



Management Science

Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:
<http://pubsonline.informs.org>

Competition Between Organizational Groups: Its Impact on Altruistic and Antisocial Motivations

Lorenz Goette, David Huffman, Stephan Meier, Matthias Sutter,

To cite this article:

Lorenz Goette, David Huffman, Stephan Meier, Matthias Sutter, (2012) Competition Between Organizational Groups: Its Impact on Altruistic and Antisocial Motivations. Management Science 58(5):948-960. <http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1110.1466>

Full terms and conditions of use: <http://pubsonline.informs.org/page/terms-and-conditions>

This article may be used only for the purposes of research, teaching, and/or private study. Commercial use or systematic downloading (by robots or other automatic processes) is prohibited without explicit Publisher approval, unless otherwise noted. For more information, contact permissions@informs.org.

The Publisher does not warrant or guarantee the article's accuracy, completeness, merchantability, fitness for a particular purpose, or non-infringement. Descriptions of, or references to, products or publications, or inclusion of an advertisement in this article, neither constitutes nor implies a guarantee, endorsement, or support of claims made of that product, publication, or service.

Copyright © 2012, INFORMS

Please scroll down for article—it is on subsequent pages



INFORMS is the largest professional society in the world for professionals in the fields of operations research, management science, and analytics.

For more information on INFORMS, its publications, membership, or meetings visit <http://www.informs.org>

Competition Between Organizational Groups: Its Impact on Altruistic and Antisocial Motivations

Lorenz Goette

Department of Economics, University of Lausanne, Internef, 1015 Lausanne-Dorigny, Switzerland,
lorenz.goette@unil.ch

David Huffman

Department of Economics, Swarthmore College, Swarthmore, Pennsylvania 19081, dhuffma1@swarthmore.edu

Stephan Meier

Graduate School of Business, Columbia University, New York, New York 10027, sm3087@columbia.edu

Matthias Sutter

Department of Public Finance, University of Innsbruck, A-6020 Innsbruck, Austria; and
Department of Economics, University of Gothenburg, 40530 Gothenburg, Sweden, matthias.sutter@uibk.ac.at

Firms are often organized into groups. Group membership has been shown empirically to have positive effects, in the form of increased prosocial behavior toward in-group members. This includes an enhanced willingness to engage in altruistic punishment of inefficient defection. Our paper provides evidence of a dark side of group membership. In the presence of cues of competition between groups, a taste for harming the out-group emerges: punishment ceases to serve a norm enforcement function, and instead, out-group members are punished harder and regardless of whether they cooperate or defect. Our results point to a mechanism that might help explain previous mixed results on the social value of punishment, and they contribute to understanding the sources of conflict between groups. They also point to an important trade-off for firms: introducing competition enhances within-group efficiency but also generates costly between-group conflict.

Key words: group decisions, cooperation; punishment; experiment, army

History: Received March 31, 2011; accepted September 4, 2011, by Teck Ho, decision analysis. Published online in *Articles in Advance* January 13, 2012.

1. Introduction

Many beneficial exchanges within societies and organizations require individuals to cooperate and trust each other, even though narrow self-interest may tempt them to act selfishly. The pervasive tendency for formal contracts to be incomplete enhances the importance of such prosocial behaviors for efficiency of organizations and firms (Williamson et al. 1975, Knez and Simester 2001, MacLeod 2007). Choice experiments designed to isolate such altruistic motives have found evidence for altruistic cooperation, but show that on its own altruistic cooperation typically breaks down (e.g., Andreoni 1995, Fischbacher and Gächter 2010). Rather, high levels of cooperation are often sustained by a willingness of subjects to expend resources to impose harm on others who act selfishly. This altruistic, and costly, informal sanctioning has been shown to deter defection (Ostrom 1990, Güth et al. 1982, Fehr and Gächter 2000, Fuster and Meier 2010). Thus, mutual monitoring and sanctioning in terms of social pressure or other means, could be particularly important in

contributing to an organization's efficiency (Kandel and Lazear 1992, Mas and Moretti 2009). A key question, then, is what factors can enhance (or undermine) prosocial norm enforcement within organizations?

This paper focuses on one particular factor that has received increasing attention in the organizational literature: membership in a group (see, e.g., Akerlof and Kranton 2000, 2005). Organizations and firms are typically organized into groups, and it has been shown using choice experiments that membership in a group can increase prosocial behaviors toward in-group members (e.g., Charness et al. 2007, Chen and Li 2009, Chen and Chen 2011), including greater willingness to enforce norms within the group (Goette et al. 2006). This enhanced norm enforcement and cooperation within groups then has positive consequences for overall efficiency of the organization. However, there is also a long-standing hypothesis that group membership might have a dark side, generating hostility, and antisocial actions, toward outsiders (e.g., Durlauf 1999, Hewstone et al. 2002). If there is costly conflict between groups within an organization, this would

be harmful for organizational efficiency. So far, however, this type of negative effect of group membership has not been observed in experiments studying group effects, and the mechanisms that could cause it to arise are not fully understood.¹ The contribution of this paper is to show how a negative impact of group membership can arise.

We identify a mechanism—a cue of competition between groups—that can generate between-group conflict through a particular channel, i.e., punishment behavior. In a baseline condition, without competition (Goette et al. 2006), we found that punishment is prosocial, in the sense that it is selectively used against defectors. Adding competition, punishment behavior is transformed from beneficial norm enforcement to “antisocial punishment” of outsiders, which means outsiders are punished harder, and regardless of whether they cooperate or defect. We find little evidence that people cooperate less with outsiders as the result of competition, so conflict appears to work mainly through punishment behavior. There are, however, especially high levels of cooperation with in-group members when competition is present. We argue that previous studies have not found such effects because it is necessary to have both competition between groups and punishment options. We discuss how a shift from prosocial to antisocial punishment, depending on the presence of competition, is consistent with the predictions of recent theories on the coevolution of human altruism and aggression (Choi and Bowles 2007, Bowles 2009). Our results also indicate that different preferences may be dormant in one individual, and that these preferences may be triggered by cues about the nature of the surrounding economic environment (Bowles 1998).

Our experiments were conducted using officers in the Swiss Army, and involved four treatments that varied the group membership of players in the choice experiments. The group manipulation was generated by the army: for the duration of its officer training program, the army randomly forms platoons of the officer candidates, thus providing a strong, yet exogenous manipulation of group membership. The choice experiments were one-shot interactions and were designed to test for willingness to cooperate altruistically, or to use a costly punishment option for either prosocial or antisocial purposes. As we explain in §2, competition between groups was implemented such that it left the monetary payoffs from punishment unchanged. Thus, the appearance of antisocial punishment directed toward the out-group must be

due solely to the creation of a more competitive atmosphere, not because of a change in which punishment can affect outcomes. The “army as laboratory” is an interesting setting, as all officers in the Swiss Army serve as reservists and in their civilian lives are active in business life, typically in leadership positions. Furthermore, the army setting provides a largely unique opportunity to observe random assignment to real social groups, in combination with choice experiments and exogenously implemented competition.

Of course, it has already been shown experimentally that competition between groups has behavioral implications for in-group and between-group interactions, specifically in terms of generating more cooperation within groups (Bornstein and Ben-Yossef 1994, Bornstein et al. 2002, Augenblick and Cunha 2009). Similar to these earlier studies, we also find that under competition there is a particularly strong tendency to cooperate with the in-group (Halevy et al. 2008). Our results are also similar in that we do not observe hostility being expressed through the decision to cooperate or defect.

