causes radical right success as well as a higher share of manifestos dedicated to cultural protectionism. However, it is rather implausible that a not-observed condition should increase green party vote share and at the same time decrease environmental issues in party manifestos. Moreover, the inclusion of the lagged dependent variable partly controls for this omitted variable bias, insofar as it captures the effect of public opinion on party positions at  $t-1$ . The actual bias is, thus, reduced to the scenario where public opinion influences the vote share of a radical right party at  $t-1$  and party positions at  $t$ , but has not influenced party positions at  $t-1$ . In sum, the findings indicate that niche party success has a causal impact on mainstream party agendas and that this effect differs according to the type of niche party.

**Mainstream Party Positions and Past Electoral Performance.** In order to investigate the effects proposed in the other hypotheses, two interactions have been added to the basic

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<sup>53</sup> Adams et al. 2004, Adams et al. 2006


models successively. As stated in H3a and H3b, parties more located to the right should be more likely to shift their position and emphasize immigration, but have a bigger incentive to deemphasize environmental issues as a response to the according niche party success. Hence, there should be an interaction between left-right placement of a party and niche party support. The index for the general *left-right position* used here is provided by the CMP data (rile). It theoretically ranges from -100 to 100 with higher values indicating a party being more on the right. It should be emphasized that the index for left-right positioning of a party does not include the items used as dependent variables here. The rile measure derived from the manifesto data has been subject to considerable criticism.<sup>54</sup> However, it remains the only measure of parties' left-right position that is time-variant and available for the time under investigation here. As an additional robustness check table A9 and figure A2 in the online appendix present results using a composite measure of the average standardized values of the rile measure and Benoit and Laver's (2006) expert measure of a party's left-right position. H4 states that electoral losers are more susceptible to radical right party success. In order to test this hypothesis an additional interaction with *vote difference* has been added, indicating vote gains/losses as the difference in vote share between t-1 and t-2. While no relationship was hypothesized for green party success, the results are presented in order to underline this claim.

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<sup>54</sup> Gemenis 2013

Since the main effects of interest are interactions of two continuous variables the best way of interpreting them is a marginal effects plot,<sup>55</sup> which can be found in Figure 2 and 3. The according regression tables can be found in the online appendix (table A7 and A8).

**Figure 2 – Marginal effect of niche party success conditional on left-right position**



Dashed lines give 95%-confidence intervals


Figure 2 shows how the effect of niche party support varies with the left-right position of an established party. First, the positive effect of radical right support on anti-immigrant positions and issue emphasis increases with a party moving to the right on the left-right scale. This indicates that right-of-center parties are more inclined to politicize the

<sup>55</sup> Brambor, Clark and Golder 2005

immigration issue. This is in line with the expectation that radical right success due to coalitional perspectives presents less of a threat to these parties and that they can use this strategy to appeal to left-authoritarian voters. Yet, there is still a significant positive effect for center and moderate left-wing parties, especially pronounced for positional changes. This indicates that even left-of-center parties on average choose an accommodative strategy and emphasize anti-immigrant positions when facing an increase in radical right support. On the other hand, no matter where a mainstream party can be located on the left-right scale, there is no significant marginal effect of green party vote share on positional shifts on the environment issue. However, confirming hypothesis 3b, the more a party is located to the right, the more it deemphasizes environmental issues in response to green party success. Nevertheless, one can still observe a significant negative marginal effect for more left-wing parties. Hence, while it is more pronounced for parties of the Right, parties of all mainstream party families deemphasize environmental issues facing the increasing strength of an issue owner. These findings also speak against a purely spatial interpretation of the impact of niche party success on mainstream party strategies. Following a spatial logic of political competition, one should observe right-wing parties reacting more strongly to radical right party success and left-wing parties more strongly to green party success. This, however, is not the case for the countries and time-period observed here. First, although right-of-center parties react more strongly to radical right success, they also deemphasize the environment more in response to increasing green party support. Second, a wide range of parties reacts to niche party success particularly by emphasizing and deemphasizing issues. This speaks for the important role that issue salience plays in assessing the impact of niche parties on multi-party competition.



**Figure 3 – Marginal effect of niche party success conditional on vote difference at t-1**



Dashed lines give 95%-confidence intervals

Finally, figure 3 confirms that parties which have lost votes at a previous election react more strongly to radical right party success than those who performed better. The more votes a party has lost at the previous election the more it shifts its position and emphasizes multiculturalism in response to an increase in radical right vote share. These parties indeed follow a logic of dispersion and engage in strategies that will lead to the politicization of an issue they perceive as likely to cause partisan realignment. In contrast, with green parties

dominating discourse on the environment, their success provides an incentive to deemphasize the issue independent of past electoral performance.

