BANKING CRISES WITHOUT PANICS

Matthew Baron, Emil Verner, and Wei Xiong*

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Abstract

We examine historical banking crises through the lens of bank equity declines, which cover a broad sample of episodes of banking distress both with and without banking panics. To do this, we construct a new dataset on bank equity returns and narrative information on banking panics for 46 countries over the period of 1870–2016. We find that even in the absence of panics, large bank equity declines are associated with substantial credit contractions and output gaps. While panics are an important amplification mechanism, our results indicate that panics are not necessary for banking crises to have severe economic consequences. Furthermore, panics tend to be preceded by large bank equity declines, suggesting that panics are the result, rather than the cause, of earlier bank losses. We also use bank equity returns to uncover a number of forgotten historical banking crises and to create a banking crisis chronology that distinguishes between bank equity losses and panics.
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* Corresponding author: Matthew Baron, Johnson Graduate School of Management, Cornell University, 144 East Avenue, Ithaca, NY 14853, USA, telephone: (607) 255-8686, fax: (607) 254-4590, email: baron@cornell.edu.

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The severe economic distress faced by the world economy following the 2008 financial crisis has renewed interest in understanding the causes and consequences of banking crises. Academics and policy makers often emphasize panics among bank creditors as a key driver of banking crises. As highlighted by the classic theory of Diamond and Dybvig (1983), using short-term debt to finance long-term illiquid investments exposes even solvent banks to self-fulfilling panics. Consistent with this theory, Friedman and Schwartz (1963) argue that depositor panics played a central role in the severity of the Great Depression, and Bernanke (2018) attributes the unusual severity of the Great Recession primarily to the panics in funding and securitization markets after the collapse of Lehman Brothers. As a reflection of the influence of this panic-based view of banking crises, some have gone so far as to define banking crises as essentially banking panics (Schwartz 1987; Gorton 2014).

However, another strand of research on banking crises argues that policy makers should be concerned primarily by bank capital crunches driven by asset losses rather than banking panics per se (e.g., Calomiris and Mason 2003; Greenlaw et al. 2008; Admati and Hellwig 2014). This alternative view is motivated by an extensive literature that emphasizes bank equity as a key state variable that determines banks' capacity to intermediate funds from savers to firms and households (e.g., Holmström and Tirole (1997); Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010); He and Krishnamurthy (2013); Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014); Rampini and Viswanathan (2019)). According to these models, adverse shocks that impair bank equity may constrain banks' capacity to finance the economy, depressing output through a bank capital crunch. As a result, an important debate remains about whether banking panics are so essential to banking crises, or whether large bank losses even without panics can also translate into severe recessions.

In this paper, we take advantage of a large historical sample of bank equity returns to systematically examine the role of bank losses and panics in banking crises. Our conceptual definition of a banking crisis is an episode in which the banking sector's ability to intermediate funds is severely impaired. Since equity holders are the first to suffer losses from a banking crisis that damages banks' intermediation capacity, we assume that conceptually, a large bank equity decline is necessary for a banking crisis. By panics, we mean episodes of severe and sudden withdrawals of funding by bank creditors from a significant part of the banking system. We assume that panics are a subset of banking crises, as not all banking crises necessarily feature panics.

Large bank equity declines offer several advantages relative to the existing approaches to studying historical banking crises (e.g., Reinhart and Rogoff 2009; Laeven and Valencia 2013). First, bank equity returns provide an objective, real-time, and quantitative measure to map out historical periods of bank distress and are therefore not subject to lookback biases inherent in retrospective narrative approaches to identifying banking crises (Romer and Romer, 2017). Second, large declines in bank equity cover a broad sample of episodes of banking distress both with and without panics, as episodes without panics may be otherwise hard to detect due to the "quiet" nature of some such episodes of bank distress. Third, as bank equity has the lowest payoff priority among bank stakeholders, bank equity returns are sensitive to bank losses regardless of whether a bank is close to or far away from insolvency. Bank equity declines can thus serve as a continuous measure capturing early signs of banking crises for real-time policy making, in contrast to the information insensitivity of credit-market instruments prior to panics.[1] Fourth, the broad availability of bank equity returns across many countries going far back in time makes bank equity returns particularly appealing for studying historical crises.

We construct a new historical dataset of bank equity index returns for 46 advanced and emerging economies going back to 1870, built in large part from hand-collected individual bank stock price and dividend data from historical newspapers. We control for broader stock market conditions by also constructing new indexes for nonfinancial stocks over the same sample. Our dataset thus provides nearly 2,500 country-years of information on bank equities, nonfinancial equities, and macroeconomic variables. We also collect new information on the occurrence of events such as banking panics and widespread bank failures, backed by several hundred pages of narrative documentation. With this dataset of bank equity returns, we address the following research questions related to the aforementioned debate.

Are large bank equity declines associated with adverse macroeconomic consequences? We begin by examining whether bank equity index returns have predictive content for future macroeconomic dynamics, beyond the information contained in nonfinancial equities. We find that bank equity declines predict large and persistent declines in future real GDP and bank credit

[1] Panic-based runs tend to occur as discontinuous disruptions in credit markets. Bernanke (2018) provides a summary of credit market disruptions during the 2007–2008 U.S. financial crisis, highlighting that, as short-term credit-market instruments are by design information-insensitive during normal periods, it is difficult for policy makers to predict panic runs on these instruments and the economic consequences of such runs.

to the private sector. For example, a decline in bank equity of at least 30% predicts 3.4% lower real GDP and 5.7 percentage points lower bank credit-to-GDP after three years. The relation between bank equity returns and future output and credit growth is highly nonlinear: declines in bank equity predict future output and credit contraction, whereas increases in bank equity do not predict stronger economic performance. In contrast, while nonfinancial equity declines also separately predict lower GDP, they have no relation to subsequent bank credit-to-GDP. Large bank equity declines thus likely pick up episodes when output contracts in part due to troubles in the banking sector.[2] As further confirmation, we find that bank equity declines tend to capture other characteristics associated with banking crises, such as widespread bank failures, high rates of nonperforming loans, and government intervention in the banking sector.[3]

Are panics necessary for banking crises to have severe economic consequences? Bank equity returns allow us to address this central question, as large equity declines capture a sample of episodes of bank distress in which banks suffer large losses from the viewpoint of equity investors. Since large bank equity declines include episodes of banking sector distress both with and without banking panics, they allow us to separately examine the macroeconomic consequences of each type of episode. Banking crises without panics may occur when banks are undercapitalized and their ability to lend is severely impaired, even when panics by bank creditors are prevented, often due to a combination of regulatory forbearance, implicit creditor guarantees, and forceful government interventions.

To capture episodes of bank distress, we define a "bank equity crash" as an annual bank equity decline of over 30%. We then separate these bank equity crashes into panic versus non-panic episodes based on a systematic reading of the narrative evidence for each of these episodes. We define panics as episodes of severe and sudden withdrawals of funding by bank creditors from

[2] By using bank equity declines as a convenient measure of banking distress, our analysis provides broad evidence of the macroeconomic consequences of banking distress across time and countries, complementing previous studies that use cross-sectional variation in specific episodes to offer sharp identification of the macroeconomic consequences of banking distress (Peek and Rosengren 2000; Khwaja and Mian 2008; Amiti and Weinstein 2011; Puri, Rocholl, and Steffen 2011; Mehran and Thakor 2011; Chodorow-Reich 2014; and Huber 2018).

[3] As the bank equity index contains measurement error, it may not fully capture the capitalization of the entire banking sector in a country for two reasons. First, the bank equity index primarily covers large commercial banks and thus may not capture distress at private banks, regional banks, or nonbank financial institutions not included in the index. Second, the number of publicly traded banking institutions included in the index can be sparse in some countries and time periods, as shown in Online Appendix Table B1. Despite this measurement error, we show the bank equity index still has strong predictive power for macroeconomic outcomes and is useful for identifying periods of banking distress.

a significant part of the banking system, which could include withdrawals of funding from either insolvent banks or illiquid but fundamentally solvent banks. Our analysis finds that while bank equity crashes with panics tend to be followed by greater credit contractions and lower output growth, bank equity crashes without panics also predict substantial credit contractions and persistent output gaps. For example, even in the absence of any creditor panic, a decline in bank equity of at least 30% predicts that after three years, bank credit-to-GDP declines by 3.5% and real GDP declines by 2.7%. This finding suggests that in a large historical sample, panics are not necessary for banking sector distress to result in severe economic consequences.

While some non-panic bank equity crashes might be solely driven by equity market noise, we show that many are well-documented episodes in which the financial system suffered major losses and was undercapitalized; yet, strong regulatory forbearance, implicit government guarantees, or outright government intervention prevented panics from emerging among bank creditors. To stress their relevance, we highlight several prominent episodes of severe non-panic banking distress, including Canada during the Great Depression, Spain in 1977–1982, the U.S. in 1990–1992, Japan in 1990–1996 and 2001–2003, and several Eurozone countries in the years following the Eurozone Crisis—examples that are all associated with prolonged recessions and credit crunches. Our analysis thus motivates policy makers to broaden their policy interventions to cover not just panics on the banking system but also bank capital crunches even in the absence of panics.

If panics occur, do they tend to precipitate the crisis or occur after large declines in bank equity? Bank equity returns allow for precise analysis of the turning points of historical banking crises and the dynamics of how crises evolve, as understood in real-time by equity investors. If panics are driven by self-fulfilling shocks unrelated to bank fundamentals, panics would not be preceded by bank equity declines. On the other hand, evidence of bank equity declines preceding subsequent panics suggests panics are related to prior bank losses rather than non-fundamental runs causing bank losses.

Using monthly data covering over one hundred banking crises, we find that large bank equity declines tend to precede panics and credit spread spikes. On average, panics, as identified by narrative accounts, occur seven months *after* the bank equity index has already declined by 30%, suggesting that substantial bank losses are already present at the early stages of these crisis

episodes, as opposed to these losses being due to the subsequent panics. Furthermore, while credit spreads are relatively insensitive to these early losses, bank equity, which has the lowest payoff priority among bank stakeholders, is more sensitive to bank losses at the early stages of the crisis, highlighting bank equity declines as a useful crisis indicator for policy making in real-time.

Taken together, our findings paint a more complete picture of the roles played by bank equity declines and panics during banking crises: large bank equity declines tend to be followed by severe economic consequences even without panics; large bank equity declines precede panics; and panics with large bank equity declines tend to have the most severe credit contractions and output gaps.[4] These findings highlight panics as an amplification mechanism, albeit not a necessary condition for severe banking crises. Furthermore, these findings reinforce the importance of timely recapitalization of bank capital during early phases of banking distress, rather than having policy makers simply backstop liquidity, in order to prevent subsequent panics from erupting and to minimize adverse macroeconomic consequences.

Finally, as a byproduct of our analysis, we provide a refined chronology of banking crises that highlights both crises with banking panics and crises with bank equity losses but without panics. Prior chronologies of historical banking crises, e.g., Bordo et al. (2001), Caprio and Klingebiel (2003), Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2005), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009), Schularick and Taylor (2012), and Laeven and Valencia (2013), tend to be subjective in selecting banking crisis episodes (Romer and Romer, 2017) and often disagree with one another. We use information from bank equity returns, along with newly collected information on panics and widespread bank failures, to create a more systematic banking crisis chronology. As there is no single correct definition of a banking crisis, our goal is to provide one possible construction of clear-cut crisis episodes based on three systematic measures: bank equity losses, bank failures, and panics. Importantly, our approach also removes spurious episodes from the previous narrative-

[4] Our study thus complements the literature that links banking crises to prior credit booms, which tend to go bust due to bad lending, leaving banks vulnerable to future losses that lead to bank capital crunches or even panics. Specifically, the literature shows that credit booms predict a higher probability of banking crises (Schularick and Taylor 2012; Baron and Xiong 2017) and coincide with low credit spreads and an increase in debt issuance by riskier borrowers (Greenwood and Hanson 2013; Mian, Sufi, and Verner 2017; López-Salido, Stein, and Zakrajšek 2017; Krishnamurthy and Muir 2018). These findings highlight that elevated sentiment or overoptimism likely plays a central role in credit booms. Following a period of positive shocks, lenders may over-extrapolate recent low defaults and neglect downside risk, leading to the underpricing of risk during the credit boom and subsequent bank asset losses (Bordalo, Gennaioli, and Shleifer 2018; Greenwood, Hanson, and Jin 2019).

based banking crisis chronologies and helps to reconcile disagreements between them. With the help of large bank equity declines as a screening tool, we also uncover a number of "forgotten" historical banking crises that are confirmed by new narrative evidence.

Our paper is organized as follows. Section I describes our new historical dataset. Section II presents the results on the informativeness of bank equity returns for macroeconomic outcomes. Section III explores the macroeconomic implications of panics and non-panic bank distress episodes. Section IV compares the timing of bank equity declines, panics, and other indicators around banking crises, and Section V presents our new crisis chronology.

I. Data

This section describes how we gather and construct the historical database used in our analysis. We discuss, in turn, the following types of variables: bank and nonfinancial equity real total returns, bank and nonfinancial credit spreads, macroeconomic variables, and narrative-based banking crisis chronologies. All variables are annual (except those noted as monthly variables) and form an unbalanced country panel across 46 countries over the period of 1870–2016.[5] The Online Appendix contains further details on data sources and data construction beyond what is presented here, and Online Appendix Tables B2 through B4 provide a comprehensive summary by country of all data sources used to construct the main variables.

Annual bank and nonfinancial stock returns. We construct a new historical dataset on bank equity prices and dividends for 46 advanced and emerging economies going back to 1870. A practical advantage of bank equity returns to study crises is that bank equity price and dividend data are readily available for much of our sample. This abundance of data is due to the fact that, in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, bank stocks were highly prominent, featured in newspapers and traded as much as railroad stocks.[6] This contrasts with corporate bond and

[5] We exclude country-year observations during major wars because supply-side contractions and large government financing needs can lead to both macroeconomic contractions and banking sector losses, but these are not the typical banking distress episodes we want to consider. In particular, we drop all countries during the world wars (1914–1918 and 1939–1945), Colombia during 1899–1902, France and Germany in 1870, Greece during 1946–1949, Japan during 1894–1895, Korea during 1950–1953, Mexico during 1910–1920, South Africa during 1899–1902, and Spain during 1936–1938.

[6] In the period of 1870–1939, most of the major commercial banks in the countries in our sample were publicly traded joint stock banks—with the U.S. being the main exception, where banks were not widely traded until the mid-1920s. Private banks in this period were generally either merchant banks or mortgage banks, not commercial banks. We are

interbank lending spreads, as bond markets in many countries have only been developed in recent decades.[7]

For each country in the sample, we construct annual (as of December 31 of each year) price return and dividend return indexes for both bank and nonfinancial stocks. In this paper, all equity returns (unless otherwise noted) are expressed as *real total* returns of the country-level index. The price and dividend indexes in a given country may not necessarily correspond to the exact same underlying banks due to data availability, but they are either market-capitalization-weighted or price-weighted indexes of the broad domestic banking and nonfinancial sectors within each country.[8] Each of these series is pieced together from a variety of sources (documentation and source tables can be found in the Online Appendix).[9] We start by collecting premade bank equity indexes from Global Financial Data (mainly price indexes), Datastream (price and dividend indexes), and Baron and Xiong (2017) (newly constructed bank dividend indexes).

In addition to using premade indexes, we construct bank equity price and dividend indexes from individual bank and nonfinancial companies' stock prices and dividends. Our main source of new data on individual stocks is historical newspapers in each country. From these newspapers, we hand-collect prices and dividends on an annual basis for the closing price closest to December 31.[10]

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thus able to gather the stock prices and dividends of most large commercial banks in each country from historical newspapers during this period.

[7] In the postwar period, corporate bond markets mainly existed in the U.S. and the U.K., while in most non-Anglophone advanced economies, corporate bond markets were very limited or nonexistent until deregulation in the 1980s (as corporate credit was channeled mainly through the banking system). For example, there was only a *single* corporate bond trading in Denmark and Japan before the 1980s (that of Det Store Nordiske Telegrafselskab and Nippon Telegraph and Telephone, respectively). Even organized interbank markets are a relative recent phenomenon, with data becoming available for most countries starting in the 1990s. As a result, studies using credit spreads, such as Krishnamurthy and Muir (2018), analyze a more limited sample since they do not have corporate credit spread data for emerging market countries—or even for many advanced economies (Denmark, Italy, France, the Netherlands, and Switzerland) in the modern period.

[8] In price-weighted indexes, each stock is normalized to the same par value in the initial year. Its weight in subsequent years is then determined by past returns.

[9] The nonfinancial equity index is constructed to represent a diverse set of important and large companies, mainly covering the following industries: iron and steel, goods manufacturing, electrical equipment, textiles, chemicals, paper and pulp products, food suppliers and breweries, and retail. We exclude transportation stocks (railroads and shipping), commodity-related stocks (including mining), utilities, real estate companies, and foreign and colonial enterprises, due to their high exposure to international factors or to real estate.

[10] Online Appendix Figure A1 provides examples of historical newspapers used to construct our bank equity return data. To give a sense of the sheer number and diversity of historical sources we uncovered, we list the main ones here

Data on individual stock prices and dividends of banks and nonfinancial firms also come from several databases from Yale's International Center for Finance (gathered and made publicly available by William Goetzmann and Geert Rouwenhorst), including *Investor's Monthly Manual* data (1869–1934), New York Stock Exchange data (1800–1871), and St. Petersburg Stock Exchange data (1865–1917). Other data on individual stock and index returns are from a variety of additional sources including individual country studies and statistical yearbooks. We hand-collect additional dividend data for individual bank and nonfinancial stocks from *Moody's Bank & Finance Manuals* (1928–2000) and from individual financial statements of banks accessed at the Harvard Business Library's Historical Collections. We add the bank equity price returns and dividend returns to get bank equity total returns and then adjust by the CPI for each country to get bank equity real total returns. Online Appendix Figure A3 plots the distribution of bank and nonfinancial equity returns around banking crises defined by narrative-based approaches.

The bank equity returns data start around 1870 for advanced economies such as Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, New Zealand, Sweden, Switzerland, the U.K., and the U.S. and even for economies that are currently considered emerging markets, such as Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, Greece, Hong Kong, India, Mexico, Russia, and Ottoman Turkey. To assess the coverage of our bank index, Online Appendix Table B1 reports, for each country and decade, the number of underlying banks used to construct the bank equity return index, or, when premade indexes are available, the source of the premade index. The exact range of included banks varies across countries and historical periods due to historical data limitations. However, as can be seen both from Online Appendix Table B1 and the associated lists of individual constituent banks (linked to in the Online Appendix), the bank equity index generally contains a broad representation of the largest domestically chartered commercial banks mainly located in the country's financial center and covering a substantial share of the country's bank assets and

(the full list is available in Online Appendix Table B2): *Journal de Bruxelles* for Belgium (1868–1935); *Dagens Nyheder* for Denmark (1868–1909); *Le Temps* for France (1873–1939); *Berliner Borsen-Zeitung* and *Berliner Morgenpost* for Germany (1871–1933); *La Stampa* for Italy (1865–1934); *Japan Times* for Japan (1897–1915); *De Telegraaf* and *De Standaard* for the Netherlands (1875–1933); *Diario de Lisboa* for Portugal (1921–1990); the *Straits Times* for Singapore (19651980); *ABC* for Spain (1909–1965); and *Gazette de Lausanne*, *Journal de Genève*, *Le Temps*, and *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* for Switzerland (1852–1936). We also collect stock returns data from a variety of additional sources: Argentinian stock returns data (1900–1935) from Nakamura and Zarazaga (2001); Belgian stock returns data from the SCOB database (University of Antwerp, Belgium); Danish stock returns data (1911–1956) from *Denmark Statistical Yearbooks*; Finnish stock returns data (1911–1974) from Nyberg and Vaihekoski (2010); and Swedish stock returns data (1870–1901) from Waldenstrom (2014).

deposits. For many countries, our newly constructed bank equity index is based on underlying returns for at least five banks (and often more) and almost always the largest. It is important to note that the focus on large commercial banks in the country's financial center may lead the bank equity measure to underrepresent banking crises centered on smaller or provincial banks and fail to capture distress of private banks.

Monthly stock returns and credit spreads for banks and nonfinancials. To analyze the dynamics of how crises unfold, we focus on a newly constructed set of clearly identified banking crisis episodes, referred to as the BVX Crisis List and described in detail in Section V. We construct monthly series in a three-year window around each crisis episode for the following four variables: bank equity index returns, nonfinancial equity index returns, bank credit spreads, and nonfinancial corporate credit spreads. Due to historical data availability limitations, the monthly data are a smaller subset of the larger annual dataset on bank equity returns and cover 132 episodes.

The complete list of sources for monthly equity returns and credit spreads for each country is recorded in Online Appendix Table B3. For monthly bank and nonfinancial equity data for the period of 1980–2016, we mainly use country-level indexes from Datastream, which cover nearly all 46 countries. For the period of 1870–1979, due to the difficulty of hand-collecting monthly data from historical records, the monthly equity data are limited to fifteen countries (Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the U.K., and the U.S.) and three-year windows around banking crises. In this period, monthly bank and nonfinancial stock prices are transcribed from the historical newspapers listed above or obtained from other historical sources such as *Investor's Monthly Manual* and Global Financial Data (see Online Appendix Table B3 for details). Credit spreads mainly come from Global Financial Data or from newly transcribed historical statistics (again, see Online Appendix Table B3). Bank credit spreads are typically calculated from overnight interbank lending rates, while corporate credit spreads are from corporate bond yields. We subtract a short-term Treasury bill yield (typically three-month maturity) to get the bank credit spread and a long-term Treasury bond yield (typically ten-year maturity) to get the corporate credit spread.

Macroeconomic variables. To construct real GDP growth, we obtain annual data for each country on nominal or real GDP and the consumer price index (CPI) from the Maddison database, the Jordà-Schularick-Taylor macro-history database, Global Financial Data, and the OECD, IMF,

and World Bank datasets. The same CPI used to deflate returns is used to obtain real GDP. Data on bank credit-to-GDP come mainly from the Jordà-Schularick-Taylor database (which goes back to 1870 but only for 17 countries) and from the BIS long credit series for other countries. We supplement these existing datasets on bank credit-to-GDP with newly transcribed data from: (i) IMF print statistical manuals from the 1940s and 1950s, and (ii) "League of Nations: Money and Banking Statistics" volumes from 1925 to 1939. These new data allow us to form aggregate bank credit-to-GDP series going back at least to 1918 for nearly all the countries in our sample and back to 1870 for a subset of those. The complete list of sources for each variable is recorded in Online Appendix Table B4.

Narrative accounts of crises. To compare the information contained in bank equity declines with the information content from narrative-based approaches, we construct a list of "Narrative Crises," defined as the union of all banking crises from six prominent papers: Bordo et al. (2001), Caprio and Klingebiel (2003), Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2005), Laeven and Valencia (2013), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009, online update 2014), and Schularick and Taylor (2012, online update 2017). Online Appendix Table A1 reports the Narrative Crisis list. We define the "Narrative Crisis year" as the earliest reported starting year of each banking crisis across the six papers.

Online Appendix Table A2 reports a new database documenting episodes of panics and widespread bank failures. This database also collects the starting month of each panic, as indicated by narrative sources. Links to our extensive historical documentation on episodes of panics and widespread bank failures can be found in Online Appendix Section I.B.

The BVX Crisis List. We systematically combine information on large bank equity declines with a new database of episodes of panics and widespread bank failures to create a chronology of historical banking crises, which we refer to as the BVX Crisis List. Section V discusses how we construct the new chronology.

II. Bank Equity Declines and Future Macroeconomic Dynamics

In this section, we examine the predictive power of large bank equity declines for subsequent economic outcomes such as real GDP and bank credit-to-GDP, without being concerned by whether banking panics accompany these declines. By showing that large bank equity declines tend to precede severe economic outcomes, this analysis serves to establish that bank equity declines are not simply equity market noise and instead carry important information. It thus highlights the relevance of bank capital crunches in a long and broad macroeconomic sample and justifies the use of large bank equity declines to analyze banking crises.

II.A. Real GDP and Credit Dynamics Around Bank Equity Crashes

As an initial exploration of the data, we start by examining how real GDP and bank credit-to-GDP evolve around bank equity crashes compared to times without crashes. Our definition of a "bank equity crash" is an annual bank equity decline of more than 30%. In our full sample, there are 262 country-years with a 30% bank equity crash and 212 when we restrict the sample to observations with non-missing GDP growth, credit-to-GDP, and nonfinancial equity returns.[11]

Figure I presents an event study around these bank equity crashes. We compute the average cumulative change in log real GDP and credit-to-GDP around bank equity crashes relative to five years before the crash. Year $t = 0$ is defined as the year of the bank equity crash. For reference, we also plot the average dynamics around normal times, defined as years without a crash. Panel A in Figure I shows that, in the years leading up to a bank equity crash, GDP growth is similar to growth in normal times. However, in the year after the crash, growth slows sharply, opening an output gap of 4%, which persists even five years after the crash.

In contrast to real GDP, credit-to-GDP expands rapidly in the run-up to bank equity crashes. On average, credit-to-GDP expands by 8.4 percentage points in the five years preceding a crash, relative to 5.1 percentage points during other periods. This pattern is consistent with the evidence in Baron and Xiong (2017) that credit expansions predict bank equity crashes and shows that this result holds for a broader and longer sample. After the crash in bank equity, credit-to-

[11] We define a "bank equity crash" as a 30% decline in a *single* year based on annual data and use this indicator in all specifications in Sections II and III. However, for the construction of the BVX Crisis List in Section V and for identifying panics and widespread bank failures in Online Appendix Table A2, we expand the sample of episodes to include all 30% *cumulative* declines in bank equity (a set which, by definition, encompasses all 30% annual declines).

GDP stops expanding and starts declining. This event study thus provides preliminary evidence that bank equity crashes are preceded by credit booms and followed by contractions in output and bank credit-to-GDP.

II.B. Bank Equity Declines and Future GDP Growth

We next examine the predictability of large bank equity declines for subsequent GDP growth more formally. To flexibly estimate such predictability and explore potential nonlinearities, we estimate the following Jordà (2005) local projection specification for horizons $h = 1, \ldots, 6$:

$$\Delta_{\mathrm{h}} y_{i,t+h} = \alpha_i^h + \sum_j \beta_j^h \, 1[r_{i,t}^B \in B_j] + \sum_j \delta_j^h \, 1[r_{i,t}^N \in B_j] + \Gamma^{\mathrm{h}} X_{i,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t}^h, \quad (1)$$

where $\Delta_{\mathrm{h}} y_{i,t+h}$ is real GDP growth from year t to $t+h$, α_i^h is a country fixed effect, and $1[r_{i,t}^B \in B_j]$ is an indicator variable for whether the bank equity return in year t is within a range defined by bin B_j. The indicator $1[r_{i,t}^N \in B_j]$ is similarly defined but for nonfinancial equity returns. To examine the predictability across the full distribution of returns, we include eight evenly spaced bins, B_j, for both bank and nonfinancial returns: less than −45%, −45% to −30%, −30% to −15%, −15% to 0%, 0% to 15%, 15% to 30%, 30% to 45%, and greater than 45%. The omitted bin is the 0% to 15% range, which we think of as returns during "normal" times. Relative to the traditional vector autoregression framework, the advantage of the local projection method is that it is robust to misspecification and allows for the estimation of nonlinearities and state-dependent responses, as argued by Jordà (2005).

Equation (1) controls for contemporaneous (i.e. $t-1$ to t) and lagged real GDP growth and the bank credit-to-GDP change, as well as lags of the bank and nonfinancial equity return bins, captured by $X_{i,t}$. We include three annual lags for all variables, but the results are not sensitive to the lag length. Our baseline specification does not include year fixed effects to exploit time series variation within countries, but year fixed effects are included in robustness tests. Standard errors are double-clustered on country and year, which corrects for serial correlation in $\varepsilon_{i,t}^h$ that mechanically arises from overlapping observations at horizons $h > 1$ and residual correlation across countries induced by common shocks.[12]

[12] In our sample, we find that double-clustered standard errors are generally similar or slightly more conservative than Driscoll and Kraay (1998) standard errors.

The key parameters of interest are the sequence of local projection impulse responses $\{\beta_j^h\}$ for each bin j, which capture the predictive power of bank equity returns after controlling for nonfinancial returns and current and lagged economic conditions. Note that after controlling for contemporaneous nonfinancial returns, bank equity declines reflect shocks from two sources. First, they may reflect banks' loan losses in the current period. Second, as equity prices are forward-looking, they may also reflect the stock market's anticipation of banks' losses in future periods. Thus, the impulse responses capture not only the impact of banks' current losses on the broad economy, as a result of banks' reduced capacity to lend to firms and households, but also the anticipated interactions between future economic downturns and future bank losses. For the purpose of our analysis, it is not particularly important to isolate these two effects.[13] Bank equity is probably also informative for reasons other than a banking channel: for example, bank equity declines may also reflect the macroeconomic consequences of household balance sheet distress, as households are on the other side of bank lending.

The left plot in Figure II, Panel A depicts the cumulative response of real GDP to bank equity return innovations. Relative to "normal times" (0% to 15% returns), declines in bank equity of greater than 45% predict 3.6% lower output after three years. Note that Equation (1) simultaneously estimates the responses to changes of both bank and nonfinancial equities, so that the response plotted on the left side of Panel A is the additional response to bank equity returns over and above the response to nonfinancial equity returns (which is plotted on the right side of the panel). This negative effect is persistent, translating into a permanent loss in output after six years of about 3%. More moderate but still substantial shocks of −30% to −45% are followed by 2.5% lower output after three years, with some subsequent recovery. In contrast, smaller negative shocks of −15% to 0% and positive shocks lead to weaker effects on future GDP.

The strong impact of large *negative* bank equity returns but weaker impact of *positive* returns provides evidence that shocks to bank equity have nonlinear predictive content for the real

[13] A more nuanced question is why bank equity declines contain information content about the broad economy not captured by contemporaneous nonfinancial equity returns, which are supposed to reflect all information available about nonfinancial sectors. We can think of at least two possible mechanisms. First, banks tend to provide credit to households and small firms, which are not be fully represented by equity returns of nonfinancial firms. Second, stock market participants may not immediately recognize the full consequences of banking sector losses for the broad economy. The finance literature has offered extensive evidence that stock prices may often underreact to public information. For example, Baron and Xiong (2017) show that stock prices do not fully reflect risks brought by banks' credit expansions.

economy. This nonlinear relationship between bank equity distress and output growth is consistent with models of constrained intermediaries such as He and Krishnamurthy (2013) and highlights the advantage of bank equity returns as a continuous measure of banking sector distress. Interestingly, Romer and Romer (2017) find no evidence of nonlinearity between a continuous narrative measure of financial distress and subsequent output, while Adrian et al. (2019) find evidence of asymmetry in the response of GDP growth to financial conditions in U.S. data.

The right plot in Figure II, Panel A shows the GDP response to nonfinancial equity shocks. Unsurprisingly, larger declines in nonfinancial equity predict lower subsequent output. In contrast to bank equity returns, there is less evidence of nonlinearity in the predictive power of nonfinancial equity returns. The ability of nonfinancial equity returns to predict future GDP growth is consistent with Stock and Watson (2003) and justifies nonfinancial equity returns as a suitable control for shocks to the broad economy.

Table I presents the tabular version of Figure II at the one- and three-year ahead horizons. For expositional purposes, we replace the eight return bins with an indicator variable for whether there is a bank equity crash, $1[r_{i,t}^{B} \leq -30\%]$, which is defined by an annual return below −30%:[14]

$$\Delta_{\mathrm{h}} y_{i,t+h} = \alpha_i^h + \gamma_t^h + \beta^h 1[r_{i,t}^{B} \leq -30\%] + \delta^h 1[r_{i,t}^{N} \leq -30\%] + \Gamma^{\mathrm{h}} X_{i,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t}^h \quad . \qquad (2)$$

We report results with and without including our dynamic controls, as well as with and without including year fixed effects, γ_t^h. In Table I, Panel A, a bank equity crash of at least 30% is associated with a decline in real GDP of about 2.6% after one year (column (2)) and 3.4% after three years (column (5)). These estimated coefficients are statistically significant and largely similar to the estimates without controls (columns (1) and (4)). A crash of 30% in nonfinancial equity also predicts significant and persistently lower real output, and the magnitude is similar to the impact of a bank equity crash.

II.C. Bank Equity Declines and Future Bank Credit Growth

Why do bank equity declines predict lower future GDP growth, even controlling for nonfinancial equity returns? In this subsection, we show that the bank lending channel may play a key role. Figure II, Panel B presents estimates of Equation (1) with the change in bank credit-to-

[14] Table A3 presents the table version of Figure II with all eight return bins for the three-year forecast horizon.

GDP as the dependent variable. The left plot shows that, after six years, a bank equity decline of over 45% predicts a 12 percentage point decline in credit-to-GDP, controlling for nonfinancial equity. Declines of between 30% and 45% also predict sizeable credit contractions, amounting to a credit-to-GDP decline of 8 percentage points after six years. Table I, Panel B presents the tabular version of Figure II, Panel B using the 30% bank equity crash indicator. It shows that the decline in credit-to-GDP following a bank equity crash is statistically significant and robust to including controls.

Figure II, Panel B also shows that the response of credit-to-GDP to bank equity return shocks is highly nonlinear. Large declines in bank equity are followed by sharp credit contraction, but smaller declines (0% to −15%), and increases in bank equity are followed by muted changes in bank credit. This nonlinearity in credit growth is again consistent with models in which banks are financially constrained. Larger shocks to bank net wealth are more likely to force banks up against their capital constraint and therefore to contract the asset side of their balance sheet.

The right plot in Figure II, Panel B presents the credit-to-GDP response to nonfinancial equity shocks. There is a striking contrast between bank equity and nonfinancial equity shocks. Nonfinancial equity shocks have essentially no predictive content for future credit-to-GDP. Even large declines or increases in nonfinancial equity returns have no impact on the subsequent credit-to-GDP ratio. This sharp contrast provides one potential explanation for why bank equity shocks matter for future growth, even after we control for nonfinancials. Bank equity declines likely capture shocks to bank net wealth, which translate into a credit-supply contraction that may depress household consumption, corporate investment, and production.

II.D. Robustness, Subsamples, and Further Evidence on the Informativeness of Bank Equity

The strong relation between bank equity crashes and subsequent output and credit contraction is highly robust to alternative specifications. Online Appendix Figure A4 shows that the results in Figure II are quantitatively similar when including year fixed effects to control for global shocks. Online Appendix Figure A5 explores an alternative timing in which bank equity returns impact real GDP and credit-to-GDP in the same year. Since bank equity returns are correlated with contemporaneous GDP growth, this specification implies that bank equity crashes are associated with even larger output and credit contractions. Panel A in Online Appendix Figure

A6 shows that a simpler specification with just a single indicator variable for 30% bank equity crashes (as in Table I) predicts persistent output gaps and credit-to-GDP contraction. Panel B presents another alternative specification showing the responses to *continuous* innovations in bank and nonfinancial equity returns, rather than using indicator variables. This specification assumes a linear relation between innovations to returns and subsequent outcomes. Panel B shows that shocks to both bank equity and nonfinancial equity predict subsequent output growth. The right plot shows that only bank equity returns predict future credit-to-GDP. Online Appendix Table A4 shows that the nonlinear relation between bank equity returns and subsequent output and credit also emerges using a quadratic specification or separating positive and negative returns.