One way that we differ from previous studies on competition between groups is that we also look at punishment behavior. This is important, because conflict appears to be expressed through this channel, and because we show how this can completely subvert what has been argued to be a crucial mechanism for sustaining cooperation. Another difference is our approach of using army officers. This keeps many aspects from the field while still leveraging the advantages of experimental methods. We build, in general, on Goette et al. (2006), where we investigated in-group and out-group effects, but did not examine how cooperation and punishment behavior interact with absence or presence of competition. The use of randomly assigned real groups, i.e., platoons, has significant advantages over most previous approaches. Studies based on real groups or existing friends (e.g., Fershtman and Gneezy 2001, Bahry et al. 2005, Bernhard et al. 2006, Leider et al. 2009) analyze groups with social content and social ties, which is an important aspect of real groups. However, these groups are endogenously formed or differ in other dimensions than just their group membership (i.e., ethnicity), making inferences about the effects of groups *per se* difficult. A solution to these confounds is to randomly assign individuals to so-called “minimal” groups that are nothing more than a label (e.g., Tajfel et al. 1971, Charness et al. 2007, Chen and Li 2009, Sutter 2009). By design, however, these groups lack any social content and behavior might be very different from real groups, as shown in Goette et al. (2012). Combining the advantages of both group manipulation methods, our groups do have social content as groups in the former method but are at the

¹ Note that, conceptually, in-group favoritism need not be the flip-side of out-group hostility. Individuals might favor the in-group, without going out of their way to harm the out-group (for evidence of interethnic trust in Russia, see, e.g., Bahry et al. 2005).

same time randomly assigned as groups in the minimal group-paradigm.²

Our results are relevant for an ongoing debate about the social value of punishment. Although many studies have found that punishment serves a prosocial norm enforcement function (Ostrom 1990, Güth et al. 1982, Fehr and Gaechter 2000, Fuster and Meier 2010), other studies question whether punishment has such beneficial effects (Dreber et al. 2008, Egas and Riedl 2008, Herrmann et al. 2008, Houser et al. 2008, Abbink et al. 2010). For example, Herrmann et al. (2008) find antisocial punishment directed at people who are relatively cooperative, as well as defectors, in certain societies. Our experiments provide some of the first evidence on a mechanism that determines whether the prosocial or antisocial form of punishment behavior will emerge.

The findings of our experiment are also relevant for understanding why social groups are sometimes in conflict, and other times not. Research studies using field data have often conjectured that competition generates conflict. For example, the extent of competition for political power has been argued to explain why the Chewas and the Tubukas are enemies in Malawi, but are friends right across the border in Zambia (Posner 2004), and conflict between natives and immigrants has been linked to the extent of competition in the job market (Esses et al. 1998). Within organizations, it can happen that different groups/departments work well together or they fight each other leading to huge burdens for the organization. For example, Auletta (1985) describes how the fight between the “bankers” and the “traders” almost led to the end of Lehman Brothers. The main challenge for this type of study, however, is the presence of many factors that confound a clean identification of group effects per se, and of the effect of the economic environment. For example, groups typically differ according to many characteristics, and these differences could drive behavior rather than group membership. The extent of competition is also often not randomly assigned, raising the concern that more hostile types self-select into competitive situations. Also, behavioral measures have typically not allowed disentangling strategic motives from

nonstrategic motives that lead to conflict between groups.³

Finally, our findings indicate that organizations and firms may face a trade-off when it comes to trying to influence whether the “corporate culture” encourages internal competition between groups. Our results suggest that, although a sense of competition may enhance efficiency within groups, it may also lead to costly conflict between groups. If between-group conflict is sufficiently costly, the net effect of competition on efficiency may even be negative. The trade-off is also relevant for the choice of incentive schemes within organizations. Explicit incentives to compete in the form of, e.g., team tournaments would presumably generate even more salient competition and even stronger hostility effects.

The outline of this paper is as follows. In §2, we introduce the experimental design. Section 3 presents behavioral hypotheses, and §4 reports the experimental results. Section 5 concludes the paper.

2. Experimental Design

We conducted experiments in the Swiss Army, which allows us to exploit the random assignment of individuals into platoons as our group manipulation. Platoon assignment generated different treatments in terms of four different combinations of group membership for players in our experiments. We also used two types of experimental games, and two conditions in each game, to investigate the effect of competition between groups on cooperation and particularly on norm enforcement.

2.1. Subject Pool and Random Group Assignment

All Swiss males are required to perform at least 300 days of military service, beginning with twenty-one weeks of basic training. In week seven, about one fourth are selected to go through ten weeks of officer-candidate training. Of these, one fourth are promoted to officers. Because the Swiss Army is a reserve army up to the highest officer ranks, all officers have a civilian life and typically hold leadership positions in organizations.⁴ In part, the army selects officers based on their education. Among our officer candidates, 41% have completed an apprenticeship, and the

² The advantage of the “minimal group” paradigm is that it allows investigating the pure “labeling effect” of groups versus the effect of actually identifying with the group. Our methodology does not differentiate between these two steps of group identity formation, categorization and identification, because they were completed before the experiment was conducted. Our results are thus not directly comparable to those of minimal group studies; they are, however, applicable to “real groups,” where both categorization and identification have occurred.

³ The seminal study in psychology involved young boys being randomly assigned to different groups at a summer camp, and being observed as they first played competitive games and, subsequently, engaged in cooperative activities (Sherif et al. 1961). Our study is different because we use controlled choice experiments where anonymity allows disentangling strategic and nonstrategic motives. Other differences include randomization of competition, rather than a fixed order, and using adults ($N = 525$) rather than young boys ($N = 24$).

⁴ Jann (2003) documents that officers in the Swiss Army earn a wage premium of 25% compared to other Swiss males.

remaining 59% are on a university track. The comparable age group of 19- to 26-year-olds in Switzerland have significantly lower educational attainments. According to the Swiss Labor Force Survey 2008, 23% only completed compulsory schooling, 48% have completed an apprenticeship, and only 30% are on the university track.

As part of the training program, all officer candidates participate in the Joint Officer Training Program (JOTP). Whereas officer-candidate training is specific for each branch of service and occurs in separate locations, the JOTP brings new officers from all branches of service together, to the same location, for four weeks. Officers are randomly assigned to a platoon at the beginning of the JOTP, and spend virtually all time during the day with their platoon. Training involves mainly coursework on principles of security, combat in large military units, logistics, and leadership. At the end of the JOTP, the platoons are dissolved and officers are once again sent to separate locations for further, advanced training specific to each branch of service.

We use the random assignment of candidates to platoons in the JOTP as our manipulation of social groups. Each platoon is identified by a different number. Assignment to platoons is random and stratified according to the different branches of service. The army assigns platoons orthogonally to any previous social ties among officers with the aim of promoting exchanges of perspectives among different individuals and branches of service.

