
Why you shouldn't trust me: A survey on Adversarial Model Interpretation Manipulations.

Verena Heusser Seminar Explainable Machine Learning

Motivation


Motivation: Omnipresent ML

- Machine learning algorithms are moving out of the lab into the real world
- Performance comes at the cost of complexity




Motivation: Omnipresent ML

- Machine learning algorithms are moving out of the lab into the real world
- Performance comes at the cost of complexity → black box





Motivation: Omnipresent ML


- Machine learning algorithms are moving out of the lab into the real world
- Performance comes at the cost of complexity → black box





- so far: *what* is the most likely label → accuracy
- now also: why does the model chose this label and which features are important for the decision















- Local vs. global
 - Local: Explain the decision
 - → Why is this image a cat?
 - Global: explain the whole model
 - → What does a cat look like?

- White box vs. black box
 - White box: use the model itself to compute interpretations
 - Black box: use an interpretable model to mimic an uninterpretable model





(a) Original.

(b) Map.

LRP [Bach et al., 2015]



(a) Original



(b) Mask.




(c) Saliency Map.

- Problem solved? → Not quite ...
- Interpretation methods are already used in many domains for model validation
- However
 - Humans do not benefit from interpretation methods
 - they cannot build better models [Hase et al., 2020]
 - improve their performance [Hase et al., 2020]
 - and are not better at detecting false model decisions [Poursabzi-Sangdeh et al., 2018]
 - Methodological difficulties: it is unclear
 - how to evaluate
 - how to compare different interpreters

Motivation: Adversarial ML

- Adversarial model fooling
 - attacks on the model
 - o altered input [Szegedy et al., 2013]
 - → model makes false predictions








correctly labeled image

image difference

incorrectly labeled image


Motivation: Adversarial ML

- Adversarial model fooling
 - attacks on the model
 - o altered input [Szegedy et al., 2013]
 - → model makes false predictions
- Adversarial interpreter fooling
 - attacks on the interpreter
 - → interpreter makes false interpretations




Motivation: Adversarial ML

Adversarial Interpreter Fooling




Fooling Interpretations via Model Manipulation!!

Fooled Interpretations!!




Try to hide the fact that model uses Race and Sex features




Manipulation Methods

Manipulation Types

- Input Level Manipulations
 - O [Subramanya et al., 2019]
 - O [Dombrowski et al., 2019]
 - O [Ghorbani et al., 2019]




- Model Level Manipulations
 - [Heo et al., 2019]
 - O [Dimanov et al., 2020]
 - [Slack et al., 2020]



Evaluation Criteria: Is the fooling successful?

- Fooling successful if [Dimanov et al., 2020]
 - (Model prediction similarity)
 - Interpretation dissimilarity
- Other criteria
 - Effectiveness: no computational overhead
 - Transferability: manipulation does not only affect one type of interpretation
- Evaluation → which is the best interpreter?
 - Qualitative Evaluation: Inspection and random sampling
 - Quantitative Evaluation → similarity scores

Interpreter Manipulation Examples Input Level



 $\mathbf{x} + \delta$

Explanations can be manipulated and geometry is to blame


Ann-Kathrin Dombrowski¹, Maximilian Alber⁵, Christopher J. Anders¹, Marcel Ackermann², Klaus-Robert Müller^{1,3,4}, Pan Kessel¹

Explanations can be manipulated and geometry $\mathbf{x} + \delta$ is to blame [Dombrowski et al., 2019]

manipulate an image with a hardly perceptible perturbation such that the explanation map matches an arbitrary target map

$$\mathcal{L} = \|h(x_{adv}) - h^t\|^2 + \gamma \|g(x_{adv}) - g(x)\|^2$$


- Practical implication:
 - adversary can imperceptibly change the input to a model
 - → arbitrary + drastic manipulation of the interpreter



Further Studies




 Learned adversarial patches can cause both model and interpreter to fail [Subramanya et al., 2019]



 Interpreters are susceptible even to infinitesimal perturbations [Ghorbani et al., 2019]

Interpreter Manipulation Examples **Model** Level



$N + \delta$


Fooling Neural Network Interpretations via Adversarial Model Manipulation


Juyeon Heo¹*, Sunghwan Joo¹*, and Taesup Moon^{1,2}

¹Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, ²Department of Artificial Intelligence Sungkyunkwan University, Suwon, Korea, 16419


heojuyeon12@gmail.com, {shjoo840, tsmoon}@skku.edu


Fooling Network Interpretations via Adversarial Model Manipulation [Heo et al., 2019]





Fooling Network Interpretations via Adversarial Model Manipulation [Heo et al., 2019]





(b) Examples of different kinds of foolings

Fooling Network Interpretations via Adversarial Model Manipulation [Heo et al., 2019]


$N + \delta$

Results:

- generalization to unseen test samples
- different types of interpreters are be fooled
- while the model performance stays approx. the same
- \circ \rightarrow the model is robust but the interpreter is not


Practical implication:

- No way to detect the model inherent bias
- Interpreters can be systematically manipulated to contain unfair biases




Fooling Interpretations via Model Manipulation!!