Online Appendix Figure A7 and Table A5 estimate the responses to 30% bank and nonfinancial equity crashes for various subsamples. Online Appendix Figure A7 Panel A excludes the Great Depression and Great Recession years. Specifically, we drop years 1927–1937 and 2005–2015 for all countries and find estimates similar to the full sample. Panel B focuses on the prewar sample and finds weaker relationships between bank equity crashes and both real GDP and credit-to-GDP. In contrast, Panel C shows that effects are stronger in the postwar period. The postwar results hold in the Bretton Woods Era (1946–1970, Panel D) and in recent decades (1971–2016, Panel E). The fact that bank equity crashes predict output declines and credit contraction during the Bretton Woods Era, a period without major banking crises according to narrative chronologies, suggests a role of bank equity distress outside of traditionally defined banking crises and even during normal recessions. We explore this point further in Section III. Online Appendix Figure A8 presents estimates for the U.S. only and finds qualitatively similar results, even when excluding the Great Depression and Great Recession years.[15]

In addition to having strong predictive power, large bank equity declines line up closely with existing narrative classifications of banking crises in terms of signal-to-noise properties. To explore the signal-to-noise properties of bank equity returns, Online Appendix Figure A2 shows that bank equity returns provide the best real-time signal of banking crises on the list of Narrative Crises identified by existing classifications, relative to a host of other variables including nonfinancial equity returns, credit spreads, and macroeconomic conditions. See the full discussion

[15] The episodes of 30% annual bank equity crashes for the U.S. capture the most serious episodes of banking distress, namely in 1907, 1930, 1931, 1937, 1974, 1990, 2007, and 2008.

in Online Appendix Section II.A. Specifically, bank equity declines best *coincide* with Narrative Crises identified in terms of the signal-to-noise ratio (i.e. a higher "true positive" rate for a given "false positive" rate) relative to all the other indicators. In particular, 57% of Narrative Crises involve a bank equity crash of at least 30% in the year of the crisis or in adjacent years. This further validates large bank equity declines as a reasonable measure of banking distress.

As a final test to illustrate the information content of bank equity returns, we focus on the predictive content of bank equity declines *conditional* on Narrative Crisis episodes. Online Appendix Table A6 shows that the magnitude of the peak-to-trough bank equity decline of each Narrative Crisis episode is associated with the magnitude of the decline in real GDP and with crisis characteristics such as the severity of deposit withdrawals, nonperforming loans, bank failures, and the likelihood of various forms of government interventions to support the banking sector. General declines in equity markets do not drive these findings, as these findings also hold, albeit not as strongly, when using bank returns in excess of nonfinancial equity returns, as reported in Online Appendix Table A7. See the full discussion in Online Appendix Section IV. These facts confirm that bank equity returns capture the salient features of banking crises and motivate their use in identifying a broad sample of episodes of banking sector distress, as well as in refining banking crisis chronologies.

III. Banking Crises Without Panics

The global financial crisis and Great Recession rekindled a discussion about the role of panics in banking crises. Bernanke (2018), for example, argues that the unusual depth and severity of the Great Recession was caused by the panics in funding and securitization markets that occurred in the fall of 2008 after the collapse of Lehman Brothers, which led to a sharp contraction in credit supply. He argues that distressed bank and nonfinancial private sector balance sheets alone would not have precipitated such a sharp decline in output. The central role attributed to panics in banking crises has a longstanding theoretical underpinning. In the classic model of Diamond and Dybvig (1983), a panic occurs in the form of self-fulfilling multiple equilibria and leads depositors to withdraw demand deposits, a type of short-term debt, from a fundamentally

solvent but illiquid bank.[16] The coordination problem among short-term debt holders may also exacerbate negative fundamental shocks to banks and nonbank financial institutions (e.g., Goldstein and Pauzner 2005; He and Xiong 2012). On the other hand, theories of the bank lending channel, for example, Holmström and Tirole (1997), highlight that a bank capital crunch may itself lead to a contraction in credit supply that depresses consumption and investment, even without a panic. In this section, we use bank equity declines to compare the macroeconomic consequences of banking distress with and without panics.

From a conceptual standpoint, bank equity crashes are likely to be necessary, but not sufficient, for banking panics to occur. Panics lead to bank failures and therefore to large losses for equity holders. However, not all bank equity crashes necessarily involve panics.[17] To capture episodes of bank distress with and without panics, we therefore systematically go through all 30% bank equity crashes, classifying each episode as a "panic" or "non-panic." In practice, however, there are also episodes with narrative evidence of panics but without bank equity crashes due to measurement error in the bank equity return index (see our discussion of this issue further below), so we also examine episodes on the list of Narrative Crises and code whether they involved a banking panic. Online Appendix Table A2 provides a summary of our classification. We research each individual episode, drawing both on standard narrative accounts of crises and new narrative sources (e.g., newspaper articles, research papers, IMF and governmental reports, first-hand accounts). Links to our systematic historical documentation for each episode regarding the presence or absence of panics can be found in Online Appendix Section I.B.

Following Calomiris and Gorton (1991) and Gorton and Huang (2003), we define a "panic" as an episode containing any of the following criteria appearing in narrative accounts: (i) severe and sudden depositor or creditor withdrawals at more than one of a country's largest banks or more than ten smaller banks, that lead these banks to be on the verge of collapse; (ii) severe and sudden strains in interbank lending markets; or (iii) severe and sudden foreign-currency capital outflows

[16] While financial systems include nonbank financial institutions and non-deposit funding, short-term debt remains the most important form of financing, due to its important advantages in disciplining borrowers in the presence of moral hazard, for example, Calomiris and Kahn (1991), and in alleviating adverse-selection problems in secondary markets, for example, Gorton and Pennacchi (1990) and Dang, Gorton and Holmström (2019).

[17] Historically, this is often due to a combination of implicit creditor guarantees, regulatory forbearance, and opacity regarding the extent of banking problems, lack of maturity mismatch (for example, long-term credit banks or European mortgage banks are often financed mainly through long-term debentures), and forceful government interventions, such as liquidity backstops and nationalizations/forced mergers of distressed banks before the occurrence of panics.

from the banking sector.[18,19] In short, we define a panic as an episode when banks experienced sudden salient funding pressures.[20] Our goal is to err on the side of being overly inclusive in calling episodes a panic and include all potential types of panics. By being overly inclusive, we ensure that the non-panic distress episodes that we are most interested in do not include any of these characteristics.

III.A. Bank Equity Declines With and Without Panics

To examine the consequences of banking sector distress by whether they coincide with a panic, we estimate a macroeconomic predictive regression similar to Equation (2), but now interact the 30% bank equity crash indicator, $1[r_{i,t}^{B} \leq -30\%]$, with an indicator for whether there is narrative evidence of a panic, $Panic_{i,t}$.[21] The specification we estimate is:

$$\Delta_{\mathrm{h}} y_{i,t+h} = \alpha_i^h + \beta_1^h 1[r_{i,t}^{B} \leq -30\%] + \beta_2^h Panic_{i,t} + \beta_3^h 1[r_{i,t}^{B} \leq -30\%] \times Panic_{i,t} +$$

[18] Our empirical mapping of panics is based on the definition of Gorton and Huang (2003), who, following Calomiris and Gorton (1991), define a banking panic "as an event in which bank debt holders (depositors) at many or even all banks in the banking system suddenly demand that their banks convert their debt claims into cash (at par) to such an extent that banks cannot jointly honor these demands and suspend convertibility. *Note that this definition excludes events in which a single bank faces a run, as a panic is a system-wide phenomenon. Also, cases where depositors seek to withdraw large amounts from the banking system, but banks can honor these withdrawals, are not 'panics,' although the banking system may shrink significantly*" [emphasis added].

[19] Our broad definition of a panic is motivated by the fact that traditional depositor runs are rare in modern banking crises and we thus want our definition of banking panics to be sufficiently broad enough to also capture modern banking panics. Furthermore, traditional runs are difficult to observe directly because banks do not generally report their funding status at daily or weekly frequencies, so we need other characteristics, such as sudden strains in interbank lending markets, to help infer the existence of panics among bank creditors.

[20] Empirically it is challenging to disentangle panic runs on solvent but illiquid banks due to strategic uncertainty and runs on insolvent banks. For our purpose, this distinction is not crucial, and we do not attempt it. Artavanis et al. (2019) examine large-scale depositor withdrawals in Greece and provide evidence that both fundamental and strategic uncertainty led to sharp increases in depositor withdrawals, with about two-thirds driven by fundamental uncertainty.

[21] Specifically, the indicator $Panic_{i,t}$ takes the value of 1 in the year of a bank equity crash if there is an associated panic according to Online Appendix Table A2. Note that in Online Appendix Table A2, the year of the bank equity crash (column (2)) may not be same as the year of the panic (column (6)), but the events are linked based on narrative sources documented in Online Appendix Section I.B. For example, Finland's bank equity crash in 1990 is coded as a "panic bank equity crash" based on the panic recorded in 1991. In addition, consecutive bank equity crashes associated with panics are also coded as panic years. In the example of Finland's crisis, 1991 and 1992 are also recorded as a "panic bank equity crash," since bank equity also declined by over 30% in each of those years. On the other hand, Germany's bank equity crash in 2011 is not considered a panic based on the "panic bank equity crash" in 2008 because those crashes were not successive, reflecting that these were two separate episodes. In all other times not near a crash, $Panic_{i,t}$ takes the value of 1 just in the year of the panic. The results are similar if $Panic_{i,t}$ is coded to take a value of 1 just in the year of the panic.

$$+\Gamma^{h} X_{i,t} + \varepsilon_{i,t}^{h}. \quad (3)$$

As in Equation (2), Equation (3) also includes a 30% nonfinancial equity crash indicator, along with the standard control variables (country fixed effects, three lags in the bank equity crash, nonfinancial equity crash, a panic indicator, and the panic indicator interacted with the equity crash measures, as well as contemporaneous and up to three-year lagged real GDP growth and change in credit-to-GDP). We emphasize that the estimation of Equation (3) does not provide causal evidence on the effects of panics. Instead, it provides the predicted path of output following a panic episode, as well as evidence about whether episodes of non-panic distress are also associated with subsequent downturns. Furthermore, as we define a panic based on narrative information, any selection bias in narrative accounts might inflate the subsequent downturns after panics but goes against finding substantial downturns after non-panic bank equity crashes.

Impulse responses of real GDP and bank credit-to-GDP are plotted in Figure III. The responses represent the impact of: (i) non-panic bank equity crash episodes, β_1^h, (109 observations in the estimation); (ii) panic episodes without a bank equity crash, β_2^h, (34 observations); and (iii) panic episodes with bank equity crashes, $\beta_1^h + \beta_2^h + \beta_3^h$, (67 observations). Figure III, Panel A shows that both panic and non-panic bank equity crashes predict lower subsequent output and credit contraction, although the magnitudes are stronger for panic episodes. The corresponding coefficient estimates at the *t+3* horizon are reported in Table II, Panel A. Non-panic bank equity crashes predict 2.7% lower output (column (2)) and 3.5% lower credit-to-GDP (column (5)) after three years, and the estimates are statistically significant at the 1% level. Episodes of panic bank equity crashes are associated with 4.6% lower output (column (2), sum of rows 1–3) and 8.9% lower credit-to-GDP (column (5), sum of rows 1–3) after three years.[22] While it is not surprising that panic episodes are worse, these estimates suggest that even non-panic bank equity crash episodes are associated with deep recessions and persistently tight credit conditions.

Bank equity crashes allow us to pick up periods of banking sector distress that are not associated with headline events such as a banking panic. However, one concern with Equation (3)

[22] For robustness, Online Appendix Figure A9 plots the full nonlinear specification for bank equity return (as in Figure II) but excluding all panic episodes. Online Appendix Figure A10 estimates the impact of episodes on the BVX Crisis List, a clear-cut list of banking crises constructed in Section V, distinguishing between panic and non-panic episodes. The results in Online Appendix Figures A9 and A10 reinforce the finding that bank equity distress outside of panic episodes is also associated with adverse macroeconomic performance.

is that some of the bank equity crashes may reflect equity market "noise" that is not associated with banking sector losses or other forms of impairment to the banking sector. That is, some of these banking crises without panics may not be banking crises at all, but simply equity market crashes due to sentiment.

To address this concern, we can further refine the set of bank distress episodes into those that also include narrative evidence of *widespread bank failures*. Observing widespread bank failures is likely a sufficient condition for impairment of the banking system's ability to intermediate credit. Widespread bank failure is defined as the failure of a top five (by assets) bank or of more than five banks above the normal rate of bank failures, associated with each bank distress episode in either the same year or following years, as documented in Online Appendix Section I.B. Widespread bank failures may still occur in the absence of panics due to orderly bank resolutions, for example, government-directed purchase and assumptions, nationalizations, restructurings, or judicial bankruptcies, all of which we consider bank failures. We again interact bank equity crash episodes conditional on widespread bank failures with the panic indicator and re-estimate Equation (3). Figure III, Panel B presents the results, which are also reported in Table II, Panel B. Once we condition on episodes of bank failures, bank equity crash episodes without panics are now as severe as episodes with panics. For example, three years after the start of a non-panic bank equity crash, real GDP is 5.0% lower (column (2)), compared to 4.8% for panic episodes (column (2), sum of rows 1–3). Over the same horizon, non-panic bank equity crashes predict a 7.5 percentage point decline in bank credit-to-GDP (column (5)), compared to 10.0 percentage points (column (5), sum of rows 1–3) for panic episodes.[23]

Figure III also analyzes the reverse case: panics without bank equity crashes. The impulse response for these episodes is not statistically or economically different from zero. Thus, panics without bank equity crashes are not associated with any adverse macroeconomic consequences.[24]

[23] One possibility, raised by the model of Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015), is that low output in non-panic bank equity crash episodes may partly reflect *anticipated* panics that do not materialize. Anticipated panics that do not occur ex-post can increase bank funding costs, reduce bank net worth, and decrease credit supply in their model. In some settings, explicit government guarantees for distressed banks, including state-owned banks, likely imply that creditors would assign close to zero probability of a panic occurring. In practice, it is difficult to ascertain whether bank creditors assign a positive probability of a panic in our non-panic bank equity crash episodes. Nevertheless, our results show that banking distress can be associated with adverse macroeconomic outcomes without the occurrence of a panic.

[24] Online Appendix Figure A11 addresses the concern that our conservative classification of panics introduces noise that biases down the estimate on the impact of panics without bank equity crashes. Online Appendix Figure A11 performs a similar analysis to Figure III but uses a finer classification of potential panic episodes. We distinguish

One may wonder how we can observe panics without bank equity crashes, given that we have argued that bank equity crashes are conceptually necessary for panics. In practice, measurement error can lead to observations of narrative accounts of bank panics that are not associated with bank equity crashes for at least two reasons. First, because our bank equity index primarily covers large commercial banks, our bank equity index may not reflect runs on private banks, regional banks, or nonbank financial institutions that are not captured by our bank equity index. Second, panics without bank equity crashes can also be episodes of short-lived panics, in which long-run bank solvency is not severely affected and bank equity thus recovers by the end of the year. As a result, one should not view these panics without bank equity crashes as non-fundamental panics but rather as episodes where the solvency concerns are not fully picked up by the bank equity index due to measurement error and other reasons. In fact, as Online Appendix Table A16 documents, nearly all the panics without bank equity crashes are associated with narrative evidence of bank solvency concerns, and there is almost no evidence of non-fundamentally driven runs over our 1870–2016 sample.[25] Nevertheless, the macroeconomic consequences of these events are mild, due to the less severe bank solvency concerns for the large commercial banks captured by the bank equity index.[26]

III.B. Examples of Non-Panic Bank Distress Episodes

Non-panic bank distress episodes have been quite common historically. From Online Appendix Table A2, we find that among Narrative Crises, 32.8% of these banking crises do not

between episodes with isolated creditor runs (which also include borderline episodes with inconclusive evidence as to whether a panic occurred) versus clear-cut panic episodes. Clear-cut panic episodes have the most severe consequences, but generally only if they are associated with bank equity crashes.

[25] To see this, Online Appendix Table A16 counts 47 such banking panic episodes without bank equity crashes. However, of these 47 episodes, 29 (62%) are due to likely bank equity measurement errors (either the banking panics were centered around small or regional banks and thus not captured by the bank equity index, or the bank equity index contains a very small number of banks for a given episode); 14 (30%) are "near misses," defined as episodes where the bank equity decline is between 20% and 30%; and two (4%) are triggered by the onset of wars. In addition to these 47 episodes, another 36 banking panic episodes that do not have bank equity data, which also presents a measurement problem. Only the remaining two (4%) episodes can *potentially* be considered non-fundamental panics (Japan in 1927 and Hong Kong in 1991, both of which were triggered by false rumors leading to widespread runs).

[26] Our finding on the negligible macroeconomic impact of panics without bank equity crashes is consistent with Calomiris (2000), who writes that most pre–Great Depression panics in the U.S. were driven by small fundamental shocks compared to those in modern crises, due to the absence of a proper lender of last resort, which created a lower threshold for bank losses to lead to panics. Calomiris (2000) argues that the macroeconomic consequences of these panics were generally mild, consistent with the smaller fundamental shocks, despite the "temporary confusion" of depositors.

feature panics. Online Appendix Figure A12 plots the frequency of banking crisis episodes (using the BVX Crisis List introduced in Section V) that are not associated with panics for each decade in our sample since the 1870s. In the nineteenth century, virtually all banking crises featured banking panics. By the interwar period, some crises did not involve banking panics, although most crises were associated with panics. In the postwar era, especially in the post–Bretton Woods period, the frequency of crises without panics increased. This increase over time may reflect the expanded role of government in financial regulation, including the gradual adoption of central banks with lender of last resort facilities, deposit insurance, and expanded fiscal capacity for regulatory forbearance. The twentieth century also witnessed a gradual increase in banking sector leverage (Jordà, Richter, Schularick, and Taylor 2017), which has increased bank vulnerability to losses.

We highlight several prominent episodes of Narrative Crises that do not feature panics. Our first example of non-panic bank distress is the initial stages of Japan's recent banking crisis (1991–1996). In this phase of Japan's crisis, most of the major banks were thought to be near insolvency following the crash in the Japanese real estate and stock market, but significant regulatory forbearance and perceptions of strong government guarantees to creditors forestalled a creditor panic. (In general, strong government guarantees characterize many episodes of "non-panic bank distress.") This situation lasted until the fall of 1997, when the collapse of two major securities firms and the Hokkaido Takushoku Bank led interbank markets to seize up, ushering in the panic phase of the crisis (1997–1998). The severe declines in bank equity experienced by Japanese banks also translated into contractions in lending and construction activity in U.S. markets with large penetration by subsidiaries of Japanese banks, highlighting that a cutback in credit supply had important real effects in this crisis (Peek and Rosengren 2000).

Other examples of Narrative Crises that did not feature panics include the following well-known historical banking crises: Sweden in 1921–1926, Spain in 1977–1982, Denmark in 1987–1992, and the U.S. in 1990–1992. For example, a number of studies argue that bank losses contributed to the severity of the 1990–1991 recession in the U.S., despite the absence of panics,

especially in the northeast region (Syron 1991; Bernanke and Lown 1991; Peek and Rosengren 1992; and Mian, Sufi, and Verner 2019).[27,28]

At the same time, we identify many other episodes of non-panic bank distress that were not previously identified by narrative-based approaches, including:

- Canada during the Great Depression. Despite the lack of a banking panic and only a single bank failure (Weyburn Security Bank), Kryzanowski and Roberts (1993) argue that the large and widespread bank losses in Canada, as reflected by the large fall in bank stock prices, in part explain the extreme macroeconomic severity of the Great Depression in Canada.[29]

- 1973–1975: Many countries experienced bank distress during the global downturn of 1973–1975, including Australia, Finland, France, Greece, Hong Kong, Ireland, Italy, Singapore, Switzerland, Turkey, and the U.S., all of which saw large drops in bank equity, both in absolute terms and relative to nonfinancial equity.[30,31] The recessions in these countries were relatively deep and prolonged compared to previous postwar recessions.

[27] For example, writing about the U.S. 1990–1991 recession, Syron (1991, p. 4) argues, "In substantial measure, this period of tight credit is the result of a loss of bank capital, rather than a loss of deposits."

[28] Although it is not included on our list of non-panic bank equity crash episodes because the bank equity decline is less than 30% in magnitude, the 1920–1921 period in the U.S., in which strong monetary contraction and the collapse of commodity prices and rural land prices induced waves of bank failures and a large aggregate credit contraction, is an important example too.

[29] Kryzanowski and Roberts (1993, p. 362) note that the large Canadian banks "were insolvent at market values and remained in business only due to the forbearance of regulators coupled with an implicit guarantee of all deposits," which were policies that had been held over from the Canadian banking crisis of 1923. They report that the largest Canadian bank at the time, the Bank of Montreal, had estimated nonperforming loans in excess of 40%.

[30] Among these non-panic episodes, the banking problems were perhaps the most severe in Australia, which saw a large real estate bust and numerous failures of building societies and small banks between 1974 and 1979 (Fitz-Gibbon and Gizycki, 2001). In Western Europe, countries faced balance-of-payment crises, which impacted the banking sector especially through large foreign exchange losses at banks and tight Eurodollar funding (Coombs, 1973). In particular, Germany's Herstatt Bank failed in 1974, and Germany's Westdeutsche Landesbank and Switzerland's UBS suffered large losses in foreign exchange markets (Schwartz, 1987). In Singapore, the Chung Khiaw Bank, then part of United Overseas Bank, was rumored to be close to bankruptcy.

[31] In the U.S. in particular, there were large aggregate bank losses, widespread symptoms of financial distress, and several prominent failures of large regional banks. Doyran (2016, p. 55) writes: "Although bank profits subsided in 1974 because of high interest rates and foreign competition, US banks were particularly hard hit by bad loan portfolios, poor regulatory oversight over foreign exchange transactions, inadequate capital (high loan/capital ratio), deficient internal controls and audit procedures, and aggressive expansion through the use of short-term borrowed funds, especially Eurodollar funds, money market CDs and federal funds. In early 1974, a tightened monetary policy surprised banks expecting eased interest rates. This led to short-term borrowing for large real estate projects as many large banks borrowed billions on a daily basis to collateralize short-term loans. When higher interest rates were

- 2002–2003: Several countries, including Germany, Greece, Israel, Italy, Japan, and Portugal, saw large drops in bank equity, both in absolute terms and relative to nonfinancial equity. In Germany, for example, according to the IMF's financial stability report in 2003, three out of the four largest German private commercial banks suffered major losses in 2002, and due to serious difficulties, a number of small and medium-sized institutions had to be merged, closed by regulators, or assisted. In Israel, banks suffered large credit losses, with the collapse of Trade Bank and large losses at Discount Bank. In Japan, which was still recovering from the banking crisis of the 1990s, new problem loans were disclosed across the banking sector; in particular, the government injected 2 trillion yen into Resona Bank, one of Japan's largest banks, which was effectively insolvent, and nationalized Ashikaga Bank, a large regional bank.

III.C. Quiet Crises

In this subsection, we ask whether large bank equity declines predict subsequent output and credit contractions even in the absence of narrative evidence of either banking panics or widespread bank failures. We refer to episodes of banking sector distress with neither panics nor narrative evidence of bank failures as "quiet crises." These quiet crises may reflect bank losses that do not translate into headline events such as panics or bank failures, but where losses nevertheless impair banks' ability to lend. During such quiet crises, several factors may forestall bank creditors from running on a bank, including government intervention that is kept hidden and the absence of other bank failures, which may give the impression to creditors that the health of the banking sector is sound. As a result, narrative-based approaches have difficulty detecting quiet crises, as acknowledged by Caprio and Klingebiel (1996, 2003). However, any losses experienced by a bank may still lead to tighter credit conditions.

Are quiet crises associated with negative macroeconomic consequences? We re-estimate Equation (1) but now exclude country-year observations within a ±3-year window around episodes with either a panic or widespread bank failure in Online Appendix Table A2. As before, we control for nonfinancial equity return indicators along with the standard control variables. Figure IV plots impulse responses from local projections for future real GDP and bank credit to GDP. As can be

announced, they suffered enormous losses. The concern over the effects of financial instability increased greatly as regulators reported substantial increases in the number of 'problem banks' under their supervision."

seen in this non-parametric specification, the magnitudes of the real GDP decline are nearly as large when excluding episodes with panics or bank failures as they are in the full sample (Figure II).[32] Thus, the predictive content of bank equity declines is not simply driven by episodes with panics or bank failures and reinforces the result that episodes of non-panic bank distress are associated with substantial macroeconomic consequences.

IV. Relative Timing of Bank Equity Crashes, Panics, and Other Indicators

The previous section showed that panics are not necessary for bank equity distress to be associated with output and credit contractions. However, panics can substantially amplify the consequences of banking sector distress. In this section, we examine the timing of bank equity crashes relative to the start of panics and other indicators. To do this, we use monthly data around banking crises on the BVX Crisis List, which is a list of clear-cut crisis episodes fully described in Section V, to provide an in-sample analysis of the relative timing of bank equity crashes, panics, credit spread spikes, and nonfinancial equity crashes. This analysis illustrates how bank equity returns can be useful in providing information on the timing and proximate causes of banking crises. Monthly data tell us about the turning points of crises and the dynamics of how crises evolve, as understood in real time by equity and debt investors, since even quarterly macroeconomic data is often not available for many crises far back in time. This higher-frequency information allows us to show that bank equity crashes usually precede panics and credit spread increases during these clear-cut banking crisis episodes.

The U.S. 2007–2008 banking crisis provides a vivid illustration of the key results, so we start with this case study before showing the results for a broad sample of crises. Figure V shows that, for the 2007–2008 U.S. crisis, bank equity declined substantially before the panic phase of the crisis, which we date as starting in September 2008. Bank equity also detected the impending crisis before credit spreads and nonfinancial equity. Bank equity peaked in January 2007, ten months before the nonfinancial index peak in October 2007; similarly, bank equity cumulatively fell 30% by February 2008, while nonfinancial equity did not do so until September 2008. Meanwhile, corporate spreads (the AAA-Govt and BAA-AAA spreads) and interbank lending spreads (the LIBOR-OIS spread), while moderately elevated starting in August 2007, remained

[32] Similarly, Online Appendix Table A8 shows that bank equity crashes also predict subsequent declines in output and credit-to-GDP outside of Narrative Crisis episodes.

under one percentage point relative to their precrisis troughs until the panic phase of the crisis in September 2008, a full 21 months after bank equity had started declining.[33] We will show in this section that these patterns also hold in other historical episodes on the BVX Crisis List.

IV.A. Bank Equity Crashes and Panics

Figure VI presents the dynamics of bank equity returns, relative to other financial market measures, systematically across all crises on the BVX Crisis List.[34] We focus on a three-year window around the crises on the BVX Crisis List and compute the average evolution of equity indexes and credit spreads. Time 0 in event time is defined as January of the BVX crisis year, and equity indexes (measured on the left axis) and credit spread measures (right axis) are normalized to zero in this month. In the same figure, we also plot the frequency distribution of panics, conditional on panics occurring, to provide a visual sense of whether panics tend to occur before or after large bank equity declines. The area under the panic frequency distribution is normalized to one. Panel A in Figure VI presents the average dynamics for the full sample, and the remaining panels present results for various subsamples.

We start by focusing on the relative timing of bank equity declines and panics. Figure VI shows that on average bank equity falls substantially before the panic phase of the crisis. Panics tend to occur during the crisis year (months 0 to 11 in event time), while bank equity generally peaks and starts to decline in the year prior to month 0 when the crisis is dated.

Table III, Panel A analyzes the timing of bank equity crashes and panics more formally. Column (1) computes the average number of months between the "bank equity crash" (defined here as when bank equity has declined cumulatively by 30% from its previous peak) and the month of the panic. For example, in the U.S. in 2008, the bank equity crash occurred in February, while the panic occurred in September, giving this episode a value of seven months. On average across

[33] Equity and bond prices for Lehman Brothers, whose failure precipitated the panic phase of the 2007–2008 crisis, display similar dynamics. Lehman Brothers' stock price saw a gradual but large decline of 67% relative to the S&P 500 from its peak in January 2008 to the week before its bankruptcy in September 2008. In contrast, returns on Lehman bonds were much more stable throughout the spring and summer of 2008. Relative to January 2008, the cumulative abnormal return on Lehman bonds was only −3% one week before its bankruptcy. Lehman bonds then fell sharply in the week leading up to its bankruptcy (Denison, Fleming, and Sarkar 2019).

[34] Online Appendix Figure A13 presents the same results across crises on the Narrative Crisis list, demonstrating that these results are robust to alternative banking crisis lists.

BVX Crisis List episodes with a panic, the panic occurs 7.5 months after the bank equity crash. Column (1) also reveals that in 74% (69 out of 93) of crises with panics for which we have data, the bank equity crash strictly precedes the panic. In contrast, panics occur before bank equity crashes in only 20% of cases (19 out of 93).[35] These point estimates are statistically significant based on a *p*-value calculated under the null hypothesis that the event "bank equity crash happens before the panic" is Bernoulli-distributed with a parameter of 0.50.[36]

Figure VII, Panel A presents the full distribution of bank equity declines from the previous peak to the month just prior to the panic for the sample of banking crises with panics, and Panel B plots the distribution of bank equity declines at the month strictly prior to the panic expressed as a percent of its total eventual peak-to-trough decline. On average across banking crises with panics, bank equity has sustained 55% of its total eventual peak-to-trough decline strictly before the panic occurs.

Overall, the evidence shows that panics, when they occur, tend to occur substantially after the crisis has been detected by bank equity and large losses have been realized by bank equity investors. This pattern therefore implies that a nontrivial proportion of bank losses are already present at the early stages of a crisis, before the panic, rather than being caused by the panic. Panics thus tend to represent the final, most extreme phase of a crisis that arises after substantial losses have been realized. This general pattern is less consistent with banking crises as unanticipated, non-fundamental panics (Diamond and Dybvig 1983) and lends support to theories that highlight panic bank runs as an amplification mechanism of initial bank losses due to negative fundamental shocks (Goldstein and Pauzner 2005; He and Xiong 2012).

Do bank equity crashes pick up crises before or after the crisis dates from previous narrative approaches? Table III, Panel A shows that bank equity crashes pick up banking crises 3.2 months before the Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) dates and 2.9 months before the *Narrative Crisis* dates (defined as the earliest date across the six narrative approaches). This calculation uses January as

[35] Gorton (1988) finds that panics in the U.S. National Banking Era (1863–1914) typically occurred a few months after NBER business cycle peaks. He argues these panics were due to systematic responses by depositors to changing perceptions of risk, based on the arrival of new information about a coming recession and resulting loan losses. Calomiris and Gorton (1991) also focus on panics in the U.S. National Banking Era and find that panics were preceded by sharp declines in stock prices and increases in corporate bankruptcies.

[36] Online Appendix Table A9 shows these results are robust to using the sample of episodes on the Narrative Crisis List, demonstrating that the result is not specific to the BVX Crisis List.

the starting month of each Narrative Crisis, as narrative chronologies usually only provide the year of the crisis, so this estimate is conservative. Given that narrative chronologies often date crises based on the year when the panic starts, this provides further support for the result that bank equity crashes precede panics. It also suggests that narrative accounts tend to date crises late. This result is consistent with Boyd, De Nicolo, and Rodionova (2019), who show that bank lending declines prior to the start of banking crises as dated by narrative approaches.

IV.B. Bank Equity Crashes and Credit Spread Spikes

What is the relationship between bank equity declines and credit spread increases? Policy makers tend to use disruptions in credit markets as indicators of panics by bank creditors. Credit spread spikes serve as our proxy of disruptions in credit markets. Figure VI shows that, in all subsamples of the data, bank equity falls by large amounts well ahead of the credit spread increases. Both interbank lending spreads and corporate credit spreads increase after the start of the crisis, while bank equity falls prior to the year of the crisis. The spike in credit spreads tends to coincide with panics, confirming that credit spread spikes proxy for panics. Because credit spreads are only available for a smaller subset of crises, Panel B in Figure VI presents the same event study for a consistent sample with non-missing equity measures and bank credit spreads. Panel B confirms that the difference in the timing of bank equity crashes and credit spread spikes is not driven by different underlying samples. The fact that bank equity falls first before the spike in credit spreads is consistent with credit market instruments having lower information sensitivity than bank equity because equity holders take first losses while creditors suffer losses only when banks approach default (Gorton and Pennachi 1990). This implies that while it is particularly difficult for policy makers to predict panic runs using information-insensitive short-term credit market instruments, bank equity declines can signal the risk of future panics, precisely because it is information-sensitive.

Table IV reinforces the evidence that bank equity tends to lead credit spreads by showing the distribution of credit spread increases conditional on bank equity falling by a certain amount. For example, Panel A shows that, by examining BVX Crisis List episodes, when bank equity first falls by more than 30% (row 3), the median credit spread is only elevated by 54 basis points (bps) relative to its precrisis trough. In more than 20% of cases, bank credit spreads have not increased at all at this point. Only in around 30% of cases has the bank credit spread increased by more than

1 percentage point. For reference, the median eventual trough-to-peak bank credit spread increase across BVX Crisis List episodes is 2.5 percentage points.

Panel B in Table IV presents the results for corporate credit spreads, rather than bank credit spreads.[37] Similar to the results in Panel A, when bank equity first falls by more than 30% (row 3), the median corporate credit spread increase is only elevated by 29 bps relative to its precrisis trough, and in over 30% of cases corporate credit spreads have not increased at all. For reference, the median eventual trough-to-peak corporate credit spread increase across BVX Crisis List episodes is 1.7 percentage points.[38]

Taken together, the analysis in this subsection shows that bank equity crashes tend to precede credit spread spikes, which motivates policy makers to pay more attention to bank equity declines in assessing the developing risk of an emerging banking crisis.

IV.C. Bank and Nonfinancial Equity Crashes

Figure VI also shows that bank equity tends to peak and decline earlier than nonfinancial equity during banking crises. Column (1) in Table III, Panel B confirms this result by showing that bank equity crashes precede similarly defined nonfinancial equity crashes by a statistically significant average of 1.94 months. Similarly, column (2) in Table III, Panel B shows that the bank equity index peaks 1.38 months before the nonfinancials index peaks. The fact that bank equity declines before nonfinancial equity suggests that many banking crises originate with shocks to specific segments of the economy to which banks have significant exposures (e.g., subprime exposure in 2008), rather than with broad macroeconomic shocks affecting the entire nonfinancial sector. Interestingly, Panels C and D in Figure VI show that the pattern that bank equity declines before nonfinancial equity holds mainly for post-WWII crises and advanced economies—and is often the opposite for prewar crises or emerging economies (see also Online Appendix Table A10).

[37] The finding that bank equity crashes tend to precede spikes in corporate credit spreads shows that the risk in bank loans is different from that in corporate bonds. This is consistent with the typical observation that banks tend to lend to small firms and households, while corporate bonds are usually only available to large firms.

[38] As a robustness check, Table III, Panel A compares the timing of 30% bank equity crashes to the timing of credit spreads spikes. We record a credit spread "spike" as the first month in which credit spreads increase at least 1 percentage point above their precrisis troughs. Since a 1 percentage point increase is somewhat arbitrary, we present this evidence as robustness analysis confirming the result in Figure VI. Nevertheless, Table III, Panel A shows that 30% bank equity crashes detect the crisis 3.4 months before a 1% spike in bank credit spreads (column (5)) and 4.3 months before a 1% spike in corporate credit spreads (column (7)).

This suggests that the initial causes of banking crises may have changed over time. More recent crises in advanced economies tend to start with distress to banks exposed to specific segments of the economy, such as real estate. In contrast, prewar banking crises may have been the result of broader macroeconomic shocks that only later translated into bank equity losses.

Figure VI, Panel A also reveals several additional facts about bank equity around banking crises. First, bank equity falls substantially more than nonfinancial equity conditional on a BVX banking crisis, even though bank equity has an unconditional market beta of 0.8 in our sample. Second, bank equity declines are "permanent," in the sense that they do not recover postcrisis, presumably reflecting permanent credit losses. In contrast, nonfinancial equity gradually recovers after the crisis. Third, bank equity declines tend to unfold gradually over several years, with an average peak-to-trough duration of 27.0 months (column (3) in Table III, Panel B). This slow decline could potentially reflect a behavioral bias of overoptimistic investors initially underestimating the true depth of the crisis (e.g., Gennaioli and Shleifer 2018), or, in a rational framework, the presence of informational frictions making it difficult for investors in real time to assess the extent of bank losses.