The assignment mechanism is ideal, in several ways, for investigating the impact of group membership on behavior. First, trainees know that platoon composition is designed to be identical and that nobody could choose which platoon to join. Indeed, statistical tests reveal no significant differences in platoon composition, by branch of service, education, or age. Second, there is no competition between the groups (or trainees) for evaluations or other resources. Relative performance evaluations were completed previously in candidate training. Thus, there is no function of the group assignment, other than to affect the circle of individuals with whom an officer interacts most frequently. Third, social interactions within a platoon are intense. Platoon members spend the whole workday with their group for the three weeks leading up to our experiments. Despite the fact that platoons are assigned orthogonally to previous social ties, social interactions and ties also arise endogenously within platoons in after-work time. In a questionnaire, officers in our study report to a question on “How often do you spend off-duty time with members of (a) your own platoon or (b) the other platoons?” that they spend significantly more time off-duty with members of their own platoon. This is notable given that 79.8%

Table 1 Off-Duty Time Spent per Week

Frequency of spending off-duty time with	Own platoon	Other platoon
Less than once	4.5%	30.4%
Between one and two times	45.0%	44.0%
Twice or more	50.5%	25.7%
<i>N</i>	489	491

Note. The two distributions are significantly different (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, $p < 0.001$).

of the trainees know people in other platoons, mostly from earlier stages of their training. Yet, as illustrated in Table 1, they choose to spend most of their off-duty time with members of their newly assigned group.

By using randomly assigned real groups we incorporate the social ties aspect of real groups that is abstracted from in arbitrary “minimal groups.” The groups are also attractive because they are not endogenously formed (as in, e.g., Leider et al. 2009) nor do they differ in other dimensions than just membership to different groups, e.g., nationality or ethnicity (as in, e.g., Bernhard et al. 2006, Habyarimana et al. 2007, Bahry et al. 2005). This allows us to make inference about the causal effect of real groups on behavior.

2.2. Experiments and Group Conditions

In this subsection, we present the two types of choice experiments used in our study; in the next subsection, we introduce the two conditions with which we varied the economic environment as being competitive or noncompetitive. Experiments were one-shot and were always conducted in the third week of the four-week training period.

2.2.1. Experiment 1: Cooperation. The game was a simultaneous prisoners’ dilemma (PD). The players, labeled A1 and A2, were each endowed with 20 points worth of real money (4 points = CHF 1). They simultaneously decided whether to keep the points or pass all of them to the other player. Passed points were doubled. Thus, if both players passed their points (cooperation), they each got 40 points. However, a selfish player could always do better by keeping the points (defecting) regardless of the other player’s decision: Defecting when the other defected would yield 20, whereas cooperating would sacrifice the endowment and yield nothing in return; defecting when the other cooperated would yield 60, the maximum possible individual payoff in the game (while leaving the cooperator with zero). Cooperation thus entails lowering one’s own payoff, and improving the payoff of the other player, and is an indicator of non-selfish motives. We use the game as our workhorse for studying how group boundaries, and economic environment, affect nonselfish motives for cooperation.


Experiment 1 involved two conditions in a between-subject design; individuals did not know about treatments besides the one in which they participated. In all conditions, a subject never learned the individual identity of their partner. In the *in-group* condition, subjects interacted anonymously, except for being informed that the other player was a member of their own platoon. The *out-group* condition was the same, except subjects were informed that the other player was a member of another platoon. Group affiliation was clearly marked on the decision sheets. These conditions allow us to examine how group assignment affects cooperation. For a selfish individual, the group affiliation will not change the prediction that he will always defect.

We also elicited individual's beliefs about in-group and out-group cooperation. Independent of the condition they were in, we asked participants to state both their belief for in- and out-group cooperation. We asked them to predict the percentage of the in- and out-group that would send all of the points (cooperate). They were given an incentive to make their best guess: they knew that their prediction would be compared to the percentage actually observed. If the deviation was less than 10 percentage points, then they would get one extra point.

At the very end of the experimental sessions, we conducted a short survey in which we asked participants whether they agreed or disagreed with three statements about trust: (1) "In general, people can be trusted." (2) "Nowadays, you cannot rely on anybody." (3) "Dealing with strangers, it is better to be cautious before trusting them." Participants answered on a four-point scale (1 = agree strongly, 2 = agree slightly, 3 = disagree slightly, and 4 = disagree strongly). We created an individual variable, *Trust*, by adding the answers to the three questions and assigning a one for the least amount of trust and four the highest amount of trust per question (answers to question 1 are reversed coded). This is used to help capture individual differences in beliefs about trustworthiness in our statistical analysis.

2.2.2. Experiment 2: Punishment. In Experiment 2, two players, A1 and A2, played a PD as in Experiment 1, but we added two additional players, B1 and B2. Each B-player was endowed with 70 points. B1 could assign up to 10 deduction points to A1, and B2 could do the same to A2. Each deduction point subtracted three points from the A-player, and cost the B-player one point of his endowment. The B-players could condition their choices on the actions of A1 and A2. Thus, Experiment 2 incorporated the possibility of third-party punishment (Fehr and Fischbacher 2004) and is suited for examining determinants of whether punishment takes the form of norm enforcement (selectively punishing defection)

Figure 1 Group Composition in Third-Party Punishment Game



Notes. The game allowed B1 to punish A1, and B2 to punish A2, conditional on the actions of A1 and A2 in a simultaneous prisoners' dilemma game. The dark shading indicates the four possible group combinations for B1, A1, and A2, which were implemented as different treatments (players with the same shading are from the same group). The design deliberately did not vary all possible combinations of B1 and B2 group roles, because of number of observations, so the effect of B2 group identity on B1 behavior is not studied. The pattern of B-player (and A-player) group compositions was identical across the economic environments, the NG and CG treatments.

or antisocial punishment (punishing both cooperation and defection). Because punishment is costly, a selfish B-player would never punish.

To examine the impact of group membership on norm enforcement, we varied the composition of players in each game in a between-subject design. For the remainder of the paper, we refer to the group composition in Experiment 2 from B1's perspective. Thus, A1 always refers to the player that the B-player can punish, and we refer to the other A-player as A2. The four different group compositions we implemented are shown in Figure 1.

Varying the group membership of A1 (while keeping constant the group membership of A2) allows us to investigate how the group identity of the person being punished (A1) matters. We also study how punishment varies with the group affiliation of A2, the person affected by A1's actions. Web Appendix C in the online supplementary material (available at <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1967200>) provides a translation of the instructions for one group composition in the Neutral Group Environment treatment.

2.3. Economic Environment Treatments

We compare two conditions, which differ in terms of the absence or presence of cues of competition between groups.

2.3.1. Neutral Group Environment (NG). In this baseline condition, we used the randomly assigned groups as our group manipulation and varied the group composition as described above. There was no

economic competition between the platoons. Preliminary results from baseline were previously presented in Goette et al. (2006).

2.3.2. Competitive Group Environment (CG).

We added competition to the NG treatment by offering a bonus to the platoon that got the highest payoff in the PD stage. The bonus was 20 points for each member if the platoon got the highest average payoff in the PD. In case of a tie between two platoons, the winner was randomly determined. Because the bonus was based on average payoffs for pairs playing the PD, and cooperation maximized payoffs for the pair, cooperation facilitated winning the bonus for the platoon. Importantly, however, the bonus did not change the incentives for a selfish individual: the best strategy for a selfish A-player was still to defect (for the intuition and a formal test, see §3 on the behavioral hypothesis). Furthermore, in Experiment 2 the bonus was calculated based on the A-player average payoffs *before* deducting any punishment points imposed by the B-players. B-players (and A-players) knew this. This design feature makes punishment different from sabotage, in which “hurting” the other group can affect the probability of winning the prize in a tournament (for a paper on sabotage, see Harbring and Irlenbusch 2011). Thus, the bonus was irrelevant for the choices of the B-players, regardless of whether they were selfish or altruistic. The rules of the game, in terms of the size of the bonus, and the irrelevance of punishment points for influencing the competition outcome, were made clear in the instructions. Furthermore, we only began the experiment after control questions verified that all participants understood these specific features.