Fooled Interpretations!!



Try to hide the fact that model uses Race and Sex features



Further Studies



- Interpreters fail to decide if a model is fair [Dimanov et al., 2020]
 - o create adversarial models that focus only on sensitive features
 - → model interpreters fail to incorporate fairness and fail to detect model biases
 - → use real-world datasets

⇒ Core motivational concern of Interpretable ML

Conclusion

Summary

- → Adversarial setting for fooling model interpreters
 - Interpretation methods can be tricked by applying input and model perturbations
 - interpreters can be fooled with simple input perturbations


$$\mathbf{x} + \delta$$

- Biases can be encoded into the model
- and there might be no way to uncover the hidden biases

$$N + \delta$$

Conclusion

- Models and interpreters can be misled in a large and systematic manner
- However, this does not mean that interpreters are useless
 - ⇒ Caution when using interpretation techniques
 - ⇒ Future work:
 - Benchmarking
 - Robustness
 - Theoretical understanding
 - Extension to other task domains



References

References

[Bach et al., 2015] Bach, S., Binder, A., Montavon, G., Klauschen, F., Müller, K. R., & Samek, W. (2015). On pixel-wise explanations for non-linear classifier decisions by layer-wise relevance propagation. *PloS one*, 10(7), e0130140.

[Deng et al., 2009] Deng, J., Dong, W., Socher, R., Li, L. J., Li, K., & Fei-Fei, L. (2009, June). Imagenet: A large-scale hierarchical image database. In 2009 IEEE conference on computer vision and pattern recognition (pp. 248-255). Ieee.

[Dimanov et al., 2020] Dimanov, B., Bhatt, U., Jamnik, M., & Weller, A. (2020, February). You Shouldn't Trust Me: Learning Models Which Conceal Unfairness From Multiple Explanation Methods. In SafeAl@ AAAI (pp. 63-73).

[Dombrowski et al., 2019] Dombrowski, A. K., Alber, M., Anders, C., Ackermann, M., Müller, K. R., & Kessel, P. (2019). Explanations can be manipulated and geometry is to blame. In *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems* (pp. 13589-13600).

[Ghorbani et al., 2019] Ghorbani, A., Abid, A., & Zou, J. (2019, July). Interpretation of neural networks is fragile. In *Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence* (Vol. 33, pp. 3681-3688).

[Hase et al., 2020] Hase, P., & Bansal, M. (2020). Evaluating Explainable Al: Which Algorithmic Explanations Help Users Predict Model Behavior?. arXiv preprint arXiv:2005.01831.

[Heo et al., 2019] Heo, J., Joo, S., & Moon, T. (2019). Fooling neural network interpretations via adversarial model manipulation. In *Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems* (pp. 2925-2936).

[Subramanya et al., 2019] Subramanya, A., Pillai, V., & Pirsiavash, H. (2019). Fooling network interpretation in image classification. In *Proceedings of the IEEE/CVF International Conference on Computer Vision* (pp. 2020-2029).

[Szegedy et al., 2013] Szegedy, C., Zaremba, W., Sutskever, I., Bruna, J., Erhan, D., Goodfellow, I., & Fergus, R. (2013). Intriguing properties of neural networks. arXiv preprint arXiv:1312.6199.

[Poursabzi-Sangdeh et al., 2018] Poursabzi-Sangdeh, F., Goldstein, D. G., Hofman, J. M., Vaughan, J. W., & Wallach, H. (2018). Manipulating and measuring model interpretability. arXiv preprint arXiv:1802.07810.

[Ribeiro et al., 2016] Ribeiro, M. T., Singh, S., & Guestrin, C. (2016, August). "Why should i trust you?" Explaining the predictions of any classifier. In *Proceedings of the 22nd ACM SIGKDD international conference on knowledge discovery and data mining* (pp. 1135-1144).