V. Forgotten Crises and the BVX Crisis List

Large bank equity declines allow us to screen out a broad set of episodes of banking distress with and without narrative evidence of panics. However, some bank equity crashes may be due to equity market sentiment unrelated to banking distress. For some in-sample studies of banking crises, such as the timing analysis on specific events in the previous section, it is useful to create a chronology of clear-cut banking crisis episodes, albeit at the expense of potentially selecting more severe episodes. This section provides details on constructing the BVX Crisis List, which uses bank equity returns along with narrative information on crises to refine existing chronologies of banking crises in a systematic way.

Existing chronologies identify banking crises based on narrative accounts of salient features such as bank runs, bank failures, and large-scale government interventions (e.g., Reinhart and Rogoff 2009; Schularick and Taylor 2012; Laeven and Valencia 2013). A drawback of existing chronologies is that they disagree with each other about which episodes should be regarded as banking crises. Table V highlights this disagreement in the case of Germany, while Online

Appendix Table A1 shows this disagreement arises for many countries.[39] This disagreement is due in part to a lack of a consistent definition as to which features constitute a banking crisis.[40] Moreover, existing narrative approaches do not provide quantitative measures of bank impairment to distinguish between minor versus major crises.

There is obviously no single correct definition of a banking crisis or list of crises. Our goal is to provide one possible construction of clear-cut crisis episodes based on systematic criteria emphasizing three dimensions: bank equity losses, bank failures, and panics. To construct the BVX Crisis List, we initially construct two non-mutually exclusive chronologies. The first is a chronology of "bank equity crises." We build this list by first selecting instances of cumulative 30% declines in bank equity, which are marked in Online Appendix Table A2 and indicate potential banking crises. As we have shown, bank equity has strong predictive power for macroeconomic consequences and a high signal-to-noise ratio in terms of detecting typical characteristics of banking crises and coinciding with Narrative Crises (as discussed in Section II.D). To avoid including episodes of bank equity declines purely due to equity market noise, we then only select the subset of these with narrative evidence of *widespread bank failures,* as indicated in Online Appendix Table A2. As in Section III.A, we define widespread bank failures as the failure of a top five (by assets) bank or more than five total banks failures above the normal rate of bank failures. The second is a chronology of "panic banking crises," based on the list of panics from Online Appendix Table A2. As discussed in Section III.A, one should not view "panic banking crises" that are not also "bank equity crises" as non-fundamental panics; in fact, as we argue in Section III.A, there is almost no evidence of non-fundamental panics over our 1870–2016 sample.

The union of these two overlapping sets is the BVX Crisis List, which we present in Table VI. The BVX Crisis List distinguishes between crises involving bank equity losses and those

[39] Jalil (2015) discusses this disagreement among narrative chronologies in the case of U.S. pre-1929 banking panics.

[40] Moreover, these approaches (with the exception of Laeven and Valencia 2013) have minimal historical documentation for each banking crisis episode, making it difficult for other researchers to reconcile these differences between approaches or even to assess the basic facts of what happened during each crisis. Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and Caprio and Klingebiel (2003) write only a few sentences about each crisis, while Bordo et al. (2001)'s database mainly presents macroeconomic variables. Schularick and Taylor (2012) do not provide publicly available documentation to support their chronology; in personal correspondence, the authors say their chronology is constructed by surveying country-specific experts in banking history in 17 countries. In contrast, we provide extensive historical documentation on episodes of panics and widespread bank failures in Online Appendix Section I.B.

involving panics (or both), emphasizing that banking crises take various forms. We date the start of each crisis as the year in which the bank equity index first falls more than 30% from its previous peak. In cases in which there is no cumulative 30% decline, we date the crisis based on narrative information. Table VI also lists the bank equity peak-to-trough real total return, based on annual data, as a measure of the severity of each banking crisis.[41,42]

Our new bank equity data allow us to uncover 27 newly identified crises not contained in previous narrative chronologies, which are marked with an asterisk in Table VI. While some of these are newly identified just because they are very recent episodes, for example, the 2011 Eurozone crises, others are "forgotten" historical crises that do not appear to have been known by the authors of the Narrative Crisis lists, such as the following examples.[43]

- Belgium in 1876. As reported by Grossman (2010): "[T]he boom in Belgium after the Franco-Prussian war led to the establishment of new banks. Several of these failed when the international crisis of 1873 arrived in Belgium. A few smaller banks went into receivership, and the larger Banque de Belgique, Banque de Bruxelles, and Banque Central Anversoise had to be re-organized. Durviaux (1947) calls this a serious crisis, while Chelpner (1943) suggests it may have been less serious." In this episode, the bank equity total return index declined by 37.4%.

- Japan in 1922. This episode is distinct from the Japanese banking crises of 1920 and 1923. Shizume (2012) writes: "Ishii Corporation, a lumber company engaged in speculative activities, went bankrupt at the end of February 1922, triggering bank runs in Kochi Prefecture (in the south-western part of Japan) and Kansai region (Osaka, Kyoto and their environs). Then, from October through December 1922, bank runs spread far across the

[41] With the new crisis starting dates based on 30% bank equity declines, our goal is to offer additional information about when markets first recognized substantial bank equity losses. Of course, there are reasons the prior narrative accounts date the starting year when they do. See Online Appendix Table A2 and Online Appendix Table A12 Panel A for a comparison with the Narrative Crisis dates, which in most cases are very similar. Also, on the BVX Crisis List, we occasionally combine several pairs of episodes occurring close together in time (see Online Appendix Table A12 Panel B), when it seems more appropriate to consider them as a single crisis, for example, when bank equity returns did not show two separate declines and when the narrative evidence on bank failures conveyed a continuous sequence of banking distress across time, not clustered into two phases.

[42] In Online Appendix Section VI.C and Figure A15, we use these crisis severity measures to analyze episodes from the global Great Depression, in which there is some debate about which countries experienced severe banking crises.

[43] They have not been forgotten by all banking crisis historians, as we collect narrative evidence on each of these episodes, as presented here.

country, from Kyushu (the westernmost part of Japan) to Kanto (Tokyo and its environs in eastern Japan). In 1922, operations were suspended at 15 banks, either permanently or temporarily. The Bank of Japan extended special loans to 20 banks from December 1922 to April 1923."

Online Appendix Table A11 lists the "removed banking crises," which include 53 episodes from the Narrative Crisis list that are not considered banking crises on the BVX Crisis List. Of the "removed banking crises," we mark a subset of them with an asterisk that we consider "spurious banking crises," defined as episodes that have few or no characteristics typically associated with banking crises and are likely the result of clear-cut typographical or historical errors on one of the Narrative Crisis chronologies.[44] As a concrete example, the BVX Crisis List omits Germany in 1977. For this episode, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) only report that "Giro institutions faced problems," although we could not find any independent verification from contemporaneous German- or English-language newspaper accounts of any unusual problems affecting the banking sector at the time, and the peak-to-trough bank equity decline was small (−11.7%). These errors are often perpetuated across studies that build on previous chronologies.[45] Bank equity declines thus provide an objective criterion to screen crisis episodes and remove episodes that feature little evidence of any of the features commonly associated with banking crises.

Table VII summarizes the properties of episodes on the BVX Crisis List. Column (1) shows that the average peak-to-trough bank equity decline in BVX Crises is 46.2%, and the average peak-to-trough decline in real GDP is 5.5%. Crises with a bank equity decline of greater than 30% display even larger declines in real GDP (column (2)). Columns (3) and (4) also provide summary statistics on the newly uncovered crises and removed crises. Column (3) shows that the newly identified crises display larger declines in bank equity and real GDP compared to the average for

[44] The documentation linked to in Online Appendix Section I.B traces many of the sources of these errors. One problem inherent in many older accounts of crises is that they use the terms "financial crisis" and "panic" to variously describe monetary crises, currency crises, sovereign debt crises, or even just stock market crashes, without being clear about what they are describing. These other types of financial crises often get conflated with banking crises in secondary sources that cite these original historical accounts.

[45] For example, Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) call Italy in 1935 a crisis because Bordo et al. (2001) consider it a crisis, because, in turn, Bernanke and James (1991) consider it a crisis, although it is unlikely that any banking crisis, however defined, started in 1935. In fact, the main banking crisis in Italy erupted in 1930 and by 1935, it was largely resolved (the entire banking sector had largely been nationalized). According to Italian government records, the only bank to fail in 1935 was Credito Marittimo, which had been nationalized years earlier and was only finally liquidated by the government in 1935.

all episodes on the BVX Crisis List (column (1)), suggesting that these added episodes are worthy of being considered crises. In contrast, column (4) shows that the removed episodes are considerably less severe, suggesting that some of these episodes may indeed be "spurious crises."

To assess potential biases of the narrative lists, we compare the BVX Crisis List with various narrative crisis lists. Online Appendix Figure A16 compares the macroeconomic consequences of BVX Crisis List episodes with those from Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and Laeven and Valencia (2013), and Online Appendix Table A13 compares these chronologies along various other dimensions. Compared to Reinhart and Rogoff's list of banking crises, for example, we find the consequences of the BVX Crisis List episodes are actually slightly *more* severe in terms of the decline in real GDP and credit-to-GDP.[46] These results are discussed in detail in Online Appendix Section VI.D. The fact that crises on the BVX Crisis List are on average more severe may be, in large part, due to the elimination of spurious crises.[47]

VI. Conclusion

By constructing a new historical dataset of bank equity returns for 46 countries going back to 1870, we document that large bank equity declines are a strong predictor of lower subsequent GDP growth and bank credit-to-GDP, even after controlling for nonfinancial equity returns. The relation between bank equity returns and subsequent macroeconomic outcomes is highly nonlinear, showing that bank equity is particularly informative about severe negative macroeconomic events involving a decline in intermediated credit. The informativeness of large declines in bank equity allows us to map out a broader sample of crises, including banking crises with and without panics. By separately examining these subsamples of crisis episodes, we find that while large bank equity declines coupled with narrative evidence of panics are followed by the

[46] Online Appendix Table A13, Panel B performs the same comparison with Laeven and Valencia's crisis chronology (on their time sample, 1970–2012). On average, BVX crisis episodes are slightly less severe than Laeven and Valencia's, perhaps because Laeven and Valencia only identify crises that are serious enough to warrant several forms of major government intervention. In unreported results we find that the BVX Crisis List episodes are more severe than Schularick and Taylor's (when compared to their sample of 14 countries) and Bordo et al.'s. As an alternative way to compare the accuracy of the BVX Crisis List and previous chronologies, Online Appendix Table A14 shows that a variety of crises indicators (real GDP growth, bank equity returns, and credit growth) line up more closely with the BVX Crisis List than with crises identified by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and Laeven and Valencia (2013).

[47] On the BVX Crisis List, we removed 44 events from Reinhart and Rogoff's list, and these removed events have an average GDP decline of −2.1%. Thus, this small average GDP decline from removed crises biases down the average severity of Reinhart and Rogoff's crises.

most severe macroeconomic downturns, episodes of non-panic banking distress also translate into prolonged output gaps and non-trivial credit contractions. Moreover, panics, when they do occur, tend to come after substantial bank equity declines, reflecting the fact that large current and expected future losses have already been realized by equity investors.

Our results suggest that the defining feature of a banking crisis is a bank capital crunch. These capital crunches often, though not always, lead bank creditors to run on bank debt, especially once large current and expected future losses have been realized and banks appear sufficiently undercapitalized. However, even when panics are averted, for example by implicit or explicit guarantees, an undercapitalized banking system is still unable to adequately service the economy. Thus, it is important for regulators to focus on bank capital adequacy during emerging crises, in addition to preventing funding pressures and outright panics. Furthermore, while credit spreads directly capture panic-like disruptions in credit markets, bank equity, by being more information-sensitive to banking sector health, may give more information about the state of the banking sector in the early stages of the crisis. Our evidence suggests that simple bank equity measures, in addition to credit expansion measures, provide useful real-time barometers of the health of the banking sector.

As a final caveat, we emphasize that while our results provide new insights into the roles of bank losses and panics, we cannot causally identify the role of bank losses and panics in depressing bank lending and output. Our episodes of large bank equity declines capture broad episodes of bank distress and output contraction, but these declines may in part be due to weak corporate and household balance sheets, beyond banking sector distress itself. We look forward to future work that attempts to disentangle the causal roles of the bank lending channel, banking panics, and nonfinancial balance sheet distress.

Johnson Graduate School of Management, Cornell University
MIT Sloan School of Management
Princeton University, CUHK Shenzhen and NBER

Supplementary Material

An Online Appendix for this article can be found at *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* online (qje.oxfordjournals.org).

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Figure I: Dynamics of Output and Credit Around Bank Equity Crashes

This figure presents the average dynamics of real GDP and credit-to-GDP around 30% bank equity crashes. Bank equity crashes are defined to occur in year $t = 0$. Each panel plots cumulative growth in a given variable from five years before a bank equity crash ($t = -5$) to five years after the crash ($t = 5$). For comparison, average dynamics around years with no crash are presented by the dashed line.

(A) Real GDP



(B) Credit-to-GDP



Figure II: Bank Equity Crashes Predict Output Gaps and Credit Contractions

This figure plots the predictive content of bank equity and nonfinancial equity returns for real GDP (Panel A) and bank credit-to-GDP (Panel B). The responses are estimated jointly using Equation (1), which includes eight bins of bank and nonfinancial equity returns to capture the predictive content across the return distribution. The specification controls for country fixed effects, contemporaneous real GDP growth and change in credit-to-GDP, and three lags of real GDP growth, change in credit-to-GDP, and bank and nonfinancial equity return bins. The responses to bank equity and nonfinancial equity returns are estimated jointly. The x-axis is time in years, and the y-axis is real GDP or bank credit-to-GDP relative to the omitted return bin (return between 0% and 15%).

(A) Real GDP response



(B) Credit-to-GDP response



Figure III: Banking Distress With and Without Banking Panics

This figure presents the response of real GDP and credit-to-GDP to bank equity crashes that coincide with panics, bank equity crashes without panics, and panics without bank equity crashes. The impulse responses are estimated from Equation (3). Panel A presents the results from the baseline specification. Panel B analyzes episodes with a bank equity crash *and* narrative evidence of widespread bank failures. The specification controls for country fixed effects, contemporaneous real GDP growth and change in credit-to-GDP, and three lags of real GDP growth, change in credit-to-GDP, and bank and nonfinancial equity return bins. The dotted lines represent 95% confidence intervals based on standard errors double-clustered on country and year.

(A) Baseline



(B) Conditioning on bank failures



Figure IV: Impact of Bank Equity Crashes Outside of Episodes with Either a Panic or Widespread Bank Failures

This figure shows that bank equity crashes predict output gaps and credit contraction even excluding episodes with narrative evidence of panics or widespread bank failures. Local projection impulse responses are estimated as in Figure II but exclude observations within a ±3-year window around a panic or an episode of widespread bank failures.

(A) Real GDP response



(B) Credit-to-GDP response



Figure V: Equity Returns and Credit Spreads Around the U.S. 2007–2008 Banking Crisis

This figure plots bank and nonfinancial equity total return indexes and credit spreads around the U.S. 2007–2008 banking crisis. The scale on the left corresponds to equity returns (which are normalized to 0 in January 2007), and the scale on the right corresponds to bond yield spreads.



Figure VI: Timing of Bank Equity Crashes Relative to Panics and Other Indicators

This figure compares the average evolution of monthly bank equity returns relative to a series of other indicators around BVX Crises. The other indicators are nonfinancial equity returns, bank credit spreads, corporate credit spreads, and the first month of a banking panic based on narrative accounts. Equity returns correspond to the left axis, and credit spreads correspond to the right axis. Equity indexes and credit spreads are normalized to 0 in event month 0, defined as January of the BVX crisis year. The curve representing the "start of panic" is a frequency plot of the first month of the banking panic based on narrative accounts. The "start of panic" curve corresponds to a third axis that we omit, but the area under this curve is one. Panel A presents results for the full sample, Panel B uses a sample where bank equity, nonfinancial equity, and bank credit spreads are all non-missing, and Panels C to E present results across subsamples.

(A) Full sample



(B) Consistent sample



(C) 1870–1939



(D) 1940–2016



(E) 1940–2006



Figure VII: Bank Equity Falls Substantially Before the Start of Banking Panics

This figure illustrates that bank equity falls substantially before a banking panic. Panel A shows the distribution of bank equity returns from its previous peak to the month strictly before a panic. The unit of observation is an episode in which a panic occurred and the month of the panic is known. Panel B is the bank equity decline from Panel A normalized by the eventual total peak-to-trough decline.

(A) Cumulative bank equity decline at the month before the panic



(B) As a percentage of total eventual peak-to-trough decline



Table I: Bank Equity Crashes Predict Output Gaps and Credit Contraction

This table shows that bank equity crashes predict lower subsequent real GDP and credit-to-GDP. The results are estimated using Equation (2). A bank (nonfinancial) equity crash is defined as a 30% decline in the bank (nonfinancial) equity real total return index from year $t-1$ to year t. Controls are contemporaneous real GDP growth and credit-to-GDP change, as well as three lags in the bank equity crash indicator, nonfinancial equity crash indicator, credit-to-GDP change, and real GDP growth. t-statistics in brackets are computed from standard errors double-clustered on country and year. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.

Panel A: Real GDP growth

	Real GDP growth$_{t,t+1}$			Real GDP growth$_{t,t+3}$		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Bank equity crash	-0.033***	-0.026***	-0.019***	-0.045***	-0.034***	-0.029***
	[-6.73]	[-6.38]	[-4.98]	[-5.92]	[-5.50]	[-5.84]
Nonfinancial equity crash	-0.023***	-0.022***	-0.010**	-0.031***	-0.029***	-0.023**
	[-3.80]	[-4.33]	[-2.32]	[-2.79]	[-3.07]	[-2.44]
Country fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls		✓	✓		✓	✓
Year fixed effects			✓			✓
Adj. R^2 (within)	0.11	0.19	0.09	0.05	0.11	0.07
N	2548	2548	2548	2548	2548	2548

Panel B: Credit-to-GDP change

	Credit-to-GDP change$_{t,t+1}$			Credit-to-GDP change$_{t,t+3}$		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Bank equity crash	-0.020***	-0.010*	-0.011*	-0.077***	-0.057***	-0.051***
	[-2.71]	[-1.72]	[-1.87]	[-4.75]	[-4.27]	[-3.72]
Nonfinancial equity crash	0.010**	0.0071	0.0031	0.0077	0.0035	-0.0038
	[2.26]	[1.56]	[0.69]	[0.73]	[0.25]	[-0.29]
Country fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls		✓	✓		✓	✓
Year fixed effects			✓			✓
Adj. R^2 (within)	0.01	0.22	0.21	0.03	0.14	0.13
N	2535	2535	2535	2535	2535	2535

Table II: Impact of Banking Distress With and Without Panics

This table presents the response of real GDP and credit-to-GDP to 30% bank equity crashes, distinguishing between 30% bank equity crashes that coincide with a banking panic and crashes that are not associated with a panic. The coefficients are estimated from Equation (3). Panel A presents the results from the baseline specification. Panel B defines episodes of banking sector distress as years with a 30% bank equity crash *and* narrative evidence of widespread bank failures ("Bank eq. crash and failures"). The specification controls for country fixed effects, contemporaneous real GDP growth and change in credit-to-GDP, and three lags of real GDP growth, change in credit-to-GDP, and all right-hand-side variables in the table. t-statistics in brackets are computed from standard errors double-clustered on country and year. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.

Panel A: Baseline

	Real GDP growth$_{t,t+3}$			Credit-GDP change$_{t,t+3}$		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Bank equity crash	-0.030***	-0.027***	-0.023***	-0.051***	-0.035**	-0.032***
	[-3.05]	[-3.57]	[-2.88]	[-3.36]	[-2.67]	[-2.71]
Panic	-0.017	0.0018	0.017	-0.018	0.00080	0.0014
	[-1.05]	[0.13]	[1.68]	[-0.96]	[0.041]	[0.069]
Bank equity crash × Panic	-0.025	-0.021	-0.034**	-0.053*	-0.055*	-0.051
	[-1.44]	[-1.41]	[-2.64]	[-1.74]	[-1.69]	[-1.62]
Nonfinancial equity crash	-0.030**	-0.028***	-0.024**	0.0098	0.0036	-0.0045
	[-2.60]	[-2.85]	[-2.36]	[0.86]	[0.27]	[-0.33]
Country fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls		✓	✓		✓	✓
Year fixed effects			✓			✓
Adj. R^2 (within)	0.05	0.11	0.07	0.03	0.15	0.13
N	2548	2548	2548	2536	2536	2536

Panel B: Conditioning on bank failures

	Real GDP growth$_{t,t+3}$			Credit-GDP change$_{t,t+3}$		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Bank eq. crash and failures	-0.062***	-0.050***	-0.039***	-0.099***	-0.075***	-0.074***
	[-5.54]	[-5.73]	[-5.41]	[-4.72]	[-3.39]	[-3.85]
Panic	-0.021	-0.00065	0.0064	-0.013	-0.0062	-0.0032
	[-1.39]	[-0.045]	[0.51]	[-0.79]	[-0.38]	[-0.19]
Bank eq. crash and failures × Panic	0.0091	0.0027	-0.0020	-0.017	-0.018	-0.017
	[0.47]	[0.16]	[-0.12]	[-0.48]	[-0.50]	[-0.46]
Nonfinancial equity crash	-0.037***	-0.036***	-0.029**	-0.0089	-0.0047	-0.0078
	[-3.45]	[-3.66]	[-2.67]	[-0.75]	[-0.42]	[-0.61]
Country fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls		✓	✓		✓	✓
Year fixed effects			✓			✓
Adj. R^2 (within)	0.06	0.11	0.07	0.03	0.16	0.15
N	2548	2548	2548	2536	2536	2536

Table III: Timing of Bank Equity Crashes Relative to Panics, Credit Spread Spikes, and Nonfinancial Equity Crashes

This table analyzes monthly data around BVX Crisis List episodes to compare the relative timing of various financial market indicators. Panel A compares the timing of 30% bank equity crashes with the panic start date, narrative crisis start dates, and credit spread spikes (i.e. the increase in credit spreads relative to their pre-crisis troughs). The time difference is positive if the bank equity crash is recorded before the other event and negative if after the event. Panel B, column (1) records the average time difference in months between detecting a 30% bank equity crash relative to a 30% nonfinancial equity crash. Column (2) records the average time difference in months between a bank equity peak and a nonfinancial equity peak. Column (3) records the average duration of a bank equity crash from peak to trough. For each column in all panels, a t-statistic is calculated under the null hypothesis that the average time difference is zero. As an alternative non-parametric test, we also count the number of episodes the bank equity crash is recorded first ("pos"), the other event is recorded first ("neg"), or both events are recorded in the same month ("zero"). We then calculate the fraction of times that the bank equity crash happens first ("pos / (pos + neg)") and calculate a p-value under the null hypothesis that the bank equity crash happening first is Bernoulli-distributed with a parameter of 0.50. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.

Panel A: Bank equity crashes detect the crisis before panics, narrative crisis dates, and credit spread spikes

	Before panic	Before Reinhart-Rogoff start dates	Before earliest narrative start dates	Before 2% spike in bank credit spread	Before 1% spike in bank credit spread	Before 2% spike in corp credit spread	Before 1% spike in corp credit spread
Average (in months, signed)	7.46***	3.20**	2.85**	6.18***	3.44**	8.84***	4.26*
t-stat	4.92	2.48	2.34	6.14	2.03	6.75	1.80
N	93	93	101	40	41	19	19
Pos	69	38	32	32	23	16	12
Zero	5	33	53	4	2	1	0
Neg	19	22	16	4	16	2	7
Pos / (Pos + Neg)	78.4%***	63.3%**	66.6%**	88.9%***	58.9%	88.9%***	63.2%
p-value	0.000	0.026	0.015	0.000	0.168	0.001	0.180

Panel B: Bank equity crashes pick up the crisis first before nonfinancial equity crashes

	Before nonfin. eq. crash	Bank equity peaks before nonfin. eq. peak	Duration of bank equity decline
Average (in months, signed)	1.94**	1.38**	26.97***
t-stat	2.44	2.14	23.95
N	127	139	141
Pos	65	57	Duration $\geq$ 24 mo. = 85 episodes
Zero	16	40	
Neg	46	42	Duration $<$ 24 mo. = 56 episodes
Pos / (Pos + Neg)	58.56%**	57.6%*	% Duration $\geq$ 24 mo. = 60.3%***
p-value	0.044	0.080	0.009

Table IV: Distribution of Credit Spreads Just After Bank Equity Crashes

This table presents the distribution of credit spreads (relative to prior troughs within the past five years) just after bank equity crashes around BVX Crisis List episodes. Each row presents the distribution of credit spreads in the month following a given decrease in bank stocks (relative to the previous bank stock peak). For example, the third row of Panel A reports the distribution of credit spreads when the bank equity index first falls by more than 30%. Panel A presents the analysis for bank credit spreads, and Panel B presents the analysis for corporate credit spreads.

Panel A: Distribution of bank credit spreads (relative to prior troughs) subsequent to bank equity crashes

	... bank credit spreads are elevated by (in percentage points):								
	10^{th} pctile	20^{th} pctile	30^{th} pctile	40^{th} pctile	50^{th} pctile	60^{th} pctile	70^{th} pctile	80^{th} pctile	90^{th} pctile
When banks stocks fall more than...									
-20%	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.29	0.52	0.69	0.98	1.14	5.46
-25%	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.36	0.52	0.69	0.98	1.14	5.46
-30%	0.00	0.00	0.29	0.44	0.54	0.78	0.99	2.27	9.23
-35%	0.00	0.00	0.36	0.52	0.68	0.99	1.33	2.88	12.65
-40%	0.00	0.29	0.52	0.63	0.85	1.29	2.27	3.26	48.68
-45%	0.00	0.36	0.55	0.68	0.86	1.33	2.27	3.26	48.68
-50%	0.10	0.49	0.62	0.85	1.23	2.01	2.81	6.64	64.71
-55%	0.29	0.59	0.85	1.10	1.35	2.50	3.26	6.49	37.49

Panel B: Distribution of corporate credit spreads (relative to prior troughs) subsequent to bank equity crashes

	... corporate credit spreads are elevated by (in percentage points):								
	10^{th} pctile	20^{th} pctile	30^{th} pctile	40^{th} pctile	50^{th} pctile	60^{th} pctile	70^{th} pctile	80^{th} pctile	90^{th} pctile
When banks stocks fall more than...									
-20%	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.42	0.92	1.19	2.27
-25%	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.25	0.42	0.92	1.19	2.27
-30%	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.19	0.29	0.73	1.25	1.57	2.27
-35%	0.00	0.00	0.02	0.23	0.37	0.86	1.35	1.59	2.51
-40%	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.32	0.45	0.96	1.41	1.61	3.00
-45%	0.00	0.00	0.31	0.36	0.63	1.06	1.45	1.64	3.30
-50%	0.00	0.00	0.31	0.36	0.63	1.06	1.45	1.64	3.23
-55%	0.00	0.00	0.30	0.35	0.45	1.19	1.49	2.99	4.78

Table V: Narrative-Based Banking Crises in Germany

This table illustrates disagreement among narrative-based chronologies regarding the occurrence of historical banking crises, focusing on the case of Germany (similar results hold for other countries, see Online Appendix Table A1). It lists the occurrence of banking crises according to six prominent papers. Years listed correspond to the starting year of the banking crisis, according to each paper. A "0" means that the source reports no banking crisis in a given year, while a blank cell means that the crisis is not covered in the sample period. Note that Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2005) focus on the period of 1980–2002 and do not report any crises for Germany during this period.

Reinhart Rogoff	Schularick Taylor	Laeven Valencia	Bordo	Caprio Klingebiel	Demirgüç-Kunt Detragiache
0	1873				
1880	0				
1891	1891		0		
1901	1901		1901		
0	1907		0		
1925	0		0		
1929	1931		1931		
1977	0	0	0	late 1970s	
2008	2008	2008		0	

Table VI: The BVX Crisis List

This table lists a chronology of banking crisis episodes, covering 46 countries over the period of 1870–2016, which we refer to as the BVX Crisis List. The BVX Crisis List is then divided into two (non-mutually exclusive) types of banking crisis episodes: those featuring a panic ("Panic banking crisis") and those featuring both a 30% bank equity crash *and* evidence of widespread bank failures ("Bank equity crisis"). Newly identified banking crises (i.e., those that did not previously appear on the Narrative Crises list) are marked with a "*". The column labeled "Bank equity return" reports the peak-to-trough real total return for each episode, which is computed as the maximum cumulative decline (based on annual data) in the bank equity real total return index relative to its previous peak. "0" indicates no decline in bank equity. A blank entry indicates a lack of bank equity return data for that episode.

Country	BVX starting year	Bank equity return	Panic banking crisis	Bank equity crisis	Country	BVX starting year	Bank equity return	Panic banking crisis	Bank equity crisis	Country	BVX starting year	Bank equity return	Panic banking crisis	Bank equity crisis
Argentina	1891	-0.307	1	1	Chile (cont.)	1914		1	0	Greece	1929	-0.727	1	1
	1914	-0.473	1	0		1925		1	1		2008	-0.671	1	0
	1930	-0.819	1	0		1931*	-0.356	1	1		2010*	-0.961	1	1
	1934	-0.563	1	1		1976	0	1	0	Hong Kong	1892*	-0.565	1	1
	1980		1	1		1982	-0.837	1	1		1965	-0.196	1	0
	1985		1	1	Colombia	1931*	-0.675	1	0		1982	-0.445	1	1
	1989		1	1		1982	-0.831	0	1		1991	-0.096	1	0
	1995	-0.305	1	1		1998	-0.813	1	1		1998	-0.464	1	1
	2000	-0.656	1	1	Czech	1923		1	1	Hungary	1873*	-0.518	1	1
Australia	1893	-0.469	1	1		1991		1	1		1931		1	1
	1931	-0.230	1	0		1995	-0.904	1	1		1991		0	1
	1989	-0.281	1	0	Denmark	1877	-0.207	1	0		1995*	-0.398	1	1
Austria	1873	-0.715	1	1		1885	-0.043	1	0		2008	-0.671	1	0
	1924	-0.344	0	1		1907	-0.269	1	0	Iceland	1920*	-0.535	1	1
	1931	-0.566	1	1		1919	-0.347	1	1		1930*	-0.359	1	1
	2008	-0.673	1	1		1992	-0.425	0	1		1985		0	1
	2011*	-0.509	0	1		2008	-0.739	1	1		1993		0	1
Belgium	1870	-0.018	1	0		2011*	-0.444	0	1		2008	-0.963	1	1
	1876*	-0.374	1	1	Egypt	1907	-0.132	1	0	India	1913	-0.249	1	0
	1883	-0.139	1	0		1914	-0.407	1	0		1920	-0.495	0	1
	1914		1	1		1931	-0.608	1	1		1993	-0.561	0	1
	1929	-0.831	1	1	Finland	1900		1	1	Indonesia	1990	-0.659	1	1
	1939	-0.511	1	1		1921	-0.569	0	1		1998	-0.88	1	1
	2008	-0.842	1	1		1931	-0.252	1	0	Ireland	2007	-0.918	1	1
	2011*	-0.755	0	1		1990	-0.814	1	1		2010*	-0.908	1	1
Brazil	1890	-0.275	1	0	France	1871		1	0	Israel	1983	-0.499	0	1
	1900	0	1	0		1882	-0.456	1	1	Italy	1873	-0.237	1	0
	1914	-0.374	1	0		1889	-0.106	1	0		1889	-0.348	1	1
	1929	-0.182	1	0		1914	-0.475	1	0		1891	-0.453	1	1
	1985		1	1		1930	-0.571	1	1		1907	-0.24	1	1
	1990		1	0		1937*	-0.435	1	0		1914	-0.333	1	1
	1994		1	1		2008	-0.64	1	0		1921	-0.55	1	1
Canada	1873	0	1	0	Germany	1874	-0.371	1	1		1930	-0.073	1	0
	1920	-0.426	1	1		1891	-0.23	1	0		1992	-0.397	0	1
	1982	-0.164	1	0		1901	-0.05	1	0		2008	-0.575	1	0
Chile	1878		1	1		1914		1	0		2011*	-0.601	0	1
	1898	-0.003	1	0		1930	-0.489	1	1		2016*	-0.304	0	1
	1907		1	1		2008	-0.728	1	1					

Table VI: The BVX Crisis List (cont.)

Country	BVX starting year	Bank equity return	Panic banking crisis	Bank equity crisis	Country	BVX starting year	Bank equity return	Panic banking crisis	Bank equity crisis	Country	BVX starting year	Bank equity return	Panic banking crisis	Bank equity crisis
Japan	1871		1	1	Peru	1876		1	1	Switzerland	1870	-0.418	1	0
	1882		1	1		1914*	-0.612	1	0		1914		1	0
	1890		1	1		1931*	-0.373	1	1		1919	-0.432	0	1
	1901	-0.221	1	0		1981	-0.980	0	1		1931	-0.559	1	1
	1907	-0.377	1	1		1998	-0.396	0	1		1990	-0.326	1	1
	1920	-0.405	1	1	Philippines	1971*	-0.781	1	0		2008	-0.676	1	0
	1922*	-0.405	1	1		1981	-0.719	1	1	Taiwan	1923		1	0
	1923	-0.157	1	1		1997	-0.687	0	1		1927		1	1
	1927	-0.168	1	0	Portugal	1876		1	1		1983		1	1
	1990	-0.546	0	1		1890		1	1		1995	-0.307	1	1
	1997	-0.605	1	1		1921	-0.643	1	1		1998	-0.557	0	1
	2001*	-0.808	0	1		1923	-0.684	1	1	Thailand	1979	-0.461	0	1
Korea	1997	-0.726	1	1		1931	-0.597	1	1		1983	0	1	0
Luxembourg	2008	-0.474	1	1		2008	-0.613	1	1		1997	-0.734	1	1
Malaysia	1985	-0.368	1	1		2011*	-0.725	0	1	Turkey	1914*	-0.654	1	1
	1997	-0.686	1	1		2014*	-0.800	0	1		1930	-0.719	1	1
Mexico	1883		1	1	Russia	1875	-0.188	1	0		1980	-0.409	1	1
	1893	-0.325	1	0		1900	-0.401	1	1		1991	-0.758	1	0
	1913	-0.596	1	1		1995		1	1		1994	-0.203	1	0
	1921		1	1		1998	-0.751	1	1		2001	-0.622	1	1
	1928	-0.839	1	1		2008	-0.723	1	1	U.K.	1878	-0.132	1	0
	1981		1	1	Singapore	(no crises)					1890	-0.128	1	0
	1994	-0.602	1	1	South Africa	1881	-0.27	1	0		1914		1	0
Netherlands	1907	-0.083	1	0		1890	-0.062	1	0		1973	-0.737	1	1
	1914	-0.093	1	0	Spain	1882	-0.349	1	1		1991	-0.147	1	0
	1921	-0.334	0	1		1890	-0.124	1	0		2008	-0.707	1	1
	1931*	-0.418	0	1		1913	-0.038	1	0	U.S.	1873	-0.172	1	0
	2008	-0.562	1	1		1920	-0.14	1	0		1884	0	1	0
New Zealand	1888	-0.549	1	1		1924	-0.222	1	0		1890	0	1	0
	1987	-0.892	1	1		1931	-0.336	1	1		1893	-0.29	1	0
Norway	1898		1	1		1975	-0.814	0	1		1907	-0.334	1	1
	1914		1	0		2008	-0.466	1	1		1930	-0.654	1	1
	1919	-0.71	1	1		2010*	-0.411	0	1		1984	-0.263	1	0
	1931	0	1	0	Sweden	1878		1	1		1990	-0.332	0	1
	1987	-0.464	1	1		1907	-0.135	1	0		2007	-0.676	1	1
	2008*	-0.670	1	0		1919	-0.395	0	1	Venezuela	1981	-0.34	1	1
						1991	-0.787	1	1		1992	-0.839	1	1
						2008	-0.519	1	1		2008	-0.614	1	1

Table VII: BVX Crisis List Summary Statistics

This table reports average outcomes for episodes on the BVX Crisis List, BVX Crisis List episodes having a bank equity decline of more than 30%, newly uncovered banking crises on the BVX Crisis List, and episodes that are recorded as crises on the list of Narrative Crises but that do not appear on the BVX Crisis List ("Removed crises"). The variables *abnormal bank equity decline*, *bank market cap decline*, etc. are defined in Online Appendix Sections I.C and IV.

