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SECURITY AUDIT OF

THE PARALLEL SMART CONTRACTS

Public Report

Dec 09, 2021

Verichains Lab

info@verichains.io

https://www.verichains.io

Driving Technology > Forward

ABBREVIATIONS

Name	Description
Ethereum	An open source platform based on blockchain technology to create and distribute smart contracts and decentralized applications.
Ether (ETH)	A cryptocurrency whose blockchain is generated by the Ethereum platform. Ether is used for payment of transactions and computing services in the Ethereum network.
Smart contract	A computer protocol intended to digitally facilitate, verify or enforce the negotiation or performance of a contract.
Solidity	A contract-oriented, high-level language for implementing smart contracts for the Ethereum platform.
Solc	A compiler for Solidity.
ERC20	ERC20 (BEP20 in Binance Smart Chain or *x*RP20 in other chains) tokens are blockchain-based assets that have value and can be sent and received. The primary difference with the primary coin is that instead of running on their own blockchain, ERC20 tokens are issued on a network that supports smart contracts such as Ethereum or Binance Smart Chain.

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This Security Audit Report prepared by Verichains Lab on Dec 09, 2021. We would like to thank the The Parallel for trusting Verichains Lab in auditing smart contracts. Delivering high-quality audits is always our top priority.

This audit focused on identifying security flaws in code and the design of the The Parallel Smart Contracts. The scope of the audit is limited to the source code files provided to Verichains. Verichains Lab completed the assessment using manual, static, and dynamic analysis techniques.

During the audit process, the audit team had identified some vulnerable issues in the smart contracts code.

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1. MANAGEMENT SUMMARY

1.1. About The Parallel Smart Contracts

The Parallel is a virtual world universe with a real-world simulation game system where players can fully create materials in the world and participate in monetization, entertainment, and networking activities.

1.2. Audit scope

This audit focused on identifying security flaws in code and the design of The Parallel Smart Contracts. It was conducted on commit 08f3fa789b50c76a1712b63c1bf79262ac4bc693 from git repository *https://github.com/theparalleldotio/*.

1.3. Audit methodology

Our security audit process for smart contract includes two steps:

- Smart contract codes are scanned/tested for commonly known and more specific vulnerabilities using public and RK87, our in-house smart contract security analysis tool.
- Manual audit of the codes for security issues. The contracts are manually analyzed to look for any potential problems.

Following is the list of commonly known vulnerabilities that was considered during the audit of the smart contract:

- Integer Overflow and Underflow
- Timestamp Dependence
- Race Conditions
- Transaction-Ordering Dependence
- DoS with (Unexpected) revert
- DoS with Block Gas Limit
- Gas Usage, Gas Limit and Loops
- Redundant fallback function
- Unsafe type Inference
- Reentrancy
- Explicit visibility of functions state variables (external, internal, private and public)
- Logic Flaws

For vulnerabilities, we categorize the findings into categories as listed in table below, depending on their severity level:

SEVERITY LEVEL	DESCRIPTION
CRITICAL	A vulnerability that can disrupt the contract functioning; creates a critical risk to the contract; required to be fixed immediately.
HIGH	A vulnerability that could affect the desired outcome of executing the contract with high impact; needs to be fixed with high priority.
MEDIUM	A vulnerability that could affect the desired outcome of executing the contract with medium impact in a specific scenario; needs to be fixed.
LOW	An issue that does not have a significant impact, can be considered as less important.

Table 1. Severity levels

1.4. Disclaimer

Please note that security auditing cannot uncover all existing vulnerabilities, and even an audit in which no vulnerabilities are found is not a guarantee for a 100% secure smart contract. However, auditing allows discovering vulnerabilities that were unobserved, overlooked during development and areas where additional security measures are necessary.

2. AUDIT RESULT

2.1. Overview

The initial review was conducted on Nov 30, 2021 and a total effort of 6 working days was dedicated to identifying and documenting security issues in the code base of the The Parallel Smart Contracts.