In sum, the results presented here support the hypotheses derived from a new approach taking into account considerations of spatial and issue competition in order to predict mainstream parties' responses to niche party success. These parties do act strategically and choose their positions and issue emphases according to the electoral consequences that can be expected from the politicization of an issue. However, their reactions are not homogenous among all parties but depend on their ideological position and past election results.

## **Conclusion**

This article has quantitatively assessed the impact of niche party success on mainstream party policy strategies, showing how this effect varies according to the type of niche party. The success of radical right parties provides an incentive for established parties especially of the moderate right to shift their position towards a cultural protectionist profile and to emphasize the immigration issue in order to appeal to left-authoritarian voters. In response to green party success, on the other hand, parties deemphasize the environment issue because a successful issue owner of this topic has entered the field. These mechanisms and strategic considerations vary with ideological position and past electoral performance of the established parties. Right-wing parties and electoral losers change their immigration policy agendas more strongly in response to radical right success than parties that are located left

of the center. Moreover, mainstream parties located more to the right tend to deemphasize environmental issues more, when facing electoral gains of a green party. These findings and insights on the strategic behavior of mainstream parties in response to niche party success have important implications for the analysis of multi-party competition and issue evolution. First, they underline the important role that both spatial and issue competition play in determining the behavior of political parties and their reactions to each other. Dynamic representation should, thus, not only be understood in terms of parties' positions but equally needs to take into account parties' issue emphases. While theories of spatial and issue competition have mostly been presented as two competing theories about party competition, nothing in the general nature of these theories prescribes that it is impossible to include insights from both perspectives. Dynamics of saliency and position are crucial to understanding the impact that radical right and green parties have on mainstream parties – they are very likely to have equally intertwined effects for other types of parties and in other areas of multi-party competition. Second, while niche parties play an important role in explaining issue evolution, this study shows that niche party success does not necessarily lead to the politicization of their promoted issues. Mainstream parties react strategically and assess the possible effect that politicization of a certain issue will have on their future electoral performance. Further research will be needed to explore if these findings also hold for other types of niche parties and the issues they compete on. Moreover, analyses of electoral behavior will help to investigate the micro-level mechanisms that have been assumed in this study of party behavior.

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# Online Supplementary Appendix to “Niche Party Success and Mainstream Party Policy Shifts – How Green and Radical Right Parties Differ in Their Impact”

Table A1 – Radical Right and Green Parties

Country	Radical Right Party	Green Party
<b>Austria</b>	Alliance for the Future of Austria Freedom Party (after 1986)	The Greens (Die Grünen)
<b>Belgium</b>	Front National Vlaams Blok/Belang	Agalev – Groen Ecolo
<b>Denmark</b>	Danish People’s Party Progress Party	Greens (De Gronne)
<b>Finland</b>	True Finns	Green League
<b>France</b>	Front National	Greens (Les Verts)
<b>Germany</b>	Deutsche Volksunion Die Republikaner Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands	Greens (Bündins 90 – Die Grünen)
<b>Great Britain</b>		Green Party
<b>Ireland</b>		Green Party
<b>Italy</b>	Alleanza Nazionale Lega Nord Movimento Sociale–Fiamma Tricolore	Green Federation (Federazione dei Verdi)
<b>Luxembourg</b>		The Greens (Déi Gréng)
<b>Netherlands</b>	Center Democrats List Pim Fortuyn Party for Freedom Progress Party	Greens (De Groenen) GreenLeft (GroenLinks)
<b>Norway</b>		Greens (Os Verdes)
<b>Portugal</b>		Initiative for Catalonia Greens (Iniciativa per Catalunya Verds)
<b>Spain</b>		Greens (Miljöpartiet)
<b>Sweden</b>	New Democracy Sweden Democrats	
<b>Switzerland</b>	Freiheits-Partei der Schweiz Nationale Aktion für Volk und Heimat Schweizer Demokraten Schweizerische Volkspartei	Greens (Grüne – Écologiste)