	BVX Crisis List		BVX Crisis List (Bank equity decline > 30%)		Newly uncovered crises		Removed crises	
Bank equity decline	-0.462	(N=183)	-0.610	(N=119)	-0.550	(N=27)	-0.116	(N=47)
Abnormal bank equity decline	-0.344	(N=170)	-0.437	(N=105)	-0.329	(N=22)	-0.180	(N=45)
Bank market cap decline	-0.416	(N=79)	-0.534	(N=55)	-0.536	(N=13)	-0.116	(N=23)
Real GDP decline (pk to tr)	-0.055	(N=210)	-0.063	(N=115)	-0.082	(N=30)	-0.021	(N=54)
Real GDP growth decline (pk to tr)	-0.085	(N=209)	-0.091	(N=114)	-0.085	(N=29)	-0.057	(N=54)
Real GDP growth (max dev from trend)	-0.060	(N=210)	-0.066	(N=117)	-0.072	(N=30)	-0.036	(N=54)
Failed banks (% of total bank assets)	0.296	(N=66)	0.317	(N=47)	0.322	(N=1)	0.060	(N=11)
NPL at peak	0.171	(N=79)	0.170	(N=61)	0.188	(N=9)	0.054	(N=8)
Decline in deposits (prewar only)	-0.196	(N=49)	-0.209	(N=24)	-0.143	(N=3)	-0.051	(N=18)
Significant liability guarantees	0.561	(N=148)	0.638	(N=94)	0.545	(N=22)	0.357	(N=28)
Significant liquidity support	0.761	(N=159)	0.827	(N=98)	0.783	(N=23)	0.407	(N=27)

ONLINE APPENDIX

Banking Crises Without Panics

Matthew Baron, Emil Verner, and Wei Xiong

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I. Data

A. Narrative Crises

Table A1 reports the list of Narrative Crises, defined as the union of all banking crises from six prominent papers: Bordo et al. (2001), Caprio and Klingebiel (2003) Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2005), Laeven and Valencia (2013), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009, and online spreadsheets updated 2014)[1], and Schularick and Taylor (2012, online update 2017). We use the most recent update of each paper. The years listed correspond to the starting year of the banking crisis, according to each paper. The starting year of the Narrative Crisis list (reported in column (8)) is the earliest year across all six papers. In the table, a "0" means that the source reports no banking crisis in a given year, while a blank cell means that the crisis is not covered in the sample period (i.e. no information provided either way as to whether a banking crisis occurred).

B. Master List of Episodes

Table A2 reports the master list of episodes, which is intended to be a very broad list of *potential* crises, many of which may not necessarily be "banking crises" according to any definition. The master list of episodes is the union of: i) the Narrative Crises list defined in Table A1, and ii) years in which the bank equity real total return index *cumulatively* declines by more than 30% relative to its previous peak.[2] The year of each episode, reported in column (2), is defined

[1] Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) present three slightly different banking crisis lists: in their Appendix A3, Appendix A4, and online spreadsheets (we use the latest 2014 update). We generally take the union of these lists; however, when there is a small disagreement regarding the starting date of a banking crisis, we use the most recent online update.

[2] Note that 30% bank equity crashes in a single year (i.e. the episodes analyzed in Sections II and III of the main paper) are a subset of the 30% *cumulative* declines listed in Table A2. Thus, Table A2 is a broader list that encompasses all 30% bank equity crashes analyzed in Sections II and III.

as the first year in which the bank equity index cumulatively falls by more than 30% from its previous peak. In cases in which the bank equity index does not decline by 30% or more, the year in column (2) is the year from the Narrative Crises list. Column (3) indicates whether the episode is a Narrative Crisis. If the year from the Narrative Crisis list is different from the year defined by the bank equity decline (column (2)), that is also indicated in column (3).

Column (5) indicates the presence or absence of a banking "panic." As stated in the main text, we define a "panic" as an episode containing any of the following criteria appearing in narrative accounts: i) severe and sudden depositor or creditor withdrawals at more than one of a country's largest banks or more than ten smaller banks, that lead these banks to be on the verge of collapse; ii) severe and sudden strains in interbank lending markets; or iii) severe and sudden foreign-currency capital outflows from the banking sector. Column (6) records the starting month of the panic, according to narrative accounts. Column (7) records whether there is a 30% cumulative bank equity decline associated with a given episode. Column (8) indicates the presence or absence of narrative evidence of "widespread bank failures," which is defined as the failure of a top five (by assets) bank or more than five total banks failures above the normal rate of bank failures. A "bank failure" is defined broadly to include liquidations, bankruptcies, forced mergers, substantial restructurings, nationalizations, suspensions of payment, etc. Detailed narrative evidence of panics (or their absence) and widespread bank failures (or their absence) for each episode, to support the classification in Table A2, is documented in the following link: https://blogs.cornell.edu/baron/documentation-bank-panics-and-failures/

C. A New Database of Banking Crisis Characteristics and Policy Responses

We construct a new historical database of banking crises. Our dataset is similar to that of Laeven and Valencia (2013), which covers the period 1970–2012, though we extend their database back to 1870. This database consists of all episodes on the master list (Table A2). We code the various characteristics of banking crises, including the extent of: deposit runs, bank failures, nonperforming loans, and various forms of government intervention into the banking sector like liquidity support and equity injections. Following Laeven and Valencia (2013), we define the following variables for each potential crisis in our sample:

- Decline in deposits (the peak-to-trough % decline in aggregate deposits of the banking sector, only calculated for pre-1945 banking crises, since postwar crises are generally not associated with a loss in aggregate deposits);
- Failed banks (% of total bank assets or deposits);
- Largest banks failing (1 if any of the failed banks are among the top-5 banks by assets in the country, 0 otherwise)
- NPL at peak (the peak level of non-performing loans of the banking sector or of the largest banks);
- Significant liability guarantees (1 if the central bank or government provides extraordinary guarantees of bank deposits and other short-term liabilities, 0 otherwise);
- Significant liquidity support (1 if the central bank or government provides extraordinary liquidity support to the banking sector, 0 otherwise);
- Banks nationalized (1 if the government nationalizes any major banks, 0 otherwise);
- Government equity injections (1 if the government purchases newly issued equity of major banks in an effort to recapitalize the banking sector, 0 otherwise).

The above variables are gathered for each of the crises on the master list, which involved a major data collection effort using an extensive number of primary and secondary sources. First, we started with the dataset of Laeven and Valencia (2013), which collected all the above variables for their set of crises over the period 1970-2012. To extend our dataset back further, we examined the descriptions of crises from 400+ primary and secondary sources and gathered information on the above variables, whenever it was present. We back up this new database of banking crises with extensive documentation derived from these primary and secondary sources. Some of the sources are relatively well-known, such as Reinhart and Rogoff (2009, Appendix A3), Bordo et al. (2001), Caprio and Klingebiel (2003), Kindleberger (1993), Mehrez and Kaufmann (2000), Rocha and Solomou (2015), Conant (1915), Sumner (1896), and Grossman (2010). One important primary source is the "League of Nations: Money and Banking Statistics", volumes from 1925 to 1939, which contained data on bank failures and deposit declines in a wide range of countries during the interwar period. Many other sources are new archival primary sources that we uncovered (e.g., newspaper articles, contemporaneous accounts, bank financial reports, corporate manuals) covering individual countries and specific banking crisis episodes. We also have hundreds of secondary sources written by historians about specific crisis episodes. We plan to provide this new

database to other researchers studying historical banking crises, along with the extensive narrative documentation.

D. Documentation of Sources

Figure A1 provides examples of historical newspapers used to construct our bank equity return data. Table B1 provides an overview of the coverage and sources for the bank equity index total return variable. Cells with numbers indicate the number of underlying banks used to construct new bank equity return indexes. Shaded areas refer to premade bank equity indexes.

Table B2 lists in detail all the sources used to construct the *annual* equity variables: yearly bank stock prices, year bank stock dividends, yearly nonfinancial stock prices, and yearly nonfinancial stock dividends.

As noted in Table B2, some of the annual bank price return and dividend yield indexes are constructed from individual stock data that we gathered. The individual bank names, sample coverage, and the original data sources for the bank stocks used to construct these annual indexes are listed in the following document:

https://blogs.cornell.edu/baron/individual-banks-used-for-yearly-price-and-dividend-indexes-1n23632/

As one can see in the link above, we include banks based on which country they lend in, not the country in which their stocks trade. Thus, for an "overseas bank" like the Anglo-Argentine Bank, it is considered an Argentinian bank, not a U.K. bank.

Table B3 lists in detail all the sources used to construct the *monthly* equity and credit spread variables: monthly bank stock returns, monthly nonfinancial stock returns, monthly bank credit spreads, and monthly corporate credit spreads. As noted in Table B3, some of the monthly data is constructed from individual securities from banks or nonfinancial firms. The banks' and nonfinancials' company names, sample coverage, and the original data sources used to construct these indexes are listed in the following document:

https://blogs.cornell.edu/baron/individual-stocks-and-bonds-for-monthly-data-1phvomt/

Table B4 lists in detail all the sources used to construct the yearly macroeconomic variables, such as bank credit, nominal GDP, inflation, unemployment, and other variables.

II. Validation

To help validate bank equity returns as an informative measure of banking crises, we show that bank equity has a better signal-to-noise ratio than other financial and macroeconomic variables, in terms of identifying Narrative Crises in real time. In other words, bank equity declines, compared to a host of other indicators, most closely coincide with the onset of Narrative Crises. Later, in Appendix Section IV, as another form of validation, we show that, conditional on a Narrative Crisis episode, the magnitude of the peak-to-trough bank equity decline is correlated with the economic severity of banking crises and many of the characteristics and policy responses commonly associated with banking crises (e.g., deposit runs, bank failures, non-performing loans).

A. Bank Equity Provides the Best Real Time Signal of a Banking Crisis.

Using receiver operating characteristic (ROC) analysis, a standard tool for assessing classification performance, we find that bank equity returns provide the best real time signal of narrative banking crisis relative to a host of other variables, including nonfinancial equity returns, credit spreads, and macroeconomic conditions. To be clear, the goal of this analysis not *predicting* banking crises, but simply asking which variable best *coincides* with banking crises identified from existing classifications.

ROC curves are plotted in Figure A2. A ROC curve is a simple tool that allows one to assess the signal-to-noise ratio of bank equity in identifying Narrative Crises in real time. For a given variable, say bank equity returns, ROC analysis works by classifying observations into "banking crises" or "non-banking crises" using a given threshold X (e.g., a more than -30% decline in bank equity). By using the Narrative Crises as our "true" list of banking crises, ROC analysis plots the "true positive" rate against the "false positive" rate using this classification threshold X.[3] Then, by varying the threshold X across *all possible thresholds*, it produces the full ROC curve. For a given classifying variable, a higher value of the ROC curve indicates a better classifying variable, as it implies a higher "true positive rate" for a given "false positive" rate. It is typical in this literature to use the area under the curve (AUC) as a summary measure of the performance of

[3] We use the Narrative Crisis list as the set of "true" banking crises for ROC analysis, simply because it is a natural starting point from which to evaluate the informativeness of bank equity. We do not use the BVX Crisis List because it incorporates information from bank equity and might give bank equity returns an unfair advantage in picking up these crises.

the classifying variable. Note that the 45-degree line represents the benchmark uninformative classifier for a variable having no information content, which has an AUC of 0.50.

Panel A compares the ROC curve constructed from bank equity returns with ROC curves constructed using other equity market variables, while Panels B and C perform the comparison with credit market and macroeconomic variables. Each panel uses the sample for which all variables are non-missing. The bank equity ROC curve therefore varies across panels.

All the panels in Figure A2 suggest that bank equity returns provide the best real time signal of Narrative Crises. Panel A, which compares bank equity to returns on nonfinancial equity, broad market equity, and bank minus nonfinancial equity, shows that bank equity has the highest ROC curve and therefore the highest area under the curve (AUC = 0.71) and thus the highest signal-to-noise ratio. Panel B shows that bank equity also provides a better signal of a crisis compared to bank credit spreads and corporate credit spreads. Bank credit spreads provide the next best signal of a Narrative Crisis after bank equity, with an AUC of 0.63 (compared to 0.69 for bank equity on this sample).[4] Finally, Panel C repeats the ROC analysis for several macroeconomic variables, showing that bank equity returns provide a more accurate real time signal of a Narrative Crisis than the increase in the unemployment rate, the decline in GDP growth, and future credit contraction from t to t+5.[5] Adverse changes in macroeconomic conditions are not as useful for detecting Narrative Crises because they frequently also occur during "normal" recessions, thus generating many "false positives" and a lower signal-to-noise ratio.

B. Distribution of Bank and Nonfinancial Equity Returns

Figure A3 presents histograms of annual bank and nonfinancial equity real total returns during Narrative Crisis years. For comparison, we also present the histogram during other years ("No crisis"). The figure shows that the bank equity return distribution for Narrative Crisis years relative to non-crisis years is shifted further left and more left-skewed. These patterns are qualitatively similar but quantitatively weaker for the nonfinancial equity return distribution.

[4] The ROC curve for corporate credit spreads in Figure A2 uses the *level* of corporate credit spreads. The diagnostic performance of corporate credit spreads is similar, albeit slightly weaker, using the change in the spread or the spread relative to its five-year moving average. We should note that we only have credit spreads for about one-third of our overall sample.

[5] Boyd et al. (2019) use bank credit contraction as their definition of a "systemic bank shock."

III. Robustness Analysis

A. Bank Equity and Subsequent Macroeconomic Outcomes: Robustness to Alternative Specifications

We start with Table A3, which simply restates the estimates from Figure II (the impact of bank equity and nonfinancial equity returns on real GDP and bank credit-to-GDP) but in table form and at the three-year horizon.

The following analysis shows that the results in Figure II are robust to a variety of other specifications. As in Figure II, these impulse responses are all estimated using Jordà (2005) local projections with controls for three lags in the bank and nonfinancial equity variables, country fixed effects, and contemporaneous and lagged real GDP growth and credit-to-GDP change.

Figure A4 presents the same impulse responses as in Figure II but the specification includes year fixed effects, in addition to the baseline controls. This figure shows that the results in Figure II are not sensitive to the inclusion of year fixed effects.

Figure A5 presents the same impulse responses as in Figure II, but the specification adjusts the timing to allow for bank and nonfinancial equity returns to affect the outcome variable within the same year, instead of with a one-year lag. Figure A5 shows that bank equity crashes are associated with larger declines in real GDP and credit-to-GDP when bank equity crashes are assumed to affect the outcome variable within the same year.

Figure A6 demonstrates the robustness of the results in Figure II to other alternative specifications. Panel A plots the response of real GDP and credit-to-GDP to 30% crashes in bank equity and nonfinancial equity. It shows that a 30% crash in bank equity (controlling for a nonfinancial equity crash) is associated with a future decline in output of around 3 percentage points and future decline in credit-to-GDP of around 8 percentage points. The dotted lines represent 95% confidence intervals based on double-clustered standard errors.

Panel B plots the response to continuous innovations in bank and nonfinancial equity returns. It shows that a hypothetical 100% log-decline in bank equity returns is associated with a maximum 2.5 percentage point decrease in real GDP and 6 percentage point decrease in credit-to-GDP, though this specification does not distinguish between a positive or negative sign of the bank equity return or any potential nonlinearities. Therefore, Table A4 explores this nonlinearity in the alternative specification by showing that the predictive content of bank equity returns is nonlinear

by including quadratic terms (columns (2) and (5)) and by separately estimating the predictive content of positive and negative bank and nonfinancial equity returns (columns (3) and (6)).

B. Bank Equity Crashes and Subsequent Macroeconomic Outcomes: Subsample Analysis

Figure A7 demonstrates the robustness of the results in Figure II to various subsamples of countries and time periods. Because of the limited data in such subsamples, we choose a simpler nonlinear specification in which we look at the impulse response subsequent to 30% crashes in both bank and nonfinancial equity estimated jointly, as in Figure A6, Panel A.[6] Similar to Figure II, impulse responses are estimated using Jordà (2005) local projections with controls for three lags in the bank and nonfinancial equity crash variables, country fixed effects, and contemporaneous and three-year lagged values of real GDP growth and credit-to-GDP change. The dotted lines represent 95% confidence intervals based on double-clustered standard errors.

Figure A7 shows that the results are qualitatively similar in the following subsamples: excluding the Great Depression and the Great Recession (Panel A), the pre-WWII subsample (Panel B), the post-WWII subsample (Panel C), the period 1946-1970 (Panel D), the period 1971 to 2016 (Panel E). Table A5 reports these results in tabular form.

Figure A8 also reports the same results but for the U.S. only. Figure A8 is estimated just for the U.S. on the full sample (Panel A) and excluding the Great Depression and the Great Recession (Panel B). Results are qualitatively similar to those on the full panel.

IV. Analysis Conditional on Narrative Crises

A. Bank Equity Declines are Correlated with the Severity and Symptoms of Banking Crises

We validate the usefulness of bank equity declines by showing that they are correlated with the severity of banking crises along a number of dimensions, conditional on a crisis as defined by narrative accounts. Specifically, we ask whether banking crises with larger peak-to-trough bank equity declines are more macroeconomically severe and have greater frequency and intensity of

[6] One can estimate the full nonlinear specification on the subsamples, and the results are qualitatively similar to those in Figure II. However, because of the large number of indicator variables used in the full nonlinear specification relative to the number of observations, the impulse responses are often noisy and have large confidence bands.

characteristics and policy responses commonly associated with banking crises (e.g., deposit declines, bank failures, nonperforming loans).

We estimate the following regression equation, with each observation being a single banking crisis from the Narrative Crisis list,

$$y_{i,t} = \alpha_i + \beta r_{i,t}^{B} + \gamma 1_t^{postwar} + \varepsilon_{i,t} \quad \text{(A1)}$$

where α_i is a country fixed effect, $1_t^{postwar}$ is a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 if the year of the crisis is greater than 1945, and r_{it}^{B} is the peak-to-trough change in the real bank equity total return index during the crisis.[7] The sample size of regressions across the different dependent variables varies due to differences in data availability. As with the ROC analysis, we take the Narrative Crises as a starting point from which to evaluate the informativeness of bank equity.

Panel A in Table A6 presents estimates of Equation (A1) where the dependent variable is a measure of the decline in real GDP. The table shows that greater declines in bank equity are associated with larger output declines. For example, columns (1) through (3) show that a 100% peak-to-trough decline in bank equity returns is associated with a 13.9% peak-to-trough decline in real GDP, a 13.0 percentage point decline in the real GDP growth rate (peak-to-trough), and a 9.1 percentage point decline in the real GDP growth rate from its past 10-year average.

Panel B shows that bank equity peak-to-trough declines during Narrative Crises are correlated with other characteristics of banking crises. Larger bank equity declines are associated with a significantly larger declines in bank deposits, an increased incidence of failure of the largest banks, and higher nonperforming loans. Moreover, larger bank equity declines predict an increased probability of various forms of government intervention including significant liquidity support, bank nationalization, and government equity injections. We conclude that greater bank equity declines are associated with increased likelihood and severity of typical banking crisis characteristics and policy responses.

[7] The postwar dummy is important because, empirically, we find that bank equity declines have to be greater in the postwar period to get the same crisis symptoms, perhaps because of greater government protections and assistance for the banking sector, countercyclical fiscal and monetary policy, etc. Without the postwar dummy, the coefficient estimates in Table A6 are similar, but the R^2 is substantially reduced.

B. Using Alternative Measures of Bank Equity Declines

We next show that the validation results in the previous subsection are robust to two alternative measures of bank equity declines: *bank abnormal returns* (bank minus nonfinancial returns) and *bank market capitalization returns* (which seeks to capture the total change in the market value of equity within the banking sector).

One may be concerned, for example, that in the validation analysis of the previous subsection, the bank equity decline simply reflects a general decline in equity markets, rather than something specific about bank equity. Therefore, Table A7, Panel A shows that our results are robust to replacing bank equity returns with *bank abnormal returns* (defined as bank equity total returns minus nonfinancial equity total returns). However, it is important to note that, in terms of the magnitude of the estimates and the adjusted R^2, the bank equity return is a substantially better predictor of crisis severity than bank abnormal return. For example, the adjusted R^2 for real GDP peak-to-trough decline on the bank equity decline is 18.6%, compared to 7.0% for the bank abnormal returns. Thus, both as a signal of a Narrative Crisis and as a measure of crisis severity, bank equity returns dominate bank abnormal returns. Nonfinancial equities fall substantially during severe bank crisis, likely in part because of banking sector distress, and the overall level of bank equity provides valuable information beyond the differential information contained in *bank abnormal returns*.

Panel B re-estimates Equation (A1) with *bank market capitalization returns* as the independent variable. *Bank market capitalization returns* is defined specifically as the bank equity price returns plus new issuance of bank equity. This variable seeks to capture the change in the market value of equity within the banking sector. Equity issuance is new capital raised by the bank, which may be important as banks seek to recapitalize. Price returns rather than total returns are used to calculate *bank market capitalization returns*, because dividends are paid out from the bank and hence deplete bank equity. An index of bank equity issuance is constructed for each country using new historical data and the methodology from Baron (2020). Data sources include *Moody's Bank and Finance* manuals, *Investor's Monthly Manual*, and Jane's and Beerman's manuals of European firms. It is important to note that *bank market capitalization returns* can only be constructed on a subsample of the data, due to historical data limitations on the availability of data on new bank equity issuance.

Panel B shows that *bank market capitalization* declines strongly predict output declines. Given that theory (e.g. Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist, 1999; Brunnermeier and Sannikov, 2014) links the net equity of the banking sector to macroeconomic outcomes, we should expect *bank market capitalization returns* to have the strongest predictability for output. Indeed, this is the case, as Panel B shows the adjusted R^2 to be 23.4%, substantially higher than 18.6% in Table A6. However, as historical data on bank market capitalization are difficult to obtain and could be collected for only a subset of Narrative Crisis episodes, we do not use this variable for the main analysis of the paper.

Panel C of Table A7 is similar to Table A6 but has an additional independent variable, the *bank equity recovery* (the positive returns in the bank equity total returns index subsequent to the trough within three years after a banking crisis). Rebounds in bank equity returns may be due to unexpected policy interventions or to the fact that the crisis may not have been as severe as initially perceived by equity investors. However, surprisingly, Panel C shows that the *bank equity recovery* has no predictive power for economic output, a result which is robust to various other measures of bank equity recoveries.

V. Additional Results on Non-Panic Bank Distress

A. Bank Equity Crashes Outside of Narrative Crisis Episodes

Table A8 estimates future real GDP and bank credit-to-GDP conditional on bank equity crashes excluding a window around Narrative Crisis episodes. Table A8 shows the magnitudes of the real GDP and bank credit decline are just as large excluding narrative-based banking crises as they are in the full sample. Table A8 is obtained by estimating a specification similar to Equation (3) but interacting the bank equity crash indicator variables with an indicator variable for whether a given observation falls within a ±3-year window of a Narrative Crisis episode. According to the estimates at the $t+1$ and $t+3$ horizons reported in Table A8, the interaction term with a Narrative Crisis episode is small in magnitude and not statistically significant for output, thus signifying that the predictive content from bank equity crashes is similar in magnitude outside of Narrative Crises. We conclude there is generally little difference in the predictive content of bank equity between Narrative Crisis and non-Narrative Crisis episodes.

B. Bank Equity Crashes Outside of Panic Episodes

We show as a robustness test that bank equity crashes predict real output and credit contraction even excluding panic episodes. Specifically, Figure A9 plots estimates of local projection impulse responses to bank equity returns across different bins, as in Figure II, but excluding observations within a ±3-year window of a panic (as defined in Table A2). The results in Figure A9 are nearly identical to those in Figure II, demonstrating that the predictability from bank equity returns holds even outside of panic events.

C. Impact of BVX Crises With and Without Panics

Figure A10 plots the response of real GDP and credit-to-GDP to episodes on the BVX Crisis List without panics and with panics. The dotted lines represent 95% confidence intervals based on double-clustered standard errors. Figure A10 demonstrates that both panic and non-panic BVX Crises are associated with adverse macroeconomic outcomes, which are worse for non-panic BVX Crises.

D. Results Using a Finer Panic Classification

Figure A11 is similar to Figure III but uses a finer classification for creditor runs. The figure distinguishes between episodes with "isolated runs," defined as episodes featuring isolated runs on a single large bank or a few small banks or borderline episodes with inconclusive historical evidence, and "clear-cut panics," defined as all panic episodes from Table A2 not labeled as "isolated runs." The responses of real GDP and credit-to-GDP are estimated using local projections, as in Figure III.

E. Frequency of Panic and Non-Panic Crises Across Decades

Figure A12 plots the frequency of crisis episodes for each decade for the 46 countries in our sample. The frequency is calculated as the number of crises divided by the total number of country-years in each decade.

F. Timing of Bank Equity Crashes Relative to Panic Dates and Other Crisis Indicators: Robustness

Figure A13 shows that the timing of bank equity crashes relative to panic dates and other crisis indicators is robust to conducting the analysis on the sample of Narrative Crises instead of episodes on the BVX Crisis List. Figure A13 presents the same results as in Figure VI, but on the sample of Narrative Crises instead of episodes on the BVX Crisis List. Similarly, Table A9 shows that the timing results reported in Table III are robust to conducting the analysis on the sample of Narrative Crises instead of the BVX Crisis List.

G. Timing of Bank vs. Nonfinancial Equity Crashes: Country and Time Subsamples

Table A10 compares the timing of bank versus nonfinancial equity crashes as in Table III but on country and time subsamples. Table A10 shows that bank equity crashes tend to precede nonfinancial equity crashes in post-WWII and advanced economy banking crises but is often the opposite for prewar and emerging market crises. Panel A performs the analysis on the BVX Crisis List sample, and Panel B uses the Narrative Crisis List sample as robustness, as in Table A9.

VI. BVX Crisis List: Additional Information

A. Additional Information on Constructing the BVX Crisis List

We describe some additional information on constructing the BVX Crisis List.

Table A11 lists "removed banking crises", episodes from the Narrative Crisis list that are not considered banking crises on the BVX Crisis List. Of the "removed banking crises", we mark a subset of them with a "*" which we consider "spurious banking crises", defined as episodes which have few or no characteristics typically associated with banking crises and are likely the result of typographical or historical errors on one of the Narrative Crisis chronologies (e.g., in Reinhart and Rogoff 2009). Several of these spurious banking crises have missing bank equity returns data; because there is discretion in marking these events as spurious, along with the lack of quantitative evidence in these cases, we list them separately at the bottom of Table A11 to be transparent about the fact that these episodes could not be verified with bank equity data.

Turning back to the BVX Crisis List reported in Table VI, we compute the peak-to-trough decline in bank equity as an "intensity measure" of each banking crisis, also reported in Table VI. We date the start of each crisis as the year in which the bank equity real total return first falls more

than -30% from its peak. In cases in which there is no cumulative 30% decline, we date the crisis based on narrative information. Of course, there are important reasons why the narrative accounts date the starting year when they do. With the new dates, our goal is simply to offer additional and alternative information about when markets first recognized the bank equity losses. Table A12, Panel A lists all the changes to starting dates on the BVX Crisis List. See Table A2 for a comparison with the Narrative Crisis dates, which in most cases are very similar.

We occasionally combined several pairs of episodes occurring close together in time, when it seems more appropriate to consider them as a single crisis (i.e. when bank equity prices did not show two separate declines and when the narrative evidence on bank failures and panics conveyed a continuous sequence of banking distress across time, not clustered into two phases). These combined episodes are listed in Table A12, Panel B.

B. Bank and Nonfinancial Equity around BVX Banking Crises and Normal Recessions

Figure A14 plots the average dynamics of bank equity and nonfinancial equity around BVX banking crisis recessions and normal recessions. A recession is defined as a period in which real GDP declines. As in Jordà, Schularick, and Taylor (2013), the first year of the recession is marked as the real GDP peak, and if there are two peaks in three years, then it is the first peak. Banking crisis recessions are defined as recessions that coincide with a BVX Crisis List episode. Normal recessions are the remaining recessions in the sample.

Figure A14, Panel A shows that the dynamics of bank and nonfinancial equity are similar around normal recessions, with a fall in both bank and nonfinancial equity of ~10% on average in the year prior to the start of the recession, followed by a quick recovery afterwards. If anything, bank equity falls slightly less than nonfinancial equity in a normal recession, which is consistent with the finding that the bank equity index has an unconditional beta (on the full sample) slightly less than 1.

Figure A14, Panel B, in contrast, show that, conditional on a banking crisis recession, bank equity falls substantially more than nonfinancial equity—over 60% on average for bank equity, compared to 30% for nonfinancial equity—and that the bank equity decline, unlike the nonfinancial equity decline, is persistent over the 5-year window. This result is consistent with the results in Figures V and VI of the main text.

C. Revisiting the Global Great Depression

To showcase the usefulness of the crisis intensity measure constructed from bank equity returns, we revisit the banking crises of the Great Depression. While there is no doubt of the presence of severe banking crises in some countries (e.g., Germany and the U.S.) and their absence in other countries (e.g., Japan and the U.K.), there is considerable debate about the presence and severity of banking crises in certain countries. Additionally, because of previous data limitations, the literature has had difficulty assessing the degree to which banking crises help explain the severity of the Great Depression. For example, in their cross-country study, Bernanke and James (1991) write, "A weakness of our approach is that, lacking objective indicators of the seriousness of financial problems, we are forced to rely on dummy variables to indicate periods of crisis."

We use bank equity declines to assess the severity of banking problems across countries in the Great Depression. Figure A15 plots the peak-to-trough decline in real GDP against the peak-to-trough bank equity decline over the period 1929-1933. This figure plots all countries in the sample for which data is available, not just those that may have experienced banking crises.[8]

The decline in bank equity has moderate explanatory power (R^2 = 15%), consistent with the evidence in Bernanke and James (1991) on the role of banking crises in explaining the severity of the Great Depression. However, from Figure A15, there is still substantial unexplained heterogeneity in outcomes. Much of this is surely measurement error in real GDP plus other idiosyncratic country shocks. Other potential reasons for this heterogeneity, which are non-mutually exclusive, include: the duration of adherence to the gold standard (Eichengreen and Sachs 1985), the sharp monetary contraction in certain countries (Friedman and Schwartz 1963), the trade collapse (Madsen 2001), and political instability (e.g., the 1930 coups in Argentina and Brazil). Nevertheless, the severity of banking losses explains an important part of the variation across countries.

Do bank equity declines line up with the narrative evidence on crisis severity across countries in the Great Depression? In general, yes. For example, Figure A15 shows large declines

[8] The picture is similar if one plots the peak-to-trough decline in industrial production on the y-axis. Using our data on real GDP (taken from Maddison's database and from Schularick and Taylor 2012), in contrast to industrial production, makes the Great Depression look less severe in Belgium and the Netherlands (which may be attributable to the larger service sector in these economies) but much more severe in Latin America (attributable to the higher share of commodity production in these economies).

in bank equity for well-known examples of severe banking crises: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Switzerland, and the U.S. Similarly, Japan and the U.K. are considered not to have had banking crises during this period and have minimal bank equity declines.

Furthermore, the quantitative data helps resolve uncertainty within narrative account about the extent of banking crises. Thus, in the BVX Crisis List, we remove Denmark and India, since these countries had mild bank stock declines (less than 30%) and the narrative evidence further confirms a lack of panics or widespread bank failures. Italy also had a relatively mild bank stock decline (though there was, in fact, a severe banking crisis), but this is due to the unusually early and vigorous policy intervention in 1931, culminating in a near-total nationalization of the banking sector by 1933. Thus, bank stock prices did not decline as much as in other countries.

We also highlight several newly identified banking crises to the BVX Crisis List that are overlooked in the previous narrative approaches: newly identified banking crises in Chile, Colombia, Iceland, the Netherlands, and Peru during the Great Depression. All of these countries experienced large bank stock declines (greater than 30%), and the narrative evidence supports either panics or widespread bank failures (or both) in these countries.

Finally, there is the case of Canada in the Great Depression, which has previously been discussed in the main text in the context of quiet banking crises. While not labeled a banking crisis on the BVX Crisis List, since there were no panics and only a single tiny bank, Weyburn Security Bank, failed, there was nevertheless a steep decline in bank stock prices. This evidence is consistent with the argument of Kryzanowski and Roberts (1993), that the large Canadian banks "were insolvent at market values and remained in business only due to the forbearance of regulators coupled with an implicit guarantee of all deposit", both policies being holdovers from the previous Canadian banking crisis of 1923.[9] Consistent with Section III.C on quiet crises, the large and widespread bank equity losses in Canada, as reflected by the large fall in bank stock prices, may help explain the severity of the Great Depression in Canada, in which the fall in real GDP and rise in unemployment rivaled the U.S. in severity.

[9] The largest Canadian bank at the time, the Bank of Montreal, had estimated non-performing loans in excess of 40% (Kryzanowski and Roberts 1993).

D. Comparison to Other Chronologies of Banking Crises

How does our BVX Crisis List compare to other banking crisis chronologies? We discuss the evidence in detail here. We find that the consequences of the BVX Crisis List episodes are actually *more* severe, compared to Reinhart and Rogoff's list of banking crises, both in terms of GDP, credit contraction, and characteristics of crises. This is due, in large part, to eliminating many spurious crises from their list.

Table A13 compares the average severity of crises by looking at declines in real GDP and other selected characteristics of crises. Panel A compares the BVX Crisis List to Reinhart and Rogoff's chronology and Panel B to Laeven and Valencia's chronology. Similarly, Figure A16 plots impulse responses of GDP and credit-to-GDP subsequent to episodes on the BVX Crisis List compared to episodes on Reinhart and Rogoff's and Laeven and Valencia's chronologies.

In the BVX Crisis List, the average crisis has a -5.5% peak-to-trough decline in real GDP. In comparison, Reinhart and Rogoff's (2009, online update 2014) headline number is an average peak-to-trough decline in real GDP per capita of -9.6%. However, Reinhart and Rogoff's headline statistic overstates the severity of banking crises, since it is calculated over a subsample of severe banking crises (it is unclear what criteria is used to select this sample, other than ex-post severity). Instead, estimating the consequences of banking crises on Reinhart and Rogoff's entire list of banking crises, the average fall in real GDP that we calculate for Reinhart and Rogoff in Table A13, Panel A is -4.5%—and is in fact *less* severe than using the BVX Crisis List (a difference of 0.9% with a *t*-statistic of 2.92). Looking at the likelihood and magnitude of other symptoms of crises and policy interventions—including failed banks, nonperforming loans, declines in deposits, liability guarantees, and liquidity support—the BVX Crises are also more severe. We also note that, in unreported results, the BVX Crisis List episodes are more severe than Schularick and Taylor's (when compared on their sample of 14 countries) and Bordo et al.'s crises.

Panel B, which compares the BVX Crisis List to Laeven and Valencia's chronology, shows the opposite, that the BVX Crisis List is slightly less severe than Laeven and Valencia's (when compared on their time sample 1970-2012), perhaps because Laeven and Valencia only identify crises that are serious enough to warrant several forms of major government intervention.

In general, we conclude that, comparing the BVX Crisis List to previous chronologies, the aftermath of banking crises tends to be *more* severe (the exception being with Laeven and

Valencia), especially when restricting our chronology to crises featuring large bank equity declines. However, it is important to note that the evidence is nuanced and also that the comparisons are sensitive to the sample studied.

E. ROC Curve Comparisons for BVX Crises and Other Crisis Chronologies

Table A14 compares the area under the ROC curve (AUC) when using a variety of variables to classify BVX crises and Reinhart-Rogoff crises (Panel A) or BVX crises and Laeven-Valencia crises (Panel B). The table shows that, across a variety of classifiers (e.g., real GDP growth), the AUC is generally higher for BVX Crises than for Reinhart-Rogoff and Laeven-Valencia crises. Panel A compares the AUC on the full sample, while Panel B focuses on the post-1970 sample covered by Laeven and Valencia (2013). Thus, BVX Crises tend to better coincide with declines in real GDP, credit-to-GDP, bank equity, and nonfinancial equity, relative to Reinhart-Rogoff and Laeven-Valencia crises.