2.2. Contract code

The The Parallel Smart Contracts was written in Solidity language, with the required version to be ^0.8.2. The source code was written based on OpenZeppelin's library.

The provided source codes consist of three contracts which inherit some contracts from OpenZeppelin.

2.2.1. Parallel token contract

The parallel token is an ERC20 token contract. Besides the default ERC20 functions, the contract implements additional functions which avoid Whale trading to control the price of tokens in the IDO time.

In addition, the contract inherits Pausable contract. So the owner of the contract can pause or unpause the contract.

Table 2 lists some properties of the audited ParallelToken contract (as of the report writing time).

PROPERTY	VALUE
Name	Parallel Token
Symbol	PRL
Decimals	18
Total Supply	1,000,000,000 ($x10^{18}$) Note: the number of decimals is 18, so the total representation token will be 1,000,000,000 or 1 billion.

Table 2. The ParallelToken contract properties

2.2.2. PowerStone token contract

PowerStone is an ERC20 token contract. Currently, the contract is inheriting upgradeable contracts. Therefore, the contract can be upgradeable or changed in the future.

In addition, the contract implements the mint public function which allows owner contract can mint unlimited token. Therefore, the totalSupply value can be changed by this function.

Table 3 lists some properties of the audited PowerStone contract (as of the report writing time).

PROPERTY	VALUE
Name	PowerStone
Symbol	PS
Decimals	18

Table 3. The PowerStone contract properties

2.2.3. TokenDistribution contract

The The Parallel team uses this contract to release the token. The contract releases tokens following 8 packages. They are Dumpy, Advisors, Seed round, Private round, Public round, Team, Ecosystem + Marketing and Game rewards.

In addition, the owner contract can addLiquidity for pair of the token and busd token in the pancakeswap.

2.3. Findings

During the audit process, the audit team found some vulnerabilities in the given version of The Parallel Smart Contracts.

The Parallel fixed the code according to Verichain's draft report in commit a2b81355644a61fbf69bfea7a79935a35afaa395.

2.3.1. TokenDistribution.sol - Unsafe using transfer, transferFrom method through IERC20 interface HIGH

Currently, there are some functions in the contract that use transfer, transferFrom method to call functions from the token contract. The contract doesn't point exactly which the token contract is using. So we can't ensure that the transfer function of the token contract works exactly as expected.

For instance, the transfer function can return false with the function call failure instead of returning true or revert like ERC20 Oppenzepplin. With claim logic, the user doesn't receive anything while the amount claimed still adds.

```
129  function claim() public {
130          require(!suspended[msg.sender], "Must be not suspended");
131          uint256 amount = getClaimAmount(msg.sender);
132          require(amount > 0, "Must be > 0");
133          investors[msg.sender].claimed = investors[msg.sender].claime…
     d.add(
134              amount
135          );
136          token.transfer(msg.sender, amount);
137      }
```

Snippet 1. TokenDistribution.sol Unsafe using `transfer` method in `claim` function

There are four functions that are using them. They are allocationFor, claim, useFund and withdraw functions.

RECOMMENDATION

We suggest using SafeERC20 library for IERC20 and changing all transfer, transferFrom method using in the contract to safeTransfer, safeTransferFrom which is declared in SafeERC20 library to ensure that there is no issue when transferring tokens.

UPDATES

- *Dec 09, 2021*: This recommendation has been acknowledged and fixed by the The Parallel team.