2.4. Experimental Procedures

The experiment was conducted with paper and pencil in a large auditorium and lasted 45 minutes. Subjects did not know of the experiment in advance.

Special care was taken to ensure particularly strong anonymity conditions. First, subjects were never told the identity of their partner(s). Second, they knew that payoffs would be mailed to home addresses 10 days after the experiment, so that all participants would only learn the outcome of the experiment (including the outcome of the competition) *after* the JOTP was over and they were no longer with their platoon. These conditions ensured that the experiment was truly one-shot, and that defection was the optimal choice for a selfish individual. For example, subjects did not need to fear reprisal after the experiment if they chose to defect; no one even knew if someone had or had not defected, until after training was over, and on top of that, identities were anonymous even when that information was revealed. Points earned were converted into Swiss francs (1 point = CHF 0.25)

and the subjects earned on average CHF 14.4 (approximately \$14). There was no show-up fee.

Overall, 525 subjects participated in the experiments: 228 in the NG treatment and 297 in the CG treatment. The different treatments were conducted in different sessions, in which 281 were assigned the role of A-players and participated in Experiment 1. Half were assigned to the in-group treatment and half to the out-group treatment. In the few cases in which the groups had an uneven number of A-players, we randomly used the action of some A-players twice to calculate payoffs. The payoff of these players was determined by the decisions associated with the first match. After participating in Experiment 1, these same subjects participated as A-players in Experiment 2. This procedure introduces a possible order effect for the A-players when looking at choices in the second experiment (A-players did not know about the second experiment, however, when making choices in the first experiment). Choices of the A-players in Experiment 2 are not of interest for our purposes, however, as we analyze cooperation of A-players in Experiment 1, and norm enforcement of B-players in Experiment 2. A total of 244 subjects were assigned the role of B-players. They participated only in Experiment 2 and were assigned to one of four conditions (see Figure 1). We elicited B-players' deduction points using the strategy method; i.e., they specified how many points to deduct from their associated A-player for each possible combination of actions by A1 and A2.

3. Behavioral Hypotheses

This section develops behavioral hypotheses on how the competitive environment might affect cooperation and punishment behavior. If individuals do not have (group-specific) prosocial preferences, individuals will always defect in the PD game, because this is a dominant strategy. Similarly for punishment, a selfish individual would never punish another player as punishment is costly and there is no benefit of punishment in this one-shot interaction.

The competitive environment, i.e., the small bonus in the CG treatment, does not change the predictions for a selfish player. The intuition is straightforward: Cooperation never leads to an increased payoff because it costs 20 points, and the bonus is only 20 points. In fact, our rules for tiebreaking in case two groups have the same number of points imply that individuals always must expect to lose money when cooperating, because the bonus is only 10 in expected terms. Thus, adding competition cannot generate an increase in cooperation rates through selfish incentives; an increase in cooperation under competition must reflect an effect working through nonselfish

motives (see Web Appendix A for a proof). The competitive environment also has zero impact on punishment choices of a selfish B-player, by construction. The rules of the game are such that the competition is determined without taking into account punishment. Thus, punishment can have no influence on the likelihood of winning the bonus. Hence, our null hypothesis can be summarized as follows:

HYPOTHESIS 0 (H_0). *With selfish players, defection by A-players and no punishment by B-players will be the dominant strategies—both in NG and in CG.*

Of course, past research has shown that people are not only willing to cooperate and to punish (for surveys, see Fehr and Schmidt 2003, Meier 2007) but that they have group-specific social preferences (for evidence with minimal groups, see, e.g., Chen and Li 2009). With group-specific social preferences, a competitive environment can change individuals' behavior. It has been shown that intergroup competition increases intragroup cooperation and coordination within "minimal" groups (Bornstein and Ben-Yossef 1994, Bornstein et al. 2002) and real, self-selected, groups (Augenblick and Cunha 2009).

Recent evolutionary models provide an explanation for how such group-specific social preferences can survive. In particular, the idea of (cultural) group selection implies that a pattern of altruistic cooperation, and altruistic punishment of defectors, can emerge within groups. These altruistic behaviors can survive because they enhance group fitness, and make groups composed of altruists more likely to survive environmental shocks (Henrich 2004, Boyd et al. 2003). Crucially, altruism must be parochial, or preferentially directed toward own group members, otherwise altruistic groups lose their relative fitness advantage.

Conflict between groups can emerge, however, with the introduction of competition for resources between groups. In this case the seemingly benign trait of altruism can play a surprising role, because enhancing own-group fitness is not the only way to win: damaging competitor groups is also a viable strategy. In addition to being even more cooperative within their group, altruists might become hostile toward other groups, and use antisocial punishment as a way to damage outsiders. This taste for harming the out-group could survive because it reinforces the relative fitness advantage of groups with altruists (Choi and Bowles 2007, Bowles 2009). These theories thus predict that cooperation should be reinforced by competition:

HYPOTHESIS 1 (H_1). *A-players with group-specific social preferences cooperate more often with in-group members in CG than in NG.*

These theories also predict that punishment of the out-group should become stronger under competition, because hurting the other group generates an advantage for one's own group. This should reflect a taste for harming the out-group, because such nonstrategic motives help solve the free-riding problem associated with the "public good" of punishing the out-group. In our experiment, competition did not affect the material consequences of punishment, and thus using punishment to harm the out-group must reflect a taste for hostility rather than strategic motives. Although the deeper evolutionary rationale for such hostility, at the group level, depends on this helping win the competition between groups, it is likely that the cue of competition is already sufficient to trigger an individual's taste for harming the out-group. Previous evidence suggests that a mere cue of competition can create aggression that spills over into relations between groups that are completely unrelated to the competition itself.⁵ These results are corroborated by recent studies showing that a threat to one's group identity can affect behavior in domains that are unrelated to the threat (Inzlicht and Kang 2010), and that emotions of anger can create cognitive bias against an out-group (Dasgupta et al. 2009). A cue of competition is likely interpreted as a threat to one's group, and likely also increases anger toward the other group. Thus, even though the competition introduced in CG does not affect the material consequences of punishment, and has no strategic value to the individual, it may still spill over into the social preferences underlying punishment, as it provides a direct means of hurting the other group.⁶ We thus put forward the following hypothesis:

HYPOTHESIS 2 (H_2). *B-players with group-specific social preferences punish out-group members more often in CG than in NG.*

4. Results

We present the results in two steps: first we analyze the impact of group membership and the presence of competition on cooperative behavior. Second, we show how group boundaries and a competitive environment affect punishment behavior.

⁵ For example, Sherif et al. (1961) report that the equivalent of war broke out between the two groups of boys in the camp, even though competition was confined to a tug-of-war competition. The two groups stole household items from each other, which clearly does not present an advantage in a tug-of-war.