F. Other Episodes of Minor Bank Distress from Narrative Accounts

Table A15 list additional episodes of minor bank distress from narrative sources. These episodes are listed purely for historical interest and the aid of future researchers who are interested in other periods of minor banking distress. They are not used in any of the analyses in this paper.

G. Panics Without Bank Equity Crashes

Table A16 demonstrates that nearly all panics without bank equity crashes are associated with narrative evidence of bank solvency concerns and that there is almost no evidence of non-fundamentally driven runs over our 1870-2016 sample. The top panel features a two-by-two table of all episodes from Table A2, sorted on the incidence of panics and 30% bank equity crashes; there are 47 episodes of panic banking crises without 30% bank equity crashes.

The bottom panel analyzes each of these 47 episodes individually and demonstrates that nearly all the panics without bank equity crashes are associated with narrative evidence of bank solvency concerns. The bottom table also analyzes why the bank equity decline was nevertheless less than 30% in magnitude: 29 episodes (62%) are due to possible bank equity measurement errors (either the banking panics were centered around small or regional banks and thus are not captured

by the bank equity index, or the bank equity index contains a very small number of banks for a given episode); 14 (30%) are "near misses," defined as episodes where the decline is between 20% and 30%; and 2 (4%) are triggered by the onset of wars. (In addition to these 47 episodes, there are another 36 banking panic episodes for which we do not have bank equity data, which also presents a measurement problem.) See Appendix Section I.B for a link to the historical documentation and sources from which the information in this chart was taken.

Thus, there is almost no evidence of non-fundamentally driven runs over our 1870-2016 sample. Only the remaining 2 (4%) episodes can *potentially* be considered non-fundamental panics (Japan in 1927 and Hong Kong in 1991, both being triggered by false rumors leading to widespread runs).

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Figure A1: Sample Historical Data

This figure shows scans of three historical newspapers containing bank stock price data. Panel A shows Italian bank stock prices at the end of 1904 from the newspaper *La Stampa*. Panel B shows Dutch bank stock prices at the end of 1908 from the newspaper *De Telegraaf*. Panel C shows German bank stock prices at the end of 1873 from the newspaper *Berliner Boersen-Zeitung*. The full list of historical primary sources for bank stock prices and dividends can be found in the Data Appendix.

(A) Italian bank stock prices, 1904

BORSE ITALIANE.

Corsi di chiusura del 28 dicembre 1904.

Valori	Roma	Milano	Genova	Firenze
Rend. it. 5 0/0 perc.	105 35	105 25	105 32 1/2	105 37
» f.m.	105 50	105 30	105 37 1/2	105 32 1/2
3 1/2 0/0 p.c.	103 45 1/2	—	—	103 25
» f.m.	103 35	103 37 1/2	103 37 1/2	103 30
Az. Banca d'It.	1132 —	1134 50	1135 50	— —
» Banca Comm.	829 —	828 50	828 —	— —
» Credito Ital.	611 —	611 —	612 —	— —
» Meridionali	758 —	756 —	758 —	758 —
» Mediterranee	— —	459 —	460 —	460 50
» Rubattino	— —	468 50	470 —	— —
» Terni	— —	1945 —	1949 —	— —
» Elba	— —	— —	— —	— —
» Savona	— —	— —	— —	— —
» Molini Alta It.	— —	— —	— —	— —
» Fridania	— —	— —	— —	— —
» Carburo Rom.	— —	— —	— —	— —

(B) Dutch bank stock prices, 1908

	V.K.	L.K.	H.K.
Amst. Liq.-Kas. dito...	115	—	—
Buit. Bankver. A-U. dito	64	—	—
Cent. Bankv. L. & N. dito	—	—	—
Cen. Cred.-Bank S.....4½	99⅜	—	—
Cent. Werkg. Ris.-B. O.4½	100¾	100¾	—
Crediet-Vereen. A.....	101½	—	—
Disc. en Eff.b. 1&2ser.do.	112	—	—
Disc.-Mij te Rotterd. do.	—	—	—
Fin. Mij v. Zuid-Afr. do.	95	—	—
Geld. Credietvereenig.	165	—	—
Gemeente-Cred. Obl. 4	101½	—	—
dito dito dito 3½	96½	96⅛	—
dito dito dito 3	85¾	85⅝	—
dito dito dito 2½	—	—	—
Holl. Belegg. Cie. dito 4	98	—	—
Holl. Voorsch. Bk. S. b..	100	—	—
Incasso Bank Aand...	116½	—	—
Ind. Bnk. te Haarl. dito	—	—	—
Kas Vereeniging Aand.	142	142½	—

(C) German bank stock prices, 1873



Bank- und Creditbank-Actien.

	Div 71	Div 72	E F	Einz-Termin.	Appoints b	
Aachener Bank f. H. u. L. (40% E.)	—	—	4	1/7.	100 ℛ	98 bz B.
Aachener Disconto-Ges. (40% E.)	—	—	5	do.	200 ℛ	107 bz G
Allg. Depositen-Bank (60% Einz.)	—	—	5	1/1.	1000 u. 200 ℛ	84 bz G
Allg. Deutsche Handelsg. (70% E.)	—	—	5	do.	100 ℛ	93¾ bz G
Amsterdamer Bank	—	—	4	do.	250 fl. Holl	10⅝
Anglo-Deutsche Bank	—	—	5	do	100 ℛ	132½ G, j. 117 B
Anh.-Dessauische Landes-Bank	12½	—	4	do.	100 ℛ	149 B
do. do. neue	—	—	4	do.	100 ℛ	136 bz
Antwerpener Central-Bank	—	—	5	do.	500 Frcs	108 bz G
Austro-Italienische Bank (50% E.)	—	—	5	do.	500 Lire	— —
Austro-Türk. Cred.-Angt. (40% E.)	—	—	6	1/8 p. Stck.	200 fl S	— —
Badische Bank	5	—	4	1/1.	200 ℛ	115⅝ bz G
Bank f. Rheinl. u. Westph. (80% E.)	—	—	4	do.	200 ℛ	103½ bz
Bank für Sprit u. Prod.-Handel	—	—	5	do.	200 ℛ	83⅜ bz G
Barmer Bankverein	7½	—	5	do.	200 ℛ	122½b. G

	Div 71	Div 72	E F	Einz-Termin.	Appoints b	
Gothaer Privat-Bank	8½	—	4	1/1.	200 ℛ	— —
Halle'sche Credit-Anst. (40% E.)	—	—	4	1/9.	200 ℛ	— —
Hamburger Commerz-Bank ..	7⅛	—	5	1/1.	200 ℛ	121 G
Hamburger Hyp.-Bank (40% E.)	7⅛	—	5	do.	250 ℛ	107½ G
Hamburger internation. B. (40%)	9⅛	—	5	do.	200 ℛ	124⅛ B, a. 124
Hamburger Vereins-B. (20% E.)	11½	—	4	do.	200 ℛ	125⅛ G
Hannoversche Bank	5⅛	—	4	1/1 u. 7.	250 ℛ	111⅛ B
Hannov. Disconto-Bank (60% E.)	—	—	5	1/1.	200 ℛ	95⅛ bz B
Hessische Bank	—	—	4	5/9.	100 ℛ	90 B
Internat. Handelsges. (40% E.)	—	—	4	1/1.	200 ℛ	111½ bz B
Kieler Bank (40% Einz.)	—	—	5	1/9.	200 ℛ	178 G
Kölnische Wechsler-Bank ...	—	—	4	2/4 72	200 ℛ	98 G
Königsberger Vereins-Bank ..	11	—	4	1/8.	200 ℛ	104 G
Landw. u. Industrieb. Kwilecki	—	—	5	1/7.	200 ℛ	— —
Leipziger Credit-Anstalt ...	11	—	4	1/1.	100 ℛ	178 G

Figure A2: Bank Equity Returns Provide the Best Real Time Signal of Narrative Banking Crises: ROC Analysis

This figure presents receiver operating characteristic (ROC) analysis to understand which variables best coincide with banking crises from the Narrative Crisis list. The higher the ROC curve, the better a given variable is at classifying episodes on the list of Narrative Crises. Panel A compares the ROC curve constructed from bank equity returns with the ROC curves constructed using other equity market variables. Panels B and C perform the comparison with credit market and macroeconomic variables. Each panel uses the sample for which all variables are non-missing. The bank equity ROC curve therefore varies across panels.

(A) Bank equity compared with other equity market variables



(B) Bank equity compared with credit market variables



(C) Bank equity compared with macroeconomic variables



Figure A3: Distribution of Bank and Nonfinancial Equity Returns

This figure presents histograms of annual bank and nonfinancial equity returns during Narrative Crisis episodes. For comparison, it also presents the histogram during other years ("No crisis"). Bank and nonfinancial equity returns are annual real total returns winsorized at the top 1% level. The figure shows that the bank equity return distribution for Narrative Crises relative to non-crisis years is shifted further left and more left-skewed. These patterns are qualitatively similar but quantitatively weaker for the nonfinancial equity return distribution.





Figure A4: Bank Equity Crashes Predict Output Gaps and Credit Contraction: Robustness Including Year Fixed Effects

This figure presents the same impulse responses as in Figure II, but the specification includes year fixed effects, in addition to the baseline controls. This figure shows that the results in Figure II are robust to the inclusion of year fixed effects.

(A) Real GDP response



(B) Credit-to-GDP response



Figure A5: Bank Equity Crashes Predict Output Gaps and Credit Contraction: Alternative Timing

This figure presents the same impulse responses as in Figure II, but the specification adjusts the timing to allow for bank and nonfinancial equity returns to affect the outcome variable within the same year (year "0"), instead of with a one year lag. This figure shows that bank equity crashes are associated with larger declines in real GDP and credit-to-GDP when bank equity crashes are assumed to affect the outcome variable within the same year.

(A) Real GDP response



(B) Credit-to-GDP response



Figure A6: Bank Equity and Subsequent Macroeconomic Outcomes: Robustness to Alternative Specifications

Panel A plots the response of real GDP and credit-to-GDP to 30% crashes in bank equity and nonfinancial equity. Panel B plots the response to innovations in bank and nonfinancial equity continuous negative returns (i.e., returns times −1). Continuous returns are winsorized at the top 1% level. Impulse responses are estimated using Jordà (2005) local projections with controls for three lags in the bank and nonfinancial equity variables, country fixed effects, and contemporaneous and lagged values of real GDP growth and change in credit-to-GDP. The dotted lines represent 95% confidence intervals based on standard errors double-clustered on country and year.

(A) 30% bank equity crashes



(B) Bank equity continuous negative return innovations



Figure A7: Bank Equity Crashes and Subsequent Macroeconomic Outcomes: Subsamples

This figure plots the response of real GDP and credit-to-GDP to 30% crashes in bank equity and nonfinancial equity across various subsamples. Impulse responses are estimated using Jordà (2005) local projections with controls for three lags in the bank and nonfinancial equity crash variables, country fixed effects, and contemporaneous and lagged values of real GDP growth and change in credit-to-GDP. The dotted lines represent 95% confidence intervals based on standard errors double-clustered on country and year.

(A) Excluding the Great Depression and Great Recession



(B) Pre-WWII subsample



(C) Post-WWII subsample



(D) 1946–1970



(E) 1971–2016



Figure A8: Bank Equity Crashes and Subsequent Macroeconomic Outcomes: U.S. Only

This figure plots the response of real GDP and credit-to-GDP to 30% crashes in bank equity and nonfinancial equity for the U.S. time series. The impulse responses are estimated using local projections, controlling for contemporaneous real GDP growth and change in credit-to-GDP, as well as three lags in bank equity returns, nonfinancial equity returns, real GDP growth, and change in credit-to-GDP. The dotted lines represent 95% confidence intervals based on Newey-West standard errors with six lags.

(A) Full sample



(B) Excluding the Great Recession and Great Depression



Figure A9: Bank Equity Crashes Excluding Panic Episodes

This figure shows that bank equity crashes predict real output and credit contraction even excluding panic episodes. We estimate local projection impulse responses to bank equity returns across different bins, as in Figure II, but excluding observations within a ±3-year window of a panic (as defined in Table A2).

(A) Real GDP response excluding panic episodes



(B) Credit-to-GDP response excluding panic episodes



Figure A10: Impact of BVX Crises With and Without Panics

This figure plots the response of real GDP and credit-to-GDP to episodes on the BVX crisis list without panics and with panics. The impulse responses are estimated using local projections, controlling for country fixed effects, contemporaneous real GDP growth, change in credit-to-GDP, and nonfinancial equity returns, as well as three lags in all independent variables. The dotted lines represent 95% confidence intervals based on standard errors double-clustered on country and year.



Figure A11: Banking Distress With and Without Banking Panics: Finer Panics Classification

This figure is similar to Figure III but uses a finer classification for creditor runs. The figure distinguishes between episodes with "isolated runs," defined as episodes featuring isolated runs on a single large bank or a few small banks or borderline episodes with inconclusive historical evidence, and "clear-cut panics," defined as all panic episodes from Table A2 not labeled as "isolated runs." The responses of real GDP and credit-to-GDP are estimated using local projections, as in Figure III.

(A) Baseline



(B) Conditioning on bank failures



Figure A12: Frequency of Panic and Non-Panic Crises Across Decades

This figure plots the frequency of crisis episodes for each decade for the 46 countries in our sample. The frequency is calculated as the number of crises divided by the total number of country-years in each decade. "BVX panic crisis" refers to episodes on the BVX Crisis List with a panic. "BVX non-panic crisis" refers to episodes on the BVX Crisis List that do not feature a banking panic. "All 30% bank equity crashes without panic" refers to all 30% annual declines in bank equity that are not associated with a panic in Table A2.



Figure A13: Timing of Bank Equity Crashes Relative to Panics and Other Indicators: Robustness on the Sample of Narrative Crises

This figure presents the same results as in Figure VI, but on the sample of Narrative Crises instead of episodes on the BVX Crisis List.



(B) Consistent sample



(C) 1870–1939



(D) 1940–2016



(E) 1940–2006



Figure A14: Bank and Nonfinancial Equity Around Banking Crises and Normal Recessions

This figure plots the average dynamics of bank equity and nonfinancial equity around banking crisis recessions and normal (i.e. non-banking crisis) recessions. Banking crisis recessions are defined as recessions that coincide with a BVX Crisis List episode within a year of the peak in GDP. Normal recessions are the remaining recessions in the sample. Time $t = 0$ refers to the GDP peak year.

(A) Normal recessions



(B) Banking crisis recessions



Figure A15: Bank Equity Declines and the Global Great Depression

This figure plots the peak-to-trough decline in real GDP against the peak-to-trough bank equity decline over the period 1929–1933. Note that this figure plots all countries in the sample for which data is available, not just those that experienced banking crises. We omit from the plot one outlier observation, Chile, which reported a real GDP decline of 48% and a bank equity decline of 30%.



Figure A16: Comparisons with Other Banking Crisis Chronologies

This figure compares the BVX Crisis List with the Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) and Laeven and Valencia (2013) banking crisis chronologies. The comparisons in each panel are estimated separately using local projections on consistent samples (i.e. the same sample covered by Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) or Laeven and Valencia (2013)). All specifications control for country fixed effects, along with contemporaneous and lagged real GDP growth and change in credit-to-GDP. The dotted lines represent 95% confidence intervals based on standard errors double-clustered on country and year.

(A) Comparison with Reinhart and Rogoff



(B) Comparison with Laeven and Valencia



Table A1: Narrative Crises

This table reports the list of Narrative Crises, defined as the union of all banking crises from six prominent papers: Bordo et al. (2001), Caprio and Klingebiel (2003) Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2005), Laeven and Valencia (2013), Reinhart and Rogoff (2009, and online spreadsheets updated 2014), and Schularick and Taylor (2012, online update 2017). We use the most recent update of each paper. The years listed correspond to the starting year of the banking crisis according to each paper. The starting year of the Narrative Crisis list (reported in column (8)) is the earliest year across all six papers. A "0" means that the source reports no banking crisis in a given year, while a blank cell means that the crisis is not covered in the sample period (i.e. no information provided either way as to whether a banking crisis occurred).

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Country	Reinhart Rogoff	Schularick Taylor	Laeven Valencia	Bordo et al.	Caprio Klingebiel	Demirgüç-Kunt Detrag.	Narrative Crises
Argentina	1885						1885
	1890			1890			1890
	1914			1914			1914
	1931			1931			1931
	1934			1934			1934
	1980		1980	1980	1980	1980	1980
	1985		0	0	0	0	1985
	1989		1989	1989	1989	1989	1989
	1995		1995	1995	1995	1995	1995
	2001		2001		2001	2001	2001
Australia	1893	1893		1893			1893
	1931	0		0			1931
	1989	1989	0	1989	1989	0	1989
Austria	1873						1873
	1924						1924
	1929						1929
	1931						1931
	2008		2008				2008
Belgium	1870	1870					1870
	0	1885					1885
	1914	0		1914			1914
	1925	1925		1925			1925
	1931	1931		1931			1931
	1934	1934		1934			1934
	1939	1939		1939			1939
	2008	2008	2008				2008
Brazil	1890			1890			1890
	1897			1897			1897
	1900			1900			1900
	1914			1914			1914
	1923			1923			1923
	1926			0			1926
	1929			0			1929
	1963			1963			1963
	1985		0	0	0	0	1985
	1990		1990	1990	1990	1990	1990
	1994		1994	1994	1994	1994	1994
Canada	1873	0					1873
	1906	0					1906
	1908	1907					1907
	1912	0					1912
	1923	0		1923			1923

Continued on next page

Table A1: Narrative Crises

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Country	Reinhart Rogoff	Schularick Taylor	Laeven Valencia	Bordo et al.	Caprio Klingebiel	Demirgüç-Kunt Detrag.	Narrative Crises
	1983	0	0	1983	1982	0	1982
Chile	1890			1889			1889
	1898			1898			1898
	1907			1907			1907
	1914			1914			1914
	1926			1925			1925
	1976		1976	1976	1976		1976
	1980		1981	1981	1981	1981	1980
Colombia	1982		1982	1982	1982	1982	1982
	1998		1998	0	0	1999	1998
Czech	1931						1931
	1991		0		1991		1991
	0		1996		0		1996
Denmark	1877	1877					1877
	1885	1885		1885			1885
	1902	0		0			1902
	1907	1908		1907			1907
	1914	0		1914			1914
	1921	1921		1921			1921
	1931	1931		1931			1931
	1987	1987	0	1987	1987	0	1987
	2008	2008	2008				2008
Egypt	1907						1907
	1931						1931
	1980		1980	1981	1980s	0	1980
	1990		0	1991	1991	0	1990
Finland	0	1877					1877
	1900	1900		1900			1900
	1921	1921		1921			1921
	1931	1931		1931			1931
	1939	0		1939			1939
	1991	1991	1991	1991	1991	1991	1991
France	1871						1871
	1882	1882		1882			1882
	1889	1889		1889			1889
	1904	0		0			1904
	1907	0		1907			1907
	1914	0		0			1914
	1930	1930		1930			1930
	1939	0		0			1939
	1994	0	0	1994	1994	0	1994
	2008	2008	2008				2008
Germany	0	1873					1873
	1880	0					1880
	1891	1891		0			1891
	1901	1901		1901			1901
	0	1907		0			1907
	1925	0		0			1925
	1929	1931		1931			1929
	1977	0	0	0	late 1970s		1977
	2008	2008	2008		0		2008

Continued on next page

Table A1: Narrative Crises

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Country	Reinhart Rogoff	Schularick Taylor	Laeven Valencia	Bordo et al.	Caprio Klingebiel	Demirgüç-Kunt Detrag.	Narrative Crises
Greece	1931			1931			1931
	1991		0	1991	1991	0	1991
	2008		2008				2008
Hong Kong	1982		0	1982	1982		1982
	1983		0	1983	1983		1983
	1998		0		1998		1998
Hungary	1931						1931
	1991		1991		1991	0	1991
	2008		2008				2008
Iceland	1985		0	1985	1985	0	1985
	1993		0	1993	1993	0	1993
	2007		2008				2007
India	1908						1908
	1913						1913
	1921						1921
	1929						1929
	1947						1947
	1993		1993	1993	1993	1991	1991
Indonesia	1992		0	0	0	1992	1992
	1994		0	1994	1994	0	1994
	1997		1997	1997	1997	1997	1997
Ireland	2007		2008				2007
Israel	1977		1977	1977	1977	0	1977
	1983		0	counted above	counted above	1983	1983
Italy	0	1873					1873
	1887	1887					1887
	1891	0		1891			1891
	1893	1893		1893			1893
	1907	1907		1907			1907
	1914	0		1914			1914
	1921	1921		1921			1921
	1930	1930		1930			1930
	1935	1935		1935			1935
	1990	1990	0	1990	1990	1990	1990
	2008	2008	2008				2008
Japan	1872	1871					1871
	1882	0					1882
	0	1890		0			1890
	1901	0		1901			1901
	1907	1907		1907			1907
	1914	0		0			1914
	1917	0		1917			1917
	0	1920		0			1920
	1923	0		0			1923
	1927	1927		1927			1927
	1992			1992	1991	1992	1991
	counted above	1997	1997	counted above	counted above	counted above	1997
Korea	1983		0	0	0	0	1983
	1986		0	0	0	0	1986
	1997		1997	1997	1997	1997	1997
Luxembourg			2008				2008

Continued on next page

Table A1: Narrative Crises

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Country	Reinhart Rogoff	Schularick Taylor	Laeven Valencia	Bordo et al.	Caprio Klingebiel	Demirgüç-Kunt Detrag.	Narrative Crises
Malaysia	1985		0	1985	1985	1985	1985
	1997		1997	1997	1997	1997	1997
Mexico	1883						1883
	1893						1893
	1908						1908
	1913						1913
	1920						1920
	1929						1929
	1981		1981	1981	1981	0	1981
	1982		counted above	0	counted above	1982	1982
	1992		0	0	0	0	1992
	1994		1994	1995	1994	1994	1994
Netherlands	0	1893		0			1893
	1897	0		1897			1897
	0	1907		0			1907
	1914	0		1914			1914
	1921	1921		1921			1921
	1939	1939		1939			1939
	2008	2008	2008				2008
New Zealand	1890						1890
	1893						1893
	1987		0	1987	1987	0	1987
Norway	1898	1899		0			1898
	1914	0		0			1914
	1921	1922		1921			1921
	1927	0		0			1927
	1931	1931		1931			1931
	1936	0		0			1936
	1987	1988	1991	1987	1987	1987	1987
Peru	1872						1872
	1983		1983	1983	1983	1983	1983
	1999		0		0	0	1999
Philippines	1981		1983	1983	1981	1981	1981
	1997		1997		1998	1998	1997
Portugal	1890	1890		1891			1890
	1920	1920		1920			1920
	1923	1923		1923			1923
	1931	1931		1931			1931
	0	0	0	0	0	1986	1986
	2008	2008	2008				2008
Russia	1875						1875
	1896						1896
	1995		0		1995	0	1995
	1998		1998		1998	0	1998
	2008		2008				2008
Singapore	1982		0	1982	1982		1982
South Africa	1877						1877
	1881						1881
	1890						1890
	1977		0	1977	1977		1977
	0		0	0	0	1985	1985

Continued on next page

Table A1: Narrative Crises

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Country	Reinhart Rogoff	Schularick Taylor	Laeven Valencia	Bordo et al.	Caprio Klingebiel	Demirgüç-Kunt Detrag.	Narrative Crises
	1989		0	0	1989	0	1989
Spain	0	1883					1883
	0	1890		0			1890
	0	1913		0			1913
	1920	1920		1920			1920
	1924	1924		1924			1924
	1931	1931		1931			1931
	1977	1977	1977	1977	1977		1977
	2008	2008	2008				2008
Sweden	1876	1878					1876
	1897	0		1897			1897
	1907	1907		1907			1907
	1922	1922		0			1922
	1931	1931		1931			1931
	1991	1991	1991	1991	1991	1990	1990
	2008	2008	2008				2008
Switzerland	1870	1870					1870
	1910	1910		0			1910
	1921	0		0			1921
	1931	1931		1931			1931
	1933	0		1933			1933
	0	1991	0	0	0	0	1991
	2008	2008	2008				2008
Taiwan	1923						1923
	1927						1927
	1983			1983	1983	0	1983
	1995			1995	1995	0	1995
	1997			1997	1997	1997	1997
Thailand	1979		0	0	0		1979
	1983		1983	1983	1983	1983	1983
	1996		1997	1997	1997	1997	1996
Turkey	1931						1931
	1982		1982	1982	1982	1982	1982
	1991		0	0	0	1991	1991
	1994		0	1994	1994	1994	1994
	2000		2000		2000	2000	2000
U.K.	1878	0					1878
	1890	1890		1890			1890
	1908	0		0			1908
	1914	0		0			1914
	1974	1974	0	1974	1974		1974
	1984	0	0	0	1980s-90s	0	1984
	1991	1991	0	0	0	0	1991
	1995	0	0	0	0	0	1995
	2007	2007	2007				2007
U.S.	1873	1873					1873
	1884	0		1884			1884
	1890	0		0			1890
	1893	1893		1893			1893
	1907	1907		1907			1907
	1914	0		1914			1914

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Table A1: Narrative Crises

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Country	Reinhart Rogoff	Schularick Taylor	Laeven Valencia	Bordo et al.	Caprio Klingebiel	Demirgüç-Kunt Detrag.	Narrative Crises
	1929	1929		1930			1929
	1984	1984	1988	1984	1984	1980	1984
	counted above	counted above	counted above	0	counted above	counted above	1990
	2007	2007	2007				2007
Venezuela	1978		0	1978	late 1970s		1978
	1993		1994	1994	1994	1993	1993
	2009		0				2009

Table A2: Master List of Episodes

This table reports the master list of episodes, which is intended to be a very broad list of potential crises, many of which may not necessarily be "banking crises" according to any definition. The master list of episodes is the union of: i) the Narrative Crises list defined in Table A1, and ii) years in which the bank equity real total return index cumulatively declines by more than 30% (relative to its previous peak). The year of each episode, reported in column (2), is defined as the first year in which the bank equity index cumulatively falls by more than 30% from its previous peak. In cases in which the bank equity index does not decline by 30% or more, the year in column (2) is the year from the Narrative Crises list. Column (3) indicates whether the episode is a Narrative Crisis. If the year from the Narrative Crisis list is different from the year defined by the bank equity decline (column (2)), that is also indicated in column (3). Column (5) indicates the presence or absence of a banking "panic," which is defined in the main text. Column (6) records the starting month of the panic, according to narrative accounts. Column (7) records whether there is a 30% cumulative bank equity decline associated with a given episode (or blank if there is no bank equity data). Column (8) indicates the presence or absence of narrative evidence of widespread bank failures, which is defined in the main text. Column (9) records whether the episode is included on the BVX Crisis List.

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Country	Year by bank eq. decline	Narrative Crisis (Narrative start year, if different)	Excluded due to war	Panic	Panic month	Bank eq. 30% cumulative decline	Widespread bank failures	BVX Crisis List
Argentina	1885	1		0		0	0	
	1891	1890		1	March 1890	1	1	1
	1914	1	1	1	July 1914	1	0	1
	1930	1931		1	April 1931	1	0	1
	1934	1		1	September 1934	1	1	1
	1980	1		1	March 1980		1	1
	1985	1		1	May 1985		1	1
	1989	1		1	April 1989		1	1
	1995	1		1	December 1994	1	1	1
	2000	2001		1	March 2001	1	1	1
	2008			0		1	0	
	2011			0		1	0	
Australia	1893	1		1	April 1893	1	1	1
	1931	1		1	April 1931	0	0	1
	1952			0		1	0	
	1974			0		1	0	
	1989	1		1	March 1990	0	1	1
	2008			0		1	0	
Austria	1873	1		1	May 1873	1	1	1
	1888			0		1	0	
	1920			0		1	0	
	1924	1		0		1	1	1
	1931	1929, 1931		1	May 1931	1	1	1
	1966			0		1	0	
	1982			0		1	0	
	1995			0		1	0	
	2008	1		1	September 2008	1	1	1
	2011			0		1	1	1
Belgium	1870	1		1	July 1870	0	0	1
	1876			1	March 1876	1	1	1

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Table A2: Master List of Episodes

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Country	Year by bank eq. decline	Narrative Crisis (Narrative start year, if different)	Excluded due to war	Panic	Panic month	Bank eq. 30% cumulative decline	Widespread bank failures	BVX Crisis List
	1883	1885		1		0	1	1
	1914	1	1	1	July 1914		1	1
	1925	1		0		0	0	
	1929	1931, 1934		1	May 1931	1	1	1
	1939	1	1	1	December 1939		1	1
	1974			0		1	0	
	1980			0		1	0	
	2002			0		1	0	
	2008	1		1	September 2008	1	1	1
	2011			0		1	1	1
Brazil	1890	1		1	December 1890	0	1	1
	1897	1		0		0	0	
	1900	1		1	October 1900	0	1	1
	1914	1	1	1	July 1914	1	0	1
	1923	1		0		0	0	
	1926	1		0		0	0	
	1929	1		1	June 1932	0	0	1
	1953			0		1	0	
	1957			0		1	0	
	1962	1963		0			0	
	1985	1		1	September 1985		1	1
	1990	1		1	February 1990		0	1
	1994	1		1	July 1994		1	1
	1998			0		1	0	
	2008			0		1	0	
	2012			0		1	0	
Canada	1873	1		1	July 1879	0	1	1
	1906	1		0		0	0	
	1907	1		0		0	1	
	1912	1		0		0	0	
	1920	1923		1	December 1921	1	1	1
	1932			0		1	0	
	1974			0		1	0	
	1982	1		1	July 1982	0	1	1
	2008			0		1	0	
Chile	1878			1	December 1877		1	1
	1889	1		0		0	0	
	1898	1		1	July 1898	0	1	1
	1907	1		1	October 1907		1	1
	1914	1	1	1	July 1914		0	1
	1925	1		1	December 1925		1	1
	1931			1	June 1932	1	1	1
	1954			0		1	0	
	1962			0		1	0	
	1970			0		1	0	

Continued on next page

Table A2: Master List of Episodes

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Country	Year by bank eq. decline	Narrative Crisis (Narrative start year, if different)	Excluded due to war	Panic	Panic month	Bank eq. 30% cumulative decline	Widespread bank failures	BVX Crisis List
	1976	1		1	June 1975	0	1	1
	1982	1980		1	September 1981	1	1	1
	1998			0		1	0	
Colombia	1931			1	June 1929	1	0	1
	1972			0		1	0	
	1982	1		0		1	1	1
	1998	1		1	June 1998	1	1	1
	2008			0		1	0	
Czech	1923			1	May 1923		1	1
	1931	1		0		0	0	
	1991	1		1	April 1994		1	1
	1995	1996		1	June 2000	1	1	1
Denmark	1877	1		1		0	1	1
	1885	1		1	September 1885	0	1	1
	1902	1		0		0	0	
	1907	1		1	February 1908	0	1	1
	1914	1	1	0			0	
	1919	1921		1	September 1922	1	1	1
	1931	1		0		0	0	
	1974			0		1	0	
	1992	1987		0		1	1	1
	2008	1		1	September 2008	1	1	1
	2011			0		1	1	1
Egypt	1907	1		1	May 1907	0	1	1
	1914		1	1	July 1914	1	0	1
	1931	1		1	July 1931	1	1	1
	1980	1		0			0	
	1990	1		0			0	
Finland	1877	1		0			0	
	1900	1		1	November 1900		1	1
	1921	1		0		1	1	1
	1931	1		1	October 1931	0	1	1
	1939	1	1	0		0	0	
	1974			0		1	0	
	1990	1991		1	September 1991	1	1	1
	2002			0		1	0	
	2008			0		1	0	
France	1871	1	1	1			0	1
	1882	1		1	January 1882	1	1	1
	1889	1		1	March 1889	0	1	1
	1904	1		0		0	0	
	1907	1		0		0	0	
	1914	1	1	1	July 1914	1	0	1
	1919			0		1	0	
	1930	1		1	October 1930	1	1	1

Continued on next page

Table A2: Master List of Episodes

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Country	Year by bank eq. decline	Narrative Crisis (Narrative start year, if different)	Excluded due to war	Panic	Panic month	Bank eq. 30% cumulative decline	Widespread bank failures	BVX Crisis List
	1937			1	September 1938	1	0	1
	1939	1	1	0		0	0	
	1974			0		1	0	
	1987			0		1	0	
	1994	1		0		0	1	
	2008	1		1	September 2008	1	0	1
	2011			0		1	0	
Germany	1874	1873		1	October 1873	1	1	1
	1880	1		0		0	0	
	1891	1		1	September 1891	0	1	1
	1901	1		1	June 1901	0	1	1
	1907	1		0		0	0	
	1914		1	1	July 1914		0	1
	1920			0		1	0	
	1925	1		0		0	0	
	1930	1929		1	April 1931	1	1	1
	1962			0		1	0	
	1973			0		1	0	
	1977	1		0		0	0	
	1987			0		1	0	
	2002			0		1	0	
	2008	1		1	September 2008	1	1	1
	2011			0		1	0	
Greece	1929	1931		1	September 1931	1	1	1
	1973			0		1	0	
	1980			0		1	0	
	1988			0		1	0	
	1992	1991		0		1	0	
	2001			0		1	0	
	2008	1		1	September 2008	1	0	1
	2010			1	August 2011	1	1	1
Hong Kong	1874			0		1	0	
	1892			1	March 1892	1	1	1
	1950			0		1	0	
	1965			1	February 1965	0	1	1
	1974			0		1	0	
	1982	1982, 1983		1	September 1983	1	1	1
	1991			1	July 1991	0	0	1
	1998	1		1	January 1998	1	1	1
	2011			0		1	0	
Hungary	1873			1	July 1873	1	1	1
	1883			0		1	0	
	1924			0		1	0	
	1931	1		1	October 1930		1	1
	1991	1		0			1	1

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Table A2: Master List of Episodes

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Country	Year by bank eq. decline	Narrative Crisis (Narrative start year, if different)	Excluded due to war	Panic	Panic month	Bank eq. 30% cumulative decline	Widespread bank failures	BVX Crisis List
	1995			1	February 1997	1	1	1
	2008	1		1	September 2008	1	0	1
	2011			0		1	0	
Iceland	1920			1	Late 1920	1	1	1
	1930			1	February 1930	1	1	1
	1985	1		0			1	1
	1993	1		0			1	1
	2008	2007		1	September 2008	1	1	1
India	1908	1		0		0	0	
	1913	1		1	November 1913	0	1	1
	1920	1921		0		1	1	1
	1929	1		0		0	0	
	1947	1	1	0			0	
	1993	1991		0		1	1	1
	1998			0		1	0	
	2011			0		1	0	
Indonesia	1990	1992, 1994		1	November 1992	1	1	1
	1998	1997		1	January 1998	1	1	1
Ireland	1974			0		1	0	
	1990			0		1	0	
	2007	1		1	September 2008	1	1	1
	2010			1	November 2010	1	1	1
	2016			0		1	0	
Israel	1977	1		0		0	0	
	1983	1		0		1	1	1
	1988			0		1	0	
	2002			0		1	0	
	2008			0		1	0	
	2011			0		1	0	
Italy	1873	1		1		0	1	1
	1889	1887		1	August 1889	1	1	1
	1891	1891, 1893		1	November 1893	1	1	1
	1907	1		1	September 1907	1	1	1
	1914	1	1	1	July 1914	1	1	1
	1921	1		1	November 1921	1	1	1
	1930	1		1	December 1930	0	1	1
	1935	1		0			0	
	1962			0		1	0	
	1974			0		1	0	
	1982			0		1	0	
	1992	1990		0		1	1	1
	2001			0		1	0	
	2008	1		1	September 2008	1	0	1
	2011			0		1	1	1
	2016			0		1	1	1

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Table A2: Master List of Episodes