2.3.2. TokenDistribution.sol - Unsafe using addLiquidity with zero value of amountAMin and amountBMin HIGH

In the addLiquidity function, the pancakeRouter.addLiquidity method use zero value with amountAMin and amountBMin parameters. Both parameters are the minimum amount of token to provide (slippage impact). So if a whale account calls a huge transaction before addLiquidity function call, the minimum amount will be changed to a huge amount. After this function call, the whale can sell a lot of tokens to get money from the liquidity we just added.

```
212  function addLiquidity(uint256 amountBUSD)
213          public
214          onlyRole(ADDLIQUIDITY_ROLE)
215      {
```

```
216         (uint256 amountA, uint256 amountB, ) = pancakeRouter.addLiqu…
    idity(
217             address(token),
218             busd,
219             1_000_000_000 * 1e18,
220             amountBUSD,
221              0,
222              0,
223             address(this),
224             block.timestamp
225         );
226         require(amountB == amountBUSD, "Must exact BUSD Liquidity");
227         require(capped.sub(allotted) >= amountA, "Must be have liqui…
    dity fund");
228         allotted = allotted.add(amountA);
229     }
```

RECOMMENDATION

We suggest calculating the rate of both tokens and setting accepted values to amountAMin and amountBMin parameters to reduce slippage impact.

UPDATES

- *Dec 09, 2021*: This recommendation has been acknowledged and fixed by the The Parallel team.

2.3.3. TokenDistribution.sol - Conflict require statements in addMoreAllocation function and setupLiquidity function LOW

In the addMoreAllocation function, the require statements allow for allotted.add(amount) <= capped but in the setupLiquidity function capped.sub(allotted) > 2_000_000 * 1e18. If the owner of contract add alloted too much, the contract can't setupLiquidity for the first addLiquidity.

RECOMMENDATION

We suggest adding a boolean state variable named isAddedLiquidity and changing addMoreAllocation, setupLiquidity functions like the below code:

```
function addMoreAllocation(address investor, uint256 amount)
        public
        onlyRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE)
    {
        if (!isAddedLiquidity){
```

```
            require(allotted.add(amount) <= (capped - 2_000_000 * 1e18)`,…
   "Full out");
        }
        else{
            require(allotted.add(amount) <= capped, "Full out");
        }
        require(investors[investor].packageId != 0, "Investor not found");
        investors[investor].total = investors[investor].total.add(amount);
        allotted = allotted.add(amount);
        emit MoreAllocation(investor, amount);
    }
```

Snippet 2. TokenDistribution.sol Recommend fixing in the `addMoreAllocation` function

```
function setupLiquidity() public onlyRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE) {
        require(
            capped.sub(allotted) > 2_000_000 * 1e18,
            "Must be have liquidity"
        );
        require(timeRelease == 0, "Must be fresh liquidity");
        token.approve(address(pancakeRouter), 1e40);
        IERC20(busd).approve(address(pancakeRouter), 1e40);
        pancakeRouter.addLiquidity(
            address(token),
            busd,
            2_000_000 * 1e18,
            200_000 * 1e18,
            0,
            0,
            address(this),
            block.timestamp
        );
        isAddedLiquidity=true;
        allotted = allotted.add(2_000_000 * 1e18);
        timeRelease = block.timestamp;
    }
```

Snippet 3. TokenDistribution.sol Recommend fixing in the `setupLiquidity` function

UPDATES

- *Dec 09, 2021*: This recommendation has been acknowledged and fixed by the The Parallel team.

2.3.4. TokenDistribution.sol - Missing check value of _timePreriod variable in the constructor LOW

The timePeriod state variable is set by 30days value. But in the constructor, The timePeriod is updated. So the default value is useless. And timePeriod can be zero which causes an issue with the div operator in getClaimAmount function.

```
87  function getClaimAmount(address user) public view returns (uint256) {
88          if (block.timestamp < timeRelease || timeRelease == 0) retur…
    n 0;
89          Investor memory investor = investors[user];
90          if (investor.packageId == 0) return 0;
91          Package memory pack = packages[investor.packageId];
92          uint256 claimable = investor.total.mul(pack.unlockPercent).d…
    iv(100);
93          if (block.timestamp.sub(timeRelease) > pack.lockedTime) {
94              uint256 unlockAmount = investor
95                  .total
96                  .sub(claimable)
97                  .mul(
98                      (block.timestamp.sub(timeRelease).sub(pack.locke…
    dTime)).div(
99                          timePeriod
100                     )
101                 )
102                 .div((pack.vestingTime).div(timePeriod));
103             claimable = claimable.add(unlockAmount);
104         }
105         if (claimable > investor.total) {
106             claimable = investor.total;
107         }
108         return claimable - investor.claimed;
109     }
```