Table A2– Summary Statistics

	Mean	Sd	Min	Max	N
Multiculturalism Position	-0.46	0.72	-1.00	1.00	313
Multiculturalism Salience	1.12	2.21	0.00	16.99	525
Environment Position	0.38	0.58	-1.00	1.00	503
Environment Salience	7.14	4.63	0.00	29.10	525
Radical Right Support (t-1)	5.16	6.74	0.00	26.91	501
Green Party Support (t-1)	2.46	2.88	0.00	11.60	501
Party Size	20.10	13.82	0.00	51.29	529
Government Party	0.50	0.50	0.00	1.00	501
Immigration (log)	3.87	1.17	0.99	6.85	380
GDP per Capita (log)	9.84	0.51	8.53	11.25	501
Chernobyl	0.15	0.36	0.00	1.00	529

Figure A1 – Party Fixed Effects




Table A3 – ADLDV2 Model

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Multiculturalism Position	Multiculturalism Salience	Environment Position	Environment Salience
<b>DV (t-1)</b>	-0.140 (0.099)	0.403* (0.173)	0.013 (0.118)	0.129 (0.114)
<b>DV (t-2)</b>	0.047 (0.074)	-0.025 (0.183)	-0.161 (0.096)	-0.072 (0.101)
<b>Radical Right / Green Support (t-1)</b>	0.040** (0.010)	0.094** (0.032)	-0.018 (0.025)	-0.182 (0.223)
<b>Radical Right / Green Support (t-2)</b>	0.004 (0.011)	0.028 (0.039)	-0.027 (0.021)	-0.583* (0.228)
<b>Controls and Party Fixed Effects</b>				
<b>Observations</b>	140	326	340	366
<b>R-squared</b>	0.841	0.603	0.661	0.835

Panel corrected standard errors in parentheses

\*\* p&lt;0.01, \* p&lt;0.05

Table A4 – Operationalization Immigration - Alonso and da Fonseca (2011)

$$Immigration (Pos.) = \frac{per601 + per605 + per608 - per607 - per705}{per601 + per605 + per608 + per607 + per705}$$

$$Immigration (Sal.) = per601 + per605 + per608 + per607 + per705$$

	(1)	(2)
	Immigration Position	Immigration Salience
<b>Lagged DV</b>	-0.015 (0.099)	0.246* (0.112)
<b>Radical Right Support (t-1)</b>	0.015* (0.006)	0.260** (0.062)
<b>Immigration (log)</b>	-0.017 (0.026)	0.907** (0.308)
<b>Party Size</b>	-0.013** (0.004)	0.027 (0.055)
<b>Government Party</b>	-0.069 (0.049)	-0.086 (0.514)
<b>Party Fixed Effects</b>		
<b>Observations</b>	333	365
<b>R-squared</b>	0.619	0.840

Panel corrected standard errors in parentheses

\*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05

Table A5 – Operationalization Environment

$$Environment (Pos.) = \frac{per501 + per416 - per410}{per501 + per416 + per410}$$

$$Environment (Sal.) = per501 + per416 + per410$$

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	Environmental Protection (per501)	Environment Position	Environment Salience
<b>Lagged DV</b>	0.196 (0.112)	0.046 (0.102)	0.190 (0.107)
<b>Green Party Support (t-1)</b>	-0.408* (0.160)	-0.028 (0.016)	-0.506** (0.159)
<b>GDP per Capita (log)</b>	0.807 (0.643)	0.270** (0.104)	1.996** (0.727)
<b>Party Size</b>	0.057* (0.028)	0.002 (0.005)	0.053 (0.033)
<b>Government Party</b>	0.738* (0.287)	0.060 (0.041)	0.787* (0.324)
<b>Chernobyl</b>	1.288* (0.599)	-0.005 (0.084)	1.919** (0.712)
<b>Fixed Effects</b>			
<b>Observations</b>	432	409	432
<b>R-squared</b>	0.778	0.694	0.853

Panel corrected standard errors in parentheses

\*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05

Table A6 – Reverse Causality Regression

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Radical Right Support	Radical Right Support	Green Party Support	Green Party Support
<b>Radical Right / Green Party Support (t-1)</b>	0.285 (0.175)	0.352* (0.158)	0.368** (0.124)	0.381** (0.124)
<b>Multiculturalism Position (t-1)</b>	0.140 (0.509)			
<b>Multiculturalism Salience (t-1)</b>		0.298** (0.108)		
<b>Environment Position (t-1)</b>			-0.273 (0.162)	
<b>Environment Salience (t-1)</b>				0.029 (0.015)
<b>Controls and Party Fixed Effects</b>				
<b>Observations</b>	182	307	355	369
<b>R-squared</b>	0.884	0.889	0.933	0.933