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Country	Year by bank eq. decline	Narrative Crisis (Narrative start year, if different)	Excluded due to war	Panic	Panic month	Bank eq. 30% cumulative decline	Widespread bank failures	BVX Crisis List
Japan	1871	1		1	August 1871		1	1
	1882	1		1			1	1
	1890	1		1			1	1
	1901	1		1	April 1901	0	1	1
	1907	1		1	February 1907	1	1	1
	1914	1	1	0		0	0	
	1917	1	1	0		0	0	
	1920	1		1	April 1920	1	1	1
	1922			1	February 1922	1	1	1
	1923	1		1	September 1923	1	1	1
	1927	1		1	March 1927	0	1	1
	1953			0		1	0	
	1974			0		1	0	
	1990	1991		0		1	1	1
	1997	1		1	November 1997	1	1	1
	2001			0		1	1	1
	2008			0		1	0	
Korea	1976			0		1	0	
	1984	1983		0		1	0	
	1986	1		0		0	0	
	1990			0		1	0	
	1997	1		1	October 1997	1	1	1
	2008			0		1	0	
Luxembourg	1879			0		1	0	
	1924			0		1	0	
	1930			0		1	0	
	2008	1		1	September 2008	1	1	1
	2012			0		1	0	
Malaysia	1973			0		1	0	
	1985	1		1	July 1985	1	1	1
	1997	1		1	August 1997	1	1	1
	2008			0		1	0	
Mexico	1883	1		1	March 1883		1	1
	1893	1		1		1	0	1
	1908	1		0		0	1	
	1913	1	1	1	November 1913		1	1
	1921	1920		1	December 1920		1	1
	1924			0		1	0	
	1928	1929		1	July 1931	1	1	1
	1974			0		1	0	
	1981	1981, 1982		1	September 1982		1	1
	1992	1		0		0	0	
	1994	1		1	December 1994	1	1	1
	1998			0		1	0	
Netherlands	1893	1		0		0	0	

Continued on next page

Table A2: Master List of Episodes

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Country	Year by bank eq. decline	Narrative Crisis (Narrative start year, if different)	Excluded due to war	Panic	Panic month	Bank eq. 30% cumulative decline	Widespread bank failures	BVX Crisis List
	1897	1		0		0	0	
	1907	1		1	November 1907	0	1	1
	1914	1	1	1	July 1914		0	1
	1921	1		0		1	1	1
	1931			0		1	1	1
	1939	1	1	0			0	
	1957			0		1	0	
	1965			0		1	0	
	1987			0		1	0	
	2002			0		1	0	
	2008	1		1	September 2008	1	1	1
	2011			0		1	0	
New Zealand	1888	1893		1	January 1893	1	1	1
	1931			0		1	0	
	1960			0		1	0	
	1984			0		1	0	
	1987	1		1	August 1988	1	1	1
	1998			0		1	0	
	2008			0		1	0	
Norway	1898	1		1	June 1899		1	1
	1914	1	1	1	July 1914		0	1
	1919	1921		1	April 1923	1	1	1
	1927	1		0		0	0	
	1931	1		1	December 1931	0	1	1
	1936	1		0		0	0	
	1951			0		1	0	
	1964			0		1	0	
	1971			0		1	0	
	1987	1		1	October 1991	1	1	1
	2008			1	September 2008	1	0	1
Peru	1876	1872		1	August 1875	1	1	1
	1914		1	1	July 1914	1	0	1
	1931			1	October 1930	1	1	1
	1981	1983		0		1	1	1
	1987			0		1	0	
	1998	1999		0		1	1	1
Philippines	1971			1	June 1974	1	0	1
	1981	1		1	January 1981	1	1	1
	1997	1		0		1	1	1
	2008			0		1	0	
Portugal	1876			1	August 1876		1	1
	1890	1		1	May 1891		1	1
	1921	1920		1		1	1	1
	1923	1		1		1	1	1
	1931	1		1	November 1930	1	1	1

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Table A2: Master List of Episodes

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Country	Year by bank eq. decline	Narrative Crisis (Narrative start year, if different)	Excluded due to war	Panic	Panic month	Bank eq. 30% cumulative decline	Widespread bank failures	BVX Crisis List
	1956			0		1	0	
	1986	1		0			0	
	2002			0		1	0	
	2008	1		1	September 2008	1	1	1
	2011			0		1	1	1
	2014			0		1	1	1
Russia	1875	1		1	October 1875	0	1	1
	1900	1896		1	August 1899	1	1	1
	1995	1		1	August 1995		1	1
	1998	1		1	August 1998	1	1	1
	2008	1		1	September 2008	1	1	1
Singapore	1973			0		1	0	
	1982	1		0		0	0	
	1877	1		0		0	0	
	1881	1		1		0	1	1
	1890	1		1	September 1890	0	1	1
	1920			0		1	0	
	1969			0		1	0	
	1973			0		1	0	
	1977	1		0		0	0	
	1984	1985		0		1	0	
	1989	1		0		0	0	
Spain	1882	1883		1	February 1882	1	1	1
	1890	1		1	November 1890	0	1	1
	1913	1		1	December 1913	0	1	1
	1920	1		1	November 1920	0	1	1
	1924	1		1	September 1924	0	1	1
	1931	1		1	April 1931	1	1	1
	1958			0		1	0	
	1971			0		1	0	
	1975	1977		0		1	1	1
	1991			0		1	0	
	2002			0		1	0	
	2008	1		1	September 2008	1	1	1
	2010			0		1	1	1
Sweden	1878	1876		1	December 1878		1	1
	1897	1		0		0	0	
	1907	1		1	October 1907	0	1	1
	1919	1922		0		1	1	1
	1932	1931		0		1	0	
	1991	1990		1	September 1992	1	1	1
	2002			0		1	0	
	2008	1		1	September 2008	1	1	1
Switzerland	1870	1		1	July 1870	0	1	1
	1910	1		0		0	1	

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Table A2: Master List of Episodes

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Country	Year by bank eq. decline	Narrative Crisis (Narrative start year, if different)	Excluded due to war	Panic	Panic month	Bank eq. 30% cumulative decline	Widespread bank failures	BVX Crisis List
	1914		1	1	July 1914		0	1
	1919	1921		0		1	1	1
	1931	1931, 1933		1	July 1931	1	1	1
	1963			0		1	0	
	1974			0		1	0	
	1987			0		1	0	
	1990	1991		1	October 1991	1	1	1
	2008	1		1	September 2008	1	0	1
Taiwan	1923	1		1	September 1923		0	1
	1927	1		1	April 1927		1	1
	1983	1		1	August 1985		1	1
	1990			0		1	0	
	1995	1		1	July 1995	1	1	1
	1998	1997		0		1	1	1
	2008			0		1	0	
Thailand	1979	1		0		1	1	1
	1983	1		1	October 1983	0	1	1
	1997	1996		1	May 1996	1	1	1
	2008			0		1	0	
Turkey	1875			0		1	0	
	1883			0		1	0	
	1914		1	1	August 1914	1	1	1
	1930	1931		1	July 1931	1	1	1
	1974			0		1	0	
	1980	1982		1	November 1983	1	1	1
	1988			0		1	0	
	1991	1		1	January 1991	1	0	1
	1994	1		1	April 1994	0	1	1
	1998			0		1	0	
	2001	2000		1	November 2000	1	1	1
	2008			0		1	0	
	2011			0		1	0	
U.K.	1878	1		1	September 1878	0	1	1
	1890	1		1	November 1890	0	0	1
	1908	1		0		0	0	
	1914	1	1	1	July 1914	1	0	1
	1951			0		1	0	
	1973	1974		1	February 1974	1	1	1
	1984	1		0		0	0	
	1991	1		1	July 1991	0	1	1
	1995	1		0		0	0	
	2008	2007		1	September 2008	1	1	1
	2011			0		1	0	
U.S.	1873	1		1	September 1873	0	1	1
	1884	1		1	May 1884	0	1	1

Continued on next page

Table A2: Master List of Episodes

(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)
Country	Year by bank eq. decline	Narrative Crisis (Narrative start year, if different)	Excluded due to war	Panic	Panic month	Bank eq. 30% cumulative decline	Widespread bank failures	BVX Crisis List
	1890	1		1	November 1890	0	1	1
	1893	1		1	May 1893	0	1	1
	1907	1		1	October 1907	1	1	1
	1914	1	1	0		0	0	
	1930	1929		1	November 1930	1	1	1
	1937			0		1	0	
	1974			0		1	0	
	1984	1		1	May 1984	0	1	1
	1990	1		0		1	1	1
	2007	1		1	September 2008	1	1	1
Venezuela	1960			0		1	0	
	1981	1978		1	December 1978	1	1	1
	1988			0		1	0	
	1992	1993		1	October 1993	1	1	1
	1998			0		1	0	
	2008	2009		1	November 2009	1	1	1
	2014			0		1	0	

Table A3: Bank Equity Return Bins, Real GDP, and Credit-to-GDP

This table presents the predictive content of bank equity return bins for real GDP growth and the change in credit-to-GDP. The table corresponds to the estimates in Figure II at the three year horizon. Nonfinancial equity bin controls refer to the same bins in nonfinancial equity returns from $t-1$ to t. Other controls refer to contemporaneous real GDP growth and credit-to-GDP change, three lags of real GDP growth and credit-to-GDP change, as well as three lags of the bank and nonfinancial equity return bins. t-statistics in brackets are computed from standard errors double-clustered on country and year. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.

	Real GDP growth$_{t,t+3}$			Credit-GDP change$_{t,t+3}$		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
$r^B_{it} \leq -45\%$	-0.065***	-0.036***	-0.042***	-0.12***	-0.080***	-0.069***
	[-4.00]	[-2.78]	[-3.23]	[-4.81]	[-3.81]	[-3.13]
$-45\% < r^B_{it} \leq -30\%$	-0.039***	-0.025***	-0.025***	-0.071***	-0.058***	-0.055***
	[-4.38]	[-2.92]	[-3.81]	[-4.18]	[-3.26]	[-3.06]
$-30\% < r^B_{it} \leq -15\%$	-0.022***	-0.017**	-0.016***	-0.031***	-0.019*	-0.022**
	[-3.09]	[-2.59]	[-3.06]	[-3.98]	[-1.94]	[-2.25]
$-15\% < r^B_{it} \leq 0\%$	-0.0052	-0.0032	-0.0043	-0.013**	-0.0070	-0.0074
	[-1.23]	[-0.90]	[-1.39]	[-2.38]	[-0.98]	[-0.98]
$15\% < r^B_{it} \leq 30\%$	-0.0021	-0.0017	-0.0011	0.012	0.010	0.0083
	[-0.33]	[-0.30]	[-0.21]	[1.47]	[1.21]	[1.13]
$30\% < r^B_{it} \leq 45\%$	-0.0040	-0.000095	-0.0016	0.025	0.024	0.022
	[-0.61]	[-0.015]	[-0.23]	[1.61]	[1.43]	[1.47]
$r^B_{it} > 45\%$	0.0025	0.00073	0.0035	0.016	0.014	0.013
	[0.31]	[0.100]	[0.51]	[1.48]	[1.33]	[1.20]
Country fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Nonfin. eq. bins	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Other controls		✓	✓		✓	✓
Year fixed effects			✓			✓
Adj. R^2 (within)	0.06	0.17	0.10	0.04	0.17	0.15
N	2548	2548	2548	2536	2536	2536

Table A4: Bank Equity Returns, Output, and Credit: Alternative Specifications

This table presents the predictive content of bank and nonfinancial equity continuous returns for real GDP growth and the change in credit-to-GDP. Both outcome variables are measured from years t to $t+3$. The table also shows that the predictive content of bank equity returns is nonlinear by including quadratic terms (columns (2) and (5)) and by separately estimating the predictive content of positive and negative bank and nonfinancial equity returns (columns (3) and (6)). Controls variables are contemporaneous real GDP growth and credit-to-GDP change, three lags of real GDP growth and credit-to-GDP change, as well as three lags of the independent variables reported in each respective column. t-statistics in brackets are computed from standard errors double-clustered on country and year. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.

	Real GDP growth$_{t,t+3}$			Credit-to-GDP change$_{t,t+3}$		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Bank eq. ret.	0.027***	0.041***		0.052***	0.075***	
	[3.18]	[4.25]		[3.00]	[3.74]	
(Bank eq. ret.)^2		-0.033***			-0.048**	
		[-2.98]			[-2.33]	
Nonfin. eq. ret.	0.018**	0.025**		-0.0029	-0.013	
	[2.12]	[2.04]		[-0.23]	[-0.64]	
(Nonfin. eq. ret.)^2		-0.015			0.017	
		[-0.97]			[0.71]	
Positive bank eq. ret.			0.0050			0.030*
			[0.48]			[1.70]
Negative bank eq. ret.			0.078***			0.11***
			[5.30]			[3.25]
Positive nonfin. eq. ret.			0.013			0.010
			[1.12]			[0.59]
Negative nonfin. eq. ret.			0.028			-0.042
			[1.23]			[-1.38]
Country fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Adj. R^2 (within)	0.13	0.14	0.14	0.14	0.15	0.15
N	2548	2548	2548	2536	2536	2536

Table A5: Bank Equity Crashes and Subsequent GDP and Credit Growth: Subsample Analysis

This table is similar to Table I but estimates Equation (2) on various subsamples. A bank (nonfinancial) equity crash is defined as an annual return of less than -30% of the bank (nonfinancial) equity total return index. Control variables are contemporaneous real GDP growth and credit-to-GDP change, as well as three lags of the bank equity crash, nonfinancial equity crash, credit-to-GDP change, and real GDP growth. t-statistics in brackets are computed from standard errors double-clustered on country and year. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.

Panel A: Real GDP growth from year t to $t+3$

	Pre-1939		1946-1970		1971-2016	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Bank equity crash	-0.018	-0.026	-0.027***	-0.034**	-0.042***	-0.035***
	[-0.91]	[-1.37]	[-4.08]	[-2.59]	[-5.17]	[-5.04]
Nonfinancial equity crash	-0.12**	-0.10**	-0.011***	-0.0037	-0.017*	-0.016
	[-2.46]	[-2.55]	[-22.6]	[-0.27]	[-1.84]	[-1.45]
Country fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls		✓		✓		✓
Adj. R^2 (within)	0.05	0.17	0.01	0.10	0.06	0.13
N	545	545	523	523	1478	1478

Panel B: Credit-to-GDP change from year t to $t+3$

	Pre-1939		1946-1970		1971-2016	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Bank equity crash	-0.036	-0.0087	-0.028***	-0.025***	-0.093***	-0.067***
	[-1.45]	[-0.41]	[-5.14]	[-5.15]	[-5.24]	[-4.68]
Nonfinancial equity crash	-0.0052	-0.0065	0.0087	0.018	0.0098	-0.00019
	[-0.25]	[-0.45]	[1.68]	[1.64]	[0.87]	[-0.012]
Country fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls		✓		✓		✓
Adj. R^2 (within)	0.00	0.19	0.00	0.03	0.04	0.18
N	544	544	523	523	1466	1466

Table A6: Bank Equity Captures the Symptoms and Severity of Banking Crises

This table shows that bank equity peak-to-trough declines during Narrative Crises are correlated with characteristics of banking crises and their economic severity. The table reports estimates from Equation (A1), which regresses various dependent variables (in the various columns) on the bank equity peak-to-trough decline (which is always a negative number, if there is a decline, or zero, if there is no decline). Each observation is an individual Narrative Crisis episode. We control for an indicator variable that equals one in the post-1945 sample, as prewar data tends to be more volatile, but results are similar without this indicator. The sample size in different columns varies due to data availability of the dependent variable. t-statistics in brackets are computed using robust standard errors. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.

Panel A: Severity of banking crises – Real GDP

	Real GDP (peak-to-trough decline)	Real GDP growth (%.-pt. decline, peak-to-trough)	Real GDP growth (max deviation from trend)
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Bank equity peak-to-trough decline	0.139***	0.130***	0.0906***
	[5.488]	[6.594]	[4.890]
Post-1945 dummy	✓	✓	✓
Adj. R^2 (within)	0.186	0.195	0.131
N	183	183	183

Panel B: Characteristics of banking crises

	Decline in deposits (prewar only)	Failed banks (% of total bank assets)	Largest banks failing	NPL at peak
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Bank equity peak-to-tr. decline	0.314***	-0.476***	-0.631***	-0.221**
	[3.152]	[-3.282]	[-2.620]	[-2.290]
Post-1945 dummy	✓	✓	✓	✓
Adj. R^2 (within)	0.133	0.084	0.053	0.058
N	56	67	127	71
	Significant liability guarantees	Significant liquidity support	Banks nationalized	Govt equity injections
	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Bank equity peak-to-tr. decline	-0.464*	-0.882***	-0.794***	-1.519***
	[-1.935]	[-3.935]	[-2.833]	[-6.159]
Post-1945 dummy	✓	✓	✓	✓
Adj. R^2 (within)	0.021	0.104	0.077	0.282
N	135	142	110	94

Table A7: Alternative Measures of Bank Equity Declines

This table is similar to Table A6 but uses alternate measures of bank equity declines as the independent variable. In Panel A, the independent variable is the *abnormal bank equity decline*, which is defined as the peak-to-trough decline of the bank equity total return minus nonfinancial equity total return. In Panel B, the independent variable is *bank market capitalization decline*, defined as the peak-to-trough decline in an index defined by annual returns of (1+bank equity price returns)·(1+bank equity new issuance). Panel C has two independent variables: *bank equity peak-to-trough decline* (as in Table A6) and *bank equity recovery* (positive returns in the bank equity total returns index subsequent to the trough within three years after a banking crisis).

Panel A: Abnormal bank equity decline (i.e. bank equity minus nonfinancial equity returns)

	Real GDP (peak-to-trough decline)	Real GDP growth (%.-pt. decline, peak-to-trough)	Real GDP growth (max deviation from trend)
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Abnormal bank decline	0.0569***	0.0480***	0.0385***
	[3.273]	[3.500]	[3.243]
Post-1945 dummy	✓	✓	✓
Adj. R^2 (within)	0.0704	0.0585	0.0529
N	174	174	174

Panel B: Bank market capitalization decline

	Real GDP (peak-to-trough decline)	Real GDP growth (%.-pt. decline, peak-to-trough)	Real GDP growth (max deviation from trend)
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Bank market cap decline	0.109***	0.0829***	0.0763***
	[4.046]	[4.912]	[5.181]
Post-1945 dummy	✓	✓	✓
Adj. R^2 (within)	0.234	0.194	0.212
N	78	78	78

Panel C: Bank equity recoveries

	Real GDP (peak-to-trough decline)	Real GDP growth (%.-pt. decline, peak-to-trough)	Real GDP growth (max deviation from trend)
	(1)	(2)	(3)
Bank equity decline	0.143***	0.125***	0.0856***
	[4.581]	[5.638]	[4.238]
Bank equity recovery	0.00973	-0.0134	-0.0120
	[0.364]	[-0.647]	[-0.591]
Post-1945 dummy	✓	✓	✓
Adj. R^2 (within)	0.182	0.193	0.128
N	183	183	183

Table A8: Impact of Bank Equity Crashes Outside of Narrative Crises

This table shows that bank equity crashes predict output gaps and credit contraction even outside of narrative-based banking crisis episodes. *Narrative crisis* is an indicator that equals one within a ±3-year window around a crisis on the list of Narrative Crises. The specification controls for country fixed effects, contemporaneous real GDP growth and change in credit-to-GDP, and three lags of real GDP growth, change in credit-to-GDP, and all right-hand-side variables in the table. t-statistics in brackets are computed from standard errors double-clustered on country and year. *,**,*** indicate significance at the 0.1, 0.05, and 0.01 levels, respectively.

Panel A: Real GDP growth

	Real GDP growth$_{t,t+1}$		Real GDP growth$_{t,t+3}$	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Bank equity crash	-0.024***	-0.021***	-0.028***	-0.026***
	[-5.64]	[-4.48]	[-4.82]	[-3.05]
Narrative crisis	-0.0034	-0.0029	-0.031***	-0.030***
	[-1.16]	[-0.93]	[-3.34]	[-3.11]
Bank eq. crash × Narrative crisis		-0.0061		-0.0047
		[-0.96]		[-0.33]
Nonfinancial equity crash	-0.021***	-0.021***	-0.028***	-0.028***
	[-4.12]	[-4.14]	[-2.94]	[-2.94]
Country fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓
Adj. R^2 (within)	0.20	0.20	0.16	0.16
N	2548	2548	2548	2548

Panel B: Credit-to-GDP change

	Credit/GDP change$_{t,t+1}$		Credit/GDP change$_{t,t+3}$	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Bank equity crash	-0.0086	0.0011	-0.046***	-0.016
	[-1.37]	[0.17]	[-3.90]	[-1.20]
Narrative crisis	0.017***	0.018***	0.046***	0.051***
	[2.76]	[2.90]	[3.30]	[3.64]
Bank eq. crash × Narrative crisis		-0.018*		-0.058***
		[-1.86]		[-3.04]
Nonfinancial equity crash	0.0070	0.0068	0.0045	0.0037
	[1.58]	[1.54]	[0.34]	[0.29]
Country fixed effects	✓	✓	✓	✓
Controls	✓	✓	✓	✓
Adj. R^2 (within)	0.24	0.24	0.17	0.18
N	2535	2535	2536	2536

Table A9: Timing of Bank Equity Crashes Relative to Panics, Credit Spread Spikes, and Nonfinancial Equity Crashes: Robustness on the Sample of Narrative Crises

This table shows that the results reported in Table III are robust to conducting the analysis on the sample of Narrative Crises instead of the BVX Crisis List.

Panel A: Bank equity crashes detect the crisis before panics, narrative crisis dates, and credit spread spikes

	Before panic	Before Reinhart-Rogoff start dates	Before earliest narrative start dates	Before 2% spike in bank credit spread	Before 1% spike in bank credit spread	Before 2% spike in corp credit spread	Before 1% spike in corp credit spread
Average (in months, signed)	7.49***	2.95**	2.60**	6.18***	3.44**	9.68***	5.84***
t-stat	4.68	2.36	2.22	6.14	2.03	8.76	2.86
N	85	97	106	40	41	19	19
Pos	63	38	32	32	23	17	13
Zero	5	36	57	4	2	1	0
Neg	17	23	17	4	16	1	6
Pos / (Pos + Neg)	78.8%***	62.3%**	65.3%**	88.8%***	59.0%	94.4%***	68.4%*
p-value	0.000	0.036	0.022	0.000	0.168	0.000	0.084

Panel B: Bank equity crashes pick up the crisis first before nonfinancial equity crashes

	Before nonfin. eq. crash	Bank equity peak before nonfin eq peak	Duration of bank equity decline
Average (in months, signed)	1.02	0.64	26.85***
t-stat	1.12	0.82	24.42
N	132	148	151
Pos	66	61	Duration $\geq$ 24 mo. = 89 episodes
Zero	15	41	
Neg	51	46	Duration $<$ 24 mo. = 62 episodes
Pos / (Pos + Neg)	56.4%*	57.0%*	% Duration $\geq$ 24 mo. = 58.9%**
p-value	0.098	0.088	0.017

Table A10: Timing of Bank vs. Nonfinancial Equity Crashes: Subsample Analysis

This table performs the same analysis as Table III, Panel B, column (1) for various subsamples. The table shows that bank equity crashes tend to precede nonfinancial equity crashes in postwar and advanced economy banking crises, but not in prewar and emerging market crises. Panel A performs the analysis on the BVX Crisis List sample. Panel B uses the Narrative Crisis List sample as robustness, as in Table A9.

Panel A: BVX Crisis List sample

	Prewar	Postwar	Postwar & Emerging	Postwar & Advanced	Postwar (pre-2006) & Advanced
Average (in months, signed)	-0.27	3.42***	0.89	5.82***	3.87*
t-stat	-0.20	3.71	0.69	4.82	1.75
N	51	76	37	39	15
Pos	21	44	17	27	9
Zero	4	12	5	7	2
Neg	26	20	15	5	4
Pos / (Pos + Neg)	44.7%	68.8%***	53.1%	84.4%***	69.2%
p-value	0.191	0.002	0.430	0.000	0.133

Panel B: Narrative Crisis List sample

	Prewar	Postwar	Postwar & Emerging	Postwar & Advanced	Postwar (pre-2006) & Advanced
Average (in months, signed)	-0.96	1.97*	0.05	4.47***	4.29*
t-stat	-0.66	1.95	0.03	3.87	1.87
N	49	69	39	30	14
Pos	19	37	17	20	9
Zero	3	11	5	6	2
Neg	27	21	17	4	3
Pos / (Pos + Neg)	41.3%*	63.8%**	50.0%	83.3%***	75.0%*
p-value	0.092	0.024	0.568	0.001	0.073

Table A11: Removed Banking Crises

This table lists episodes from the list of Narrative Crises (crises identified by six previous prominent studies) that do not appear on the the BVX Crisis List. "Spurious banking crises", episodes which have few or no characteristics typically associated with banking crises and are likely the result of typographical or historical errors, are marked with a "*"

Country	Starting year of crisis	Bank equity return	Country	Starting year of crisis	Bank equity return
Argentina	1885	0	Israel	1977	0
Belgium	1925	-0.193	Japan	1914	-0.232
Brazil	1897	0		1917*	-0.239
	1923	-0.131	Korea	1984	-0.326
	1926*	0		1986*	0
Canada	1906	0	Mexico	1908	-0.029
	1907	-0.081		1992*	0
	1912	-0.002	Netherlands	1893	0
Chile	1889	-0.254		1897*	0
Czech	1931	-0.099	Norway	1927*	0
Denmark	1902*	0		1936*	-0.209
	1914	-0.296	Singapore	1982	-0.275
	1931	-0.102	South Africa	1877	-0.004
Finland	1939	-0.111		1977	-0.153
France	1904*	0		1984	-0.492
	1907*	-0.049		1989	0
	1939	-0.121	Sweden	1897*	-0.183
	1994	-0.246		1932	-0.431
Germany	1880*	0	Switzerland	1910	0
	1907	-0.051	U.K.	1908*	-0.011
	1977*	-0.117		1984	0
Greece	1992	-0.391		1995	-0.159
India	1908	0	U.S.	1914	-0.158
	1929	0			
Probably spurious banking crises, but with no bank equity data					
Brazil	1963*		Italy	1935*	
Germany	1925*		Netherlands	1939*	
India	1947*		Portugal	1986*	

Table A12: Changes to Start Years of Banking Crises Based on Bank Equity Crashes

This table lists modifications made in constructing the BVX Crisis List. Panel A lists changes in start dates of banking crises that were made by examining the year in which bank equity returns index declined 30% or more. Panel B lists episodes from the Narrative Crises list which were deemed to be part of the same episode and thus combined.

Panel A: Changes in starting dates of banking crises

Country	Change in starting date	Country	Change in starting date
Argentina	1890 → 1891	New Zealand	1890 → 1888
	1931 → 1930	Norway	1921 → 1919
	2001 → 2000	Peru	1872 → 1876
Austria	1929 → 1931		1983 → 1981
Belgium	1885 → 1883		1999 → 1998
	1931 → 1929	Portugal	1920 → 1921
Brazil	1963 → 1962	Russia	1896 → 1900
Canada	1923 → 1920	South Africa	1985 → 1984
	1982 → 1983	Spain	1977 → 1975
Chile	1980 → 1982		1883 → 1882
Czech	1996 → 1995	Sweden	1876 → 1878
Denmark	1921 → 1919		1922 → 1919
	1987 → 1992		1931 → 1932
Finland	1991 → 1990		1990 → 1991
Germany	1873 → 1874	Switzerland	1921 → 1919
	1929 → 1930		1991 → 1990
Greece	1931 → 1929	Taiwan	1997 → 1998
	1991 → 1992	Thailand	1996 → 1997
Iceland	2007 → 2008	Turkey	1931 → 1930
India	1921 → 1920		1982 → 1980
	1991 → 1993		2000 → 2001
Indonesia	1992 → 1990	U.K.	1974 → 1973
	1997 → 1998		2007 → 2008
Italy	1887 → 1889	U.S.	1929 → 1930
	1990 → 1992	Venezuela	1978 → 1981
Japan	1991 → 1990		1993 → 1992
Korea	1983 → 1984		2009 → 2008
Mexico	1920 → 1921		
	1929 → 1928		

Panel B: Combined episodes for the BVX Crisis List

Country	Combined Events
Austria	1929 and 1931
Belgium	1931 and 1934
Hong Kong	1982 and 1983
Indonesia	1992 and 1994
Italy	1891 and 1893
Mexico	1981 and 1982
Switzerland	1931 and 1933

Table A13: Comparison of Banking Crisis Chronologies

This table compares key outcomes in episodes on the BVX Crisis List to episodes on other crisis chronologies. Panel A compares episodes from Reinhart and Rogoff's (2009) chronology to episodes on the BVX Crisis List. Panel B compares episodes from Laeven and Valencia's (2013) chronology to episodes on the BVX Crisis List (over Laeven and Valencia's sample period 1970-2012). The table reports differences in averages (computed as Reinhart-Rogoff or Laeven-Valencia minus BVX) and t-statistics (in brackets), computed using the pooled variance across the differenced groups.

Panel A: Comparison of Reinhart and Rogoff episodes with BVX Crisis List episodes

	Reinhart Rogoff	Difference with BVX Crisis List		Difference with BVX Crisis List having bank eq. decline >30%	
Bank equity decline	-0.376	0.086	[6.27]	0.234	[17.21]
Abnormal bank equity decline	-0.311	0.033	[2.29]	0.126	[7.93]
Bank market cap decline	-0.318	0.097	[4.85]	0.216	[10.62]
Real GDP decline (pk to tr)	-0.045	0.009	[2.92]	0.018	[4.98]
Real GDP growth decline (pk to tr)	-0.080	0.005	[1.76]	0.011	[3.81]
Real GDP growth (max dev from trend)	-0.055	0.006	[2.47]	0.011	[4.46]
Failed banks (% of total bank assets)	0.260	-0.036	[-1.65]	-0.057	[-2.37]
NPL at peak	0.160	-0.010	[-1.01]	-0.010	[-0.88]
Decline in deposits (prewar only)	-0.165	0.031	[2.32]	0.044	[2.97]
Significant liability guarantees	0.523	-0.037	[-1.29]	-0.115	[-3.62]
Significant liquidity support	0.701	-0.060	[-2.38]	-0.125	[-4.62]

Panel B: Comparison of Laeven and Valencia episodes with BVX Crisis List episodes

	Laeven Valencia	Difference with BVX Crisis List (1970-2012)		Difference with BVX Crisis List having bank eq. decline >30% (1970-2012)	
Bank equity decline	-0.641	-0.046	[-2.30]	0.019	[1.06]
Abnormal bank equity decline	-0.472	-0.038	[-1.36]	0.014	[0.50]
Bank market cap decline	-0.625	-0.068	[-2.93]	-0.015	[-0.75]
Real GDP decline (pk to tr)	-0.053	-0.006	[-1.51]	-0.006	[-1.27]
Real GDP growth decline (pk to tr)	-0.093	-0.015	[-3.87]	-0.013	[-3.25]
Real GDP growth (max dev from trend)	-0.070	-0.011	[-3.32]	-0.009	[-2.36]
Failed banks (% of total bank assets)	0.406	0.037	[1.01]	0.013	[0.33]
NPL at peak	0.168	-0.007	[-0.48]	-0.011	[-0.76]
Decline in deposits (prewar only)			N/A		
Significant liability guarantees	0.630	-0.050	[-1.14]	-0.120	[-2.62]
Significant liquidity support	0.913	0.056	[1.84]	-0.014	[-0.52]

Table A14: Area Under the ROC Curve for BVX Crises and Other Crisis Chronologies

The table compares the area under the ROC curve (AUC) when using a variety of variables to classify BVX crises and Reinhart-Rogoff crises (Panel A) or BVX crises and Laeven-Valencia crises (Panel B). The table shows that, across a variety of classifiers (e.g., real GDP growth), the AUC is generally higher for BVX crises than Reinhart-Rogoff and Laeven-Valencia crises. Panel A compares the AUC on the full sample, while Panel B focuses on the post-1970 sample covered by Laeven and Valencia (2013).

Panel A: Comparison of AUCs for BVX and Reihart-Rogoff crises

	BVX Crisis		Reinhart-Rogoff Crisis	
	AUC	se(AUC)	AUC	se(AUC)
Real GDP growth, $t-1$ to t	0.67	0.02	0.62	0.02
Bank eq. return, $t-1$ to t	0.86	0.02	0.71	0.02
Nonfin. eq. return, $t-1$ to t	0.78	0.02	0.66	0.02
Credit-to-GDP change, t to $t+5$	0.66	0.02	0.63	0.02

Panel B: Comparison of AUCs for BVX and Laeven-Valencia crises

	BVX Crisis		Laeven-Valencia Crisis	
	AUC	se(AUC)	AUC	se(AUC)
Real GDP growth, $t-1$ to t	0.67	0.03	0.66	0.04
Bank eq. return, $t-1$ to t	0.91	0.02	0.84	0.04
Nonfin. eq. return, $t-1$ to t	0.79	0.03	0.77	0.04
Credit-to-GDP change, t to $t+5$	0.72	0.03	0.75	0.04

Table A15: Additional Episodes of Minor Bank Distress from Narrative Accounts

This table lists additional episodes of minor bank distress that are not classified as banking crises on the BVX Crisis List or as episodes in Table A2 (because the bank equity declines are less than 30% in magnitude). These episodes are listed purely for historical interest and are not analyzed in this paper.

Country	Starting year of bank distress
Australia	1974
Belgium	1900, 1920
Canada	1887, 1891, 1901, 1905, 1908, 1912, 1966, 1991
Czech	1884, 1931, 1936
Denmark	1914, 1931, 1984
France	1991, 1994
Germany	1907, 1974, 2002
Hong Kong	1914, 1961
India	1914, 1938
Ireland	1885
Israel	1935
Italy	1926, 1982, 1997
Netherlands	1981
Norway	1886
Peru	1992
Philippines	1968
South Africa	1977, 1991
Spain	1991
Switzerland	1910
Turkey	1998
U.K.	1911, 1984, 1995
U.S.	1998

Table A16: Panics Without Bank Equity Crashes

The top panel features a two-by-two table of all episodes from Table A2, sorted on the incidence of panics and 30% bank equity crashes; there are 47 episodes of panic banking crises without 30% bank equity crashes. The bottom panel analyzes each of these 47 episodes individually and demonstrates that nearly all the panics without bank equity crashes are associated with narrative evidence of bank solvency concerns. The bottom table also analyzes why the bank equity decline was nevertheless less than 30% in magnitude: 29 episodes (62%) are due to likely bank equity measurement errors (either the banking panics were centered around small or regional banks and thus not captured by the bank equity index, or the bank equity index contains a very small number of banks for a given episode); 14 (30%) are "near misses," defined as episodes where the decline is between 20% and 30%; and 2 (4%) are triggered by the onset of wars. See Online Appendix Section I.B for a link to the historical documentation and sources from which the information in this chart was taken.

		Panic		
		0	1	Total
	No BE data	3	36	48
30% bank	0	43	47	90
eq. crash	1	160	109	269
	Total	206	192	407 episodes from Table A2

According to the above table, there are 47 panic banking crises without 30% bank equity crashes, which we examine below.
In addition, there are 36 other panic banking crises that do not have bank equity data.