⁶ There are many examples where emotional reactions are triggered by cues in the environment, before or in spite of efforts at a more cognitive evaluation that might lead to a different characterization of the situation than suggested by the cue alone. This may reflect the evolutionarily old origins of such emotional systems, which were programs designed to respond to cues that were reliable indicators in the adaptive environment (Cosmides and Tooby 1994, 2000).

4.1. Cooperation and Beliefs About Cooperation

Panel (a) in Figure 2 shows the fraction of individuals cooperating as a function of the group composition and the presence or absence of competition. In general, the figure shows that individuals are willing to cooperate in the PD and that they exhibit in-group favoritism. In the NG baseline, we replicate the usual finding in the literature on group effects: there is a significant and large increase in cooperation if individuals are paired with someone from their own platoon rather than another platoon. In fact, cooperation rates are 18 percentage points higher for within-

group interactions than between-group. Notably, the lower cooperation rates with out-group members need not indicate hostility, but might simply indicate less willingness to deviate from the dominant selfish strategy when paired with an out-group member. Turning to the CG treatment, we see that favoritism toward the in-group is even more extreme when competition is present, with cooperation rates being 36 percentage points higher in in-group than in out-group interactions. Thus, in the presence of competition, the difference between out-group and in-group cooperation rates is especially pronounced. However, our results also show that out-group cooperation is not decreasing in CG. Thus, competition does not lead individuals to express hostility toward the out-group by defecting more often. This could reflect the limited “expressive value” of defection; individuals might not see defection as a way to unambiguously express hostility, given that it also coincides with the dominant selfish strategy. As we will see below, a design that includes punishment behavior does reveal evidence of a taste for harming the out-group.

Panel (b) in Figure 2 shows that the results on cooperation behavior are fully reflected in the individuals’ beliefs; people report that they expect in-group favoritism in NG, and significantly greater favoritism in CG.


The results in Figure 2 are also confirmed in logit models of the following form

$$coop_i = \alpha + \gamma_0 IG_i + \gamma_1 IG_i \times CG_i + \delta CG_i + x_i \beta + e_i, \quad (1)$$

where $coop$ is an indicator variable equal to 1 if individual i cooperates, and 0 otherwise. The indicator variable IG is equal to 1 if the individual is paired with another individual from his platoon (*in-group*) and 0 if the other player is from another platoon. The indicator variable CG_i is equal to 1 for the Competitive Group Environment treatment, and 0 otherwise. In some specifications, we also add control variables x , an index of a person’s self-reported trust (explained in §2.1), to increase the precision of the estimates. For ease of interpretation, we report marginal effects.

Results in column (1) of Table 2 show that there is a significant overall in-group effect of almost 30 percentage points. Columns (2) and (3) separate the effects of group membership in the two treatments. In the NG treatment, cooperation is about 20 percentage points higher if the interaction is in-group ($p = 0.03$ in column (2), and $p = 0.05$ in column (3)). The strength of the in-group effect depends on the presence of competition. The interaction term between IG and CG shows that the cooperation differential in in-group interactions is about 20 percentage points larger when there is competition ($p = 0.07$ in column (2), and $p = 0.021$ in column (3), where we include an index of trust questions).

Figure 2 Cooperation Rates and Beliefs About Cooperation in NG and CG



Notes. The bars show standard errors of the mean. White indicates an out-group pairing and dark indicates an in-group pairing. Panel (a) shows the fraction of A-players passing their endowment to the other player in a simultaneous one-shot PD. Panel (b) shows beliefs about the fraction of A-players who pass their endowment in the PD.

Table 2 Results for Cooperation Rates and Beliefs About Cooperation

Dependent variable:	Cooperation (=1)			Beliefs: % cooperating		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
<i>In-group</i> (=1)	0.28*** (0.05)	0.18** (0.08)	0.17* (0.09)	0.26*** (0.02)	0.18*** (0.02)	0.18*** (0.02)
<i>CG</i> (=1)	0.08 (0.06)	0.00 (0.08)	0.01 (0.08)	0.01 (0.03)	−0.06* (0.03)	−0.06* (0.03)
<i>In-group</i> × <i>CG</i>		0.18* (0.10)	0.22** (0.10)		0.13*** (0.03)	0.13*** (0.04)
<i>Trust</i>			0.06*** (0.02)			0.03*** (0.01)
<i>Constant</i>				0.37*** (0.02)	0.41*** (0.02)	0.34*** (0.04)
(Pseudo)- <i>R</i> ²	0.07	0.08	0.10	0.20	0.21	0.25
No. of observations	281	281	267	538	538	515
No. of individuals	281	281	267	274	274	262

Notes. In columns (1)–(3), marginal effects from logit models are shown. In columns (4)–(6) coefficients from OLS models are shown. The model in columns (4)–(6) uses two observations per individual (if available); therefore, standard errors of the estimates in columns (4)–(6) are adjusted for clustering on individuals.

*0.05 ≤ *p* < 0.1; **0.01 ≤ *p* < 0.05; ****p* < 0.01.

We can also estimate OLS models⁷ similar to those above with the dependent variable being bel_{ik} , which is individual *i*'s belief about the percentage of individuals cooperating in the two group configurations, *k*. Because we use two observations per individual, we adjust the error terms by clustering on individuals for possible correlations in e_{ik} within individuals. The results, displayed in columns (4)–(6) of Table 2, show that there is a strong overall in-group effect in beliefs, of almost the identical magnitude as observed in behavior (*p* < 0.01; column (4)). We then separate the in-group effect in the two environments. Beliefs about cooperation are significantly higher for in-group pairings in NG, about the same magnitude as we find for behavior. There is a significant interaction with the economic environment: The in-group differential is 13 percentage points larger in CG than in NG (*p* < 0.01 in both specifications). All in-group differentials in beliefs are within a standard deviation of the in-group differentials in cooperation, showing that the individuals had well-calibrated beliefs.

In sum, group membership per se creates in-group favoritism; i.e., individuals cooperate more with in-group members than with out-group members. This effect is also reflected in people's beliefs. Randomly adding competition between the groups increases the in-group favoritism even though it does not change the predictions for individuals under the assumption of selfish preferences. This indicates that a

competitive environment has an impact on group-specific social preferences. Importantly, competition increases in-group cooperation without reducing out-group cooperation. Thus, just looking at cooperation, one would conclude that competition between groups increases social efficiency.

4.2. Punishment


We now turn to the analysis of B-players' punishment behavior. Figure 3 displays the results for punishment in situations in which A2 cooperated. The figure allows us to highlight two distinct motives related to the group membership. By varying the identity of A1, the person who can be punished, we can see if punishment depends on whether A1 was a member of the punisher's own group (dark lines) or another group (grey lines). By varying the identity of A2, the player who is the potential victim of defection, we can examine if punishment of A1 depends on whether the victim of defection was from the punisher's group (solid lines) or some other group (dashed lines). The figure also distinguishes between whether A1 cooperated or defected.

Panel (a) in Figure 3 displays the results for the NG baseline. There is a clear pattern of norm enforcement in the data: A1 is punished more strongly for defection than cooperation. Punishment of A1 also depends on the identity of A2. If A1 defects, the solid lines (A2 from the punisher's group) are always above the dashed lines (A2 from another group). Thus, individuals are especially prone to punish defection if the "victim" of defection is from the in-group. These results are consistent with the prediction that punishers engage in altruistic punishment in a way that enforces a norm of cooperation toward members of their own group. They also mirror the in-group favoritism observed for cooperation behavior. It is also evident from the figure that the identity of A2 does not matter if A1 cooperates. This indicates a lack of hostility in this treatment. Hostility would imply stronger punishment of an A1 that belongs to another group, regardless of what A1 does. As can be seen in the graph, there is essentially no difference as a function of A1's group affiliation. In sum, group boundaries per se do not create hostility in punishment.