Panel corrected standard errors in parentheses

\*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05

Table A7 - Interactions Radical Right Support

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Multiculturalism Position	Multiculturalism Salience	Multiculturalism Position	Multiculturalism Salience
<b>Lagged DV</b>	0.008 (0.112)	0.410** (0.159)	0.039 (0.124)	0.404* (0.160)
<b>Radical Right Support (t-1)</b>	0.032** (0.007)	0.085** (0.032)	0.027** (0.009)	0.086* (0.034)
<b>Immigration (log)</b>	0.184** (0.024)	0.307* (0.120)	0.168** (0.030)	0.283* (0.119)
<b>Party Size</b>	-0.011 (0.010)	0.027 (0.019)	-0.010 (0.010)	0.024 (0.019)
<b>Government Party</b>	-0.214** (0.070)	-0.235 (0.247)	-0.226** (0.073)	-0.288 (0.250)
<b>Left-Right Position</b>	0.004 (0.004)	-0.010 (0.012)		
<b>Radical Right Support X Left- Right Vote Difference (t-1)</b>	0.001** (0.000)	0.002 (0.001)	0.004 (0.009)	0.009 (0.015)
<b>Radical Right Support X Vote Loss</b>			-0.001 (0.001)	-0.003 (0.002)
<b>Party Fixed Effects</b>				
<b>Observations</b>	202	365	199	357
<b>R-squared</b>	0.748	0.597	0.735	0.593

Panel corrected standard errors in parentheses

\*\* p&lt;0.01, \* p&lt;0.05

Table A8 - Interactions Green Party Support

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Environment Position	Environment Salience	Environment Position	Environment Salience
<b>Lagged DV</b>	0.035 (0.100)	0.169 (0.104)	0.045 (0.103)	0.190 (0.108)
<b>Green Party Support (t-1)</b>	-0.029* (0.015)	-0.467** (0.153)	-0.030 (0.017)	-0.470** (0.165)
<b>GDP per Capita (log)</b>	0.152 (0.098)	0.720 (0.739)	0.197 (0.109)	1.049 (0.728)
<b>Party Size</b>	0.003 (0.006)	0.061 (0.034)	0.006 (0.006)	0.061 (0.035)
<b>Government Party</b>	0.057 (0.046)	0.742* (0.315)	0.089 (0.049)	0.609 (0.320)
<b>Chernobyl</b>	-0.074 (0.081)	1.636* (0.685)	-0.054 (0.083)	1.948** (0.703)
<b>Left-Right Position</b>	-0.008** (0.003)	-0.047* (0.019)		
<b>Green Support X Left-Right Vote Difference (t-1)</b>	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.004 (0.004)	-0.012* (0.005)	0.054 (0.041)
<b>Green Support X Vote Difference</b>			0.001 (0.001)	-0.004 (0.009)
<b>Party Fixed Effects</b>				
<b>Observations</b>	406	429	397	420
<b>R-squared</b>	0.641	0.839	0.623	0.832

Panel corrected standard errors in parentheses

\*\* p&lt;0.01, \* p&lt;0.05



Table A9 – Interaction Different Operationalization Left-Right Position

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
	Multiculturalism Position	Multiculturalism Salience	Environment Position	Environment Salience
<b>Lagged DV</b>	0.004 (0.107)	0.410** (0.159)	0.036 (0.100)	0.170 (0.104)
<b>Radical Right / Green Party Support (t-1)</b>	0.032** (0.008)	0.087** (0.033)	-0.029 (0.015)	-0.486** (0.150)
<b>Party Size</b>	-0.012 (0.011)	0.026 (0.019)	0.003 (0.006)	0.058 (0.034)
<b>Government Party</b>	-0.214** (0.069)	-0.255 (0.246)	0.056 (0.047)	0.725* (0.314)
<b>Immigration (log)</b>	0.188** (0.022)	0.297* (0.117)		
<b>GDP per Capita (log)</b>			0.152 (0.098)	0.722 (0.735)
<b>Chernobyl</b>			-0.072 (0.081)	1.623* (0.684)
<b>Left-Right Position</b>	0.271 (0.148)	-0.038 (0.459)	-0.306** (0.094)	-1.880** (0.615)
<b>Left-Right Position X Radical Right / Green Party Support (t-1)</b>	0.015* (0.007)	0.036 (0.027)	0.004 (0.011)	-0.121 (0.087)
<b>Party Fixed Effects</b>				
<b>Observations</b>	204	368	409	432
<b>R-squared</b>	0.747	0.593	0.641	0.840

Panel corrected standard errors in parentheses

\*\* p&lt;0.01, \* p&lt;0.05

Figure A2 – Marginal Effects Plot Different Operationalization Left-Right Position