Country	Year	Panic	BE decline	Category	Why the bank equity decline is small	Evidence of solvency issues
Australia	1931	4/1931	-0.230	near miss		
Australia	1989	4/1990	-0.281	near miss		
Belgium	1870	7/1870	-0.018	due to onset of war	The panic was quickly resolved when Finance Minister Malou had the bank Société Générale transfer gold holdings from London to Belgium. As soon as convertibility was restored, the panic faded away.	The panic in July 1870 was caused by the evacuation of gold reserves from the capital, due to the start of the Franco-Prussian War. (Buyst & Maes, 2007, p. 17).
Belgium	1883	1885	-0.139	bank equity measurement	The crisis consisted mostly of smaller banks and is thus not captured well by the bank equity index, which consists of the very largest banks.	"The first banks hit were those already weakened by the turmoil of the 1870s. […] The 1885-1886 financial crises coincided with a deep industrial slump" (Buyst & Maes, 2008a, p. 170). As a result, the third-largest bank Banque des Travaux Publics failed in 1885, along wth many smaller banks.
Brazil	1890	12/1890	-0.275	near miss		
Brazil	1900	10/1900	0	bank equity measurement	Our bank equity index only has two banks at that time, giving rise to likely measurement error in our bank equity index.	This crisis, featuring the collapse of 58 banks, was preceeded by the collapse of a large bubble and banking crisis in 1890, which led to a decade of civil war, deflation, currency depreciation, and other severe macroeconomic and political problems.
Brazil	1929	6/1932	-0.182	bank equity measurement	The crisis consisted mostly of smaller banks and is thus not captured well by the bank equity index, which consists of the very largest banks.	According to Triner (2000), the banking losses were overall relatively mild in Brazil. However, the price for coffee, Brazil's main export good, peaked in March 1929 and plummeted afterwards, which led to banking losses. In addition, according to Scranton (2012): "The Great Depression deepened an ongoing Brazilian political crisis that had intensified during the 1920s and resulted in a military coup and the rise to power of Getulio Vargas in 1930. Civil war broke out in 1932."

Table A16: Panics Without Bank Equity Crashes (cont.)

Canada	1873	7/1879	0	bank equity measurement	The crisis consisted mostly of smaller banks (Bank of Acadia, Mechanics Bank, Bank of Liverpool, and Banque Sainte Hyacinthe) and is thus not captured well by the bank equity index, which consists of the very largest banks.	According to Grossman (2010), “Towards the end of the severe cyclical downturn ushered in by the commercial crisis of 1873, several banks failed or were liquidated […] These accounted for about 7.5 per-cent of total bank capital at the time. […] Although the banks were criticized for reducing outstanding credit during this period, most banks survived by relying on their capital and reserves and by mergers” (p. 300)
Canada	1982	7/1982	-0.164	bank equity measurement	The crisis consisted mostly of smaller banks (Canadian Commercial Bank, Northland, and several others) and is thus not captured well by the bank equity index, which consists of the very largest banks.	Many of the banking problems resulted from the Alberta oil price bust. For example, Canadian Commercial Bank and Northland Bank, both based in Alberta, were heavily investing in real estate and energy sector companies and became insolvent in 1985 during a period of rising interest rates and falling oil prices.
Chile	1898	7/1898	-0.003	bank equity measurement	Our bank equity index only has one bank at that time, giving rise to likely measurement error in our bank equity index.	Brock, P. L. (2016): "In August 1898, following an abortive three-year gold standard regime, a run on the banks resulted in the government assuming responsibility for all bank notes, thereby putting all currency issue in the hands of the government." Subercaseaux, G. (1922): "...the relations between Chile and the Argentine Republic were becoming alarmingly strained, the danger of war causing it to be rumoured in Santiago that the government was preparing to return to the regime of paper currency. In consequence of this rumour bank depositors began to withdraw their money in order to save their gold. It was not so much a question of redeeming bank notes, since there were but few of them in circulation, as it was a question of withdrawing deposits. Presently the movement of distrust became more general and finally culminated in a run on the Santiago banks..."
Chile	1976	6/1975	0	bank equity measurement	The crisis consisted mostly of smaller banks and is thus not captured well by the bank equity index, which consists of the very largest banks.	The SINAP system failed in 1976, along with the medium-sized bank Banco Osorno y La Union in 1977, due to sudden liberalization of the financial system, combined with a drop in worldwide copper prices.
Denmark	1877	1877	-0.207	near miss		
Denmark	1885	9/1885	-0.043	bank equity measurement	The crisis consisted of few banks (Varda Bank, Handels- og Landmandsbanken, Nyborg Bank) and is thus not captured well by the broad bank equity index.	Varde bank failed in 1885 largely due to fraud. Bankruptcies among nonfinancial firms caused the banking sector's liquidity to come under pressure (Abildgren, 2014, p. 23).
Denmark	1907	2/1908	-0.269	near miss		

Table A16: Panics Without Bank Equity Crashes (cont.)

Egypt	1907	5/1907	-0.132	bank equity measurement	We only have six banks in the bank equity index at that time (foreign-owned Egyptian banks trading on the London and Paris exchange), giving rise to likely measurement error in our bank equity index.	The crisis was probably driven by the global collapse of cotton prices, one of Egypt's biggest exports. One important bank failed (Noyes 1909, p. 203), and Commercial, Industrial, & Land Co. of Egypt and Société immobilière d'Égypte also failed. Credit Franco-Egyptien was absorbed. Credit Foncier Egyptien failed and required a gold infusion from the Bank of England.
Finland	1931	10/1931	-0.252	near miss		
France	1889	3/1889	-0.106	bank equity measurement	The crisis mainly involved just one bank and is thus not captured well by the broad bank equity index.	Hautcoeur, River, White (2014) report a large-scale run on the Comptoir d'Escompte (CdE), caused by a failed corner of the copper market. Further contagion was prevented by an aggressive response from the Bank of France.
Germany	1891	9/1891	-0.23	near miss		
Germany	1901	6/1901	-0.05	bank equity measurement	The crisis was mostly among mortgage banks and is thus not captured well by the bank equity index, which is of commercial banks.	Two mortgage banks failed in the autumn of 1900. Pommersche Hypotheken Bank, Mortgage Bank of Mechlenberg-Strelitz failed and were saved by discount banks in 1901. Preussische Hypothekenaktienbank, Deutsche Grundschuldbank, Dresdner Creditanstalt and Leipziger Bank failed in 1901, as well, followed by some other smaller banks.
Hong Kong	1965	2/1965	-0.196	bank equity measurement	Our bank equity index only has one bank at that time, giving rise to likely measurement error in our bank equity index.	Chiu Tai Bank failed in 1963. Ming Tak, Canton Trust and Savings, and the second-largest bank Hang Seng failed in 1965. All were due to gross mismanagement and fraud (Goodstadt, 2007).
Hong Kong	1991	7/1991	-0.096	potential non-fundamental-driven panic	The solvency problems mainly involved just one minor bank (the BCCI Group subsidiary in Hong Kong) and thus not captured well by our broad bank equity index.	Li (1999, p. 133) reports that the failure of the BCCI Group subsidiary in Hong Kong (which was due to fraud and mismangement) led to several bank runs (Standard Chartered Bank, Dao Heng Bank, International Bank of Asia, First Pacific Bank, and Citibank Hong Kong [Goodhart, 1995, p. 389; Basler, 1991]) and protests by depositors (no deposit insurance scheme). These runs seemed to be purely fueled by rumors and mistrust of the colonial government, and subsided after several days.
India	1913	11/1913	-0.249	near miss		
Italy	1873	?	-0.237	near miss		

Table A16: Panics Without Bank Equity Crashes (cont.)

Italy	1930	12/1930	-0.073	bank equity measurement	The government nationalized nearly the entire banking sector in 1930, leaving almost no public bank equity to be traded.	Russo (2012): "When the 1929 crisis hit Italy with full force, the interconnections among industry and banks spread the meltdown in both the financial and the industrial sectors, provoking a sharp increase in the unemployment rate and a reduction in foreign trade, as well as the virtual closure of the stock market because of the steep share value depreciation. Moreover, the former bank-industry fights and the bailouts of the mid-1920s had seriously weakened the financial system's ability to absorb any unexpected and severe losses and withstand a crisis."
Japan	1901	4/1901	-0.221	near miss		
Japan	1927	3/1927	-0.168	potential non-fundamental-driven panic	The crisis consisted mostly of smaller banks (Tokyo Watanabe Bank, Omi Bank, Fifteenth Bank, and 29 other small banks failed) and is thus not captured well by the bank equity index, which consists of large banks.	Shizume (2012) suggests this panic may have been set off by a false rumor: "On March 14, in the courses of heated debate on the government's measures in the Diet, Finance Minister Naoharu Kataoka falsely declared that the Tokyo Watanabe Bank had failed (the bank had not yet failed at the time of this declaration). This statement set off a surge of financial panic in the regions surrounding the two great metropolises, Tokyo and Osaka. On March 23, the Diet approved the legislation, temporarily calming the depositors' panic." However, Yamamura (1972): "Runs were especially intense for those banks suspected of close ties with unhealthy firms." The banking sector also still had large problems left over from the earlier crisis in 1923.
Netherlands	1907	11/1907	-0.083	bank equity measurement	The crisis consisted mostly of smaller banks and is thus not captured well by the bank equity index, which consists of the very largest banks.	Several banks were heavily exposed to American shares and other American investments in Panic of 1907.
Netherlands	1914	7/1914	-0.093	due to onset of war	No banks failed due to aggressive intervention, and the crisis subsided.	The panic started on July 28, 1914, right at the outbreak of World War I.
Norway	1931	12/1931	0	bank equity measurement	The crisis was centered around only two banks. Also, the crisis was mitigated by aggressive central bank actions.	Bergens Privatbank and Den norske Creditbank, two of the country's largest banks, were saved with considerable liqudity support and would have otherwise failed.
Russia	1875	10/1875	-0.188	bank equity measurement	Our bank equity index only has three banks at that time, giving rise to likely measurement error in our bank equity index. Also, the crisis was centered on only some banks, most prominently Commercial Loan Bank, and is thus not captured well by our broad bank equity index.	Owen (2005, pp. 118-120) reports that the panic began on October 08, 1875 when Commercial Loan Bank announced that it had suffered severe losses from a railroad-related bankruptcy in Germany.
South Africa	1881	?	-0.27	bank equity measurement	Our bank equity index only has one bank at that time, giving rise to likely measurement error in our bank equity index.	

Table A16: Panics Without Bank Equity Crashes (cont.)

South Africa	1890	9/1890	-0.062	bank equity measurement	Our bank equity index only has three banks at that time, giving rise to likely measurement error in our bank equity index.	Cape of Good Hope Bank failed, and a bank run on Natal Bank occurred in September 1890 (The Mercury, 1890, p. 3).
Spain	1890	11/1890	-0.124	bank equity measurement	Our bank equity index only has three banks at that time, giving rise to likely measurement error. Also, the crisis was centered mainly around smaller banks and is thus not captured well by our bank equity index, which consists of the very largest banks.	The immediate consequences of the Baring crisis in the U.K. produced a fall in Spanish stock prices (Betrán & Pons, 2013, p. 19) and triggered a panic in Spain in November 1890 when Baring Brothers failed in London.
Spain	1913	12/1913	-0.038	bank equity measurement	Our bank equity index only has four banks at that time, giving rise to likely measurement error. Also, the crisis was centered on only one large bank (Banco Hispano Americano) and regional Barcelona and Vizcaya banks, which may limit its impact on our broad bank equity index.	Banco Hispano Americano was rescued by the central bank in January 1914 after it had suspended payments in December 1913. Later in 1914, Crédito de la Unión Minera faced financial difficulties, along with other Barcelona and Vizcaya banks.
Spain	1920	11/1920	-0.14	bank equity measurement	Our bank equity index only has six banks at that time, giving rise to likely measurement error. Also, the crisis was centered on only Barcelona banks, which may limit its impact on our broad bank equity index.	Banco de Barcelona suspended payments in November 1920 after an announcement of severe losses, leading to depositor runs first at the bank itself but, later, at other banks in Barcelona (Martín-Aceña, 1995, p. 509).
Spain	1924	9/1924	-0.222	near miss		
Sweden	1907	10/1907	-0.135	bank equity measurement	The crisis was centered on only the subsest of banks that had exposure to the U.S. Panic of 1907 is thus not captured well by our bank equity index, which consists of the very largest banks.	16 banks went bankrupt or were reorganized. Among the failed banks were Aktiebolaget Stockholms Kreditbank (1907), AB Sundsvalls Köpmansbank (1910), AB Sundsvalls folkbank (1910), AB Hudiksvalls Folkbank (1910), AB Linköpingsbank (taken over, 1910), AB Gäfle handelsbank (reorganized, 1910), Halmstads Bankaktiebolag (taken over, 1911), AB Sollefteå folkbank (merged, 1911), and Bankaktiebolaget Stockholm Öfre Norrland (taken over, 1911).
Thailand	1983	10/1983	0	bank equity measurement	The crisis consisted mostly of mid-sized banks and securities firms and is thus not captured well by our bank equity index, which consists of the very largest banks.	Solvency issues, as in the other contemporaneous banking crises in Southeast Asia, were likely due to the U.S. raising interest rates. 3 commercial banks representing 13% of total assets failed, and the government intervened in 50 securities firms and 5 commercial banks.
Turkey	1994	4/1994	-0.203	near miss		

Table A16: Panics Without Bank Equity Crashes (cont.)

U.K.	1878	9/1878	-0.132	bank equity measurement	The crisis was centered on only a few banks (a mid-sized Scottish bank and English provincial banks) and is thus not captured well by our bank equity index, which consists of the very largest banks.	The events surrounding the collapse of City of Glasgow Bank in September-October 1878 triggered a nationwide banking panic that resulted in bank runs at several other banks (Collins, 1989). The City of Glasgow Bank collapsed due to risky investments (in Australasian farming, mining stocks, and American railway shares) and massive fraud (false reports of gold holdings, falsified financial statements, and secret purchases of the bank's own stock to increase its share price).
U.K.	1890	11/1890	-0.128	bank equity measurement	The crisis mainly involved just one bank and is thus not captured well by our bank equity index.	Crisis driven by large losses at Barings Bank, connected to its bad investments in the Argentina boom and bust. Crisis likely would have spread more broadly to other British banks, if not for the forceful intervention of the Bank of England (see White 2018).
U.K.	1991	7/1991	-0.147	bank equity measurement	The crisis was centered on smaller banks (BCCI and mortgage lenders) and is thus not captured well by our bank equity index, which consists of the very largest banks.	Confidence in British & Commonwealth Holdings, a financial services group, was gradually lost following a heavy write-down at its leasing subsidiary, Atlantic Computers. The Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI) was closed by the Bank of England in 1991 due to financial crimes, which led to wholesale runs on other banks. Many small banks and building societies closed because of bad mortgage lending (Balluck, Gallay, Ferrara, and Hoggarth, 2016).
U.S.	1873	9/1873	-0.172	bank equity measurement	U.S. banks limited stock ownership and managed their stock prices to avoid them being informative in crises, see O'Sullivan (2007) and Gorton and Tallman (2016)	
U.S.	1884	5/1884	0	bank equity measurement	U.S. banks limited stock ownership and managed their stock prices to avoid them being informative in crises, see O'Sullivan (2007) and Gorton and Tallman (2016)	
U.S.	1890	11/1890	0	bank equity measurement	U.S. banks limited stock ownership and managed their stock prices to avoid them being informative in crises, see O'Sullivan (2007) and Gorton and Tallman (2016)	
U.S.	1893	5/1893	-0.29	near miss		
U.S.	1984	5/1984	-0.263	near miss		

Table B1: Bank Equity Index Coverage and Sources

This figure provides an overview of the coverage and sources for the bank equity index total return variable. Cells with numbers indicate the number of underlying banks used to construct new bank equity return indexes. Shaded areas refer to pre-made indexes.

	1870	1880	1890	1900	1910	1920	1930	1940	1950	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2010
Argentina	2	3	4	Nakamura-Zaragoza index									Datastream index		
Australia	11	S&P/ASX 200 Banking Index from GFD													
Austria	5	6	4	5	4	Austria National Bank Banks Index from GFD				2	Austria Bank and Insurance Stocks" index from GFD		Baron-Xiong bank index		
Belgium	Annaert, Buelens, and De Ceuster (2012, Appendix 2) financials index					3	Two bank price indexes from GFD							Baron-Xiong bank index	
Brazil	2	2	2	1	1	1	3	1	1	1			Datastream index		
Canada	4	3	6	5	Canada S&P/TSX Banks index from GFD										
Chile			1	Chile BEC Finance price index from GFD											
Colombia	Colombia IBOMED Financial Sector price index from GFD														
Czech	Czech Bank index from GFD												Datastream index		
Denmark	6	6	7	7	Copenhagen SE Banks index from GFD										
Egypt	3	3	2	6	5	4	4	1	1				Datastream index		
Finland					11	14	8	6	4	Finland Unitas Banks index from GFD			Datastream index		
France	14	17	13	14	13	16	14	France INSEE Credit Banks index from GFD					Paris CAC financials index from GFD		
Germany	6	8	8	10	10	10	CDAX Banks Price index from GFD								
Greece	1	1	1	2	2	4	4	Greece National Bank Finance index from GFD							
Hong Kong	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	Datastream index				
Hungary	Hungary Korosy Bank index from GFD					2							Datastream index		
Iceland														Datastream index	
India	4	3	3	3	3	2							Datastream index		
Indonesia													Datastream index		
Ireland	9	9	9	8	8	7	6		2	3	Datastream index				
Israel										Israel Finance and Insurance Composite	Datastream index				
Italy	7	9	11	7	5	6	6		2	6	Datastream index				

Table B1: Bank Equity Index Coverage and Sources (cont.)

	1870	1880	1890	1900	1910	1920	1930	1940	1950	1960	1970	1980	1990	2000	2010
Japan				7	4	3	6	Oriental Economist Bank & Trust index from GFD			Japan TOPIX Banks index from GFD				
Korea											Korea SE Banks/Finance index from GFD				
Luxembourg	1	1	1	1	1	1	Luxembourg SE Banks index from GFD						Datastream index		
Malaysia											Malaysia KLSE Financial Index from GFD				
Mexico		2	2	4	4	3	Mexico Nacional Financiera Bank index from GFD						Datastream index		
Netherlands	2	4	4	5	5	5	Netherlands ANP-CBS Banks & Insurance index from GFD					Netherlands CBS Banks index from GFD			
New Zeal.	4	3	3	3	2	2	2	2	1	1		4	Datastream index		
Norway					Oslo SE Banks and Insurance Index from GFD								Baron-Xiong bank index		
Peru	2				1	Lima SE Banks index from GFD							Datastream index		
Philippines									Manila Banks index from GFD				Datastream index		
Portugal						3	4	Portugal Banks/Financials index from GFD					Datastream index		
Russia	3	3	3	3	5								Datastream index		
Singapore										4	Singapore SE Finance GFD index			Datastream index	
S. Africa	2	1	3	4	4	2	1	1	1	Johannesburg SE Financial index from GFD			Datastream index		
Spain	1	2	2	1	4	6	6	Madrid SE Banking and Finance from GFD						Baron-Xiong bank index	
Sweden			3	Stockholm SX Banks index from GFD											Datast.
Switzerland	12	16	18	13	12	12	12	SWX ICB Banks index from GFD							
Taiwan												Datastream index			
Thailand											Thailand SE Banks index		Datastream index		
Turkey	4	3	3	2	2	2	2			1	1	Datastream index			
UK	70	70	Various bank price indexes from GFD												
US	4	4	4	4	Various bank price indexes from GFD										
Venezuela								Caracas SE Financial index from GFD							

Table B2: Data Sources: Annual Equity Variables

	Yearly bank stock prices	Yearly bank stock dividends	Yearly nonfinancial stock prices	Yearly nonfinancial stock dividends
Notes:	See document linked in Appendix text for individual bank stocks used and their sources. "Baron-Xiong" refers to indexes constructed from individual stocks in Baron and Xiong (2017). Datastream refers to the pre-constructed "DS BANKS" stock index from Datastream. The Datastream index codes used are: BANKSXX (for banks), INDUSXX (for nonfinancials), and TOTMKXX (for broad market), with XX being the two-character country code for each country.		For nonfinancial stocks only, price returns are occassionally used in place of total returns, when dividend returns are not available. Also for nonfinancial stocks only, broad market returns are occassionally used when nonfinancial returns are not available (noted in specific cases below).	
Argentina	Individual bank stocks from various sources (1870-1900, 1935-1938), Nakamura-Zarazaga index (1900-1935), Datastream (1992-2016)	Individual bank stocks from various sources (1870-1938), Datastream (1992-2016)	IMM (1882-1935), Broad market index (Buenos Aires SE General Index (_IBGD) from GFD, 1967-1993), Datastream (1994-2016)	IMM (1882-1935), Broad market index (Datastream: TOTMKAR, 1987-1993), Datastream (1994-2016, INDUSAR)
Australia	Individual bank stocks from various sources (1870-1874), "S&P/ASX 200 Banking Index" (_AXBAJD) from GFD (1875-2016)	Individual bank stocks from various sources (1870-1923), Baron-Xiong (1924-2016)	IMM (1870-1882), “Sydney SE Industrial and Commercial” (AUINCM) price index from GFD (1883-1980), “Australia ASX All-Industrials” (_AAIID) price index from GFD (1981-2002), Datastream (2003-2016)	IMM (1870-1882), Broad market index (Australia ASX Dividend Yield (SYAUSYM) from GFD, 1883-2002), Datastream (2003-2016)
Austria	Individual bank stocks from various sources (1870-1921, 1929-1968, 1981-1985),"Austria National Bank Banks Index" (ATBBANKM) from GFD (1922-1928), "Austria 6 Bank and Insurance Stocks" (ATWBANKM) index from GFD (1969-1980), Baron-Xiong (using Compustat Global) (1986-2016)	Individual bank stocks from various sources (1870-1985), Baron-Xiong (using Compustat Global) (1986-2016)	“Austria National Bank Industrials Index” (ATINDUM) price index from GFD (1921-1934), “Vienna Miscellaneous Stocks” (ATMISCM) price index from GFD (1948-1966), “Austria 36 Industrials” (ATAUT36W) price index from GFD (1967-1980), Datastream (1981-2016)	Broad market index (Vienna SE Dividend Yield (SYAUTYM) from GFD, 1925-38, 1969-80)
Belgium	Financials stock total return index from Appendix 2 of Annaert et al. (2012) (1870-1913), Individual bank stocks from various sources (1914-1933), “Belgium INS Finance and Insurance” (BEFININM) index from GFD (1934-1989), “Brussels Bank Index” (_BXSSBKD) index from GFD (1989-2005), and price index constructed from Compustat global (2005-2012) and Datastream (2013-2016).	Individual bank stocks from various sources (1872-1933), Baron-Xiong (1934-2016)	Broad market index (JST 1870-1955), “Belgium INS Industrials Index” (BEINDUSM) price index from GFD (1956-1972), Datastream (1973-2016)	Broad market index (Annaert et al., 1871-1972), Datastream (1973-2016)
Brazil	Individual bank stocks from various sources (1870-1964), Datastream (1994-2016)	Individual bank stocks from various sources (1870-1959), Datastream (1994-2016)	IMM (1873-1926), newspapers (1927-42), Broad market index (Brazil Bolsa de Valores de Sao Paulo (_BVSPD) from GFD, total returns, 1955-2016)	IMM (1873-1926), newspapers (1927-42)
Canada	Individual bank stocks from various sources (1870-1914), "Canada S&P/TSX Banks" index from GFD (1915-2016)	Individual bank stocks from various sources (1870-1923), Baron-Xiong (1923-2016)	IMM (1870-1914), “Canada Investor's Index Industrials” (CAIINDUM) price index from GFD (1915-1977), “Toronto SE-300 Industrial Products” (_TIPD) price index from GFD (1978-2004), Datastream (2005-2016)	IMM (1870-1929), Broad market index (S&P/TSX-300 Dividend Yield (SYCANYTM) from GFD, 1930-2004), Datastream (2005-2016)
Chile	Individual bank stocks from various sources (1891-1901), "Chile BEC Finance Index" (_FINANCD) price index from GFD (1927-2016)	Individual bank stocks from various sources (1891-1901, 1928-1980), Datastream (1989-2016)	IMM (1870-1928), “Chile BEC Industrials Index” (_INDUSTD) price index from GFD (1927-2009), Datastream (2010-2016)	IMM (1870-1928), Broad market index (Datastream: TOTMKCL, 1983-2009) Datastream (2010-2016, INDUSCL)
Colombia	"Colombia IBOMED Financial Sector" (_IBMFDC) price index from GFD (1923-2016)	Individual bank stocks from various sources (1928-1980), Datastream (1992-2016)	“Bogota SE Industrials (old)” (COBINDUM) price index from GFD (1928-1942), “Bogota SE Industrials Index” (COBOINDD) price index from GFD (1956-1964), “Colombia IBOMED Industrials” (_IBMID) price index from GFD (1968-2000), Datastream (2001-2016)	Datastream (2001-2016)
Czech	“Czechoslovakia Banks Index” (CZBANKSM) price index from GFD (1919-1938), Datastream (1994-2016)	Individual bank stocks from various sources (1919-1937), Datastream (1994-2016)	Czechoslovakia Industrials and Transports (CZINDTRM) from GFD (1919-1937), Datastream (1993-2016)	Datastream (1993-2016)

Table B2: Data Sources: Annual Equity Variables (cont.)

	Yearly bank stock prices	Yearly bank stock dividends	Yearly nonfinancial stock prices	Yearly nonfinancial stock dividends
Denmark	Individual bank stocks from various sources (1870-1920), "Copenhagen SE Banks" (_CX4010D) index from GFD (1921-2011), Datastream (2012-2016)	Individual bank stocks from various sources (1870-1951), Baron-Xiong (1952-2016)	Individual nonfinancial stocks from various sources (1875-1915), Denmark Other Shares (DKOTHERM) (1915-1920), Copenhagen SE Industrials Index (_CX20PID) from GFD, 1921-2012, Datastream (2013-2016, INDUSDK)	Individual nonfinancial stocks from various sources (1876-1936), Datastream (1969-2016, INDUSDK)
Egypt	Individual bank stocks from various sources (1870-1959), Datastream (1996-2016)	Individual bank stocks from various sources (1870-1959), Datastream (1996-2016)	IMM (1906-29), Broad market index (Egyptian Stock Exchange Index (EGCAIROM) from GFD, 1949-62), Datastream (1996-2016)	IMM (1906-29), Datastream (1996-2016)
Finland	Individual bank stocks from various sources (1911-1958), "Finland Unitas Banks" (FIUBANKM) index from GFD (1959-1987), Datastream (1988-2016)	Individual bank stocks from various sources (1911-1987), Datastream (1988-2016)	Broad market index (Nyberg-Vaihekoski, 1913-32), "Finland Unitas Industrials Index" (FIUINDUD) price index from GFD (1933-1991), Datastream (1992-2016)	Broad market index (Nyberg-Vaihekoski, 1913-1970, and Datastream: TOTMKFN, 1972-1991), Datastream (1992-2016, INDUSFN)
France	Individual bank stocks from various sources (1870-1923), "France INSEE Credit Banks" (FRBANKCM) price index from GFD (1924-1990), "Euronext Paris CAC Financials 8000" (_FRFIND) price index from GFD (1991-2016)	Individual bank stocks from various sources (1870-1938), Baron-Xiong (1939-1993), Datastream (1994-2016)	Individual nonfinancial stocks from various sources (1870-1920), Euronext Paris CAC Construction and Materials (_FRCMD) from GFD (1921-2016)	Individual nonfinancial stocks from various sources (1870-1899), Broad market index (France Dividend Yield (SYFRAYM) from GFD, 1900-2016)
Germany	Individual bank stocks from various sources (1871-1902, 1915-1929), "Germany Conrad German Banks" (DECBGERM) index from GFD (1903-1914), "CDAX Banks Price" (_CXKBXD) index from GFD (1930-2016)	Individual bank stocks from various sources (1871-1929), Baron-Xiong (1930-2016)	Individual nonfinancial stocks from various sources (1870-1902), "Germany Conrad Metalworking and Machinery" (DECMACHM) index from GFD (1903-1914), "Germany Bundesamt Heavy Industry" (DEBHEAVM) index from GFD (1914-1950), "Germany CDAX Industrials" (_CXKNXD) index from GFD (1950-2016)	Individual nonfinancial stocks from various sources (1871-1929), Broad market index (Germany Dividend Yield (SYDEUYM) from GFD, 1900-2009), Datastream (2009-2016, INDUSDE)
Greece	Individual bank stocks from various sources (1870-1933), "Greece National Bank Finance" (GRFINANM) index from GFD (1952-1996), Datastream (1997-2016)	Individual bank stocks from various sources (1870-1933), Datastream (1990-2016)	Broad market index (Greece Stock Market Index (GRATHENM) from GFD, 1929-1940), "Athens SE Industrials Index" (_ATIDD) price index from GFD (1953-2005), Datastream (2006-2016)	Athens SE Dividend Yield (SYGRCYM) from GFD (1977-2005), Datastream (2006-2016)
Hong Kong	Individual bank stocks from various sources (1870-1972), Datastream (1973-2016)	Individual bank stocks from various sources (1870-1972), Datastream (1973-2016)	Broad market index (Hong Kong Hang Seng Composite Index (_HSID) from GFD, 1965-1972), Datastream (1973-2016)	Broad market index (Datastream: TOTMKHK, 1970-1972), Datastream (1973-2016)
Hungary	"Hungary Korosy Bank Stock" (HUKOBNKA) index from GFD (1874-1899), Individual bank stocks from various sources (1870-1874, 1923-1930), Datastream (1994-2016)	Individual bank stocks from various sources (1870-1890, 1923-1930), Datastream (1994-2016)	"Hungary Korosy Industrials Stock Index" (HUKOINDA) price index from GFD (1873-1898), "Hungary Stock Market Index" (HUBUDAM) price index from GFD (1921-1944), Broad market index (1992-1996), Datastream (1997-2016)	Broad market index (Datastream: TOTMKHU, 1992-1996), Datastream (1997-2016)
Iceland	Datastream (1999-2016)	Datastream (1999-2016)	Datastream (1993-2016)	Datastream (1993-2016)
India	Individual bank stocks from various sources (1870-1929), Datastream (1990-2016)	Individual bank stocks from various sources (1870-1929), Datastream (1990-2016)	IMM (1870-1928), Broad market index (Bombay SE Sensitive Index (_BSESND) from GFD, 1929-1989), Datastream (1990-2016)	IMM (1870-1928), Datastream (1990-2016)
Indonesia	Datastream (1990-2016)	Datastream (1990-2016)	Broad market index (Jakarta SE Composite Index (_JKSED) from GFD, 1978-1992), Datastream (1993-2016)	Broad market index (Datastream: TOTMKID, 1990-1992), Datastream (1993-2016)

Table B2: Data Sources: Annual Equity Variables (cont.)

	Yearly bank stock prices	Yearly bank stock dividends	Yearly nonfinancial stock prices	Yearly nonfinancial stock dividends
Ireland	Individual bank stocks from various sources (1870-1936, 1953-1972), Datastream (1973-2016)	Individual bank stocks from various sources (1870-1936, 1953-1972), Datastream (1973-2016)	IMM (1870-1929), Broad market index (Ireland ISEQ Overall Price Index (_ISEQD) from GFD, 1934-72), Datastream (1973-2016)	IMM (1870-1929), Datastream (1973-2016)
Israel	"Israel Finance and Insurance Composite" (ILXFINSM) index from GFD (1966-1983), Datastream (1984-2016)	Individual bank stocks from various sources (1966-1994), Datastream (1995-2016)	"Tel Aviv SE Industrial and Manufacturing" (ILTLVND) from GFD (1966-1993), Datastream (1993-2016)	Datastream (1993-2016)
Italy	Individual bank stocks from various sources (1870-1972), Datastream (1973-2016)	Individual bank stocks from various sources (1870-1972), Datastream (1973-2016)	Individual bank stocks from L'Economista (1884-1894) and Corriere newspaper (1884-1894), Broad market index (Banca Commerciale Italiana Index (_BCIID) from GFD , 1905-1961), "Milan SE Industrials" (ITMILAND) price index from GFD (1962-1985), "Milan SE Historical Industrials" (_MHIDD) price index from GFD (1986-2009), Datastream (2010-2016)	Broad market index (Italy Dividend Yield (SYITAYM) from GFD, 1925-2009), Datastream (2010-2016)
Japan	Individual bank stocks from various sources (1897-1932), "Japan Oriental Economist Bank and Trust" (JPOBANKM) index from GFD (1933-1944), "Japan TOPIX Finance and Insurance" (JPFININM) index from GFD (1946-1985), "Japan TOPIX Banks" (_IBNKS_D) index from GFD (1986-2016)	Individual bank stocks from various sources (1901-1957), Baron-Xiong (1958-2016)	Broad market index (JST, 1879-1914, and Nikkei 225 Stock Average (_N225D) from GFD, 1915-1944), "Japan TOPIX Machinery" (_IMCHN_D) price index from GFD (1947-2016)	Broad market index (Tokyo SE Dividend Yield (SYJPNYM) from GFD, 1886-1944, 1947-2016)
Korea	"Korea SE Financial Institutions" (_KS49D) index from GFD (1975-1978), "Korea SE Banks" (_KS49D) index from GFD (1979-2016)	Individual bank stocks from various sources (1978-1986), Datastream (1987-2016)	Broad market index (Korea KOPSI SE Stock Price Index (_KS11D) from GFD, 1962-1987), Datastream (1988-2016)	Broad market index (Korea SE Dividend Yield (SYKORYM) from GFD, 1962-1987), Datastream (1988-2016)
Luxembourg	Individual bank stocks from various sources (1871-1929), "Luxembourg SE Banks and Finance" (LUBANKM) index from GFD (1930-1967), Datastream (1992-2016)	Individual bank stocks from various sources (1871-1929, 1947-1968), Datastream (1992-2016)	"Luxembourg SE Miscellaneous" (LUMISCM) price index from GFD (1930-1967), Broad market index (Luxembourg SE LUXX Index (_LUXXD) from GFD, 1968-1991), Datastream (1992-2016)	Broad market index (Datastream: TOTMKLX, 1982-1991), Datastream (1992-2016)
Malaysia	"Malaysia KLSE Financial Index" (_KLFID) from GFD (1969-2016)	Datastream (1985-2016)	"Malaysia KLSE Industrials" (_KLIND) price index from GFD (1969-2016)	Broad market index (Datastream: TOTMKMY, 1973-2016)
Mexico	Individual bank stocks from various sources (1884-1913, 1919-1933), "Mexico Nacional Financiera Bank" (MXBANKSM) index from GFD (1937-1976), Datastream (1988-2016)	Individual bank stocks from various sources (1884-1913, 1919-1976), Datastream (1988-2016)	IMM (1908-1929), "Banco de Mexico Industrials Index" (MXXINDUM) price index from GFD (1930-1944), "Mexico Nacional Financiera Industrials Index" (MXINDUSM) price index from GFD (1945-1976), Broad market index (Mexico SE Indice de Precios y Cotizaciones (_MXXD) from GFD, 1977-1988), Datastream (1989-2016)	IMM (1908-1929), Datastream (1989-2016)
Netherlands	Individual bank stocks from various sources (1873-1929), "Netherlands ANP-CBS Banks and Insurance" (NLDBKINM) index from GFD (1928-1971), "Netherlands CBS Banks" (NLBNKPRD) index from GFD (1972-2003), Baron-Xiong (2003-2016)	Individual bank stocks from various sources (1873-1927), Baron-Xiong (1928-2016)	Broad market index (JST, 1891-1919, and Netherlands All-Share Price Index (_AAXD) from GFD, 1891-1962), "Netherlands CBS Industrials Index" (NLINDD) price index from GFD (1963-1989), Datastream (1990-2016)	Broad market index (imputed from total returns from GFD: _AAXRD, 1951-1968, and Netherlands SE Dividend Yield (SYNLDYAM) from GFD, 1950-1989), Datastream (1990-2016)
New Zealand	Individual bank stocks from various sources (1870-1965, 1980-1992), Datastream (1998-2016)	Individual bank stocks from various sources (1870-1929, 1980-1992), Datastream (1998-2016)	IMM (1881-1913), Broad market index (New Zealand SE 40 Share Index (_NZ40D) from GFD, 1927-2016)	IMM (1881-1913), Broad market index (Datastream: TOTMKNZ, 1984-2016)

Table B2: Data Sources: Annual Equity Variables (cont.)