Turning to the competition treatment in panel (b) in Figure 3, we see that the punishment choices are starkly different. Most importantly, there is now a clear difference in punishment depending on whether A1 belongs to the punisher's own group or not. Grey lines (A1 is from another group) are clearly above the dark lines (A1 is from the punisher's group). Thus, out-group individuals are punished significantly harder than in-group members, and importantly, this is true no matter whether the individual

⁷ Estimating the same specification with tobit models does not change the results. Results are available from the authors upon request.

Figure 3 Punishment in the Case A2-Player Cooperated



Notes. B-players could deduct between 0 and 10 points. Each deduction point costs B-players 1 point and A1-players 3 points. Deduction points were made conditional on whether A1-players cooperated or defected using the strategy method. Error bars show standard errors of the mean.

cooperates or defects (grey lines are above dark lines in both cases). Thus, the introduction of competition leads to conflict between groups, in the form of anti-social punishment or hostility. Furthermore, there is no relationship between the identity of A2 and punishment in CG, so the tendency to preferentially punish defection against the in-group is no longer present.

The two different conditions (neutral and competitive) generated qualitatively different patterns of punishment, as is evident in the figure. A formal statistical test confirms this impression: We estimate the following OLS regressions:⁸

$$PP_{ik} = \alpha + \gamma_1 I_i(A1 \text{ out-group}) + \gamma_2 I_i(A2 \text{ in-group}) + e_i, \quad (2)$$

where PP are the punishment points that individual i assigns in case k . We include two indicator variables to capture the effect of the group composition on i 's punishment; $I(A2 \text{ in-group})$ is equal to 1 if player A2 is from the same group as B1 and 0 otherwise, and $I(A1 \text{ out-group})$ is equal to 1 if player A1 is from another group as B1 and 0 otherwise.

We estimate Equation (2) separately for the two cases where A1 cooperates and the two cases where A1 defects, and we estimate these again separately

for NG and CG. The coefficients across columns are compared in the bottom panel using two-sided χ^2 -tests (see Web Appendix B for a formal expression of the tests). Table 3 displays the result for the case in which A2 cooperates. The table shows that in the NG treatment, i.e., in the neutral environment, we find stronger punishment of defection against a member of one's own group, i.e., A2 is an in-group member ($p = 0.05$, column (1)), but no effect of the identity of A1 on punishment ($p = 0.85$, column (1)). Importantly, in the NG environment, there is no effect of the group composition on punishment of cooperation (column (3)). In contrast, in CG, we observe a different pattern in punishment. This can be seen in columns (2) and (4) of Table 3. The identity of A2 is no longer significant. However, A1 gets punished more heavily, whether he cooperates or defects, if he is from a different group than the punisher, i.e., A1 is out-group ($p < 0.01$ in columns (2) and (4)). Hence, there is substantial anti-social punishment.

The comparison of the coefficients across columns, i.e., the neutral versus the competitive environment, in the lower panel of Table 3 shows that in treatment CG, A1 is punished more heavily than in NG if he is out-group ($p < 0.01$). This is true for whether A1 defects or cooperates. The different punishment pattern conditional on the identity of A2 is not statistically significant. In sum, we clearly reject the hypothesis that the effect of A1's and A2's group affiliation on punishment are the same across the two

⁸ The results are maintained in tobit regressions and can be obtained upon request.

Table 3 Punishment as a Function of Group Membership

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Behavior of A1:	A1 defects		A1 cooperates	
Environment:	Neutral	Comp	Neutral	Comp
A1 out-group (γ_1)	0.155 (0.853)	3.742*** (0.658)	−0.099 (0.693)	2.898*** (0.684)
A2 in-group (γ_2)	1.694** (0.840)	0.868 (0.676)	0.535 (0.697)	−0.544 (0.693)
Constant	4.487*** (0.705)	1.636*** (0.447)	2.307*** (0.578)	1.988*** (0.517)
R^2	0.039	0.203	0.005	0.125
No. of observations/individuals	111	132	111	132
Tests across equations (environments)				
Test that γ_1 differs	$p < 0.01$		$p < 0.01$	
Test that γ_2 differs	$p = 0.44$		$p = 0.27$	
Test that γ_1 and γ_2 differ	$p < 0.01$		$p < 0.01$	

Notes. Dependent variable: no. of deduction points. OLS estimates for the cases in which A2 cooperates. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.

0.01 $\leq p < 0.05$; * $p < 0.01$ (p -values in cross-equation tests are all two-sided).

treatments ($p < 0.01$ for both defection and cooperation of A1). And the results show substantial antisocial punishment in the CG treatment.

The results are also robust (qualitatively the same, but slightly weaker) to adding the cases in which A2 defected. Obviously, in the case in which A1 cooperates and A2 defects, A1 has a payoff of zero and punishment cannot reduce his payoff further. So as a result of censoring, there is no punishment in this case—even in CG. Nevertheless, individuals exhibit hostility in punishment also in the case when A1 defects and A2 defects. For reasons of succinctness, the detailed results have been relegated to the Web appendix (see Figure A1 and Table A1 there).

Figure 3 additionally indicates that norm enforcement might be weaker in CG than in NG, i.e., that punishment seems to depend less on A1's behavior in CG than in NG: Whereas in panel (a) of Figure 3, punishment is clearly higher when A1 defects, regardless of the group composition, that relationship is almost completely muted in panel (b). To examine the differential in punishment between cooperation and defection, we estimate for each treatment the following equations:

$$PP_{ik} = \alpha + \gamma_1 I_i(\text{A1 out-group}) + \gamma_2 I_i(\text{A2 in-group}) + \gamma_3 I_k(\text{A1 defects}) + e_i, \quad (3)$$

$$PP_{ik} = \alpha + \gamma_1 I_i(\text{A1 out-group}) + \gamma_2 I_i(\text{A2 in-group}) + \gamma_4 I_k(\text{A1 defects}) \times I_i(\text{A2 out-group}) + \gamma_5 I_k(\text{A1 defects}) \times I_i(\text{A2 in-group}) + e_i, \quad (4)$$

in which A1 *defects* equals 1 if A1 defects and 0 otherwise. Regression 4 adds two interaction terms for A1

Table 4 Norm Enforcement Across Environments

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Environment:	Neutral	Comp	Neutral	Comp
A1 out-group (γ_1)	0.028 (0.624)	3.320*** (0.589)	0.028 (0.625)	3.320*** (0.590)
A2 in-group (γ_2)	1.114* (0.609)	0.162 (0.595)	0.513 (0.691)	−0.533 (0.694)
A1 defects (γ_3)	2.838*** (0.445)	0.682** (0.330)		
A1 defects \times A2 out-group (γ_4)			3.510*** (0.722)	1.482*** (0.560)
A1 defects \times A2 in-group (γ_5)			2.306*** (0.549)	0.092 (0.385)
Constant	1.978*** (0.565)	1.471*** (0.465)	2.244*** (0.578)	1.766*** (0.495)
R^2	0.130	0.161	0.136	0.167
No. of observations	222	264	222	264
No. of individuals	111	132	111	132
Tests across equations (environments)				
Test that γ_1 differs	$p < 0.01$		$p < 0.01$	
Test that γ_2 differs	$p = 0.26$		$p = 0.29$	
Test that γ_3 differs	$p < 0.01$			
Test that γ_4 differs			$p = 0.03$	
Test that γ_5 differs			$p < 0.01$	
Test that γ_1 , γ_2 , and γ_3 differ	$p < 0.01$			
Test that γ_1 , γ_2 , γ_4 , and γ_5 differ			$p < 0.01$	

Notes. Dependent variable: no. of deduction points. OLS estimates. Robust standard errors clustered on the individual are in parentheses.