Snippet 4. TokenDistribution.sol Zero value causes an issues in `getClaimAmount` function

RECOMMENDATION

We suggest adding a require statement to check the value of timePeriod in the constructor like the below code:

```
87  constructor(
88          address _token,
89          address _busd,
```

```
90          address _pancakeRouter,
91          uint256 _timePeriod
92      ) {
93          _setupRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE, msg.sender);
94          _setupRole(ADDLIQUIDITY_ROLE, msg.sender);
95          capped = 1_000_000_000 * (10**18);
96          token = IERC20(_token);
97          busd = _busd;
98          _setupInitPackage();
99          pancakeRouter = IPancakeRouter02(_pancakeRouter);
100         require(_timePeriod>0,"timePeriod needs to be greater than 0…
    ");
101         timePeriod = _timePeriod;
102     }
```

Snippet 5. TokenDistribution.sol Recommend fixing in the constructor

UPDATES

- *Dec 09, 2021*: This recommendation has been acknowledged and fixed by the The Parallel team.

2.4. Additional notes and recommendations

2.4.1. TokenDistribution.sol - Unnecessary usage of SafeMath library in Solidity 0.8.0+ INFORMATIVE

All safe math usage in the contract are for overflow checking, solidity 0.8.0+ already do that by default, the only usage of safemath now is to have a custom revert message which isn't the case in the auditing contracts.

RECOMMENDATION

We suggest changing all methods from SafeMath library to normal arithmetic operator in the contract for readability and gas saving.

UPDATES

- *Dec 09, 2021*: This recommendation has been acknowledged by the The Parallel team.

2.4.2. TokenDistribution.sol - Change memory variable delare to storage variable declare for gas saving INFORMATIVE

In the getClaimAmount function, we found that there are 2 variables declared with memory keyword. These variables are only used to get value. Therefore, we recommend changing memory to storage keyword for these variables for gas saving.

```
87  function getClaimAmount(address user) public view returns (uint256) {
88          if (block.timestamp < timeRelease || timeRelease == 0) return…
     0;
89          Investor memory investor = investors[user];
90          if (investor.packageId == 0) return 0;
91          Package memory pack = packages[investor.packageId];
92          uint256 claimable = investor.total.mul(pack.unlockPercent).di…
    v(100);
93          if (block.timestamp.sub(timeRelease) > pack.lockedTime) {
```

Snippet 6. TokenDistribution.sol Variables should change declaring in `getClaimAmount` function

RECOMMENDATION

We suggest changing 2 variables declaration like the below code:

```
87  function getClaimAmount(address user) public view returns (uint256) {
88          if (block.timestamp < timeRelease || timeRelease == 0) return…
     0;
89          Investor storage investor = investors[user];
90          if (investor.packageId == 0) return 0;
91          Package storage pack = packages[investor.packageId];
92          uint256 claimable = investor.total.mul(pack.unlockPercent).di…
    v(100);
93          if (block.timestamp.sub(timeRelease) > pack.lockedTime) {
```

Snippet 7. TokenDistribution.sol Recommend fixing in `getClaimAmount` function

UPDATES

- *Dec 09, 2021*: This recommendation has been acknowledged and fixed by the The Parallel team.

APPENDIX



Image 1. Parallel token smart contract call graph



Image 2. PowerStone token smart contract call graph



Image 3. TokenDistribution smart contract call graph

3. VERSION HISTORY

Version	Date	Status/Change	Created by
1.0	*2021-12-06*	Private Report	Verichains Lab
1.1	*2021-12-09*	Public Report	Verichains Lab

Table 4. Report versions history