	Yearly bank stock prices	Yearly bank stock dividends	Yearly nonfinancial stock prices	Yearly nonfinancial stock dividends
Norway	"Oslo SE Finance (Banks and Insurance) TR Index" (_FINXD) from GFD (1915-1986), Baron-Xiong (1987-2016). Note these are all total returns.	Norges Bank index (implied from differencing total returns and price returns, 1920-1935), Datastream (1986-2016)	"Oslo SE Industrials TR Index" (_NOSID) Total Return price index from GFD (1914-1981), Datastream (1982-2016)	Datastream (1982-2016)
Peru	Individual bank stocks from various sources (1870-1881, 1912-1926), "Lima SE Banks" (_LMBFIND) index from GFD (1927-1993), Datastream (1994-2016)	Individual bank stocks from various sources (1870-1881, 1912-1958), Datastream (1994-2016)	"Lima SE Industrials" (_LMINDD) price index from GFD (1938-2016)	Broad market index (1993 - 2016)
Philippines	"Manila SE Finance Index" (_PSFID) from GFD (1952-1981), Datastream (1989-2016)	Datastream (1989-2016)	"Philippine SE Industrial Index" (_PSIND) price index from GFD (1953-2012), Datastream (2013-2016)	Broad market index (Datastream: TOTMKPL, 1982-2012), Datastream (2013-2016, INDUSPL)
Portugal	Individual bank stocks from various sources (1921-1938), "Portugal Banks" (PTBANKSM) index from GFD (1939-1959) "Portugal Credit and Insurance" (PTCREDIM) index from GFD (1960-1987), Datastream (1988-2016)	Individual bank stocks from various sources (1921-1931), Datastream (1988-2016)	Broad market index (Oporto PSI-20 Index (_PSI20D) from GFD, 1930-1953, 1983-1989), "Portugal Industrials" (PTINDUSM) price index from GFD (1954-1982), Datastream (1990-2016)	GFD (1954-1982), Datastream (1990-2016)
Russia	Individual bank stocks from various sources (1870-1917), Russia AK&M Bank Index (RUAKMBD) from GFD (1993-1997), Datastream (1997-2016)	Individual bank stocks from various sources (1870-1917), Datastream (1997-2016)	"Russia St. Petersburg Yale Stock Index" (RUSPSEYM) price index from GFD (1871-1914), Russia AK&M Industrials Index (_AKMED) from GFD (1993-2013), Datastream (2013-2016)	Datastream (1995-2016)
Singapore	Individual bank stocks from various sources (1966-1969), "Singapore SES Finance" (_FIAND) Index from GFD (1970-1999), Datastream (2000-2016)	Individual bank stocks from various sources (1966-1986), Datastream (1986-2016)	"Singapore Straits-Times Industrials Index" (SGSS1D) price index from GFD (1965-1998), Datastream (1999-2016)	Broad market index (Singapore SE Dividend Yield (SYSGPYM) from GFD, 1972-1998), Datastream (1999-2016)
South Africa	Individual bank stocks from various sources (1870-1959), "Johannesburg SE Financial" (_JFIND) index from GFD (1960-1985), Datastream (1986-2016)	Individual bank stocks from various sources (1870-1985), Datastream (1986-2016)	IMM (1888-1911), "Johannesburg SE Industrials" (_JIAID) price index from GFD (1912-2002), Datastream (2003-2016)	IMM (1888-1929), Broad market index (Johannesburg SE Dividend Yield (SYZAFYM) from GFD, 1954-2016).
Spain	Individual bank stocks from various sources (1873-1935), "Madrid SE Banking and Finance" (_IBAN_MD) from GFD (1940-2000), Baron-Xiong (2001-2016)	Individual bank stocks from various sources (1873-1935, 1946-1965), Baron-Xiong (1966-2016)	Broad market index (JST, 1870-1920, and Spain Pre-War Stock Index (ESZINDXM) from GFD, 1921-1936, and Madrid SE Index (ESMADM) from GFD, 2012-2016), "Madrid SE Metals" (_IMET_MD) price index from GFD (1941-2001)	Broad market index (Madrid SE Dividend Yield (SYESPYM) from GFD, 1900-1930, 1941-2016)
Sweden	Individual bank stocks from various sources (1890-1901), "Stockholm SX Banks Price" (_SX4010D) index from GFD (1906-2011), Datastream (2012-2016)	Individual bank stocks from various sources (1890-1901), Baron-Xiong (1926-2016)	Broad market index (JST, 1870-1906), "Stockholm SX Industrials Price Index" (_SX20PID) price index from GFD (1907-2011), Datastream (2012-2016)	Broad market index (Stockholm SE Dividend Yield (SYSWEYM) from GFD, 1870-2011), Datastream (2012-2016)
Switzerland	Individual bank stocks from various sources (1870-1929), "SWX ICB Banks Price Index (w/ GFD extension)" (_C8300PD) index from GFD (1930-2016)	Individual bank stocks from various sources (1870-1929), Baron-Xiong (1930-2016)	Broad market index (JST, 1900-1924, and Switzerland Price Index (_SPIXD) from GFD, 2006-2016), "Switzerland SPI Industrials Index" (_SINXD) price index from GFD (1924-2005)	Broad market index (Switzerland Dividend Yield (SYCHEYM) from GFD, 1918-1939, 1966-2016)
Taiwan	Datastream (1987-2016)	Datastream (1987-2016)	Broad market index (Taiwan SE Capitalization Weighted Index (_TWIID) from GFD, 1968-1987), Datastream (1988-2016)	Datastream (1988-2016)
Thailand	"Thailand SET Banks" (_SETBD) index from GFD (1975-1986), Datastream (1987-2016)	Individual bank stocks from various sources (1975-1986), Datastream (1987-2016)	Thailand SET Commerce Index (_SETCD) from GFD (1976-2016)	Broad market index (Datastream: TOTMKTH, 1976-2016)
Turkey	Individual bank stocks from various sources (1870-1939, 1965-1985), Datastream (1986-2016)	Individual bank stocks from various sources (1870-1931), Datastream (1986-2016)	Broad market index (Istanbul SE IMKB-100 Price Index (_XU100D) from GFD, 1986-2016)	Broad market index (Datastream: TOTMKTK, 1986-2016)

Table B2: Data Sources: Annual Equity Variables (cont.)

	Yearly bank stock prices	Yearly bank stock dividends	Yearly nonfinancial stock prices	Yearly nonfinancial stock dividends
United Kingdom	Individual bank stocks from various sources (1870-1887), "UK Banker's Magazine All-Banks" (GBBBANKM) from GFD (1888-1955), "UK FT-Actuaries Banks" (_LCBKD) from GFD (1956-1999), "FTSE All-Share Bank" (_FTA835D) index from GFD (2000-2016)	Individual bank stocks from various sources (1870-1922), Baron-Xiong (1923-2016)	UK L&CES Industrials (GBLINDUM) index from GFD (1870-1899), FTSE All-Share Industrials (_FTASX2000) index from GFD (1900-2016)	Individual nonfinancial stocks from IMM (1870-1922), UK FT-Actuaries Dividend Yield (_DFTASD) from GFD (1923-2016)
United States	Individual bank stocks from various sources (1870-1917), "S&P Banks: Money Center (NYC)" (SPMONYD) from GFD (1918-1940), "S&P 500 Banks Index" (_5SP4010) from GFD (1941-2016)	Individual bank stocks from various sources (1870-1928), Baron-Xiong (1929-2016)	S&P 500/Cowles Composite (_SPXD) index from GFD (1870-1885), Dow Jones Industrials (_DJI3D) index from GFD (1885-1925), S&P 500 Industrials (_5SP20) index from (1925-2016)	Broad market index (S&P 500 Monthly Dividend Yield (SYUSAYM) from GFD, 1871-1925), S&P Industrials Dividend Yield (SPYINDW) from GFD, 1926-2017)
Venezuela	"Caracas SE Financial Index" (_IBCFD) index from GFD (1946-2016)	Datastream (1994-2016)	Broad market index (Caracas SE General Index (_IBCD) Total Returns from GFD, 1938-2007), "Caracas SE Industrials Index" (_IBCID) price index from GFD (2008-2016)	Datastream (2008-2016)

Table B3: Data Sources: Monthly Variables

	Monthly bank stock returns	Monthly nonfin stock returns	Monthly bank credit spreads	Monthly corp credit spreads
Notes:	Note that Datastream is given priority for the monthly data over GFD, given that Datastream is a total returns index, whereas the GFD indexes are price indexes. In general, a total returns monthly index is given priority over a price return index, whenever possible.			
Argentina	Nakamura-Zarazaga index (1900-1935, quarterly), Datastream (1993-2016)	Nakamura-Zarazaga index (1900-1935, quarterly), Datastream (1993-2016)	Argentina BAIBAR Overnight Interbank (IMARGD) from GFD (1990-2016), relative to Argentina Reserve Bank Discount Rate (IDARGD) from GFD (1990-2002) and Argentina 3-month BCRA Treasury Auction Yield (ITARG3D) from GFD (2002-2016)	
Australia	"S&P/ASX 200 Banking Index" (_AXBAJD) from GFD (1875-2016)	"Sydney SE Industrial and Commercial" (AUINCM) price index from GFD (1883-1980), "Australia ASX All-Industrials" (_AAIID) price index from GFD (1981-2002), Datastream (2003-2016)	Australia 3-month Interbank Rate (IBAUS3D) from GFD (1987-2016), relative to Australia 3-month Treasury Bill Yield (ITAUS3D) from GFD	Australia Corporate Bond Yield (INAUSW) from GFD (1983-2016), relative to Australia 10-year Government Bond Yield (IGAUS10D) from GFD
Austria	"Austria National Bank Banks Index" (ATBBANKM) from GFD (1922-1933), "Austria 6 Bank and Insurance Stocks" (ATWBANKM) index from GFD (1969-1980), Datastream (1986-2016)	"Austria National Bank Industrials Index" (ATINDUM) price index from GFD (1921-1934), Datastream (1973-2016)	Austria 3-month VIBOR (IBAUT3D) from GFD (1990-2001), relative to Austria 3-month (ITAUT3M, 1960-1980) and 1-year (IGAUT1D, 1980-2001) Treasury Bill Rate from GFD. EURIBOR (IBEUR3D) relative to German T-Bill (IBEUR3D minus ITDEU3D), from GFD (2002-2016)	
Belgium	Monthly bank stock index data provided by Frans Buelens (1867-1873, 1922-1936), "Belgium INS Finance and Insurance" (BEFININM) index from GFD (1934-1973), Datastream (1973-2016)	Monthly nonfin stock index data provided by Frans Buelens (1867-1873, 1922-1936), Datastream (1973-2016)		Belgium Non-Financial Company Bond Yields (INBELW) from GFD (1960-2016), relative to Belgium 10-year Government Bond Yield (IGBEL10D) from GFD
Brazil	Datastream (1994-2016)	Datastream (1994-2016)	BRAZILIAN INTERBANK RATE (BRIBCDI) from Datastream (2004-2016), relative to Brazil 3-month Treasury Bill Yield (ITBRA3D) from GFD	
Canada	"Canada S&P/TSX Banks" index from GFD (1915-1972), Datastream (1973-2016)	"Canada Investor's Index Industrials" (CAIINDUM) price index from GFD (1915-1935), Datastream (1973-2016)	Canada 3-month Interbank Rate (IBCAN3D) from GFD (1990-2016), relative to Canada 3-month Treasury Bill Yield (ITCAN3D) from GFD	Canada Long-term Corporate Bond Yields (INCANLTW) from GFD (1948-2016), relative to Canada 10-year Government Bond Yield (IGCAN10D) from GFD.
Chile	"Chile BEC Finance Index" (_FINANCD) price index from GFD (1927-1989), Datastream (1989-2016)	"Chile BEC Industrials Index" (_INDUSTD) price index from GFD (1927-1989), Datastream (1989-2016)	Chile Interbank Rate (IBCHLD) from GFD (1986-2016), relative to Chile Time Deposit Rate (ICCHLTD, 1976-1996) and Chile 3-month Nominal T-bill Auction Yield (ITCHL3D, 1997-2012) from GFD	
Colombia	Bogota SE Banks Index (COBBANKM) from GFD (1937-1971), "Colombia IBOMED Financial Sector" (_IBMFDC) price index from GFD (1923-1993), Datastream (1993-2016)	"Bogota SE Industrials (old)" (COBINDUM) price index from GFD (1928-1942), "Colombia IBOMED Industrials" (_IBMID) price index from GFD (1968-1998), Datastream (1998-2016)	Colombia TBS Interbank Rate (IBCOLD) from GFD (1998-2016), relative to Colombia 3-month Treasury Bill Yield (ITCOL3W, 1998-2016) from GFD	
Czech	"Czechoslovakia Banks Index" (CZBANKSM) price index from GFD (1919-1938), Datastream (1994-2016)	Czechoslovakia Industrials and Transports (CZINDTRM) from GFD (1919-1937), Datastream (1993-2016)	Czech Republic 3-month PRIBOR (IBCZE3D) from GFD (1992-2016), relative to Czech Republic 3-month Treasury Bill Yield (ITCZE3D) from GFD	

Table B3: Data Sources: Monthly Variables (cont.)

	Monthly bank stock returns	Monthly nonfin stock returns	Monthly bank credit spreads	Monthly corp credit spreads
Denmark	same as yearly	same as yearly	Denmark 3-month Interbank Rate (IBDNKDD) index (1998-2014) relative to Denmark 3-month Treasury Bill Yield (ITDNK3D) from GFD	Denmark Corporate Bond Yield (INDNKEW) from GFD (1939-2011), relative to Denmark 10-year Government Bond Yield (IGDNK10D)
Egypt	Datastream (1996-2016)	Datastream (1996-2016)	Egypt Interbank Lending Rate (IBEGYD) from GFD (2001-2016), relative to Egypt 3-month Treasury Bill Yields (ITEGY3D) from GFD	
Finland	OMX Helsinki Banks Price Index (_HX4010D) from GFD (1934-2008), Datastream (2009-2016)	"Finland Unitas Industrials Index" (FIUINDUD) price index from GFD (1933-1991), Datastream (1988-2016)	EURIBOR (IBEUR3D) relative to German T-Bill (IBEUR3D minus ITDEU3D), from GFD (2002-2016)	
France	same as yearly	same as yearly	France 3-month Interbank Rate (IBFRA3D) from GFD (1969-2001) relative to Deposit Rate (IDFRAD) from GFD. EURIBOR (IBEUR3D) relative to German T-Bill (IBEUR3D minus ITDEU3D), from GFD (2002-2016)	
Germany	same as yearly	same as yearly	Germany 3-month Interbank Rate (IBDEU3D) from GFD (1959-2001), and EURIBOR (IBEUR3D) from GFD (2002-2016), relative to German T-Bill (ITDEU3D)	Corporate bond index from "Statistisches Jahrbuch für das Deutsche Reich" (1929-1934), Germany Corporate Bond Yield (INDEUD) from GFD (1958-2016), all relative to German 10-year Government Bond (IGDEU10D)
Greece	"FTSE/Athex Banks Index" (_FTATBNK) index from GFD (1978-1990), Datastream (1990-2016)	"FTSE/Athex Industrial Goods and Services" (_FTATIND) index from GFD (1952-1988), Datastream (1988-2016)		
Hong Kong	Datastream (1973-2016)	Datastream (1973-2016)	Hong Kong 1-month HIBOR (IBHKG1D) from GFD (1982-2016), relative to Hong Kong 3-month Time Deposits (ICHKGTM, 1971-1991) and Hong Kong 3-month Treasury Bill Yield (ITHKG3D, 1991-2016) from GFD	
Hungary	Datastream (1994-2016)	Datastream (1997-2016)	Hungary 3-month BUBOR (IBHUN3D) from GFD (1991-2016), relative to Hungary 3-month Treasury Bill Yield (ITHUN3D) from GFD	
Iceland	Datastream (1999-2016)	Datastream (1993-2016)	Iceland 3-month REIBOR (IBISL3D) from GFD (1970-2016), relative to Iceland 3-month Treasury Bill Yield (ITISL3D) from GFD	
India	Datastream (1990-2016)	Datastream (1990-2016)	India 3-month MIBOR (IBIND3D) from GFD (1998-2016), relative to India 3-month Treasury Bill Yield (ITIND3D) from GFD	
Indonesia	Datastream (1990-2016)	Datastream (1993-2016)	Indonesia Overnight Interbank Rate (IMIDND) from GFD (1985-2016), relative to Indonesia Treasury Bill Yield (ITIDN3M, 2000-2008) and Indonesia 6-month Treasury Bond Yield (ITIDN6D, 2009-2016) from GFD	

Table B3: Data Sources: Monthly Variables (cont.)

	Monthly bank stock returns	Monthly nonfin stock returns	Monthly bank credit spreads	Monthly corp credit spreads
Ireland	Datastream (1973-2016)	Datastream (1973-2016)	Ireland 3-month Interbank Rate (IBIRL3D) from GFD (1978-2001), relative to Ireland 3-month Treasury Bill Yield (ITIRL3M) from GFD. EURIBOR (IBEUR3D) relative to German T-Bill (IBEUR3D minus ITDEU3D), from GFD (2002-2016)	
Israel	"Tel Aviv SE Commercial Banks" (ILTLVBD) from GFD, (1973-1993), Datastream (1993-2016)	"Tel Aviv SE Industrial and Manufacturing" (ILTLVND) from GFD (1966-1993), Datastream (1993-2016)	Israel 3-month TELBOR (IBISR3D) from GFD (1969-2016), relative to Israel 3-month Treasury Bill Yield (ITISR3D) from GFD	
Italy	Individual bank stocks from L'Economista (1884-1894) and Corriere newspaper (1884-1894, 1904-1934). Datastream (1973-2016)	Individual nonfinancial stocks from L'Economista (1884-1894) and Corriere newspaper (1884-1894, 1904-1934). Datastream (1973-2016)	Italy RIBOR 3 months (IBITA3D) from GFD (1971-2001), relative to Italy 3-month Treasury Bill Yield (ITITA3D) from GFD. EURIBOR (IBEUR3D) relative to German T-Bill (IBEUR3D minus ITDEU3D), from GFD (2002-2016)	
Japan	Individual bank stocks from various sources (1897-1931). Datastream (1973-2016)	Individual nonfinancial stocks from various sources (1897-1931). Datastream (1973-2016)	Japan 3-month TIBOR (IBJPN3D) from GFD (1979-2016), relative to Japan 3-month Treasury Bill Yield (ITJPN3D) from GFD	Japan Corporate Bond Yield (INJPNW) from GFD (1933-2016), relative to Japan 10-year Government Bond Yield (IGJPN10D) from GFD
Korea	"Korea SE Banks" (_KS51D) from GFD (1979-1987), Datastream (1987-2016)	"Korea SE Manufacturing" (_KS55D) from GFD (1980-1987), Datastream (1987-2016)		
Luxembourg	Datastream (1992-2016)	Datastream (1992-2016)	Luxembourg Interbank Offer Rate (IBLUXM) from GFD (1990-2001), relative to Luxembourg 3-month Time Deposit Rate (ICLUXTM) from GFD. EURIBOR (IBEUR3D) relative to German T-Bill (IBEUR3D minus ITDEU3D), from GFD (2002-2016)	Luxembourg Industrial Bonds (LUBINDM) from GFD (1963-2016), relative to Luxembourg Government Bonds (IGLUX10D) from GFD
Malaysia	"Malaysia KLSE Financial Index" (_KLFID) from GFD (1969-1986), Datastream (1986-2016)	“Malaysia KLSE Industrials” (_KLIND) price index from GFD (1969-1986), Datastream (1986-2016)	Malaysia 3-month KLIBOR (IBMYS3D) from GFD (1994-2016), relative to Malaysia 3-month T-bill Discount Rate (ITMYS3D) from GFD	
Mexico	Datastream (1989-2016)	Datastream (1989-2016)		
Netherlands	Individual bank stocks from various sources (1890-1934). "Netherlands ANP-CBS Banks and Insurance" (NLDBKINM) index from GFD (1928-1971), Datastream (1973-2016)	Individual nonfinancial stocks from various sources (1890-1934). "Netherlands ANP-CBS Consumer Goods" (NLDCONSM) from GFD (1931-1973), Datastream (1973-2016)		
New Zealand	Datastream (2010-2016)	Datastream (1994-2016)	New Zealand 6-month Interbank Rate (IBNZL6D) from GFD (1990-2013) and NZ INTERBANK RATE - 3 MONTH (NZINTER3) from Datastream (2013-2016), relative to New Zealand 3-month Treasury Bill Yield (ITNZL3D) from GFD	
Norway	“Oslo SE Finance (Banks and Insurance) TR Index” (_FINXD) from GFD (1915-1990), Datastream (1990-2016)	“Oslo SE Industrials TR Index” (_NOSID) Total Return price index from GFD (1914-1980), Datastream (1980-2016)	Norway 3-month OIBOR (IBNOR3D) from GFD (1978-2016), relative to Norway 3-month Treasury Bill Yield (ITNOR3D) from GFD	Norway 10-year Industrial Bond Yield (INNOR10D) from GFD (1921-2003), relative to Norway Government Bonds (IGNOR10D) from GFD
Peru	"Lima SE Banks" (_LMBFIND) index from GFD (1927-1993), Datastream (1994-2016)	“Lima SE Industrials” (_LMINDD) price index from GFD (1938-1991), Datastream (1991-2016)		

Table B3: Data Sources: Monthly Variables (cont.)

	Monthly bank stock returns	Monthly nonfin stock returns	Monthly bank credit spreads	Monthly corp credit spreads
Philippines	"Philippines Banks" (PHBANKM) from GFD (1952-1981), "Philippines Finance" (PHFINM) from GFD (1981-1989), Datastream (1989-2016)	"Philippine SE Industrial Index" (_PSIND) price index from GFD (1953-1990), Datastream (1990-2016)	Philippines Interbank Overnight Rate (IMPHLD) from GFD (1982-2016), relative to Philippines 3-month Treasury Bill Yield (ITPHL3D) from GFD	
Portugal	Datastream (1990-2016)	Datastream (1990-2016)	Portugal Overnight Interbank Rate (IMPRTD, 1975-1983) and 3-month LISBOR (IBPRT3D, 1983-2001) from GFD, relative to Portugal 3-month Treasury Bill Yield (ITPRT3M, 1985-1988) and 6-month Treasury Bill Yield (ITPRT6D, 1989-2001) from GFD. EURIBOR (IBEUR3D) relative to German T-Bill (IBEUR3D minus ITDEU3D), from GFD (2002-2016)	
Russia	Russia AK&M Bank Index (RUAKMBD) from GFD (1993-1997), Datastream (1997-2016)	Russia AK&M Industrials Index (_AKMED) from GFD (1993-2013), Datastream (2013-2016)	Russia MIACR Overnight Interbank Rate (IMRUSD) from GFD (1992-2016), relative to Russia 3-month Treasury Bill Yield (ITRUS3D) from GFD	Russia Corporate Bonds Average Yield (INRUSXD) from GFD (2003-2016), relative to Russia 10-year Bond Yield (IGRUS10D) from GFD
Singapore	Datastream (1973-2016)	Datastream (1973-2016)	Singapore 3-month SIBOR (IBSGP3D) from GFD (1973-2016), relative to Singapore 3-month Treasury Yield (ITSGP3D) from GFD	
South Africa	"FTSE/JSE Africa Banks" (_JBANKD) index from GFD (1979-1985), Datastream (1986-2016)	"Johannesburg SE Industrials" (_JIAID) price index from GFD (1912-1973), Datastream (1973-2016)	South Africa 3-month JABIR (IBZAF3D) from GFD (1997-2016), relative to South Africa 3-month Treasury Bill Yield (ITZAF3D) from GFD	South Africa Eskom Corporate Bond Yield (INZAFD) from GFD (1953-2016), relative to South Africa 10-Year Bond Yield (IGZAF10D) from GFD
Spain	Individual bank stocks from various sources (1917-1934, 1974-1980). "Madrid SE Banking and Finance" (_IBAN_MD) from GFD (1940-1987), Datastream (1987-2016)	Individual nonfinancial stocks from various sources (1917-1934, 1974-1980). "Madrid SE Metals" (_IMET_MD) price index from GFD (1941-1987), Datastream (1987-2016)	Spain 3-month MIBOR (IBESP3D) from GFD (1973-2001), relative to Spain 3-month T-Bill Yield (ITESP3D) from GFD. EURIBOR (IBEUR3D) relative to German T-Bill (IBEUR3D minus ITDEU3D), from GFD (2002-2016)	
Sweden	"Stockholm SX Banks Price" (_SX4010D) index from GFD (1906-1982), Datastream (1982-2016)	"Stockholm SX Industrials Price Index" (_SX20PID) price index from GFD (1907-1982), Datastream (1982-2016)	Sweden 3-month Interbank Rate (IBSWE3D) from GFD (1980-2016), relative to Sweden 3-month Treasury Bill Yield (ITSWE3D) from GFD	
Switzerland	Individual bank stocks from various sources (1867-1873, 1907-1934). Datastream (1973-2016)	Individual nonfinancial stocks from various sources (1867-1873, 1907-1934). Datastream (1973-2016)	Switzerland 3-month Interbank Rate (IBCHE3D) from GFD (1973-2016), relative to Switzerland 3-month Treasury-Bill Yield (ITCHE3D) from GFD	Switzerland Industrial Bond Average Yield (INCHEID) and Switzerland 7-10 year AA Corporate Bond Yields (_ZDAA7YD) from GFD (1997-2016), relative to Switzerland 10-year Government Bond (IGCHE10D) from GFD
Taiwan	Datastream (1988-2016)	Datastream (1988-2016)		Taiwan 5-year Corporate Bond Yield (INTWN5M) from GFD (1985-2016), relative to Taiwan 10-year Government Bond Yield (IGTWN10D) from GFD
Thailand	Thailand SET Banks (_SETBD) index from GFD (1975-1986), Datastream (1987-2016)	Thailand SET Commerce Index (_SETCD) from GFD (1976-1993), Datastream (1993-2016)		

Table B3: Data Sources: Monthly Variables (cont.)

	Monthly bank stock returns	Monthly nonfin stock returns	Monthly bank credit spreads	Monthly corp credit spreads
Turkey	Datastream (1990-2016)	Datastream (1990-2016)	Turkey Overnight Interbank Rate (IMTURD) from GFD (1986-2016), relative to Turkey 1-month Time Deposits (ICTURTM, 1973-2008) and Turkey 1-year Government Bond Yield (IGTUR1D, 2008-2016) from GFD	
United Kingdom	same as yearly	same as yearly	United Kingdom Overnight Interest Rate (IMGBRD) from GFD (1937-1965), United Kingdom 3-month Interbank Rate (IBGBR3D) from GFD (1966-2016); all relative to Bank of England Rate (IDGBRD) from GFD (1870-1899) and 3-month Treasury Bill Yield ITGBR3D (1900-2016)	Great Britain Corporate Bond Yield (INGBRW) from GFD (1937-2016), relative to UK Long-term Government Yield (IGGBR10D) from GFD
United States	same as yearly	same as yearly	United States 3-month Interbank Rate (IBUSA3D) from GFD (1963-2016), relative to USA 3-month Tbill Yield (ITUSA3D)	Moody's AAA Corporate Yield (SPAAA15W) from GFD (1900-2016), relative to USA Long-term Government Yield (IGUSA10D)
Venezuela	"Caracas SE Financial Index" (_IBCFD) index from GFD (1946-1993), Datastream (1994-2016)	“Caracas SE Industrials Index” (_IBCID) price index from GFD (1948-1990), Datastream (1990-2016)	Venezuela Interbank Overnight Rate (IMVEND) from GFD (1998-2016), relative to Venezuela 3-month Treasury Bill Yields (ITVEN3D) from GFD	

Table B4: Data Sources: Macroeconomic Variables

	Bank Credit	Nominal GDP	Inflation	Unemploym.	Other macro variables (real consumption, investment to GDP, broad money supply, govt debt to GDP, mortgage loans, house prices)
Notes:	**IMF*** means newly transcribed data (not available online) from IMF's International Financial Statistics (print versions), 1937-1988. **GFD** refers to Global Financial Data. **League of Nations** refers to their Memorandum on Commercial Banks (eds. 1929, 1933, 1934, 1936, and 1941) covering the period 1918-1937. **BIS** means the BIS Long Credit Series. **JST** means the Jorda, Schularick, Taylor database. Data from the **World Bank** and **IMF** accessed online on their websites. **Maddison** refers to the Maddison Project Database 2018, with occasional data from Barro and Ursua (2010) and the World Bank, when Maddison data is missing; real GDP figures are converted to Nominal GDP using the inflation data from this data set.				
Argentina	Nakamura (1901-1935), IMF* (1936-1939), BIS (1940-2016)	Maddison (1884-1991), World Bank (1992-2016)	GFD (1870-2016)	GFD (1974-2016)	
Australia	JST (1870-2016)	JST (1870-2016)	JST (1870-2016)	GFD (1901-2016)	JST (1870-2016)
Austria	Rieder (1870-1878), League of Nations (1918-1937), BIS (1949-2016)	Maddison (1870-1937), GFD (1948-2016)	GFD (1870-2016)	GFD (1931-2016)	
Belgium	JST (1885-2016)	JST (1870-2016)	JST (1870-2016)	GFD (1921-2016)	JST (1870-2016)
Brazil	Triner (1906-1930), League of Nations (1931-1939), BIS (1993-2016)	Maddison (1870-1960), World Bank (1961-2016)	GFD (1870-2016)	GFD (1976-2016)	
Canada	JST (1870-2016)	JST (1870-2016)	JST (1870-2016)	GFD (1919-2016)	JST (1870-2016)
Chile	League of Nations (1920-1936), IMF* (1937-1984), BIS (1985-2016)	Maddison (1870-2016)	GFD (1870-2016)	GFD (1966-2016)	
Colombia	League of Nations (1924-1936), IMF* (1937-1959), World Bank (1960-2016)	Maddison (1924-1959), World Bank (1960-2016)	GFD (1870-2016)	GFD (1980-2016)	
Czech	League of Nations* (1919-1937), World Bank (1993-2016)	GFD (1919-1938), World Bank (1990-2016)	GFD (1921-2016)	GFD (1990-2016)	
Denmark	JST (1870-2016)	JST (1870-2016)	JST (1870-2016)	GFD (1910-2016)	JST (1870-2016)
Egypt	IMF* (1945-1959), World Bank (1965-2016)	Maddison (1887-1959), World Bank (1960-2016)	Implied from difference between real and nominal GDP		
Finland	JST (1870-2016)	JST (1870-2016)	JST (1870-2016)	GFD (1958-2016)	JST (1870-2016)
France	JST (1900-2016)	JST (1870-2016)	JST (1870-2016)	GFD (1895-2016)	JST (1870-2016)
Germany	JST (1883-2016)	JST (1870-2016)	JST (1870-2016)	GFD (1887-2016)	JST (1870-2016)
Greece	League of Nations (1918-1936), World Bank (1960-2016)	Maddison (1946-2016)	GFD (1924-2016)	GFD (1976-2016)	
Hong Kong	BIS (1978-2016)	World Bank (1960-2016)	GFD (1948-2016)	GFD (1980-2016)	
Hungary	League of Nations (1925-1936), World Bank (1991-2016)	GFD (1870-1913, 1921-1938), World Bank (1991-2016)	GFD (1870-2016)		
Iceland	IMF* (1951-1959), World Bank (1960-2016)	GFD (1901-1959), World Bank (1960-2016)	GFD (1902-2016)	GFD (1957-2016)	

Table B4: Data Sources: Macroeconomic Variables (cont.)

	Bank Credit	Nominal GDP	Inflation	Unemploym.	Other macro variables (real consumption, investment to GDP, broad money supply, govt debt to GDP, mortgage loans, house prices)
India	IMF* (1937-1950), BIS (1951-2016)	Maddison (1870-1959), World Bank (1960-2016)	GFD (1871-2016)	GFD (1994-2016)	
Indonesia	IMF* (1951-1987), World Bank (1988-2016)	GFD (1921-2016)	GFD (1926-2016)	GFD (1982-2016)	
Ireland	The Economist (1903-1922), League of Nations (1923-1936), IMF* (1937-1960), World Bank (1961-1994), BIS (1995-2016)	Maddison (1870-2016)	GFD (1870-2016)	GFD (1939-2016)	
Israel	IMF* (1945-1971), World Bank (1972-2016)	GFD (1950-1980), World Bank (1981-2016)	GFD (1923-2016)	GFD (1960-2016)	
Italy	JST (1870-2016)	JST (1870-2016)	JST (1870-2016)	GFD (1947-2016)	JST (1870-2016)
Japan	JST (1875-2016)	JST (1875-2016)	JST (1870-2016)	GFD (1930-2016)	JST (1870-2016)
Korea	IMF* (1953-1961), BIS (1962-2016)	Maddison (1953-2016)	GFD (1949-2016)	GFD (1960-2016)	
Luxembourg	IMF* (1950-1959), World Bank (1960-2016)	Maddison (1950-1959), World Bank (1960-2016)	GFD (1922-2016)	GFD (1983-2016)	
Malaysia	IMF* (1952-1959), World Bank (1960-1964), BIS (1965-2016)	Maddison (1955-2016)	GFD (1949-2016)	GFD (1982-2016)	
Mexico	League of Nations (1925-1936), IMF* (1937-1959), World Bank (1960-2016)	GFD (1895-1979), World Bank (1980-2016)	GFD (1887-2016)	GFD (1975-2016)	
Netherlands	JST (1900-2016)	JST (1870-2016)	JST (1870-2016)	GFD (1911-2016)	JST (1870-2016)
New Zealand	Statistics of the Dominion of New Zealand, 1918, vol. III (1870-1918), League of Nations (1918-1939), IMF* (1940-1959), BIS (1960-2016)	Maddison (1870-2016)	GFD (1915-2016)	GFD (1971-2016)	
Norway	JST (1870-2016)	JST (1870-2016)	JST (1870-2016)	GFD (1904-2016)	JST (1870-2016)
Peru	League of Nations (1925-1936), IMF* (1937-1959), World Bank (1960-2016)	GFD (1926-1959), World Bank (1960-2016)	GFD (1900-2016)	GFD (1969-2016)	
Philippines	IMF* (1948-1988), World Bank (1989-2016)	GFD (1946-1959), World Bank (1960-2016)	GFD (1899-2016)	GFD (1980-2016)	
Portugal	JST (1870-2016)	JST (1870-2016)	JST (1870-2016)	GFD (1953-2016)	JST (1870-2016)
Russia	World Bank (1993-2016)	Maddison (1870-1917), World Bank (1993-2016)	GFD (1870-1917, 1990-2016)		
Singapore	BIS (1963-2016)	Maddison (1950-1959), World Bank (1960-2016)	GFD (1949-2016)	GFD (1968-2016)	
South Africa	League of Nations (1918-1936), IMF* (1937-1964), BIS (1965-2016)	Madisson (1911-2016)	GFD (1896-2016)	GFD (1991-2016)	
Spain	JST (1900-2016)	JST (1870-2016)	JST (1870-2016)	GFD (1964-2016)	JST (1870-2016)
Sweden	JST (1871-2016)	JST (1870-2016)	JST (1870-2016)	GFD (1919-2016)	JST (1870-2016)
Switzerland	JST (1870-2016)	JST (1870-2016)	JST (1870-2016)	GFD (1926-2016)	JST (1870-2016)

Table B4: Data Sources: Macroeconomic Variables (cont.)

	Bank Credit	Nominal GDP	Inflation	Unemploym.	Other macro variables (real consumption, investment to GDP, broad money supply, govt debt to GDP, mortgage loans, house prices)
Taiwan	IMF* (1950-1973)	GFD (1950-2016)	GFD (1896-2016)	GFD (1964-2016)	
Thailand	IMF* (1946-1956), BIS (1957-2016)	GFD (1946-2016)	GFD (1949-2016)	GFD (1980-2016)	
Turkey	League of Nations (1929-1936), IMF* (1937-1950), IMF (1951-1959), World Bank (1960-2016)	Maddison (1950-1959), World Bank (1960-2016)	GFD (1870-2016)	GFD (1985-2016)	
United Kingdom	JST (1880-2016)	JST (1870-2016)	JST (1870-2016)	GFD (1855-2016)	JST (1870-2016)
United States	JST (1880-2016)	JST (1870-2016)	JST (1870-2016)	GFD (1890-2016)	JST (1870-2016)
Venezuela	IMF* (1937-1987), World Bank (1988-2016)	GFD (1901-2016)	GFD (1901-2016)		

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