*0.05 $\leq p < 0.1$; **0.01 $\leq p < 0.05$; *** $p < 0.01$ (p -values in cross-equation tests are all two-sided).

defects and whether A2 is an out-group member or an in-group member.

The results (displayed in Table 4) show that defection is more strongly punished than cooperation in NG ($p < 0.01$, column (1)). This effect is less strong in CG as seen in column (2). A formal test comparing the two coefficients, γ_3 , shows that the difference is significant ($p < 0.01$) and conditioning of punishment on actions of A1 is much weaker in CG, but it is still significant. As can be seen from comparing coefficient γ_4 across columns (3) and (4), this effect of competition in CG even prevails when A2 is from the punisher's own group ($p = 0.03$), the case when norm enforcement was strongest in NG. Finally, it is noteworthy from column (4) that the norm enforcement pattern of punishment if defection is directed against one's own group has completely disappeared in the competitive environment. The fact that individuals cease to use punishment to enforce cooperation among in-group members in a competitive environment might seem surprising from the perspective of increasing group fitness. However, our results on cooperation showed that competition leads to very high within-group cooperation rates, even in the absence of punishment threat, mitigating this problem for the group. In summary, competition causes punishment to stop functioning as a tool for

norm enforcement, and instead to take the form of antisocial punishment directed toward the out-group, consistent with predictions given group-specific social preferences.

5. Conclusions

Recent research has shown that people are willing to engage in costly punishment. This can be highly beneficial when punishment is directed selectively at defectors, making it possible to sustain cooperation even in the face of strong free-riding incentives (e.g., Fehr and Gaechter 2000). These findings have important implications for organizations, given that contracts are typically incomplete and potential free-riding problems abound; altruistic norm enforcement can thus help firms avoid inefficient outcomes (Gaechter et al. 2008). Results from this paper and others (Chen and Li 2009) also suggest that the division of organizations into groups can affect norm enforcement, and they can even enhance the willingness to punish defection in the case that defection is against in-group members (Goette et al. 2006).

The novel result of this paper is to show that a simple change in economic environment, interacting with group boundaries, can not only eliminate the willingness to enforce norms but in fact generate a taste for destructive punishment. In particular, the introduction of competition between organizational groups triggers strong antisocial punishment directed toward outsiders, such that they are harmed even when they cooperate. Because cooperation is punished as hard as defection, punishment ceases to deter defection, while at the same time destroying resources. This antisocial punishment reflects a taste for harming the out-group, generated by cues of competition alone; our design excludes any strategic motive for punishing outsiders, i.e., there is no competitive advantage from harming the out-group. Also, the willingness to engage in norm enforcement on behalf of one's own group is reduced by competition. Thus, our results provide an important caveat to the view that punishment behavior is beneficial, and identify a mechanism that can cause costly conflict within organizations.

Although competition can be harmful in terms of leading to antisocial punishment between groups, we also show that competition can have a positive effect on within-group cooperation, which is also fully reflected in individuals' beliefs. Thus, group cohesion is improved when there is a sense of competition with other groups. The fact that competition is a catalyst for both harmful and efficiency-enhancing motives within organizations means that firms face a complicated decision when thinking about introducing incentives for competitions between teams.

Our results also provide additional evidence that social preferences are endogenous to the economic

environment (Bowles 1998, Burks et al. 2009). This literature argues that changes in economic environments bring about changes in preferences. Yet, these changes are typically assumed to be slow, e.g., operating through slow-changing norms of cooperation (Herrmann et al. 2008). It is noteworthy that we observe a particularly strong form of endogenous preferences: Our treatments are between-subject manipulations, and still we immediately observe starkly different punishment and cooperation strategies, conditional on the economic environment. Thus, this evidence suggests that different motives of social preferences may be dormant in humans, and triggered by different economic environments.

Acknowledgments

The authors thank the editor, the associate editor, two referees, seminar and conference participants at Harvard University; George Mason University; University of California, Berkeley; University of California, Santa Barbara; University of Pittsburgh; Temple University; Tel Aviv University; the Wharton School; Tilburg University; and the Economic Science Association meeting in Tucson for very helpful comments.

References

- Abbink, K., J. Brandts, B. Herrmann, H. Orzen. 2010. Intergroup conflict and intra-group punishment in an experimental contest game. *Amer. Econom. Rev.* **100**(1) 420–447.
- Akerlof, G., R. Kranton. 2005. Identity and the economics of organizations. *J. Econom. Perspect.* **19**(1) 9–32.
- Akerlof, G. A., R. E., Kranton. 2000. Economics and identity. *Quart. J. Econom.* **115**(3) 715–753.
- Andreoni, J. 1995. Cooperation in public-goods experiments: Kindness or confusion? *Amer. Econom. Rev.* **85**(4) 891–904.
- Augenblick, N., J. Cunha. 2009. Using competition to elicit cooperation in a political public goods game: A field experiment. Working paper, University of California, Berkeley, Berkeley.
- Auletta, K. 1985. The fall of Lehman Brothers: Part 2. The men, the money, the merger. *New York Times Magazine* (February 24) 36–42.
- Bahry, D., M. Kosolapov, P. Kozyreva, R. Wilson. 2005. Ethnicity and trust: Evidence from Russia. *Amer. Political Sci. Rev.* **99**(4) 521–532.
- Bernhard, H., E. Fehr, U. Fischbacher. 2006. Group affiliation and altruistic norm enforcement. *Amer. Econom. Rev.* **96**(2) 217–221.
- Bornstein, G., M. Ben-Yossef. 1994. Cooperation in intergroup and single-group social dilemmas. *J. Experiment. Soc. Psych.* **30**(1) 52–67.
- Bornstein, G., U. Gneezy, R. Nagel. 2002. The effect of intergroup competition on group coordination: An experimental study. *Games Econom. Behav.* **41**(1) 1–25.
- Bowles, S. 1998. Endogenous preferences: The cultural consequences of markets and other economic institutions. *J. Econom. Literature* **36**(1) 75–111.
- Bowles, S. 2009. Did warfare among ancestral hunter gatherers affect the evolution of human social behaviors? *Science* **324**(5932) 1293–1298.
- Boyd, R., H. Gintis, S. Bowles, P. J. Richerson. 2003. The evolution of altruistic punishment. *Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA* **100**(6) 3531–3535.
- Burks, S. V., J. P. Carpenter, L. Goette. 2009. Performance pay and worker cooperation: Evidence from an artefactual field experiment. *J. Econom. Behav. Organ.* **70**(3) 458–469.

- Charness, G., L. Rigotti, A. Rustichini. 2007. Individual behavior and group membership. *Amer. Econom. Rev.* **97**(4) 1340–1352.
- Chen, R., Y. Chen. 2011. The potential of social identity for equilibrium selection. *Amer. Econom. Rev.* **101**(6) 2562–2589.
- Chen, Y., S. X. Li. 2009. Group identity and social preferences. *Amer. Econom. Rev.* **99**(1) 431–457.
- Choi, J.-K., S. Bowles. 2007. The coevolution of parochial altruism and war. *Science* **318**(5850) 636–640.
- Cosmides, L., J. Tooby. 1994. Better than rational: Evolutionary psychology and the invisible hand. *Amer. Econom. Rev.* **84**(2) 327–332.
- Cosmides, L., J. Tooby. 2000. Evolutionary psychology and the emotions. M. Lewis, J. M. Haviland-Jones, eds. *Handbook of Emotions*, 2nd ed. Guilford Press, New York, 91–115.
- Dasgupta, N., D. Desteno, L. A. Williams, M. Hunsinger. 2009. Fanning the flames of prejudice: The influence of specific incidental emotions on implicit prejudice. *Emotion* **9**(4) 585–591.
- Dreber, A., D. G. Rand, D. Fudenberg, M. A. Nowak. 2008. Winners don't punish. *Nature* **452**(7185) 348–351.
- Durlauf, S. 1999. The case "against" social capital. *Focus* **20**(3) 1–5.
- Egas, M., A. Riedl. 2008. The economics of altruistic punishment, and the maintenance of cooperation. *Proc. Roy. Soc.* **275**(1637) 871–878.
- Esses, V. M., L. M. Jackson, T. L. Armstrong. 1998. Intergroup competition and attitudes toward immigrants and immigration: An instrumental model of group conflict. *J. Soc. Issues* **54**(4) 699–724.
- Fehr, E., U. Fischbacher. 2004. Third-party punishment and social norms. *Evolution and Human Behav.* **25**(2) 63–87.
- Fehr, E., S. Gaechter. 2000. Cooperation and punishment in public goods experiments. *Amer. Econom. Rev.* **90**(4) 980–994.
- Fehr, E., K. Schmidt. 2003. Theories of fairness and reciprocity—Evidence and economic application. M. Dewatripont, L. P. Hansen, S. J. Turnovsky, eds. *Advances in Economics and Econometrics—8th World Congress, Econometric Society Monographs*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK, 208–257.
- Fershtman, C., U. Gneezy. 2001. Discrimination in a segmented society: An experimental approach. *Quart. J. Econom.* **116**(1) 351–377.
- Fischbacher, U., S. Gaechter. 2010. Social preferences, beliefs, and the dynamics of free riding in public goods experiments. *Amer. Econom. Rev.* **100**(1) 541–556.
- Fuster, A., S. Meier. 2010. Another hidden cost of incentives: The detrimental effect on norm enforcement. *Management Sci.* **56**(1) 57–70.
- Gaechter, S., E. Renner, M. Sefton. 2008. The long-run benefits of punishment. *Science* **322**(5907) 1510.
- Goette, L., D. Huffman, S. Meier. 2006. The impact of group membership on cooperation and norm enforcement: Evidence using random assignment to real social groups. *Amer. Econom. Rev.* **96**(2) 212–216.
- Goette, L., D. Huffman, S. Meier. 2012. The impact of social ties on group interactions: Evidence from minimal groups and randomly assigned real groups. *Amer. Econom. J.: Microeconomics* **4**(1) 101–115.
- Güth, W., R. Schmittberger, B. Schwarze. 1982. An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining. *J. Econom. Behav. Organ.* **3**(4) 367–388.
- Habyarimana, J., M. Humphreys, D. Posner, J. Weinstein. 2007. Why does ethnic diversity undermine public goods provision? *Amer. Political Sci. Rev.* **101**(04) 709–725.
- Halevy, N., G. Bornstein, L. Sagiv. 2008. "In-group love" and "out-group hate" as motives for individual participation in intergroup conflict: A new game paradigm. *Psych. Sci.* **19**(4) 405–411.
- Harbring, C., B. Irlenbusch. 2011. Sabotage in tournaments: Evidence from a laboratory experiment. *Management Sci.* **57**(4) 611–627.
- Henrich, J. 2004. Cultural group selection, coevolutionary processes and large-scale cooperation. *J. Econom. Behav. Organ.* **53**(1) 3–35.
- Herrmann, B., C. Thoeni, S. Gaechter. 2008. Antisocial punishment across societies. *Science* **319**(5868) 1362–1367.
- Hewstone, M., M. Rubin, H. Willis. 2002. Intergroup bias. *Annual Rev. Psych.* **53**(1) 575–604.
- Houser, D., E. Xiao, K. McCabe, V. Smith. 2008. When punishment fails: Research on sanctions, intentions, and non-cooperation. *Games Econom. Behav.* **62**(2) 509–532.
- Inzlicht, M., S. K. Kang. 2010. Stereotype threat spillover: How coping with threats to social identity affects aggression, eating, decision making, and attention. *J. Personality Soc. Psych.* **99**(3) 467–481.
- Jann, B. 2003. Old-boy network: Military service and professional success in civilian life in Switzerland. *Zeitschrift fuer Soziologie* **32**(2) 139–155.
- Kandel, E., E. P. Lazear. 1992. Peer pressure and partnerships. *J. Political Econom.* **100**(4) 801–817.
- Knez, M., D. Simester. 2001. Firm-wide incentives and mutual monitoring at Continental Airlines. *J. Labor Econom.* **19**(4) 743–772.
- Leider, S., M. Möbius, T. Rosenblat, Q.-A. Do. 2009. Directed altruism and enforced reciprocity in social networks. *Quart. J. Econom.* **124**(4) 1815–1851.
- MacLeod, W. B. 2007. Can contract theory explain social preferences? *Amer. Econom. Rev.* **97**(2) 187–192.
- Mas, A., E. Moretti. 2009. Peers at work. *Amer. Econom. Rev.* **99**(1) 112–145.
- Meier, S. 2007. A survey on economic theories and field evidence on pro-social behavior. B. S. Frey, A. Stutzer, eds. *Economics and Psychology: A Promising New Cross-Disciplinary Field*. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 51–88.
- Ostrom, E. 1990. *Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK.
- Posner, D. 2004. The political salience of cultural difference: Why Chewas and Tumbukas are allies in Zambia and adversaries in Malawi. *Amer. Political Sci. Rev.* **98**(4) 529–545.
- Sherif, M., O. J. Harvey, J. White, W. Hood, C. Sherif. 1961. *Intergroup Conflict and Cooperation: The Robbers Cave Experiment*. University of Oklahoma Book Exchange, Norman, OK.
- Sutter, M. 2009. Individual behavior and group membership: Comment. *Amer. Econom. Rev.* **99**(5) 2247–2257.
- Tajfel, H., M. Billig, R. Bundy, C. Flament. 1971. Social categorization and inter-group behavior. *Eur. J. Soc. Psych.* **1**(2) 149–177.
- Williamson, O. E., M. L. Wachter, J. E. Harris. 1975. Understanding the employment relation: The analysis of idiosyncratic exchange. *Bell J. Econom.* **6**(1) 250–278.